

**DRAFT**  
Organising for Large-Scale System Change  
The ENACT Case in Jamaica

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## **Acronyms**

CASE	College for Agriculture, Science and Education
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CDE	Capacity Development for the Environment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ENACT	Environmental Action Programme
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOJ	Government of Jamaica
NEEC	National Environmental Education Institute
NEPA	National Environmental Planning Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRCA	National Resource Conservation Agency
MIND	Management Institute for Local Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PMU	Programme Implementation Unit
UWI	University of the West Indies

## Executive Summary

This paper is one in a series of case studies which form part of a research programme carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) for the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The subject of that research is the way organizations and multi-organizational systems attempt to improve their capabilities and performance. This case study looks at the experience of the Environmental Action (ENACT) Programme, a collaboration between the National Conservation Resources Agency (NCRA) of the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It is based on research carried out at the ENACT headquarters in Kingston, Jamaica in February 2003.

ENACT's mandate was to work with Jamaican public, private and non-profit organisations to improve their capabilities to identify and solve national environmental problems. The design of the ENACT programme began in 1990 but activities in the field only got under way with the assignment of a Canadian advisor in 1994. However, it took until 1999, to put in place all the pieces to make the ENACT unit into a high-performing support unit.

There were four key aspects of the approach selected by the two Governments to guide ENACT's work:

- a process approach based on responsive entrepreneurship
- working across a wide spectrum of capacity development initiatives
- working with a wide variety of stakeholders and partners
- working at a variety of levels

The first aspect requires some explanation. ENACT staff did not push involvement and compliance in their programme. They did not try to mainstream ideas by a top down approach. They were also not interested in getting customers to buy in through a social marketing approach. Instead, they were looking to add value to the programs of others. They proactively sought out pockets of energy, interest and commitment and tried to respond to the needs of the groups involved.

The donor played a critical facilitating role in this case. CIDA succeeded in maintaining continuity on the major issues facing the programme. For the most part, the Agency took a strict hands-off approach, allowing the ENACT team to successfully organise itself internally and externally to meet its overall objective and stakeholder demands. The activities of the Canadian advisor evolved from originally providing considerable leadership into being a heat shield to buffer ENACT from external intrusions, to motivate and support operations, to keep the unit's financial and administrative systems efficient, and to liaise with Canadian stakeholders. With the exception of a brief period, CIDA staff put in place management and oversight mechanisms appropriate for such a programme.

The ENACT programme generated its effectiveness over time by achieving 'fit' both internally and with the conditions and demands of the surrounding environment. The ability of a programme to position itself and then manage its work strategically for productive purposes seems crucial for improving capabilities and performance. Part of this process of 'fit' has to do with getting a number of activities, functions, processes, people and so forth to interact together as a system. At a deeper level, it also has to do with matching initiatives to the level of organizational sophistication of the sector or

country at a particular time. Making that happen in the ENACT case took the better part of seven years.

The ENACT experience indicates that many of the DAC ideas, outlined in the DAC Comprehensive Guidelines for Capacity Development in the Environment issued in 1993, remain relevant at an abstract level but it also points to some gaps. First, the Guidelines were issued in the years before results-based approaches gained favour in the international funding community. It is by no means clear that the emphasis on long-term process over short-term products would still be accepted. And second, the Guidelines are, in effect, values rather than operational principles. They are more focused on the 'what' than the 'how'. As such, they need supplementing with some insights from implementation experience.

## A. INTRODUCTION

1. This case study forms part of a research programme carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) for the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. The subject of that research is the way organizations and multi-organizational systems around the world go about improving their capabilities and performance. This case study looks at the experience of the Environmental Action (ENACT) Programme, a collaboration between the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Peter Morgan, a Programme Associate of ECDPM, carried out the research at the ENACT headquarters in Kingston, Jamaica during the period 24 to 28 February 2003. He would like to thank Franklin MacDonald, the Chief Executive Officer of the National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA) of the Government of Jamaica (GOJ), Jean-Joseph Bellamy, the Programme Manager of the ENACT team and his colleagues in Kingston for their patience and support.

2. Readers need to be aware at the outset of some of the complexities which arise out of the experience of the ENACT programme. This overall case contains within it a number of themes which are instructive in their own right. These can be summarized as follows:

- The analysis looks briefly at the wider Jamaican context and its influence on the ENACT programme. Despite its comparatively small size, Jamaica has had a dramatic history leading to a country of contrasts and paradoxes. Part of the challenge facing the ENACT programme was to create the right 'fit' between this context and its strategies for enhancing capabilities and performance.
- The case analyzes the growth and development of the ENACT programme unit located in NEPA. Specifically, the case addresses the following question: how did the four main participating groups - the NEPA, CIDA, the Canadian executing agency and the ENACT field team - collaborate over time to make this unit effective? The focus of this case is thus limited to what was perceived to be its comparative advantage, namely process issues in support of large scale system change.
- The case looks at the strategies for capacity development used by the ENACT programme over the period 1996-2004 to improve the capabilities and performance of its Jamaican stakeholders and partners. The key issue here is the following: what strategies did the ENACT programme use and why were these choices made?

3. The value of this case lies in understanding the challenge facing both the two Governments and the ENACT unit and how that challenge was largely met. In 1991, the idea of embedding ideas and practices to do with environment and sustainable development in the public, private and civil society sectors in Jamaica was not a common one. Any effort to do so would involve large-scale change at a variety of levels and sectors. Twelve years later, substantial progress had been made. This case outlines the strategies employed and the outcomes achieved over the period 1994-2003.

4. The framework used in the case is divided up into seven sections including the external context, ENACT stakeholders, the structuring and positioning of the ENACT unit, ENACT's strategies for capacity development, the emerging capabilities, the effectiveness of the external intervention and finally, the emerging levels of performance. Readers should also note two other points about this case. It looks mainly at strategic directions that can be compared with those of other cases undertaken under the ECDPM research programme. It does not include much detailed analysis of the actual ENACT programme<sup>1</sup>. Second, this case study is not a management review or an overall organizational assessment of ENACT. It looks back not forward. Its purpose is explanatory. It makes no recommendations or proposals for future action.

5. A final word about definitions. The term 'capacity' is used in this case to refer to the ability of the organization or system *as a whole* to perform<sup>2</sup>. As such, it is not equated with any subsidiary element such as particular 'capability'. That term refers to an ability of the organization or system to do something in particular such as facilitation or to learning or managing projects. Most of this case is about 'capability' as opposed to 'capacity' development. Finally, the term 'performance' is used in this case study to mean accomplishment or execution or delivery. It is not about potential or capability.

## B. BACKGROUND

6. Readers need an overview of the main outlines of the ENACT story before getting to the main part of the analysis. The design of the ENACT programme began in 1990 at the CIDA head office led by a group of officers interested in applying some of the emerging principles of capacity building for sustainable development<sup>3</sup>. Discussions started in 1991 with interested Jamaican officials including the then Chief Executive Officer of the National Resources Conservation Agency (NRCA) and continued into 1994<sup>4</sup>. Official CIDA approval for \$21.0 million (Canadian) came in August 1993<sup>5</sup>. A Canadian co-operant or technical assistance adviser arrived in August 1994 for two years with a mandate to assist the NRCA in planning future activities. During this period, the main outlines of the ENACT programme were put in place including the five programme areas (see para 7 below). Jamaican officials in NRCA and other agencies also made sustained efforts during the years 1991 - 1996 to consult widely with a variety of organizations and groups in Jamaica interested in the environment and sustainable development. CIDA signed a contract with a Canadian consulting firm in May 1996 to help

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<sup>1</sup> For those interested in these programme details, they can contact the ENACT programme directly or check its website at [www.enact.org.jm](http://www.enact.org.jm)

<sup>2</sup> Alan Kaplan refers to capacity as "the ability of an organization to function as a resilient, strategic and autonomous entity" (*Capacity Development*, p. 32)

<sup>3</sup> The Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris subsequently issued a set of principles for Capacity Development for the Environment in 1993.

<sup>4</sup> The Chief Executive Officer of the NRCA, Franklin MacDonald, later became the CEO of the National Environmental Planning Agency, a position he retains to this day.

