Peer reviews of DAC members

United Kingdom (2006), DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations

 

Review of the Development Co-operation Policies and Programmes of the United Kingdom

 See also the United Kingdom's Aid-at-a-Glance

 

Overall framework and new orientations

UK offers a powerful model for development co-operation

The UK is currently seen by many aid practitioners and donors as one of the bilateral models for today’s evolving world of development co-operation. The UK Government has made global poverty reduction a national priority. In 1997 it created a freestanding Department for International Development (DFID) and a seat in Cabinet for the Secretary of State for International Development. A strong political alliance was formed with the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that has ensured consistent clarity of vision and the resources required to address this large and complex issue. The bedrock of the current vision is contained in the 2002 International Development Act which provided a clear legislative mandate around poverty reduction (DFID’s “ONE” aim) and gave the UK its current strategic orientation on issues of development, not only aid. This has been further refined by DFID at the policy level through a series of regular “White Papers”.

This framework has permitted the UK to organise strategically around a lean and well managed delivery system. The institutional core of the system is DFID, which has both ministerial (policy and government leadership) and agency (aid delivery, technical expertise) functions. Because it is clearly designated the lead department for combating international poverty, DFID enjoys a well defined, unambiguous relationship with other departments in this area. This permits a unified government approach and coherent policy direction around DFID leadership. DFID knowledge allows it a position of interdepartmental leadership and has raised the profile of development co-operation. DFID is responsible for almost all ODA, with direct control over some 84% of total disbursements. While development policy is strategically directed from headquarters, DFID views its delivery operations as “country led, decentralised and delegated” through a world-wide network of 67 offices. Operational follow-through on the substantive intent of the International Development Act is provided through a government-wide system of Public Service Agreements (PSA), both with respect to DFID and other departments. High calibre and highly motivated staff are also a linchpin of the DFID system.

This coherent and well organised approach to development co-operation has permitted the UK to make good progress against the DAC recommendations of the 2001 Peer Review, including substantial movement towards an ODA/GNI target of 0.7%, a sharper focus on poverty, a stronger framework for efforts of government-wide policy coherence, a proactive collaboration with other donors and improved operational guidelines (the Blue Book), headquarters-field relationships, and systems of monitoring and evaluation. DFID has gone through a “golden age” of growth and achievement since 1997, and certainly since the last Peer Review in 2001. It must now consolidate those achievements and prepare for the next growth phase, when performance scrutiny will intensify, both domestically and internationally.

Challenges of doing “more with less”

In spite of the well informed and strategic manner in which the UK has carried out its development co-operation over the last decade, it is already aware that it will face important, simultaneous challenges in the near future. It proposes to more than double its current level of ODA in the next seven years, to deliver its aid better (aid effectiveness, results monitoring) and to move further into more complex and difficult environments for aid delivery (fragile states and situations of conflict). At the same time, it plans to do so with fewer delivery resources (10% reduction in DFID staff numbers and support service costs) as part of the Efficiency Programme 2005-2008. It will be a challenge for the UK to undertake all these tasks while maintaining the quality and innovative character of its aid.

Sustaining leadership and support calls for new tactics

DFID has inspired and endorsed both the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the EU Action Plan on Harmonisation. It is now developing a Medium Term Action Plan for aid effectiveness, which will emphasise improving the quality of aid, both through international processes and bilateral country programmes. The plan establishes an Action Matrix at the country level, based on Paris Declaration indicators and additional EU and UK commitments. For the moment, implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda is not consistent across all of DFID and the Action Matrix will be an important tool to encourage further improvement in this area. DFID (and all other donors) currently have considerable scope for innovation in favour of greater effectiveness, including immediate opportunities to foster delegated partnerships and other forms of harmonisation.

