

G / GOVERNING GLOBALIZING CITIES, RESHAPING URBAN POLICIES

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1. Introduction

What happened to urban policies? Rumours and evidence of retreat or even death of urban policies have been documented in line with the restructuring of the nation state, globalisation processes and the neo liberal turn of many public policies: large public investments in social housing is for instance at low ebb (Harloe 1995). By contrast, urban policies seem to be everywhere, “new” urban policies in particular, whatever that means, seem to flourish even at every level. Against the view that globalisation is sweeping everything and determining the faith of cities, a set of literature attempts to show that state and cities have still a major say in the structuring and organisation of cities, hence a role for politics and institutions in relation to social groups, and economic relations constrained and articulated to different sets of pressures (Saraceno 2002; Marcuse & Van Kempen 2002; Moulaert 2002; Jessop 2002; Le Galès 2002, Brenner 2005, Harding, Forthcoming). Urbanization is reaching new high in the contemporary world with the rise of mega cities beyond 15 million inhabitants such as Calcutta, Los Angeles, Cairo, Tokyo, New York, Bombay or Seoul. Beyond the modern metropolis, researchers try to make sense of those large urban areas: postmetropolis, global cities, global city-regions. Processes of globalisation, including transnational migration, architecture, financial transactions, transport flux, or dissemination of technological innovations contribute to the rise of mega cities in different part of the globe. The puzzle of contemporary urban policies has to be studied in relation with two trends : 1) the development of multilevel governance and 2) during the current “Urban moment” (Beauregard & Body-Gendrot 2000; Healey, Khakee, Motte & Needham 1995), globalising cities are growing, gaining inhabitants (not everywhere,) and they are seen, for the time being, to be gaining momentum to be again place of cultural innovation, economic development, places for different kinds of projects and attempts to implement new modes of governance of multiculturalism.

However, there are tensions. The urban is as unsettled as ever, urban regions organised in networks, metropolitan areas, global cities, ever increasing suburbs, towns, neighbourhood, may all be targeted by urban policies. They face all ranges of problems: new forms or renewed forms of inequalities, poverty, competition pressure, illegal immigration, extreme right vote, urban renewal issues, pollution, crime, suburbanization, health alerts, creation of gated communities, globalisation, lack of social housing, etc.

For the time being, the political, economic, cultural and social questions are increasingly becoming urban questions under current conditions of capitalism. A key symptom of this dynamism of cities, and the importance it represents for the nation states is the conflicts surrounding urban policy which have been on the cards for the last decade in Western Europe. In Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Finland, Britain lately to name a few. Associations of cities were organised to challenge national urban policies and to claim a growing part of resources in order to both deal with social problems and to face investments related to their new economic and cultural role. This occurs at the expense of classical priorities of State regional policies, like for instance remote rural areas or support to small towns. Although not determinant, the urban/rural cleavage has gained new salience in Nordic countries (rise of agrarian parties) but also in Britain, Germany and France. Urban policies

have even emerged in centralised uniform welfare states such as Sweden (in 1998 for Göteborg, Malmö and Stockholm) and Finland, or in the South of Europe.

In the modern conception of the word city, characterised by the size, the aggregation of housing, differentiated division of labour, density of interaction several conceptions of cities were entangled and sometimes opposed underlining different processes of integration: the material city of walls, squares, houses, roads, light, utilities, buildings, waste, and physical infrastructure ; the cultural city in terms of imaginations, differences, representations, ideas, symbols, arts, texts, senses, religion, aesthetics ; the politics and policies of the city in terms of domination, power, government, mobilisation, public policies, welfare, education ; the social city of riots, ethnic, economic or gender inequalities, everyday life and social movements ; the economy of the city : division of labour, scale, production, consumption, trade, etc.

At a superficial level, the contrast between US and Europe is quite sharp: American scholars write about the decline of national urban policy, local welfare to work, race and attempts to revive metropolitan government, new urbanism, private developers, urban regime and growth coalitions. European scholars emphasise urban social policies, public investments, growing cities, political legitimacy and initiatives of urban elites, welfare anti poverty policy. However, the combination of both remaining of the European legacy, in particular the combination of economic and social policies supported by powerful groups and public funds, together with increasing pressures and fragmentation of the policy process which make the comparison with the US case much more obvious. Issues of social and racial segregation, violence or boosterism make the point.

Urban policies have come back on the political agenda both because of their own dynamics but in relation with state restructuring and economic changes. The paper attempts at documenting some of the current changes of urban policies in different context. Those are likely to shape the future of urban policies. The paper looks at what the priorities might be for a new round of reshaped urban policies and set some priorities. As in previous period, changing economic and social conditions, state restructuring and political entrepreneurs are on their way to set a different list of priorities and therefore to bring those problems on the policy agenda under the heading “urban policy”.

2. Urban Policy: legacy of the past and innovative labelling

Instead of analysing urban policies as they are labelled by governmental agencies, it is first useful to remember past urban policies and how at times, different set of policies are labelled as urban policy.

Before concentrating on new urban policy and moving toward reshaping urban policy, it is worth remembering briefly past experiences. Urban policy is nothing new of course and there is in Europe a long history related to the rise of the medieval cities, communal government and the making of the nation state. Bourgeois running medieval urban communes invented public policies to organise town planning, to maintain social order, to build housing and protect properties, to foster economic development, with the last being their main concern. The making of nation states also had an urban policy dimension to dominate cities: states elites created castles and fortresses to protect cities, symbols of their powers through public buildings and transports networks such as roads. Developing a prestigious capital was seen as an essential element of state making. In many ways, over several hundreds years, national urban policy was first and foremost about the transformation of the state capital with the support of state resources. London, Madrid, Paris, Vienna, Stockholm, Berlin, Rome all benefited from national programmes designed to develop the capital, creating new buildings, lightning the streets, creating avenues, developing a police system to control the poor. Competition between regional cities to attract the railways or major public building, or in the distant past to be on the main road or to locate the main seat of the Churches was nothing new as for instance.

In the US, as Hutchinson and Gottdiener (2006) remind us, the colonial period had in particular three major consequences for American cities which sharply contrast with their European counterparts : 1) the absence of city walls i.e. the fact that location within and beyond the city was remarkably free of various constraints; 2) the absence of independent economic privileges or rights specific to the city and therefore the freedom for various groups to split for whatever reasons and to develop new settlements hence a pattern of fragmentation, privatism and weak political power attached to the city, to this day; 3) the crucial role of land development when land was so freely available and cheap and the competition between coalition or network to organise land development, a major source of wealth creation, a distinctive pattern of boosterism and economic competition.

In the modern sense, urban policies started during the XIX century, i.e. at the time of the making or the reinforcement of the modern nation state using all the modern techniques of government. The European urban map was modified by the rise of industrial cities, mainly in Britain and Germany and the coming of age of imperial capitals, Vienna, London, Paris, Berlin. In that context, both urban government elites and state elites had to face the consequences of rapid urban growth in terms of need to build or organise streets, roads, sewerage, gas and then electricity networks, transport, street lighting, refuse collection, fire stations, abattoirs but also uncertainties associated to crowds, riots, mass epidemics and cycles of unemployment. New circulation and knowledge about health and epidemics gave rise to concerns about the interdependence of populations within cities, hence the rise of national policies to bring hygiene to cities in De Swaan (1988). Embryonic urban public policies were then adopted at the national level because public health issues and social concerns formed the basis upon which political elites started to react and to implement programmes such as vaccination of slums clearances. The fear of the working class and the threat it posed to the existing social and political order were also central in the “urban” policies of the time.¹

The development of urban policies went hand in hand with the making of professions and international networks of professionals, planners in particular but also social reformers more generally. In many ways, forms of internationalisation processes were strongly at play at the time as cities elites and urban professionals from different countries and cities were in close contact and influencing each other, policy transfers were common practice, including with the US (Saunier, 2001).

After the two wars, a new cycle of modern urbanisation was at play. Decades of economic growth fed urbanisation and city growth. During the time of economic and welfare growth, cities were rather an anonymous category within the nation state. In the North of Europe for instance, the rise of the universal welfare state tended to erase the social or economic distinctiveness of cities. French centralising Jacobins or British anti urban elites did not trust cities: this did not contribute to either the development of urban programmes or the political rise of cities elites. Urban policy was the development of welfare state programmes and services, first in cities and then all over the country: schools, universities, hospitals, roads, railways stations, research and cultural centres, social housing in the central and northern part of Europe.

However specific cases of urban policies emerged. In the Netherlands, the ambitious social housing programmes were the main vehicle to contribute to the development of cities. In Italy, there was no such thing as urban policy (and a limited amount of social housing) but gradually, historic city centres became centres of interest. They had to be restored and protected from cars and pollutions. “Centro storico” became a key word and goal of urban policies to protect historic city centres all over Italy. In Britain, urban policy was about planning the growth and then restructuring of the major industrial conurbations and was understood in terms of land and planning regulations, including the

1 . In Topalov (1990) as Harvey (1985*b*) eloquently put it in the Paris case

construction of New Towns. France in the 1960's had at least three, often contradictory urban policies : the building of utilities, transports and housing, the development of regional capitals supported by state investment (research centres, hospitals, cultural centres) and the organisation of the Paris region hence the creation of new towns, motorways, rail networks, and La Défense business centre.

Urban policies came back on the agenda, labelled as such in the 1970's. After president Nixon declared that the war against poverty in US cities was over (sic!), the hopes of poverty erosion, of welfare and economic growth vanished with the economic crisis, long term unemployment, new forms of poverty and social exclusion, the strengthening of anti immigrants ideas and groups, and the coming back of a political form of mobilisation that many thought had disappeared: riots. The social question was transformed and presented again as an urban question. In that meaning, the rise of urban policies in the 1970's could be labelled in terms of urban policies to deal with the social and economic crisis of industrial cities in particular in large housing estates, in the city centre (inner city) or in the suburbs of ports and industrial cities such as cities in the Ruhr, Liège, Turin, Lille, St Etienne, Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, the West Midlands, Antwerp, Glasgow, Liverpool, Le Havre, Marseille, Rotterdam, Göteborg, Porto, Genoa, Napoli, Bilbao but also part of the largest metropolis, in London, Paris, or Berlin.

New waves of immigration also made the urban crisis more visible within the public debate. The post war economic boom and imperial legacy attracted many new populations in Western Europe, in particular in the North and much later, particularly in the last decade, in the south. Business leaders encouraged immigration of cheap labour but that was often debated and contested in the political debate not least in France, Britain or Germany (Hansen and Weil, 2001). From the late 1960's onwards, the issue of "immigration" or "race" has become an important political issue with a clear urban bias in most countries (Body-Gendrot and Martiniello, 2000). The current debate in Italy and Spain echoes older debates in northern more industrial cities. The urban became "coloured" in many ways, not to the American extent, not for the time being one may say, but in a very obvious way. Immigrants communities organised as such became a component of urban life first in large industrial cities, capitals and ports such as Birmingham, Stockholm, Antwerp, Brussels or Marseille but gradually in most European cities. Policies to accommodate those new groups had a distinct urban element.

The social dimension of urban policy was therefore central in the new "urban policies" of the 1970's. Social redistribution in favour of the rising tide of poor population within cities appeared central. However, rapidly, the issue of urban regeneration and economic development was also brought forward either because it was ideologically driven by the neo liberal Thatcher revolution in the UK case or because cities came to be seen as crucial engines of economic development in the new post industrial economic development. In the UK, the basic assumptions and urban policy instruments were radically modified: public investments and social services were not seen as the solution to the urban crisis but as causes of the problems. This version of "new" urban policy aimed at promoting market disciplines, competition and private sector investments in most cities at the expense of the professions, local authorities, planning rules and social redistribution, sometimes mimicking US urban initiatives in terms of flagship projects, private developers' investments in quays and harbours, and business led partnership.

Beyond the UK, most governments became concerned with the role of cities in economic development. From the mid 1980's onwards, Western European cities enjoyed economic and demographic urban growth run parallel with processes of suburbanisation and metropolitanisation, hence opening new conflicts for urban policies, including processes of centrifugal fragmentation (Dematteis, 2000).

3. Policies for cities, metropolis or suburbs?

From the 1960's onwards, the American debate on cities has also been dominated by the image of the crisis which links three elements. Cities like St Louis, Pittsburgh or Philadelphia have simply lost more than half of their population, a figure which in Europe is only comparable to the worse British cases of urban decline : Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and hardly known elsewhere "on the western part of the continent."

