“Tracking support to SDGs – the case of peace and security”
Expert meeting, 5 February 2019

Summary of discussions

Item 1. Welcome, introduction

The TOSSD Task Force co-Chair (Laurent Sarazin) and Secretariat (Julia Benn, Guillaume Delalande) presented the main features of the new statistical measure TOSSD and the status of its development. They explained that a consultation with experts had been requested by the TOSSD Task Force to help define the boundaries of TOSSD in the field of peace and security. The meeting would thus discuss what types of activities in the field of peace and security were relevant to the SDGs. The expected outcome was to provide recommendations to the TOSSD Task Force on: i) what peace and security expenditures should be reflected in the TOSSD measure, and ii) whether some safeguards should be considered in this sensitive area.

Item 2. Peacekeeping

Presentations – see Annex

- UN peacekeeping operations, presentation by the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security
- African Union peacekeeping (example of AMISOM), presentation by the EU

Discussion

- Several participants highlighted that peacekeeping laid the ground for sustainable development and was therefore relevant for inclusion in TOSSD as a development enabler addressing the global challenge of instability and war.
  - Peacekeeping can be seen as a tool to build sustainable peace. The central mandate of peacekeeping operations is the protection of civilians, which is at the core of human rights. The protection of civilians requires adequate means, in particular high-performing troops and intelligence.
  - The Secretary General’s reform of the UN has three pillars: peace and security, management and development system. One of its objectives is to create synergies between development and other aspects, which is also the aim of TOSSD.
  - In the area of peacekeeping, TOSSD could help release the pressure to broaden the coverage of ODA, and bring real value by protecting the integrity of ODA.
  - The recent increase of the ODA coefficient for UN peacekeeping (from 7% to 15%) was not due to broadening of ODA eligibility but rather a more accurate identification of ODA-eligible activities conducted by military contingents and police. The non ODA-eligible share of UN peacekeeping relates to activities undertaken as a precursor of development.

- However, the CSO community warned that in this field macro political issues and the impact of measurement decisions needed to be carefully thought through. They recalled that the inclusion of SDG16 had been a difficult compromise in the SDG framework; there was a risk of securitisating the development agenda and the SDGs would be mistrusted if this were to happen. Several risks were identified:
Military expenditures are already very high. Governments need no additional “incentives” or “credit” for military spending. There is a risk of overinvesting in this area as opposed to investing in prevention, addressing drivers of conflict and empowering civil society – real things that are needed to reduce conflict on the ground.

Including “war fighting” expenditures in TOSSD could mean abandonment of the “do no harm” principle and human rights. It would also be preferable to keep development and military actors clearly separated, otherwise there is a risk of putting aid agencies in great danger.

On UN peacekeeping more specifically, a number of risks were mentioned in relation to the recent trend whereby these operations were given more “robust” mandates. For example, UN peacekeeping missions are now specifically being asked to combat terrorist groups and other criminal groups; provide intelligence; help states protect, reinforce and expand their authority under stabilisation mandates; train and equip security forces; define rebel groups as violent, etc. The risk in this trend is that international peacekeeping operations fall in the same pitfalls than counter-terrorism operations (see item 4).

Several eligibility rules and safeguards were discussed:

- The safeguards used in the ODA context should be used, unless there is good reason for not applying them in the TOSSD context.
- Priority should be given to the needs of recipient countries. UN peacekeeping operations need to have the consent of host Governments, respect human rights and apply due diligence policies.
- Contribution to achieving one SDG target (e.g. 16.a) does not seem to be a sufficient TOSSD eligibility criterion in the field of peace and security. There should also be assurance that activities have no adverse impacts on other targets. The track record of security assistance indeed shows that activities combatting terrorism can reinforce corruption and Governments’ bad behaviours, and support patterns of violence.
- One option could be to start reporting TOSSD following a conservative approach and then adjust progressively. Another option could be to develop a coefficient, as is the case for ODA.
- Acknowledgement by the UN Security Council was mentioned as a possible safeguard, but some participants thought both UN-mandated missions and UN-supported missions should be included. The eligibility of missions not supported by the UN should be examined case by case.

