

Paradigmatic Shifts in Capacity Development for an Effective State and an Engaged Society

BT Costantinos, PhD

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Introduction:

Current discussions and analyses of CD generally are marked by several limitations: a tendency to narrow CD thought and practice to the terms and categories of immediate, not very well considered, political and social action, a naïve realism, as it were; inattention to problems of articulation or production of CD systems and process within fragile state politics rather than simply as formal or abstract possibilities; ambiguity as to whether civil society is the agent or object of CD change; a nearly exclusive concern in certain institutional perspectives on CD with generic attributes and characteristics of organisations and consequent neglect of analysis in terms of their specific strategies and performances in capacitation; and inadequate treatment of the role of international agencies and the relations between global and indigenous aspects or dimensions of CD.

On the other hand, human security, an emerging CD concept, is a multi-disciplinary understanding of security involving a number of research fields, which equates security with people's wellness; ensuring freedom from want -- the basic idea that violence, poverty, inequality, diseases, and environmental degradation are inseparable concepts in addressing the root causes of human insecurity -- and freedom from fear -- that seeks to limit the practice of human security to protecting individuals from violent conflicts; for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity refers to an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather. Human security is criticised for being ineffective because of its vagueness -- it has become little more than an advocacy tool since it is so fuzzy, idealistic and so broad.

Nonetheless, to every human problem, there is always a solution that is smart, simple and immoral. Important stakeholders tend to have a linear way of thinking that is inadequate to unravel the many complex inter-relationships underlying people's insecurity. It is neither popular nor scientific. The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the internecine crises must change since places such as Darfur, Somalia, Northern Uganda and now Kenya, to name a few, have become a new insignia of 'bestiality'. The need for collective learning about responses, and the responsibility to those whose suffering provided the basis for that learning will never be more urgent than it is now. Unfortunately, such lessons, which may be learned through the shocks administered by an uncompromising reality, are rarely translated quickly into personal or organisational memories and the inherent will to change. The reasons for this are sometimes rooted in human inertia, weakness, and self-interest. They are equally often the products of a genuine confusion about how to act most effectively in an environment that seems to be growing more complex.

Hence the thinks piece diagnoses the issue of capacitation of fragile states, an efficient and a development-oriented private sector that can provide the nourishment which markets require to grow and function effectively and a Code of Practice for a mutual accountability Peer-review Mechanism is recommended, serving as a guiding document to contribute to on-going efforts of the CD partnership towards commitment to the use of standard practices and encourage societies and politics to develop collective capacity for an effective process of institutional strengthening and horizontal linkages among themselves; and build systems of knowledge management (KM) for CD as a systematic creation, acquisition, synthesis and sharing of knowledge, required to transform an organisation into a learning enterprise, a knowledge powerhouse.

Leadership is the key in all this. Leaders have to maintain continuity whilst simultaneously promoting change; such is the nature of leadership ambiguity and contradiction that comes as part of the same deal. The allusion of the foregoing is that the leader is responsible for change management, and change in a transition implies some degree of anarchy. The nexus between the status quo ante and the new, between letting go of the status quo ante and adopting the new order, is most often a place where rules are bent, and habit and routine are replaced with periods of chaos - which are indeed pieces of good fortune and opportunities for change.

This think piece presents four sections: analytical limitations in CD, paradigmatic Shifts in CD and Code of Practice for a CD Peer-review Mechanism and conclusions.