<sup>5</sup> CIDA later reduced this figure to \$15.0 million Canadian in 1995.

with the implementation of the ENACT programme and two full-time Canadian staff arrived in October 1996. The two Governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding in April, 1997. The current ENACT Programme Manager began in October 1998. The programme is due to end in mid-2004.

7. This case study does not go into great detail concerning the five sub-programme areas that make up the overall ENACT programme. These were divided, in turn, into about thirty (30) components. These five programmes were following:

- Greening of Government
- Capacity Development for NEPA
- Local Sustainable Development Planning
- Environmental Education for Sustainable Development
- Support to the Private Sector

8. ENACT has functioned as a concentric organization - a tight full-time core at the centre acting as a node or coordinating unit surrounded by outer rings of occasional partners, consultants and advisers. The core includes 12 staff positions: one programme manager, seven professional staff, one office manager and three administrative staff.

### C. THE WIDER JAMAICAN ENVIRONMENT

9. This case needs to give some initial attention to the wider Jamaican context for two reasons: first, the ENACT programme was intended to have broad systemic impact in terms of enhancing Jamaican capabilities and performance for sustainable development. Some rough understanding is therefore needed of the dynamics of that wider context that ENACT aimed to change. Second, it is easy for case studies to see programmes as self-contained and independent of their context whereas they remain open systems responding to the environment that surrounds them.

10. Some of the basic data about Jamaica can be set out quickly. As the third largest island in the Caribbean, Jamaica is 80% highlands. Its current population is about 2.8 million people of whom 57% are under 30 years of age and 55% live in urban areas. The per capita income is about \$3100 (US) giving it a middle-income ranking of 78 out of 162 in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index.

11. The economic situation has declined sharply over recent years. Jamaica's level of debt and deficit is now twice the guidelines set out by the International Monetary Fund. At the time of the writing of this case study, the GOJ was facing a major budget crisis which could affect ENACT. For some years, there has been high pervasive unemployment, reinforcing startling disparities in wealth. Jamaica has continued, in common with countries such as El Salvador and Pakistan, to export many of its most talented people.

12. Some readers will be surprised by the richness of the Jamaican biodiversity. It ranks as the 5th most diverse country in the world in terms of endemic species. 24% of its 3300 plants are found only in Jamaica. It is the home of many rare birds and mammals. Forests cover 24% of its land mass. Beaches make up 2.5% of the coastal line. Not surprisingly, it suffers from a series of familiar problems contributing to environmental decline including:

- deforestation
- oil spills
- poor to non-existent treatment of sewage and solid waste
- declining water quality
- damage to coral reefs
- air pollution in Kingston
- land degradation
- pollution of coastal waters
- damage to wetlands

13. Jamaica is closely connected to the globalizing world given its membership in most international organizations and its large diaspora. Its public sector organizations appear familiar to a casual observer. Many of these are trying to become more effective with projected reforms often suggesting a country with an advanced range of technical skills such as introducing GIS technology and equipment into planning and map registry departments of local authorities. NEPA in the Ministry of Land and the Environment is currently implementing an Integrated National Applications Processing System<sup>6</sup> focusing on computerization. Jamaica has also been implementing a public sector modernization programme since 1998 complete with citizen charters, executive agencies, decentralization, modernized planning frameworks and talk about 'joined-up' government. The reform of local government began in the 1990s and is now moving beyond a narrow concentration on the delivery of a few municipal services to a broader approach to the process of local governance.

14. Like many other countries, Jamaica suffers from major cleavages between the bureaucracy and the politicians. Within public sector organizations, there are obvious pools of expertise and commitment which can be harnessed to energize new policies and innovations. ENACT itself benefited from the support of these kinds of groups. The political level, on the other hand, has traditionally been much more involved with the struggle for position and control within the country. Politicians face a quite different set of incentives and are not likely to be interested in broad, long-term programs that generate only disbursed benefits.

15. A complex range of informal institutions in Jamaica are as, if not more important, in terms of shaping progress on sustainable development<sup>7</sup>. Jamaica has had a turbulent history marked by the growth of dramatic cleavages amongst groups and classes. The institution of slavery, battles over the control of land, the governance role in the churches, the influence of a mercantile elite and the rise of a small number of families controlling most of the national wealth played a role in the shaping of Jamaican society. Most of the so-called modern institutions - the legislature, the political parties, much of the state apparatus, the schools, police and judiciary - were developed to serve the needs of influential groups. Few managed to acquire much in the way of legitimacy or a capacity to deliver services to the broad mass of the public. New informal institutions, both predatory and well-intentioned, have set up various groups to compete for control and resources within the country and outside. Some of these have superseded the existing formal institutions such as the police or local governments in various parts of the country. Such struggles for legitimacy, control and resources can

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<sup>6</sup> Described in a report by Richard Lumsden, *Capacity Study of NEPA*, p. 52.

<sup>7</sup> One rough estimate is that 80-90% of national activities take place outside the official formal planning system. About half the economy takes place in the informal sector.

be seen in many countries with dysfunctional governance including Brazil, Pakistan, Kenya and Russia.

16. These governance issues have implications for ENACT. It is relatively easy for the many supporters of ENACT to get carried away with the inherent virtue of strategies to do with participation, policy integration, systems management, holistic approaches and all the other mechanisms currently in fashion in the international development community. By themselves, these ideas remain useful. But they will only have a symbolic impact if the governance issues lying at the heart of Jamaican society remain unresolved. Many citizens need to be reconnected back into a legitimate system of governance. The environmental behaviour of such citizens - agriculturalists, urban dwellers, fishers - will have to be influenced through incentives and other policy measures. Without that happening, ENACT's effectiveness within the modern formal sector will make little difference. The drive for survival will continue to push ordinary citizens towards actions that undermine sustainable development regardless of the inherent value of sustainable development<sup>8</sup>. This is not an argument for the inherent futility of the ENACT work. Indeed the reverse. The modern formal sector must try to become more relevant by taking a broader view in assessing the constraints and prospects inhibiting sustainable development.

17. Most observers see the lack of social capital in Jamaican society as a key 'missing link'. One analyst has pointed out the contrast between Jamaica and Barbados in terms of lack of trust among groups and individuals, the constraints to collaboration and the high level of political violence and factionalism<sup>9</sup>. It is commonly observed in Jamaica that there is a paradox between the obvious wealth of individual talent and the inability to convert this richness into collective performance. This accounts in part for the dichotomy between the high intellectual content to discussions on sustainable development and the lack of implementation and enforcement. The challenge is to convert the obvious individual talent and energy in the Jamaican context into collective action.

#### D. THE BASELINE CONDITION IN THE EARLY 1990s

18. To assess the overall contribution of the ENACT programme, we need some sort of rough baseline or starting point. This section gives a brief overview of the capabilities and performance with respect to environmental and sustainable development in the early 1990s.

- The paradoxes of Jamaican life could be seen in the public sector. Most large public bureaucracies were structured along the traditional command and control pattern with a good deal of the usual hierarchical, authoritarian behaviour. Few were much concerned with outcomes, capabilities or performance. Intersectoral coordination was minimal. Organizational stovepipes predominated. Not surprisingly, government structures worked more on the basis of informal relationships and personalization. At the same time, government organizations in Jamaica were more stable than those in many poorer countries because of adequate salaries and benefits.
- Many public sector organizations contain within them reserves of innovation and commitment that could be energized to address environmental issues<sup>10</sup>. The understanding of some officials within

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<sup>8</sup> For analysis of this issue, see John Montgomery, "Environmental Management as a Third World Problem" *Policy Sciences*, vol. 23, #2, 1990

<sup>9</sup> See Ross Brewster, June 1996, *Social Capital and Development: Reflections on Barbados and Jamaica*, CARICOM Perspective, More Jamaicans died in violence in 1998 than died in Kosovo, David Bell, Note B, July 16, 1999, p. 1

<sup>10</sup> The deteriorating environment had been an issue in the 1989 Jamaican election.

the public sector of the ideas underlying sustainable development was relatively advanced in the early 1990s. The Government of Jamaica had signed all the main global agreements and protocols that applied to sustainable development and was an early supporter of the Rio Conference and Agenda 21<sup>11</sup>. Jamaica had begun its own work on the Greening of Government before similar programmes had started in Canada.

