FROM STATE TO MARKET:
A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON PRIVATIZATION

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1. Introduction

The political and economic policy of privatization, broadly defined as the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or assets to private economic agents, is now in use worldwide. Since its introduction by Britain’s Thatcher government in the early 1980s to a then-skeptical public (that included many economists), privatization now appears to be accepted as a legitimate – often a core – tool of statecraft by governments of more than 100 countries. Privatization is one of the most important elements of the continuing global phenomenon of the increasing use of markets to allocate resources.

It is tempting to point to the spread of privatization programs around the world during the past two decades and conclude that the debate on the economic and political merits of government versus private ownership has been decided. But such a conclusion is flawed since twenty years ago proponents of state ownership could just as easily have surveyed the postwar rise of state-owned enterprises and concluded that their model of economic organization was winning the intellectual battle with free market capitalism. Instead of pointing to the spread of privatization and calling it destiny, our goal is to assess the findings of empirical research on the effects of privatization as a policy. Therefore, this paper surveys the rapidly growing literature on privatization, attempts to frame and answer the key questions this stream of research has addressed, and then describes some of its lessons on the promise and perils of selling state-owned assets. Throughout this survey, we adopt the perspective of an advisor to a government policymaker who is wrestling with the practical problems of whether and how to implement a privatization program. The policymaker asks “What does the research literature have to tell us about these aspects of privatization as an economic policy?” We attempt to answer these important questions.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical overview of privatization. We examine the impact that privatization programs have had in reversing SOE involvement in the economic life of developed and developing countries. Section 3 briefly surveys the recent theoretical and empirical research on the relative economic performance of state-owned and privately owned firms. Section 4 details the different types of transactions that are labeled “privatization” in different regions. We draw particular attention to the structure and pricing selected for share issue privatizations. We also evaluate the various forms of “voucher” or “mass” privatizations that have been implemented. This section also examines whether less radical methods of improving the performance of SOEs, such as deregulation and allowing greater competition (or more routine steps such as using management performance contracts), can effectively substitute for outright privatization. In Section 5, we examine the issue of whether, and by how much, privatization programs have actually improved the economic and financial performance of
divested firms. Our discussion first evaluates privatization in industrialized and developing countries, and then assesses privatization’s overall impact in the transition economies. Section 6 asks whether domestic and international investors who purchase privatizing share offerings experience positive initial and long-term investment returns, and Section 7 evaluates the impact of privatization on the development of non-US capital markets over the past two decades. Finally, Section 8 discusses how privatization programs have impacted the development of—and interest in—corporate governance practices around the world. Section 9 concludes and summarizes our survey.

2. How Large Has the Impact of Privatization Been to Date?

Given the attention the press has given to the global movement toward markets, especially the privatization of state-owned enterprises, some might conclude that privatization has almost ended the involvement of state-owned enterprises in global economic activity.¹ This is a significant overstatement. To understand the impact of privatization on the state’s role in different economies, we must first briefly review the history behind both privatization and its precursor, nationalization.

Throughout history, there has been a mixture of public (often including religious institutions) and private ownership of the means of production and commerce. Sobel (1999) writes that state ownership of the means of production, including mills and metal working, was common in the ancient Near East, while private ownership was more common in trading and money lending. In ancient Greece, the government owned the land, forests, and mines, but contracted out the work to individuals and firms. In the Ch’in dynasty of China, the government had monopolies on salt and iron. Sobel notes that in the Roman Republic the "publicani (private individuals and companies) fulfilled virtually all of the state’s economic requirements." Rondinelli and Iacono (1996) note that by the time of the Industrial Revolution in the western industrialized societies and their colonies, the private sector was the most important producer of commercial goods and was also important in providing public goods and services. This pattern, with more government involvement in some countries and less in others, continued into the twentieth century in both Western Europe and its colonies and former colonies. In the United States, there was less government involvement than many other countries.

The Depression, World War II, and the final breakup of colonial empires pushed government into a more active role, including ownership of production and provision of all types of goods and services, in much of the world. In Western Europe, governments debated how deeply involved the national government should be in regulating the national economy and which industrial sectors should be reserved

¹ Throughout this paper, we will use the World Bank’s definition of state-owned enterprises, as described in Haggarty and Shirley (1995): "government-owned or government-controlled economic entities that generate the bulk
exclusively for state ownership. Until the Thatcher government came to power in 1979, the answer to this debate in the U.K and elsewhere was that the government should at least own the telecommunications and postal services, electric and gas utilities, and most forms of non-road transportation (especially airlines and railroads). Many politicians also believed the state should control certain “strategic” manufacturing industries, such as steel and defense production. In many countries, state-owned banks were also given either monopoly or protected positions, as discussed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000a).

Rondinelli and Iacono (1996) argue that government ownership grew in the developing world for slightly different reasons, primarily that government ownership was perceived as necessary to promote growth. In the post-colonial countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, governments sought rapid growth through heavy investment in physical facilities. Another reason for government ownership, often through nationalization, was a historical resentment of the foreigners who had owned many of the largest firms in these countries [see also Noll (2000)].

Thus, there had been a tremendous growth in the use of SOEs throughout much of the world, especially after World War II, which in turn led to privatizations several decades later. Most people associate modern privatization programs with Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, which came to power in Great Britain in 1979. However, the Adenauer government in the Federal Republic of Germany launched the first large-scale, ideologically motivated "denationalization" program of the postwar era. In 1961, the German government sold a majority stake in Volkswagen in a public share offering heavily weighted in favor of small investors. Four years later, the government launched an even larger offering for shares in VEBA. Both offerings were initially received favorably, but the appeal of share ownership did not survive the first cyclical downturn in stock prices, and the government was forced to bail out many small shareholders. It was almost twenty years before another major western nation chose to pursue privatization as a core economic or political policy.

of their revenues from selling goods and services.”


3 Using a broader definition of privatization – one that encompassed reactively changing the policies of an immediate predecessor government – the Churchill government’s denationalization of the British steel industry during the early 1950s could well be labeled the first “privatization.” We thank David Parker for pointing this out to us.

4 Yotopoulos (1989) describes and assesses the Chilean programs, which began before the program in the UK. The Pinochet government of Chile, which gained power after the ouster of Salvador Allende in 1973, attempted to privatize companies that the Allende government had nationalized. However, the process was poorly executed and required very little equity investment from purchasers of assets being divested. Thus, many of these same firms were re-nationalized once Chile entered its debt and payments crisis in the early 1980s. Chile’s second privatization
Although the Thatcher government may not have been the first to launch a large privatization program, it is without question the most important historically. Privatization was not a major campaign theme for the Tories in 1979, but the new Conservative government embraced the policy. Margaret Thatcher adopted the label “privatization” which was originally coined by Peter Drucker and which replaced the name denationalization (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998, 114). Early sales were strenuously attacked by the Labour opposition, which promised that if it were reelected it would to renationalize divested firms such as British Aerospace and Cable and Wireless.6

It was not until the successful British Telecom initial public offering in November 1984 that privatization became established as a basic economic policy in the UK. A series of increasingly massive share issue privatizations (SIPs) during the last half of the 1980s and early 1990s reduced the role of SOEs in the British economy to essentially nothing after the Tories left office in 1997, from more than 10 percent of GDP 18 years earlier.

We note that the objectives set for the British privatization program by the Conservatives were virtually the same as those listed by the Adenauer government twenty years before—and almost every government in the years since. These goals, as described in Price Waterhouse (1989a, b), are to (1) raise revenue for the state, (2) promote economic efficiency, (3) reduce government interference in the economy, (4) promote wider share ownership, (5) provide the opportunity to introduce competition, and (6) subject SOEs to market discipline. The other major objective mentioned by the Thatcher and subsequent governments is to develop the national capital market.7 We note these goals can be conflicting and we discuss the tradeoffs further in the paper.

The perceived success of the British privatization program helped persuade many other industrialized countries to begin divesting SOEs through public share offerings. Jacques Chirac’s government, which came to power in France in 1986, privatized 22 companies (worth $12 billion) before being ousted in 1988. The returning Socialist government did not execute any further sales, but neither did

program, which was launched in the mid-1980s and relied more on public share offerings than direct asset sales (in which the government often acted as creditor as well as seller) was much more successful.5

6 Ironically, a Labour government partially privatized a SOE just before Thatcher came to power. In 1977, the Labour government sold a relatively small fraction of the government’s shares in British Petroleum as a means of raising cash.

7 For more detailed discussions of the goals of the British privatization program, see Menyah, Paudyal, and Inganyete (1995) and Menyah and Paudyal (1996).
it renationalize the divested firms. Beginning in 1993, the Balladur government launched a new and even larger French privatization program, which has continued under the Jospin administration. The Socialists, in fact, launched the two largest French privatizations ever, the $7.1 billion France Telecom initial public offering (IPO) in October 1997 and the subsequent $10.5 billion seasoned France Telecom issue in November 1998.

Several other European governments, including Italy, Germany, and, most spectacularly, Spain, also launched large privatization programs during the 1990s. These programs typically relied on public share offerings, and were often launched by avowedly socialist governments. Privatization spread to the Pacific Rim, beginning in the late 1980s. Japan has sold only a relative handful of SOEs during the past 15 years (usually relying on SIPs), but many of these have been truly enormous. The three Nippon Telegraph and Telephone share offerings executed between February 1987 and October 1988 raised almost $80 billion, and the $40 billion NTT offer in November 1987 remains the largest single security offering in history. Elsewhere in Asia, governments have taken an opportunistic approach to SOE divestment, selling pieces of large companies when market conditions are attractive, or when money is needed to plug budget deficits. It is unclear how the economic difficulties that gripped the region during the late 1990s will impact privatizations in the future.

Two Asian countries deserve special attention. These two countries are already the world’s second and fifth largest economies on a purchasing-power-parity basis, and promise to become even more important over time. The People’s Republic of China launched a major economic reform and liberalization program in the late-1970s that has transformed the productivity of the Chinese economy. While there have been numerous small privatizations, there have been relatively few outright sales of SOEs, thus the overall impact of privatization has been limited. Though the government recently (1999) reaffirmed its commitment to privatizing all but the very largest state enterprises, the fact that Chinese SOEs are burdened with so many social welfare responsibilities suggests that it will be extraordinarily difficult to implement a privatization program large enough to seriously undermine the state’s economic role (Lin, 2000, Lin, Cai, and Li, 1998, and Bai, Li, and Wang, 1997). The other special Asian case is India, which adopted a major economic reform and liberalization program in 1991, after being wedded to state-directed economic development for the first 44 years of its independence. India’s reform program shares two key features with China’s: it was adopted in response to highly disappointing SOE performance (Majumdar, 1996), and privatization has thus far not figured prominently in the reform agenda.

On the other hand, Latin America has truly embraced privatization. Chile’s program is particularly important, both because it was Latin America’s first and because the 1990 Telefonos de Chile privatization, which used a large American depository receipt (ADR) share tranche that was targeted
towards U.S. investors, opened the first important pathway for developing countries to use to directly tap western capital markets.

Mexico’s program was both vast in scope and remarkably successful at reducing the state’s role in what had been an interventionist economy. LaPorta and López-de-Silanes (1999) report that in 1982 Mexican SOEs produced 14 percent of GDP, received net transfers and subsidies equal to 12.7 percent of GDP, and accounted for 38 percent of fixed capital investment. By June 1992, the government had privatized 361 of its roughly 1,200 SOEs and the need for subsidies had been virtually eliminated.

Several other countries in Latin America have also executed large divestment programs (Gottret, 1999). For example, Bolivia’s innovative “capitalization” scheme has been widely acclaimed. However, the most important program in the region is Brazil’s. Given the size of Brazil’s economy and its privatization program, and the fact that the Cardoso government has been able to sell several very large SOEs (CVRD in 1997 and Telebras in 1998) in spite of significant political opposition, this country’s program is likely to remain very influential.

Privatization in sub-Saharan Africa has been something of a stealth economic policy. Few governments have openly adopted an explicit SOE divestment strategy, but Bennell (1997) shows that there has been substantially more privatization in the region than is commonly believed. For example, Jones et al. (1999) show that Nigeria has been one of the most frequent sellers of SOEs, using public share offerings. The experience of the African National Congress after it came to power in South Africa also shows the policy realities that governments with interventionist instincts face in this new era. Though nationalization and redistribution of wealth have been central planks of ANC ideology for decades, the Mandela and Mbeki governments have almost totally refrained from nationalizations, and have even sold off several SOEs (though use of the word “privatization” remains taboo).

The last major region to adopt privatization programs comprised the former Soviet-bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These countries began privatizing SOEs as part of a broader effort to transform themselves from command into market economies. Therefore, they faced the most difficult challenges and had the most restricted set of policy choices. After the collapse of communism in 1989-91, all of the newly elected governments of the region were under pressure to create something resembling a market economy as quickly as possible. However, political considerations essentially required these governments to significantly limit foreign purchases of divested assets.

Since the region had little financial savings, these twin imperatives compelled many — though not all — governments throughout the region to launch “mass privatization” programs. These programs generally involved distributing vouchers to the population, which citizens could then use to bid for shares in companies being privatized. Although these programs resulted in a massive reduction of state ownership
and the programs were (initially) popular politically, the net effects of these programs have been mostly disappointing. We discuss the empirical evidence on voucher privatization in Section 5.

Although different regions have embraced privatization at varying speeds, governments have found the lure of revenue from sales of SOEs to be attractive – which is one reason the policy has spread so rapidly. According to *Privatisation International* (Gibbon, 1998, 2000), the cumulative value of proceeds raised by privatizing governments exceeded $1 trillion sometime during the second half of 1999. As an added benefit, this revenue has come to governments without raising taxes or cutting other government services. Annual proceeds grew steadily before peaking at over $160 billion in 1997. Since then, proceeds seem to have leveled off at an annual rate of about $140 billion. Figure 1 shows the annual revenues governments have received from privatizations from 1988 through 1999. Mahboobi (2000) reports similar figures classified by privatizations in OECD and non OECD countries. He reports that since 1990 privatization in OECD countries has raised over $600 billion, which is approximately 2/3 of global privatization activity. Western Europe has accounted for over half of these proceeds.

*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***

This historical discussion suggests that state ownership has been substantially reduced since 1979, and in most countries this has in fact occurred. Using data from Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999), Figure 1 demonstrates the role of state-owned enterprises in the economies of high-income (industrialized) countries has declined significantly, from about 8.5 percent of GDP in 1984 to less than 6 percent in 1991. Data presented in Schmitz (1996), Nester and Mahboobi (1999), and Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (1999), as well as our own empirical work on share issue privatization, suggests that the SOE share of industrialized-country GDP has continued to decline since 1991, and is now probably below 5 percent.

The low-income countries show an even more dramatic reduction in state ownership. From a high point of almost 16 percent of GDP, the average SOE share of national output dropped to barely 7 percent in 1995, and has probably dropped to about 5 percent since then. The middle-income countries also experienced significant reductions in state ownership during the 1990s. Since the upper- and lower-middle-income groups include the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, this decline was expected given the extremely high beginning levels of state ownership. For example, Shafik (1995) reports that the Czechoslovakian government owned 98 percent of all property in 1989.

*** Insert Figure 2 about here ***
3. Why Have Governments Embraced Privatization Programs?

3.1. The Efficiency of State Versus Private Ownership: Theory

Throughout history, scholars, including economists, have debated the role of government in the economy. Among economists, this debate now spans many areas including welfare economics, public choice, public finance, industrial organization, law and economics, corporate finance, and macroeconomics. In this section, we summarize some of the important theoretical issues that arise in the study of privatization and that are needed to analyze the empirical evidence we review in the rest of the paper. We concentrate on empirical evidence because, as Laffont and Tirole (1993) say at the end of their model analyzing tradeoffs between government and private ownership in promoting efficiency, “theory alone is thus unlikely to be conclusive in this respect.” There are also several excellent articles that discuss the theory of privatization and review the literature, including Boardman and Vining (1989), Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Sheifer (1998), Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999), Nellis (1999), Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999), and Shirley and Walsh (2000).

The economic theory of privatization is a subset of the large literature on the economics of ownership and the role for government ownership (or regulation) of productive resources. An initial question to be asked is “what is the proper role of government?” Implicitly, we assume that the goal of government is to promote efficiency. Thus, we discuss the efficiency implications of government ownership and more importantly, the movement from government ownership to privatization. To a large extent we ignore the arguments concerning the importance of equitable concerns such as income distribution. We do so not because they are unimportant, but because they are beyond the scope of this review. The effects of privatization on productive efficiency, or at least observable variables that are proxies for productive efficiency, is the focus of most of the empirical literature we review here.

The theoretical arguments for the advantages of private ownership of the means of production are based on a fundamental theorem of welfare economics: Under strong assumptions, a competitive equilibrium is pareto optimal. However, the assumptions include requirements that there are no externalities in production or consumption, that the product is not a public good, that the market is not monopolistic in structure, and that information costs are low. Thus, a theoretical argument for government intervention based on efficiency grounds rests on an argument that markets have failed in some way, one or more of these assumptions do not hold, and that the government can resolve the market failure.

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8 For example, Frederich von Hayek’s passionate critiques of the welfare state and collectivism, exemplified in the 1944 book *The Road to Serfdom*, had a direct impact on policymakers in developing a motive for privatization. Yergin and Stanislaw (1998, p. 98-107) write how Hayek’s work was the intellectual basis for Keith Joseph and then Margaret Thatcher and the Tory politicians who began the intellectual campaign against statism in the U.K. that triggered the worldwide privatization movement.
Intellectual arguments for government intervention based on efficiency considerations have been made in many areas. Governments perceive the need to regulate (or own) natural monopolies or other monopolies, intervene in the case of externalities (such as regulating pollution), and help provide public goods (such as providing national defense and education, or in areas where there is a public good aspect to providing information). The arguments for government intervention become more complicated when they extend to distributional concerns. For example, some (e.g., Briggs, 1961) argue that the role of government is to act as a “welfare state,” using state intervention in the market economy to modify the actions of the market. Thus, the arguments for state ownership or control rest on some market failure or perceived market failure, and countries have often responded to market failure with state ownership. Privatization, in turn, is a response to the failings of state ownership. Theoretical arguments that have arisen in the privatization debate include:

1) The impact of privatization depends on the degree of market failure. As noted, welfare theory (ignoring the theory of second best) would argue that privatization tends to have the greatest positive impact in those cases where the role for the government in lessening a market failure is the weakest, i.e., for SOEs in competitive markets, or markets that can become readily competitive. Sheshinski and López-Calva (1999), in summarizing the theoretical literature, arguing that there should be “… important efficiency gains from changes to private ownership in competitive structures.” In fact, the effects of competition can be so strong that SOEs, in an increasingly global environment, may be forced to respond to pressures that maximize productive efficiency without the ownership change of privatization. (See Shirley and Walsh (2000) for additional discussion of the effects of competition on the privatization decision.)

In contrast, the justification for privatization is less compelling in markets for public goods and natural monopolies where competitive considerations are weaker. However, even in those markets, Shleifer (1999) and others have argued that government-owned firms are rarely the appropriate solution for many of the reasons discussed below.

2) Contracting ability impacts the efficiency of state and private ownership. Government ownership of firms results in problems in defining the goals of the firm. While the shareholder-wealth-maximizing model of corporate organization is becoming increasingly dominant in part because of the advantages of having a well-defined corporate goal (see Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000), governments have many objectives other than profit or shareholder-wealth maximization. Further, government objectives can change from one administration to the next. The inability of the government to credibly commit to a policy can significantly reduce the efficiency of a firm’s operations and governance. Even if

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9 Gough (1989) notes Archbishop Temple first used the term in wartime Britain to differentiate Britain from the “warfare” state of Nazi Germany.
the government does attempt to maximize social welfare, for example, welfare is a difficult thing to measure and use in guiding policy. In addition, the government’s goals can be inconsistent with efficiency, inconsistent with maximizing social welfare, or even malevolent (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993 and Shleifer, 1999).