I. Analytical limitations in CD:

1. The opening salvo of the UN Millennium Declaration proclaims “we recognise that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level” The resulting Millennium Declaration identified urgent, collective commitments and ambitious targets with clearly defined deadlines to be achieved by 2015. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the Declaration, current CD thinking in official circles emphasises the immediacies of institutional and political activity to the neglect of the constitutive and regulative concepts and norms that define, structure and validate CD institutions and practices. It attempts to establish a direct relation to social experience, largely bypassing the intangible, yet no less significant, terrain of critical ideas and thought. Its immediate turn to the practical tasks of inducing people to participate in ostensibly rapid capacitation such as democratisation, elections, meeting the MDGs ... the full meaning of which is often beyond the grasp of the participants, in itself tends to become a substitute for the making of transparent and open rules of engagement. Hence CD must augur on the emergence of supportive set of institutions that are recurrent and valued patterns of social, economic and political behaviour that give shape and regularity to CD and would appear to offer considerable explanatory power. Let us look at each of these analytical limitations more closely.

The notion of **naïve realism** is invoked here to point to certain conceptual shortcomings in current perspectives on CD reform. This naïveté can be seen as outcomes of more or less conscious attempts by CD promoters to quickly get their hands on 'urgent' or 'practical' matters without worrying much about the 'abstracts' of developing rules of the game and institutions. Manifestations of this are the pre-emptive 'socialisation' of CD ideas and practices and the simple equation of partisan elaboration of CD principles. Here, our attention and thought are diverted from the critical destination between, a system of abstract categories as a construct of an explicit rationalisation, a formal conceptualisation and design, on the one hand, to a broad and diverse domain of purposefulness in the plenitude of social experience, on the other. We are discouraged from acknowledging the distance and tension between these two spheres of CD. Instead, one is led to believe that dogmatic construction in one sphere is reducible to another doctrinaire assembly of ideas in the other. Still another expression of **naïve realism** in existing perspectives and projects of CD is the common assumption that the proliferation of social organisations is, in and of itself, an index of development and democratisation. The assumption seems plausible. After all, what is more obvious in projects of CD than the goal of increasing the number of social institutions that will build stronger civil societies that will create favourable conditions for CD? Nevertheless, the assumption is open to question.¹

Inattention to problems of articulation of CD systems: When it is not dissolved into the immediate reality of political, often partisan activity, CD is likely to be represented as “pure” principle that needs only proper “application”. Practitioners and analysts tend to quickly pass over the particular nature of CD in fragmentary presence in much of fragile states, “adjusting” it against an ideal-general conception of what it might be. On the implicit, theoretically complacent assumption that formalistic, rhetorical modes of circulation of ideas and values nearly exhaust their articulation there, one often rushes to matters of “implementation”. Consequently, critical problems concerning the philosophical and practical entrenchment of CD systems and processes in fragile states receive scant attention. The fundamental issues of how the concepts, standards and practices of CD could be generated and sustained under historically hectic conditions, and the manner in which they are likely to gain systemic integrity and autonomy as well as broad social currency are inadequately addressed. This relative inattention leads analysts and practitioners to make internal observations and assessments in terms of the performances of fragile state polities without raising the question of setting up or securing the polities as viable systems in the first place.² Capacity must actually exist, take definite shape and structure and become a working process, before particular criticisms, claims and demands can be based on it.

¹ Civil society institutions also remain generally underdeveloped; possessing relatively few authentic, large-scale organisations that can articulate and aggregate social interests; but the growing number and diversity of women NGOs in fragile states mean that the organisations have very uneven political and professional capabilities and differing levels of commitment to processes of democratisation in fragile states. They do not function simply as instruments to those ends, but have their own inclinations, concerns and motivations and may be problematic in that far from contributing to the strengthening of civil society vis-à-vis the state, they can function as instruments for the consolidation of technocratic elite within the NGO sector. In addition, it appears that the proliferation of NGOs over the last decade has been more as outcome of funding by external donors than an indigenous "grassroots" phenomenon. Problems such as these constitute significant obstacles to the realisation of the democratic potential of fragile states..

