

# **AFRICAN DEVELOPEMENT BANK GROUP**



## ***WORKING PAPER***

### **MAINSTREAMING GENDER EQUALITY:**

#### **A ROAD TO RESULTS OR A ROAD TO NOWHERE?**

#### **AN EVALUATION SYNTHESIS**

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT  
(OPEV)**

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**MAINSTREAMING GENDER EQUALITY:  
A ROAD TO RESULTS  
OR  
A ROAD TO NOWHERE?**



**AN EVALUATION SYNTHESIS**

The views and interpretations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the African Development Bank or the Operations Evaluation Department.

***“We’re on a road to nowhere  
Come on inside.  
Takin’ that ride to nowhere  
We’ll take that ride.”<sup>1</sup>***

***Talking Heads: Road To Nowhere<sup>2</sup> (1985)***

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<sup>1</sup> Byrne, D., Weymouth, T., Frantz, C., & Harrison, J. (1985)

<sup>2</sup> Cover Photo: “A Road to Results or A Road to Nowhere?”, Northern Kenya 2003. © Lee Alexander Risby

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## Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB (“Bank”)	African Development Bank
AusAid	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPO	Development Policy-Operations
EC	European Community
GAD	Gender and Development
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GBS	General Budgetary Support
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for International Cooperation
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEV	Operations Evaluation Department
PBL	Policy-based Lending
RBM	Results-based Management
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SWAPs	Sector-Wide Approaches
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UN ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT	UN Human Settlements Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WID	Women in Development
WFP	World Food Program

## 1. MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND OPTIONS

This chapter presents the main conclusions and suggested options for gender equality and women's empowerment in development interventions and organizations, drawing the findings and discussions presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

### 1.1 Introduction

Since the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Gender and Development in 1995, the majority of multilateral and bilateral donors have put gender policies and / or strategies in place to promote equality in the design and delivery of development assistance to partner countries. In doing so, 'mainstreaming' has become the ubiquitous 'process' through which donor organizations have attempted to integrate gender into development analyses, country dialogue, sectors and operations, with the aim of making gender 'everyone's business', and therefore leading to improved gender equality results and more equitable, and sustainable development. The central conceptual heart of gender mainstreaming is<sup>3</sup>:

*"...that questions of gender must be taken seriously in central, mainstream, "normal" institutional activities and not simply left in a marginalized, peripheral backwater of specialist women's institutions."*

From the mid to late 1990s until 2010 gender policies, and mainstreaming processes have been evaluated by multilateral and bilateral agencies, with over 25 thematic and country evaluations. Some organizations such as ADB, Norad, Sida and the World Bank have conducted multiple evaluations of gender over the last decade allowing opportunities to assess trends in findings, and management responsiveness to evaluation. Individual evaluations have shown that mainstreaming has not succeeded in making gender everyone's business and gender equality results have been fragmented and not scaled-up. Furthermore, many of the evaluations have been conducted in isolation and with the exception of the Norad synthesis of eight organizational evaluations completed in 2006<sup>4</sup>, have lacked a broader comparative assessment of findings across organizations. Currently, there is a strong informal perception that mainstreaming gender equality is consistently underperforming across the majority of donor organizations. However, in the absence of a comprehensive synthetic review, such perceptions are not sufficient, to establish general root causes and thus to influence policy or operational change strategies. Therefore, currently a gap in evaluative knowledge needs to be filled.

In response to the 'evaluative gap' this synthesis intends to build on the Norad 2006 study, which made an early overview of the subject; by making a comprehensive assessment of gender evaluations conducted between 1990 and 2010. The results of the synthesis will provide the Bank and other stakeholders

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<sup>3</sup> Charlesworth (2005: 3)

<sup>4</sup> Norad (2006)

with a clear overview of the challenges and good practices at an organizational level; as well as future options for or alternatives to gender mainstreaming.

This analysis comes at a time when multilateral interest in gender equality is rising again with the creation of UN Women in 2010<sup>5</sup> and with the forthcoming 2012 World Development Report on 'gender equality and development'.