In addition, even if the government and the nation's citizens agree that profit maximizing is the goal of the firm, it is difficult to write complete contracts that adequately tie managers' incentives to that goal. Shleifer (1999) argues that the owners of public firms (the nation’s citizens) are less able to write complete contracts with their managers because of their diffuse nature, making it difficult to tie the managers’ incentives to the returns from their decisions. This is a subset of the broader arguments based in property rights and agency costs that there will be differences in performance between government and privately held firms because there are a broader range of monitoring devices under private ownership.\\footnote{Alchian (1977) notes, “behavior under [public and private] ownership is different, not because the objectives sought by organizations under each form are different, but, instead, because even with the same explicit organization goals, the costs-rewards system impinging on the employees and the ‘owners’ of the organization are different.”}

3) **Ownership structure affects the ease with which government can intervene in the operations of a firm.** Of course, governments can intervene in the operations of any firm, either public or private. However, the government’s transaction costs of intervening in production arrangements and other decisions of the firm are greater when firms are privately owned. Thus, to the extent that government intervention has greater costs than benefits, private ownership is preferred to public ownership (see Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987).

4) **A major source of inefficiency in public firms stems from less-prosperous firms being allowed to rely on the government for funding, leading to “soft” budget constraints.** The state is unlikely to allow a large SOE to face bankruptcy. Thus, the discipline enforced on private firms by the capital markets and the threat of financial distress is less important for state-owned firms. Kornai (1998, 1993), Berglof and Roland (1998), and Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000) all suggest that soft budget constraints were a major source of inefficiency in Communist firms. They also note that supposedly “hard” budget constraints imposed by a government on SOEs are not very effective either.

5) **Privatization can impact efficiency through its effect on government fiscal conditions.** As noted in Section 1, governments have raised huge amounts of money by selling SOEs. Such sales have helped reduce the fiscal deficit in many countries. Though important, examining the efficiency effects of reducing
government deficits is beyond the scope of this paper. Davis, Ossowski, Richardson and Barnett (2000) show that privatization has significant positive effects on governments’ fiscal conditions.

6) **At a macroeconomic level, privatization can help develop product and security markets.** One important motivation for privatization is to help develop factor and product markets, as well as security markets. As discussed above, welfare economics argues that efficiency is achieved through competitive markets. Thus, to the extent that privatization promotes competition, privatization can have important efficiency effects.

Inevitably, the effectiveness of privatization programs and markets themselves are simultaneously determined. It has been clear in the transition economies that the success of the privatization program depends on the strength of the markets within the same country, and vice versa. Thus, the impact of privatization will differ across countries depending on the strength of the existing private sector. The empirical evidence shows that this is the case.

3.2. **Summary of the Theory of Privatization**

Theoretical work that examines privatization offers many reasons why, even in the case of market failure, state ownership has important weaknesses. Shleifer (1998) sums up much of the literature with, “… a good government that wants to further ‘social goals,’ would rarely own producers to meet its objectives.” A question for the post-privatization world is the role of the public sector in the economy and in the regulation of firms. The alternative to state ownership is rarely purely private, unregulated firms. State ownership is only one form of the continuum of governance structures that reflect the level of state regulation of public and privately owned firms (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Many of the theoretical arguments for privatization are based on the premise that the harmful effects of state intervention have a greater impact under state ownership than under state regulation, not that the harmful effects can be eliminated through privatization. However, in this paper we leave to others the continuing debate on the proper role of regulation in a market-oriented economy. Instead, we analyze recent empirical literature examining the relative effectiveness of state versus private ownership.12

3.3. **The Efficiency of State versus Private Ownership: Empirical Evidence**

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12 The opinions of policymakers throughout the world have been moving closer to those expressed by Ronald Coase in his classic 1960 article, “The Problem of Social Cost.” In analyzing market failure, Coase says, “All solutions have costs, and there is no reason to suppose that governmental regulation is called for simply because the problem is not handled well by the market or the firm.” Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (1997) in a more recent analysis of the benefits and costs of free markets versus central planning say markets have worked better because, “First, the price system motivates better use of knowledge and information in economic decisions. Second, it provides stronger incentives for individuals to make productive decisions.”
Comparing the performance of government-owned to privately owned firms is one method through which the impact of government ownership on firm performance can be analyzed.\(^{13}\) In section 5 we present a more complete discussion of the potential problems in all empirical work in this area which includes lack of data and bad data, omitted variables, endogeneity, and selection bias. There are two methodological difficulties that are especially pronounced in attempts to isolate the impact of ownership on performance. First, in comparing SOEs to privately owned firms, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the appropriate set of comparison firms or benchmarks, especially in developing economies with limited private sectors. Second, there are generally fundamental reasons why certain firms are government-owned and others are privately owned, including the degree of perceived market failure within the particular industry. These factors that determine whether the firm is publicly or privately owned likely also have significant effects on performance. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of government ownership in cases where the ownership structure is itself endogenous to the system that includes both political and performance goals. Despite these problems, researchers have compared SOEs and privately owned-firm performance in several cases with some success. We summarize the papers included here in Table 1.

**** Insert Table 1 about here ****

Given the above noted limitations, Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter (1994) provide good evidence on productivity differences between state-owned and privately owned firms. They use a sample of 23 comparable international airlines of different (and in some cases changing) ownership categories over the period 1973-83 for which they are able to obtain good and comparable cost, output, and ownership data. They develop a model of endogenous, firm-specific productivity growth as a function of firm-specific capital and use the model as a basis for their fixed-effects regressions estimating a cost function in a simultaneous framework with input-demand equations. They argue that they are able to separate the impact of ownership changes on short-term levels of productivity changes from the long-term effects on the rate of productivity growth, improving on earlier studies that have concentrated on the static rather than dynamic effects of state ownership and changes in state ownership. Further, the authors suggest that they are able to isolate the effects of ownership from other factors impacting the rate of productivity growth, including market conditions and exogenous technical changes.

Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter (1994) find a significant link between ownership and firm-specific rates of productivity growth. Their results suggest that private ownership leads to higher rates of productivity growth and declining costs in the long run and these differences are not affected by the

\(^{13}\) A related literature that we do not review analyzes the relative performance of nonprofit firms and for-profit firms. Brickley and Van Horn (2000), in an analysis of large hospitals, argue that the evidence suggests there is little distinction between the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Their results suggest the similarities in behavior are due to the effects of competition and not identical objective functions of the managers.
degree of market competition or regulation. Their estimates suggest that the short-run effects of changes from state to private ownership on productivity and costs are ambiguous, providing a possible explanation for some of the anomalous results in studies examining short-run effects of ownership changes. However, their point estimates indicate that the change from complete state ownership to private ownership in the long run would increase productivity growth by 1.6 to 2 percent a year and costs would decline by 1.7 to 1.9 percent. Their empirics also suggest that a partial change from state ownership to private ownership has little effect on long-run productivity growth -- the benefits are based on complete privatization of the firm.

This paper has advantages over much of the other work in the area due to the good data, as well as guidance from a well-developed literature in estimating the determinants of productivity. The authors perform some of the more sophisticated econometric analysis of papers in this area. For example, they replicate their results with a subset of firms that did not experience any within-firm changes in ownership, enabling the authors to be sure that their time-ownership interaction term captures only between firm variations in ownership. Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter also perform various other robustness checks using different specifications and subsamples as well as controlling for the special characteristics of their sample period (oil price shocks and deregulation in the U.S.), and find that their results are robust. Finally, they consider the potential for simultaneity effects between ownership and productivity and find that causality goes from ownership to productivity, and not vice versa. The weakness in the work is that it is based on one industry with relatively old data. The authors also note that they make the implicit assumption that all firms are cost minimizing, but if state-owned enterprises have other objectives, it is difficult to interpret the meaning of differences in costs.

Majumdar (1996) examines differences in efficiency between government-owned, mixed, and private-sector firms in India. He finds support for the superior efficiency of private and mixed-sector firms over SOEs. Using aggregate, industry-level survey data, Majumdar finds that SOEs owned by the central and state governments have average efficiency scores of 0.658 and 0.638, respectively, over the period 1973-89. Mixed enterprises have scores of 0.92 and private enterprises have scores of 0.975. A concern with Majumdar’s study is that the aggregated nature of the data, along with problems arising from the reliance on survey data, limits his ability to identify any specific areas where private versus state ownership works best, and whether there are simultaneity and selection bias problems in trying to estimate the effects of ownership and productivity. In addition, he can provide little insight into the reasons for the efficiency differences between the sectors.

Tian (2000) offers another country-specific study. He examines 825 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, with 513 mixed-ownership firms and 312 private firms. He finds that private firms perform better than mixed ownership firms. In addition, he examines the valuation of the companies
and finds that corporate value with small government shareholdings decreases with the fraction of state shareholding but rises when the government is a large shareholder.

Another approach to studying the effects of government ownership on efficiency relies on a multi-industry, multinational, time-series methodology. While cross-sectional time series studies suffer from methodological problems we discuss later, they are able to capture differences that are not apparent in single country or single industry studies. An influential paper taking this approach is Boardman and Vining (1989) who examine the economic performance of the 500 largest non-U.S. industrial firms in 1983. Using four profitability ratios and two measures of X-efficiency, they show that state-owned and mixed (state and private) ownership enterprises are significantly less profitable and productive than are privately owned firms. They also find that mixed enterprises are no more profitable than SOEs, suggesting that full private control, not just partial ownership, is essential to achieving performance improvement. In a later study, Vining and Boardman (1992), use a sample of Canadian firms to re-examine the state versus private ownership question. Their results are qualitatively similar to the earlier findings. In addition, the Canadian study finds that mixed enterprises are more profitable than SOEs, though they fall far short of private-firm levels.

Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) follow the general approach of Boardman and Vining (1989) using more recent data. They test whether the profitability, labor intensity, and debt levels of SOEs in the 500 largest international companies, as reported in Fortune for 1975, 1985, and 1995, differ from privately owned firms in the same samples. Their data have 1,369 total firm years, of which 147 represent government-owned firms. Since Fortune excluded U.S. firms until 1995, the data are mainly international. After controlling for firm size, location, industry, and business-cycle effects, Dewenter and Malatesta find robust evidence that private companies are significantly (often dramatically) more profitable than SOEs, and also have lower levels of indebtedness and fewer labor-intensive production processes than do their state-owned counterparts.

Finally, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of Central Europe, and explicitly try to control for selection bias. Using survey data for 506 midsize manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1994, they compare four measures of firm performance – sales revenues, employment, labor productivity (revenue per employee) and material costs per unit of revenue. They compare the privatized group to the nonprivatized group with panel data, controlling for potential pre-privatization differences between the two groups. Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski find that the average effect of

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14 Frydman et al. also compare the performance of the privatized firms to themselves as SOEs. Thus, we also discuss the paper in Section 5 and it is summarized in Table 5.
privatization is that it works – privatized firms perform better than the state owned firms. However, the performance improvement is concentrated in revenue improvement (not cost reduction) in firms privatized to outside owners.

Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) make two important contributions. First, they show that while privatization improves performance, the effect is limited to certain measures of performance and in cases where the SOE is sold to outside owners. Second, they attempt to control for the effects of selection bias in examining the effects of privatization in several ways. First, they use a fixed effects model to control for selection bias caused by unobserved firm characteristics correlated with performance outcomes that are fixed over time. Further, they contrast the performance of firms privatized in one period with those privatized in another for two different time periods to compare the privatized firms with how they would have performed without privatization. Finally, to control partially for the possibility that better firms are selected for privatization, they contrast the pre-privatization performance of managerially controlled firms with those controlled by other owners. Thus, the paper does an excellent job of controlling for potential biases, though it necessarily depends on survey data.

We conclude this section with two studies that use unique situations to analyze the effects of government versus private ownership. Kole and Mulherin (1997) set out to answer the basic question in the public versus private debate as posed by Peltzman (1971), “If a privately owned firm is socialized, and nothing else happens, how will the ownership alone affect the firm’s behavior.” Kole and Mulherin study 17 firms with significant German or Japanese ownership when the U.S. entered World War II. The U.S. government assumed ownership of the foreign stock in these firms and ended up holding between 35 and 100 percent of the common stock for up to 23 years during and after World War II. Kole and Mulherin find industry controls for five firms, comprising 61 percent of the book value of the 17 firms, and compare the performance of the government-owned firms. They find no significant difference between the performance of their sample with the private-sector firms and state “the preceding results stand in contrast to the typical results regarding the inefficiency of government enterprise.” The authors argue that the fact that these firms were operating in competitive industries forced them to operate efficiently.

The Kole and Mulherin (1997) results are evidence that in a competitive environment, where the government has no agenda other than as a passive investor, factors other than ownership determine firm performance. Many of the firms were involved in the war effort so the government had an incentive to run them efficiently. In addition, all the firms were eventually reprivatized so the government was also concerned with running the firms efficiently to maximize the later sale value. Kole and Mulherin admit that their sample and the period they study is novel, limiting its generality. Further, their results are based
on only five firms. Still, their findings do illustrate the importance of factors other than ownership in
determining firm performance

Another paper takes a very interesting natural experiment to compare the performance of
government-organized versus privately organized production. Karpoff (2000) studies 35 government- and
56 privately-funded expeditions to the Arctic from 1818 to 1909 seeking to locate and navigate a
Northwest Passage, discover the North Pole, and make other discoveries in arctic regions. He finds that the
private expeditions performed better using several measure of performance. Karpoff shows most major
arctic discoveries were made by private expeditions, while most tragedies (lost ships and lives) were on
publicly funded expeditions. Karpoff also estimates regressions explaining outcomes in several ways (crew
deaths, ships lost, tonnage of ships lost, incidence of scurvy, level of expedition accomplishment),
controlling for exploratory objectives sought, country of origin, the leader's previous arctic experience, or
the decade in which the expedition occurred. In essentially every regression, the dummy variable for
private expedition is significant with a sign indicating that the private expedition performed better. Karpoff
concludes that the incentives were better aligned in the private expeditions, leading to systematic
differences in the ways public and private expeditions were organized. Again, the uniqueness of the sample
limits its generality. Further, the government-funded expeditions tended to be earlier than the private
expeditions, suggesting the endogeneity of the funding decision to the riskiness of the expedition.
However, Karpoff provides an interesting illustration of the impact of ownership on the performance of an
organization. 15

3.4. Are there policy alternatives to privatization?

As discussed earlier, some argue that competition and deregulation are more important than
privatization in improving performance of firms (Yarrow, 1986, Kay and Thompson, 1986, Vernon-
1992). Others maintain that privatization is necessary for significant performance improvements (Vining
1998) [see Nellis (1999) for the best synthesis of the empirical arguments on this question]. Although
much of this debate is outside the scope of this paper, there are a few empirical studies that examine
countries where economic reform has been implemented instead of, or prior to, full privatization. 16

15 Olds (1994) also uses data from the 1800s to show that after the privatization of the tax supported
Congregationalist churches in New England demand for preachers and church membership rose dramatically.

16 Majumdar (1996) also suggests that reform can improve SOE performance by showing that the gap
between the private and public firms’ performance partly closes during those periods when governments are pushing
reform agendas.
Pinto, Belka, and Krajewski (1993) examine the way in which the Polish state sector responded in the three years following Poland’s “Big Bang” reforms of January 1990. These reforms deregulated prices, introduced foreign competition to many industries, and signaled that tight monetary and fiscal policies would be pursued. However, the Polish government did not immediately launch a large-scale privatization program. The authors document significant performance improvements on the part of most manufacturing firms. They conclude that these improvements were due to the imposition of hard budget constraints reinforced by tighter bank lending behavior, consistency in the government’s “no bailout signal,” import competition, and reputational concerns by SOE managers.

Potentially the best way to improve performance in SOEs is the use of incentive contracts for management and workers to improve the performance of the firms (Jones, 1991). The World Bank endorsed these contracts in the 1980s. China has undergone widespread economic reform with minimal privatization through the use of these incentive contracts and offers a natural setting in which to study their impact.

Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1995) discuss the ways in which incentives were added to the Chinese managerial labor market by the late 1980s, including replacement after poor performance and the linking of managerial pay to profits. Further, managers were selected by auctions, where the auction process revealed information about the managers that in a market economy could have come from observations of the performance of the manager. Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1994) show that after 1978, when Chinese firms were given more autonomy and were allowed to retain more of their profits and to increase workers’ incentives through bonus payments and differing work contracts, there were increases in workers’ incomes (thought not of managers) and additional investment in the firms.

Li (1997) documents marked improvements in the marginal and total factor productivity of 272 Chinese SOE over the period 1980-89 as a result of economic reforms in China, including the increased use of incentives. He finds evidence of substantial increases in productivity over the reform period, much of which can be attributed to the reform. In addition, his evidence suggest that 87 percent of the growth in productivity was due to improved incentives and compensation. Li notes, however, the potential for selection bias in his study both in the firms selected for the survey and in the responses to the survey.

Shirley and Xu (1998) come to the opposite conclusion concerning the ability of incentive contracts to improve firm performance. They analyze the effects of these contracts in 12 monopoly SOEs. They find that the incentive contracts have no effect on profitability or labor productivity, and they find some evidence of negative effects on growth in total factor productivity. They attribute the failure of the contracts to the inability of the governments to follow through on promised actions and to the inability of supervisory agencies to negotiate and monitor the contracts in an effective manner. It must be noted,
however, that the study is based on a small sample size, limiting the ability to draw conclusions from its results, especially in light of the evidence from the studies of Chinese firms.

The evidence from China suggests that enterprise restructuring, concentrating on improving the allocation of property rights and incentives, can yield large benefits even without privatization.\textsuperscript{17} Naturally, this begs the question whether economic reform coupled with privatization could lead to even greater performance improvements. Unfortunately, this is little evidence on this question and it would be difficult to develop any evidence on it. Note also that the evidence on the benefits of reform without privatization comes primarily from one country where country-specific factors may play an important but unidentified role. One thing we can say is that, as we note later in the paper, the evidence demonstrating the benefits of privatization is weakest for countries in Eastern Europe, where privatization was implemented rapidly. This may suggest that privatization should have proceeded along a more gradual path. We address that question later on.


A key decision to be made by the privatizing government is the method through which the state-owned asset is transferred to private ownership. This decision is difficult because, in addition to the economic factors such as valuing the assets, privatizations are generally part of an ongoing, highly politicized process. Some of the factors that influence the privatization method include: (1) the history of the asset’s ownership, (2) the financial and competitive position of the SOE, (3) the government’s ideological view of markets and regulation, (3) the past, present, and potential future regulatory structure in the country, (4) the need to pay off important interest groups in the privatization, (5) the government’s ability to credibly commit itself to respect investors’ property rights after divestiture, (6) the capital market conditions and existing institutional framework for corporate governance in the country, (7) the sophistication of potential investors, and, (8) the government’s willingness to let foreigners own divested assets.

The complexity of the goals of the process means that different countries have used many different methods for privatizing many different types of assets. Although financial economists have learned much about selling assets in well-developed capital markets, we still have a limited understanding of the determinants and the implications of the privatization method for state-owned assets. Theoreticians have modeled some aspects of the privatization process, but to be tractable, their models must ignore important

\textsuperscript{17} This is consistent with the findings of Brickley and VanHorn (2000) that the managers of non-profit hospitals face similar incentives to the managers of for profit hospitals and behave in a similar manner.
factors. Empirical evidence on the determinants of privatization is also limited by the complexity of the goals of the privatization process.

4.1. Methods of Privatization

Brada (1996) presents an excellent taxonomy of privatization methods. Although the context of his paper is Central and Eastern Europe, his classification of four principal divestment methods is quite general. In addition, he provides a review of the successes and failures of each of these general approaches in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, there are many variations within each of his four categories and Brada shows that many privatizations use combinations of the different types of privatization.