² For example, in the face of the fact that past fragile states' constitutions had never actually been effectively established, especially as democratic structures, they are criticised for failing "to protect the rights of the citizenry. This is like attempting to assess failure to make a move in a game by reference to a set of rules which had never been in force

Overplay of generic institutional variables: Institutional approaches to the study of CD reforms in fragile states call for analysis of the effectiveness of government and NGOs in contributing to the reforms in terms of their generic characteristics that include: autonomy, capacity, complexity, cohesion and a combination of these. Presumably, the more institutions are endowed with these attributes, the greater their strength, and the more likely they are to promote CD. Let us then look at the hypotheses. The prospects for a CD improve to the extent that the state apparatus contains organisations that are autonomous, capacious, complex and cohesive; nonetheless, CD is least likely in highly personalistic, neo-patrimonial regimes where state elite have routinely violated the rule of law with impunity. In assessing the effectiveness of indigenous organisations in contributing to CD change, the measure of their articulated ideas and practices and the strategies and forms of that articulation must not be neglected. One should be alive to the possibility that actual performances of autonomous and complex institutions may be indifferent, or even contrary to CD principles, notwithstanding the formal profession of such principles by the institutions in question. Hence the need for capacity diagnostics: a UNDP report defines capacity diagnostics³ help gather critical data and knowledge, including capacity shifts in financial and human resource bases that facilitate or impede development progress. This information often opens a window to addressing critical capacity elements of development, such as the functionality of decentralised public institutions and the availability and depth of state and non-state response mechanisms at the local level.

Inadequate analysis of the role of external agencies: The effectiveness of political conditionality is a function of the dependence of a recipient government on foreign aid. Government compliance with donor conditions is high for measures that can be implemented by a small number of central government officials and low for reforms requiring extensive institutional change. The imposition by donors of political conditions on aid disbursements is alone insufficient to effect CD, i.e., in the absence of organised domestic constituencies for change within the state and within civil society. Intervention by external agencies disrupts capacity to the extent that it is perceived as partisan; and contributes most to CD when it provides neutral arbitration services like support for human security, election observation...

II. Paradigmatic shifts in CD:

1. Since much of the CD initiative is driven by donors, the questions that arise from the above are: What is the overall rationality or significance of the great traffic of international programmes and projects of democratisation and development in fragile states, the proliferating activities that seem to show little regard for economy of co-ordination? How far and in what ways do various international agencies, programmes, mechanisms, forms of knowledge and technical assistance feed on one another in helping set the boundaries of CD reform in fragile states? The important issues that these questions suggest are not sufficiently addressed, or even raised, in much of the current discussion of CD. Insofar as the activities of external agencies are not understood and engaged in CD, their developmental impact may diminish with their proliferation. This can mean little more than a weakly coordinated multiplication of projects which have immediately recognisable or measurable effects in limited areas, but which seem to suspend rather than serve the ultimate goals of capacitation of fragile state political systems. The strategic co-ordination of diverse international activities supportive of CD in fragile states can become a challenge both for the international agencies involved and for poor nations. This is in part because of limitations in the individual characteristics of the activities with narrow technocratic orientation and because of shortcomings in the relational and contextual articulation of external projects, their limited generalisability and variability.

Fragile state governments and societies undoubtedly depend on international assistance in their projects of reform; vital for the projects in many areas and at many levels. Yet, it must be recognised that external support creates problems as well as opportunities for fragile states. In confronting the imperatives of change, nothing is more challenging for our polities than the strategic co-ordination of diverse global and local elements, relations and activities within themselves, nor has anything greater potential for enabling them achieve successful capacitation.

Capacity Development: governance implications – where the leadership has not sufficiently assimilated the value system of the rule of law, checks and balances or power sharing - basic to democratic governance and polity - the tendency to be corrupt, undemocratic and abuse human rights is rife; and the organisational imperative of the massive bureaucratic machine is to command and control and is preoccupied with its own survival and enrichment. The pivotal question in CD is the construction of political rules and institutions⁴ that ensure human development and human security.⁵

³ UNDP Capacity Assessment Practice Note, July 2006

⁴ Keller E, (1997), Political Institutions, Agency and Contingent Compromise: Understanding Democratic Consolidation and Reversal in Africa, New York

A key distinction, which runs through much of in the history of political theory, is between the stewardship/ guardianship on the one hand and guiding/steering responsibilities of the state on the other. Over the centuries, these two images i.e. the shepherd and the helmsman - have been at the heart of many political governance controversies. Although neither guardianship nor *guiding* can be discharged effectively in isolation, some writers advocate one and others the other as the primary responsibility of the state.⁶ Recently developmentalists emphasise stewardship while neo-classical economists augur its guiding functions.