- But this advanced state of interest did not translate into a capability for implementation. Jamaica still lacked a clear national vision for sustainable development. Coalitions at the political level for such reforms did not exist and would not come into being during the course of the ENACT programme. The organizational and institutional framework remained weak. And no initiatives in environment and sustainable development were likely to attract much in the way of financial resources within the Government. Efforts to enhance capabilities and support would have to be supported in the face of the usual constraints - lack of political and financial support.
- Non-state actors in Jamaica played modest roles in promoting environmental and sustainable development. The private sector and the trade unions were not heavily involved. An atmosphere of distrust characterized the relations between the Government and the civil society.

#### **Box 1 The evolution of organizational and institutional approaches to sustainable development**

- Let us look at a hypothesis on the evolution of organizational and institutional approaches to sustainable development. Although countries differ dramatically in their inclination to change their structures and processes in support of the environment and sustainability, most countries evolve through stages of capacity development as they try to deal with the issue. Each of these stages may be prolonged and last a decade or longer depending on circumstances.
- In the first stage, the organizational approach is mainly incremental. Public sector organizations experiment with modest reforms. They try to improve existing procedures and practices as in the various efforts at the greening of government. Environmental inventories are carried out and priorities debated. Awareness raising is carried out. Training programmes are introduced. New policies and strategies are designed although implementation may lag far behind. Few mandates are challenged or new structures created with the possible exception of ministries of the environment<sup>12</sup>. The focus of capacity building is mainly on improving the capabilities and performance of individual organizations.
- At some point, pressures for more fundamental reforms begin to build. International experience and pressure support less incremental approaches. Groups and individuals in the society and inside government accept the need for new institutions and organizations that can deal with a high level of complexity among systems - physical, organizational, social. More efforts are made to establish new kinds of intersectoral or non-sectoral solutions. Experiments are tried with new structures such as networks or integrating organizations.

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<sup>11</sup> These include the Convention on Wetlands (RAMSAR), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITIES), and the UN Convention of The Law of the Sea.

<sup>12</sup> See Randall Baker, "An Administrative trap revisited, Part 1" *Public Administration and Development*, 1989 p. 41

19. In assessing the ENACT experience, we need to keep the hypothesis outlined in Box 1 in mind.. It is likely that countries need to evolve through these stages slowly as learning accumulates and political support builds. Strategies for enhancing capabilities and performance have to be matched to fit the absorptive capacity of the country at various points in time. This case will argue that much of ENACT's effectiveness came from its ability to make this 'fit' with Jamaican needs that were typical of the early stage of the implementation of sustainable development.

#### E. THE ENACT STAKEHOLDERS

20. The ENACT programme in Jamaica operated within a complex web of stakeholders which could be divided into four main groups.

- The key group was made up of the set of organizations including the Government of Jamaica (NEPA), the Government of Canada (CIDA headquarters and the High Commission in Kingston) and the Canadian office of the executing agency<sup>13</sup>. As we shall see later in this case, the pattern of relationships amongst these supervising organizations changed over the life of the programme.
- The second group was the wide range of participating organizations in Jamaica with which ENACT entered into some kind of working relationship. The closest relationships in this group were with selected organizations in the public sector such as the Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture. Strong common interests, geographic proximity and bureaucratic capabilities characterized many of these relationships and they evolved into strategic alliances.
- It was more challenging, but no less productive, to establish ties and build relationships with actors in the private and civil societies. Actors in academia, municipal governments and local communities were harder to contact but many did collaborate with ENACT in planning and implementation of activities. The total number of participating organizations in both these groups was probably in the order of 40 to 50.
- A group of non-participating organizations, groups and individuals mainly within the public sector whose occasional support could be useful to the ENACT unit. These included staff in the Cabinet Office, outside consultants and others. ENACT made efforts to build and maintain this web of relationships that could be used to support its work.
- A final group of stakeholders grew out of the many ENACT courses and educational programs. As we shall see, a key part of ENACT's strategy was to create a critical mass of sustainable development supporters throughout the country who would continue to push for change after the end of the ENACT programme. Estimates of the size of this group are also rough but it may include as many as 6000 individuals<sup>14</sup>.

21. The implications of this stakeholder pattern were the following.

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<sup>13</sup> NEPA came into existence in April 2001 as one of the new executive agencies under the Public Sector Modernization Program. It reported to the Ministry of Land and the Environment. The mission of NEPA is "to promote sustainable development by ensuring protection of the environment and orderly development in Jamaica through highly motivated staff performing at the highest standard according to our Citizen's Charter".

<sup>14</sup> Estimate by Anne Fouillard, *ENACT Operational Review*, 2001 p. 72

- ENACT's relationships with its stakeholders were not characterized by much conflict or controversy or collusion. Most operated in different functional and geographic areas of Jamaica and had little interaction.
- Most of these relationships were personal and informal. ENACT staff had to be able to relate to a wide variety of people and groups at all different levels.

## F. THE STRUCTURING AND POSITIONING OF THE ENACT TEAM

22. The key intervention of the ENACT programme was the establishment of an organizational unit within the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) to help enhance Jamaican capabilities for environmental and sustainable development. The underlying assumption was that such a unit could be effective in addressing one of the most challenging tasks facing any government- that of achieving organizational innovation and change. This section looks at the organizational evolution of the ENACT unit over the period 1996-2003 as it addressed that challenge.

23. Most efforts at enhancing capabilities and performance involve some sort of process management. Most fail to achieve their objectives especially within the public sector<sup>15</sup>. But a few, including the one crafted by the ENACT programme, have generated some real value. This section tries to explain the structuring and positioning of the ENACT unit that led, in part, to this effectiveness. In the following section, the analysis turns to the actual processes of change and capacity development that the ENACT unit used both inside and outside the public sector.

24. Discussions on the ENACT programme began between the two Governments in 1991. The Executive Director of the National Resources Conservation Agency (NRCA) represented the Government of Jamaica<sup>16</sup>. CIDA acted for the Government of Canada. Over the course of the next three years, most of the planning activities took place in Jamaica led by a group of GOJ officials and national consultants. This first planning phase 1991-1994 was continued during the period 1994-1996 using the services of a Canadian technical assistance adviser working with the NRCA. Jamaican officials did not want commercial consultants from Canada participating in this second planning phase. Long-term public servants with experience in the Government of Canada were thought to be a better source of technical advice for the particular needs of the ENACT programme.

25. These two interconnected planning phases in the period 1991-1996 set the following strategic directions for the ENACT programme:

- Jamaican officials focused the attention of the ENACT programme on longer-term issues such as capacity building given its ten year horizon from 1994-2004<sup>17</sup>. Many of the new ideas coming out of the Rio Summit and the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD made sense to

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<sup>15</sup> For a case study of a capacity building unit similar to that of ENACT that failed dramatically, see UNFPA case study of integrated family planning in Egypt, 2002.

<sup>16</sup> The National Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA) became an independent agency in 1991. The Environmental Foundation of Jamaica was also founded in 1991 under a Debt for Nature Swap.

<sup>17</sup> Franklin MacDonald, the current CEO of NEPA and then Head of the NRCA stated that "Government of Jamaica was not in a hurry" in the early 1990s. It wanted to think through the longer-term implications of managing sustainable development before making major decisions.

Jamaican officials, especially those with international experience. Other donors such as USAID were directed towards activities more suitable for short-term interventions injected through a conventional project format. GOJ staff, in effect, tried to match ENACT's comparative advantage to the kinds of issues that governments do not normally address - those that are important but not urgent. This wide scope of activity was reflected in the programme components selected during the period 1994-1996 including the Greening of Government, assistance to NEPA, environmental education, some attention to the private sector and a focus on local government.