British strategic interest in promoting more effective approaches to aid includes a role to motivate bilateral and multilateral donors to act similarly. DFID frequently uses its own system flexibility to encourage more effective donor behaviour. Initiatives in this area are often highly appreciated by the international community. However, DFID enthusiasm for certain initiatives is not always shared by other partners and British advocacy can be perceived as promoting DFID’s own model rather than leading and encouraging complementary donor action. DFID may be paying more attention to the strategy of introducing reform (e.g. general budget support) than to the tactics needed to effectively implement such reforms. Broader donor receptivity and collaboration could be possible in a more inclusive and empirical environment for partnership. As DFID influences international partners toward common approaches, it should seek to strike a balance between its interest in promoting aid reform and in leading donor harmonization efforts.

It is widely felt that UK development co-operation is at an historic high point of political and public support, buttressed by a well thought through and professionally marketed Communication Strategy. National dialogue is also flourishing in the current environment, involving a rich assortment of NGO, academic, think tank and other civil society groups. However, DFID is already asking the fundamental question of “how to maintain the momentum?”. It realises that success will require an ability to communicate results convincingly and even more simply to “tell the story” of tomorrow’s development co-operation. Strategically tailored communications will be needed to report results effectively and to justify involvement in less clearly understood areas, such as expanding engagement in fragile states. Effective communications are also important when aid is suspended in a partner country in the light of serious human rights violations and corruption. Although DFID has issued a policy paper on conditionality and has drafted a statement on implementation, some stakeholder perceptions and expectations of this policy remain unclear. A further clarification of UK’s approach to political conditionality in light of recent events (e.g. Ethiopia) could also help harmonize donor approaches.

Recommendations

  • The challenge for UK development co-operation is how to build from its currently strong base. As DFID tries to deliver more, better aid and under more difficult circumstances, it will need to continue to adjust and adapt its model and invest in a steep learning curve at the country level, while ensuring that its political leadership is informed and supportive of these changes.
  • As DFID proactively seeks to influence international donors toward common approaches, it needs to strike a balance between its objective of leadership in aid reform and being perceived as promoting its own model. DFID is encouraged to further refine its guidelines to promote broadest possible debate and space for all donors to participate in its pilot efforts on the ground.
  • Maintaining current high levels of public support for development will be a special challenge. DFID will need to identify and communicate results and “tell the story” to the British public and elected political representatives. Strategically tailored communications will be needed in less clearly understood areas, such as expanding engagement in fragile states or suspending aid in light of serious human rights violations and corruption.

Aid volume and distribution

Strong commitment to scaling up

Over the period 2000-04, ODA volume of the United Kingdom increased by 30% in real terms. With USD 7.9 billion disbursed in 2004, the United Kingdom is now the fourth largest donor in volume terms. The ODA/GNI ratio rose progressively to attain 0.36% in 2004 and according to preliminary figures, 0.48% in 2005. In 2004, the United Kingdom committed to achieving the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2013, backed with a financial “roadmap” agreed to by the Treasury. When implemented, net ODA volume will increase over the 2004 level by 22% (USD 9 602 million) in 2006 and by 85% (USD 14 600 million) in 2010.

Scaling up at this speed will require development aid to remain among the top government expenditure priorities. This is particularly the case given the lower amounts of debt forgiveness in coming years (the high point of debt relief was in 2005 when it represented 34% of total ODA). Since 2000 the United Kingdom has actively promoted new funding mechanisms, such as the International Finance Facility proposed in 2003 to rapidly increase support for the MDGs over the period 2006-2015. It has also successfully supported additional debt relief for some countries, including relief of the multilateral debt of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).

In addition to the scaling up issue, DFID emphasises the need for better aid predictability. Thanks to three year budget allocations from Treasury, DFID is able to set rolling triennial budgets at the division and department levels and frequently enters into three-year arrangements with its partner countries. DFID is also considering longer-term arrangements with countries committed to poverty reduction and good governance, and has already signed ten-year partnership arrangements with Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Afghanistan. A Resource Allocation Model is used to carry out DFID annual planning, with emphasis on achieving a balance between the improved predictability of DFID support and the flexibility needed to adjust allocations to countries most in need, while allocating resources effectively among Low Income Countries (LIC).