“Some of the most dramatic gains in capacity development come about as a result of shifts in political power; effectively tapping the political space for CD and sustaining the change requires the following essential conditions: broad consensus underpinning the change, i.e., across political parties; new or revitalised institutions that embody the change; resourcing of such institutions over the long-term; partnerships that spread the benefits of change, diminish resistance, and forge a larger base of players with a stake in the change and accountability and communication on results to boost the credibility of change and build political, civil, and bureaucratic support that can outlast changes in governments ... and require holistic and integrated responses supported by a culture of cooperation that focuses on support to ... local systems and that is not driven by external implementation and delivery schedules and conditions”⁷; hence, the legitimacy of CD processes underway will depend in important ways on it being perceived as reasonably honest, predictable, transparent, and accountable. Public sector corruption and inefficiencies undermine political, economic, and social stability by undermining citizen’s faith in the democratic process. Identified elements of an effective state and an engaged society are: rule of law, anti-corruption, executive, legislative and judicial accountability; and efficiency of civil service and budget administration, development of public information and media enhance human security and cultural democracy, tourism and the rise of the arts;

Capacitation of fragile states: Conflicts have destroyed economies and physical infrastructure that were developed for half a century, they have spun social infrastructure and society off their axes, and the political architecture and polity of nations has been dismantled. In short it has destabilised nations, nationalities and peoples resulting in genocidal human insecurity unparalleled in world history. They have to their culpability, a harvest of millions of refugees. New forms of vulnerabilities arise in the form of uncontrolled epidemics; the child soldier that has taken hostage whole communities of their beloved ones. Conflicts have spawned the percept of failed and fragile states that have not been able to ensure human security and human development -- both fundamentally concerned with the lives of human beings -- longevity, education, and opportunities for participation. Compared with other low income countries, fragile states face longer term underlying reasons for insecurity that include poverty, conflict over scarce resources, vulnerability to external economic shocks, weak institutions and poor governance. However, under militarised governance and with mostly short-term thinking, these are often not seen as ‘national security’ issues at all and are considered a lower priority than military and security affairs. Underpinning these weaknesses is the absence of a clear strategy for promoting long-term human security to be more stable and predictable by a correct identification of their wider range of threats, many of them real and potential ones that include among others:⁸

- insufficiently institutionalised constitutional order; absence of governance institutions; ethnic, religious and regional cleavages and the incapacity to manage claims;
- actual and potential external threats of force projection (invasion); external threats of destabilisation and terrorism; potential sources of conflict with neighbours such as undemarcated borders, and contested natural resource control;
- corruption; violent crime via light weapons; potential social unrest associated with economic recession; mass distress migration due to natural and man-made calamities; and
- Diseases of poverty and its impact on institutions and capacities including security services.

⁵ The UNDP’s *Human Development Report* of 1994 (chapter two) pioneered exploration of these questions (http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/pdf/hdr_1994_ch2.pdf) International Chamber of Commerce www.iccwbo.org the UN Global Compact www.unglobalcompact.org and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development www.wbcsd.org for perspectives on the important roles of business in fostering human security, in coalitions with civil society and governments. The human security Network

⁶ Banuri, T, Holmberg, J (1992) *Governance for Sustainable Development: A view from the South*, London: IIED

⁷ UNDP (2006) *Capacity Development Strategies: Let the Evidence Speak*, Conference Report, Madrid, Spain