## 1.2 Conclusions

**Conclusion 1: Leadership has not consistently supported the implementation of mainstreaming gender equality and policy, resulting in what has become widely described as 'policy evaporation'.**

Mainstreaming requires change, so that organizational culture breaks with old ways of thinking and acting, and accepts and acts on new concepts. Importantly, mainstreaming also needs to resonate sufficiently with the past and present organizational 'raison d'être' to be accepted. Such change requires senior management leadership and commitment over time for a policy or strategy to be mainstreamed, working in tandem with the necessary resources, incentive and accountability systems. A key challenge to mainstreaming gender equality has proved to be the failure of donor organization senior management to move beyond policy rhetoric and to actively commit to the concept, to put in place organization-wide systems and resources necessary to make gender 'everyone's business' (see 4.2).

The underlying reasons for failure are often related to competing leadership priorities, such as the MDGs, aid effectiveness and governance agendas to name a few, which have crowded out mainstreaming gender equality. Furthermore, senior management are often most responsive to those priorities that receive the most international attention and resources, and so offer rewards and career enhancement.

**Conclusion 2: The absence of accountability and incentive systems to systematize the integration of gender equality across organizations and intervention has limited achievement of results.**

The absence of accountability and incentives systems at the organization-wide level has been strongly emphasized by evaluations as a key factor limiting the integration of gender equality into organizational processes and interventions, and therefore inhibiting the attainment of results (see 4.4).

However, it is important to note that discussion about the effects of such systems is almost entirely hypothetical. In practice, they do not seem to exist in a coherent form, and for this reason the status they have acquired as a solution to the broad failure of mainstreaming gender equality should presently be approached with caution, until such systems are put in place and can be evaluated.

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<sup>5</sup> UN Women was created in 2010 to bring together the various organization resources focusing on gender equality and women's empowerment within the UN system.

**Conclusion 3: Financial and Human Resources have not been sufficient to enable effective mainstreaming of gender equality within donor organizations and interventions.**

Evaluations show that mainstreaming is not a financial or resource free process. Donor organizations have not devoted sufficient resources to support mainstreaming gender equality. The lack of resources is largely a symptom of the inconsistent or absent leadership focus on gender equality (see 4.3).

Human resources, in terms of the numbers of gender specialists have been cut or remained at a low level within many donor organizations. Gender equality responsibilities has been often been allocated to consultants, junior or part-time staff, who lacked the power and responsibility to influence policy dialogue and operational staff in the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of interventions. Many evaluations were unable to ascertain financial / budgetary allocations for mainstreaming gender equality at the headquarters or intervention level as such information was not available or tracked. Frequently, budgetary allocations for monitoring gender equality components in project interventions were missing, contributing to lack of results reporting and learning.

**Conclusion 4: Many procedures and practices have been introduced, following the adoption by donor organizations of new gender policies or strategies and have been actively pursued for a short period before gradually declining in use.**

The most common organizational ‘technical’ response to support mainstreaming gender equality has been to develop procedures and practices, such as Gender Action Plans (GAPs), gender analyses, toolkits, manuals, checklists and staff training. Evaluations found that most are not used systematically because of the lack of rules mandating their use or incentives. Hence, their use often depends on individual country and sectoral contexts and the choices of operational staff (see 4.1).

Experience and derived good practice show that procedures such as GAPs and analyses can be effective if they are integrated throughout the intervention design, implementation and monitoring. Presently, they tend to be confined to particular sectors such as education and health where opportunities for gender sensitive approaches are more self-evident to operations and partner governments. Cross-sectoral learning and organization-wide adoption has been limited, and this has been attributed to the lack of supporting organizational systems, particularly accountability and incentive mechanisms.