Clear poverty reduction focus

DFID programming is strongly focussed on poverty reduction and closely aligned to the MDGs. Geographically, DFID currently has a PSA target of allocating at least 90% of its bilateral funding for LICs in 2005-08. Within this allocation guideline, DFID plans to emphasize scaled up aid to Africa and Asia, while de-emphasizing aid to Latin America. DFID is encouraged to sustain its strong emphasis on Africa to follow through on its G-8 Presidency and Africa Commission initiatives. Sectorally, DFID does not routinely use targets, but social infrastructure and services accounted for 41% of UK gross disbursements in 2003-04. A growing emphasis is now being placed on the “government and civil society” sub-sector in line with DFID stronger engagement in fragile states, and on basic education in support of the MDGs. DFID benefits from a clear mandate, an ambitious commitment and a strong strategic approach which efficiently drive the entire programme, whether in organisational terms or sector allocation spending. It is important that DFID avoid imposed earmarks which can contradict its ownership approach and undermine effectiveness.

The DFID approach to maintaining this strong poverty reduction focus and maximising its impact includes policy documents (e.g. the Middle Income Country policy) and programming tools (e.g. the Resource Allocation Model). In coming years, the balance between good performers and fragile states in DFID’s portfolio will need to be assessed against the ability to have the greatest impact on poverty reduction while demonstrating results to ensure continued public support. Future needs for humanitarian action will also influence DFID’s approach to geographic and sector allocations.

DFID is increasing the attention it is paying to the cross-cutting “pro-poor growth” agenda and is considering further integration of economic growth and productive sectors into programming for poverty reduction. Over the last decade, support to economic infrastructure and services as a percentage of ODA declined (although it increased in real terms) and in 2003-04 stood below the DAC average; the percentage of ODA going to the production sectors also declined, although the UK position equated with the DAC average in 2003-04. As it addresses pro-poor growth, DFID will need to emphasise its own areas of expertise and comparative advantage and seek complementarity with other donors in line with aid effectiveness principles. DFID should also pursue its efforts to better capture the gender equality dimension in its programme while taking advantage of new aid modalities. This could include widening the ownership of this objective within DFID and more closely aligning DFID’s gender agenda and decentralised country office practice.

Contributions to multilateral organisations linked to effectiveness

With about one-third of its ODA disbursed to multilateral organisations, the United Kingdom is an important contributor to that system. DFID has developed a strategic approach to the multilaterals, with individual institutional strategies framing the shape of each partnership. DFID tracks the results of the multilateral institutions through a Multilateral Effectiveness Framework (MEFF). These tools help DFID prioritise its multilateral support and provide the means to allow it to play a leading role within the international community to promote the effectiveness of multilateral aid, in line with its 2005-08 PSA objective. DFID could further capitalize on these tools to develop synergies between multilateral and bilateral channels. At the same time, it will want to keep in mind the multilateral principles when developing specific institutional strategies, allocating non-core resources and assessing multilateral organisations’ effectiveness.  To this end, strategic assessment tools, such as the MEFF, have the potential to become common frameworks for all donors.

Recommendations

  • The DAC welcomes the commitment to reach the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2013 and reinforces the importance of the United Kingdom being seen to deliver on this commitment. It is encouraged to develop a more comprehensive roadmap over time on how increases will be spent, including the geographic priorities, the balance between main areas for intervention, bilateral and multilateral channels and the set of delivery instruments.
  • The United Kingdom should continue to pursue the geographic concentration of its ODA on poor countries and should build further on its progress in focusing on fewer countries. It should also continue to strengthen its strategic approach through a sector focus that reflects its overarching poverty reduction objective and its comparative advantage. Complementarity with other donors could be sought more systematically when shaping DFID allocations.
  • Building on its comparative advantage and strong technical expertise, DFID needs to promote pro-poor growth and address gender equality as key vectors to attain the MDGs, in its programmes and through advocacy in international fora.
  • In keeping with the Paris Declaration, DFID is encouraged to avoid setting additional aggregate sector and thematic spending targets, so as not to undermine partner country ownership and aid effectiveness.
  • The UK should seek to improve strategic tools for the assessment of multilateral performance, such as the MEFF, and to further maximise their use internally and internationally. While developing a strategic vision for funding of core and non-core multilateral budgets, DFID should take care not to distort multilateral principles.