⁸ de Waal, A., & Mohamed, A., (2005) *Peace and security dimensions of African and regional integration*; paper to be submitted at Sub-Regional Consultation on Peace, Security and human security in the Horn of Africa, Sudan

As we move down this list we shift from immediate military threats to structural problems confronting African governments. In the longer term, it is these structural problems that are most likely to cause major problems. In the long term, security is best guaranteed by democratic, accountable and stable governments presiding over sustainable development. A far-reaching agenda of security sector reform, ensuring civilian control of the military and similar measures, will help to deliver these gains. In post-conflict situation, post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) is a “multifaceted initiative with a complex web of public and private sector projects addressing human, social, physical, environmental and political capital development in a sustainable form. The synergy is designed to create sustainable communities using the livelihoods construct.”⁹ In this context the policy framework must be intended to facilitate coherence in the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring of PCR systems by providing a common frame of reference and conceptual base for the broad range of multidisciplinary, multifunctional and multidimensional actors that collectively populate these systems; with a view to produce outputs such as methods and indicators identified for home-grown policy analysis for sustainable livelihoods and food security, which disaggregate policy effects on different stakeholder groups such as women, children, elderly, etc., strengthened capacity for policy dialogue and improved policy, strategy, process and structural environment for people to attain decision-making positions including affirmative action;¹⁰

Private sector development: With the modernisation of the economic sector and the respect for ownership of private property, the private sector began to flourish only to be rudely discontinued in the seventies by military governments in fragile states. As a consequence, a fairly extensive public sector emerged. The consequences of this are all too glaring to demand an explanation. In a research undertaken by the author the methodology for the enquiry included a comprehensive literature review; SWOT analysis, lengthy and detailed discussions were held with knowledgeable personalities. Information obtained from key informants was invaluable in understanding the context and the constraints of the sector. The recommendations from the findings include: the need for political stability, managed restructuring of public sector: the aim here is to define ‘core businesses of government and reduce involvement in non-core areas; and streamline central government apparatus. Specific measures to stimulate, develop and promote entrepreneurship must rest on a firm foundation of sound economic management, efficient public services, positive attitudes towards business and reliable infrastructure and the establishment of sound information systems on micro-economic behaviour and markets greatly enhance business development and promote informal sector entrepreneurship. Through incentives and other measures, CD can encourage or facilitate linkages between informal sector entrepreneurs and their better established formal sector counterparts. An efficient and a development-oriented private sector provide the nourishment which markets require to grow and function effectively.¹¹

III. Code of Practice for a mutual accountability Peer-review Mechanism

A major constraint to the development of the CD system is that states, CSOs and development practitioners remain weak and highly dependent on economic and political forces outside their countries. The competition for funding greatly erodes their capacity and commitment to mobilise collaborative action and achieve consensus around issues of common interest for autonomous development. While many proposals for remedial action have been formulated, real commitment to collaborative processes at the inter-organisational level has always been limited. By publishing such a Code, CD actors will have taken a first bold step in gearing individual groups and networks into action, and generating the momentum required for a true process of collaborative development. This in itself is a testament to the voluntary accession to communities of practice based on commonality of objectives and unity of purpose. As a living document, the need for periodic review of the Code will continue to encourage opening up forums for such initiatives, as they pave the way towards

⁹ Costantinos, BT. (1997). Strategic approaches to building capacity for democratic transition in Africa, International Advisory Group on capacity building, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm

¹⁰ Civic engagement in PCR, while it is not so positively encouraged by the international community, the system require an overarching strategic planning process that sets out the overall vision, determines priorities, identifies milestones and negotiates an appropriate network of responsibilities among the various internal and external actors that collectively make-up the system. This should be intended to provide a common platform for the diverse range of actors involved in PCR systems to conceptualise, organise and prioritise such policy responses for civic engagement.