The issue of the monitoring of compliance with the eligibility criteria and safeguards was raised and whether the Secretariat would have the resources and capacity to do such monitoring. In the view of the CSOs, the monitoring system should be strong enough to outweigh the risk of including activities with negative impact in TOSSD.
Item 3. Disarmament

Presentation – see Annex

➢ NATO Trust Funds for safe destruction of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions, presentation by NATO

Discussion

- Participants generally considered that activities proposed for inclusion under this item were less controversial than others on the agenda of the meeting. Disarmament activities such as small arms and light weapons (SALW) destruction and demining contribute to sustainable development and could thus be considered for inclusion in TOSSD.

- However, carrying out some of these activities may entail the transfer of capacity and equipment (e.g. software) to the local military and thereby reinforce them in their core mission. The question was raised as to whether such support to the armed forces should be included in TOSSD or not. The inclusion of capacity building of the military was considered legitimate by some participants and would have the advantage of making a clear difference with ODA; others felt it should rather be considered a red line in TOSSD.

- To help decide on the inclusion or not of disarmament in TOSSD, one suggestion was to examine the intent of the activities concerned. The discussion highlighted a number of points:
  - The intent could be challenging to determine in some cases, e.g. humanitarian demining could well be for the purpose of protecting civilians, but also for the purpose of protecting the military as part of a military strategy.
  - Responding to a question on why the development of TOSSD did not follow the same method as for ODA (i.e. the elaboration of a casebook on conflict, peace and security activities), the Secretariat clarified that TOSSD was of a different nature. ODA rules were based on the intent (main objective) of the activity, a criterion that is difficult to operationalise in the field of peace and security, hence the development of the casebook. By contrast, TOSSD did not look at the intent and the central eligibility criterion is rather the expected impact on sustainable development at the time the activity is designed. Many activities have been excluded from ODA because the “main objective” criterion was not respected, e.g. nuclear non-proliferation, international treaties. In TOSSD, these activities could be recognised as a contribution to international public goods, i.e. global peace.
  - The Chair clarified that TOSSD would measure financial flows; it would not be a measure of impact as such, as this can be measured only several years after the activity has taken place.

- One participant signalled the issue of negative externalities within the TOSSD framework: if the objective of TOSSD was to provide a comprehensive framework of contributions to the SDGs, it should also reflect negative externalities. For example, providers’ positive contributions to sustainable development through disarmament activities should be netted out by their participation in arms trade. TOSSD would be particularly relevant if it could reflect these policy incoherencies.
The Secretariat clarified that ODA-eligible activities in the field of peace and security would not automatically be considered as TOSSD-eligible: the assessment would need to be made based on the TOSSD eligibility criteria, i.e. sustainable development. In terms of potential safeguards for the inclusion of disarmament activities, the idea of verifying that a positive contribution to one SDG target did not adversely impact other targets was brought up again. This had been raised in the TOSSD Task Force but had not been reflected in the emerging Reporting Instructions so far. It could however constitute an additional safeguard in the sensitive area of peace and security. The TOSSD Task Force would re-examine the coverage of TOSSD based on the results of the data survey undertaken in February-April.

The Chair concluded this item by noting that the engagement with the military, including for disarmament matters, always entailed reinforcing the military in its core mission and presented a risk of misuse, even if the original purpose was legitimate for inclusion in TOSSD. In next steps, it would need to be determined whether this risk should constitute a red line, meaning that any type of engagement with the military should be excluded from TOSSD, or whether it would be possible to include safeguards that would mitigate this risk and allow the inclusion of legitimate activities (see also item 5).

**Item 4. Police, combatting transnational crimes and terrorism**

**Presentations – see Annex**
- Australian peace and security assistance, presentation by Australia
- Combatting transnational crimes and terrorism, presentation by UNODC
- In addition, Interpol presented its activities as part of the discussion

**Discussion**
- Several participants expressed the view that support to police and law enforcement agencies in general was **essential to achieving sustainable development**.
  - As regards terrorism, since there is no universal definition of this term, one could focus on the 19 legal instruments related to terrorism that have been agreed by the international community.
  - The UN global counter-terrorism strategy and work undertaken by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) could serve as a reference for illustrating the types of activities that could be eligible under TOSSD. Work relates to both prevention (such as measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including structural causes – e.g. lack of education – and catalysts – e.g. charismatic leaders or local issues such as alienation) and combatting terrorism (suppression of terrorism and fight against terrorism financing, legal and criminal responses to terrorism).
  - One could start from the ODA casebook on conflict, peace and security activities, as the ODA rules already include many areas of policing work, and explore whether additional activities could be included.