Promoting policy coherence

UK actively pursues policy coherence for development, but challenges remain

The current government used its first White Paper (1997) to establish the principle that all government policies affecting developing countries should take account of the objectives of sustainable development. A second White Paper (2000) addressed the development impact of non-aid policies and led to a substantial engagement by DFID on trade. In 2002, the International Development Act provided a legislative basis for the whole of government to deal coherently with issues of development. Much of this high level attention to policy coherence has its origins in the strong support afforded by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It permitted the UK to use effectively its dual Presidency of the G-8 and the EU in 2005 to further the development agenda. DFID has moved rapidly to operationalise its leadership in this area. It has found its work greatly facilitated by the strategic positioning of the Secretary of State in the Cabinet and several Cabinet sub-committees (e.g. asylum and migration) and by the existence of PSA targets on this topic which are shared among government departments either with DFID leadership or its strong participation. Organisationally, DFID has a strong Policy Division which has proven effective in focussing national and international attention to issues of policy debate and in developing policy guidance that is used across government, within DFID headquarters, and in country offices to achieve development policy coherence. This policy function is instrumental in supporting DFID’s leadership at home and abroad.

Significant progress has been made in some areas of policy incoherence to date, including those relating to trade and untying, where DFID has successfully worked particularly at the national and European levels. DFID could usefully undertake a comprehensive review of its experience of untying, which would be of general interest for the other members of the DAC. A report by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group in 2005 encouraged greater attention to national approaches concerning corruption, anti-bribery and money laundering. Another recent report from the parliamentary International Development Committee notes in summary that UK work on policy coherence for development has been good, but “could move further and faster”. For example joined-up working on migration has begun to receive greater attention, but there is still more to do in this area. Finally and more specifically, efforts to improve policy coherence toward fragile states also have been noteworthy, although further improvement is challenged by department cultures. In fragile states it is crucial to bridge institutional differences between the local DFID office and the UK Embassy and to build regular communication and effective joint approaches.

Better operationalising policy coherence: priorities, collaboration and delivery

Work on policy coherence for development to date has tended to be issue-based and has been raised through a variety of national political channels, NGOs or international campaigns. Given the UK’s recognition of the central role of policy coherence for development success, DFID could more proactively identify its priorities so as to better align partners and resources toward addressing high impact policy coherence issues. Current work on the 2006 White Paper is ideally suited to helping define these priority areas.

Such a prioritised agenda for action would have numerous operational benefits. It could facilitate the task of joining forces with other departments and would permit a more organised cross-Whitehall identification of lead departments for each issue. DFID has selectively forged effective alliances with FCO and others in London and should consider expanding these links in a manner targeted to priority issues in high payoff areas. Inside DFID, a prioritised agenda could help to establish lead responsibility for agenda implementation and help to garner the organisational forces needed to analyse and address the policy issue at hand, including an appropriate role for country offices which draws on their considerable local insight.

DFID recognises that monitoring and reporting of results is a cornerstone for the future of all aspects of its development co-operation. Policy coherence actions, given their importance for the overall achievement of results need to be fully integrated into DFID’s results framework. Because policy coherence issues generally go beyond the scope of action of any one bilateral donor, DFID should work with other partners to establish its results monitoring system.

Recommendations

  • The UK should articulate a more clearly prioritised action agenda for policy coherence for development. DFID should make judicious use of its significant headquarters and field resources in identifying and working on specific policy inconsistencies.
  • Policy coherence actions should be fully integrated into DFID’s approach to results monitoring and reporting, if at all possible in concert with other similarly motivated international partners.

Aid management and implementation

Scaling up implications for organisation and management

DFID senior management has carefully charted a modern, corporate management approach, including strong corporate values and a logically laid out Corporate Performance Framework, which is intended to be strategic and transparent. At the level of operational procedures, DFID issued in 2005 a 100-page Blue Book which sets out the core rules, procedures and systems of the department. Compact and user friendly, the Blue Book is one of the best examples of this kind of one-stop, primary reference guide seen in the DAC to date.

