



**Economic Commission for Africa  
Commission économique pour l'Afrique**

The Outcome of the Doha WTO Ministerial  
Conference :

**Implications for Africa**

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**The Challenges of Trade Capacity Building in Africa**

**Regional Workshop on Trade  
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in an African Context**

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## **I. Introduction**

1. The main outcome of the Doha World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference was an agreement to launch a broad based and balanced work programme for continuation of multilateral trade negotiations to be completed by the year 2005. The work programme incorporates an expanded negotiating agenda and other important decisions and activities necessary to address the challenges facing the multilateral trading system. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for several issues and other work. The Declaration covered 21 subjects, which primarily called for negotiations along with work in other WTO councils and committees.

2. This broaden agenda poses serious challenges for many African countries, especially in view of their' weak trade capacities to meaningful engage in such trade negotiations. Also it is a great challenge to provide the technical assistance and capacity/strengthening to enable the African countries effectively and properly take part in the negotiations for their own benefits. The African group has, therefore, strongly expressed a great need for technical assistance and capacity building/strengthening of African countries to enable them negotiate various issues on trade. This being demand driven re-enforces the necessity for a comprehensive programme on development of capacities of African negotiators, strengthening ECA's internal capacity for trade research and analysis, strengthening the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) support to the WTO Geneva Africa Group, and strengthening technical support on negotiations on the trade protocol of Cotonou African and Caribbean and Pacific/ European Union (ACP/EU) Agreement and to Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This cannot be overemphasised as Africa faces the daunting task of promoting rapid economic development in order to improve the welfare of its people.

3. A number of organizations are also providing trade-related capacity building support to African countries individually and collectively and they include the WTO, UNCTAD, ITC, the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department for International Development (DFID) of the British Government, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). There are also a number or research networks, which are also involved in this area and include the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), Southern Africa Trade Research Network (SATRN), and Southern and the Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Initiative (SEATINI).

4. Accordingly, in this clouded arena, it is imperative that the intervention of the Economic Commission for Africa should aim at adding value to these other initiatives and develop a niche. In this respect, the ECA's programme of assistance will focus on developing on a "sustainable basis" a pool of African trade negotiators based in Geneva and African capitals that will be able to assist

these countries to negotiate complex issues contained in the post-Doha agenda of the WTO as well as the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement, especially the "Trade Protocol". More importantly, the aim is to develop an informed group of African Experts that will assist African countries in trade formulation and implementation and in mainstreaming trade in development as well as in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. This exercise will be an ongoing one.

## **II. ECA Trade-Related Activities Pre-Doha and at the Doha**

### **WTO Ministerial Conference**

5. Prior to Doha ECA carried out a number of activities, in collaboration with other organizations, aimed at providing trade-related technical assistance to African countries. The purpose of these meetings was to bring together African trade negotiators to discuss issues to be tabled at the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference and to formulate recommendations for consideration by African Ministers of Trade.

6. Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Africa, in collaboration with the African Economic Research Consortium and the Organization of African Unity, prepared prior to Doha "Policy Briefs" on various issues to be discussed at Doha in order to provide quick reference materials for African Ministers and African trade negotiators on positions taken by African countries in various meetings and for a. These policy briefs proved extremely useful and have now been compiled into a document entitled (Africa and the World Trade Organization (WTO): Doha and Beyond" which has been circulated widely.

7. The ECA delegation at the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference contributed to servicing of the various meetings held by African countries during the WTO Ministerial Conference. The delegation continued to provide technical support to African countries during the protracted negotiations that lead to the adoption of the Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration and other Decisions. The Policy Briefs produced by ECA, AERC and OAU were widely circulated and very much appreciated.

## **III. Trade-Related Capacity Building: Post Doha**

8. Prior to Doha ECA carried out a number of activities, in collaboration with other organizations, aimed at providing trade-related technical assistance to African countries. The purpose of these meetings was to bring together African trade negotiators to discuss issues to be tabled at the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference and to formulate recommendations for consideration by African Ministers of Trade.

9. Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Africa, in collaboration with the African Economic Research Consortium and the Organization of African Unity, prepared prior to Doha "Policy Briefs" on various issues to be discussed at Doha in order to provide quick reference materials for African Ministers and African trade negotiators on positions taken by African countries in various meetings and for a. These policy briefs proved extremely useful and have now been compiled into a document entitled (Africa and the World Trade Organization (WTO): Doha and Beyond" which has been circulated widely.

