The 2013 Annual Report describes the activities undertaken to promote the observance of the Guidelines during the implementation cycle of June 2012-June 2013. This includes the launch of the Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct (RBC), the establishment of a Working Party on RBC, and the elaboration of a robust multi-stakeholder proactive agenda to promote the observance of the principles and standards found in the Guidelines.
Developed by companies, for companies, with assistance from the OECD, UNODC, and World Bank, this Handbook serves as a useful, practical tool for companies seeking compliance advice in one, easy-to-reference publication. It brings together the major business guidance instruments for companies and illustrates them using real-life, anonymised case studies provided by companies.
The Malaysian government, in partnership with the OECD and ASEAN, has undertaken a review of its investment policies as part of an active programme of investment policy reforms to help revive both foreign and domestic investment.
English, PDF, 312kb
The main hallmarks of the global financial crisis were too-big-to-fail institutions taking on too much risk with other people’s money: excess leverage and default pressure resulting from contagion and counterparty risk. This paper looks at whether the Basel III reforms address these issues effectively and proposes improvements to the current reform proposals.
English, PDF, 114kb
This paper investigates whether countries that had controls on inflows in place prior to the crisis were less vulnerable during the global financial crisis. More generally, it examines economic growth effects of such controls over the entire economic cycle, finding that capital restrictions on inflows (particularly debt liabilities) may be useful in good times but may have adverse effects in a crisis.
English, PDF, 377kb
This paper looks at macro-prudential policies in the light of empirical evidence on the determinants of bank systemic risk, and the effectiveness of capital controls. It concludes that complexity and interdependence is such that care should be taken in implementing macro-prudential policies until much more is understood about these issues.
English, PDF, 317kb
The bank regulator's paradox is that large, complex and interconnected banks need very little capital in the good times, but they can never have enough in an extreme crisis. Separation is required to deal with this problem, which derives mainly from counterparty risk. This paper outlines the OECD’s separation proposal and also compares it to current national approaches to separation.