Firstly, the image of the urban crisis was shaped by the series of urban riots in the 1960's in New York, Los Angeles and a few others. The obsession with race became even more central in urban America. The question of the ghetto, ethnic and spatial segregation of the black population became essential. Secondly, the industrial economic crisis led to the accelerated decline of industrial cities from the North East which has been underlined. The classic image of metropolis/cities in the US became associated with crime, social problems, violence. The departure or collapse of firms led to major financial difficulties epitomised by the bankruptcy of New York in the 1970's. Thirdly, the state supported boom of new houses in suburbs fed the "white flight", the massive suburbanisation of the US, what observers have called the rise of "edge cities". White middle classes massively left the inner cities and the metropolis for either the suburbs or rapidly growing cities in the south and the west, leaving the rustbelt. The cultural divide between city and suburb grew, and the political support for the needs of cities and their poorer inhabitants declined.

The gloomy picture of the marginalisation of cities and metropolis remained both politically and empirically accurate in the 1980's in the US when booming cities were at last identified in the European context. By the 1980's, there was a remarkable revival of not only large but also medium size classic European cities and urban agglomeration, regional capitals for instance, in particular in the North of Europe, the Netherlands, part of Germany, France, Austria, and to a lesser extent in Italy, much later in the UK. On average, this dynamic was marked by one feature which confused many analysts: the growth concerned both the city and the urban agglomeration. In most cities, the urban growth took the dynamics of suburbanisation. However, in most cases the city centre also enjoyed growth, or gentle decline in marked difference with the UK and the US. Timing is essential here: by the late 1980's, medium sized European cities/urban agglomerations were enjoying growth and dynamism while gloom prevailed in the American context. In the US the 1990s presented the strongest urban growth in four decades (Katz, 2005). Urban America is striking back, for the first time in decades, the census showed the revival of urban agglomerations.

The contrast is of course not just about the timing: the remarkable feature of Europe was the long term stability i.e. the revival of medieval cities or regional and national capitals with strong identification and public role of the city centre. By contrast in the US, beyond New York and Los Angeles, fastest growing cities and urban agglomerations are to be found in the sunbelt, Las Vegas, Austin, Dallas, Atlanta, Miami or Phoenix epitomizes the urban growth of sprawled, polycentric, low density cities.

One way to think about urban development in US and Europe alike is to defend the idea of the end of cities and the triumph of urban sprawl, in other words the suburbanisation of cities and the urbanisation of suburbs, what Dear and his colleagues in Los Angeles sometimes call the Los Angelisation of the world (Dear et al. 2000). This makes sense as suburbs are more and more diverse in the US and cases of sprawls are rapidly growing in Europe ... but that does not undermine the strength of cities. "Sprawl is a land development pattern that spreads residential units over a large area ... sprawl also encompasses the separation of residential from commercial land uses, the absence of clustered development of town centers, and reliance on the automobile" (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2004: 59). In that line of analysis, the dissolution of the city is taking place within a

large fragmented, chaotic, unstable urban world: if that is the case, why bother for urban policy? It is useful to look at figures about cities and metropolitan areas in the two continents (Tables G.1-2)

Table G.1 Fifty largest US (2000) and European cities (2003)

Rank	City	Population (Census 2000)	Rank	City	Country	Population (2003)
1	New York	8.008.278	1	London	UK	7.074.000
2	Los Angeles	3.694.820	2	Berlin	Germany	3.387.000
3	Chicago	2.896.016	3	Madrid	Spain	2.824.000
4	Houston	1.953.631	4	Roma	Italy	2.649.000
5	Philadelphia	1.517.55.	5	Paris	France	2.152.000
6	Phoenix	1.321.045	6	Hamburg	Germany	1.705.000
7	San Diego	1.223.400	7	Vienna	Austria	1.540.000
8	Dallas	1.188.580	8	Barcelona	Spain	1.455.000
9	San Antonio	1.144.646	9	Milan	Italy	1.306.000
10	Detroit	951.270	10	Munich	Germany	1.195.000
11	San Jose	894.943	11	Naples	Italy	1.047.000
12	Indianapolis	791.926	12	Birmingham	UK	1.021.000
13	San Francisco	776.733	13	Köln	Germany	963.000
14	Jacksonville	735.617	14	Turin	Italy	921.000
15	Columbus	711.470	15	Marseille	France	800.000
16	Austin	656.562	16	Athens	Greece	772.000
17	Baltimore	651.154	17	Thessaloniki	Greece	749.000
18	Memphis	650.100	18	Stockholm	Sweden	744.000
19	Milwaukee	596.974	19	Valencia	Spain	736.000
20	Boston	589.141	20	Amsterdam	Netherlands	729.000
21	Washington DC	572.059	21	Leeds	UK	727.000
22	Nashville-Davidson	569.891	22	Seville	Spain	695.000
23	El Paso	563.662	23	Palermo	Italy	689.000
24	Seattle	563.374	24	Genoa	Italy	656.000
25	Denver	554.636	25	Frankfurt/Main	Germany	644.000
26	Charlotte	540.828	26	Glasgow	UK	616.000
27	Fort Worth	535.694	27	Saragossa	Spain	601.000
28	Portland	529.121	28	Essen	Germany	600.000
29	Oklahoma City	506.132	29	Rotterdam	Netherlands	593.000
30	Tucson	486.699	30	Dortmund	Germany	590.000
31	New Orleans	484.674	31	Stuttgart	Germany	582.000
32	Las Vegas	478.434	32	Düsseldorf	Germany	569.000
33	Cleveland	478.403	33	Lisbon	Portugal	563.000
34	Long Beach	461.522	34	Helsinki	Finland	549.000
35	Albuquerque	448.607	35	Malaga	Spain	543.000
36	Kansas City	441.545	36	Bremen	Germany	540.000
37	Fresno	427.652	37	Sheffield	UK	530.000
38	Virginia Beach	425.257	38	Duisburg	Germany	520.000
39	Atlanta	416.474	39	Hanover	Germany	515.000
40	Sacramento	407.018	40	Oslo	Norway	505.000
41	Oakland	399.484	41	Copenhagen	Denmark	499.000
42	Mesa	396.375	42	Leipzig	Germany	490.000
43	Tulsa	393.049	43	Nuremberg	Germany	487.000
44	Omaha	390.007	44	Bradford	UK	483.000
45	Minneapolis	382.618	45	Dublin	Ireland	482.000
46	Honolulu	371.657	46	Dresden	Germany	477.000
47	Miami	362.470	47	Liverpool	UK	468.000
48	Colorado Springs	360.890	48	Antwerpen	Belgium	468.000
49	St Louis	348.189	49	Gothenburg	Sweden	462.000
50	Wichita	344.284	50	Edinburgh	UK	449.000

Source: US Census Bureau, www.citymayors.com

Table G.2. Fifty largest US and European metropolitan areas in 2000

Rank	Metropolitan area	Population	Rank	Metropolitan area	Population
1	New York	21 199 865	1	Essen	9 962 743
2	Los Angeles	16 373 645	2	Paris	9 849 666
3	Chicago	9 157 540	3	London	9 160 487
4	Washington	7 608 070	4	Madrid	4 658 427
5	San Francisco	7 039 362	5	Brussels	4 423 523
6	Philadelphia	6 188 463	6	Barcelona	3 988 393
7	Boston	5 819 100	7	Manchester	3 976 124
8	Detroit	5 456 428	8	Milan	3 890 644
9	Dallas	5 221 801	9	Berlin	3 755 223
10	Houston	4 669 571	10	Athens	3 349 716
11	Atlanta	4 112 198	11	Rotterdam	3 116 490
12	Miami	3 876 380	12	Naples	2 973 487
13	Seattle	3 554 760	13	Rome	2 897 788
14	Phoenix	3 251 876	14	Birmingham	2 456 183
15	Minneapolis	2 968 806	15	Lisbon	2 344 824
16	Cleveland	2 945 831	16	Hamburg	2 195 830
17	San Diego	2 813 833	17	Vienna	1 928 221
18	St. Louis	2 603 607	18	Lille	1 800 000
19	Denver	2 581 506	19	Kortrijk	1 696 813
20	San Juan	2 450 292	20	Leeds	1 659 893
21	Tampa	2 395 997	21	Munich	1 576 104
22	Pittsburgh	2 358 695	22	Frankfurt/Main	1 439 695
23	Portland	2 265 223	23	Lyon	1 416 093
24	Cincinnati	1 979 202	24	Turin	1 400 320
25	Sacramento	1 796 857	25	Copenhagen	1 396 666
26	Kansas City	1 776 062	26	Marseille	1 354 571
27	Milwaukee	1 689 572	27	Stockholm	1 346 291
28	Orlando	1 644 561	28	Valence	1 332 319
29	Indianapolis	1 607 486	29	Glasgow	1 317 411
30	San Antonio	1 592 383	30	Porto	1 258 077
31	Norfolk	1 569 541	31	Stuttgart	1 210 544
32	Las Vegas	1 563 282	32	Douai	N/A
33	Columbus	1 540 157	33	Peruwelz	1 202 742
34	Charlotte	1 499 293	34	Newcastle	1 178 500
35	New Orleans	1 337 726	35	Amsterdam	1 158 310
36	Salt Lake City	1 333 914	36	Bielefeld	1 118 606
37	Greensboro	1 251 509	37	Seville	1 050 941
38	Austin	1 249 763	38	Helsinki	1 037 958
39	Nashville	1 231 311	39	Zurich	985 624
40	Providence	1 188 613	40	Dublin	978 282
41	Raleigh	1 187 941	41	Bilbao	944 527
42	Hartford	1 183 110	42	Florence	924 858
43	Buffalo	1 170 111	43	Southampton	904 278
44	Memphis	1 135 614	44	Nice	893 366

45	West Palm Beach	1 131 184	45	Mannheim	891 244
46	Jacksonville	1 100 491	46	Bremen	838 710
47	Rochester	1 098 201	47	Genes	826 163
48	Grand Rapids	1 088 514	48	Thessaloniki	805 645
49	Oklahoma City	1 083 346	49	Oslo	778 998
50	Louisville	1 025 598	50	Toulouse	775 512

Source: Sources: US Census Bureau, Moriconi-Ebrard (2000), Géopolis database.

Contrasting urbanization in US and in Europe

At first glance, two features make those two continents more or less comparable. Firstly, both continents are now massively urbanised, more than 80 % of inhabitants live in cities. As shown in previous figures, the dynamics was staggering in the US case while more progressive in the European case. For most Southern European countries and some Nordic European countries, the generalisation of urbanisation only took place in the post war period, while rural populations and interests were still very strong and organised. Secondly, if one takes as a measure, the number of urban agglomerations comprising more than a million inhabitants, one will find a more or less comparable number of urban agglomerations, around 35. However, this does not suffice, and those averages mask profound differences.

Europe and the US are distinct not only because of the “longue durée” of European cities but also the relative stability of the urban map made of medium size cities. Beyond London and Paris, other European cities of this size are rare. Thanks to their work in building databases on European and world cities (Moriconi and Ebrard, 1993) Cattan (*et al.* 1994) are able to highlight the factors that distinguish Europe. With a degree of urbanization comparable to that of the United States, Europe is characterized firstly by its very large number of cities and their marked proximity to one another: in Cattan (*et al.* 1994: 23); secondly, by the fact that the major cities of Europe are not huge: large metropolises with a population of over two or three million are rare, and ‘if one compares the total number of urban areas of over 200,000, the average size is of the order of 800,000 in Europe, as against 1.3 million in the United States and Japan. The top thirty American cities are markedly larger than the top thirty European cities’ in Cattan (*et al.* 1994 p. 26); and thirdly, by the relative importance of small and medium-sized cities: Europe distinguishes itself by its relatively large number of urban areas of between 200,000 and one or two million. In 1990, the European Union contained 225 urban areas of 200,000 or more, forty or so of these exceeding one million and a very small number, two million.

Given that to some extent size goes with social, political, and economic diversity and complexity, these facts provide a very important contextual element for the analysis of European cities: one that is accounted for partly by the age of cities that came into being before the development of different forms of transport. The relatively stable core of Europe's urban system is made up of medium-sized and reasonably large cities, which are fairly close to one another, and a few metropolises. This importance of regional capital cities, of medium sized cities (200 000 to 2 million inhabitants) remains a major feature of contemporary European societies in Therborn (1985) and Crouch (1999). But are those features under threat?

Cities versus metropolis: the Los Angelisation of the world?