Brada's first category is *privatization through restitution*. This method is appropriate when land or other easily identifiable property that was expropriated in years past can be returned to either the original owner or to his or her heirs. This form of privatization is rarely observed outside of Eastern Europe, though it has been important there. For example, Brada (1996) reports that up to 10 percent of the value of state property in the Czech Republic consisted of restitution claims. The major difficulty with this form of privatization is that the records needed to prove ownership are often inadequate or conflicting.

The second method is *privatization through sale of state property*, under which a government trades its ownership claim for an explicit cash payment. This category takes two important forms. The first is *direct sales* (or asset sales) of state-owned enterprises (or some parts thereof) to an individual, an existing corporation, or a group of investors. The second form is *share issue privatizations* (SIPs), in which some or all of a government’s stake in a SOE is sold to investors through a public share offering. These are similar to IPOs in the private sector, but where private IPOs are structured primarily to raise revenue, SIPs are structured to raise money and to respond to some of the political factors mentioned earlier.

Brada’s (1996) third category is *mass or voucher privatization*, whereby eligible citizens can use vouchers that are distributed free or at nominal cost to bid for stakes in SOEs or other assets being privatized. This method has been used only in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, where it has brought about fundamental changes in the ownership of business assets in those countries, although it has not always changed effective control. Longer descriptions of the issues that governments in Central and Eastern Europe have confronted when designing voucher privatization programs are provided in Bornstein (1994, 1999), Alexandrowicz (1994), Drum (1994) and Shafik (1995).

The final method is *privatization from below*, through the startup of new private businesses in formerly socialist countries. Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999) also stress the importance of this type of economic growth in the transition economies. Although privatization from below has progressed rapidly in many regions (including China, the transition economies of central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa), a survey of this phenomenon is being the scope of our paper.
There are many other methods besides the four described above that governments can use to increase private-sector participation. For example, the term “privatization” in the United States means something different from any of these strategies. As López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) show, the privatization debate in the U.S. refers to the choice between in-house provision of goods and services by (state and local) government employees and the contracting out of that production to private firms. Their empirical study finds that the more binding are state fiscal constraints and the less powerful are public-sector unions, the greater the likelihood of privatization.

4.2. The Choice of the Method of Sale

Gibbon (1997) provides one of the most helpful delineations of the decisions facing a government that wants to privatize through cash sales. Gibbon discusses the steps such a government must take in developing a divestment program. These include setting up a structure for privatization (including legislation, if necessary), providing adequate performance records for SOEs being sold (generating believable accounting data), developing any necessary new regulatory structures, and determining the appropriate post-sale relationship between the firm and the government. Other authors who examine non-pricing issues relating to the actual divestment contracts involved in privatization include Baldwin and Bhattacharya (1991), Rondinelli and Iacono (1996), Schmidt (1996), Shafik (1996), and Cornelli and Li (1997).

Two empirical papers analyze the choice of privatization method. One explicitly studies the choice between an asset sale and a share issue privatization. Using a sample of 1,992 privatizations that raised $720 billion in 92 countries, Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2000) examine why 767 firms are divested using share offerings (in public capital markets), but 1225 companies are privatized via direct sales (in private markets). They find robust results that the choice is influenced by capital market, political and firm-specific factors and report that SIPs are more likely to be used when capital markets are less developed, presumably as a way to develop capital markets, and when there is less income inequality. SIPs are also more likely the larger the size of the offering and the more profitable the SOE. On the other hand, governments that have a greater ability to commit to property rights are more likely to privatize via asset sales. Perhaps the most interesting result is that governments choose to privatize the more profitable SOEs through SIPs, which is evidence supporting the possibility of sample selection bias in studies of the performance of privatized firms. In the second paper, Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (1999) estimate the determinants of the fraction of privatization revenues that come from public offerings (SIPs) for privatizations in 49 countries. They find that the greater the selling government’s deficit and the more conservative the selling government, the more likely it is that privatization will occur through public offerings. However, SIPs are less likely in French civil law countries.
4.3. Restructuring SOEs Prior to Sale and Sequencing and Staging of SOE Sales

One of the more complex issues in this area involves the interrelated questions of when to privatize, whether to privatize rapidly or slowly, what order to follow in privatizing firms (sequencing), whether to sell an SOE at once or in stages (staging), whether to restructure a SOE prior to sale (or to just restructure the SOE), and the role of macroeconomic reform in privatization. Since this is a complex issue that involves factors outside the scope of this article (especially macroeconomic reform which we do not discuss) we do not spend much time on this topic. Further, the complexity of the issue has limited the empirical work in this area.

Several authors have theoretically modeled the question of sequencing and staging of SOE sales, including Katz and Owen (1993, 1995), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996b), Cornelli and Li (1997), Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1999). The models illustrate the importance of the sequencing and staging to build reputational capital with investors by the privatizing government, building domestic support for the privatization program, as well as identifying bidders that maximize the efficiency of the firm in the future. However, the complexities of these interrelationships have limited the ability of empiricists to identify factors in sequencing and staging. Several articles that do empirically examine sequencing or staging are Perotti and Guney (1993), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999), and Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2000).

A related practical question about privatization is whether governments should restructure SOEs (e.g., lay off redundant workers) prior to selling or leave this to the new owners. This is related to the question we discussed in section 3.4, can governments reform SOEs (including reform without privatization) and the question of whether reform and privatization should proceed quickly or slowly. Early advice from the World Bank (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989) was that governments should restructure SOEs prior to divestment, since governments are better able than private owners to cushion the financial blow to any displaced workers by using unemployment or pension payments. Government-led restructuring can thus provide a private buyer of the SOE with a “clean slate.” Preparing companies for privatization was standard practice in the U.K. during the 1980s, in part to smooth the transition with the trade unions. However, by 1992, the same authors (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992) had become more nuanced in their interpretation of the optimal strategy. They said (p. 54) that small and medium-sized SOEs “should be sold ‘as is’ at the best price possible, as quickly as possible.” However, they also noted that in all cases (p. 60) new investments “should be left to private owners once a decision has been made to privatise the enterprise.”

Two empirical papers that examine SOE reform prior to privatization are López-de-Silanes (1997) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2000). López-de-Silanes (1997) examines whether prior government
the restructuring of SOEs improves the net price received for the company, and finds evidence that it does not. He shows that prices received by the government would have increased by 71 cents per dollar of assets if the only restructuring step taken by the government had been to fire the CEO and if the assets had been divested an average of one year earlier. He argues that other restructuring steps slow down the process and consume too many resources to be worthwhile. The 71 cents per dollar improvement would be a significant improvement on the average 54 cents per dollar of assets actually received by the governments. However, this evidence is based on a small sample of banks, which limits its usefulness. Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) find some evidence that the improvements brought about by privatization occur before the SOE is privatized.

4.4. Pricing and Allocation of Control and Ownership in SOE Sales

Although mass or voucher privatization programs have attracted a great deal of academic interest, asset sales and SIPs account for most of the value of assets that have been moved from state to private employment during the past two decades. Thus, in this discussion of the pricing and allocation of control and ownership in the privatization of SOEs, we focus on these two divestment methods.

4.4.1. Pricing Decisions in Asset Sales

Four papers study the revenue impact of SOE direct sale pricing decisions. At a theoretical level, Bulow and Kemperer (1996) ask whether it is more profitable to sell a company through an auction with no reserve price or by using an optimally structured direct negotiation with one less bidder. They show that under most conditions, a simple competitive auction with N+1 bidders will yield more expected revenue than a seller could expect to earn by fully exploiting his or her monopoly selling position against N bidders. López-de-Silanes’ (1997) study of Mexican privatizations empirically supports this theoretical conclusion that maximizing the number of bidders in an open auction is usually the best way to maximize revenues. He finds that prices received are sensitive to the level of competition in the auction process but that the Mexican government frequently restricted participation (particularly by foreigners) in spite of this fact. Nonetheless, the amount of revenue generated was the main criteria in selecting the winning bidder for more than 98 percent of the SOEs sold.

Rondinelli and Iacono (1996) examine auctions in Central and Eastern Europe, where thousands of small businesses have been auctioned off, as well as in Latin America and Russia, where larger SOEs have been sold. Many types of auctions have been used, including English, Dutch, first price, second price,
double, and pro-rata sales. Auctions have been used to sell both lease rights and ownership rights. In other
cases, governments have sold SOEs directly to groups of private investors or firms, setting prices and terms
by negotiation. In some cases, the groups of investors consist of management or employees. In other cases,
the government has liquidated the SOE and sold physical assets to a group of investors.

Hingorani, Lehn, and Makhija (1997) examine an actual voucher privatization program, the first
round of the Czech Republic’s mass privatization in 1991. Because the mechanics of how companies are
divested by this government are actually more similar to an asset sale than to any other method, we discuss
their work here. Hingorani, Lehn, and Makhija test whether the level of share demand, as measured by
voucher redemptions by Czech citizens, effectively predicts the actual level of stock prices in the secondary
market. The authors confirm the predictive power of share demand, and also document that share demand
is positively related to the level of insider shareholdings and the extent of foreign ownership in a company
being sold. They find that share demand is positively related to the level of past profitability, which itself
shows that even imperfect accounting statements convey useful information. Additionally, they find that
share demand is inversely related to the firm’s market risk, which they measure as the post-offering
coefficient of variation of stock prices.

4.4.2. Pricing and Share and Control Allocation Decisions in Share Issue Privatizations (SIPs)

Any government that intends to privatize SOEs using public share offerings faces three sets of
interrelated decisions: (1) how to transfer control, (2) how to price the offer, and (3) how to allocate shares.
The control transfer decision includes whether to sell the SOE all at once or through a series of partial
sales. If the government chooses the latter course, then it must determine how large a fraction of the
company’s shares to issue in the initial versus subsequent offers. The government must also decide
whether to insert any post-privatization restrictions on corporate control. The pricing decision requires that
the government determine the amount of underpricing, whether the offer price should be set by a tender
offer, a book-building exercise, or at a fixed price. If the latter, the government must decide whether the
offering price should be set immediately prior to the offer or many weeks in advance. The share allocation
decision requires the government to choose whether to favor one group of potential investors over another
(i.e., domestic investors, SOE employees, or both, over foreign and institutional investors). It also requires
deciding whether to use the best available investment banker as lead underwriter (regardless of nationality)
or to favor a national champion.

Several papers empirically examine the choices governments actually make in designing SIP
programs. Menyah and Paudyal (1995) and Inganyete, Menyah, and Paudyal (1996) investigate the way in
which the aims and objectives of privatization influence the procedures and incentives used in the sale of
state-owned shares on the London Stock Exchange by the U.K. government. Jones, Megginson, Nash, and
Netter (1999), Huang and Levich (1998), and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) present comprehensive studies of the pricing and share and control allocation decisions made by governments disposing of SOEs through public share offering. The results are broadly similar so we concentrate on the paper by Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) since it has the largest sample.

Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999), whose results are summarized in Table 2, provide evidence on the way in which political factors impact the offer pricing, share allocation, and other terms in SIPs. They analyze a large sample of 630 SIPs from 59 countries made over the period June 1977 to July 1997. One result Jones et al. document is the sheer size of SIP offers -- the mean (median) size of initial SIPs is $555.7 million ($104.0 million) and the mean size of seasoned issues is $1.069 billion (median $311.0 million), much larger than typical stock offerings. Jones et al. also find that SIPs are significantly underpriced by government sellers. The mean level of underpricing for initial SIPs is 34.1 percent (median 12.4 percent). Even seasoned SIP offers are underpriced by an average of 9.4 percent (median 3.3 percent). We return to the issue of the determinants of underpricing in Section 6.

The evidence of Jones et al. on the allocation of control in SIPs supports a political interpretation of the divesting governments’ motives. Jones et al. find that nearly all SIPs are essentially secondary offerings, in which only the government sells its shares and no money flows to the firm itself. Since the divesting government sells an average (median) of 43.9 percent (35.0 percent) of the SOE’s capital in initial offers and 22.7 percent (18.1 percent) in seasoned issues, the offers cited in the Jones et al. study represent significant reductions in direct government stock ownership. The authors find that although governments typically surrender day-to-day operating control of the SOE to private owners in the initial SIP, they retain effective veto power through a variety of techniques. The most common technique is government retention of a “golden share,” which gives it the power to veto certain actions, such as foreign takeovers.

4.5. The Structure of Voucher Privatizations

20 Though Jones et al. rely primarily on Privatisation International for the data used in this study; one of the authors has also developed from secondary sources (primarily the Financial Times, but also publications such as Price Waterhouse, 1989b) an appendix that details similar information for an additional 500 SIPs. This appendix can be obtained upon request by contacting wmegginson@ou.edu.

21 Though golden shares have been widely adopted, they are in fact almost never used to affect control contests (McCurry, 2000). The EU is trying to block new adoptions of golden shares and roll back those already in place, charging they are designed to discourage free cross-border competition for corporate control. At a recent OECD conference, the director of Italy’s privatization program, Vittorio Grilli, pointed out an additional political problem with exercising a golden share: When a government uses its share to veto a takeover bid, this is equivalent to publicly stating it does not approve of the bidder. Such a statement is awkward at best, and could cause an international incident if the bidder is a foreign company.
Voucher privatization is by far the most controversial method of divesting state-owned assets. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that the decision to pursue mass privatization, and even the specific design of the programs, is largely dictated by politics. The privatization programs practiced in Western Europe and elsewhere were politically difficult to execute in Eastern Europe, although Hungary, Estonia, and Poland used case-by-case privatizations, which have been successful at a macro level. Nonetheless, voucher privatization schemes can be made attractive from an economic perspective, since they maximize value, foster free and efficient markets, and promote effective corporate governance.

Katz and Owen (1997) investigate what they call the “voucher portfolio problem.” This problem arises whenever the proportion of ownership resulting from a given voucher bid is unknown, but the post-privatization performance of a divested company largely depends on the skills of the new owners and their respective ownership stakes. Katz and Owen also provide a good discussion of the philosophical differences between the Czech program, which relied heavily on vouchers and prohibited post-sale trading of stock, and the Russian program, which privatized relatively small (29 percent on average) stakes in most firms and allowed unrestricted trading of vouchers.

Although most countries’ actual experience with vouchers has been poor, none has been quite as dismal as Russia’s. Although a variety of factors have played a role, Frydman, Pistor, and Rapaczynski (1996) show that insider control of privatized firms has been by far the most important impediment to effective reform. Initially, the Russian government had high hopes that the “voucher privatization funds” (VPFs) formed during the initial voucher distributions might be able to overcome the collective action problem inherent in mass privatization programs. Such funds might use their concentrated ownership in privatized firms to force managers to restructure. Though most funds attempted to exercise their “voice” in corporate boardrooms, insider dominance completely blocked their efforts. The VPFs turned instead to their “exit” option and sold shares on the secondary market.

Pistor and Spicer (1997) also examine the early promise and subsequent failure of privatization investment funds in Russia and the Czech Republic. In both countries, citizens have become owners of the worst performing privatized assets, while the “crown jewels” have all come under insider control. As the authors say, “… establishing property rights is a longer and more complicated process than allocating title.” Blanchard and Aghion (1996) also conclude that privatization is proceeding slowly in Eastern Europe, largely because insiders, who currently have control of firms but no property rights, oppose outsider privatization. Given this reality, Blanchard and Aghion examine whether privatization would proceed more rapidly if governments were simply to allocate property rights to insiders (insider

22 Using a subset of firms, Nellis (1996) describes how the Estonians sold off majority shares to strategic investors and then exchanged the minority shares for vouchers.
privatization). However, they find there is a wedge between the private value of the firm to insiders and its value to an outsider, and that this difference might well preclude value-increasing exchanges. Given the actual experience with insider dominance of most voucher privatizations, we conclude that this wedge is in fact alive, well, and fully operational.

5. Has Privatization Improved the Financial and Operating Performance of Divested Firms?

Since privatization has been part of government policy tool-kits for almost two decades now, academic researchers have had enough time to execute many empirical studies of the effect of divestment on the operating performance of former SOEs. However, there are difficult methodological problems with research in this area.23 An important problem is that of data availability and consistency. The amount of information that must be disclosed is much less in most countries than in the United States, and these standards vary from country to country as well as within countries over time. A large literature in accounting has shown that management can manipulate U.S. accounting data, and this problem is probably greater for international firms. Furthermore, the possibility of sample selection bias can arise from several sources, including the desire of governments to make privatization “look good” by privatizing the healthiest firms first.

There are also many problems in measuring performance changes that arise from using accounting or stock data. We discuss the problems with stock return data in section 6, but the problems with accounting data are more important since many empirical studies employ primarily accounting information. These problems include determining the correct measure of operating performance, selecting an appropriate benchmark with which to compare performance, and determining the appropriate statistical tests to use (see Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1994) and Barber and Lyon (1996)). The finance literature has not reached a consensus on the ways to deal with these problems for U.S. companies, much less privatized international firms. Therefore, the results of each of the studies we discuss must be kept in perspective. We also note that the studies of post-performance do not usually look at the welfare effects on consumers. Most important, few studies control for the possible use of market power by the privatized firms. That is, performance improvements could be due to greater exploitation of monopoly power, which has harmful effects on allocative efficiency, rather than productive efficiency. Many of the studies on performance changes after privatization examine the effects of divestiture on groups such as workers, but few examine the effect of privatization on consumers. On the other hand, one of the principal reasons for launching privatizations, particularly of monopoly utilities, is consumer dissatisfaction with a firm’s

23 Many of the difficulties are similar to those discussed in Temple (1999) who surveys cross-country research in the determinants of growth. Temple discusses the substantial problems that arise in estimating and
service. Furthermore, the studies cited here almost unanimously report increases in performance associated with privatization. This consistency is perhaps the most telling result we report -- privatization appears to improve performance measured in many different ways, in many different countries.

With the above caveats in mind, this section evaluates the results of 38 studies that employ accounting and/or real output data to examine the impact of privatization on the operating efficiency, ownership structure, and/or financial performance of former SOEs in developed, developing and transition economies. Though all these studies are detailed in the accompanying tables, and most are discussed at least briefly in the text, we also specify which studies we think are the most important—and why we think this is so. To effectively synthesize such a large number of empirical studies, we first categorize papers according to whether they examine privatization in transition or non-transition economies. The latter studies are evaluated in section 5.1, while the transition economies are examined in section 5.2. This dichotomization is necessary, since both direct observation and published research suggest that reforming transition economies invariably requires embracing a great many economic and political changes simultaneously, whereas privatization (and attendant regulatory changes) is often the sole major component of reform processes in non-transition economies. A further organizational step is to present, in Tables 3 through 7, summary information for each of the studies we examine. Presenting this information in tabular form saves us from having to sequentially discuss each paper’s sample construction methodology, estimation procedure, and empirical results in the section’s text. Instead, we can identify key findings that appear in many different studies, and can discuss methodological pros and cons for entire groups of studies, rather than for each paper in turn.

5.1. Empirical Studies Employing Data From Non-Transition Economies

We separate non-transition studies by empirical methodology, depending upon how the papers compare performance changes resulting from privatization. The first set of papers examines a single industry, a single country, or one or a small number of individual firms. While these studies employ a variety of empirical techniques, most compare actual post-privatization performance changes with either a comparison group of non-privatized firms or with a “counter-factual” expectation of what would have occurred if the privatized firms themselves had remained state-owned. The second set of studies examine interpreting cross-country regressions.

A cynic might say that all of the gains researchers have documented after privatization are due to selection bias. However, while there is some evidence discussed elsewhere that the better firms are privatized, at least in SIPs the evidence is still strong that performance improves after privatization. Further, the paper that does the best job of controlling for selection bias, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999), finds privatized firms perform better than SOEs.

