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English, , 2,206kb
It is often said that competition policy protects competition, not individual competitors. Policies that support this concept promote consumer welfare, choice and efficiency. How sharply does industrial policy conflict with this? Industrial policy creates or favours national champions; yet it purports to have the same goals and produce many of the same benefits for the market. This roundtable examined the tensions and interesting
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This workshop addressed abuse of dominance, with discussions focusing on defining the relevant market, barriers to entry, determining whether market power exists, efficiency considerations as well as remedies and sanctions.
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Accounting professions provide key services for ensuring the smooth operation of market economies. Maintaining access to quality accounting work at a reasonable price is crucial for increasing transparency of publicly held companies. While many practices may serve to protect consumers who are not otherwise able to assess the company accounts, there appear to be many areas in which there is restricted competition, particularly as a
Spanish, , 740kb
Este informe evalúa el desarrollo y aplicación de la ley de competenciaen Colombia durante los últimos años y los resultados a esperar de sureciente reforma, en los campos de acuerdos anticompetitivos, abuso deposición dominante, fusiones y adquisiciones, exclusiones y exenciones,aspectos de procedimientos e institucionales, coordinación con reguladoressectoriales, revisiones judiciales, asuntos internacionales y defensa de
English, , 872kb
Jointly published by OECD and the IDB, this report reviews competition laws and policies in Colombia and concludes with recommendations for changes in government policy. “Peer review” is a core element of OECD work. The mechanisms of peer review vary, but it is founded upon the willingness of all OECD countries and their partners to submit their laws and policies to substantive questioning by other members. This report is also
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This seminar explored how to detect and prevent bid rigging in public procurement using the OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging. A variety of case studies in which procurement officials detected bid rigging or designed procedures for preventing bid rigging will be discussed. Key focal areas for the seminar are investigative best practices and techniques, leniency programs, trade associations, and the use of indirect evidence.
The OECD Recommendation on Competition Assessment calls for governments to identify existing or proposed public policies that unduly restrict competition and to revise them by adopting more pro-competitive alternatives.
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The term "resale price maintenance" refers to a practice in which suppliers and resellers come to an understanding that places restrictions on the prices resellers may charge. There are several types of such agreements, the most common involves a supplier agreeing with retailers not to charge less than a certain price for the supplier's product. RPM may harm consumers by restricting intrabrand price competition, but RPM may benefit
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Settlements procedures may pursue different policy objectives in different OECD jurisdictions. Generally, they reward cooperation from the investigated parties, they create and sustain momentum in the investigation of other conspirators and they allow cartel cases to be resolved quickly. In some jurisdictions, settlements also offer “finality”, i.e. they offer companies certainty as to the outcome of the investigation and allow them
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The term “refusal to deal” describes a situation in which one firm refuses to sell to another firm, or is willing to sell only at a price that is considered “too high” or only under conditions that are deemed unacceptable. RTDs may harm competition by preventing entry that would have eroded or eliminated the dominant firm’s position. They may also restrict competition in markets where the dominant firm’s product is an input or a