- The ENACT programme acquired a different identity and legitimacy within the GOJ during these two periods, a positioning strategy that continued in 2003 to energize the program. ENACT was one of the first donor-supported interventions in Jamaica that put capacity building as its core objective. Its aim was to work with and through Jamaican organizations to accomplish its aims<sup>18</sup>. Most aid programmes up to that point had the image in Jamaica of being supply-driven resource providers. Jamaican officials would agree to support the donor agenda in exchange for getting access to tangible goods - vehicles, equipment, training, funds and technical assistance. The focus was on the importation of resources not available in Jamaica. The ENACT programme tried to alter that image by emphasizing the potential value of combining outside and Jamaican ideas about sustainable development and then embedding them in Jamaican organizations, institutions and processes. The programme was intended to support a process rather than supply a product. Jamaican officials wanted the ENACT process to crystallize slowly and focus on bringing new ideas to the Jamaican scene. Planning was to be done on an iterative basis with the emphasis on response to Jamaican need and commitment.
- Officials designing such a unit as ENACT within the public sector usually face a critical choice about its bureaucratic location. Should, for example, the unit be attached to a central agency? Should it be part of a line ministry? Or should it be located outside the main structure of government altogether? Should it be located high up in the structure or is it better off in the middle? What should be its mandate? What about its actual physical location as opposed to its organizational? The ENACT location decision taken mainly by Jamaican officials was to make it part of NEPA including physically. In organizational terms, ENACT was given maximum flexibility and some bureaucratic buffering and protection. From the outset, the NEPA leadership ensured that the ENACT unit would have the flexibility to work freely, informally and laterally across organizational boundaries within all sectors in Jamaica almost as a consulting firm offering free services. It also had good access vertically to senior officers in ministries and in the Cabinet office.
- The complex organizational positioning of the ENACT unit needs a brief elaboration given its critical impact on ENACT's work. ENACT was supervised by the CEO of NRCA/NEPA, an organization whose own capacity development was the focus of one of ENACT's five programmes. Yet at the same time, ENACT's resources and attention could not be captured by the NRCA and its successor NEPA and used for their own purposes if ENACT's crucial range and flexibility was to be preserved. Part of the solution was to structure the ENACT unit itself as a

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<sup>18</sup> The purpose of ENACT as agreed by the two Governments was to "improve the capability of the key players at the government policy, private sector, community and general public levels to identify and solve Jamaican environmental problems and to enhance these improvements by linking and coordinating capacity development activities across the levels and sectors targeted".

hybrid programme implementation unit (PMU)<sup>19</sup>. On the one hand, it was set up a temporary unit dedicated solely to coordinating the implementation of the ENACT programme. It was, however, staffed by both Canadian TA co-operants and Government of Jamaica staff paid directly by NEPA. Indeed, NEPA paid a good deal of ENACT's local expenses over the years through the Capital B budget.

- More than many similar programmes, ENACT was intended to be values-driven. The workplans and patterns of stakeholder engagement could change over time. But its identity and style of working would flow directly from these values which both Governments and ENACT staff would have to support. In practice, the adherence to these values was a stabilizing influence on the ENACT unit over its organizational life. The nature of the values themselves came largely from the sustainable development movement and was derived from the DAC Guidelines issued in 1993 (see below).

**Box 2 Comprehensive Guidelines for Capacity Development for the Environment, DAC-OECD 1993)**

- CDE is based on promoting sound environmental considerations and criteria in the development process
- CDE is aimed at strengthening institutional pluralism in civil society
- CDE integrates environment and development concerns
- CDE is a multifaceted, long-term process
- CDE is process rather than product oriented
- CDE is a systemic approach
- CDE process belongs to and is driven by the community in which it is based
- CDE must take gender issues fully into account in all respects and levels of development
- CDE seeks to develop participatory approaches to include all disadvantaged groups in society
- CDE involves a variety of management techniques, analytical tools, incentives and organizational structures in order to achieve a given policy objective.

- The range of ENACT interventions were to extend across a wide range of actors including the central and local governments, communities, the private sector and in the beginning, the Jamaican trade unions. Environmental management was to be the entry point into an involvement with the larger issue of sustainable development.

26. The period 1991-1996 marked the 'direction finding' or strategic design phase of the program. The signing of the CIDA contract by the Canadian consulting consortium in May 1996 marked the beginning of the operational phase of the programme. Over the next six years, both governments and

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<sup>19</sup> Programme implementation units (also called project management units) have been out of fashion in some development cooperation circles for most of the last decade. They are usually accused of being artificial units set up by international funding agencies to insulate their projects from dysfunctional conditions in a particular country. As such, they are not seen as supportive of capacity development or institutional sustainability. But they remain a key mechanism for many programs. See, for example, Rouzanna Tarvedian, 1996, *Adjustment Operations in Transition Economies: The Role of Project Implementation Units*. See also Jonathan Pincus, "State Simplification and Institution-Building in a World-Bank Financed Development Project" Chapter 4 in J.R. Pincus and J.A. Winters, *Reinventing The World Bank*, 2002. In this article the bank is criticized for not setting up a programme support unit to protect a development activity from recalcitrant government bureaucrats.

the ENACT field unit collaborated to craft an effective management strategy that would both build on the strategic decisions taken up to 1996 and which would also 'fit' the emerging needs of the programme and the Jamaican context. In retrospect, we can see that the management strategy evolved as follows:

- ENACT's effectiveness in capacity development clearly depended on the ENACT unit in Kingston having a high level of operational autonomy to react quickly to opportunities in Jamaica. The organizational structure of the programme and the unit changed over the period 1996-1999. The management of the ENACT unit - its work program, its linkage and partnership strategies, its investment decisions, its personnel decisions and so forth - could not be tightly controlled by the two governments or by the headquarters of the consortium. Authority was thus progressively delegated to the field unit especially after the appointment of a new programme head in June 1998.
- The highly interactive nature of ENACT's work - networking, facilitating, mediating, persuading, mobilizing, demonstrating and image building - led inexorably to the need for front line staff in the unit with local experience and networks. This, in turn, led to the decision to increase the number of Jamaican full-time staff and reduce the number of short-term Canadian consultants. In effect, the ENACT unit was slowly Jamaicanized. The increasing authority being devolved from CIDA and the Canadian consortium was used to empower these staff. Efforts were also made to reduce disparities between the staff of the two countries.
- ENACT's effectiveness depended critically on its ability to motivate and retain its own staff. This issue of staff motivation had particular relevance for units such as ENACT that worked in sustainable development given the values, commitment and expectations that self-selecting staff usually brought to this kind of work. For both ENACT staff and for many of those people with whom they worked in Jamaica, working on issues to do with environment and sustainable development provided them with an opportunity to make a contribution to the renewal of Jamaican governance and society. Every unit of this kind needs some kind of organizational 'glue' or cohesion to keep it together. In the ENACT case, the glue came from a common allegiance to a set of values and principles that had been part of the programme from the outset.
- Part of ENACT's emerging effectiveness after 1998 came from its ability to build the skills of its staff and then deploy them in the most effective way. Staff had to have a general command of the substantive issues facing their partners in order to communicate effectively. But too much attention on technical issues would detract from their efforts at process and facilitation. What mattered was the balance and combination. When situations required the application of detailed technical knowledge, ENACT staff could bring in consultants and other technical support<sup>20</sup>.
- The management techniques used by the ENACT unit were adapted to meet the particular needs of working in a fast-changing, interactive way. The detailed management plan devised in 1997 was scrapped and replaced by something much simpler and more flexible<sup>21</sup>. Programme planning became more interactive. The initial approach to performance monitoring - highly predictive, detailed, and mechanistic - was abandoned as unworkable<sup>22</sup>. The somewhat elaborate governance

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<sup>20</sup> ENACT issued between 70 to 100 contracts a year, 90% of which were sourced in Jamaica.

<sup>21</sup> The initial management plan was about 300 pages in length and was accompanied by a 22 page logical framework analysis.

<sup>22</sup> The monitor suggested that all ENACT staff should submit monthly reports detailing achieved and anticipated targets.

structure involving both a steering and a management committee was simplified and authority again shifted down to the front-line staff.

- The leadership style of the unit changed. The head of the unit during 1996-1998 had been a technical environmental specialist with little experience in managing an entrepreneurial unit. The new ENACT programme head appointed in October 1998 was more management-oriented. But more complex leadership issues needed to be addressed in addition to basic management. A heroic style of leadership by a Canadian was felt to be inappropriate. What the programme head needed to supply were the skills to manage the ENACT unit as an organizational system - being a heat shield by buffering ENACT staff from external intrusions, motivating and supporting operations, keeping the unit's financial and administrative systems efficient and liaising with Canadian stakeholders especially CIDA and the implementing consortium. One hypothesis coming out of the ENACT experience is the greater likelihood of finding and exercising this kind of unit leadership through a consulting contract as opposed to an individual TA arrangement.