10. The Post Doha Agenda has to be firmly set in the framework, which can boost African growth and sustainable development. This demands market access, removal of trade distorting domestic policies, and special and differential treatment encompassing 'non-trade' concerns. Transforming African development through MTN demands effective participation of African countries in the post Doha agenda and firmly establishing the goals of market access, removal of domestic policy impediments, and translating special and differential provisions into concrete measures which can enable African countries to reduce supply constraints while reducing food insecurity and poverty.

11. In the post Doha period, ECA activities have focused on support to African countries in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations; formulation and designing of an ECA/IDEP Trade-Related Capacity Building, Research and Training Programme; as well as providing support to the Africa WTO Geneva Group. The ECA trade-related capacity building and training programme for African countries for the period 2002/2003 is designed to contribute towards building trade capacity in African countries by focusing on three inter-related aspects:

- Strengthening the internal trade capacity of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in order for the Commission to be able to undertake high quality trade research and analysis and develop a pool of qualified trade specialists to provide advisory services to African countries on key trade issues;
- Develop a comprehensive training programme at the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) in Dakar, Senegal for African trade negotiators in order to enhance their capacities and skills for effective participation in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations;
- Strengthen ECA's support to the WTO Geneva Africa Group in order to assist them in their day-to-day negotiation processes within the WTO and to provide them with informed research to help them in their work; and strengthen the technical support on trade protocol negotiations and Regional Economic Communities.

12. This Part of the Paper reviews the outcome of the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference; the post-Doha WTO agenda; challenges for African countries in current round of multilateral trade negotiation; and ECA's contribution to trade-related capacity building: pre and post Doha. It unfolds that while Doha focused on extolling an expanded negotiating agenda embodying "built in issues" and "new issues" it gave rise to a wide ranging, unwieldy, and complex Post Doha agenda with sharply differing views among developing and developed countries over the resolution of promised agreements, the compromises, and planned future concerns. This was underscored by measures to establish an integrated framework for market access and the special needs of

African countries. This poses major challenges for urgently devising modalities to implement the negotiations. African institutions-exemplified by the ECA-could be instrumental in realizing this vision against a backdrop of marginalization of African countries.<sup>1</sup>

#### **A. The Outcome of the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference**

13.The main outcome of the Doha World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference was an agreement to launch a broad based and balanced work programme for continuation of multilateral trade negotiations to be completed by the year 2005. The work programme incorporates an expanded negotiating agenda and other important decisions and activities necessary to address the challenges facing the multilateral trading system. The outcome also included agreement on modalities for resolving outstanding implementation-related issues and concerns; and agreement on certain issues relating to the Trade-Related Intellectual Property [TRIPS] Agreement and Public Health.

14.The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for several issues and other work including the implementation of the present agreements, with negotiations taking place in the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiaries, and activities under the work programme in the WTO Councils and Committees. The Declaration covered 21 subjects, which primarily called for negotiations with work in other WTO Councils and Committees: Market Access for Non-Agricultural Goods, Agriculture, Trade in Services, TRIPS, Implementation Issues, Singapore Issues, Trade and Environment, Electronic Commerce, WTO Rules, Dispute Settlement, New Working Groups.<sup>2</sup>

15.The Declaration could be viewed as being more "development friendly" with some shift towards an attempt to redress the imbalances in the Uruguay Round. The Declaration is replete with references to the special circumstances of developing and least developed countries and the need to take this into account in the negotiations including "Special and Differential Treatment", "small farmers", and "Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building." Developing countries made a limited advance on some concerns including highlighting the urgency of reducing or eliminating peak tariffs and tariff escalation in products of export interest to them, measures to protect public health under TRIPS, reiterating the importance of knowledge and folklore and placing it on the agenda, and partial success in keeping the negotiations on Singapore from being launched.

16.The Declaration gave WTO members the mandate to devise modalities to engage in negotiations on several issues underpinned by WTO's "built in agenda" exemplified by agriculture and services. They were also given mandate to evolve modalities for agreeing to enter into negotiations on trade and environment, industrial tariffs, antidumping, and countervailing measures, fisheries subsidies, regional trade agreements and dispute settlement.

17.Despite protests from many developing countries the Doha Ministerial Declaration established future development agenda on the "New Issues"-the "Singapore Issues". It also ushered in "development related provisions," work on integration of the small

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<sup>1</sup> Gerry Hellenier: Marginalization and/or Participation: Africa in Today's Global Economy, University of Toronto.