The comprehensive and logically constructed programming hierarchy found in the Corporate Performance Framework is administratively efficient, simple and transparent. However, a potential disadvantage of this top-down and organised approach is the tension between the strong, centralised directives coming from London and DFID’s objectives of country ownership and operational decentralisation. Elements of this tension may be defused as DFID implements its Medium Term Action Plan for aid effectiveness, which should improve the quality and integration of its delivery into those of other partners. Rapid scaling up of UK funding will require flexible application of the current, highly structured system.

Performance system improvements: streamlining and greater results focus

The use of a “Corporate Performance Framework” is a clear indication of DFID management intent to focus on performance as the touchstone of its operational approach. Its logical, bottom-up sequence of feedback actions reflects the performance achieved at each level of aggregation: delivery planning is submitted to routine quarterly, mid-year or annual reviews; business planning is reviewed annually; higher goals are tracked annually.

This carefully laid out approach may, over time, generate more information than needed unless care is taken to clearly articulate policy maker needs and target other specific user needs. As with other DAC member systems, there will be a need to continue simplifying and integrating reporting systems, all of which impose upon the time of field managers. Similarly, the renewed interest in “telling the story” to the British public (rather than simply reporting data) may require rethinking these systems. Increasingly, DFID will want to reflect with its partners on how to support field based, common results systems. Because of DFID’s increasingly stronger interest in fragile states, which often are less on track to meet the MDGs and have weaker data, DFID will need to develop performance measurements that demonstrate results in these special environments.

Assuring the best use of high calibre and motivated staff

As with other parts of its system, DFID manages its human resources strategically, as is currently outlined in the document Our People Strategy 2005-2008. DFID focuses on the strategic challenges of development co-operation as the starting point of its human resource management, with the aim of ensuring the availability of skills necessary to support DFID corporate objectives. The Strategy situates DFID staff at the centre of its management approach and aims to place them in a work environment of simplified procedures and “people processes” so they may function in a wide range of operating environments (e.g. flexi-time, teleworking, teleconferencing). DFID now has the reputation of being one of the UK government’s best work environments.

The fast evolving international development agenda (e.g. sharing of staff, delegated partnerships, management by results) and the features of future UK development co-operation noted previously (10% reduction in staff size, doubling of ODA volume, fragile state focus) will require regular review of DFID’s skill mix and assignment of personnel. Care will be needed to maintain a diversity of skills that reflects the range of priority interests of the Department.

Based on limited Peer Review exposure to actual field practice, DFID is encouraged to examine the current rate of staff turnover which in some cases may undermine effective programme implementation. Another personnel issue that attracted Peer Review attention was the role of the advisor as a “thinker” vs. that of a “doer” and the ever-present need to use integrated country strategic teams to both shape programmes and implement them. The Review team would also encourage staff currently working in headquarters to spend more time visiting the field and country office staff to spend more time out of capital cities. Greater effort should be made in getting key staff closer to the development realities they support. Also DFID should continually assess the optimum balance and size of staff between headquarters and the field and between well-performing and fragile countries.

Assuring aid programme quality and delivery modalities appropriate to country contexts

In parallel with top end programming processes, the structured DFID approach to development has led the Department to produce a very wide range of policies, practice papers and other directive materials, some of which are not necessarily linked to field needs or realities. Particularly as DFID becomes more field based and moves closer to an operational approach that involves multiple partners, it will want to review the utility of this type of documentation to ensure that it is not over-investing intellectual resources into an area that is either redundant with other partner efforts or of little relevance to the field. Also, thematic and cross cutting policy needs to be further mainstreamed in the DFID programme. In an effort to improve the relevance of its policy, DFID already requires that new policy documents contain implementation plans which state their intended value-added and impact. Given the well-structured, top down aid programming guidance reflected in policy documents, DFID will want to encourage and assure that their application furthers country ownership and aid effectiveness.

Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), which includes both general and sector budget support, is seen by DFID as an important means of strengthening partner country ownership and the simplest way for donors to align with government priorities. The UK is considered a champion within the DAC regarding budget support. DFID estimates that over 20% of its bilateral programme consisted of PRBS in 2004 and growing. Nevertheless, budget support is an area of donor involvement that still is actively debated, the most recent evidence for which is a major joint evaluation on the topic (supported by DFID) concluded this year. It is important that DFID’s corporate approach to PRBS be consistently applied in partner countries as part of a range of aid instruments and to avoid the impression that it may always be the preferred instrument. It is encouraged to utilise the results of the 2006 joint evaluation as an opportunity to review how its policy is to be translated to its own country offices, donor partners and recipient countries alike.

In the field, the UK needs to develop a more systematic and strategic approach to local civil society, especially given the DFID tendency to work at the high end of development co-operation, particularly at the level of policy dialogue and budget support and frequently with high level government officials. It is vital that such high level dialogue be nourished by a substantive dialogue with the lower levels of the development spectrum, particularly as the UK aims to promote results and real ownership of locally informed poverty reduction programmes.

In the large and growing group of so-called fragile states, there is a need to bring greater clarity to the relationships between different policies, units and professional cadres directly or indirectly involved in management of ODA in these countries. This should cover in particular the operational linkages between the Fragile States Team, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), Africa Conflict Group, Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), etc, as well as how the humanitarian, conflict and governance advisers relate to each other and to country teams on the fragile states issue.

Recommendations

  • DFID should continue to give close consideration to the implications of the scaling-up of aid and the rapid and continuing increases in productivity required in a context of reduced administrative and human resources. In doing this, DFID should consider how promising innovations linked to the aid effectiveness agenda, such as extensive use of delegated partnerships, will impact upon DFID organisation and management.
  • Building on decentralisation, DFID should make full use of available flexibility in applying the programming guidelines and identifying the better mix of aid modalities, particularly in the fragile states. Implementation of its Medium Term Action Plan for aid effectiveness should be seen as one important step in addressing these issues.
  • As DFID seeks to improve its approach to performance measurement and reporting, it will need to seek solutions which do not add to the burden and complexity of the existing system. DFID is encouraged to more systematically build on existing PRS monitoring and evaluation systems in partner countries. DFID should weigh the benefits and costs of its current system. Because of DFID’s stronger focus on fragile states, DFID will need to work with others to develop appropriate performance measurement tools in order to demonstrate results.
  • In a context of significant scaling up of aid and a future agenda of collective donor aid effectiveness, priority emphasis in human resource policy will need to be on implementation, including the extent to which current staff turnover affects continuity and consistency of DFID action in the field. Attention is called to rapidly evolving future staff directions and the need for flexibility and significant advance planning to identify and place critical skills.
  • The strong role of DFID in supporting international thinking on development is appreciated. DFID is encouraged to develop closer links between its policy work and aid programmes so as to better translate its policies into its decentralised field work and to more strongly integrate the field perspective into central policy design. Such two-way linkages are all the more important to appropriately address the challenges resulting from new aid modalities and scaling up.
  • The United Kingdom is encouraged to look at the instrument of General Budget Support in the context of the complementarity of aid instruments, on the basis of country needs, development results, and DFID’s comparative advantage, taking full account of the recent joint evaluation of this modality.
  • DFID is encouraged to further engage levels of government other than central government, and to develop a strategic approach to engaging with and strengthening local civil society. DFID should take steps to keep sight of the grass-roots context as well as to maintain expertise in key sectors.
  • In order to promote links in the range of issues covered by work on fragile states, notably the issue of conflict prevention, there is need for a comprehensive mapping on the roles and responsibilities of different policy and operational teams within DFID concerning fragile states.