- However, others thought that reinforcing police institutions, on the contrary, could have a **negative impact on sustainable development and human rights** and therefore should not be reflected in TOSSD. In particular, the CSOs warned against including any counter-terrorism activities. They emphasised the prevalence of repressive approaches to counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, even when placed under police authorities and ministries of interior rather than military. They
stressed how these approaches could hinder civilian space and be used against political opponents. Reinforcing ministries of interior and police agencies in the name of counter-terrorism could represent an obstacle to conflict prevention and contribute to the spreading of violence into the civilian sphere and the misuse of weapons. It was also emphasised that in some contexts counter-terrorism approaches can directly hinder humanitarian and development organisations’ ability to deliver assistance. Several concrete examples were cited to support this viewpoint.

- The Secretariat clarified that the value added of including more activities in TOSSD was not to be seen from a provider’s perspective (TOSSD will not be a measure of donor efforts) but from a recipient perspective, as the objective of TOSSD was to provide transparency on support received to achieve the SDGs. However, one participant noted that countries might not be all willing to disclose figures on their counter-terrorism expenditures and programmes.

- Several eligibility rules and safeguards were proposed:
  - Programmes should include a clear focus on accountability and oversight, e.g. anti-corruption measures associated with the assistance provided. Providers should target both the institutions that are mandated to provide security and those that are in charge or supervising them (e.g. parliamentarians, independent oversight bodies, CSOs). Focusing on SDG targets would allow placing the discussion at a more technical level, the goals being more politicised.
  - Providers should set up robust risk management strategies to avoid misuse of their assistance (e.g. turning non-lethal equipment into lethal). The Secretariat would need to monitor the effectiveness of these strategies or there is a risk of including in TOSSD activities with negative impact. Providers should also apply human rights and due diligence principles.
  - Support to police and law enforcement is important but should be part of an integrated response and linked to development agendas. (See e.g. new index on organised crime developed by the Global Initiative against Transnational Crime.)
  - There should be a clear constitutional delineation between police and military in the recipient country.
  - TOSSD should exclude the provision of lethal equipment. (Although non-lethal equipment can be turned into lethal weapons, it should also be recognised that the police and military need to be well-equipped to provide security and stability so that socio-economic development can thrive.)
  - TOSSD should exclude kinetic activities. However, it was not clear whether support to non-kinetic activities of institutions that have kinetic functions should be included. The example of the EU-funded headquarters of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (a counter-terrorism organisation) was cited. Also, a significant part of the UN and EU assistance to AMISOM (USD 600 million and USD 250 million per year respectively) does not support kinetic activities.
  - Providers should place a focus on recipient country ownership and align the expenditures with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which is designed with the host government and civil society.¹
  - It would be useful to differentiate between immediate response (short term) and structural (long-term) peacebuilding activities. Structural aspects of peace and security are captured in security sector reforms and included in ODA.

¹ The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is the main platform for the collaboration of the UN system at country level. It describes the collective and coherent response of the UN to national development priorities.
The chair noted that the objections are mostly related to the risk of misuse of the support provided. The risk of misuse can exist with every type of aid but it is more critical in the area of peace and security since it can have more dramatic consequences. Given these concerns, a way forward could be to introduce a segmentation in TOSSD, and keep the peace and security component of TOSSD separate. This would recognise the positive contributions of peace and security to sustainable development, but avoid mixing it with other TOSSD activities. This would allow gathering evidence and reconsidering the eligibility criteria of these activities on this basis at a later stage.

**Item 5. Engagement with partner country military**

**Presentations – see Annex**
- *International co-operation in the field of security, presentation by France*
- *EU Military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM CAR), presentation by the EU*
- *NATO Defence Capacity Building Trust Fund, presentation by NATO*

**Discussion**
- Several participants saw TOSSD as an opportunity to provide an improved measurement of financing for peace and security and more transparency in this field.
  - They presented cases of activities where provider countries build the capacity of partners countries’ armed forces to make them self-sustainable, credible, accountable, ethically-balanced and managed under democratic control.
  - The 2030 Agenda prompted the development of more integrated approaches in line with a whole-of-government approach involving various ministries (Defence, Interior, Customs, Justice) and diplomats.