In the 1970's, cities, in the US and Europe alike many cities and urban areas lost population and were bound to disappear. Many prophets, including sociologists announced the end of cities as we knew it, the coming age of a post city era, or the final crisis of cities organised by capitalism. The loss of population includes two different phenomena: 1) departure of population from both the city and the

metropolitan area because of deindustrialisation for instance or the decline of the city because of suburbanisation and 2) the rise of the metropolitan area (case of Paris for instance, Brussels, Milan, Marseille, or Lisbon). Again similar dynamics in the two continents had very different outcomes. “Born to run” Americans massively left the cities for the suburbs but also the industrial North East, when “born to stay Europeans” only left the more industrial cities to a lesser extent. Those individual choices are largely influenced by collective strategies: European Welfare states and urban policies contributed to the regeneration of quick growth of medium size cities when the absence of regional or urban policy and less generous welfare state encourage adjustments by mobility.

In the European context, the economic crisis of the 1970’s marked the decline of the once symbol of economic development: industrial cities. Large scale economic restructuring processes took place the relative or absolute decline of the most industrial regions, particularly the oldest, and of industrial ports. UK northern cities in particular lost hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. The decline was even more pronounced in small industrial cities. All these have experienced the effects of deindustrialization, the urban crisis, loss of population (especially the most highly-skilled people), and the departure of firms, followed by attempts to renew the fabric of enterprise, either by attracting businesses or by creating them. (See the Urban Audit 2000). The scale of the urban decline was particularly massive in UK cities, in industrial Belgian cities, in the Ruhr Germany, in industrial harbours or in the industrial triangle of the North West of Italy.

However, this was not the dominant pattern of European cities: industrialisation and then deindustrialisation were important dynamics but overall represented a parenthesis in the structuring of urban Europe. The power of images of urban decay together with the dominance of UK literature gave the overall impression that cities were in decline all over Europe. Also, beyond the urban industrial crisis, the rise of post 68 anti urban ideology in the European greens and left gave rise to powerful images of the coming age of a post city period. Numerous accounts of the “end of the city” prophecy developed all over Europe, in the north in relation for instance with ecological disasters or the final crisis of capitalism.

Increasing urban concentration has been accompanied by apparently inescapable, unlimited dispersal into conurbations and into urban regions with fluctuating outlines. Cities have expanded, fragmented, and organized into networks like those in Northern Italy or the Netherlands, and this is said to be rendering traditional spatial representations obsolete. Many writers stress the unending extension of the suburbs, the development of ‘non-places’, in Augé (1992) anonymously similar urban spaces (motorway slip roads, shopping centres, residential developments, areas of commodified leisure facilities, car parks, railway stations and airports, office blocks, and leisure parks), and megalopolises (‘post-cities’) in different parts of the world. In short, this is the time of ‘citizens without cities’ (Agier, 1999), where new forms and experiences are being invented.

Physically, the medieval European city was characterized by: a citadel, an enclosing wall and a marketplace, a built-up area around a focal point, administrative and public buildings, churches, monuments, squares, areas for commerce and trade, and development radiating out from the centre revealing the centralisation of power, the relative integration, if not coherence of the city, unlike American cities, which are organized around a geometric plan. The medieval city evolved little by little, partly as a result of the development of such towns and partly because walls and identifiable town boundaries gradually disappeared to make way for “faubourgs”, i.e. districts beyond the walls, and peripheral urban spaces.

By contrast, the US model was constructed around the industrial city with its low-income neighbourhoods linked to manufacturing districts and close to commercial cores and its middle income neighbourhoods beyond. The theme of the physical break-up of the city is classic in the American

literature, because of the exodus into residential suburbs and the decline of the centres of big cities. This vision of break-up has been strengthened by the political marginalization of cities, the creation of fortified districts on the margins of cities, and the development of secessionist movements, for example in Los Angeles or Toronto (Boudreau and Keil, 2000). In the American experience, privately owned, fragmented technical networks have promoted urban sprawl and the break-up of cities, giving rise to urban regions with several focal points defined in contrast to the city centre.

This built-up-town model, characteristic of the medieval city, has not remained unchanged. The logic of the metropolis exerted a strong influence on the way in which the urban space broke up and became increasingly complex. Revolutions in technology, starting with roads and railways, had an impact on the development of cities and the forms they took. Finally, every state made its mark, in the shape of public buildings, networks, forms of urban planning, and the development of forms of housing. It was a mark that varied considerably according to country: the ascendancy of the Jacobin French state, with its prefectures and stations, had little in common with that of the Italian or Swedish states. Despite these significant differences, the centre, whether historic or not, continues to hold meaning in most European cities and has preserved its historic influence — for example, as a place for citizens to gather at protest meetings. The way authority is organized also still has meaning in relation to the centre. European cities have remained relatively built-up in nature, even though important developments have taken place, and the imagined picture of the city is still a reality.

American cities were organised around a particular type of urban planning model “the grid”, with low density, essential role given to cars, zoning, and suburbanisation. After 1945, mobility became even more the distinctive characteristics of American within a dynamic society where the large middle class was in them making. The post war period marks the triumph of highways, trucks, flights air freight (Warner, 1985). Moving people and commodities became inexpensive. The rise of ports and trading centres in all four corners of the USA led to major urban development. Progressively cities in the West and the South of the US started to grow from Houston, Dallas, San Antonio but also Memphis, New Orleans, Seattle and Phoenix and Los Angeles. The rise of a large number of widespread metropolises was accompanied by the dispersal of population from central city.

In the US, the 1990’s are characterised by the following elements: sprawl, continuous decline of the poorest industrial cities and revival of central districts within metropolitan areas. Out of the suburban migration of the middle classes accentuated after World War II, emerged the prototypical metropolis with its central city ringed by suburban enclaves. In the best cases, the commercial core became dominant. In the worst cases, it along with manufacturing districts was in decline. The dynamics of development was horizontal, with activities de-concentrated and decentralized from the centre and the making of secondary centres in the urban region, hence the image of the polycentric metropolis.

The 1990s saw, as has been the case for at least 50 years, a continuous sprawl of metropolitan areas. A study of the 50 American largest cities during that period shows that they grew faster than in the 1970s and 1980s: 9.8 % according to the 2000 census, whereas this rate was 6.3 % in the 80s and – 1.6 % in the 70s. Several cities, such as Atlanta, Chicago, Denver or Memphis, gained population after a decrease in the 1980s. Nevertheless, suburbs grew even faster: the population growth in the 100 largest cities during the 1990s was 8.8 %, in the 100 largest suburbs it was 17 %. In Atlanta for instance, the central city’s population growth was 6 %, 44 % in its suburbs. The analysis of the 2000 census about US cities with populations greater than 100 000 also reveals that the median growth rate for cities in the 1990s was 8.7 %, more than double the median growth rate of the 1980s (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001). Old industrial metropolitan areas with high unemployment rates are growing slower and have not yet entirely recovered after a period of economic decline. By contrast, the cities with less social and economic problems are growing fast: levels of residents’ education and income are

consistent predictors of urban growth (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001). Also, foreign-born residents contributed to strong-city growth rates. Storper and Manville (2006) rightly suggest distinguishing two different processes: the coming back of metropolitan areas which had lost investment and population on the one hand, the revival on central cities on the other. The coming back of various groups within the central cities, enjoying city life was seen as a major shift.

Europe: increase of sprawl but not the decline of cities

The European context is made of few declining cities, many dynamic medium size and large cities, and two dynamic large global cities, whatever that means. European cities make a fairly general category of urban space, relatively original forms of compromise, aggregation of interest and culture which brings together local social groups, associations, organised interests, private firms and urban governments. The pressures created by property developers, major groups in the urban services sector, and cultural and economic globalization processes provoke reactions and adaptation processes of actors within European cities, defending the idea of a fairly particular type of city that is not yet in terminal decline. The modernized myth of the European city remains a very strongly mobilized resource, and is strengthened by growing political autonomy and transverse mobilizations.

The long term meta stability of the European urban structure has been central in the making and development of European societies but that does not lead to a conservative view of the urbanity of the European city—balanced, welcoming, innovative, and dynamic, isolated from any restructuring of the labour market, from globalization processes, social conflicts, re-organized power relations, new forms of domination, deregulation of transport, telecommunications, and energy services, as well as from pollution and from persistent and developing forms of poverty. This stability goes together with its original structure (the high concentration of medium-sized cities) and the remains of its physical form. European cities (if we set London and Paris apart), although they are gaining more autonomy, are still structured and organized within European states — in particular, welfare states. The ongoing restructuring process does represent a threat, but — for the time being — European cities are supported and to some extent protected by the state, including in terms of resources. European cities are becoming more European, in the sense that the institutionalization of the EU is creating rules, norms, procedures, repertoires, and public policies that have an impact on most, if not all, cities. The EU also is a powerful agent of legitimation. By designing urban public policies and agreeing (under the influence of city interests) to mention the idea of ‘a Europe of cities’ as one of the components of the EU, it is giving a boost to cities to act and to behave as actors within EU governance. This also, to some extent, leads other actors — for instance, firms — to take European cities more seriously. Another point relates to their economic and social structure. European cities are characterized by a mix of public services and private firms, including a robust body of middle class and lower-middle class public sector workers, who constitute a firm pillar of the social structure. Despite increasing social tensions, inequalities, even riots at times. There is no ideal world of European cities but the remains of a less unequal social structure than in most cities in the world. The more important the welfare state and the scale of redistribution (North of Europe), the lesser the level of inequality and poverty. Both the form of the city, the existence of public spaces, the mix of social groups, and despite powerful social segregation mechanisms, and one can suggest the idea of continuing sense of “urbanity” still characterizing European cities in Zijdeveld (1998). Despite sprawling movements in most European cities, the resistance of the old city centres epitomizes their peculiarity. Levy takes the example of large public collective transport (in particular the tramway) together with pedestrian areas and cycling paths to demonstrate the remaining strength of the idea of European city. Finally, there is a continuing representation of the city as a whole, Crouch (1999) suggests a “Durkheimian” view of the city which still exists in Europe. The increased legitimacy of political urban elites sustains and re-invents this presentation. European cities are still strongly regulated by public authorities and complex arrangement of public and private actors. European cities appear to be relatively robust, despite

pressures from economic actors, individuals, and states (including welfare states) being reshaped within the European Union. Processes of exclusion, strengthening and transformation of inequalities, segregation, and domination are also unfolding in these cities. The development of residential suburbs separated from the city and of polycentric cities, the isolation of disadvantaged districts, the development of cultural complexes, leisure facilities and shopping centres, as well as diverse cultural models and migrations, all clearly demonstrate the pressures exerted on the traditional medium-sized city. The urban regions of Milan, the Randstadt are good example of more polycentric structure and interdependent dynamics between the city centre and other cities. Finally — and this point is vital to our analysis — actors within cities have been strongly mobilized to direct the future of cities.

Yet, focusing on European cities nowadays goes hand in hand with analysis of forms of interdependence between scales, between levels of government, multilevel strategies of social actors and linkages between forms of mobility and local societies. It would be a vain exercise to work on European cities without applying oneself at all to the global strategies of major firms from private developers to utilities and leisure firms, to the transnational communities that weave links on both sides of the Mediterranean or towards the East, to the competition rules drawn up and then imposed in the European Union context, or to the restructuring of welfare states.

Since the mid-1980s, cities (those that are not old industrial cities), and above all the largest cities, have felt the full benefits of growth. In centralized countries, it seems to be mainly the region around the capital city that absorbs the strongest forces and the economic dynamism: this is true not only of London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin, the capitals of the leading Member States, but also of Madrid, Dublin, Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Lisbon. In the lower echelons of the hierarchy of cities, some regional capitals and other medium-sized European cities have also experienced strong growth: Bologna, Strasbourg, Lyon, Grenoble, Nice, Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Geneva, Valencia, Seville, Saragossa, Norwich, Bristol, Swindon, Leicester, Turku. In some cases, however, economic dynamism has actually combined with population losses to release the grip previously exerted by certain metropolises, a development that has been particularly spectacular in Northern Italy, where medium-sized cities from Milan to Venice have seen very strong growth. A new feature has been that a number of cities have undergone economic development disconnected from the regions surrounding them. The movement of concentration/dispersal of activities favours smaller cities and rural spaces around cities. By contrast, others — especially smaller cities (which, from a French point of view, might be described as medium-sized cities) — are experiencing changes that tend more towards decline, as if regional metropolises in their turn are largely absorbing the economic dynamism of their region, as in Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées.

4. Urban policies as public policies

This brief historical account reminds us of the wide range of policy programmes which make sense as “urban policies” but also of the limits of labels such as “urban policy”. Urban policies are part of the complex crossed boundaries, crossed sectors world of public policies and should be analysed in those terms. In analytical terms, it has been a common mistake to analyse urban policy as independent from changes in public policy in general.