27. Two insights come out of the experience of structuring and positioning the ENACT unit.

- This case is an illustration of the slowly-developing nature of many process approaches that focus on capacity development. They are, in practice, complex dynamic systems that require a combination of values, components and practices to 'fit' together. In the ENACT case, this case argues that it took from mid 1991 until early 1999 to put in place all the pieces to make the ENACT unit into a high-performing support unit. Its positioning and mandate had to be right. Its programmes had to be relevant. Its legitimacy as a process programme had to be earned. It took time for the unit to learn how to be effective. The right kinds of leadership and staffing had to be slowly put in place. If this insight is correct, it has implications for the assessment of the performance of these kinds of processes. When should they be conclusively assessed? Can individual aspects be assessed on their own? And so on.
- The ENACT unit was a customized response to a set of Jamaican conditions. And it depended critically on Jamaican resources and expertise to function. These included the strategic vision of the Jamaican officials most of which was sustained throughout the life of the programme. Jamaican energy and commitment at the middle levels of many organizations fuelled the process. And Jamaica could supply staff with sufficient talent to meet the process demands of such a unit. Many of these conditions do not apply in other countries. The ENACT 'formula' is thus not likely to replicate itself easily.

## G. ENACT'S STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE

28. The previous section described the evolving structure and positioning of the ENACT team over the period 1994-2003 as it organized itself to carry out its work within Jamaica. Simultaneously, the team also had to support the efforts of ENACT's stakeholders and partners both within Government and outside. A key issue to address in this case is thus the following: what capacity development approaches did the ENACT programme use and why?

29. Again, we need to step back and be clear about the key assumptions underlying the ENACT work. Both Governments were facing a choice about how to design and implement large-scale

organizational change. At the risk of over simplification, two options were available. The first involved a conventional, top-down restructuring along the following lines:

- The Governments and the ENACT unit would draw up and attempt to help implement an explicit road map for a sustainable development reform either at the societal or the public sector level.
- ENACT would prescribe and push for a detailed set of capabilities or performance levels that would be needed to implement a grand strategy for sustainable development in the Jamaican context.
- This strategy would be programmed and proceed according to preset goals and targets.
- The emphasis would be on the restructuring of formal organizations, the installation of new ‘hard’ systems and the creation of new institutions and organizations designed to support sustainable development.

30. This option was not selected. We can see both Governments agreeing on a second, more incremental and opportunistic approach. From the outset, the ENACT programme was not set up to begin its work by designing complex attempts and organizational and institutional change. The ENACT programme would instead experiment with different approaches to enhancing capabilities and performance at a variety of levels. It would seek out willing partners. At some point in the future, a broader strategy backed up by operational learning and some emerging political support would hopefully emerge. In the meantime, the unit would focus on building awareness in addition to enhancing capabilities and performance in selected locations. ENACT would work across a wide spectrum of activities, some of which would only have a tangential connection to organizational and institutional change.

31. Nor would the ENACT programme have a tight view of capacity development. It did not develop an explicit analytical framework or ‘model’ that it used to assess capabilities and performance levels. It did not push for the creation of new organizations. It did not, for example, try to push the government as a whole to set up enhanced government -wide capabilities such as information management systems. It made only limited efforts to help reorganize entire organizations<sup>23</sup>. The ENACT approach to enhancing capabilities and performance was, for the most part, far less prescriptive and intrusive<sup>24</sup>.

32. The grand strategic calculation of the ENACT programme was therefore the following: that it could follow an incremental approach across a wide spectrum of actors and levels and tactics - a breadth option - and still help Jamaica to generate a critical mass of capabilities and performance improvements that would make a difference. At the very least, its investments would produce a critical mass of people both inside and outside government who would generate the energy and the connections and the commitment to sustain the process of capacity development after the termination of the ENACT unit as an organizational unit.

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<sup>23</sup> See report by Richard Lumsden, *Capacity Assessment for the Planning and Development Division of the National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA)*, February 2003

<sup>24</sup> As in all organizational strategies, there is a downside risk to this ‘emergent’ approach. The lack of an explicit debate and the unwillingness to adopt a definable model at the outset can lead staff to lose touch with the discussion and resort to business as usual. In the ‘emergent’ approach, more, not less, effort has to be invested in continuous learning and the management of ideas and participant understandings.

33. In this section, we look at the four key aspects of the approach selected by the two Governments to guide ENACT's work. These were the following:

- Using responsive entrepreneurship
- Working across a wide spectrum of capacity development initiatives
- Working with a wide variety of stakeholders and partners
- Working at a variety of levels

#### *Using responsive entrepreneurship*

34. Facilitating units within large bureaucratic structures can adopt a variety of process approaches. They can, for example, rely on conventional *mainstreaming* as is frequently employed to promote gender. In this approach, the policy and programme is centrally determined and then applied uniformly, at least in theory. All operational staff is accountable for integrating activities relating to the policy into their work packages. Senior managers are expected to enforce mainstreaming. Checklists are frequently used to screen compliance. Staff is rewarded, or not, during their performance appraisals. The dynamic here is one of supply and enlightened enforcement. The onus is on the targeted staff to comply.

35. A less intrusive approach is based on the principles of *social marketing*. From this perspective, targeted staff is seen as clients or customers who are free to buy into or at least accept the programme or service on offer. The emphasis here is on persuasion, on building awareness and on inducing officials to try something that has wider social benefits. The relevance of the product or service in question and demand creation are key. The onus here is on the provider to make the case for the adoption of the programme that it supports. A key concept here is that of the 'customer' buying into a programme or prescription supplied from the outside.

36. The ENACT team followed a somewhat different approach. The top-down application of conventional mainstreaming was not an option in the Jamaican context. Even the lighter touch of social marketing *by itself* involved too much intrusive selling to groups that might well not be appropriate partners for the ENACT programme. In fact, the ENACT team did not support the idea of groups and individuals buying into its programme. Its intent was to enhance the capabilities of others to deliver programmes supportive of sustainable development. What was needed was something that was far more demand-driven and that fitted in better with the Jamaican conditions.

37. What emerged over time was an ENACT approach that combined a variety of elements into a coherent way of process management. Part of it bore some resemblance to a venture capital model in which initiatives came from the participants rather than the investor<sup>25</sup>. Part was similar to consulting work in which enhancing the organizational effectiveness of the client was the priority. A third part reflected the techniques of social marketing in which clients were introduced to ideas and practices that generate broader social value. And finally, part was based on the general idea of partnership in

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<sup>25</sup> For an analysis of this approach which captures most of the issues, see C.W. Letts, W.P. Ryan and A. Grossman, 1999, chapter Nine, "Virtuous Capital: Investing in Performance" in *High Performance Nonprofit Organizations: Managing Upstream for Greater Impact*

which both parties combined their resources for the achievement of an objective that needed some collective action. This case uses the awkward term ‘responsive entrepreneurship’ in an effort to capture the nature of the ENACT approach<sup>26</sup>.

38. We can set out the characteristics of this approach as follows:

- ENACT staff was not pushing involvement and compliance in their program. They were, instead, looking to add value to the programs of others. Such initiatives could take the form of new techniques for the Greening of Government, used motor oil disposal or improved coffee roasting techniques. ENACT was as much responsive as it was proactive. ENACT team members used their networks and access to people to seek out opportunities. Or put another way, team members searched out pockets of energy, interest and commitment, groups or even individuals who would be willing to work with ENACT on capacity issues. In ENACT terms, this was called working with ‘primacy processes’ or those activities that were already working. The emphasis was on responding to real as opposed to ‘constructed’ needs, a pattern of behaviour that was new inside the GOJ.
- The ENACT experience leads us to think a bit more about the nature of ‘demand’ for capacity development. In the early stages, much of the demand for ENACT’s services in the public sector was latent in the sense of groups or organizations showing no immediate interest but who were willing to collaborate and work with outside groups if approached appropriately and directly. Later, this pattern became more varied with the ENACT unit coming in contact with articulated demands not directly aimed at ENACT participation. Finally, ENACT was increasingly faced with specific articulated demands for its participation in various projects and activities. By 2003, all three patterns were in a shifting mix. Much of the effectiveness of units such as ENACT appears to depend on their ability to adapt their management strategies to deal with a varying pattern of demand over time. In some situations and in some countries and on some issues, the unit must be more proactive and be able to search out latent demands. In others, it must be able to balance out supply and demand as its credibility and legitimacy increases.
- The resulting relationships between ENACT and various groups within the GOJ varied but frequently took the form of a close partnership in which both sides would contribute ideas, resources and legitimacy<sup>27</sup>. Most interventions relied on dialogue, facilitation, demonstrations, accommodation and some persuasion<sup>28</sup>. As will be seen in the next section, the nature of the partnership normally went far beyond the traditional quick fix of a capacity assessment followed by a short consultancy or an injection of resources. The ENACT programme was thus more than just a catalyst or a coordinator. It tried to become a co-creator of results<sup>29</sup>. It is also important to remember that the ENACT unit focused on Jamaican organizations and groups that had already demonstrated commitment and a willingness to achieve results<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> One ENACT team member described the ENACT approach as combining “the magic of art and the logic of science”.