- However, for CSOs, although they agreed that engaging with defence structures to make them more accountable was positive and that the use of force was necessary to protect human lives, they disagreed to give credit to these activities as contributing to a peaceful society (SDG 16) because of their potential negative impact. These types of activities routinely have perverse impacts and reinforce conflicts. The net effect of these measures needs to be kept in mind, and TOSSD should not be used to legitimise them.

- In response, some participants noted that while there exists several examples of engagement with defence structures that have negatively impacted on peace and conflict prevention, many other examples can be cited where the impact has been positive.

- The discussion was about the usefulness and effectiveness of operations, rather than on the relevance of measuring them in TOSSD. TOSSD would give the opportunity to measure the resources involved, instead of leaving them in a black box as at present. For example, TOSSD could inform of the allocation of funds at target level, e.g. to verify that not all expenditures are allocated to SDG 16.a while neglecting the other targets (e.g. 16.5, 16.7, 16.10 not prioritised by the international community at present).

- In terms of safeguards, it was suggested that compatibility with SDGs required ownership by the country receiving the assistance and inclusive partnerships (civil society, police, justice). Activity-level reporting in TOSSD could also be a safeguard in itself as the dubious projects would not be reported by providers. Military interventions should be excluded.
Wrap up and next steps

The discussion in this workshop would feed the pilot study on peace and security and recommendations to the Task Force on the treatment of peace and security in TOSSD. Participants were invited to send written comments on the various topics covered. The Secretariat would pursue consultations with experts in the field of peace and security (Questionnaire to INCAF, missions to international organisations), and would finalise the pilot on peace and security on this basis.
Item 2. Peacekeeping

**UN peacekeeping operations, presentation by the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security**

- The United Nations is undertaking a reform process, which addresses aspects related to management, development and peace and security. Through this reform, the UN aims to move beyond the traditional separation between peacekeeping operations and special political missions towards a more integrated approach (peace operations), in order to achieve sustainable peace. More flexibility will be allowed in defining peace operations depending on the social context. Many of the political missions have a mandate similar to that of peacekeeping missions, except for the presence of military components, which is specific to peacekeeping. Today UN peacekeeping operations comprise 14 operations, 90,000 troops and a budget around USD 6.7 billion. If the special political missions are included, there are currently more than 35 missions.
- Institutionally, the reform has translated in the renaming of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), respectively into the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). The peacebuilding support office has been integrated into the DPA. In addition, the UN resident coordinators are now responsible for both the peacekeeping and political aspects.
- The initiative “action for peacekeeping” (A4P) was presented. A4P had been created at the initiative of the UN Secretary General and was supported by the Security Council. More than 150 countries have signed the “declaration of shared commitments for peacekeeping”. The key elements of the A4P agenda are:
  - Primacy of politics. Strong emphasis is put on reaching a political solution in order to achieve sustainable peace. Peacekeeping is an instrument, peace is the mission.
  - More sequenced, achievable and measurable mandate provided by the UN Security Council (UNSC).
  - Enhanced triangular co-operation between the UNSC (base mandates on realistic expectations and provide resources to achieve them), troops and police contributing countries (tasked with doing the work on the ground) and the UN Secretariat. The objective are more coherent actions and a shared vision.
  - More emphasis on the role of women in peace. Peace is more sustainable when women are involved.
  - Protection of civilians is now a key component of peacekeeping operations.
- Human rights due diligence policy, training and partnerships (African Union, European Union, support to G5 Sahel provided through voluntary contributions) were mentioned as central aspects of UN peacekeeping.
- The nature and size of peacekeeping missions have evolved. In addition to the traditional peacekeeping operations focused on building of confidence and preventive action (chapter 6 operations), UN peacekeeping includes today more “robust” and multidimensional operations (e.g. MINUSMA, MINUSCA) that have more troops. These operations respond to two new realities:
  - A more complex mandate (in order to protect civilians there is a need of increased mobility and effective peace intelligence), and
  - Fewer resources.
- The example of MINUSMA, one of the newer, more robust operations, was presented: In the context of MINUSMA 13,200 troops and 929 police officers are deployed. It is a chapter 7 operation.
The overall goal as set out in the mandate of MINUSMA (latest Security Council Resolution, 2423, adopted in June 2018) is the implementation of the 2015 peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali. The mandate places a strong emphasis on the political task, as will be the case in future UN operations. Human rights due diligence policy is central to the mission. An important characteristic to MINUSMA is the support it provides to the G5 Sahel Joint Forces. The European Union and other donors provide funding to MINUSMA, which in turn provides support to the G5 Sahel operations, provided that these respect human rights. The tasks of the missions include:

