English, PDF, 779kb
Countries adhering to the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises have declared that enterprises from adhering countries should be accorded National Treatment in their territory. This report describes the main features of the OECD National Treatment instrument and contains a complete survey of adhering governments' measures relating to National Treatment.
The Greek government and the OECD are working together to assess the costs and benefits of regulations restricting competition in the tourism, retail trade, food processing and construction materials sectors and to propose specific recommendations for change.
The Malaysian government, in partnership with the OECD and ASEAN, has undertaken a review of its investment policies as part of an active programme of investment policy reforms to help revive both foreign and domestic investment.
English, PDF, 312kb
The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people’s money: excess leverage and default pressure resulting from contagion and counterparty risk. This paper looks at whether the Basel III reforms address these issues effectively and proposes improvements to the current reform proposals.
English, PDF, 114kb
This paper investigates whether countries that had controls on inflows in place prior to the crisis were less vulnerable during the global financial crisis. More generally, it examines economic growth effects of such controls over the entire economic cycle, finding that capital restrictions on inflows (particularly debt liabilities) may be useful in good times but may have adverse effects in a crisis.
English, PDF, 377kb
This paper looks at macro-prudential policies in the light of empirical evidence on the determinants of bank systemic risk, and the effectiveness of capital controls. It concludes that complexity and interdependence is such that care should be taken in implementing macro-prudential policies until much more is understood about these issues.
English, PDF, 317kb
The bank regulator's paradox is that large, complex and interconnected banks need very little capital in the good times, but they can never have enough in an extreme crisis. Separation is required to deal with this problem, which derives mainly from counterparty risk. This paper outlines the OECD’s separation proposal and also compares it to current national approaches to separation.