<sup>27</sup> For example, the ENACT officer dealing with environmental education conducted her work using the stationery of the National Environmental Education Committee and was paid by NEPA.

<sup>28</sup> This is a common pattern. See Sanford Borins, 2001, *The Challenge of Innovating in Government*, p. 21

<sup>29</sup> For a detailed description of ENACT’s process management techniques at various levels, see Alain Lafontaine and Richard Lumsden, *Capacity Development (CD) for Sustainable Development: Review and Recommendations The CIDA/GOJ Environmental Action (ENACT) Experience*, January 2003, Section 4.

<sup>30</sup> In practice - and without being aware of it, the ENACT unit followed a style of relating to partners that closely resembles an approach found in a book entitled *High-Impact Consulting: How Clients and Consultants Can Work Together to Achieve Extraordinary Results* by Robert Shaffer. These include defining goals in terms of client results rather than consultant products, matching the project scope to what the client is ready to do, aiming for rapid-fire

- The ENACT programme did not take on controversial or politically intractable issues connected to the enhancement of capabilities and performance. It did not threaten the prerogatives, mandates or vested interests of powerful groups within the Government of Jamaica such as public sector unions or central agencies. It did not press for the reform of legislation which governed environmental and sustainable development<sup>31</sup>. ENACT in some ways was a stealth programme specializing in ‘middle-up and down’ initiatives - i.e. addressing those interventions largely controlled by senior and middle bureaucratic managers in the public sector that rode below the political radar screen. It did not appear, in practice, to buy into the idea that support from the highest political levels was critical for its effectiveness at the early stage of organizational evolution<sup>32</sup>. Few of their initiatives represented dramatic breakthroughs in capability and performance but they could be effective on a cumulative basis if pursued with persistence and patience<sup>33</sup>.
- Most efforts at capacity development within the public sector unconnected to specific projects suffer from lack of unallocated funds and process support. Staff at the middle levels of government organizations cannot usually get access to seed money for services, workshops, publications or expert advice. The actual funding of innovation through the enhancement of capabilities was not easily done through regular channels in the Jamaican context. This gap created opportunities for the ENACT team to inject resources into the system which it did by supplying small amounts of funding and consulting advice as in the case of the Coffee Board workshops. The ENACT unit therefore acted as a capability investor trying to shift the balance in particular situations towards innovation and organizational change. ENACT worked on the assumption that the provision of financial resources followed results rather than preceding them.
- The ENACT team’s varied approach to publicizing its role and achievements needs careful scrutiny. On the one hand, it made sustained efforts to disseminate the ENACT programme image and ‘brand’ through documents, workshops and other public events<sup>34</sup>. The objective here was to reinforce the image of support, of Jamaicanization and of partnership. But at the same time, the unit took care to adopt a low profile in terms of taking individual or unit credit. Publicity for successes was to be passed on to partners through whom and with whom the ENACT unit was working. The ENACT programme head, in particular, was careful to avoid public attention. Too much intrusive or publicity-grabbing behaviour would likely undermine the very legitimacy and credibility that the unit needed to do its work.
- Much more could be said about the process and organizational change techniques of the ENACT unit. Included in such a list could be the unit’s use of informal networks, its balanced reliance on so-called ‘champions’, its customizing of different approaches to fit the particular client group. It should be added here that the ENACT unit did face a different set of challenges in working with the private sector in Jamaica. Techniques that found a response in the public sector, e.g. certain

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success to generate momentum, building a partnership to achieve and to learn and finally, leveraging resources and getting more results with fewer consultants.

<sup>31</sup> Such as The Land Development and Utilization Act, the Watershed Protection Act, the Wildlife Protection Act

<sup>32</sup> This approach changed as soon as ENACT took on the task of promoting some sort of ‘sustainable unit’ at the highest levels of government.

<sup>33</sup> See Sanford Borins, *The Challenge of Innovating in Government*, The Price Waterhouse Coopers Endowment for The Business of Government, February 2001

<sup>34</sup> According to the Canadian High Commissioner to Jamaica, the ENACT programme “produces like crazy”. Interview in Kingston on February 24th, 2003.

kinds of general training, incentives and awareness raising, generated little interest in corporate private sector actors. At the city, town and parish levels, however, local private firms showed stronger interest.

*Working across a wide spectrum of capability improvement initiatives*

39. The second part of the ENACT strategy centred around the type of capability development initiatives that the team should support. At least two options presented themselves. First, should the ENACT programme specialize in certain capability enhancement activities such as advising its partners on the design and implementation of organizational change much like a consulting firm? Or, second, should it operate across a much wider spectrum of activities ranging from awareness raising to general training to the upgrading of administrative and technical systems? Putting the choice another way, should ENACT go for *depth* in terms of the enhancement of specific capabilities and performance in particular organizations? Or would it be best to go for *breadth* and address a wide range of needs in wide range of situations?

40. The ENACT strategy, with the agreement of both Governments, was to opt for the second alternatives - that of breadth and coverage. Chart 1 below sets out the main categories of activities in ascending order of intensity and intrusiveness with respect to capacity development. For the most part, ENACT supported smaller, more modest interventions and did not take on the reform of big systems or organizational functions.

**Chart 1**

<b>type of capacity development activity</b>	<b>examples of specific ENACT involvement</b>
action research and demonstration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>at the local government and parish level</li> </ul>
awareness raising, confidence building, attitudinal change, motivating, advocacy, modelling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>working with the Business Council for the Environment</li> </ul>
formal training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>at a variety of levels including teachers, public servants</li> </ul>
networking, connecting, bridging, facilitating, partnering, resource mobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>nation-wide consultations on local sustainable development planning</li> </ul>
assistance with policy change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sustainable development ideas have been included in the public sector reform programme and the National Physical Sustainable Development Plan (in progress)</li> </ul>
enhancement of specific capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>improvement to plans and budgets through the public sector modernization process led by the Cabinet Office</li> </ul>
organizational change and capabilities improvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>leadership development</li> <li>encouragement of innovation in NEPA</li> </ul>

41. It is difficult in the absence of a detailed analysis to estimate the proportion of ENACT resources devoted to each of these activities. A rough guess would be that five - awareness raising, formal training, networking, research and development and functional improvements - absorbed the bulk of ENACT's time and resources.

*Working with a wide variety of stakeholders and partners*

42. The ENACT programme was designed on the basis of strengthening institutional pluralism - encouraging civil society, responding to the needs of communities and disadvantaged groups in the society, interacting with the private sector and other key societal groups<sup>35</sup>. The strategy of ENACT was therefore to work with a wide variety of stakeholders and partners both inside and outside government. Chart 2 below sets these out and gives examples. On some issues such as environmental education, ENACT worked with the Ministry of Education, the NGO community and local schools. Similarly, work with local governments involved parish councils and development committees, community based organizations, NGOs, the local private sector etc.