Firstly, in multi-level governance system, every level of government is required to be able to demonstrate it has an urban policy. Once the question of urban crisis, poverty and or social exclusion has entered the political field, and it has been the case in old industrial cities, in the US and now more else everywhere, it acquired a dynamics of its own as an issue which will be regularly activated through research reports, claims by organised interests, images, policy discourses. Political elites, whatever the level, cannot be seen doing nothing. In his classic account of symbolic policies, M.

Edelman (1985) chooses the example of the creation of a national urban agency in the 1950's in the USA to show that something was done. The creation of task forces, committees, agencies surrounded by publicity is a classic tool of government. In the cases of urban policies, where the time scale of change is rather slow, several years or a decade, and where many actors and issues are mixed, it is particularly tempting for political elites to demonstrate ad hoc commitment to large programmes, priorities, new agencies, emergency programmes, and units. For instance, the fantastic photograph of Mrs Thatcher within the urban ruin of an industrial city, wearing a building worker's helmet, in the early 1980's, also clearly signalled that the government was in charge and was dealing with the problem. Creating an urban programme or initiative is a way to avoid blames in case of problems, for instance urban riots.

Most of the times, a "new policy" results from the re-organisation of existing pieces of public policy which are reassembled, brought together and re-branded as "new urban policy". Reassembling and reframing elements of public policies is a major activity within ministries for two reasons: 1) policies die hard and 2) there is a constant pressure for ministers to be visible in the public debate, to start new initiatives, to launch new policies, to start innovative programmes. Even cases of innovation most of the time build upon existing marginal programmes which are brought to the fore as was for instance the case of the "new urban policy" in France, labelled as "politique de la ville" before it got a dynamics of its own (Estèbe, 2003).

Secondly, urban policies, as most public policies, are part of the world of overlapping powers within the global and regional (such as European) governance in the making: municipalities, metropolitan authorities, regions sometimes, federal states or Autonomies, the nation state, the EU and sometimes the OECD, the UN (Habitat Summit) international rules comprising environmental norms, can play a role in urban policies. There are endless cases of urban policies where the norm is now for the overlapping funding and influence of different levels of government, for the better i.e. more targeted and coordinated effort, or the worse, more piecemeal fragmented actions. In most countries, the territorial organisation of the nation state has been facing serious reshaping, an ongoing process which leads to the pluralisation of territorial interests within the state. Associations, voluntary sector organisations, from neighbourhood group to giant utility firms have a say and some power in urban policies. Urban policy therefore covers a wide range of actors from different sector of societies, with different status, acting at different levels. Emerging problems raise questions which cross horizontally over bureaucracies and sectors, and vertically over different levels of government.

Urban problems, programmes and networks of actors are characterised by deep heterogeneity hence the attraction of decentralisation and experimentation. The development of new policy tools provides evidence of attempts to redefine public policy in a rather flexible way in order to face ill defined problems and to cope with difficult heterogeneous goals. If "combating poverty" or "regenerating urban neighbourhood in crisis" is a set goal, the degree of generality provides large room of manoeuvre to define, design, "bricoler" (Lascoumes & Le Bourhis 1998), various types of representations, goals and programmes. In all countries, urban public policies are not given. Some constructionist approach is required to see how locally, or nationally, the problem is constructed by different actors, how adjustment processes are taking place to define a cognitive frame which is adopted by the actors, what the relations of power are. The dynamic of partnership offers some remarkable insights of these processes (Benington & Geddes 2001).

Thirdly, changing urban policies in a globalising world may require to be analysed through the framework on the sharpest critics of globalised capitalism. N. Brenner for instance provides an ambitious theoretical framework and brings empirical evidence to analyse the transformation of the state under current conditions of capitalism (Brenner, 2004). In order to do so, Brenner concentrates on urban policy, that he defines as "encompassing all state activities orienting towards the regulation

of capitalist accumulation” (Brenner, 2004: 2), as the chief political mechanism to analyse those changes. He then argues that although the importance of the national state controlled scale of political power has been in decline, states are still very active and control many resources. In other words “they play a key role in formulating, implementing, coordinating and supervising urban policy initiative”. He develops his political economy of scale to analyse the rescaling of the state, or rather, statehood. He focuses on the dynamics of uneven development under capitalism and the rescaling of the state to deal with this. By contrast to most of the critical analysis of uneven development, he concentrates on the particular role of the state in dealing with the contradiction of accumulation by promoting regional and urban policy. That allows him to contrast the post war fordist Keynesian period with the more competitiveness driven approaches to contemporary state spatial policies.

Crucially, he therefore argues that “it is no longer capital that is to be moulded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space, but state space that is to be moulded into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital (p.16)” and therefore “the goal of national , regional and local state spatial policies is no longer to alleviate uneven geographical development but to intensify it through the deployment of locational policies designed to strengthen the place-specific socio-economic assets of strategic, globally linked regions”. His arguments allow a sharp contrast to be made between the urban governance and the nationalisation of state space under Keynesianism and then the coming age of inter-locality competition as a state project. Empirically, Neil Brenner aims at explaining what he calls the “major realignment of urban governance and state spatial policy that has occurred across Western Europe in the past three decades” (p.2). Brenner develops new ideas on the dynamics of regulatory regimes and their failure as the prime mechanism to restructure statehood and to develop new scales of urban policy, for instance at the neighbourhood level or at the city region level. There are some limits to this argument (Le Galès, 2007) but urban policy has to be considered not just at the level of cities themselves: the state plays a crucial role.

Urban policies are increasingly brought together and implemented at the urban level

All the points made previously stress the role of the urban elites to design, implement, and coordinate policies. Urban policies therefore are also a result of urban governments/governance transformation (John 2001; Le Galès 2002). In most OECD countries, more than half of public investment is now made at the local or regional level, in particular by urban governments hence the flourishing of projects and initiatives. Altogether, urban policies are at least as important as initiated by urban elites than national programmes. In terms of revenue raising and sharing, the context in which the cooperation/competition between various levels of government takes place is making the choice more acute and politically contested.

Urban government has not disappeared from globalising cities. Organised within nation states they still perform functions for the state together with having more responsibility because of the decentralisation, restructuring and differentiation of the state and the fragmentation of public policies. As cities are becoming even more a site of aggregation and representation of different interests then the job remains of bringing them together to organise a mode of governance of the city, to institutionalise collective action and to integrate them with a more or less shared cognitive framework, a set of priorities which may appear as the city common good. In cities, local governments have been profoundly restructured, becoming more political, strategic and organised for action, for implementing policies (Klausen and Magnier, 1998; John, 2001). Urban governments retain a strong presence, and their political expertise and influence are also tending to increase. By comparison with American public-private partnerships, which frequently vest most of the power in the private sector, European public-private partnership experiments remain fairly limited (except in the UK), and urban governments still have strong capacities for initiative and control. Urban governments have developed their mode of action in three directions in particular: consideration of group, neighbourhood and

resident demands, diversification of public policies and management of urban services despite privatisation (Lorrain and Stoker, 1995). The processes of making collective choice, choosing, linking, aggregating and representing interests within a territory, taking and implementing decisions are inherently politics. Therefore, within cities, urban governments and elected politicians are under pressure both to deal with a set of problems which used to be under state control (economic development, law and order, social exclusion, representation of the city in Europe). In terms of urban policies they are now at the first place both to deliver and implement national, European urban programmes –in the EU-, international norms and standards and to implement their own urban policies. There are issues which cannot be addressed at that level, but most of the literature on urban policies or urban governance stresses the dynamism and the relevance of urban policies understood as policies implemented by urban elites within the constraints of the nation state (Moulaert, Rodriguez and Swyngedouw, 2003; Haila and Le Galès, 2003).

What does the label “urban policies” cover?

The point has been made: urban policy is a rather elusive category, (but aren’t there all?). In most countries, urban policy was organised, shaped, determined by a set of actors, interests, institutions, representations, ideas which were related to the particular situation of a nation state. During what may be called a century cycle of the nation state, national variables were central to determine what urban policy would be, or would be considered to be in Asia, South America, North America or Europe. This national different structuring of what urban policy meant and its outcomes have not disappeared overnight. Any attempt to provide some views on urban policies has to take into account this heritage which has only been recently mixed with a different set of powers and internationalisation pressures. But new issues have arisen in close interaction with dynamics of state restructuring. Because cities are back on the agenda, because more resources, social conflicts and wealth production are concentrated there, the notion of urban policy is now recovering an ever increasing range of issues. Here is a list of items with a deliberate effort to avoid classification (Table G.3).

Table G.3 Urban policies: an empirical list

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic planning, urban collective projects • Housing, social housing (construction and destruction) • Construction and management of utilities, infrastructures, • Transport: railways, buses, airports, metro, tramway, stations, dealing with NIMBY’s • Area-based, transversal/global policies • Social services, targeting of categories : young children, old people • Training for the workforce, attracting specific professionals groups • Policies against social exclusion • Cultural policies: prestige projects, new museums, but also carnivals, festivals, Neighbourhood initiatives, initiatives to deal with multiculturalism • Regeneration policies, renovation of old urban centres, Quays, property developments, flagship projects • Economic development: training, attracting investment, image making, support to firms, enterprise zones, tax policies • Innovation policies • Anti-violence, social control, policing, dealing with marginal groups, surveillance, safety • Integration of immigrants, control of immigrants • Quality of life, environment, anti pollution, sustainable development • <i>Patrimoine</i>, protection of the historic centre • Urban tourism promotion, leisure and consumption spaces, public spaces, malls, entertainment, • Policies to raise participation of the inhabitants, democratic procedures, consultations • Health policies to target groups at risks, to deal with epidemics (Aids) • Investments in science, universities, research centres, innovation districts • Positive discrimination in disadvantages neighbourhoods: education, health, economic
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- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> development, public services • International exchange, twinings, international relations • Programmes to coordinate fragmented policies: partnership, contracts |
|---|

“New” urban policies are often the result of existing elements with a different emphasis. For instance, the EU “urban policy” came out as the hybrid result of different national traditions (mostly UK, France, The Netherlands) bringing together issues of economic, social and environmental regeneration. A European wide urban coalition has gradually organized, finding intermediaries among Commissioners, Member State representatives to the Commission, and in the Parliament, promoting the URBAN Programme for the renewal of urban neighbourhoods. The Commission also produced a document entitled ‘Europe’s cities, community measures in urban areas’ (1997), which has strengthened this dynamic. The URBAN programme has its objectives: promoting local employment, revitalizing depressed neighbourhoods both socially and economically, providing social and other services, improving living conditions and the urban environment and public spaces, and improving local strategies and decision-making processes so as to involve local communities. A second phase is now on the way (Aldskogius, 2002). This URBAN programme is therefore a classic case of hybridisation between different urban policy traditions (Atkinson, 1999a). The creation of the EU URBAN programmes goes together the making of a European network of Cities benefiting from that programme and its funding, the creation of professional networks and the dissemination of norms and rules, i.e. a classic case of horizontal European integration mechanism. However, urban policies in Europe are also shaped by EU competition policy, immigration policy or environment policy.

5. What sort of urban public policies for more mosaic like cities and metropolis? Urban policy and urban integration

Basically, in most places, some elements of those different policies are already at play one way or another, but with contrasting degrees of priority, funding, visibility. We identify seven trends in urban policy:

How can different ethnic, age and social groups live together within cities? Policies for the relative incorporation of different groups, the making of an urban common good, social policies

Policing the city : Regulating the flux, controlling the poor and the immigrants, control and surveillance

Urban renovation, housing, private developers, back to basics but financierisation of private developers

Fantasy cities, Internationalisation, place marketing, cities of culture

Economic development, places for innovation, economic competition

Sustainable development, energy saving, controlling utilities, investments in cities Transport, infrastructure, immaterial city

Anti-Corruption, performance, accountability, democracy

Each trend deserves a serious analysis. The present work concentrates on the issues of social order and integration within cities and on the policy instruments which are central for urban policies.

Inequalities are by definition quite central in cities which are more and more diverse. Historically, phases of vigorous capitalist accumulation and economic growth led to more class division, social and economic inequalities. Current development in developing cities of the world, from urban China to Sao Paolo, Johannesburg, Moscow or Mexico do not provide evidence that this classic line of analysis is obsolete. On the other hand, classic analyses on the doom obvious scenario of dual cities and massive exclusion have proved wrong in many cases. Although the situation is often complex because of the importance of lower middle and middle classes, similar pressures are at play in most large cities of the North. However, economic and social inequalities are also put in perspective with gender, ethnic, health, cultural inequalities, categories which may or may not relate to divisions of class. In terms of urban policy, some neo liberal thinkers have argued that as there are conflicting, plural differences, that does not justify public intervention (urban policies for instance) to combat them, individuals should adjust. By contrast, the great Swedish sociologist G. Therborn (2006) argues that it is essential to distinguish inequality from difference.