Temple (1999) also notes the importance of both historical case studies and cross-sectional analysis in assessing recent developments in the economic theory of growth.
only firms divested through public share offerings, and measure privatization-related performance changes by comparing the 3-year mean or median operating and financial performance of divested firms to their own mean or median performance during their last three years as state-owned firms.


The studies we examine in this section are summarized in Table 3. The first study listed merits detailed analysis because it has proven so influential, both due to the rigor of its methodology and because it was sponsored by the World Bank. Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1992) compare the actual post-privatization performance of 12 large firms--mostly airlines and regulated utilities--in Britain, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico to the predicted performance of these firms had they not been divested. Using this counter-factual approach, the authors document net welfare gains in 11 of the 12 cases considered which equal, on average, 26 percent of the firm’s pre-divestiture sales. They find no case where workers are made significantly worse off, and three where workers significantly benefit. Newberry and Pollitt (1997) perform a similar counter-factual analysis of the 1990 restructuring and privatization of the U.K.’s Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), and document significant post-privatization performance improvements. However, they find that the producers and their shareholders capture all of the financial rewards of this improvement and more, whereas the government and consumers lose out. The authors conclude that CEGB’s restructuring and privatization was in fact “worth it,” but could have been implemented more efficiently and with greater concern for the public’s welfare.26

Two of the studies described in Table 3 examine national privatization experiences. Martin and Parker (1995) find that, after adjusting for business cycle effects, less than half the British firms they study perform better after being privatized. The authors do, however, find evidence of a “shake-out” effect, where several firms improve performance prior to being privatized (but not afterward). The results of the second national study are far less ambiguous. LaPorta and López-de-Silanes (1999) find that the former Mexican SOEs they study rapidly close a large performance gap with industry-matched private firms that had existed prior to divestment. These firms go from being highly unprofitable before privatization to being very profitable thereafter. Output increases 54.3 percent, in spite of a reduced level of investment spending, and sales per employee roughly doubles. The privatized firms reduce (blue and white-collar) employment by half, but those workers who remain are paid significantly more. The authors attribute most

26 The privatization and liberalization of the British electricity industry is also discussed at length in Newberry (1997) and Vickers and Yarrow (1991), while the regulatory regime adopted for earlier utility privatizations is described in Beesley and Littlechild (1989). None of these works showers the Thatcher government with praise for its policy decisions, though Beesley and Littlechild do find the RPI-X price regulation system adopted in the U.K. is superior to the U.S. rate of return regulatory regime.
of the performance improvement to productivity gains resulting from better incentives, with at most one-third of the improvement being attributable to lower employment costs.

Three of the papers described in Table 3 are essentially case studies of individual privatized companies, though two of the articles benchmark performance changes with respect to one or more private companies. Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997) examine the effect of British Airways’ 1987 privatization on competitors’ stock prices and on fares charged in those routes where BA competes directly with foreign airlines. They find that the stock prices of U.S. competitors fall, as do airfares in markets served by BA; both findings suggest that stock traders anticipated a much more competitive BA would result from the divestiture.27 Laurin and Bozec (1999) compare the productivity and profitability of two large Canadian rail carriers (one state-owned and one private-sector), both before and after the 1995 privatization of Canadian National. They find that CN’s relatively poor performance during the “fully state-owned period” (1981-1991) rapidly converges on Canadian Pacific’s performance levels during the pre-privatization, but post-announcement period (1992-1995), and then surpasses it thereafter. These findings suggest two separable impacts of privatization on firm performance: an “anticipation” effect prior to divestiture and a “follow through” effect subsequently. The final case study, Ramamurti (1997), examines the 1990 restructuring and privatization of Ferrocarilla Argentino, the Argentine national freight and passenger railway system. The author documents a nearly incredible 370 percent improvement in labor productivity and an equally striking (and not unrelated) 78.7 percent decline in employment—from 92,000 to 18,682 workers.28 Operating subsidies declined almost to zero, and consumers benefited from expanded (and better quality) service and lower costs. Ramamurti concludes that these performance improvements could not have been achieved without privatization.

No less than six of the studies detailed in Table 3 examine the telecommunications industry, which has been transformed by the twin forces of technological change and deregulation (including privatization) since 1984 — the year when the AT&T monopoly was broken-up in the United States and the Thatcher government began privatizing British Telecom. Five of these are empirical studies, while Ramamurti (1996) provides a simple, though highly readable, summary of empirical studies examining four telecom privatizations in Latin America. Ramamurti concludes that all were judged to be political and economic

27 Eckel, Eckel, and Singal also examine the two-stage privatization of Air Canada (from 100 percent state ownership to 57 percent, then to zero). Unlike BA, Air Canada does not compete with U.S. carriers on many routes, so there is no significant competitor stock price effect resulting from its divestiture. Air Canada’s fares do not fall after the first, partial privatization, but fall a significant 13.7 percent after the final, complete divestiture of state ownership.

28 Ramamurti details the intense political maneuvering that accompanied the attempt to restructure and slim down FA. The generous severance payments awarded to displaced workers were instrumental in winning union acquiescence in the restructuring plan, while the presence of effective road transport competition for rail traffic reduced the threat of a potentially crippling strike weapon.
success stories. Unfortunately, the empirical studies tell somewhat conflicting stories, probably due in part to differences in the nations covered and methodology employed. Petrazini and Clark (1996), Ros (1999) and Wallsten (2000a) examine developing countries, either exclusively or as separate subsamples, while Ros (1999) and Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) provide similar coverage of OECD countries, and Boles de Boer and Evans (1996) studies the deregulation and privatization of Telecom New Zealand. Though Ros, Wallsten, and Boylaud and Nicoletti all use some variant of panel data methodology, they arrive at slightly different conclusions regarding the relative importance of deregulation/liberalization and privatization in promoting expanded teledensity (number of main lines per 100 population) and operating efficiency of national telecom companies, and the quality and pricing of telecom services. On balance, these studies generally indicate that deregulation and liberalization of telecom services are associated with significant growth in teledensity and operating efficiency, and significant improvements in the quality and price of telecom services. The impact of privatization, per se, is somewhat less clear-cut, but most studies agree that the combination of privatization and deregulation/liberalization is associated with significant telecommunications improvements. This is certainly the result predicted by Noll (2000) in his analysis of the political economy of telecom reform in developing countries. The D’Souza and Megginson (2000) study’s findings—described in the following section—also support the idea that telecom privatization yields net benefits. 29

5.1.2. Empirical Studies Comparing Pre- Versus Post-Privatization Performance For SIPs

The studies summarized in Table 4 all examine how privatization affects firm performance by comparing pre- versus post-divestment data for companies privatized via public share offering. Since the first study to be published using this methodology is Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994), we will refer to this is the MNR methodology. This empirical procedure has several obvious economic and econometric drawbacks. Of these, selection bias probably causes the greatest concern, since by definition a sample of SIPs will be biased towards very the largest companies sold during any nation’s privatization program. Furthermore, since governments have a natural tendency to privatize the “easiest” firms first, those SOEs sold via share offerings (particularly those sold early in the process) may well be among the

29 Though they do not quite fit into our empirical classification scheme, six related studies deserve mention here. Smith and Wellenius (1999) and Wellenius (2000) present normative analyses of telecom regulation in developing countries, while Wasserfallen and Müller (1998) discuss the privatization and deregulation of western Europe’s telecom industry. Pollitt (1997) analyzes the impact of liberalization on the performance of the international electric supply industry, and Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (1999) document that effective regulation is a crucial institutional variable in electric utility privatization. Establishing such a regulatory regime allows governments to increase the pace of privatization, sell higher stakes, and maximize offering proceeds. Finally, Wallsten (2000b) shows that exclusivity periods, which are usually granted to telecom monopolies as they are being privatized, are economically harmful to consumers and do not achieve the efficiency objectives assigned to them at the time of divestment. Exclusivity periods do, however, raise the price that investors are willing to pay for privatized telecoms, which largely explains why they are employed.
healthiest state-owned firms. Another drawback of the MNR methodology is its need to examine only simple, universally available accounting variables (such as assets, sales, and net income) or physical units such as number of employees. Obviously, researchers must be careful when comparing accounting information generated at different times in many different countries. Most of the studies cited here also ignore (or, at best, imperfectly account for) changes in the macroeconomy or industry over the seven year event window during which they compute pre- versus post-privatization performance changes. Finally, the studies cannot account for the impact on privatized firms of any regulatory or market-opening initiatives that often are launched simultaneously with or immediately after major privatization programs.

**** Insert Table 4 about here ****

In spite of these drawbacks, studies employing the MNR methodology have two key advantages. First, they are the only studies that can examine and directly compare large samples of economically significant firms, from different industries, privatized in different countries, over different time periods. Since each firm is compared to itself (a few years earlier) using simple, inflation-adjusted sales and income data (that produce results in simple percentages), this methodology allows one to efficiently aggregate multi-national, multi-industry results. This point is made clear in Table 5, which summarizes the results of three studies that use precisely the same empirical proxies and test methodology—and can thus be aggregated and directly compared—yet examine non-overlapping samples. In total, these three studies examine seven performance criteria for 204 companies from 41 countries. Second, while focusing on SIPs yields a selection bias, it also yields samples that encompass the largest and most politically influential privatizations. As discussed in section 4, SIPs account for more than two-thirds of the $1 trillion of total revenues raised by governments since 1977. With these methodological caveats in mind, we turn to a summary of the findings of studies using the MNR technique.

**** Insert Table 5 about here ****

All of these studies offer at least limited support for the proposition that privatization is associated with significant improvements in the operating and financial performance of SOEs divested via public share offering. Two of these studies focus on specific industries (banking [Verbrugge, et al. (1999)] and telecommunications [D’Souza and Megginson (2000)]), one examines data from a single country (Chile [Macqueireira and Zurita (1996)]), and the other six employ multi-industry, multi-national samples. Five of these studies—MNR (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D’Souza and Megginson (1999, 2000) and Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2000)—document economically and statistically significant post-

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30Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2000) find that governments selling SOEs tend to sell the more profitable SOEs in the public capital markets and the less profitable in the less transparent private markets. Those sold in the public capital markets are the firms that appear in studies of performance. Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) also show performance improvements before privatization in firms that are being privatized.
privatization increases in real sales (output), profitability, efficiency (sales per employee), and capital spending, coupled with significant declines in leverage. Macquieira and Zurita find similar results for Chilean firms using data that is not adjusted for changes experienced by other Chilean firms over the study period, but many of these improvements cease to be statistically significant once such adjustments are made. Verbrugge, et al. (1999) document significant, though modest, increases in the profitability and capital adequacy of commercial banks privatized in OECD countries, as well as significant declines in leverage, but they also find substantial ongoing state involvement in these banks’ affairs.

Finally, Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) estimate the effects of government ownership and privatization using a sample of large firms from three separate time periods (1975, 1985 and 1995), compiled by Fortune. They estimate regressions explaining profitability controlling for firm size, location, industry, and the business cycle. They find that net income-based profitability measures increase significantly after privatization, but operating income-based measures do not. Instead, they find that operating profits increase prior to divestiture, once more supporting the idea that privatization can have a significant anticipation effect.

5.1.3. Summary and Analysis

These 22 studies from non-transition economies offer at least limited support for the proposition that privatization is associated with improvements in the operating and financial performance of divested firms. Several of the studies offer strong support for this proposition, and only Martin and Parker (1995) document outright performance declines (for six of eleven British firms) after privatization. Almost all studies that examine post-privatization changes in output, efficiency, profitability, capital investment spending and leverage document significant increases in the first four and significant declines in leverage.

The studies examined here are far less unanimous regarding the impact of privatization on employment levels in privatized firms. All governments fear that privatization will cause former SOEs to shed workers, and the key question in virtually every case is whether the divested firm’s sales will increase enough after privatization to offset the dramatically higher levels of per-worker productivity. Three studies document significant increases in employment [Galal, et al. (1992), Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994), and Boubakri and Cosset (1998)], two find insignificant changes [Macquieira and Zurita (1996) and D’Souza and Megginson (2000)], while the remaining five document significant -- sometimes massive--employment declines [Ramamurti (1997), LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Laurin and Bozec (2000), D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2000)]. These conflicting results could be due to differences in methodology, sample size and make-up, or omitted factors. However, it is more likely that the studies reflect real differences in post-privatization employment changes between countries and between industries. In other words, there is no “standard” outcome.
Perhaps the safest conclusion we can assert is that privatization does not automatically mean employment reductions in divested firms—though this will likely occur unless sales can increase fast enough after divestiture to offset very large productivity gains.

In our opinion, the Galal, et al (1992), LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Dewenter and Malatesta (2000), and the three articles summarized in D’Souza and Megginson (1999) are the most persuasive studies examined in this section. As mentioned, the main strength of Galal et al. is its construction and use of a clear “counter-factual” that (virtually uniquely) allows both the financial and welfare gains from privatization to be measured. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes execute what we consider the best single-country study, since it examines almost the entire population of Mexican privatizations and compares performance changes to industry-matched private firms. Dewenter and Malatesta both contrast the performance of private-sector and state-owned firms over three non-overlapping periods and study how the performance of privatized firms changes over an extended time period. Finally, D’Souza and Megginson’s summary and comparison of three studies that use the same methodology—but non-overlapping samples—provides compelling evidence that the operating and financial gains to privatization are pervasive.

Since the empirical studies discussed in this section generally document performance improvements after privatization, a natural follow-on question is to ask why performance improves. As we will discuss in the next section, a key determinant of performance improvement in transition economies is bringing in new managers after privatization. No study explicitly documents systematic evidence of this occurring in non-transition economies, but Wolfram (1998) and Cragg and Dyck (1999a, 1999b) show that the compensation and pay-performance sensitivity of managers of privatized UK firms increases significantly after divestment. The only study that explicitly addresses the sources of post-privatization performance improvement using data from multiple non-transition economies, D’Souza, et al (2000), finds stronger efficiency gains for firms in developing countries, in regulated industries, in firms that restructure operations after privatization, and in countries providing greater amounts of shareholder protection.

We now turn to an examination of research findings about privatization’s impact in transition economies. Privatization is both more difficult and more all-encompassing in these countries than it is in either industrialized or non-transition developing countries.

5.2 Empirical Tests of Privatization in Transition Economies

We again categorize the 21 empirical studies that examine privatization in transition economies into more manageable groups. Both direct observation and the findings of these studies suggest that a logical classification scheme is to evaluate separately studies that examine firms privatized in central and eastern Europe and those which study the privatization programs of Russia and the other republics of the
former Soviet Union. These categories are evaluated in section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively. We then conclude section 5 with a brief overview of China’s liberalization and privatization program.

5.2.1. Empirical Tests Examining Privatization Programs in Central and Eastern Europe

The empirical studies that examine privatization programs in central and eastern Europe are summarized in Table 6. These countries employed varying methods of privatizing SOEs, including asset sales (Hungary and eastern Germany), voucher privatizations (the Czech Republic and early Polish divestitures), “spontaneous privatizations” (Slovenia), share offerings (later Polish sales), or a combination of techniques. The studies also cover differing event periods during the 1990s, employ differing empirical methodologies, and ask somewhat different questions—though all directly or indirectly ask how privatization impacts firm-level operating performance. Additionally, all of these studies must contend with the fact that output typically fell dramatically in every central and eastern European country during the period immediately after the collapse of socialism in 1989-91, though in most cases output later snapped back smartly.31 These studies must therefore examine whether, for example, the output of privatized firms contracted less than did the output of firms that remained state-owned. These and other econometric challenges that must be faced in disentangling the effects of privatization, ownership structure changes, and other influences on the post-divestment performance of privatized firms in transition settings are discussed at length in Weiss and Nikitin (1999) and Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski [hereafter FGHR] (1999).

**** Insert Table 6 about here ****

In spite of all the caveats spelled out above, the 11 studies summarized in Table 6 yield surprisingly consistent results regarding the impact of privatization on the performance of divested central and eastern European firms. This is especially true of the four studies--Dyck (1997), Weiss and Nikitin (1999), Claessens and Djankov (1999b), and Frydman, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000)--we consider the most persuasive due to sample size, period of coverage and/or methodological rigor. All but one [Harper (2000)] of the studies detailed in Table 6 explicitly test whether the type of ownership structure that emerges from the privatization process is related to post-privatization performance, and these studies document consistent and significant relationships, as summarized below. Other things equal:

- Private ownership is associated with better firm-level performance than is continued state ownership.

  In addition, concentrated private ownership is associated with greater performance improvement than is diffuse ownership.

31 This “U-shape” pattern of aggregate output in 26 transition economies is documented and examined econometrically in Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer (2000). They find that structural reforms—including privatization—are critically important in promoting rapid recovery from the initial economic decline. Taken as a
Foreign ownership, where allowed, is associated with greater post-privatization performance improvement than is purely domestic ownership. Furthermore, majority ownership by outside (non-employee) investors is associated with significantly greater performance improvements than is any form of insider control.

Firm-level restructuring is associated with significant (sometimes dramatic) post-privatization performance improvements, and this is one key advantage of outsider control—firms controlled by non-employee investors are much more likely to restructure than are employee-owned firms.

Most studies document that performance improves more when new managers are brought in to run a firm after it is privatized than when the original managers are retained. The precise reason for the superior performance of new management is unclear, though FGHR (2000) find that the more entrepreneurial behavior of outsider-owned firms is due to incentive rather than human capital effects.

The role of investment funds in promoting efficiency improvements in privatized Czech firms is ambiguous. FGHR (1999) find selling a SOE to a domestic financial company significantly increases the growth rate of a privatized firm, while Weiss and Nikitin (1998) find that concentrated ownership by investment funds is not associated with performance improvements. Claessens and Djankov (1999b) document greater performance improvements for companies controlled by non-bank-sponsored investment funds than by bank-sponsored funds.

The impact of privatization on employment is also ambiguous, primarily because employment falls for virtually all firms in transition economies after reforms are initiated. Harper (2000) documents employment declines following the first Czech mass privatization wave in 1992, but not after the second wave in 1994. FGHR (1999) is the only study that explicitly examines employment changes—after accounting for ownership structure changes—and the authors find that sales grow fast enough in outsider-controlled firms to offset the significant increase in labor productivity.

There is little evidence that governments have been able to impose hard budget constraints on firms that remain state-owned after reforms begin. FGHR (2000) find that the threat of hard budget constraints falters for poorly-performing SOEs, since governments are unwilling to allow these firms to whole, their results strongly support a “radical” approach to reforms.

32 In his analysis of the reasons why Hungary’s privatization program has proven to be so much more successful than those in most other central and eastern European countries, Mihalyi (2000) emphasizes the importance of selling SOEs directly to western transnational companies, and thus plugging them into the global trading system. Other countries stressed domestic over foreign ownership, and thus missed out on the opportunity of using privatization as a way of attracting foreign direct investment.
fail. However, both FGHR and Schaffer (1998) show that the burden of lower SOE creditworthiness falls on the state (as deferred taxes) or on state creditors, rather than on private creditors or suppliers. Given these observed patterns for central and eastern Europe, we next examine how privatization has impacted firm performance in the republics of the former Soviet Union.

5.2.2. Empirical Tests Examining Privatization Programs in the Former Soviet Union

Table 7 summarizes the results of six empirical studies that examine privatization programs in Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. It is very difficult to reach a simple conclusion regarding privatization’s impact in the former Soviet Union in general, and Russia in particular, for four principal reasons. First, the transition from socialism to capitalism was much more difficult and painful in the former Soviet Union republics than anywhere else in the world, both because these republics were under communist rule the longest and because the transition to capitalism also coincided with dissolution of the Soviet Union. Breaking up any continental scale nation was likely to prove traumatic; breaking up a country that was also an economic system proved doubly so. Second, the contraction in output that occurred in the former Soviet Union after 1991 was far greater than anywhere else—and there is as yet no upturn—making it very difficult to document any kind of relative performance improvement, or to assign causality to any improvement that is found. Third, it seems clear that the former Soviet Union republics—especially Russia—took a decided turn for the worse economically after 1997, so competently executed studies examining privatization’s impact in the same country, but at different times, might well reach radically different conclusions. Finally, all five studies that examine Russia’s experience rely either on survey data or anecdotal evidence, so the “raw material” for empirical analysis is of much poorer quality here than in other regions. For these reasons, we believe that no truly persuasive empirical study of privatization in the former Soviet Union has yet been performed, nor is one likely until these economies stabilize and several years of reliable accounting (not survey) data become available.