**Chart 2**

<b>sub-programme</b>	<b>specific stakeholder</b>	<b>focus of capability and performance improvement</b>
Greening of Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>at least eight (8) public sector ministries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>strategic planning</li> <li>self-monitoring of environmental guidelines</li> <li>working with Social Development Commission on mission statement</li> </ul>
NEPA capacity development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NEPA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>variety of process and organizational improvements mainly centred on regulations and enforcement</li> </ul>
Environmental education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture</li> <li>NGOs working in schools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>inclusion of environmental management and sustainable development issues in curricula of certain primary and secondary schools</li> <li>creation of an environmental studies course in all teacher training institutions</li> <li>implementation of EESD<sup>36</sup> in curriculum of primary schools nationwide</li> </ul>
LSDP governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development</li> <li>National Environment and Planning Agency</li> <li>Parish councils and development committees in Portland and Kingston</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Guidelines and training on local sustainable development planning</li> <li>multi-stakeholder workshops</li> <li>improvement of planning mechanisms and processes at the parish level</li> <li>identification of sustainable tourism development projects</li> <li>infusion of sustainable development into the Sustainable Development Commission of the Ministry of Local Government, Parish Councils and</li> </ul>

<sup>35</sup> The ENACT programme in 1991-1994 foresaw establishing linkages with Jamaican trade unions but this did not happen.

<sup>36</sup> Environmental Education for Sustainable Development

		NEAP policy documents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resource mobilization for local initiatives</li> </ul>
Private sector	variety of groups including Coffee Industry Board, automotive parts sector, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• motor oil</li> <li>• car repair</li> <li>• coffee marketing</li> </ul>

*Working at a variety of levels*

43. One of the initial design principles of the ENACT programme was the need to take a systemic approach to capacity development. Specific capabilities were themselves systems made up of a variety of components, processes, resources and ideas. And they were developed in the context of a variety of levels which themselves had to be understood from a systems perspective. ENACT's efforts at capacity development thus took place at a variety of levels or perhaps more accurately as part of a collection of nested systems - the individual, the functional, the organizational, the multi-organizational - that interacted with each other at different times and in different ways. Chart 3 below sets out these three levels and gives examples of these interventions:

**Chart 3**

<b>nature of the system</b>	<b>type of ENACT support</b>
individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• training</li> <li>• awareness raising</li> </ul>
organizational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support for broad organization-wide change and functional improvements</li> </ul>
multi-organizational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• working with multi-stakeholders</li> </ul>

*Summary*

44. Much like the design of the ENACT Unit itself, the ENACT approach to process management and capability improvements responded to the special conditions of Jamaica. The ENACT experiment, for example, had acquired a legitimacy within Jamaican circles during the inclusive but lengthy design phase that helped to generate a continuing demand for its services during implementation. The approach was also based on a series of strategic calculations about needs and absorptive capability at that stage of Jamaican development. It was based, for example, on the premise that the comparative advantage of the ENACT programme and hence its real contribution lay in promoting breadth rather than depth in terms of capabilities and performance.

**Box 3 NRCA studies its capabilities<sup>37</sup>**

In 1999, the NRCA decided to conduct a study of its capabilities to achieve its mission. It engaged a consultant with the help of the ENACT programme who suggested a participatory process involving about 25 meetings with staff at different levels of the organization. A scan of the NRCA's image with the public at large was also carried out. The eventual report contained a functional analysis of the NRCA plus a series of related recommendations on topics such as required and existing capabilities,

<sup>37</sup> Richard Lumsden study on NEPA, February 2003

priority capability needs, a ranking of priority capability needs plus implementation and sustainability issues. The report itself was issued in November 1998 and was typical of most consulting reports that are produced around the world.

Nothing came of it. Reports differ on its fate. For many, it was simply overtaken by the reality of a major reorganization in 1999 of the NRCA which absorbed all the time and attention of NRCA managers. But other constraints were also evident. The consultants hired for the study had not won the confidence of the NRCA staff, an outcome which damaged the commitment to the recommendations in the report. In particular, the consultants had not understood the job content of many of the NRCA positions. The report also paid no attention to the human side of the capabilities issue which also lowered its value in the eyes of many of the participants. No budget had been allocated to support the change management process coming out of the report and no provision was made to embed any of its lessons into the regular structures and procedures of the NRCA. In short, the process of assessing NRCA's capabilities was never institutionalized. The report also never came to grips with any of the deeper strategic issues facing the organization and was unable to turn the contents into more than an inventory of organizational capabilities. Many of these issues remain unresolved today and ENACT has once again tried to work with NEPA to address them.

#### H. DEGREE OF IMPROVED OR ENHANCED CAPABILITIES

45. There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence about ENACT's effectiveness in improving the capabilities of its partners. It has earned widespread credibility throughout the public sector in Jamaica and beyond for its work. But it remains difficult to analyze systematically its effects on capabilities especially in a short visit. Both CIDA and field team have tried to find effective ways to assess these results<sup>38</sup>. The initial monitoring effort funded by CIDA focused on tight centralized control and mechanistic counting designed primarily to serve CIDA's accountability requirements. All the participants regarded it as inappropriate and CIDA rightly discontinued the effort in 2001. The ENACT team has subsequently experimented with other approaches including one at the present time at the local government level which is intended to be far more learning friendly.

46. The ENACT programme presents particular methodological difficulties to the assessment of capabilities from four aspects.

- ENACT has no overall programme that can be assessed in an aggregated way. Its outcomes are, by design, dispersed over time and place, embedded in many different organizations and people and extremely difficult to attribute as part of any so-called *results chain*. The lack of focus, for example, on one or two organizations prevents much in the way of sustained performance assessment.
- Second, part of ENACT's approach is to work through others and pass on the credit whenever possible. Artificial attempts at attribution and claiming credit in an effort to demonstrate its own contribution are not helpful for its credibility regardless of their validity for symbolic results-based management.

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<sup>38</sup> See, for example, Bob White, *Defining Indicators of Stakeholder Satisfaction and Organizational Performance*, report submitted to the ENACT Programme, December 3, 2001

- Third, monitoring and evaluation are likely to be more valid if they are designed and implemented on a participatory basis and in a context of genuine demand from partners and beneficiaries. But this requires a much longer lead time and the investment of a good deal of ENACT staff time to get properly established.
- Fourth, assessing ENACT's results requires the use of a variety of different monitoring techniques across a number of activities ranging from the individual to the multi-organizational. Designing and combining these different techniques is difficult for a programme with a heavy daily workload.

47. Casual readers will not be interested in comprehensive laundry lists of apparent capability enhancements. This section therefore tries to group ENACT's results into four main categories which seem the most relevant for outcome analysis. A brief summary addresses the overall effects.

#### *Individual*

48. Many of the ENACT results were at the individual level. First, its resources were targeted at the training or awareness raising of individuals at the operating level. The most recent estimate is a total of about 15,000 people including teachers and public servants who have received some sort of ENACT-supported training<sup>39</sup>. These efforts include courses at the University of the West Indies (UWI), the College of Agriculture, Science and Education (CASE) and the Management Institute for Local Development (MIND). Second, increasing number of students has been exposed to environmental training at both the primary and secondary school levels. Third, ENACT has tried to influence decision makers in different organizations including the Cabinet Office and the Business Council for Education. The question in terms of capabilities is the following: did this focus of ENACT resources at the individual level affect personal values and organizational behaviours? And if so, do those changes in individual behaviour add up to a sustained improvement in capabilities?

#### *Organizational*

49. ENACT can point to a variety of functional improvements including the adoption of strategic environmental assessments for all Cabinet submissions and the self-monitoring of the implementation of environmental guidelines by at least eight (8) public sector agencies. Several training organizations such as MIND and UWI have used ENACT resources to offer new courses in sustainable development. About 1200 primary and secondary schools and two (2) teacher education colleges have also added courses. Two parishes in Kingston and Saint Andrew and Portland have upgraded their capabilities for participatory planning. Much of the work on the Greening of Government and the improvements of NEPA skills in compliance and enforcement are in this category.

50. What seemed to determine the effectiveness of the improvements in capabilities at the organizational level was the nature of the interventions. Those that were additive or which upgraded or extended existing processes or functions were usually more effective in terms of capacity improvement. Those that involved deeper changes or the creation of new capabilities and organizational functions case had less chance of succeeding.

#### *Multi-organizational*

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<sup>39</sup> These include more than 3000 teachers in Grades two and Five across Jamaica.

