8-January-2010
English, , 467kb
Contagion risk and counterparty failure have been the main hallmarks of the current crisis. While some large diversified banks that focused mainly on commercial banking survived very well, others suffered crippling losses. Sound corporate governance and strong risk-management culture should enable banks to avoid excessive leverage and risk taking. The question is whether there is a better way, via leverage rules or rules on the
8-January-2010
English, , 191kb
This note explores various regulatory issues related to financial innovation. It starts from a premise that financial innovations are neither always helpful (or benign) nor always threatening. Innovations have the potential to provide for a more efficient allocation of resources and thereby a higher level of capital productivity and economic growth. Many financial innovations have had this effect. But others have not. Examples of the
8-January-2010
English, , 976kb
This paper discusses the financial systems of OECD Enhanced Engagement Countries (EE5: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa). Rather than providing a comprehensive survey of each financial system, it is designed to highlight some of the salient features of EE5 financial systems, emphasising those aspects of the system that these countries have in common and those that are different from those in OECD countries. While
7-January-2010
English, , 538kb
OECD governments are facing ongoing, unprecedented challenges in raising large volumes of funds at lowest possible cost, while balancing refinancing, repricing and interest rate risks. Gross borrowing needs of OECD governments are expected to reach almost USD 16 trillion in 2009, up from an earlier estimate of around USD 12 trillion. The tentative outlook for 2010 shows a stabilising borrowing picture at around the level of USD 16
7-January-2010
English, , 180kb
Tougher issuance conditions related to the surge in government borrowing needs are the reasons why issuance arrangements have not always been working as efficiently as before the crisis. This prompted debt management offices (DMOs) in the OECD area to review existing issuance policies and procedures. The crisis also had an impact on the use of indicators or guidelines relating to the key risks of the maturity structure of issuance or