**** Insert Table 7 about here ****

In spite of the difficulties (and caveats) spelled out above, the studies summarized in Table 7 do yield consistent conclusions. Certainly the most important result all these studies find is that insider privatization has been a failure throughout the former Soviet Union, especially in Russia, and that the concentrated managerial ownership structure that characterizes almost all privatized firms will likely hamper these economies for many years. As described in Bornstein (1994), Earle (1998), Earle and Estrin (1998), and Black, et al (2000), Russian reformers considered rapid privatization to be an imperative, and for this reason they opted for the politically expedient technique of favoring incumbent managers and employees with allocations of controlling shareholdings during the initial mass privatization waves of 1992-93. The investment funds created during this program proved ineffective, due primarily to insider
control and poor legal protection of (outside) shareholder voting rights. In spite of this, Barberis, et al (1996), Earle (1998) and Earle and Estrin (1998) all document that privatization was associated with performance improvements in firms that were divested during the mass privatization program of the early 1990s. However, all three studies, as well as Djankov (1999a,b), find that post-privatization performance improves the most (or only) for firms which are outsider controlled, and all the studies stress the importance of bringing in new management whenever possible. Additionally, Djankov (1999a) finds that foreign share ownership is associated with significantly greater performance improvement than is purely domestic ownership, and Djankov (1999b) shows that managers who actually pay for divested firms (through management buy-outs) improve performance more than do managers who are effectively given control (through voucher schemes).

The pivotal, disastrous event for Russia’s privatization program was the 1995 “loans for shares” scheme, which transferred control of the most valuable natural resource firms to a small group of “oligarchs” at very low prices. As discussed in Black, et al (2000), this corrupt and non-transparent transfer of assets precipitated widespread insider expropriation and commercial lawlessness, which effectively decapitalized much of Russian industry. Russia’s privatization program provides an important cautionary tale of the dangers of allowing rampant self-dealing in privatized firms and makes clear that privatization is not an economic panacea.33

Does the Russian experience imply that a poorly designed privatization program is worse than none at all? Black et al. argue affirmatively, but Nellis (1999) and other commentators point out that many of Russia’s problems resulted from a collapse of central governmental authority, and would thus not likely be solved by re-nationalization. Perhaps the best long-term hope for economic revitalization in the former Soviet Union republics is the type of de novo private development described in Havrylyshyn and McGee (1999). One conclusion that we can draw from the privatization experience in transition economies is that allowing incumbent managers to gain control of privatized firms—whether through legal means or otherwise—will yield disappointing results. Whenever possible, firms should be privatized, for cash, in as transparent a method as possible, and through an auction or sale process that is open to the broadest possible cross-section of potential buyers (including foreigners).

5.2.3. Privatization and Economic Reform in China

China, one of the most important transition economies, has been vigorously pursuing economic reform since 1978. It has dramatically increased the total factor productivity [Li (1997)] of Chinese state-owned enterprises, largely by improving incentives [Groves, Hong, McMillan and Naughton (1994, 1995)]

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33 The Czech Republic’s market collapse of 1997, described in Coffee (1999), and the Lithuanian government’s tortuous privatization of the Mazheikiu Nafta refiner in early 2000, described by Samonis (2000) are
and decentralizing economic decision-making [Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999), Lau, Qian and Roland (2000)]. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party recently committed the country to a massive privatization program [Lin (2000)] under the slogan “seize the large, release the small,” which roughly translates as privatizing all but the largest 300 or so SOEs. Assuming this plan is even partially implemented, the result will be a privatization program of unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the World Trade Organization accord negotiated between China and the United States in November 1999 (and subsequently with the European Union in early 2000) may ultimately lead to China’s accession to the WTO. If this occurs, broad swathes of heretofore protected Chinese industry -- including telecommunications, automobile production, and financial services -- will be opened to international competition for the first time. This process will almost certainly increase the pressure on China to fully privatize its industry.

On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that China’s “privatization” program will do little to lessen the state’s role in economic decision-making, either at the macro or micro-economic levels. For one thing, the ownership structure of Chinese stock companies is unlike anything seen elsewhere in the world. As described by Xu and Wang (1997), Tian (2000) and Lin (2000), only one-third of the stock in publicly-listed former Chinese SOEs can be owned by individuals; the remaining two-thirds of a company’s shares must be owned by the state and by domestic (usually financial) institutions—which are invariably state-owned. So called “A-shares” may be owned and traded only by Chinese citizens, while B-shares are stocks listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen that may be owned and traded only by foreigners. Other shares are listed in Hong Kong (H-shares) or New York (N-shares), and these are also restricted to foreigners. The net effect of this fractionalization of ownership is that, even in publicly listed former SOEs, control is never really contestable and the long-term financial performance of “privatized” Chinese companies has been quite poor. This is particularly true for the “Red Chip” (PRC-controlled companies incorporated and listed in Hong Kong) and H-shares sold in Hong Kong.34

These ownership restrictions could, however, be rescinded by government fiat at any time. Perhaps the key constraint on privatization in China is the fact that SOEs, rather than the government itself, serve as the country’s social safety net. As described in Bai, Li and Wang (1997) and Lin, Cai and Li (1998), Chinese SOEs are burdened with many social welfare responsibilities. Thus it is difficult to imagine the government adopting a privatization program that would either grant these firms discretion over staffing levels or subject them to truly enterprise threatening competition. In sum, the long-term prognosis for also examples of what can go wrong in privatization programs.

34 We thank Cyril Lin, Samuel Huang and George Tian for helping us understanding Chinese listing procedures. See http://www.csry.gov.cn/CSRCsite/eng/elaws/elaws.htm for an English-language summary of Chinese securities laws.
privatization in China is unclear; there is great scope for such a program to have a dramatic impact, coupled with great danger of social turmoil if handled (or sequenced) incorrectly.

We now re-direct our emphasis away from transition economies and examine whether investors who participate in share issue privatizations have, on average, benefited from these investments—both initially (first day) and longer term (up to five years).

6. Do Investors Benefit From Privatization?

6.1. Initial Returns Earned by Investors in Share Issue Privatizations

As noted earlier, governments generally rely on share offerings as the best method of privatizing large state-owned enterprises, and they routinely adopt highly politicized offer terms in order to achieve political objectives. Offering terms that differ fundamentally from those observed in private-sector offerings, plus the very large average size of privatization issues, have motivated many researchers to examine the initial and long term returns earned by SIP investors. Table 8 summarizes the results of ten studies examining initial returns. Most of these studies evaluate whether investors who purchase privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs) at the offering price, and then sell these shares on the first day of open market trading, earn returns that are significantly different from zero. Thus, these studies test whether PIPOs are “underpriced.” A few also test whether PIPOs yield initial returns that are materially different from the significantly positive first-day returns earned by investors in private-sector IPOs, as documented in a vast number of articles using both U.S. and international data. The U.S. market experience is summarized in Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) and international IPO underpricing studies are surveyed in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).

**** Insert Table 8 about here ****

Five of the studies in Table 8 examine PIPO returns from individual countries. All five studies document significant, often massive, average levels of underpricing, ranging from 39.6 percent for the 40 British PIPOs studied by Menyah and Paudyal (1996) to 940 percent for the 308 Chinese PIPOs examined by Su and Fleisher (1999). Menyah and Paudyal and Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) find that UK and Malaysian PIPOs are significantly more underpriced than their private-sector counterparts, and Ausenegg finds the same result for Polish PIPOs. Hungarian PIPOs are also more underpriced than private IPOs, but the difference is not significant (Jelic and Briston, 2000a). Since there are as yet few truly comparable private-sector IPOs in China, Su and Fleisher cannot test whether private offerings also have the incredible underpricing they document for PIPOs, but they do point to an intriguing rationale for this phenomenon based on the signalling model presented in Welch (1989). Unlike almost any other comparable group of IPOs, over 90 percent of Chinese PIPOs do in fact execute seasoned equity offerings within a short time after the PIPO.
The other five studies in Table 8 examine multi-national samples of PIPOs, generally using offering data from *Privatisation International* and stock returns from *Datastream*. The number of countries studied ranges from eight in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) to 61 in Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000), though the studies’ main results are similar. All these studies document economically and statistically significant underpricing of PIPOs, averaging about 30 percent in the large-sample studies. The two that examine seasoned SIPs (Huang and Levich (1998) and Jones, et al.) find these are significantly underpriced as well, though much less so than are PIPOs. Four of these studies—Dewenter and Malatesta (1987), Huang and Levich (1998), Choi and Nam (2000) and Ljungqvist, et al.—also test whether PIPOs are significantly more underpriced than private-sector IPOs. The first three studies find no systematic evidence that PIPOs are significantly more or less underpriced than private IPOs; instead all three suggest that results vary by country. However, the Ljungqvist, et al. study performs the most convincing analysis of the relative underpricing of IPOs and PIPOs, since they use regression methodology and a privatization dummy variable to examine underpricing for a sample of 2,051 IPOs—including 185 PIPOs—from 61 non-U.S. markets. They document that PIPOs are significantly more underpriced (by about 9 percentage points) than are private sector IPOs. They also find that the underwriting spreads on PIPOs are significantly lower (by a mean 61 basis points) than on IPOs.

The principal objective of the Jones, et al. study differs from the others in that it tests whether government issuers are attempting to maximize SIP offering proceeds or are instead trying to achieve multiple political and economic objectives, even at the cost of revenue maximization. Jones, et al. test the underpricing models of Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1999). Both models predict that governments that are ideologically committed to privatization and economic reform will deliberately underprice SIPs and will privatize in stages, to signal their commitment to protecting investor property rights. “Populist” governments that are pursuing privatization strictly as a means of raising revenue will be unwilling to underprice as much as will committed governments. Populist governments will also try to sell larger stakes in SOEs. Jones, et al. find that initial returns (underpricing) are significantly positively related to the fraction of the firm’s capital sold and to the degree of income inequality (Gini coefficient) in a country. They also find that initial returns are negatively related to the level of government spending as a fraction of GDP (a proxy for how socialist a society is) and to a dummy variable indicating that more than 50 percent of a company’s stock is being sold. Collectively, these findings strongly support the predictions of Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1999).

6.2. Long-Run Returns Earned by Investors in Share Issue Privatizations

Since the seminal article by Ritter (1991), financial economists have paid close attention to estimating the long-run returns earned by investors who purchase unseasoned and seasoned issues. Most of

There is a major debate in the empirical finance literature on methodological issues in estimating long-run returns. This is not surprising since findings of significant negative (or positive) long-run returns can be interpreted as evidence contradicting the efficient market hypothesis, a fundamental concept in finance. The debate centers on how to calculate long-run returns and how to construct test statistics. For example, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that most corporate actions are not random events. They contend that after controlling for cross-correlation of abnormal returns, most statistical evidence of abnormal performance disappears. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), drawing on the work of Kothari and Warner (1997), and Barber and Lyon (1997a), note five reasons for misspecification in test statistics designed to detect long-run returns. There are three sources of bias -- a new listing bias, a re-balancing bias and a skewness bias -- as well as cross-sectional dependence in sample observations and a poorly specified asset-pricing model. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, among others, suggest several methods to control for misspecification, but there is no one correct method. They conclude that the “analysis of long-run returns is treacherous.” Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1998) present a behavioral approach to dealing with long-run returns and Fama (1999) argues bad model problems are "unavoidable … and more serious in tests on long-term returns.” Since the methodological problems identified with estimates of long-run returns have not been resolved for U.S. firms, they have not been resolved for privatizations that are subject to the additional problems of scarce data and the lack of liquid markets. Nevertheless, the fact that most of the studies of long run returns following privatizations, using different methodologies and focusing on different countries, find similar results lessens some of the methodological concerns.

We discuss fifteen studies that examine the returns earned by investors who buy and hold privatization share issues, and the number of such studies appears to be growing rapidly. The papers are summarized in Table 9. Eight of these focus on either a single country or a single market for issues, and the other seven examine multi-national samples. Levis (1993) and Menyah, Paudyal, and Inganyete (1995) examine the British experience and both document significantly positive long-run abnormal returns for SIP investors. However, Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez (1993) find the opposite result for their sample of nine Chilean SIPs. Jelic and Briston (2000a) find that 25 Hungarian PIPOs yield large but insignificantly positive long-run returns (peaking at 21.3 percent in month 15), though they do find that these cumulative
returns are significantly higher than the highly negative returns (reaching −70 percent by month 30) earned on 24 private-sector IPOs. These same authors (2000b) document significantly positive 1, 3, and 5-year excess returns for Polish PIPOs, but Ausenegg (2000) finds insignificant long-term returns for essentially the same sample. Given the differing estimation methodologies employed in these two studies, it is not clear whether Polish PIPOs earn significantly higher long-run returns than IPOs. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find insignificant long-run returns for privatization stocks listing in the U.S. in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) compared to local benchmarks. The returns are significantly negative compared to U.S. benchmarks. Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) find that investors earn insignificant long-term returns on 18 Malaysian PIPOs, as well as on 77 private-sector IPOs.

**** Insert Table 9 about here ****

Two of the multi-national studies described in Table 9 focus on long-run returns earned by investors in SIPs from developing countries. A third examines only western European offerings. Boubakri and Cosset (1999b) study returns from 120 SIPs from 26 developing countries, while Perotti and Oijen (2000) develop and test a model of long-term returns using data from 20 developing nations. Both studies document large, highly significant long-run returns, though the mean 112 percent 3-year return found by Boubakri and Cosset is not significant once the returns from national markets over the corresponding time periods are subtracted (the absolute returns are converted into market-adjusted, or excess returns). This is primarily due to the extremely large weightings that SIPs themselves have in most developing-country national stock market indices. Once these size biases are accounted for, SIPs significantly out-perform most national market indices. Perotti and Oijen document significantly positive market-adjusted returns, and argue that this results from a progressive resolution of political risk as governments refrain from expropriating investors’ wealth in privatized firms—as had been feared. Their proxy for political risk declines by an average of 3.6 percent annually during the course of a privatization program, and this leads to positive excess returns for SIPs of about 6 percent per year. Davidson (1998) documents that large European SIPs began to out-perform market indices in five countries during the mid-1990s. However, these SIPs did so only after an extended period of sub-par performance.

The remaining four long-run return studies employ multi-national samples that cover a large number of countries and regions. For this reason, and because all the studies are recent enough to employ state-of-the-art techniques for computing net-of-market returns, we consider these the most persuasive evidence on long term excess returns earned by SIP investors. Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Schwartz (2000) examine the long-run buy-and-hold returns earned by domestic, international, and U.S. investors who purchase shares at the first open-market price in 158 share issue privatizations (SIPs) from 33 countries during the period 1981-1997. They use several benchmarks and compute one, three, and five-
year local currency and US dollar net returns with respect to domestic, international, US market indices, and industry-matched comparison samples. They find statistically significant positive net returns for the 158 unseasoned SIPs for all holding periods and versus all benchmarks. Boardman and Laurin (2000), Choi, Nam and Ryu (2000) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) find similar results. All four studies document significantly positive market-adjusted returns over holding periods of up to five years. In general, British privatizations yield higher long-run returns than do non-U.K. initial and seasoned SIPs, and British utilities yield the highest returns among the U.K. offerings. However, the net return is significantly positive for most non-U.K. sub-samples as well. These studies, and those cited earlier, support the conclusion that the average long-term, market-adjusted return earned by international investors in share issue privatizations is economically and significantly positive. Apart from Perotti and Oijen, however, few of these studies can offer any convincing explanation of precisely why SIP issues out-perform over time, and isolating one or more specific cause-and-effect relationships is likely to prove extremely difficult. Most likely, these excess returns result from a gradual resolution of uncertainty on the part of investors regarding both the micro-economic success of privatization programs and the ability of governments to resist the temptation to expropriate shareholder wealth in privatized firms through direct intervention, or through targeted regulation or taxation. If so, an important implication is that returns on SIPs are likely to be much lower in the future than they have been historically, since investors will no longer demand a political risk premium to purchase shares.

7. Privatization’s Impact on Financial Market Development

7.1. The Impact of Privatization on Stock Market Capitalization and Trading

There is no doubt that privatization has had a major impact on capital markets. Table 10 describes the growth in the total market capitalization, and in the value of shares traded, on the world’s stock exchanges from 1983 to 1999. This was a period of rapid growth in the capitalization of markets in every country except Japan, which suffered a four-year, 70 percent decline in total market capitalization after reaching a value of $4.4 trillion in 1989. At year-end 1999, Japan’s market was eight times as valuable in dollar terms (and less than four times as valuable in yen terms) as it was in 1983. By contrast, total world market capitalization increased over ten-fold (to $35.0 trillion) between 1983 and 1999, and the total capitalization of the U.S. market increased almost nine-fold (from $1.9 trillion to $16.6 trillion) over the same period. The growth in markets outside the United States was even greater. It is also in these markets where privatization’s impact has been greatest, since there have been only two significant SIPs in the United States in the modern era (Conrail in 1987 and U.S. Enrichment Corporation in 1999). Between 1983 and 1999, the total capitalization of non-U.S. stock markets increased from $1.49 trillion to $18.36
trillion. The total market capitalization of developing country stock exchanges increased by 26 times
during these sixteen years, even after declining significantly from 1997’s peak value of $2.5 trillion to $2.2 trillion in 1999.

**** Insert Table 10 about here ****

Though the rise in market capitalization has been impressive, trading volumes have increased even more. The total value of shares traded worldwide between 1983 and 1999 rose from $1.2 trillion to more than $37.5 trillion. As before, non-U.S. markets experienced the greatest increases. The value of shares traded on markets in developing countries rose from $25 billion in 1983 to more than $2.3 trillion in 1999. This rise in market liquidity was probably due in large part to the increasing popularity of “emerging market” investing among western investors, particularly institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds.

What role has privatization played in this remarkable growth in market capitalization and trading volume? At the end of 1983, the total market capitalization of the handful of British, Chilean, and Singaporean firms that had been privatized was less than $50 billion. By the middle of 1999, the 153 privatized firms listed in either the Business Week “Global 1000” ranking of the most valuable companies in developed-nation stock markets or the Business Week “Top 200 Emerging Market Companies” ranking had a total market capitalization of $2.44 trillion. This equals approximately 10 percent of the combined market capitalization of the firms on the two lists, and is more than 21 percent of the non-U.S. total. (American firms accounted for 494 of the Global 1000 firms, and $11.3 trillion of the $19.7 trillion Global 1000 total capitalization.)

An examination of the historical evolution of non-U.S. stock markets since 1980 suggests that large SIPs played a key role in the growth of capital markets almost everywhere, especially because they are generally among the largest firms in national markets. Using the Business Week 1999 Global 1000 and Top 200 data, Table 11 details the total market value and relative size of the world’s 25 most valuable privatized firms. Columns 1 and 2 give the company names and domicile countries. Column 3 shows each firm’s ranking in the Global 1000 list (firms from the Emerging Market list are given the ranking they would have if included in the Global 1000 ranking). Column 4 gives the firm’s ranking within its home market, and column 5 lists the firm’s total market capitalization. Column 6 expresses the single firm’s market capitalization as a percentage of the entire national market’s year-end 1998 capitalization.