Training has largely been reported to be ineffective in raising awareness and improving knowledge necessary for gender sensitive approaches. This is because training has been delivered on a ‘one-size-one-shot fits all’ approach, with little tailoring to local country or sectoral contexts; resources have not been consistently targeted at providing training, and gender specialists, few in number, are overstretched with other responsibilities; and finally it has been difficult to target training at those who need it, such as senior management and

non-gender specialist operational staff. These staff often bypass training citing busy workloads and other priorities.

Earlier evaluations of organizational responses to Women in Development (WID) in the 1980s and early 90s indicate similar sets of procedures and practices were developed which also encountered a similar set of challenges to those reported in evaluations of gender equality.

**Conclusion 5: Results reporting and learning has been seriously challenged by inconsistent approach to monitoring and evaluation of gender equality.**

One of the most common findings reported by evaluations has been the lack of monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and also supervision systems across donor organizations to track progress, allow for adaptive management, record gender equality results, and document good practice (see 4.5).

Even when gender equality analyses are conducted at the design stage of interventions the impetus is not consistently continued into implementation and monitoring, often this is reported to be because of lack of financial and / or human resources. Gender is included in project design to satisfy bureaucratic requirements for approval and then dropped during implementation as operations focus on the main priorities for the intervention. This situation often creates a vicious circle – lack of monitoring leads to invisibilization of gender results, which feeds back into a lack of awareness and interest in promoting gender equality in future interventions.

Many evaluations findings show that where results are reported they tend to be: Firstly, focused on women and not gender, indicating that in practice a gender equality approach is reduced to WID. Secondly, sectorally focused within education and health interventions because it is easier to monitor and evaluate effects on women and gender in these areas. However the transfer of these operational experiences to other sectors has generally not taken place. This illustrates that instead of mainstreaming gender equality it has become focused in specific sectors.

Evaluations have also reported that evaluation itself has failed to systematically incorporate gender into its body of evidence. Outside of specific thematic gender evaluations, Evaluation Offices have tended to place gender on their list of topics for occasional coverage rather than systematically integrating into all their streams of work (see also 5.1).

**Conclusion 6: Integrating gender equality into new aid modalities presents many new challenges to donor organizations**

The emerging evaluative data on integrating gender equality into new aid modalities such as Policy-based Lending (PBL), General Budget Support (GBS) and Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) indicates that gender is not being mainstreamed systematically into these interventions. Although, SWAPs focused on education, health and social safety net sectors report better integration of gender concerns than other sectors and types of modality, for much the same reasons as for similar traditional project-based interventions (see 5.1).

The emerging challenges relate to inconsistent ownership of gender within partner governments which results in it being given a low priority in poverty reduction strategies and country policy dialogue; the lack of donor harmonization around gender issues, resulting in inconsistent supply and generated demand in policy discussions and the design of PBL, GBS and / or SWAPs; and a lack of in-country gender expertise and tools to mainstream gender in policy dialogue and interventions, which means gender issues have difficulty gaining 'a place at the table'.

### **1.3 Options for Gender?**

As substantial challenges have prevented gender equality from entering the mainstream, the evaluation evidence suggests that it may be time to consider different options (see Chapter 5):

#### **Option 1: Focusing on specific sectors – 'Gender Focusing'**

This approach would focus on those sectors where gender equality appears to be sufficiently embedded and has made some progress and attempt to link to related 'new' sectors.

To a large extent this would continue 'business as usual' for most donor organizations and partner governments through emphasis on education and health interventions either through projects or SWAPs with a focus on women's empowerment and gender equality. Donors could then work with partner governments to add additional entry points for gender in other sectors, such as improvement of labor market policies and enabling environment to breakdown gender-based discrimination and private sector development. This may enhance partner government support as part of policy dialogue and an intervention strategy designed to increase market competitiveness and economic development. Furthermore, increasing the emphasis of developing women's involvement and leadership in the corporate world would resonate strongly with debates and experiences in developed countries.