'Inequalities are differences that we consider unjust.....a difference may constitute an unjust inequality because

- It is a difference that constitutes a violation of some just equality, of human rights, of citizenship – in brief of some human qualification held to be equal, whether by humanity, by social membership or by achievement ;
- It is too large a difference, limiting the life possibilities of the disadvantaged, either directly materially by concentrating resources among the privileged , or indirectly via social psychological mechanisms of humiliating signals of superiority and inferiority ;
- It goes in the wrong direction, giving undeserved, unfair advantages to some – for example, to people born in certain countries or milieus, or to people on the basis of power rather than of contribution.

....In brief, there is inequality in this world because so many are denied the chance to live their lives at all, to live a life of dignity, to try out their interests in life, to make use of their existing potential. The inequalities of the world prevent hundreds of millions of people from developing their differences. Inequalities derive from four basic factors of social differentiation:

- Natural endowments (of individuals, groups, territories)
- Systemic arrangements of opportunities and rewards
- The performance of productivity of actors ; and
- Individual and collective distributive action, including via use of the state' (Therborn (2006: 4 and 10)

In urban terms the question of inequalities remains central for the development of cities....and therefore the mobilisation for those mechanisms (individual or collective) to combat them, urban social policies being one of them. In those representations of the city, the question of integration or coherence as marginalised to the minimum or organisation needed for competition between cities on the one hand and the renewed perceived dangers of the city on the other. It has been an enduring theme within urban policies that modern cities are sites for fragmentation, isolation and anomie. Traditional class identities and related modes of socialisation and social reproduction which had shaped the cities, for one or two centuries in some cases, for a few decades in others, although still

present, are being fragmented and reshaped, new groups, new identities, new socialisation processes are emerging, in a context where divisions, fragmentation, inequalities, segregation, fragilisation seem to be deeply affecting all categories, including middle classes. Thus the capacity of cities to foster social integration, social cohesion as some put it, is questioned in new ways. Urban policies were used to reflect on issues of fragmentation, exclusion, on various processes of disintegration of the social fabric of cities, re-evaluating what has been an enduring theme within urban studies, that modern cities are sites for fragmentation, isolation and anomie.

Within cities, what and who is supposed to cohere, to integrate, to assimilate, to define collective interests and general goals as well as to fragment? This is a major theme for urban policies. Although it is understandable that much attention be paid to the socially disruptive character of capitalist restructuring for the social fabric of cities – and the research agenda has often been influenced by that of social policies – it seems that this is excessively one sided, and that by exploring how former structures of socialisation are being dismantled we fail to see how they reorganize and how new structures emerge supported by urban policy. Forms of urban competition and conflict might actually help generate urban coherence, either as unintended consequence or through the way that the city can emerge ‘topologically’ as ‘immutable mobile’ which serves as point of intersection and interchange between otherwise diverse populations. We lack a developed conceptual vocabulary for this purpose. The concept of ‘integration’ encourages a normative perspective which celebrates the ways that individuals and social groups are assimilated to an overarching urban order, when it might be argued that what is more important is for individuals and groups to ‘come together’ without being integrated. A similar problem besets the concept of ‘cohesion’, locality, and urban society or of ‘urban community’. Social cohesion has been particularly put forward by New Labour in the UK. Like the other terms just mentioned, the issue of social cohesion brings back old questions of social order within cities that were at stake in the capitals of old empire from the Romans to the Chinese or the Ottomans. N. Buck argues that in the modern sense, “social cohesion conflates three quite separate concerns: about social inequality, about social connectedness and community and about social order.” i.e. issues of income and life chance, access to networks and knowledge, and security (Buck, 2003). Some authors (Forrest and Kearns) add questions of common values and civil culture, place attachment and identity.

In the classic old European sense, politics had a major role in bringing together, aggregating and representing the city. The city was conceived as an integrated local society (most of the time, incomplete), and as a complex social formation, more or less structured in their economic and cultural exchanges and the different actors may be related to each other in the same local context with long-term strategies, investing their resources in a co-ordinated way and adding to the social capital riches. Urban policies were the results of the interplay and conflicts of social groups, interests, and institutions, and the way in which, to some extent, regulations have been put in place through conflicts and the logics of integration. Urban policies developed by local communes regulated groups, actors and organizations opposing one another, entering into conflict, co-ordinating, producing representations in order to institutionalize collective forms of action, implementing policies, structuring inequalities, and defending their interests. That perspective on cities highlights the informal economy, the dynamism of localized family relations, the interplay of associations, reciprocity, culture and ways of life, the density of localized horizontal relations, and local social formations but under the control and the active policies of local governments.

Other forms of integration were identified, for instance integration by conflict and work experience as in the working class city organised by industrial capitalism. Industrial cities were characterized by their social structure and by their form and organization. Although these cities had large firms and major entrepreneurs, they were above all workers’ cities, sites of immense poverty and exploitation a crucible for working-class organization, and that is still the case at the moment, in China

for instance. The industrial city took the form of this combination of industries, workers' housing (slums, social housing, and suburban houses), minimal communal amenities, transport and later social democrat forms of urban government developing urban policy for the working class: housing, social services, schools, leisure activities.

For observers of the late 19th, early 20th century (and the German sociologist Simmel in particular), the development of large cities, metropolis was the major phenomenon, both in Europe and then in the US leading to different forms of integration and urban policies. Capital cities benefited from the consolidation of states, the shift of political life onto the national level, and the strengthening of the states' - and therefore the bureaucracies', including the army - capacity for control, as well as from industrial development and colonization. They absorbed a large part of the flow of migration, thus providing sizeable reserves of labour. They were the first beneficiaries of the transport revolution, from tramways to road and rail networks. Open to the world in an era that saw increasing numbers of different kinds of exchanges, discoveries, and technical innovations, they established their role by organizing universal exhibitions and great fairs. Concerned with public health and safety, governments organized major improvement works, created wide avenues and constructed new public buildings: stations, squares and monuments that symbolized their dynamism and technical progress. These cities were also places of speculation, of public and private investment in housing, and of financial capital. Their cultural influence changed scale because of more rapid diffusion, transports and colonial empires. London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna in particular, were the theatre of extraordinary physical and cultural transformations. As university cities and cultural centres, they were the focus of unrest and the sites of the political and social revolts that punctuated the 19th century. The great metropolis became the site of consumption, of department stores and wide avenues, of over stimulation with changed the urban cultural experience. This led also to physical transformation with the ever increasing diffusion of urbanisation around those large metropolis, hence the rise of suburbs, either working class ones as the red belt in Paris or bourgeois suburbs where middle classes abandoned the centre.

The rise of the large metropolis became an American feature: New York and Chicago and later Los Angeles in particular gradually replaced European cities in the urban imagination of the modernist metropolis. They grew thanks to stunning economic development and massive immigration. In the 1920's both American and European metropolis are places of strong inequalities, anti-Semitism, violence against foreigners, racism, anti communist movements, and flamboyant cultural creativity. The US model is constructed around the industrial city with its low-income neighbourhoods linked to manufacturing districts and close to commercial cores and its middle income neighbourhoods beyond. Out of the suburban migration of the middle classes accentuated after WW II, emerged the prototypical metropolis with its central city ringed by suburban enclaves. In the best case, the commercial core became dominant. In the worst cases, it along with manufacturing district was in decline. The dynamics of development was horizontal, with activities deconcentrated and decentralized from the centre. The whole development was very much encouraged by state tax policy for housing but weekly regulated and governed: urban policies were not central here.

The link between globalisation trends and inequalities within cities rose in the 1990's and was structured by Sassen's seminal work on the 'global city' (1991) which made a link between rising inequalities and globalization trends. The correlation recorded between the accelerated growth of metropolises and economic globalization processes has sharpened consideration of the contemporary logics of metropolization in Asia, in the Americas, and - to a lesser extent - in Europe. Her approach to taking this debate forward is to look at a small part of the economy, choosing one that seems to be a driving or dominant force in the economy, and then to examine the logics of globalization and the spatial implications. Sassen does this in highlighting global cities. Classic definitions of 'global cities' describe them in terms of their central role in exchange flows - flows of travellers and of merchandise, and as headquarters of the largest firms and of cultural and political institutions, banks, and insurance

companies: in other words, on the basis of their functions and their power to exert economic and political influence. Thus, growth in exchanges of goods and persons, which has accelerated since the 1970s, gives cities at the heart of these exchanges a special position. The development of multinational and then global firms means the concentration of economic power within these firms, which establish their headquarters - and therefore the power of highly aggregated economic command - in a small number of very large metropolises. These metropolises are thus integrated into the most globalized part of the economy, which gives them a special role.²

For Sassen, the dispersal of activities increases the need in the global city for a social and economic environment that can produce its own codes and its own culture, thus contributing to co-ordination. She deduces from this that there is a new social structure, distinguished by the concentration of social groups involved in the global city dynamic, who need a whole set of professional and domestic services: hence the proliferation of low-paid, insecure workers cleaning offices, providing various domestic services, and staffing restaurants and cafés. This dual structure is characteristic of advanced capitalism and the global cities that are its command centres: New York, London, Tokyo, and, to a lesser extent, Los Angeles, Paris and Frankfurt. In these conditions, the global city could be said to constitute an original social structure. However, in this regard, Hamnett's work on London and Prêteceille's on Paris invalidate the thesis. Both confirm the dynamic of growth and of segregation of the most privileged groups, but do not detect either an accentuation of polarization or the decline of the middle strata.³

Ethnicity, immigration and the city: post assimilation urban policy?

Pluralism and immigration are nothing new within cities. However, processes of globalisation have major impacts on cities : 1) thanks to technological innovation and transport - as long as there is enough energy- mobility is on the rise, either due to long term immigration, temporary immigration or just general short term transnational mobility. Cities are now systematically characterised by important ethnic minorities, of different origins who are both reshaping urban societies and urban politics. After black mayors, the US are experiencing the rise of Latino politics with for instance the election of a Latino mayor in Los Angeles and the organisation of ethnic group within the political process (see Jones and Corea, 2000). The issue of ethnic minority representation is also under discussion in large cities of most OECD countries, with massive difference in the way this is organised or resisted (for a contrast between France and Britain see Garbaye, 2005). Britain or the Netherlands have given significant political spaces for the ethnic minorities within their political systems. 2) The rise of supranational governance mechanisms and international norms make the questions of the rights - can foreigners vote in elections? - and duties -taxes- of those groups more important. 3) City users are not just city dwellers Cities develop not just because of old inhabitants, but also travellers, tourists, students, suburbanites, foreign residents who spend a few days a month, rooted ethnic minorities, groups circulating between two countries, consumers. These have serious implications for urban policy. Urban societies are more complicated to govern, the competition between groups for resources is not easy to regulate. Fierce conflicts emerge for the use of public space, for the priorities in terms of

2 . Sassen (1991) goes further, first and foremost by stressing that the dynamic of economic globalization requires capacities for control and co-ordination, which are changing scale. Global cities are cities within which these modes of control and co-ordination are organized, giving such cities increasingly extensive influence. Above all, global cities have an original dynamic of producing innovations for the leading services of capitalism - financial and legal services, consultancy, and communication. The global city is a particular environment, producing specialized, innovative services that enable co-ordination and control of the globalized economy, thanks to the concentration of global firms' headquarters and of these services.

3 . See Prêteceille, 2005

investments, for the control of schools, for access to housing or social welfare.....The rise of extreme right votes in Europe or anti immigrants mobilisation in various cities all over the world just remind us how central those issues are. Making sure that those different groups can coexist within cities is now a major priority for all cities both in the positive sense, but also in the sense of control, police and surveillance.

The Chicago school scholars identified various mechanisms of assimilation of diverse ethnic groups such as the race relation cycle, competition, accommodation without much urban policy. They more or less assume some logic between socioeconomic and residential mobility to the suburbs as key mechanisms of assimilation within the American mainstream. In that context, issues of immigration and ghettos became central and anti-black racism was quickly established as the leading cultural divide within cities. The question of race and relation between ethnic groups in the US and within cities in particular has become the cornerstone of urban politics. Ghetto formation, competition between ethnic groups and assimilation are still today the main lenses through which cities are analysed due in particular the remains of spatial segregation. Not so different debates took place in European cities at the time of large immigration in industrial cities in the 1960's and 1970's and the urban/ethnic issue has also become central in the political and social dynamics of cities : suburbanisation and rise of xenophobic organisations. These issues are now widespread as immigration of workers or involved in caring activities is developing in different context from Japan, Korea to countries of recent immigration such as Spain or Italy.