- Support political and institutional reform to help achieve the agreement, which means security sector reform (already eligible to ODA), delivering state authority, rule of law, DDR, reconciliation and justice, etc.;
- Support the State authority in delivering core services, in particular in the central region. Without this, it will be difficult to move to the next stage of peace consolidation. MINUSMA is trying to consolidate the ground so that development agencies can take over.
- Protection of civilians, including through stabilisation activities by responding to asymmetric threats. The challenge of ensuring the protection of civilians was emphasised. Without adequate training and intelligence peacekeepers risk becoming victims.

**African Union peacekeeping (example of AMISOM), presentation by the EU**
- EU is the largest contributor to AMISOM.
- Established in 2007 by African Union. Initially very limited military component. Today multidimensional mission with 20,000 troops, 1,034 of police personnel, 100 civilian personnel. AU mission that operates under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which means that it was authorised by UNSC.
- Objectives: enable a hand-over of security responsibilities from AU to Somali government, reduce threat posed by Al Shabab, threats of terrorism and crime, assist Somali forces to provide security for the political process at all levels, as well as stabilisation activities, reconciliation and peacebuilding.
- Funding of 250 million euros per year by EU. This complements and does not overlap with costs provided by UN and EU African peace facility. AMISOM is the only EU mission that has access to UN assessed contributions. EU puts in place very strong limitations, no funding of any lethal or military equipment and only contributing to the direct costs of the operation, 85% of EU contribution goes to military component.
- Would be interesting to look at other missions than AMISOM: AU non-military mission in Burundi (human rights observer mission), also regional organisations doing military and non-military missions (IGAD mission in South Sudan, CITOSOM, ceasefire and arrangement monitoring). These missions do not necessarily have authorisation from AU security council or from UN but still contribute to peace.
- Triangular partnership: objective of EU to extend triangular partnership with the UN and AU.

**Item 3. Disarmament**

**Presentation of NATO Trust Funds**
- The NATO Trust Funds mechanism was launched in 2000 as a way to support NATO partners (i.e. countries that are not part of the alliance but are interested politically and technically in cooperating with NATO).
• Initially, it was mostly related to safe destruction of stock piles of anti-personnel land mines and small arms and light weapons. Since then the Trust Fund model developed to include capacity-building in demining but also wider defence transformation, for example through the support to the Afghan army. It has also been used for defence capacity building packages.

• The Trust Funds are financed from extra-budgetary contributions. They amount to EUR 80 million (120 million if the defence capacity building trust fund is included).

**Item 4. Police, combating transnational crimes and terrorism**

*Australian peace and security assistance, presentation by Australia*

• Australia has developed for its domestic reporting purposes a classification of activities that involve engagement with their partner countries beyond ODA. This classification is not meant to pre-empt what TOSSD will encompass, but illustrates the types of activities that could be reportable in the future under this new metric, including for peace and security (e.g. operational policing). See power point presentation.

*Combatting transnational crimes and terrorism, presentation by UNODC – see power point presentation*

• UNODC is a non-operational Secretariat entity. It reports to two commissions: the commission on crime prevention and criminal justice, and the commission on narcotic drugs. UNODC has 20 national and regional field offices.

• In terms of budget, 97% of UNODC’s budget is voluntary and programmes are designed with member states.

• The SDGs are central to UNODC work. The programmes are aligned with the national Sustainable Development Goal targets of member States, and wherever possible, with the global level Goal targets and indicators, as well as the 2030 Agenda as a whole.

• Ownership is key for UNODC: UNODC aligns its country activities with the UNDAF which is designed with the host government and civil society.

• UNODC core work relates to SDG 16, but it is also active with other SDGs, such as SDG 3 (HIV prevention in prisons, drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation) or SDGs 14 and 15 (preventing wildlife and forest crime).

• UNODC is the custodian agency for 15 SDG indicators, ranking third behind ILO and the World Bank.