**** Insert Table 11 about here ****

Table 11 plus data reported in Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) reveal the relative importance of SIPs in most non-U.S. stock exchanges. Privatized firms are the most valuable companies in Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Australia, Mexico, Singapore, China, Denmark, New Zealand,
Portugal, Russia, Taiwan, Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Malaysia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Turkey, Chile, Indonesia, Venezuela, and Pakistan, and they are the second most valuable firms in many other countries, including Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and Israel. Privatized companies are the first and second most valuable companies in eleven countries, including Japan, Britain, Singapore, and Korea, and they occupy the three top slots in Italy, Portugal, Russia, and Argentina. Table 11 also shows that the largest privatized firms often account for sizeable fractions of the total capitalization of national stock markets, even in advanced countries such as Germany (10.5 percent), Italy (11.8 percent), Spain (14.8 percent), and Australia (19.4 percent). In developing countries such as Singapore (15.8 percent), Korea (17.2 percent), and Mexico (36.3 percent), individual privatized firms also account for large fractions of the total market capitalization.

Another way to measure the impact of privatized firms on capital market development is to see how important SIPs have been as security offerings, and here the impact is even greater. As Table 12 shows, the 10 largest, and 30 of the 35 largest, share offerings in history have been privatizations. Ten SIPs have been larger than the biggest U.S. share offering, the $10.6 billion ATT Wireless tracking stock offering in April 2000. Jones et al. (1999) show that, between 1984 and 1997, 112 SIPs raised at least $1 billion, a stock offering size rarely observed in the United States. Twenty-five SIPs have raised more than $7 billion, a feat no private-sector issuer achieved prior to April 2000, and governments have raised a total of more than $700 billion through some 750 public share offerings since 1977. Outside of the entire U.S. corporate sector, this is an unprecedented volume of common equity issuance, and it has fundamentally changed the nature of global stock market trading and investment.

**** Insert Table 12 about here ****

Why should we care about privatization’s impact on the development of capital markets? Obviously, new share listings can directly create some net new wealth and a handful of new (albeit well-paying) jobs, but the principal economic payoff from increasingly efficient and liquid capital markets comes from the financing opportunities and monitoring possibilities they provide. As documented in Levine (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Henry (2000a,b), among others, efficient capital markets promote economic growth and allow individual firms to fund investment opportunities they otherwise would have to forgo. Therefore, privatization deserves credit for whatever direct role it has played in promoting stock market development (through new share offerings), and for the indirect role it has played in bond market development. This catalytic role can be assumed because several of the aforementioned studies find development of one market also promotes development of related markets.
8. Privatization’s Impact on International Corporate Governance Practices

It would be an understatement to assert that interest in corporate governance issues has been growing recently among policy-makers and academic economists. A nation’s corporate governance system can be defined as the set of laws, institutions, practices, and regulations that determine how limited-liability companies will be run and in whose interest. Evidence of the professional interest in corporate governance is not hard to find. Several countries and multilateral agencies have recently published “codes” or “principles” of good corporate governance practices, such as OECD (1999), and many survey articles examining international corporate governance have been written during the past five years. These studies have examined governance practices in developed countries (Mayer, 1996, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Maher and Andersson, 1999, Dyck, 2000b and Megginson, 2000), transition economies (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999, Coffee, 1999, and Dyck, 2000a), and individual countries such as Russia (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000) and China (Xu and Wang, 1997 and Lin, 2000). These surveys conclude that developing an effective method of protecting the rights of outside investors—especially shareholders—is a prerequisite for developing a modern financial system that can provide external capital for growing firms.

There are several reasons why corporate governance has suddenly risen to prominence. These include the large increase in the total value of security issues on global capital markets, and a comparable increase in the total value of mergers and acquisitions worldwide.36 Until recently, relying on securities markets for corporate financing and resorting to (often hostile) public takeovers to effect changes in control of corporate assets were American practices, but both trends have now “gone global.” In particular, the adoption of the euro in January 1999 caused the value of European mergers and acquisitions to roughly double to $1.22 trillion in 1999 versus 1998 (itself a record year). Another reason for the interest in corporate governance today is the important role that poor governance practices are perceived to have played in the East Asian economic contraction that began in July 1997 (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Long, 2000 and Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000). Finally, academic research by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) and others shows that corporate governance generally, and corporate legal systems specifically, significantly influence capital market size, ownership structure, and efficiency. Industrialized-country governments that implement large-scale SIP programs often need to significantly change their corporate governance systems, but governments from the transition economies of China and Central and Eastern

36 The data are taken from the Investment Dealers Digest. Each January, IDD details the prior year’s total worldwide security issuance and mergers and acquisitions volume.
Europe must create such a system almost from scratch. One of the distinctive aspects of SIP programs is the tendency of governments to sell shares to large numbers of citizens, often one million or more. Democratic governments are usually acutely aware of the political fall-out that could result if small investors suffer losses on their SIP investments because of inadequate shareholder protection or insider dealings. Thus, at the same time they launch the first large SIPs, most governments establish (or augment) a regulatory body similar to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Since utilities comprise many of the important privatizations and since many utilities are natural monopolies, most privatizing governments establish regulatory bodies for these firms as well. In addition, national stock exchanges are often illiquid and non-transparent at the beginning of large SIP programs. Governments must establish the listing and other regulations that will assure potential investors that the market is a reputable place to invest and trade.

There is some literature that examines the actual corporate governance provisions of privatized firms. Jones et al. (1999) find that governments tend to retain some sort of decisive voting rights in privatized firms even after a majority of the income rights have been sold. In many countries, the government retains a golden share, with 90 percent of U.K. SIPs having such a feature. This special share held by the government enables it to veto mergers, liquidations, asset sales, and other major corporate events. An alternative method of retaining ultimate control is for the government to insert some control restrictions directly into the SIP’s charter.

8.1. Individual Share Ownership in Privatized Companies

Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) study the evolution of share ownership in large SIPs. They look at how many individual stockholders are created in a sample of large privatization share offerings, as well as how these highly atomistic ownership structures evolve over time. They compare the numbers of stockholders in the privatized firms in the 1999 Business Week Global 1000 and Top 200 Emerging Market lists to capitalization-matched private sector firms from the same markets, obtaining useable data for 97 of the 153 privatized companies and for 99 of the matching privately-owned firms. For most of the cases with data available for both the privatized and the matching firm, the privatized company has a larger number of shareholders. This result holds despite the fact that in most cases governments retain sizable stakes in these firms, thus reducing their effective total capitalization since these stakes have not yet been sold to private investors. Boutchkova and Megginson conclude that the number of shareholders in the privatized companies is significantly higher than the number of shareholders in the matching private-sector (non-privatized) sample companies.

Boutchkova and Megginson (2000) also examine how the total number of shareholders in a company evolves during the years subsequent to a SIP. They demonstrate that the extremely large numbers
of shareholders created by many SIPs are not a stable pattern of corporate ownership. Figure 3 shows the dynamics in share ownership in privatized firms. For SIPs with less than 100,000 initial investors, the number of shareholders increases steadily from one year to four years after the privatization. However, for the 39 SIPs that initially have more than 100,000 shareholders, the total number of shareholders declines steadily. The total number of shareholders in the largest privatizations (those with 500,000 or more initial investors) declines by 33 percent within five years of the share offering.

**** Insert Figure 3 about here ****

The implications of this finding for government efforts to develop an effective corporate governance system or equity culture are unclear. Many new stockholders do not retain the shares they purchase. Other evidence suggests that retail investors in privatizations generally own only that one stock, hardly indicative of a class of well-diversified stockholders. On the other hand, since the long-run returns to investors in SIPs are generally positive, the first experience of these new retail investors in stock market trading is a positive one. Furthermore, the fact that governments are able to entice large numbers of investors to return for subsequent share offerings suggests that these programs are indeed creating (at least minimally) effective governance systems and stock markets capable of absorbing large new stock issues.

9. The “Lessons” of Privatization Research

9.1 Some Thoughts on the Current Literature

Our reading of the extant literature on privatization suggests the following conclusions:

1. The privatization programs of the last 20 years have significantly reduced the role of state-owned enterprises in the economic life of most countries. Most of this reduction has happened in developing countries only during the 1990s. The SOE share of “global GDP” has declined from more than ten percent in 1979 to less than six percent today. 37

2. Research now supports the proposition that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms. There is limited empirical evidence, especially from China, that suggests that non-privatizing reform measures, such as price deregulation, market liberalization and increased use of incentives, can improve the efficiency of SOEs, but it also seems likely that these reforms would be even more effective if coupled with privatization.

3. Governments use three basic techniques to privatize their SOEs: share issue privatizations (SIPs), asset sales, and voucher or mass privatizations. We are beginning to understand the determinants

37 These figures are based on the study findings discussed in Section 2, and on the observation that OECD countries represent about three-quarters of world GDP and developing countries account for the remaining 25
of the method selected in specific circumstances. However, there is great variation within all the
techniques, because privatization is a complex process involving a host of political and economic
factors. Voucher privatizations are the least economically productive divestment technique, but
those governments that use it generally feel they have few other realistic options.

4. Governments attempt to craft the offering terms of SIPs to balance competing economic, political,
and financial objectives. Most governments underprice share offerings (particularly initial
offerings) and then use targeted share allocations to favor domestic over foreign investors. SOE
employees are particularly favored, receiving preferential allocations in 91 percent of offers.
Governments frequently retain golden shares that give them veto power over certain control
changes, and also insert various other control restrictions into the corporate charters of privatized
firms.

5. We know that privatization “works,” in the sense that divested firms almost always become more
efficient, more profitable, increase their capital investment spending, and become financially
healthier. These results hold for both transition and non-transition economies, though the results
vary more in the transition economies. The question of whether privatization generally costs at
least some SOE workers their jobs is still unresolved. The answer is ultimately based on whether
sales increase faster than productivity in privatized firms. Most studies find that employment in
privatized firms usually does fall, though three large-sample studies document employment
increases. What is clear is that whenever employment is cut, there is almost invariably a large
compensating performance improvement. Several studies also highlight the need to bring new
entrepreneurial management into privatized firms to maximize performance improvements.
However, there is little empirical evidence on how privatization affects consumers.

6. Investors who purchase initial SIP shares at the offering price and then sell those shares at the first
post-issue trading price earn significantly positive excess (market-adjusted) returns. Additionally,
there is now convincing evidence that initial returns on privatization IPOs are significantly higher
than the initial returns earned on private-sector IPOs. Investors who purchase privatization IPO
shares at their first post-offer trading price, and then retain those shares for one-, three-, or five-
year holding periods, also earn significantly positive net returns.

7. Though it is difficult to pinpoint causality, it appears that countries that have launched large-scale
SIP programs have experienced rapid growth in their national stock market capitalization and
trading volume. Countries (other than the United States) that have either not launched major
privatization programs or have emphasized asset sales and vouchers over public share offerings
percent.
appear to lag behind in market development. Privatized firms are one of the two or three most valuable companies in most non-U.S. markets, and the 10 largest (and 30 of the 35 largest) share issues in financial history have all been privatizations.

8. Emerging (largely anecdotal) evidence suggests that adopting a large-scale SIP program is often a major spur to modernizing a nation’s corporate governance system. Transition economies that launch privatization programs must create such systems largely from scratch, and the record of success here is decidedly mixed. Many governments try to develop an equity culture among their citizenry through SIP programs, also with mixed results. Share ownership has dramatically increased in most non-transition countries over the past 15 years, but the share ownership patterns that are created when SIPs are sold to large numbers of investors (often one million or more) are not stable. However, it seems clear that privatization programs lead to significant improvements in securities market regulation, information disclosure rules, and other required components of modern financial systems.

9.2. Avenues for Further Research

While much has indeed been learned about the effectiveness of privatization as a political and economic policy, there are several important areas that need further research. We believe that, in particular, there are three aspects of privatization that need to be understood much better for public policy reasons. First, researchers need to more closely examine the sequencing and staging of privatization, and conclusively document whether reforms other than government divestiture can effectively serve as a substitute (or precursor) for privatization. Responsible policy-makers are understandably reluctant to “bet their economies” on a rapid, and essentially irreversible, privatization program without some assurance that all necessary prerequisite policies have been put into place. Until these policies are identified, and the interactions between different various policy options are established, launching large-scale privatization programs will remain a leap of faith.

The second vital area of research is to conclusively document the labor economics of privatization programs. Do most such programs actually cost SOE worker jobs? Are there gender-specific impacts relating to the total commercialization of state-owned enterprises, as might happen if privatization caused SOEs to shut down child care or other social services? Are worker training/retraining programs effective methods of dealing with worker redundancies, or should governments emphasize lump-sum severance packages when lay-offs are required? Do privatization programs create more jobs economy-wide than they destroy? These questions are not only vitally important to policy-makers, they are inherently interesting in their own right.
Finally, what role can privatization play in equipping companies and countries to meet the challenges posed by major economic forces such as globalization and the rapid growth of information-based business? Technological breakthroughs have transformed the global telecommunications industry during the past decade, and privatized telecom companies have been at the forefront of this revolution. Indeed, it is unlikely that this most dynamic of industries would have been able to grow nearly as rapidly under the former state ownership model. But how important will privatization be for the global oil and gas industry’s development in the future, and for the energy-based utilities that are now being impacted by technological and regulatory changes similar to those that hit telecommunications during the 1990s? How can developing countries structure privatization programs to most effectively attract foreign direct investment from multinational companies? How will privatization impact the worldwide shift from commercial bank-based systems of corporate finance to capital market-based finance? All of these are questions can, and should, be answered using the tools of economic analysis, and it is hard to imagine an area of research more intrinsically interesting to economists than analyzing the optimal role of government in the business of nations.
REFERENCES


Figure 1: Annual Privatization Revenues For Divesting Governments, 1988-1999

$US Billions

Figure 2: SOE Share of GDP by Stage of National Development, 1979-1996

SOE as % of GDP

Source: World Bank, as reported in Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1999)
Table 1: Summary of Recent Empirical Studies Comparing Public Versus Private Ownership