51. It is important to divide up efforts at capability improvement at the multi-organizational level into two groups: the more simple, i.e. those that require independent but common action (e.g. adoption of environmental assessment guidelines) versus the more complex, i.e. those that need coordinated joint action (e.g. the environmental education programme). ENACT appears to have had reasonable success in both categories including its assistance to the National Environmental Education Committee (NEEC), a multi-stakeholder body that produced the action plan.

### *Creating a more integrated approach*

52. Any discussion on capabilities enhanced by ENACT for environmental and sustainable development must address the issue of the progress towards a specialized sustainable development unit within the Jamaican system. A brief history is useful here. The Government established a Sustainable Development Council in 1994 after the Rio Conference. This Council was never resourced or supported and achieved little. Haphazard efforts through the 1990s such as the start of the Sustainable Development Planning Unit located in the Planning Institute of Jamaica have also not made much headway<sup>40</sup>. ENACT itself has encouraged the Government to take more decisive steps but the matter remains under debate in Cabinet and other fora.

53. Readers of this case need to think carefully about both the organizational evolution of these kinds of dedicated units. Policy analysts, media commentators, aid officials and most consultants have a bias in favour of such units, preferably located high in the government. The theory is that only such an integrated formal structure can coordinate and if need be, compel cohesive action in support of multi-sectoral policies. The imputed value of centralized, integrated decision making apparently has wide appeal.

54. The difficulty with these types of integrating units remains their implementation and sustainability. Those countries that have tried to extend the reach of these integrating organizations to promote sustainable development have encountered great difficulties especially in the early stages of the institutional and organizational development. The incentives in highly politicized countries working in favour of such approaches are extremely weak. Other organizational strategies such as informal coordination and network structures seem better suited to support collective efforts. In the ENACT case, efforts were made over the years to support the Sustainable Development Council of Jamaica which existed before the start of the ENACT program. Over the past year, the discussion has begun to focus on the possibility of the ENACT unit itself taking on more of an overall coordinating and facilitating role on sustainable development as the unit itself approaches the end of its donor-supported life. Whatever the outcome over the next year, the experience points to the slowly-evolving nature of these types of interventions.

## I. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

55. The ENACT programme is also a case study of a donor - in this case the Canadian International Development Agency - searching for the most appropriate way to interact with complex programme trying to build capabilities and performance. By their very nature, such interventions have uncertain

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<sup>40</sup> There is also an advisory council on sustainable development under the National Planning Council. Another proposal centres on such a unit in the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister.

methodologies and hard-to-measure outcomes. Balancing a clear vision and improvisation is usually difficult. The case shows CIDA dealing, mostly effectively, with three key issues.

- How should such a programme be designed?
- How should CIDA help to manage such a programme in order to meet its own accountabilities?
- How should a bilateral donor support such a programme to achieve its results?

56. As described earlier, CIDA contributed a range of ideas in the early design period 1991-1994 which, for the most part, provided a durable basis for the overall intervention. Most were based on the DAC Guidelines which CIDA itself had helped to craft in the early 1990s (see Box 1 above). The added ingredient was CIDA's willingness to let the Jamaican authorities explore these ideas in their own way and at their own pace up to 1996. This approach to the design of a complex, multi-component programme seems in retrospect to have been an effective one - patient, incremental and open-minded. The results in terms of Jamaican ownership continue to the present day to energize ENACT's work.

57. Many process-oriented programmes such as ENACT eventually succumb to the intrusions of outside groups determined to micro-manage them. In the middle of the decade, most of the internal CIDA incentives and rewards pushed operational staff towards controlling projects and programs to achieve short-term results. Yet programmes such as ENACT did not lend themselves to this approach. They could not function effectively as externally-controlled production machines churning out a stream of preselected results. Donors could 'manage' them only in an indirect way by helping to get their positioning, stakeholder relationships and field management straight. Part of the value of the ENACT case lies in appreciating the efforts of the CIDA staff to put in place management and oversight strategies appropriate for such a program. They resisted the temptation to push for in appropriate short-term results. They focused more on encouraging 'fit' than on exercising control. The long-term perspective was preserved. Authority was delegated to the field team. An inappropriate approach to monitoring was abandoned. CIDA insisted - correctly - on a different approach to programme leadership.

58. What was even more unusual was the consistency of effort. Donors tend to rotate operational staff quickly for reasons to do with internal management. This constant rotation combined with wide discretion to operational project staff can result in the huge swings in donor behaviour and preferences as experienced by programme field staff such as those in the ENACT unit. Such swings can have negative effects on programmes that depend on consistent effort over some years to make an impact. In the ENACT case, its basic principles put in place in the period 1991-1994 were sustained through a number of CIDA staff changes. Much of this was due to the continuity of the Jamaican supervisory personnel. But CIDA also succeeded in maintaining continuity on the major issues facing the program.

59. Three key challenges face all donors in sponsoring these types of large process programmes. The first is to put in place a system of indirect control and supervision, in cooperation with the county authorities that allows the field unit the needed operating space while at the same time helping to meet the donor's own set of accountabilities. The second is to build the capability to support such programmes through knowledge management and the provision of relevant insights from global experience. The third is to help put in place an appropriate approach to monitoring and evaluation that can enable the field unit staff and the programme participants to learn systematically about the outcomes of their work. CIDA succeeded on the first and is still working with the ENACT unit on the second and third.

## J. EMERGING LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE

60. Some observers in Jamaica expressed some scepticism about the whole notion of capacity development. From this perspective, donors and country governments collude to keep the aid game going by using the capacity development label to dress up conventional activities particularly training. They are, however, not usually able to point too much in terms of real increases in performance<sup>41</sup>. Capacity development thus becomes a kind of symbolic cover devoid of much real content.

61. This raises a legitimate issue which goes beyond the boundaries of the ENACT case. We need better ways of assessing performance and of understanding the ‘drivers’ that lead to organizational performance under a variety of circumstances and the contribution of capabilities to that emerging performance. The short period of time available to carry out this case and the early stage of the ENACT programme in terms of assessing its performance and those of its partners did not allow much in the way of rigorous performance analysis to take place. The following were some of the most evident examples of the performance outcomes of ENACT’s work:

- By increasing their efficiency, the Ministry of Finance and other operating ministries have saved over J\$ 800,000 per year.
- A variety of training organizations including the UWI, MIND, and CASE, have improved their capabilities and increased their outputs.
- Strategic environmental assessments are institutionalized across government and appear in all Cabinet submissions.
- Parish development councils where ENACT has been involved<sup>42</sup> are more effective than those which has not received such assistance.
- Other countries and organizations around the world including South Africa, Zimbabwe and the International Olympic Committee have used the National Environmental Education Action Plan.

## K. SUMMARY

62. The ENACT programme generated its effectiveness over time by achieving ‘fit’ both internally and with the conditions and demands of the surrounding environment. The ability of a programme to position itself and then manage its work strategically for productive purposes seems crucial for improving capabilities and performance. Part of this process of ‘fit’ has to do with getting a number of activities, functions, processes, people and so forth to interact together as a system. At a deeper level, it

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<sup>41</sup> For an example of this perspective, see Michael Haley and Anthony Clayton, “The Role of NGOs in Environmental Policy Failures in a Developing Country: The Mismanagement of Jamaica’s Coral Reefs” in *Environment Values* 12, 2003

<sup>42</sup> Lafontaine and Lumsden, p. 20

also has to do with matching initiatives to the level of organizational sophistication of the sector or country at a particular time. Making that happen in the ENACT case took the better part of seven years.

63. The time dimension needs to be kept in mind as donors get involved in more complex programmes and demand more short-term results to demonstrate their own effectiveness to domestic stakeholders. The ENACT programme is involved in a process of improving capabilities and performance that needs decades to achieve a sustainable level of outcomes. Its own performance must be assessed as a small part of a much larger series of events.

64. It is instructive to look back at the DAC Comprehensive Guidelines for Capacity Development in the Environment issued in 1993 (see Box 1) and match them against the ENACT experience a decade later. Many of the DAC ideas remain relevant at an abstract level but a couple of gaps should be noted. First, these Guidelines were issued in the years before results-based approaches gained favour in the international funding community. It is by no means clear that the emphasis on long-term process over short-term products would still be accepted. And second, these Guidelines are, in effect, values rather than operational principles. They are more focused on the 'what' than the 'how'. As such, they need supplementing with some insights from implementation experience.

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