• UNODC work on terrorism prevention emanates directly from a UN mandate (UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy). UNODC promotes ratification and implementation of the 19 universal legal instruments against terrorism that have been agreed by the international community in the absence of a universal definition of terrorism (e.g. terrorism financing, hostage taking, etc.). UNODC assists with the incorporation of provisions of those instruments into national legislations, building national capacities (including to implement counter-terrorism legislation) and promoting international co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism. See power point presentation for specific examples of activities.

*Interpol*

• Interpol’s approach in addressing organised crime and terrorism could be useful for developing the TOSSD framework. Interpol has three priority programmes: counter-terrorism, organised and emerging crime and cybercrime. Interpol uses its policing and corporate capabilities (e.g. information sharing, capacity building and training, etc.) to enhance collaboration between law enforcement agencies across borders to both prevent and respond to organised crime and terrorism. Therefore, by definition all activities conducted by Interpol address transnational crime.
Interpol does not initiate operations, which is a domain exclusively reserved to member states. Interpol focuses on the coordination of cross-border operations between countries.

**Item 5. Engagement with partner country military**

*International co-operation in the field of security, presentation by France – see power point presentation*

- The adoption of Agenda 2030 prompted adjustments to the institutional setting and procedures for dealing with co-operation in the field of security and defence. In France, to support sustainable security and SDG 16, the DCSD (Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense) was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it integrated staff from Ministries of Defence, Interior, Customs, Justice, and a few diplomats.
- They co-operate with various stakeholders to ensure a continuum between conventional development co-operation and security co-operation including military in the framework of SDG 16.
- The discussion should not be framed around military versus non-military assistance, but perhaps around operational versus structural co-operation. In France, operational support to provide training and equipment to tactical units in partner countries is provided by the Ministries of Defence and Interior and the Gendarmerie. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for structural co-operation, which is the right one to consider in the scope of SDG 16. DCSD does not provide any lethal equipment, nor training to the military.
- Assistance is based on a common assessment with partner countries of their needs in order to achieve SDG 16 and depending of their situation in terms of security, fragility, crisis.
- The tools used by DCSD to address the identified needs are:
  - Training of high-ranking officers (not at tactical or military level): regional schools on security have been opened in various countries. The idea is not to train troops, but build the capacity of officers to reinforce their ability to bring stability in the regions concerned, e.g. Sahel.
  - Expertise at critical decision making level (e.g. Director of Gendarmerie or police).
  - Equipment: lethal equipment is generally not the appropriate tool for addressing SDG 16, but it could be e.g. a tool to track smuggling of illicit traffic in the Balkan.
- Development co-operation agencies are not necessarily well-placed to address security challenges and public money is necessary to address SDG 16, beyond funds for development.
- The actions are meant to support long-term security in partner countries.

*EU Military training mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM CAR), presentation by the EU – see power point presentation*

- The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) undertakes missions upon consensus by the 28 EU member states. The missions are either civilian missions – reportable as ODA- or military operations – not reportable as ODA but that could be considered for inclusion under TOSSD.
- There are executive (with a UN Security Council Resolution) and non-executive missions.
- EUTM are training missions. Currently there are three such missions, one in Somalia, one in Mali and one in CAR. They act towards the armed forces to support the development of self-sustainable, credible, accountable and ethically balanced Armed Forces under democratic control.
- EUTM CAR has three pillars: 1) strategic advice (capacity building addressing the aspects of armed forces human resources, finances, budget); 2) education; 3) training.; and recently a fourth one was created on inter-operability (to involve the Ministry of Interior and avoid unbalanced forces in the country).
- EUTM is not acting alone but co-operates with other stakeholders, it is invited by the host country, it is entirely within the SSR framework overarched by the UN MINUSCA.
- The force is made of 2000 people. It provides training to 3 to 6 battalions. It does not provide any equipment but it is challenging for partner countries to acquire the minimum equipment needed.

**NATO Defence Capacity Building Trust Fund, presentation by NATO**

- These packages are offered to Georgia, Iraq and Moldova. The objective is to build up defence capacity building under democratic control.
- There is no tactical training as such, but the training builds the capacity of Academics who will in turn take up tactical training.
- These trust funds are not eligible as ODA but could be considered under TOSSD.