By contrast to the Durkheimian view of integration, the founders of the Chicago School, more influenced by Simmel, emphasised the mechanisms concerning groups and individuals. For them, as is well known, the question of integration is framed in terms of assimilation of diverse ethnic groups at the level of individuals as much as the level of ethnic group. In line with Simmel, there is no contradiction between the idea of individualisation process in the large cities and forms of integration or assimilation. In their early definition of assimilation Park and Burgess focuss on the process of fusion, interpenetration, incorporation of a group, in order to share memories and cultural attitudes.

In their excellent discussion of the assimilation debate in the US, Alba and Nee (2003) emphasise the fact that in Park's view, there is no need for the erasure of all signs of ethnic origins in the assimilation process: "The Chicago School's definition of assimilation envisioned a diverse mainstream society in which people of different ethnic/racial origins and cultural heritages evolve in a common culture that enables them to sustain a common national existence. This flexible definition receded in favour of a more rigid approach, influenced by Parson's functionalism" (Alba and Nee, 2003: 10)

As most authors of the assimilation debate mention, in the post war period, the notion of assimilation became identified with the idea of cultural integration to the norms, social practices and values of white American middle classes, a normative perspective more or less equal to the idea of Americanization, *i.e.* a one way acculturation process to the cultural beliefs and norms of the American society, a view echoed in modernization theory of the times (Waldinger, 2002). Very similar to the French case of the Republican model, this post war view of assimilation stresses the direct link between the citizen and the nation state without the mediation of ethnic community. These views on assimilation emphasised the change concerning the individuals, the group (families) but were not concerned either with the urban dimension in the locality sense, or with conflicts and rarely urban policy. By contrast in Nordic welfare state or in the French Republican model, public policy was central in this issue of integration, but not very urban: universalist welfare state services or national organisations such as the Army and schools were supposed to guarantee integration within the mainstream model.

This view on assimilation or integration has been heavily criticised from different corners of American sociology in particular by Portes but also by those who have tried to redefine the concept of assimilation such as Waldinger and in particular Richard Alba and Victor Nee in their groundbreaking book “Remaking the American Mainstream” (2003). Their criticism of earlier work concentrates on the following points: the normative view of assimilation (which was not so much part of the Chicago School original framework), the absence of explanation in terms of precise mechanisms, the emphasis on distinct ethnic group which underestimates the dynamic of interaction between group (in other words the wrong unit of analysis), the absence of conflicts and power relationship. Although their emphasis is on the assimilation of immigrants, it is important to specify collective and individual mechanisms at play in contemporary cities and the role of urban policies in those.. There is room to distinguish between a variety of mechanisms operating, at different level and in particular more individual ones by contrast to institutional and more collectivist ones.⁴

Most of the literature now emphasises the fact that beyond “assimilation issue”, “the American mainstream” was reshaped over the last century though the assimilation of different groups i.e. to show that assimilation is a two ways process through which the “American mainstream” is more composite and diverse hence making it easier for those who want to assimilate. That point is absolutely central to think about the reshaping of urban policy because cities all over the world are being transformed by the flux of various groups and the way they use the city, using urban policy in order to achieve assimilation or integration in the classic sense is probably irrelevant.

As sometimes happens in sociology, there is a major blind spot in this analysis i.e. politics and policies. The emphasis on the American mainstream is no reason to forget the difference of social structures, political opportunities, urban policies, and labour markets in different cities (Waldinger, 2002-2005; Hall, 2003; Jones and Correa, 2000). Cities have different resources, structures and capacity to respond to the problems of integration and assimilation.

It is quite clear that in most cities, the differentiation process between groups, ethnic groups in particular is one of the difficult and interesting issue for urban policy because they raise different questions in the public space or for social services but they also are a key asset for the dynamism of the city, its international networks. The new urban policy agenda is partly shaped by this question and should be so. Two principles may guide urban policy designers in that area:

Urban policy cannot be just about classic welfare redistribution, the feminists have taught us a long time ago the limits of those

Urban policy cannot just set the rules and let the individuals adapt and compete. The market is not very good at preventing social and spatial exclusion, exploitation, racism, shortage of social housing.

4 . Waldinger also criticises this work which in his view does not emphasise what he sees as the crucial factor of integration: the labour market. Indeed the changing structures of inequalities in the US, income redistribution or the labour market are hardly taken into account. He argues (2002, p.15) that “Economic progress is the linchpin of assimilation driving all other shifts in the social structure of ethnicity”. For this author, after the original cluster phase, it is only when immigrants get a better income that they are able to increase their options, become less dependent upon their ethnic neighbours, move away to different neighbourhoods and jobs, diversify their interactions. Even if they keep strong link with their original ethnic community, once the spiral is in the making, their children are likely cross ethnic lines and to have different pattern of cultural beliefs and social interactions.

What we observe is that in a pragmatic way, not without conflicts and controversies, most urban policies in cities are a mixed of timid experience, straightforward multiculturalism, progressive adaptation : from the organisation of food at schools, to the building of mosque, temples and churches of different religions becoming visible in the public space, the delivery of social benefits to various members of the family, the representation to various attempt to control or interact with representatives of more or less structured communities, most urban policies are going along the way of some elements of multiculturalism, some element of universal services, some elements of positive discrimination. Systematising and developing those post-assimilationist urban policies is a major concern for cities.

Social inequalities: middle classes against urban policy?

Various urban forms are on the increase in the suburbs that are growing in most urban areas: beyond the dynamics of suburbanisation, scholars have pointed to the increase of gated communities (Bridge and Atkinson, 2005), secession crisis in Boudreau (Keil, 2002), the making of ghettos of rich, dynamics of privatisation, individualisation, fears of the public space. When looking at urban policy in terms of inequality, it is therefore essential to take into account two important trends:

- the difficulties of integration produced by different social actors, not only poor immigrants:
 - upper classes refusing integration - self-segregation in cities, avoiding fiscal solidarity at the local or national level, etc.
 - destabilized middle-classes taken between wider collective mobilizations and defensive distancing from poorer groups increasing diversity of social links (strong/weak, bonding/bridging, interpersonal/with institutions, etc)
- processes of individualization:
 - Dissolution of social structures (and of the question of integration?) in the enchanted vision of the free moving and choosing individual?
 - or need for a more complex analysis of individualized trajectories of socialization within family/group/class structures, constraints and opportunities, and in relation with institutions and structured forms of regulation? The rise of various types of mobility allows some individuals, some groups, to partially exit from the national society to which they belong or the cities where they leave. They can choose to exit but that remains pretty rare. Mostly, they can choose to partially exit: their culture, consumption, friends, jobs, housing, children, financial investment, may be organised at the transnational level or in relation to this level. They have a different set of opportunities which allow them to play at different level: the transnational scale, the national or the local/urban. This opportunity for partial exit allows them to negotiate their own position within the national social structure, for instance to actively campaign against high level of taxes, to escape taxation or to send their children to international schools and universities. This does not just apply to individual: large firms, religious organisations or environmental groups have some capacity to mobilise and invest resources at the national level but also at the international level, that gives them extra resources to put pressure on national structures. However, let's not have an exaggerated view about mobilities, fixity is as important as mobility and mobility has to be shown empirically.

The point here is very similar to what Mike Savage and his colleagues have argued about the rise of “elective belonging” (Savage et al., 2005), i.e. that the differentiation and overlapping of various scales of interactions for individuals, beyond the national frontiers, open room of manoeuvres for

individuals in terms of choice of residence, of social practices, of identity claiming, of investment of different resources (including time, social capital) in different territories. For Savage, in principle, mobility and individualisation increase the dynamics of choice for individuals and households: a major influence to blur national logics of stratification, distinction, national income or prestige hierarchies.

In different research projects, M. Savage, Tim Butler and their colleagues have emphasised this spatial dimension of class, in particular for middle classes. For Butler (2005) the differentiation of spaces for interaction opens the field of the possible for individuals, in terms of belonging and of negotiating their involvement in a given space. Individuals are to some extent able to choose or negotiate their belonging to one political or social space or another, and their degree of investment and interaction. Mobility and individualization open the way to logics of choice. However, uncertainty and risk associated with changes also reinforce interdependence between individuals and groups. In that sense, one wonders whether cities might become a level at which interdependence is structured to prevent risk.

For upper middle classes groups, their status often results from both their occupation (may be narrowly defined by a type of employment or a professional community) and a residential choice or trajectory. They partly define who they are by the place –neighbourhood, city, urban region- they live in

Historically, the upper classes in Europe have had a strong capacity to choose where they live – and they use it. In France, Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot (1989, 2000) working on the upper class have identified the ‘spatial stamp’ of the bourgeoisie – a way of building and organizing ‘good districts’ in cities, especially the largest ones. This has not disappeared. This geographical mutual reinforcement enables them to deploy inheritance and reproduction strategies: ‘this spatial segregation, pushed to the extreme, is in fact an aggregation, the choice of a social group, of a class, through which it is expressing its awareness of the group’s deep community of interests’ (2000: 54). The same thing was shown by Savage and Butler’s research on the UK middle classes (1995), particularly in relation to educational strategies.

European cities differ significantly from US ones on this point. Historically – and this is linked to the role of the city centre in European cities – the most privileged social strata (the cultural, political, and economic elites) have remained in the cities and in their centres, except in the UK. They have maintained and reproduced their presence, and they have accumulated economic, social, cultural, and political capital. New groups of managers and professionals have followed the same logic but they have settled less systematically in the centre, they also move to residential suburbs. European cities are rarely distinguished by urban crisis in the city centre, except in 19th-century industrial cities, ports, and some special cases such as Brussels or Frankfurt. On the contrary, their bourgeoisies have often been sufficiently active to push the building of factories and social housing out towards the periphery – more so in France and southern Europe, and less so in Scandinavia.

European bourgeoisies and aristocracies have not systematically deserted the centres of old European cities, and their presence has become more pronounced again since the 1980s. Comparative studies of social mobility show higher rates of upper-class segregation in European cities, and not merely in the larger metropolises in Burtenshaw (*et al.* 1991). However, some sections of the middle and upper strata have gradually settled on the peripheries of cities. In most European cities, it is easy to distinguish those suburban local authorities where there are concentrations of well-off households, including the richest (historically, they tend to lie to the west). In Scandinavian and Italian cities, the phenomenon was initially limited, but is now gaining momentum. It is more common in Germany and France. Areas of suburban houses or peri-urban developments and small, ethnically and socially homogeneous residential towns, largely of owner-occupiers, have developed on the periphery of cities,

and these benefit from the two movements of urban growth and dispersal. Horizontal dispersal has gradually affected European cities but has not led to the decline of city centres, except in the cases mentioned above. Good districts and residential suburbs are especially visible in the biggest cities because there are more important households there, particularly in capital cities, close to government; but most European cities are experiencing this phenomenon on a lesser scale.

In the European context, we now see at the same time dynamics of gentrification in the classic sense of city centres, continuous embourgeoisement of historical bourgeois neighbourhood, the political construction of middle classes brand new neighbourhood close to city centres, corporation headquarters and financial districts and also some trend toward suburbanisation and the making of more or less gated communities. Making sense of those different dynamics, identifying what Lockwood used to call “the urban seeking”, versus the “urban fleeing” middle classes (1995) seems to us a fruitful way to understand inequalities.

Territorialisation of welfare Social urban policies: urbanising social policies

As inequalities are seen as more urban, social policies tend to become more urban social policies. There are two reasons for this: one is the attempt to be more precise and effective to deal with social problems, for instance urban poverty. The second has to do with the restructuring of the state and social policies, the decentralisation of penury (Pickvance and Préteceille, 1991) and the rescaling of the state, the welfare state in particular (Brenner, 2004). From a neo Marxist perspective, Jessop argues that states – and therefore urban policy- are being transformed as Schumpeterian workfare state concentrating upon two main functions: 1) through supply-side policies, to promote innovation in terms of products, processes, organisation and markets in the globalised economies in order to reinforce the countries' competitiveness, and; 2) the subordination of social policies to the flexibility requirements of the labour market. In that case, urban policies are becoming more urban mobilised in favour of economic development, aiming at restructuring of social policy, local welfare state, through the privatisation of urban services, developing new forms of local politics and urban governance in terms of arrangements and exchanges between public and private players (the famous public-private partnerships in areas of growth), association members, which can make the mobilisation of new social actors and groups possible.

Because social policies are more decentralised, the question of the implementation at the urban level is becoming central (see for instance Bifulco and Vitale for Italy, 2005). The social question is now more central within urban policies because State social policies are being decentralised or eroded or have failed to be properly implemented. The regulation of the urban society through the use of social policies is therefore more important also because urban policy elites are often in the position of reshaping or cutting some of the expenditure. Those issues are becoming more salient for two reasons: the aging population and substantial level of poverty, sometimes on the increase.