This table summarizes recent academic studies of privatization that examine the relative performance of state-owned versus privately-owned companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample description, study period, and methodology</th>
<th>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boardman and Vining (1989)</td>
<td>Examine the economic performance of 500 largest non-US firms in 1983, classified by ownership structure as state-owned, privately-owned, or mixed ownership enterprises (ME). Employ four profitability ratios and two measures of X-efficiency.</td>
<td>Find that state-owned and mixed ownership firms are significantly less profitable and productive than privately-owned companies. Also find mixed ownership firms are no more profitable than pure state-owned companies—so full private ownership required to gain efficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vining and Boardman (1992)</td>
<td>Asks whether ownership “matters” in determining the efficiency of SOEs, or if only the degree of competition is important. Estimate performance model using 1986 data from 500 largest non-financial Canadian companies—including 12 SOEs and 93 mixed enterprises.</td>
<td>After controlling for size, market share and other factors, private firms are significantly more profitable and efficient than are MEs and SOEs, though now find that MEs out-perform Crown corporations (SOEs). Thus, ownership has an effect separable from competition alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993)</td>
<td>Test whether privatization is required to improve performance of SOEs by examining how Polish state sector responded in the three years following the “Big Bang” reforms of January 1990. These liberalized prices, tightened fiscal &amp; monetary policy and introduced competition—but did not include privatization.</td>
<td>Document significant performance improvement due to macroeconomic stabilization package, even without privatization. Improvements mostly due to imposition of hard budget constraints, tight bank lending policies, and enhanced credibility about government’s “no bailout” pledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter (1994)</td>
<td>Examine impact of state ownership on the long-run rate of productivity growth and/or cost decline for 23 international airlines over the period 1973-1983.</td>
<td>Find that state ownership can lower the long-run annual rate of productivity growth by 1.6-2.0% and the rate of unit cost decline by 1.7-1.9%. Ownership effects not affected by degree of competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majumdar (1996)</td>
<td>Using industry-level survey data, evaluates the performance differences between SOEs, MEs, and privately-owned Indian companies for the period 1973-1989. SOEs and MEs account for 37% of employment and 66% of capital investment in India in 1989.</td>
<td>Document efficiency scores averaging 0.975 for privately-owned firms, which are significantly higher than the average 0.912 for MEs and 0.638 for SOEs. State sector efficiency improves during concerted “efficiency drives” but declines afterwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kole and Mulherin (1997)</td>
<td>Test whether postwar performance of 17 firms partly owned by US government due to seizure of “enemy” property during WWII differs significantly from performance of private US firms.</td>
<td>Though these firms experience abnormally high turnover among boards of directors, tenure of managers is stable, and SOE performance is not significantly different from privately-owned firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewenter and Malatesta (2000)</td>
<td>Test whether profitability, labor intensity, and debt levels of SOEs in the lists of the 500 largest non-US firms during 1975, 1985, and 1995 differs from privately-owned firms in the same lists.</td>
<td>After controlling for business cycles, find private firms are significantly (often dramatically) more profitable than SOEs. Private firms also have significantly less debt and less labor intensive production processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2000)</td>
<td>Using data from 92 countries, examine whether government ownership of banks impacts level of financial system development, rate of economic growth, and growth rate of productivity.</td>
<td>Find government ownership is extensive, especially in poorest countries, that these holdings retard financial system development, and restrict economic growth rates, mostly due to impact on productivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tian (2000)</td>
<td>Studies relation between state shareholding and corporate performance of 825 publicly-traded Chinese companies in 1998. 413 of these had some government ownership, 312 had none.</td>
<td>Find performance of “private” enterprises to be significantly superior to that of “mixed” enterprises. Also find corporate value generally declines with state ownership, but then increases after state share passes 45%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table provides summary statistics on pricing, share allocation, and control allocation patterns for a sample of 630 share issue privatizations (SIPs) executed by 59 national governments during the period 1977-1997. Measures are broken down for the 417 initial public offerings of SIP shares and the 213 seasoned SIP offerings. **Pricing variables** include Initial return (also known as initial underpricing), which is a measure of one-day return an investor who purchased shares at the offering price could earn by reselling those shares at the end of the first day’s trading; Percent of offers at a fixed price, which measures the fraction of an issue offered to investors at a predetermined, fixed price rather than at an auction-determined price; and Cost of sales as a percent of issue size is a measure of the sum of cash expenses and underwriter discount charged by the investment banking syndicate managing the issue. The **Share allocation variables** measure the fraction of an issue specifically allocated to employees and foreigners, while the **Control allocation variables** describe how corporate control is parceled out as a result of the offering. Percent of capital sold measures the fraction of a firm’s total common equity (which is not necessarily synonymous with total voting rights) sold in an offering.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Initial SIPS</th>
<th>Seasoned Offers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue size (US$ million)</td>
<td>555.7</td>
<td>104.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial return</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of offer at fixed price</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of sales as a percent of issue</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of offer allocated to employees</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of offers with some allocation to employees</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of offer allocated to foreigners</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of offers with some allocation to foreigners</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of capital sold in offer</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of offers where 100% of capital sold</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of capital where 50% or more of capital sold</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table summarizes the sample selection criteria, methodologies, and empirical findings of several recent academic studies of privatization that focus on specific industries or countries. Only articles that present new empirical results—as contrasted with articles that survey other papers—are summarized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample description, study period, and methodology</th>
<th>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1992)</td>
<td>Compare actual post-privatization performance of 12 large firms (mostly airlines and regulated utilities) in Britain, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico to predicted performance of these firms had they remained SOEs.</td>
<td>Document net welfare gains in 11 of the 12 cases which equal, on average, 26% of the firms’ pre-divestiture sales. Find no case where workers were made worse off, and 3 where workers were made significantly better off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin &amp; Parker (1995)</td>
<td>Using two measures (ROR on capital employed and annual growth in value-added per employee-hour), examine whether 11 British firms privatized during 1981-88 improved performance after divestment. Also attempt to control for business cycle effects.</td>
<td>Mixed results. Outright performance improvements after privatization found in less than half of firm-measures studied. Several improved prior to divestiture, indicating an initial “shake-out” effect upon privatization announcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramamurti (1996)</td>
<td>Surveys studies of 4 telecom, two airline, and one toll-road privatization programs in Latin America during period 1987-1991. Also discusses political economic issues, methods used to overcome bureaucratic, ideological opposition to divestiture.</td>
<td>Concludes privatization very positive for telecoms, partly due to scope for technology, capital investment, and attractiveness of offer terms. Much less scope for productivity improvements for airlines and roads, and little improvement observed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boles de Boer and Evans (1996)</td>
<td>Estimates the impact of the 1987 deregulation, and 1990 privatization, of Telecom New Zealand on the price and quality of telephone services. Also examine whether investors benefited.</td>
<td>Document significant declines in price of phone services, due mostly to productivity growth that cut costs at a 5.6% annual rate, and significant improvement in service levels. Shareholders also benefited significantly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrazzini and Clark (1996)</td>
<td>Using International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data through 1994, test whether deregulation and privatization impact the level and growth in teledensity (main lines per 100 people), prices, service quality, and employment by telecoms in 26 developing countries.</td>
<td>Deregulation and privatization both are associated with significant improvements in level and growth in teledensity, but have no consistent impact on service quality. Deregulation associated with lower prices and increases employment; privatization has the opposite effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramamurti (1997)</td>
<td>Examines restructuring and privatization of Ferrocarilla Argentinos, the national railroad, in 1990. Tests whether productivity, employment, and need for operating subsidies (equal to 1% of GDP in 1990) change significantly after divestiture.</td>
<td>Documents a 370% improvement in labor productivity and a 78.7% decline in employment (from 92,000 to 19,682). Services were expanded and improved, and delivered at lower cost to consumers. Need for operating subsidies largely eliminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997)</td>
<td>Examine the effect of British Airways’ privatization on the stock prices of competitors. Also tests whether fares on competitive routes decline after privatization. Such findings would suggest a more competitive BA resulting from privatization.</td>
<td>Stock prices of US competitors decline on average by 7 percent upon BA’s privatization, and fares on routes served by BA and competitors fall by 14.3 percent after divestiture. Compensation of BA executives increases and becomes more performance-contingent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newberry and Pollitt (1997)</td>
<td>Perform a cost-benefit analysis of the 1990 restructuring and privatization of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). Compare the actual performance of the privatized firms to a counterfactual assuming CEGB had remained state-owned.</td>
<td>The restructuring/privatization of CEGB was “worth it,” in that there is a permanent cost reduction of 5 percent per year. Producers and shareholders capture all this benefit and more. Consumers and the government lose. Also show that alternative fuel purchases involve unnecessarily high costs and wealth flows out of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Methodology/Findings</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ros (1999)</td>
<td>Uses ITU data and panel data regression methodology to examine the effects of privatization and competition on network expansion and efficiency in 110 countries over the period 1986-1995. Finds that countries with at least 50% private ownership of main telecom firm have significantly higher teledensity levels and growth rates. Both privatization and competition increase efficiency, but only privatization is positively associated with network expansion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaPorta and López-de-Silanes (1999)</td>
<td>Tests whether performance of 218 SOEs privatized through June 1992 improves after divestment. Compares performance with industry-matched firms, and splits improvements documented between industry and firm-specific influences. Output of privatized firms increased 54.3%, while employment declined by half (though wages for remaining workers increased). Firms achieved a 24% point increase in operating profitability, eliminating need for subsidies equal to 12.7% of GDP. Higher product prices explain 5% of improvement; transfers from laid-off workers, 31%, and incentive-related productivity gains account for remaining 64%.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallsten (2000a)</td>
<td>Performs an econometric analysis of the effects of telecommunications reforms in developing countries. Using a panel dataset of 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984 to 1997, explores the effects of privatization, competition and regulation on telecommunications performance. Competition is significantly associated with increases in per capita access and decreases in cost. Privatization alone is not helpful, unless coupled with effective, independent regulation. Increasing competition the single best reform, competition with privatization is best, but privatizing a monopoly without regulatory reforms should be avoided.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurin and Bozec (2000)</td>
<td>Compares productivity and profitability of two large Canadian rail carriers, before and after the 1995 privatization of Canadian National (CN). Compares accounting ratios for entire 17-year period 1981-1997 and for three sub-periods: the fully state-owned era (1981-91), the pre-privatization period (1992-95), and the post-privatization era. Also compares stock returns from 1995-98. Creates a six-firm comparison group of Canadian privatizations, and computes accounting ratios and stock returns for these firms as well. Total factor productivity of CN much lower than that of privately-owned Canadian Pacific (CP) during 1981-91 period, but became just as efficient during pre-privatization (1992-95) period, then exceeded it after 1995. CN stock price out-performed CP, the transportation industry, and the Canadian market after 1995. Both firms shed workers after 1992, but CN’s employment declined by more (34% vs 18%) as average productivity almost doubled (97% increase). CN’s capital spending increased significantly, though CP increased more. Six-firm Canadian privatization comparison group also experienced significant increases in investment spending and productivity, and a significant decline in employment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000)</td>
<td>Uses factor analysis and a database on market structure and regulation to investigate the effects of liberalization and privatization on productivity, prices and quality of long-distance and cellular telephony services in 23 OECD countries over the 1991-97 period. Prospective and actual competition both bring about productivity and quality improvements—and lower prices—in telecom services, but no clear effect could be found for privatization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Sample description, study period, and methodology</td>
<td>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994)</td>
<td>Compare 3-year average post-privatization financial and operating performance ratios to the 3-year pre-privatization values for 61 firms from 18 countries and 32 industries from 1961-1989. Tests significance of median changes in post versus pre-privatization period. Also binomial tests for % of firms changing as predicted.</td>
<td>Document economically &amp; statistically significant post-privatization increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, profitability, capital investment spending, and dividend payments, as well as significant decreases in leverage. No evidence of employment declines after privatization, but significant changes in firm directors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macquieira and Zurita (1996)</td>
<td>Compare pre- versus post-privatization performance of 22 Chilean companies privatized from 1984 to 1989. Use Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (MNR) methodology to perform analysis first without adjusting for overall market movements (as in MNR), then with an adjustment for contemporaneous changes.</td>
<td>Unadjusted results virtually identical to MNR: significant increases in output, profitability, employment, investment, and dividend payments. After adjusting for market movements, however, the changes in output, employment, and liquidity are no longer significant, and leverage changes significantly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boubakri and Cosset (1998)</td>
<td>Compare 3-year average post-privatization financial and operating performance ratios to the 3-year pre-privatization values for 79 companies from 21 developing countries and 32 industries over the period 1980-1992. Tests for the significance of median changes in ratio values in post versus pre-privatization period. Also binomial tests for percentage of firms changing as predicted.</td>
<td>Document economically &amp; statistically significant post-privatization increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, profitability, capital investment spending, dividend payments, and employment—as well as significant decreases in leverage. Performance improvements are generally even larger than those documented by Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'Souza and Megginson (1999)</td>
<td>Document offering terms, method of sale, and ownership structure resulting from privatization of 78 companies from 10 developing and 15 developed countries over the period 1990-94. Then compare 3-year average post-privatization financial and operating performance ratios to the 3-year pre-privatization values for a subsample of 26 firms with sufficient data. Tests for the significance of median changes in ratio values in post versus pre-privatization period. Also binomial tests for % of firms changing as predicted.</td>
<td>Document economically &amp; statistically significant post-privatization increases in output (real sales), operating efficiency, profitability, as well as significant decreases in leverage. Capital investment spending increases—but insignificantly, while employment declines significantly. More of the firms privatized in the 1990s are from telecoms and other regulated industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbrugge, Megginson and Lee (1999)</td>
<td>Study offering terms and share ownership results for 65 banks fully or partially privatized from 1981 to 1996. Then compare pre and post-privatization performance changes for 32 banks in OECD countries and 5 in developing countries.</td>
<td>Document moderate performance improvements in OECD countries. Ratios proxying for profitability, fee income (non-interest income as fraction of total), and capital adequacy increase significantly; leverage ratio declines significantly. Document large, ongoing state ownership, and significantly positive initial returns to IPO investors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boubakri and Cosset (1999a)</td>
<td>Examine pre- versus post-privatization performance of 16 African firms privatized through public share offering during the period 1989-1996. Also summarize findings of three other studies pertaining to privatization in developing countries.</td>
<td>Document significantly increased capital spending by privatized firms, but find only insignificant changes in profitability, efficiency, output and leverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’Souza and Megginson (2000)</td>
<td>Examine pre- versus post-privatization performance changes for 17 national telecommunications companies privatized through share offerings during 1981-94.</td>
<td>Finds that profitability, output, operating efficiency, capital spending, number of access lines, and average salary per employee all increase significantly after privatization. Leverage declines significantly; employment declines insignificantly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewenter and Malatesta (2000)</td>
<td>Compare pre- versus post-privatization performance of 63 large, high-information companies divested during 1981-94 over both short-term [(+1 to +3) vs (-3 to -1)] and long-term [(+1 to +5) vs (-10 to -1)] horizons. Also examine long-run stock return performance of privatized firms and compare the relative performance of a large sample (1,500 firm-years) of state and privately-owned firms during 1975, 1985, and 1995.</td>
<td>Document significant increases in profitability (using net income) and significant decreases in leverage and labor intensity (employees ÷ sales) over both short and long-term comparison horizons. Operating profits increase prior to privatization, but not after. Document significantly positive long-term (1-5 years) abnormal stock returns, mostly concentrated in Hungary, Poland, and the UK. Results also strongly indicate that private firms out-perform state-owned firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2000)</td>
<td>Compare 3-year average post-privatization financial and operating performance ratios to the 5-year pre-privatization values for 9 Canadian firms privatized from 1988 to 1995. Also computed long-run (up to 5 years) stock returns for divested firms.</td>
<td>Find that profitability, measured as return on sales or assets, more than doubles after privatization, while efficiency and sales also increase significantly (though less drastically). Leverage and employment decline significantly, while capital spending increases significantly. Privatized firms also significantly out-perform Canadian stock market over all long-term holding periods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Summarized Results From Three Empirical Studies of the Financial and Operating Performance of Newly-Privatized Firms (Compared to Their Performance as State-Owned Enterprises)

This table summarizes the empirical results of three directly-comparable academic studies [Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), and D’Souza and Megginson (1999)] comparing the three-year average operating and financial performance of a combined sample of 211 newly-privatized firms with the average performance of those same firms during their last three years as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). All three studies employ the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its z-statistic) as the test of significance for the change in median value. All three studies employ multiple proxies for most of the economic variables being measured; this table summarizes only one proxy per topic, and emphasizes the one highlighted in the studies (almost invariably, the variable that uses either physical measures—such as number of employees—or financial ratios using current-dollar measures in the numerator or denominator, or both). Profitability, investment, leverage, and dividend measures are in percent. Efficiency and output measures are index values, with the value during the year of privatization defined as 1.000; inflation-adjusted sales figures are used in the efficiency and output measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables and Studies cited</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean value Before Privatization</th>
<th>Mean value After Privatization</th>
<th>Mean change Due to Privatization</th>
<th>Z-Statistic for Difference in Performance</th>
<th>% of Firms with improved Performance</th>
<th>Z-Statistic for Significance of % change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROFITABILITY (Net Income ÷ Sales)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.0552</td>
<td>0.0799</td>
<td>0.0249</td>
<td>3.15***</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>3.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0442)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0611)</td>
<td>(0.0140)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boubakri &amp; Cosset (1998)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.0493</td>
<td>0.1098</td>
<td>0.0605</td>
<td>3.16***</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>2.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0460)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0799)</td>
<td>(0.0181)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’Souza &amp; Megginson (1999)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.92***</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted average</td>
<td>218$</td>
<td>0.0862</td>
<td>0.1257</td>
<td>0.0396</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFICIENCY (Real Sales per Employee)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td>0.1064</td>
<td>3.66***</td>
<td>85.7</td>
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<td>(1.055)</td>
<td>(0.1157)</td>
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<td>Boubakri &amp; Cosset (1998)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.9224</td>
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<td>4.79***</td>
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<td>(0.2414)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D’Souza &amp; Megginson (1999)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.23</td>
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<td>4.87***</td>
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<td>(0.87)</td>
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<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
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<td>0.9733</td>
<td>1.1599</td>
<td>0.1914</td>
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<td>81.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>INVESTMENT (Capital Expenditures ÷ Sales)</td>
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<td>Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.1169</td>
<td>0.1689</td>
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<td>2.35**</td>
<td>67.4</td>
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<td>Boubakri &amp; Cosset (1998)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.1052</td>
<td>0.2375</td>
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<td>(0.0137)</td>
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<tr>
<td>D’Souza &amp; Megginson (1999)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td>0.1900</td>
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<td>(0.9165)</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td>(1.123)</td>
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<td>0.241</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.77***</td>
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<td>5.19***</td>
<td>7.30***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.4</td>
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<td>75.6</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.46***</td>
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<td>4.58***</td>
<td>10.94***</td>
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<td>(10,672)</td>
<td>22,941</td>
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<td>40,850</td>
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<td>(10,811)</td>
<td>(22,136)</td>
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<td>43,200</td>
<td>(276)</td>
<td>139</td>
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<td>2,346</td>
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<td>1.48</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<td>57.9</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td></td>
<td>64.1</td>
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<td>1.19</td>
<td>-2.14**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.84*</td>
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<td>(0.5575)</td>
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<td>3.51***</td>
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<td>2.11**</td>
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<td>(0.0089)</td>
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<td>0.0300</td>
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<td>4.37***</td>
<td>4.98***</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.18***</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.28***</td>
<td>5.24***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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a Number exceeds 211 because of overlapping firms in different samples.

*** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level

** Indicates significance at the 5 percent level

* Indicates significance at the 10 percent level
### Table 6: Summary of Empirical Studies of Privatization In Transition Economies: Central and Eastern Europe

This table summarizes the empirical findings of several recent academic studies of privatization that focus on central and eastern Europe (CEE).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample description, study period, and methodology</th>
<th>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl (1997)</td>
<td>Examines determinants of performance improvements for sample of 706 Czech firms privatized during 1992-95. Using Tobins-Q, tests whether concentrated ownership structure or presence of outside monitor (bank or investment fund) improves Q more than dispersed ownership.</td>
<td>Document that privatized firms do prosper, primarily because of the concentrated ownership structure that results. Find the more concentrated the post-privatization ownership structure the higher is the firm’s profitability and market valuation. Large stakes owned by bank-sponsored funds and strategic investors are particularly value-enhancing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1997)</td>
<td>Compare the extent of restructuring achieved by over 6,300 private and state-owned firms in seven eastern European countries during 1992-95. Use six measures to examine which restructuring strategies improve performance the most.</td>
<td>Privatization dramatically increases restructuring likelihood &amp; success. Firm privatized for 4 years will increase productivity 3-5 times more than a similar SOE. Little difference in performance based on method of privatization, but ownership &amp; financing effects impact restructuring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Cin and Vodopivec (1997)</td>
<td>Using a sample with 22,735 firm-years of data drawn from period of “spontaneous privatization” in Slovenia (1989-1992), examine the impact of foreign and employee ownership on firm performance.</td>
<td>Document that a percentage point increase in foreign ownership is associated with a 3.9% increase in value-added, and for employee ownership with a 1.4% increase. Also find that firms with higher revenues, profits, and exports are more likely to exhibit foreign and employee ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyck (1997)</td>
<td>Develops and tests an adverse selection model to explain the Treuhand’s role in restructuring and privatizing eastern Germany’s state-owned firms. In less than five years, the Treuhand privatized more than 13,800 firms and parts of firms and, uniquely, had the resources to pay for restructuring itself—but almost never chose to do so. Instead, it emphasized speed and sales to existing western firms over giveaways and sales to capital funds. Paper rationalizes Treuhand’s approach.</td>
<td>Documents that privatized east German firms were much more likely to have transferred western (usually German) managers into key positions than were companies that remained state-owned. Also finds that Treuhand emphasized sales open to all buyers rather than favoring eastern Germans. Principal message: privatization programs must carefully consider when and how to affect managerial replacement in privatized companies. Plans open to western buyers and which allow management change are most likely to improve firm performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999)</td>
<td>Compares the performance of privatized and state-owned firms in the transition economies of Central Europe, and asks the question “when does privatization work?” Examines influence of ownership structure on performance using a sample of 90 state-owned and 128 privatized companies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Employs panel data regression methods to isolate ownership effects.</td>
<td>Privatization “works,” but only when firm is controlled by outside owners (other than managers or employees). Privatization adds over 18 percentage points to the annual growth rate of a firm sold to a domestic financial company, and 12 percentage points when sold to a foreign buyer. Privatization to an outside owner also adds about 9 percentage points to productivity growth. Further, gain does not come at the expense of higher unemployment; insider controlled firms are much less likely to restructure, but outsider-controlled firms grow faster. Shows the importance of entrepreneurship in reviving sales growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiss and Nikitin (1999)</td>
<td>Perform econometric analysis of the effects of ownership by investment funds on the performance of 125 privatized Czech firms during the period 1993-1995. Assess these effects by measuring the relationship between changes in performance and changes in the composition of ownership at the start of the privatization period. Use robust estimation techniques, in addition to OLS, since data strongly reject normality.</td>
<td>Find that ownership concentration and composition jointly affect performance of privatized firms. Concentration of ownership in the hands of a large shareholder, other than an investment fund or company, is associated with significant performance improvements (for all measures of performance). Concentrated ownership by funds did not improve firm performance. Preliminary post-1996 data suggests that changes in investment fund legislation may improve their performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claessens and Djankov (1999a)</td>
<td>Study the effect of management turnover on changes in financial and operating performance of 706 privatized Czech firms over the period 1993-1997. Examine changes in profitability and labor productivity.</td>
<td>Find that the appointment of new managers is associated with significant improvements in profit margins and labor productivity, particularly if the managers are selected by private owners. New managers appointed by the National Property Fund also improve performance, though not by as much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claessens and Djankov (1999b)</td>
<td>Examine the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance for 706 privatized Czech firms during the period 1992-1997. Use profitability and labor productivity as indicators of corporate performance.</td>
<td>Finds that concentrated ownership is associated with higher profitability and labor productivity. Also find that foreign strategic owners and non-bank-sponsored investment funds improve performance more than bank-sponsored funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000)</td>
<td>Examines whether the imposition of hard budget constraints is alone sufficient to improve corporate performance in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Employs a sample of 216 firms, split between state-owned (31%), privatized (43%), and private (26%) firms.</td>
<td>Finds privatization alone added nearly 10 percentage points to the revenue growth of a firm sold to outside owners. Most importantly, finds that the threat of hard budget constraints for poorly-performing SOEs falters, since governments are unwilling to allow these firms to fail. The brunt of SOEs’ lower creditworthiness falls on state creditors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frydman, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000)</td>
<td>Examines whether privatized Central European firms controlled by outside investors are more entrepreneurial—in terms of ability to increase revenues—than firms controlled by insiders or the state. Study employs survey data from a sample of 506 manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.</td>
<td>Documents that all state and privatized firms engage in similar types of restructuring, but that product restructuring by firms owned by outside investors is significantly more effective, in terms of revenue generation, than by firms with other types of ownership. Concludes the more entrepreneurial behavior of outsider-owned firms is due to incentive effects, rather than human capital effects, of privatization—specifically greater readiness to take risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harper (2000)</td>
<td>Examines the effects of privatization on the financial and operating performance of 174 firms privatized in the first—and 380 firms divested in the second—wave of the Czech Republic’s voucher privatizations of 1992 and 1994. Compares results for privatized firms to those which remain state-owned. Employs Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh methodology and variables to measure changes.</td>
<td>Finds that the first wave of privatization yielded disappointing results. Real sales, profitability, efficiency and employment all declined dramatically (and significantly). However, second wave firms experienced significant increases in efficiency and profitability and the decline in employment—though still significant—was much less drastic than after first wave (-17% vs -41%).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7: Summary of Empirical Studies of Privatization in Transition Economies: Russia and Former Soviet Republics