Humanitarian aid

A welcome leadership role in international humanitarian reforms

Clear operational frameworks, an active political leadership and strong organisational set-up have placed the UK as a leader among donors in improving and reforming the international humanitarian aid system and as a main financial contributor to humanitarian action. The UK is one of the largest bilateral donors in humanitarian action and is recognised as a provider of needs-based, flexible and predictable humanitarian support. According to DFID statistics humanitarian disbursements totalled GBP 437 million in 2004/05, equivalent to approximately 10% of its total ODA, which is above DAC average levels. As the volume of UK ODA increases, it should maintain its ability to respond to humanitarian crises on the scale needed.

The UK aims to further improve the capacity of the national and international humanitarian systems. In addition to its own system improvements, it is launching a reform agenda for the humanitarian part of the UN and wants to advance the “Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship” (GHD), agreed to in Stockholm in 2003. It was on the UK proposal that the DAC formally endorsed GHD at its High Level Meeting on 5 April 2006. The UK agenda for international humanitarian reform also includes establishing and strengthening the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), strengthening the UN Common Humanitarian Action Plans and the role of UN Humanitarian Co-ordinators, increasing funding levels for humanitarian aid and disaster risk reduction, and establishing benchmarks for monitoring performance and accountability. Areas of progress include the establishment of pooled humanitarian funding at international (CERF) and country levels (e.g. DRC and Sudan).

Strong strategic foundation

The International Development Act outlines the use of humanitarian aid and its relationship to development co-operation efforts. In 2003, the UK endorsed GHD and adopted a national implementation action plan. A comprehensive humanitarian policy was launched in June 2006, covering a framework for humanitarian aid, a policy on disaster risk reduction and humanitarian features of the forthcoming White Paper 2006. The consultation process underlying these framework changes already has promoted a broader understanding of humanitarian issues across government, but further efforts to raise awareness of new policies and of GHD at the field level should be made a priority. Strong linkages with DFID development co-operation planning will be essential both to advance the disaster risk reduction agenda and to engage in new partner countries and fragile states.

Need for institutional clarity

DFID’s position as a separate ministry with a strong legislative mandate is an operational advantage and strengthens the foundations and systems for principled humanitarian aid. The particularly active role played by the Secretary of State has reinforced the overall reform agenda. Management of humanitarian aid is located in DFID and centralised in two key units; the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) in the UN, Conflict and Humanitarian Division, and in a specialised unit (Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Unit - ACHU) in Africa Division. CHASE is responsible for policy development, monitoring and operational support and ACHU for humanitarian programmes at the regional and country level. The potentially overlapping mandates of CHASE and ACHU can cause difficulties for interaction with field offices and their respective responsibilities could be clarified further. The core strength of DFID’s humanitarian system is the strategic use (and the competence of) its humanitarian and livelihood advisors. The use of national/regional policy advisors is crucial for effective management of protracted and structural humanitarian emergencies. Given the importance of human resources for humanitarian action and the high expectations currently raised in this area, DFID will need to maintain and further develop its expertise in this area.

Humanitarian affairs require efficient inter-ministerial co ordination across government. Other key ministries directly or indirectly involved in humanitarian action include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Cabinet Office. The roles and communications between DFID, FCO and MOD around fragile states and civil military interaction need to be clarified. Priority should be given to defining roles and responsibilities and reaching consensus on how to maximise the protection of civilians.

Recommendations

  • The new humanitarian policy should further strengthen the role of DFID in the provision of needs-based and principled humanitarian aid and improve coherence across Whitehall. Greater clarity regarding objectives and operational priority setting is needed when providing development and humanitarian aid in complex emergencies.
  • Awareness-raising of the new humanitarian policy framework and on GHD at field level should be made a priority.
  • Greater operational clarity between FCO, DFID and MOD is needed on how to maximise the protection of civilians and on approaches in fragile states.

    Visit the OECD country website for the United Kingdom.

 

Related Documents

 

United Kingdom, Full Report 2006, pp 103.

OECD reviews the United Kingdom's development aid

OECD Journal on Development, Development Co-operation Report 2005

List of Peer Reviews of DAC Members

United Kingdom (2001), Development Co-operation Review: Main Findings and Recommendations

 

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