Urban policies are in part related to state strategies and policies. As mentioned before, policies die hard and long term welfare state commitments are not that easy to undermine on a short term basis, not even at the time of the Thatcherite UK. OECD states are characterised by a diversity of institutional arrangement and generalisation is perilous. In cases where state intervention is more developed, urban policies and anti poverty strategies alike are developed upon a set of premises: 1) the state is legitimate to develop a policy, urban policy is a legitimate domain of state intervention; 2) there is a large body of state funding and public agencies which can be involved. Beyond all the local initiatives and partnerships, there is a robust welfare state with powerful mechanisms of redistribution through pensions, social security expenditure, public investments in major equipments (schools, hospitals, railways stations or universities). Most of these mechanisms are relatively long term, discrete and automatic. The relative stability of the importance of the state measured as a percentage of

the GDP, with some exceptions, suggests a relative macro stability of this powerful base which, even if it is not called urban policy, provides a massive support to inhabitants within cities both in terms of services, jobs and revenue. In comparative terms, by contrast to the USA, or other OECD countries, European cities are far more dependent/supported by the welfare state and the public sector. This has two consequences: 1) urban elites are not so dependent upon business interests and middle classes, hence a much smaller degree of urban boosterism, less pressure from economic competition and 2) groups within cities and associations of cities are powerful interest groups to defend existing welfare patterns and to oppose radical cuts or reshaping. The strongest the welfare state, ie in the north of Europe, the strongest the welfare pillar of cities.

The long term trend of increasing resources for subnational governments, and cities in particular, is not uniform and masks large variations among and within countries. It is not just the result of the pressures from within the state but also the result of the strategy of state elites. Pickvance & Préteceille (1991) had clearly shown that decentralising the management of cuts and shortages – i.e. decentralisation of penury- was a popular move among nation states elites. However, by contrast to the US, the support for urban policy has been relatively strong over time in Europe because 1) suburbanization has not taken place at the same scale, cities and the metropolitan area are growing and 2) lower middle classes from the public sector, often depending upon public employment still constitute the bulk of the cities social structure in most countries, less so in the South. Lower middle classes from the public sector are organised within the social democratic parties, the greens and sometimes the extreme left in Sellers (2002). Those groups play an active role within urban and national politics and are able to make demands at the national level to support the welfare state and cities. A good deal of middle classes also lives in the cities, hence an interest for good services, transports and schools for instance. In the European urban systems, there are therefore powerful forces at play which, by contrast to many US cities, support public investments in cities, urban policies more than anti poverty policies as such.

Beyond this macro dimension which is the basis upon which urban policies are based upon, what is labelled as “the urban crisis” questioned vertical policies and paved the way to all sorts of new, experimental, innovative urban policy programme which were aimed at tackling the crisis. There is no need in this chapter to come back on the dimensions of this urban crisis: process of deindustrialisation, marginalisation of the working class, rising and renewed forms of poverty, immigration, the retreat from the state in social housing, increasing unemployment, flexibility of the labour market, forms of privatisation of services and utilities. Waves of riots, mostly in France, Britain, Germany but also Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, less so in the south of Europe, epitomized and made visible in the media forms of urban crisis which were associated in the media to large housing blocks, youth unemployment, crime, immigrants. From the state point of view, urban policies are not central but state elites cannot accept too many problems in cities for revenue and social order reason. From a purely functionalist perspective, some degree of urban policy is useful for state elites for blame avoidance reason and to maintain social order but they are not crucial. This is the reason why most accounts of urban policies tend to emphasise the ad hoc nature of urban policies, the experiments, the incomplete institutionalisation, the multiplication of initiatives, the contradictions.

6. Changing instruments of urban policy

Urban policies are public policies: as such, they exist through the selection of policy instruments. General trends about this give some insight on how to restructure urban policies. The argument is that urban policy is less using classic interventionist tool and relies more upon regulation on the one hand, partnership and contract on the other.

The dynamics of growth of the state during the 20th century were accompanied by the development and diversification of public policy instruments and by the accumulation of programs and policies in the different sectors where the state intervenes as in urban policy. Each phase of state development or restructuring has been accompanied by a new wave of innovations relating to these instruments. That was the case during the rapid growth of the welfare state in the post war period that is obviously the case nowadays. The issue of reshaping urban policy makes sense within the general restructuring of public policies.

The current phase is no exception. The proliferation of actors and coordination instruments has been noticed in an ever-increasing number of sectors for instance in recently expanded areas of public policy, such as policies on risk (environmental risks, health risks, etc.) (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998), the regulation (statutory or otherwise) of the market, building infrastructures, running utilities, and state or welfare state reforms in Moran (2003), urban policy in Cochrane (2006). Some authors have brought out a new paradigm: “the new governance” in Salamon (2002) & Rhodes (1996), or “new negotiated governance”, in which public policies are less hierarchized, less organized within a sector demarcated or structured by powerful interest groups (for example, urban policy, environmental policy, new social policies or the negotiation of major infrastructures) – at the risk of denying the interplay of social interests and of masking power relations. Over and above deconstructing this issue (as well as the limits of government and failures of reform), research into government and public policies has highlighted the renewal of public policy instruments either for the development of depoliticized formulas in “the new governance” or through fostering powerful mechanisms for the control and direction of behaviours in Hood (*et al.* 1998).

In addition to the question of who governs – (Robert Dahl’s famous book) – as well as who guides, who directs society, who organizes the debate about collective aims – there is now the question of how to govern increasingly differentiated urban societies. Jean Leca’s definition of government (1995) differentiates between rules (the constitution), organs of government, processes of aggregation and direction, and the results of action. “Governing means taking decisions, resolving conflicts, producing public goods, coordinating private behaviours, regulating markets, organizing elections, extracting resources, allocating spending” (Jean Leca, quoted by Pierre Favre 2003).

Gloablized cities are parties to multinational regional logics of institutionalization (for instance the EU), to diverse and contradictory globalization processes, to the escape of some social groups and to economic flows, to the formation of transnational actors partly beyond the boundaries and injunctions of governments. Within the EU, for instance, the state no longer mints coins, no longer makes war on its neighbour; it has accepted the free movement of goods and people, and a central bank... Enterprises, social mobilizations and diverse actors all have differing capacities for access to public goods or political resources beyond the state – the capacities for organization and resistance that, in the 1970s, brought out the theme of the ungovernability of complex societies in Linders and Peters (1990) & Mayntz (1993). This literature has reintroduced the issue of instruments, through questions about the management and governance of public subsystems of societies and policy networks in Kickert (*et al.* 1997) & Rhodes (1997).

The state itself is increasingly differentiated. It seems to be a series of enmeshed agencies, organizations, flexible rules, and negotiations with an increasing number of actors. Public policy is characterized by ad hoc or contingency arrangements and enmeshed networks, by the random, by a proliferation of actors, multiple aims, heterogeneity, cross-linking of issues and changes in the scales of reference territories. The capacity for direction of the state is subject to challenge; it seems to be losing its monopoly, is less the centre of political processes or of conflict regulation, hence the importance of cities

More broadly, the proliferation of actors and coordination instruments in an ever-increasing number of sectors has brought out a new paradigm: “the new governance”, or “new negotiated governance”, in which public policies are less hierarchized, less organized within a sector demarcated or structured by powerful interest groups (for example, urban policy, environmental policy, new social policies or the negotiation of major infrastructures) – at the risk of denying the interplay of social interests and of masking power relations. Over and above deconstructing this issue (as well as the limits of government and failures of reform), research into government and public policies has highlighted the renewal of public policy instruments either for the development of depoliticized formulas in “the new governance” or through fostering powerful mechanisms for the control and direction of behaviours in Hood (*et al.* 1998).

- However, urban policy instrumentation and its choice of tools and modes of operation are generally treated either as a kind of evidence, a purely superficial dimension (governing *means* making regulations, taxing, entering into contracts, communicating, etc.), or as if the questions it raises (the properties of instruments, justifications for choosing them, their applicability, etc.) are secondary issues, merely part of a rationality of methods without any autonomous meaning.

Instrumentation is a significant avenue for reflection, primarily because it produces its own effects. In his major book on statistics, Desrosières (2002) has clearly shown this: “Statistical information does not fall from heaven, purely the effect of a ‘prior situation’. On the contrary, indeed: it can be seen as the temporary, fragile culmination of a series of equivalence agreements between beings that a multitude of disordered forces continually seek to differentiate and separate” (p.397). The common language and representations that drive statistics create the effects of truth and an interpretation of the world.

1) public policy instrumentation is a major issue in public policy, since it reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it and 2) that instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic. A Public policy instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation. It is possible to differentiate between levels of observation by distinguishing between ‘instrument’, ‘technique’ and ‘tool’: for the sake of clarity we suggest to understand

- the instrument as a type of social institution (census taking, map making, statutory regulation, taxation);
- the technique as a concrete device that operationalizes the instrument (statistical nomenclature, a type of graphic representation, a type of law or decree);
- the tool as a micro device within a technique (statistical category, the scale of definition of a map, the type of obligation provided for by a legal text, presence/absence of sanction).

Public policy instrumentation means the set of problems posed by the choice and use of instruments (techniques, methods of operation, devices) that allow government policy to be made material and operational. Another way of formulating the issue is to say that it involves not only understanding the reasons that drive towards retaining one instrument rather than another, but also

envisaging the effects produced by these choices. By way of indication, a brief catalogue of these instruments can be drawn up: legislative and regulatory, economic and fiscal, agreement- and incentive-based, information- and communication-based. But observation shows that it is exceptional for a policy, or even a program for action within a policy, to be mono-instrumental. Most often, the literature notes a plurality of instruments being mobilized and then raises the question of coordinating them (M.L. Bernelmans-Vides, *et al.* 1998).

For instance, the use of standards in urban policy and best practices shows how the sphere of standards has been extended, part of the process leading to the development of a regulatory state. Standards illustrate the tendency of the public authorities to delegate responsibility to private sector organizations for preparing and monitoring implementation of documents that sometimes have almost the force of law. They are among those low-profile policy instruments that are beyond the reach of the usual political processes developed through consultation between different interests. Public policy instrumentation reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed. Weber too, in his analyses, stressed that administration and its techniques are interdependent with domination. Administration, according to Weber, is the system of practices best adapted to legal rational domination.

In order to clarify the place of instruments in the technologies of government, it is necessary to differentiate between its various forms and to distinguish five major models. This typology relies partly on the one developed by Hood and based on the resources mobilized by public authorities (modality, authority, pressure, institution) but suitably reformulated and supplemented, taking into account types of political relations organized by instruments and the types of legitimacy that such relations presuppose.

Legislative and regulatory instruments are tools that borrow from the routinized legal forms constituting the archetype of state interventionism. However, the latter is not homogeneous, and much of the literature of the sociology of law has shown that this type of regulatory instrument includes three fairly clearly articulated dimensions. First of all, legislative and regulatory instruments exercise a symbolic function, since they are an attribute of legitimate power and draw their strength from their observance of the decision-making procedure that precedes them. Beyond this eminent manifestation of legitimate power, legislative and regulatory measures also have an axiological function: they set out the values and interests protected by the state. Finally, they fulfil a pragmatic function, in directing social behaviours and organizing supervisory systems. These three functions are combined in different proportions, and there are very many examples of situations in which the symbolic dimension prevails over the organization of methods of action. But sending out these political signals is part of a general pedagogical thrust, combining the need to demonstrate will with the need to frame activities.

Economic and fiscal instruments are close to legislative and regulatory instruments, since they follow the same route, deriving their force and their legitimacy from having been developed on a legal basis. However, they are perceived in terms of their economic and social efficiency. Their peculiar feature is that they use monetary techniques and tools, either to levy resources intended to be redistributed (taxes, fees) or to direct the behaviours of actors (through subsidies or allowing deduction of expenses). This type of instrument must also be situated in relation to particular concepts of the state, which may be shown through types of taxation (wealth tax; tax earmarked for social purposes; the system of taxing financial products) or through the use of techniques such as deficit reduction or European convergence indicators. Many urban policies were designed during the Keynesian redistributive welfare state, and followed that road.

For ease, the three other types of instrument can be referred to under the heading of “new public policy instruments” that are flourishing in urban policy. They have in common the fact that they offer

less interventionist forms of public regulation, taking into account the recurrent criticisms directed at instruments of the “command and control” type. In this sense, they lend themselves to organizing a different kind of political relations, based on communication and consultation, and they help to renew the foundations of legitimacy. We shall end by presenting a few observations about these three categories – instruments based on agreement, instruments based on information, and de facto standards.