¹¹ Markets themselves provide the credit ingredients which the private sector requires to grow expand and contributed to development. The banking system must be firmly entrenched and functioning as efficiently as planned - taking good care of the money market and hence the credit market needs of private sectors. The consequential growth response of the latter should give a boost to capital markets, which in turn provide the capital for sustained development. Famine prevention and poverty reduction via promotion of entrepreneurship and improve the quality education, develop a population action plan and revolutionise the agricultural sector and development of independent think tanks that continually remodel, expand, advance, renovate, cultivate and develop the dream.

consensus and alliances for empowerment. Any discussion on strengthening international partnership in CD must at some point address the issue of those organisations' competence to accede to common principles of human security. The business of capacitation is driven by two moral values: it is codified with defined business standards and specifies who can promote CD; and it is the responsibility of all people; spreading the message and stimulating more CD at the grass roots level. Hence, the Code is a statement of institutional principles and ethics for practice, designed as a reference for practitioners, to enhance organisational partnership to encourage relational qualitative improvement with their constituencies. Towards this end the objectives of the **Code of Practice** are

1. contribute to on-going efforts of the CD partnership towards commitment to the use of standard practices and encourage societies and polities to develop collective capacity for an effective process of institutional strengthening and horizontal linkages among themselves;
2. serve as a guiding document for improving the partnership and their collaborators, by setting out institutional modalities aimed at enhancing pluralistic processes and foster a genuine commitment on the part of partners to a locally-driven approach to the challenges of under capacity and help in focussing the attention and resources to eradicating the grinding poverty reflected in many quarters;
3. enable societies and polities to be aware of acts of public offence, such as pollution, violence against women, exploitation and abuse, which customarily pass unnoticed by law enforcement;
4. it is necessary to build systems of **knowledge management** (KM) for CD as a systematic creation, acquisition, synthesis and sharing of knowledge, required to transform an organisation into a learning enterprise, a knowledge powerhouse. Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experiences, values, contextual information and expert insight. It could be formal, codified knowledge that comes in the form of books, documents, white papers, databases, and policy manuals, etc., or tacit: informal, uncodified knowledge found in the heads of people: highly experiential, difficult to document in any detail, ephemeral and transitory.



Fig 1 Integration and mainstreaming

5. The concept of **communities of practice** (CoP) refers to the process of social learning that occurs when people who have a common interest in some subject or problem collaborate over an extended period to share ideas, find solutions, and build innovations. The term was first used in 1991 by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger who used it in relation to an attempt to "rethink learning". Wenger extended the concept and applied it to other contexts, including organisational settings. More recently, CoPs have become associated with KM as people have begun to see them as ways of developing social capital, nurturing new knowledge, stimulating innovation, or sharing existing tacit knowledge within an organisation. It is now an accepted part of CD.¹² The earlier work of Lave and Wenger¹³ had the notion of legitimate peripheral participation as the central process in CoP. In his

¹² Wenger, E, McDermott, R & Snyder, W.M., *Cultivating Communities of Practice*, HBS press 2002, Saint Onge, H & Wallace, D, *Leveraging Communities of Practice*, Butterworth Heinemann, 2003

¹³ Lave, J & Wenger E, *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Wenger (1998) described CoPs in terms of the interplay of four fundamental dualities: participation vs. reification, designed vs. emergent, identification vs. negotiability and local vs. global although, possibly because of the possible link to KM, the participation vs. reification duality has been the focus of most interest

later work, Wenger abandoned the concept of legitimate peripheral participation and used the idea the inherent tension in a duality instead.