<sup>2</sup> World Trade Organization: The Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, 14 November 2001

economies into the global system, and new "Working Groups" on Debt and Finance and Technology Transfer.

## **B. The Post Doha WTO Agenda and Africa**

18. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for several issues and other work including the implementation of the present agreements, with negotiations taking place in the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiaries, and activities under the work programme in the WTO Councils and Committees. It is essential to ensure that the Trade Negotiations Committee does not become a permanent "Green Room", coupled with greater transparency and accountability.

19. Many developed countries considered Doha a success with opening up of new areas of the global economy to international competition. However, African aspirations were somewhat unfulfilled. The African group was critical of the rules and the operations of the WTO and expressed the need for fundamental change in such rules. The Doha Declaration tried to capture developmental visions by bridging the gaps and reaching 'consensus' but many developing countries were dissatisfied and felt coaxed into accepting the norms-contrasting optimistic and pessimistic views emerged with possible confusion, mixed signals, and multiple interpretations. Demands by African countries at Doha focused primarily on the need to create (i) a multilateral trading system for growth, development and employment and hence meaningful integration of developing countries in the global trading system; (ii) collective responsibility, internal transparency and effective participation by all members of the WTO; and (iii) reconfirmation of commitment by members to liberalize trade in agriculture services and improve the functioning of the TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly many developing countries were at Doha of the view that international pledges to help Africa needed to go beyond the rhetorical.<sup>3</sup>

20. The Post Doha Agenda and negotiations have to be firmly posited in the framework of African growth and sustainable development. This demands market access, removal of trade distorting domestic policies, and special and differential treatment including curbing 'non-trade' obstacles. Hence, defining and interpreting the specific issues, the "built in issues" and the risks and opportunities stemming from the "new issues" demands sharp focus.

21. First, is the issue of market access for non-agricultural goods. This embraces tariff-cutting negotiations including elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers and the use of "modalities" to implement them. The Ministers decided to launch tariff-cutting negotiations on all non-agricultural products centered on reducing or eliminating tariffs-specially in relation to products of export interest to developing countries. The negotiations took full account of the special needs and interests of the latter and least

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<sup>3</sup> Arvind Panagariya: Developing Countries at Doha, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, USA, 2001; and Gumisai Mutume: What Doha Means for Africa, Africa Recovery, vol.15, No.4, December 2001.

developed countries, while also accepting that these countries do not need to match the full tariff-reduction commitments of other participants. Initially, participants have to agree on the 'modalities'- or the instruments-to implement tariff cutting. In the Tokyo Round participants agreed on a mathematical formula to cut tariffs across the board, while in the Uruguay Round participants negotiated cuts product by product.

22. Second, is agriculture-the, which is the most critical sector for many African countries. The agenda for negotiations on trade in agricultural products envisages continuation of the negotiations already started, with completion of such negotiations by 1 January 2005. A number of issues need to be resolved during the negotiations and they include market access, phasing out of domestic production and export subsidies, and special and differential treatment for developing countries in order for them to meet their food security and rural development needs. On export subsidies, the EU had objected to the expression "with a view to phasing out of domestic support measures" but after a day's delay in concluding the negotiations the US and the Cairns Group prevailed upon it.

23. African countries wanted to focus on resolving outstanding "implementation" issues –failure of developed countries to reduce tariff barriers to African exports and binding commitments from the developed countries on both reducing agricultural subsidies and on food aid, grants, and technical assistance. These were not resolved. But agreement was reached that a revision of past accords be incorporated into the new round. Negotiations on agriculture begun in early 2000 under Article 20 of the WTO Agriculture Agreement. By November 21, 2001 and the Doha Ministerial Conference nearly 121 governments had submitted a large number of negotiating proposals. Following Doha a number of schedules for negotiations and deadlines have been agreed to move the negotiations forward.

24. The Doha Declaration aspires to build on work already undertaken, confirming and elaborating the aims, and setting a timetable encompassing agriculture as part of the single undertaking with virtually all the linked negotiations ending by 1 January, 2005, and re-confirming the long term objective agreed in the present WTO Agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system, through a programme of fundamental reform. This envisages more robust rules and specific commitments on government support and protection for agriculture. The aim is to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. Nonetheless, a certain level of caution is reflected the Doha Declaration as regards to promises made to implement agricultural reforms. This is reflected in such statements as "without prejudging the outcome" member governments commit themselves to comprehensive negotiations to enable (a) market access (b) reducing and phasing out all forms of export subsidies (c) making special and differential treatment for developing countries to fulfill their food security and rural development needs and (d) incorporating non-trade concerns. The reality, however, reveals that in spite of current duties on non-agricultural products being at their lowest level after eight GATT Rounds, certain tariffs still restrict trade, especially on exports of developing countries. This is exemplified by "tariff peaks" which are relatively high usually on "sensitive" products amidst generally low

tariff levels, with developing countries facing "tariff peaks" of 15% and above in markets of industrialized countries.