- **Contracts, charter, and partnership:** This mode of intervention has become generalized in a context strongly critical of bureaucracy – of its cumbersome yet abstract nature, and of the way it reduces accountability. Further criticism has related to the rigidity of legislative and regulatory rules and to the fact that their universality leads to impasse. In societies with growing mobility, motivated by sectors and sub-sectors in search of permanent normative autonomy, only participatory instruments are supposed to be able to provide adequate modes of regulation. A framework of agreements, with the incentive forms linked to it, presupposes a state in retreat from its traditional functions, renouncing its power of constraint and becoming involved in modes of ostensibly contractual exchange. Ostensibly, the central questions of autonomy of wills, of reciprocity of benefits, and of sanction for non-observance of undertakings are rarely taken into account. The interventionist state (or urban leaders) is therefore supposed to be giving way to a state that is prime mover or coordinator, non-interventionist and principally mobilizing, integrating and bringing into coherence. The little research conducted in this area concurs in the view that this type of instrument’s chief legitimacy derives more from the modernist and, above all, liberal image of public policy, of which it is the bearer, than from its real effectiveness, which is in fact rarely evaluated. This has become central in urban policy where various types of contracts and partnership in order to mobilise resources and capacity for collective action are essential. All the literature on urban governance and urban regime points to this attempt to mobilise resources in a coordinated way, with goals in Le Galès (2002). In many ways, urban policy is about collective action and bringing together different actors with resources to deal with the urban renovation or economic development issue over some years.
- **Communication-based and information-based:** these instruments form part of the development of what is generally called “audience democracy” or “democracy of opinion” – that is, a relatively autonomous public space in the political sphere traditionally based on representation. There has been a decisive change since the 1970s, in the form of a reversal: citizens’ rights of access to information held by the public authority have been developed into obligations on the public authorities to inform citizens (‘mandatory disclosure’) in Barbach and Kagan (1992). Instruments to increase participation of inhabitants have grown systematically and urban policy is increasingly about trying to include groups and inhabitants in the decision process through new policy instruments.
- **De jure and de facto standards:** these organize specific power relations within civil society between economic actors (competition-merger) and between economic actors and NGOs (consumers, environmentalists, etc.). They are based on a mixed legitimacy that combines a scientific and technical rationality, helping to neutralize their political significance, with a democratic rationality based on their negotiated development and the cooperative approaches that they foster. They may also allow the imposition of objectives and competition mechanisms and exercise strong coercion.

To give an example of this shift of urban policy when looking at the instruments, it is instructive to examine the example of the UK. Analysing urban policy in the UK is a rather demanding experience. There is no such thing as an “integrated urban policy”, but that is nothing exceptional (Le Galès, 2004). As one of the leading analysts puts it, in the UK case however, urban policy is first and foremost “an often bewildering range of short term government area-based urban programmes. Burgess *et. al.* (2001) recently identified 42 running concurrently” (Harding, 2005, p.74). The organisation of urban policy has, if anything, become steadily more fragmented over the years; new agencies were relentlessly created by Conservative and new Labour governments alike. Partnership and various types of non elected agencies were created all over the country to deliver specific programmes at the sub-national level with uncertain, changing relations to local government. The “agencification” of Britain (Bulmer and Flinch 2005) is particularly clear in the case of urban and regional policy, leading to a fair amount of competition between the agencies.

Very briefly, urban policy in the UK brings together several lines of public policy programmes:

- Classic urban policy in the physical sense : Housing, Urban regeneration, planning, transport, infrastructures
- Organisation of urban government/governance, centralisation of local (in particular urban government), City Regions
- Redistribution/social policy with an urban focus
- Policies designed to enhance competitiveness with an urban focus
- General policy mainly delivering or organising services at the urban level (crime)
- The regional urban dimension: policy for London, Northern Way, and different policies in Scotland and Wales,
- Policies to control, audit evaluate the programmes

This diversity is not unusual in most countries although in Britain, in line with New Management Principle and analysis derived from economics (rational choice), the extent to which no attempt was made to integrate those different dimensions either in terms of agenda, organisation, implementation, delivery, policy discourse, is quite exceptional – even if the integration of policy programmes is no guarantee for effective policy implementation.

As is well known, under the conservative governments (1979-1997), a very long list of reforms and programmes led to the radical reshaping of urban policy in the following directions:

- The priority given to economic development, competition between cities, Large urban projects
- The demise of local authorities (resources) in the delivery of programmes and the creation of single purposed agencies (Urban Development Corporations for instance), including the destruction erasing of the metropolitan governments
- The leadership given to the private sector

- The competition between programmes and agencies organised at the national or regional level (City Challenge programmes or Single Regeneration Budget)
- Privatisation of social housing

All in all, a very different kind of urban policy gradually appeared but which never had a high level of political priority.

By contrast, the election of the New Labour government in 1997 (and subsequently in 2001 and 2005) gave rise to what appeared as a revival of urban policy. There is no surprise there as New Labour owed a lot to urban local authorities which kept the party in some form of power and gave it resources while it remained in the opposition for almost two decades.

Over the past few years, a whole range of initiatives and programmes have signalled what is sometimes labelled as the “the new urban policy”, evidence of which is signalled by the following elements:

- The first White Paper on urban policy in 20 years
- The creation of an Urban Task Force under the famous architect Lord Rogers and the creation of the Policy Action Teams , highly praised report in 1999 “Towards an urban renaissance”
- A reorientation of focus and priorities : to the urban competitiveness issue, new labour elites have added sustainable development, public services, anti poverty programmes,
- The reorganisation of local government including the creation of the Greater London Authority
- Creation of the “New Deal for communities” programme (area based) in several dozen of urban local authorities (partnership form) followed by the “New Commitment to Neighbourhood Strategy Action Plan”
- The priority given (quite late) to housing developments in the South East and in the North (Northern Way)
- The political weight of the “Office of the Deputy Prime Minister”, i.e. the aggregation of different ministers under the leadership of John Prescott a Northern MP from Hull and allied to urban and regional interests within New Labour
- The multiplication of programmes and strategic partnerships in order to deal with crime, education, health in the most deprived areas (Social Exclusion Unit, Heath Education Action Zones, Safer cities, Employment Zones, Housing Renewal Fund, English Partnership...)
- The development, in England, of a regional strategic framework to deliver and implement elements of the urban policy.

Urban policy under New Labour cannot be understood in isolation but rather as one element of a more transversal “modernisation” programme which aimed at adapting Britain to the globalising world with a competitive neo liberal understanding and analysis of globalisation. Above all, in the urban/local world, as in others, the New Labour inherited a central local government framework based upon weak local autonomy for local government, and strong central control exerted through performance measurement and audit, plus the development of partnership between local authorities, voluntary and local community organisations, the private sector. In contrast to the Conservatives however, the Blair-Brown government has pushed the “modernisation” agenda for local authorities

including emphasis on autonomy, markets, opportunities, effective service delivery, ongoing process of reforms and target setting.

Most programmes within urban policy were designed to enhance the competitiveness of cities – and therefore of the UK - in a wide sense, comprising social and environmental issues, and to increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of public programmes and public services. This was supposed to be achieved by the emphasis on “new modes of governance” and new policy instruments and not the return to the much criticised old style local government structure (by contrast to New Labour new governance). This new governance, whatever that means, is characterised on the one hand by an activist state which has also become a vigorously centralising state with the effective use of objectives, targets, synthetic indicators (CPA for instance) which have been relentlessly audited, inspected and, if needed, sanctioned. On the other hand, most programmes within New Labour have focussed on the participation of local communities at the neighbourhood level. Last but not least, although the business community has lost the systematic leadership granted to them in urban policy by conservative governments (much to their relief), private sector individuals and organisations are systematically included in the partnerships and given a prominent role, when they take it.

The urban policy under New Labour is therefore firstly characterised by an activist central government which is experimenting, launching a whole range of new programmes which special focus on delivery in different urban zones. Secondly, despite all the emphasis on partnership, the so called “new urban policy” is not much more than a “mille feuilles” made of the sedimentation of programmes, policy instruments, special programmes, using all sorts of policy instruments and targets in particular. Thirdly, following the asymmetric devolution of power in different parts of the UK has given rise to even more differentiated programmes, including within England. Fourthly, the rise and rise of partnership both at the urban and national level has maintained a very high level of fragmentation in the delivery of urban policy programmes, a point reinforced by the confusion among different zones and more or less systematic overlapping of competencies, leading at time to the “partnership fatigue” underlined by observers. The governance of those partnerships has also given rise to a number of worries as demonstrated in the recent report “Governing partnerships, bridging the accountability gap” which was published by the Audit Commission. In many places there seems to a contradiction which may contribute to explain why partnerships face some difficulties (and there is no doubt here that in many cases, partnership are an appropriate solution to deal with some issues such as urban regeneration): agencies and local governments are under financial and performance pressure in a systematic way hence a large degree of competition between them. Many contracts with voluntary sectors organisations are on a yearly base, another evidence of the short term culture contract which seems to be governing many public sector domains. On top of it, political leadership is weak as local leaders, with some exceptions, rarely have the time, the resources, the legitimacy of the money to be heavily involved in the running of those partnerships. The endless question of leadership in many areas rather hide the underlining structural problems : agencies in competition and short term contract and pressure to perform are unlikely to deliver effective partnership which requires clear guidelines, some elements of trust and cooperation, long term collective projects.

One interesting point here is the insistence of civil servants of judging “local government” by its capacity to take “tough decisions”. One wonders how “tough decisions”, whatever that means, could be taken within a world of overlapping partnership, strategies and fragmented agencies, weakly coordinated by local government and under constant pressure from central government targets and objectives. It seems very unlikely.

There is a more general point to be made here. Public policies are increasingly started and implemented in relation to the new iron law of economists: they can only be justified if there is proper evidence of market failures, hence the obsession with “evidence based” policy. That mantra would

require many detailed comments, including positive one. Let's just observe that in the urban policy world, as in many others, this is an extraordinary narrow minded view of the world of public policy. There is a wealth of market failures as there is a wealth of government or governance failures. The whole point is "what is the evidence"? Firstly, to argue, as was done in some interviews with government civil services, that markets are superior and that a policy only makes sense if there is a clear market failure demonstrates a belief in the superiority of market mechanisms which, in the field of public policy, has never been systematically shown, far from it. This is therefore a matter of beliefs in the superiority of markets, not an evidence-based statement. Of course, on many areas of public policy, market mechanisms could be more effective, more efficient. However, in many cases, that is not the case. This is therefore a matter of quasi religious belief.

Also, the problem is to find evidence of market failure. Of course, many measurements have proved essential to improve public policies and the delivery of services. However, in a whole range of domains, the measurement is just not adequate, or does not make sense, or the proxy which is used to measure some failure is just not appropriate. Identifying evidence of market failures to believers in market based mechanisms which only believe "sound evidence" is therefore too often a no go area. Supposedly "evidence based" policy is often a catch word to justify the lack of investment or financial cuts. This brief overview shows how policy instruments within urban policy have massively changed over time: partnership and standards have become central, goals are not so clear.

Conclusion

Urban public policies are a difficult business and one often tends to conclude that the less serious the problem is, the more likely the policy may appear as a success. It follows that governments are even more eager to promote their initiatives, new programmes. The analysis of urban policy over time (Andersen, 2001, Atkinson 1999, Imrie and Thomas, 1999, Le Galès 1995, Cochrane, 2006) underlines the wealth of procedures, new schemes, new combination of policy instruments, a never ending process of policy initiatives, auditing, creation of organisation, an immense field of experimentation undertaken by local actors... as if this movement could dissimulate the lack of capacity to act on some basic issues of labour market, education or wealth redistribution. The power to design what is relevant and what should be excluded from the urban policy field as defined by the government is an important one. The rise of evaluation research, a good thing by other means, also lead to endless evaluation processes which do not question the boundaries and the categories of public policy as designed by the government, whatever the level or the power relationship between different groups. The French urban policy ignored for years the ethnic minorities' questions in Morel (2002) & Garbaye (2005) while the UK urban policy tended for a while to leave out the question of poverty in Atkinson (1999). Public policy, whatever the label put upon them or the announced goals, are constantly shifted, redesigned as a result of conflicts between groups, organisations, interests, political entrepreneurs who try to define a cognitive frame, or several, a legitimate view of problems which will lead to action in their interests. This is the reason why the question of governance, coordination and coherence has become so crucial as reflected in the language and the policy instruments such as partnership, global approach, integration project, strategic programme, coalitions, leadership, contracts, governance, etc.

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