IV. Conclusion: In our cross-national analysis of democratic transitions in Africa sponsored by GCA at the beginning of the wave of democratic experiments in Africa, we asserted that political culture and democratic development derives from the following three distinct sets of factors... “firstly, many assert that certain structures, which reflect long-term historical developments in the economy and society, determine whether there is an enabling environment for democratic development. The structural factor most commonly cited as favouring democracy is an advanced industrial economy with a high average of per capita income. Secondly, on the other had there sis the school of though that underpins the fact that, from a contingent perspective, political development is installed as a result of the conscious reform initiatives of individual leaders, elite factions and social movements. The trajectory is driven by the short-term calculations and immediate reactions of strategic actors. Outcomes are indeterminate because all these actors make hurried reactions to unforeseen events, and must struggle against one another. If predictable at all, the prospects for democratic development seem to depend on the relative strength and cohesion of a shifting set of conservative and reform coalitions within the state and outside of it. A third school of thought submits that democratic development depends upon the emergence of supportive set of political institutions. Institutions are recurrent and valued patterns of political behaviour that give shape and regularity to politics. Institutions draw attention to the regularities rather than the quirks of individual behaviour. Political institutions are more proximate to transition dynamics than "deep" socio-economic structures. An institutional approach to political culture development would appear to offer considerable explanatory power. The widespread incidence of social conflict and political instability in Africa is directly attributable to basic weaknesses of political institutions”.¹⁴ They may be manifest as rules or as organisations.¹⁵ Hence, an institutional approach locates the analyst at an intermediate level between individuals and whole systems.” While poor states have greatly expanded since independence, this growth has not usually been accompanied by a concomitant improvement in the capacity of the state to extend authority throughout the territory and to deliver public services.¹⁶

With few exceptions, fragile state institutions have failed to win popular legitimacy – hence the dire need for leadership capacitation. Indeed, leadership is more than a job; *it is a calling*. Leaders are on the one hand responsible for breaking the boundaries of inward bound wisdom, of common sense, of patterns of thinking and behaving which, over the years, have built themselves into routines which pacify people to dormancy. Leadership also means mutual accountability as indicated strongly in the Paris declaration. The existence of meaningful transparency, ‘voice’ mechanisms and instruments of ‘bottom-up’ public accountability can help ascertain whether public services are needed, wanted and whether people believe that their livelihoods are improving as a result. Institutionalisation of citizen voice mechanisms on such as gender, human security and human development responsive budgets, community score cards and citizens report cards enhance mutual accountability that is inextricably linked to capacity issues: first, it implies that without mutual accountability there would not be an effective partnership to support capacity development; and second, an effective mutual accountability framework itself requires a threshold of capacity to be effective”. The contest is between creation of an unprejudiced relationship between the capacity builder and the capacity receiver; leading to identifying ways and means of helping

- to foster institutions which currently do not exist;
- reorienting institutions which have been diverted to non-democratic ends; and
- building in-country capacity for democratic governance on the basis of African demand and with a minimum of outside expertise;

On the other hand leaders have to maintain continuity whilst simultaneously promoting change; such is the nature of leadership ambiguity and contradiction that comes as part of the same deal. The allusion of the foregoing is that the leader is responsible for change management, and change in a transition implies some degree of anarchy. The nexus between the status quo ante and the new, between letting go of the status quo ante and adopting the new order, is most often a place where rules are bent, and habit and routine are replaced with periods of chaos - which are indeed pieces of good fortune and opportunities for change, although, if prolonged, can become perilous to the nation.

¹⁴ Global Coalition for Africa / Africa Leadership Forum. (1993) “Transition to democracy in africa: a cross national study. Research Design and Methodology”. Paper prepared by Bratton M, and van de Walle, N. Revised version.

¹⁵ Costantinos, BT; Akande, J; Shubane, K; Ghai, Y, (1997) Zambia: building in-country capacity for sustainable democracy – IIDEA Report, Stockholm

¹⁶ CD presents serious problems because of limitations of what the transition to capacitation means including the definition, process and practice of CD that can not be understood the way they are understood in the generic meaning elsewhere; when does CD start and end- it is difficult to pin down the timing of the end of the transition to capacious states and there is also the thorny issue of vetting civil society as a counterweight to the power of the state.