This table summarizes the empirical findings of several recent academic studies of privatization that focus on Russia and former Soviet Republics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample description, study period, and methodology</th>
<th>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996)</td>
<td>Surveys 452 Russian shops sold during the early-1990s to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring.</td>
<td>Document that presence of new owners and managers raises the likelihood of value-increasing restructuring. Finds equity incentives do not improve performance; instead points to importance of new human capital in economic transformation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earle (1998)</td>
<td>Investigates the impact of ownership structure on the (labor) productivity of Russian industrial firms. Using 1994 survey data, examines differential impact of insider, outsider, or state ownership on the performance of 430 firms—of which 86 remained 100% state-owned, 299 were partially privatized, and 45 were newly-created. Adjusts empirical methods to account for tendency of insiders to claim dominant ownership in the best firms being divested.</td>
<td>OLS regressions show a positive impact of private (relative to state) share ownership on labor productivity, with this result primarily due to managerial ownership. After adjusting for selection bias, however, finds that only outsider ownership is significantly associated with productivity improvements. Stresses that leaving insiders in control of firms—while politically expedient—has very negative long-term implications for the restructuring of Russian industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earle and Estrin (1998)</td>
<td>Using a sample very similar to that used by Earle (1998) above, examine whether privatization, competition and the hardening of budget constraints play efficiency-enhancing roles in Russia.</td>
<td>Find a 10 percentage point increase in private share ownership raises real sales per employee by 3-5%. Subsidies (soft budget constraints) reduce the pace of restructuring in state-owned firms, but the effect is small and often insignificant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djankov (1999a)</td>
<td>Investigates the relation between ownership structure and enterprise restructuring for 960 firms privatized in six newly independent states between 1995 and 1997. Employ survey data collected by the World Bank in late 1997 from Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.</td>
<td>Show that foreign ownership is positively associated with enterprise restructuring at high ownership levels (&gt;30%), while managerial ownership is positively related to restructuring at low (&lt;10%) or high levels, but negative at intermediate levels. Employee ownership is beneficial to labor productivity at low ownership levels, but is otherwise insignificant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djankov (1999b)</td>
<td>Using same survey data as in Djankov (1999a) above, studies effects of different privatization modalities on restructuring process in Georgia (92 firms) and Moldova (149 firms). Georgia employed voucher privatization, while the majority of Moldovan firms were acquired by investment funds—and numerous others were sold to managers for cash.</td>
<td>Privatization through management buy-outs is positively associated with enterprise restructuring, while voucher privatized firms do not restructure more rapidly than still state-owned firms. Implies that managers who gain ownership for fee may have less incentive to restructure, as their income is not solely based on the success of the enterprise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000)</td>
<td>Surveys the history of privatization in Russia. While mostly descriptive, several case studies are analyzed.</td>
<td>Authors conclude that Russian privatization has created a “kleptocracy” and has essentially failed. Stresses the importance of minimizing incentives for self-dealing in the design of privatization programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Summary of Empirical Studies Examining Initial Returns to Investors in Share Issue Privatizations

This table summarizes the recent academic studies of privatization that examine the initial (usually first-day) return earned by investors who buy shares in share issue privatizations (SIPs) at the offer price and then sell the shares immediately after trading begins.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Sample description, study period, and methodology</th>
<th>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menyah and Paudyal (1996)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 40 British privatization IPOs (PIPOs) and 75 private-sector IPOs on the London Stock Exchange between 1981 and 1991.</td>
<td>PIPOs offer a market-adjusted initial return of 39.6%, compared to private sector IPO initial return of 3.5%. Regression analysis explains up to 64% of variation in PIPO initial returns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewenter and Malatesta (1987)</td>
<td>Test whether privatization IPOs (PIPOs) are more or less underpriced than private sector IPOs in 8 countries. Compare actual initial returns for 109 companies from Canada, France, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Thailand and the UK with national average initial returns reported in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).</td>
<td>Finds mixed results. Initial returns to privatization issues are higher than to private sector IPOs in unregulated industries and in the UK. Privatization IPOs are lower than private offers in Canada and Malaysia, and they conclude there is not a systematic tendency to underprice PIPOs on the part of all governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang and Levich (1998)</td>
<td>Study offering terms and initial returns to investors in 507 privatization share offerings from 39 countries during 1979-1996, and test alternative explanations for the observed underpricing.</td>
<td>Document average initial returns of 32.2% for PIPOs and 7.17% for seasoned privatization offerings. Also find that SIPs from non-OECD countries are more underpriced than OECD offers, but conclude there is no evidence PIPOs are underpriced more than private IPOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns offered to investors in 18 PIPOs and 77 private sector IPOs in Malaysia from 1984-1995. Also provide details of offering terms and share allocation patterns.</td>
<td>Malaysia PIPOs offer market-adjusted initial returns of 103.5% (median 79.9%), which is significantly greater than the private sector IPO initial returns of 52.5% (29.4%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999)</td>
<td>Examine how political and economic factors influence initial returns, as well as share and control allocation patterns, for a sample of 630 SIPs from 59 countries during 1977-1997.</td>
<td>Document that governments deliberately underprice both PIPOs (mean 34.1%, median 12.4%) and seasoned SIPs (9.4% and 3.3%). Also find that share and control allocation patterns are best explained by political factors. Support predictions of Biais &amp; Perotti (1999) theoretical model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su and Fleisher (1999)</td>
<td>Study the cross-sectional pattern of underpricing of 308 Chinese PIPOs from 1987-1995. Tests whether observed underpricing can be explained using a signalling model.</td>
<td>Document massive underpricing, with an average initial return of 940%. Interpret findings as consistent with a signalling model, since 91% of all firms subsequently execute seasoned equity offerings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelic and Briston (2000a)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 25 PIPOs and 24 other IPOs in Hungary during 1990-1998.</td>
<td>Finds PIPOs are much larger and have higher market-adjusted initial returns than other IPOs (44% mean and 9% median vs 40% and 5%, respectively), but the return differences are not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelic and Briston (2000b)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 55 PIPOs and 110 other IPOs in Poland during 1990-1998.</td>
<td>Using first-day opening prices (not offer prices), find small, though significantly positive, mean abnormal initial returns (1.16%) for PIPOs and insignificant mean abnormal initial returns (0.22%) for other IPOs. The difference is insignificant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Additional Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausenegg (2000)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 52 PIPOs and 107 other IPOs in Poland during 1990-1998.</td>
<td>Documents significantly positive initial abnormal return for PIPOs (60.4% mean, 19.8% median) and for other IPOs (19.8% and 12.9%), though difference is insignificant. Without Bank Slaski, mean PIPO initial return cut roughly in half.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choi and Nam (2000)</td>
<td>Compares initial returns of 185 PIPOs form 30 countries during 1981-1997 to those of private sector IPOs from the same countries using mean national initial returns reported in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).</td>
<td>Finds there is a general tendency for PIPOs to be more underpriced than private sector IPOs (mean of 31% versus 24.6%), and that the degree of underpricing for PIPOs is positively related to the stake sold and to the degree of uncertainty in ex-ante value of newly-privatized firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000)</td>
<td>Analyze both direct and indirect costs (associated with underpricing) of 2,051 IPOs, including 185 PIPOs, in 61 non-US markets during the period 1992-99. Primarily a private-sector, underwriting study.</td>
<td>Document that PIPOs are significantly more underpriced (by about 9 percentage points) than are private-sector IPOs, and the underwriter spreads are a significant 61 basis points lower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Sample description, study period, and methodology</td>
<td>Summary of empirical findings and conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levis (1993)</td>
<td>Examines long-run return to 806 British IPOs from 1980-1988. Sample includes 12 PIPOs, accounting for 76% of total IPO value.</td>
<td>While private sector IPOs under-performed the market by over 10% over 3 years, PIPOs out-performed the market by over 15%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggarwal, Lealand Hernandez (1993)</td>
<td>Examine long-run (one-year) returns for Latin American IPOs, including 9 Chilean PIPOs from 1982-1990.</td>
<td>Using returns from offer price, finds significantly negative one-year market-adjusted returns for PIPOs averaging –29.9% (median –32.4%) versus –9.8% (-23.0%) for private sector IPOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menyah, Paudyal and Inganyete (1995)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 40 British PIPOs and 75 private sector IPOs executed on the London Stock Exchange between 1981 and 1991.</td>
<td>Document significant positive 33% market-adjusted 400-day (80 week) return for PIPO versus an insignificant 3.5% return for private sector IPOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidson (1998)</td>
<td>Studies 1,3,5, and 10-year market adjusted returns for SIPs from five European countries (Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK) through March 1997.</td>
<td>After long period of under-performance, averaging 1-1.5% per year, finds SIPs out-performed European market averages during previous 12 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foerster and Karolyi (1998)</td>
<td>Examines long-run return for 333 non-US companies that list stock on US markets in the form of ADRs from 1982-1996. Compare returns for 77 SIPs (38 IPOs, 39 seasoned offers) with private offers.</td>
<td>Document insignificantly positive 4.1% 3-year abnormal returns for SIPs compared to (insignificantly) negative returns of –1.7% for full sample.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns offered to investors in 18 PIPOs and 77 private sector IPOs in Malaysia from 1984-1995. Also provide details of offering terms and share allocation patterns.</td>
<td>Find that both PIPOs and private sector IPOs yield normal returns (insignificantly different from overall market) over 1.3, and 5-year holding periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boubakri and Cosset (2000)</td>
<td>Evaluates the long-term returns to investors in 120 SIPs from 26 developing countries during 1982-1995.</td>
<td>Find significant 3-year raw returns (112% mean, 30% median), but insignificant mean (37-46%) and median (-7% to 13%) market-adjusted returns—due to weighting of SIPs in stock market indices. Significant positive long-run returns after adjusting for impact of SIP size on index.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelic and Briston (2000)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 25 PIPOs and 24 other IPOs in Hungary during 1990-1998.</td>
<td>Finds PIPOs yield insignificantly positive market-adjusted returns over 1.2, and 3-year holding periods, reaching a peak of 21.3% in month 15, while private-sector IPOs yield significantly negative returns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelic and Briston (2000b)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 55 PIPOs and 110 other IPOs in Poland during 1990-1998.</td>
<td>PIPO investors earn significantly positive 1.3, and 5-year market adjusted returns, while other IPO investors earn negative returns. The difference is significant for most holding periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausenegg (2000)</td>
<td>Examine initial and long-term returns for 52 PIPOs and 107 other IPOs in Poland during 1990-1999.</td>
<td>Finds both PIPO and private-sector IPO investors earn negative—often significant—abnormal returns over 1.3, and 5 year holding periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perotti and Oijen (2000)</td>
<td>Develop a theoretical model suggesting that long-run returns to investors in developing-country SIPs will earn excess returns if and when political risk is resolved. Test the model using data from 22 countries with active privatization programs during 1988-1995.</td>
<td>First document that their proxy for political risk declines by an annual average of 3.6% during the course of a privatization program, and that stock markets develop very rapidly. The decline in risk leads to positive excess returns for SIPs of about 6% per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choi, Nam and Ryu (2000)</td>
<td>Compute buy-and-hold returns of 204 PIPOs from 37 countries during 1977-1997.</td>
<td>Find significantly positive market-adjusted returns to SIPs over 1, 3, and 5-year holding periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megginson, Nash, Netter and Schwartz (2000)</td>
<td>Examine long-run (1,3, and 5-year) returns for 158 PIPOs from 33 countries from 1981-1997. Compute local-currency and $ returns, versus national and international indices, and versus matching firms.</td>
<td>Document economically and statistically positive holding-period returns in both local currency and $, and versus all market indices. 5-year excess returns exceeding 80% are found for most comparisons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boardman and Laurin (2000)</td>
<td>Examines the factors that influence the long-run returns of 99 SIPs from 1980-1995. Test the effect of relative size, fraction retained (by government), the presence of a golden share, initial return, and timing on 3-year buy-and-hold returns. Also examines whether UK utility SIPs earned “excessive” returns.</td>
<td>Find significant positive abnormal returns to all SIPs over one (9.2%), two (13.5%) and three-year (37.4%) holding periods. British SIPs are higher than non-UK issues, and UK utilities have highest returns (60.6% 3-year excess returns), but 3-year non-UK SIP returns also significant. Excess returns are (significantly) positively related to fraction retained and initial period return, and are negatively related to relative size and presence of a golden share.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table details the growth in the aggregate market capitalization and trading volume, in $US millions, over the 16-year period 1983-1999. Market capitalization figures are year-end values, translated from local currencies into US$ at the contemporaneous exchange rate, while trading volumes represent the total value of all trades executed during the year. Data sources: 1983-1998, the World Bank’s *Emerging Markets Fact Book* (various issues); 1999 data from the Statistics section of the Federation of International Stock Exchange’s website (www.fibv.com), but comparable to World Bank data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed Countries</td>
<td>3,301,117</td>
<td>6,378,234</td>
<td>10,957,463</td>
<td>9,921,841</td>
<td>15,842,152</td>
<td>24,530,692</td>
<td>32,820,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,898,063</td>
<td>2,636,598</td>
<td>3,505,686</td>
<td>4,485,040</td>
<td>6,857,622</td>
<td>12,926,177</td>
<td>16,642,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>565,164</td>
<td>1,841,785</td>
<td>4,392,597</td>
<td>2,399,004</td>
<td>3,667,292</td>
<td>2,495,757</td>
<td>4,554,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>225,800</td>
<td>439,500</td>
<td>826,598</td>
<td>927,129</td>
<td>1,407,737</td>
<td>2,372,738</td>
<td>2,855,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>83,222</td>
<td>135,056</td>
<td>755,210</td>
<td>1,000,014</td>
<td>1,939,919</td>
<td>1,908,258</td>
<td>2,184,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World</td>
<td>3,384,339</td>
<td>6,513,290</td>
<td>11,712,673</td>
<td>10,921,855</td>
<td>17,782,071</td>
<td>26,519,773</td>
<td>35,005,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World, ex. US</td>
<td>1,486,276</td>
<td>3,876,692</td>
<td>8,206,987</td>
<td>6,436,815</td>
<td>10,924,449</td>
<td>13,593,596</td>
<td>18,362,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US as % of World</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trading Volume</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed Countries</td>
<td>1,202,546</td>
<td>3,495,708</td>
<td>6,297,069</td>
<td>4,151,573</td>
<td>9,169,761</td>
<td>20,917,462</td>
<td>35,187,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>797,123</td>
<td>1,795,998</td>
<td>2,015,544</td>
<td>2,081,658</td>
<td>5,108,591</td>
<td>13,148,480</td>
<td>19,993,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>230,906</td>
<td>1,145,615</td>
<td>2,800,695</td>
<td>635,261</td>
<td>1,231,552</td>
<td>948,522</td>
<td>1,891,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>42,544</td>
<td>132,912</td>
<td>320,268</td>
<td>382,996</td>
<td>510,131</td>
<td>1,167,382</td>
<td>3,399,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>25,215</td>
<td>77,972</td>
<td>1,170,928</td>
<td>631,277</td>
<td>1,046,546</td>
<td>1,956,858</td>
<td>2,320,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total World</td>
<td>1,227,761</td>
<td>3,573,680</td>
<td>7,467,997</td>
<td>4,782,850</td>
<td>10,216,307</td>
<td>22,874,320</td>
<td>37,508,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World, ex. US</td>
<td>430,638</td>
<td>1,777,682</td>
<td>5,452,453</td>
<td>2,701,192</td>
<td>5,107,716</td>
<td>9,725,840</td>
<td>17,515,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US as % of World</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11: Market Values of the Largest Publicly-Traded Privatized Firms

Stock market value, total sales, and total profits—each in millions of US dollars (translated at the contemporaneous exchange rate)—of the 25 publicly-traded privatized firms worth at least US $18 billion as of May 31, 1999. Data are from Morgan Stanley Capital International, as reported in ‘‘The Business Week Global 1000,’’ Business Week (July 12, 1999). Global 1000 Rank refers to the company’s global ranking based on market valuation, while Country Rank refers to its relative position among those firms from their country on the Global 1000 List.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Global 1000 Rank</th>
<th>Country Rank</th>
<th>Market Value US $mil</th>
<th>Mkt Value as % of National Mkt Capitalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BP Amoco</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>173,870</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>156,770</td>
<td>6.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Telekom</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>115,023</td>
<td>10.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Telecommunications</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>107,142</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTT DoCoMo</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>106,140</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France Telecom</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>79,925</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecom Italia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66,446</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telstra</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63,890</td>
<td>19.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telefonica</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51,150</td>
<td>14.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ING Groep</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50,763</td>
<td>8.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50,483</td>
<td>8.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM (Telecom Italia Mobiliare)</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43,839</td>
<td>7.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elf Acquitaine</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39,340</td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telefonos de Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>126a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33,305</td>
<td>36.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fina</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30,199</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable &amp; Wireless</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29,593</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEBA</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28,629</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Telecommunications</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>8.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swisscom</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26,659</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkswagen</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26,276</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Telecommunications</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25,446</td>
<td>15.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Telecom</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>182a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25,294</td>
<td>7.36b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gazprom</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>191a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,502</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Australia Bank</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24,287</td>
<td>7.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicredito Italiano</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23,255</td>
<td>4.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koninklijke KPN</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22,711</td>
<td>3.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Japan Railways</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21,676</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endesa</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20,432</td>
<td>5.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Tobacco</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20,034</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Electric Power</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>241a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19,752</td>
<td>17.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Paolo-IMI</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19,129</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTT Data</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18,908</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societe Generale</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18,734</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a These firms are from a companion ‘‘Top 200 Emerging-Market Companies’’ ranking in the same Business Week issue, and they are given the rankings they would have if this list was included in the Global 1000 List.

b Expressed as a percentage of the Hong Kong market’s total capitalization.
Table 12: Details of the World’s Largest Share Offerings

This table presents offering details of the 35 largest share offerings in history (those raising over $5 billion) as of August 15, 2000. The 10 largest (and 30 of the 35 total) issues are offerings of shares in privatized firms. Offers are reported in nominal amounts (not inflation-adjusted), and are translated into millions of US dollars ($mil) using the contemporaneous exchange rate. Private-sector offerings are presented in bold-face, italicized type, while share issue privatizations (SIPs) are presented in normal typeface. An initial public offering is indicated as an IPO, while a seasoned equity offers is designated an SEO. Amounts reported for SIP offers are as described in the Financial Times at the time of the issue. Private-sector offering amounts are from the Securities Data Corporation file.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount ($mil)</th>
<th>IPO/SEO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 87</td>
<td>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$40,260</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 88</td>
<td>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>22,400</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 99</td>
<td>ENEL</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>IPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 98</td>
<td>NTT DoCoMo</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>IPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 97</td>
<td>Telecom Italia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 87</td>
<td>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15,097</td>
<td>IPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 99</td>
<td>Nippon Telegraph &amp; Telephone</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 00</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14,760</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 96</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>IPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 87</td>
<td>British Petroleum</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12,430</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 00</td>
<td>ATT Wireless (tracking stock)</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>IPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 98</td>
<td>France Telecom</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>SEO</td>
</tr>
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<td>Nov 97</td>
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a Indicates a group offering of multiple companies that trade separately after the IPO.
This figure represents the dynamics of share ownership of a sample of privatized firms, where the number of shareholders in Year 0 is normalized to 1 and in subsequent years shows the change with respect to Year 0. The companies with less than 100,000 initial shareholders exhibit increasing numbers of shareholders, and the companies with more than 100,000, more than 250,000 and more than 500,000 initial shareholders exhibit strong declines that pull the whole sample to a significant decrease in the number of shareholders over the whole period.