Under the agreement on agriculture, Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) is made an integral part of all negotiations. The laudable aim is to have it embedded in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated. This could make it operationally effective and allow developing countries to execute their urgent food and rural development needs. The reference to non-trade concerns may also stimulate debate on other related problems.

25. Third, Services under GATS endorses work already done and establishes key elements of a timetable with progressive liberalization of trade in services. The Post Doha offers an opportunity for African countries to seek in the GATS negotiations a reduction in the imbalances in favour of sectors where they have comparative advantage and at the same time make some gains in those sub-sectors where they have less comparative advantage- such capital intensive and high technology sub-sectors. Another fundamental issues that needs resolving in the negotiations is the movement of labour, which has been deadlocked in the negotiations. Success in the negotiations will require inclusion in GATS of a range of features: the control of restrictive business practices of corporations; establishing the importance of adequate regulatory agencies and their links to competition policy; improving infrastructure, specially transport and communication; and bolstering capacity in science and technology.

26. Fourth, negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement will center on addressing the critical issue of primacy of public health over patents for medicines such that the TRIPS agreement should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Indeed, for the first time, WTO gave explicit right to member countries to unilaterally grant licenses that enable domestic producers to override patents removing previous stipulation under 'compulsory licensing.' Despite the limits of the declaration many developing countries welcomed it as a step in making drugs to fight public health emergencies, such as AIDS, more available to poor people. The Declaration stressed the importance of implementing and interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to support public health by promoting both access to existing medicines and the creation of new medicines. The right of member governments to act to protect public health and take advantage of the agreement's flexibilities offer hope. However, TRIPS was limited in reaching widespread consensus, especially among African countries, on the need to safeguard the patenting of life forms and biological material.

27. Fifth, on Implementation Issues The Doha Ministerial Conference undertook nearly 50 decisions clarifying the obligations of developed countries on key issues: agriculture, subsidies, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade, TRIMS and rule of origin. This stemmed from the Uruguay Round negotiations and dissatisfaction by developing countries in their implementation by developed countries and emerged from hard bargaining between negotiators over about three years. However, several implementation concerns of developing countries remain unresolved. The decision of Ministers to confront them in future work needs to be closely pursued.

28. Sixth, on the "Singapore Issues", the Doha Declaration covered issues of trade and investment, trade and competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation. Developing vigorously contested the inclusion of these issues in the WTO work programme. The compromises reached were rather unsatisfactory to many

developing countries, including some African countries. For many of them, negotiations are to begin only after the 2003 Ministerial Conference if consensus can be reached, although EU and US wanted to start earlier. Working Groups set up by the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference have been working on many of these issues. They have to clarify the scope and definition of the issues and undertake a range of tasks: transparency, non-discrimination, ways of preparing negotiated commitments, development provisions, exceptions and balance of payments, consultation and dispute settlement.

29. A large number of countries, especially from Asia and Africa had opposed the EU demand including protests about multilateral agreements on trade and investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement. They wanted to remove all these issues from the negotiating mandate. Developed countries own interpretation was that the Fifth Ministerial in 2003 would decide only on the modalities, while the agreement to kick off the negotiations soon after that Ministerial is already in place. Many developing countries, however, took the view that the decision on modalities by explicit consensus gives them a veto against the launch of the negotiations themselves.

30. Finally, a range of other issues were posed including Trade and Environment, with Ministers agreeing to launch negotiations on the relationships between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations. The Trade and Environment Committee would focus on concerns including the impact of environmental measures on market access, especially for developing countries. Trade and environment has been under study but for the first time the Doha Declaration brought it into the negotiating agenda in spite of protests from many developing countries. However, the negotiating mandate in the Declaration is quite restrictive and unlikely to damage developing country interests.

31. On WTO Rules, Ministers agreed to negotiations on the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies agreements and clarifying and improving disciplines, while preserving principles; on Regional Trade Agreements and procedures under existing WTO provisions. New Working Groups in the WTO embraced the topic of Trade, Debt and Finance as critical given the serious external debt problems facing many African countries, while on the Least Developed Countries commitment was made to fulfill the goals of duty free and quota free access to enhance market access.

### **C. Challenges for Africa in the Current Multilateral Trade Negotiations [MTN]**

32. Major challenges confront transforming African countries in becoming effective partners in the world economy and the global trading system. This requires shaping the 'modalities' to cope with the Post Doha Agenda and firmly establishing the goals of market access, removing domestic policy obstacles, and translating special and differential provisions into meaningful measures which can enable African countries to reduce supply constraints, food insecurity, and poverty. This impinges on devising effective modalities of tariff cutting, including adaptation of formulas and linking them directly to real market access, reduction of non-tariff barriers, provision of technical support, creation of a 'Development Box,' and strategies for improving WTO governance.

First, market access commitments on modalities require a balanced exchange of concessions and reduction of relatively high trade barriers by more than the lower barriers in order to increase the size of the market access concessions exchanged. <sup>4</sup>

33.A "Formula Approach"<sup>5</sup> could be effective in easing market access - a method of negotiating over tariffs or other barriers to trade by applying a general rule [formula]- for example- a rule specifying that all tariffs be cut to a certain fraction of their initial level or that an agreement should cover a certain proportion of economic activity [sector]. The search for a "Right Formula" is essential to reduce discretions in determining protection in individual sectors and has given rise to recommend actions for use of a 'Flexible Swiss Formula'<sup>6</sup> embodying (a) a "compensation parameter" to allow the same average tariff cut to be achieved with somewhat smaller reductions in peak tariffs focused on achieving agreed reductions in average tariffs (b) applying a standard "Swiss Formula" unique to each WTO member and then determining a Swiss Formula coefficient for each country to yield agreed reduction in the average tariff. The Kennedy Round used such a "formula approach" with a 50% cut yielding an effective 35% reduction in tariffs, compared to an average of 2.5% in the previous four negotiations.

34.The Tokyo Round saw the "Swiss Formula" with a 30% cut in average tariff rates. A maximum tariff rate was introduced and it brought about a larger reduction in the highest tariff rates. But it was limited with large differences in initial tariff rates and the presence of binding overhang. The concessions were concentrated in manufactured goods while agricultural commodities were treated differently. Textiles and clothing, footwear, and tropical goods received lower tariff cuts and often none at all.

35.It is critical to shape the relevant formula as trade barriers in industrial countries weigh more heavily on less developed countries-the latter face tariffs on average 20% higher than the rest of the world on their exports to rich countries. This rises to 30% for manufactured goods and it is estimated that LDCs are losing about US \$ 2.5 billion a year in potential earnings due to high levels of tariff protection in Canada, the EU, Japan and US. The Quad [US, Canada, EU and Japan] provide LDCs with about US \$ 10 billion in aid [i.e. In 1999] but for every US \$ 4 of aid the same countries take back US \$ 1 through the imposition of trade restrictions on LDC exports.

36.Non-Tariff Barriers [NTB] are a more significant barrier to developing country exports than tariffs. They are less transparent than tariffs. The true level of protection to European industry rises from 5.1% if tariffs alone are included to 9% if both tariff and non-tariff barriers are taken into account. NTB are notoriously difficult to measure and interpret and include export restrictions, variable charges, antidumping and countervailing measures and range from packaging requirements, food hygiene, to processing standards. Undoubtedly, developing countries are severely constrained in meeting rigorous legal and safety standards. This has adverse implications for the competitiveness of their exports to developed countries.

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<sup>4</sup> Stefano Inama: Market Access for LDCs. Issues to Be Addressed, Journal of World Trade, 36 (1), 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Francois and Will Martin\): A Formula for Success? Potential Approaches to Market Access Negotiations, Tinbergen Institute and CEPR and World Bank, July 2002.

<sup>6</sup> B.O. Sodersten and Geoffrey Reed: International Economics, chapter 17, "GATT", page 363-364, Macmillan, Third Edition, 1994.

37. Second, a "Development Box"<sup>7</sup> is a key modality to tackle the Post Doha agenda. This centers on incorporating developmental factors in the process of liberalization by explicitly integrating food security, rural development and poverty, including protecting small and marginal farmers facing the prospects of onslaught of cheap food imports and their employment opportunities. The principles of the Special and Differential Treatment under the Agreement on Agriculture plus 'non-trade' concerns are encompassed by this too, but the thrust is on making the ingredients operational in easing liberalization and interlocking with market access. The "Development Box" is not simply a set of specific proposals. It marks a fundamental shift in the approach to designing trade rules. It could be a very powerful tool in enabling the requisite flexibility to enhance domestic production, in particular for domestic consumption and food security, and to take the steps to improve the livelihood of their farmers.

38. Third, it is critical to evolve modalities, which can improve governance<sup>8</sup> within the WTO, including in particular the bargaining power of the Africa Geneva Group to cope with the Post Doha challenges. This demands increasing transparency, accountability, and forceful participation by African countries and their representatives, and critical assessment, monitoring, and expose of the actual practices of the principles underlying the WTO Agreements. African countries have been badly disenfranchised and flustered by the WTO governance structure due to a deficiency of resources, lack of meaningful representation in major meetings, and inadequate staffing. Hence, they have been unable to become effective "rule makers" in the WTO framework.

39. In this context, regional and sub-regional organizations could articulate negotiating objectives and positions of African countries and the Africa WTO Geneva Group by supporting, advising, and mastering the required negotiating and coordination skills. Clearly, African countries have to develop such prowess to persist with dogged determination in a highly competitive setting

#### **IV. ECA Contribution to Trade-Related Capacity Building: Pre-and-Post Doha**

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40. The ECA has made significant contributions to in building trade-related capacity of African countries in order to deal with issues of the global economy and the multilateral trading system. The Commission played an important role in assisting African countries to adequately prepare for the Doha WTO Ministerial and during the negotiations at Doha.

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<sup>7</sup> Joachim Von Braun, Peter Wobst and Ulrike Grote: Development Box and Special and Differential Treatment for Food Security of Developing Countries: Potentials, Limitations and Implementation Issues, Centre for Development Research, University of Bonn, May 2002; and Tim Ruffer: Development Box Proposals and Their Potential Effect on Developing Countries, Vol.1. Main Report, Oxford Policy Management, April 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Capacity Building in Africa for Trade Negotiations: From Nowhere to Getting There Fast, Reforming Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development.

41. In the Post Doha phase ECA support encompasses a range of relevant activities centered on building Trade Related Capacity and analytical Research through [a] reinforcing the internal trade capacity of the ECA to undertake high quality trade research and intensifying the training of qualified trade specialists [b] developing a comprehensive training programme at the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning [IDEP] in Dakar, Senegal for African trade negotiators to bolster their skills in multilateral and bilateral negotiations and [c] strengthening support to the WTO Africa Geneva Group to facilitate day to day negotiations within the WTO, providing informed research, and reinforcing technical inputs on trade protocol negotiations<sup>9</sup> such as on negotiations on trade protocol of the critical Cotonou ACP/EU agreement<sup>10</sup> and supporting Regional Economic Communities [REC]. ECA's activities to equip African experts with a fuller grasp of the Post Doha WTO agenda are exemplified by the "Workshop on Trade in Services" held in Johannesburg early 2002, and the "WTO/ECA/ADB Trade Policy Course for African Countries" held in Addis Ababa, June 2002, and by developing a comprehensive ECA/IDEP Trade-Related Capacity Building, Research and Training Programme for African countries.

42. In order to continue to assist African countries in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, ECA intends to establish a small office in Geneva to provide on the spot technical support to African Trade Negotiators based in Geneva. The establishment of an ECA Office in Geneva would be in response to repeated requests from our member States, and primarily their representatives in Geneva, prior to the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference for ECA to provide trade-related technical assistance and capacity building to enable African countries effectively participate in the negotiations undertaken in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). These requests have continued after Doha, as reflected in the correspondence ECA has received from Coordinators of the Africa WTO Geneva Group.

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<sup>9</sup> Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) and Organization of African Unity (OAU): Africa and the World Trade Organization: Doha and Beyond, October 2001; and ECA, AERC, OAU: Conclusions and Recommendations of High Level Brainstorming Meeting for African Trade Negotiators Preparatory to the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, 26-29 June 2001; Economic Commission for Africa and the African Institute for Development Planning: ECA/IDEP Trade-Related Capacity Building, Research and Training Programme to Africa, 2002/2003. Project Proposal, 25 June 2002, Dakar/Addis Ababa.

<sup>10</sup> Ademola Oyejide and Dominique Njinkeu: African Preparation For Trade Negotiations in the Context of the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement, AERC, Paper Prepared for the 4<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Conference of Ministers of Trade of the OAU/AEC, Abuja, Nigeria, 19-23 September 2001.