#### **Option 2: WID Plus**

Many of evaluations have found that in practice gender equality when integrated into country-level intervention is boiled down to a focus on women-centered or women's empowerment approach. This option would make this approach strategically explicit, building on the experiences that did deliver results, but with a proviso that these should incorporate more fundamental analysis of gender power structures that seek to position interventions to empower women economically and politically. This would entail a return to a concentration on interventions, which deliver benefits for and empower women (and men where appropriate) and facilitate incremental social change overtime.

#### **Option 3: Policy dialogue on gender equality in new aid modalities**

Gender and women's empowerment mainstreaming has been aimed at the operational level at traditional project-based modalities. However, the increasing use of new aid modalities has thrown up a further set of challenges for the integration of gender equality into interventions. Within the context of option 1,

donor organizations and partner-governments could enhance the consideration of gender equality and women's empowerment by focused policy dialogue and development in key sectors, such as education and health and private sector and investment enabling environment. In this regard, PBL could be used to enhance gender dialogue around reforms that improve the policy environment for private sector investments in relation specific sectors such as finance and extractive industries. SWAPs could continue to build from a position of strength in the education and health sectors to support longer-term enhancements in human capital and equitable economic development.

**Option 4: Improving results reporting and learning through more systematic integration of monitoring and evaluation**

Central to improving results and learning within organizations would be through enhanced M&E within the context of the options outlined above. In that respect monitoring of gender would be targeted in sectors where gender equality and women's empowerment is the focus. Evaluation, would also respond similarly, but enhanced efforts could be made to integrate gender more broadly across all evaluative activities to uncover unintended results enhance cross-sectoral learning and reduce blindness.

## **2. EVALUATION SYNTHESIS FRAMEWORK**

This chapter outlines the synthesis<sup>6</sup> objectives, scope, methodology and limitations.

### **2.1 Objectives**

The objectives of the evaluation synthesis are to:

- Examine experiences in mainstreaming gender equality across Multilateral and Bilateral donor organizations: and in doing so –
  - Highlight trends (commonalities and differences) in findings, challenges faced and good practices

### **2.2 Scope**

The scope of the synthesis was guided by the following considerations:

- Time period: From 1990 to 2010 in order to capture trends (similarities and differences) in findings and good practices from the Women in Development (WID) era and in to the current emphasis on Gender and Development (GAD);
- Evaluation type: Primary emphasis was on thematic and country evaluations with a specific focus on gender and / or women;
- Stakeholder consultation and demand: The synthesis approach paper was circulated for discussion within the Bank in spring 2010 and comments were used to focus on key issues of concern such as good practice in mainstreaming processes.

Bank evaluations were not included in the scope of the review because no gender thematic evaluations have been commissioned and / or conducted. Furthermore, it was beyond the purpose of the evaluation synthesis to make any judgment on the Bank's performance as the focus is on synthesizing existing evaluative data and not on collecting and analyzing primary data from within the organization.

### **2.3 Methodology**

The approach followed well-established methodological guidelines<sup>7</sup> for conducting syntheses of evaluative studies:

Selection of objectives: A pre-synthesis review was conducted of existing non-evaluative and evaluative data<sup>8</sup>, together with consultations with Bank gender, results-based management (RBM) specialists to identify key issues and objectives. The objectives were then reassessed and adjusted as the synthesis progressed. In this process some issues, such as resources, accountability and senior management influence, or leadership gained prominence. In contrast, reporting on results was given less prominence, since it had become clear that

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<sup>6</sup> Evaluation synthesis is an approach in which an evaluator looks across interventions addressing a similar issue or theme to identify commonalities.

<sup>7</sup> GAO (1992); Morra-Imas & Rist (2009: 201 – 202)

<sup>8</sup> Brouwers & Hunt (OECD) (2003); Norad (2006); Hafner-Burton & Pollack (2002; 2009); Mehra & Gupta (2006)

the severe monitoring and evaluation challenges encountered by development organizations seriously limit the quality of results reporting on changes in gender equality.

**Data collection:** A detailed on-line search of OECD-DAC Evaluation of Development Programs database was initially used to identify evaluations and then was supplemented by further on-line searches of the multilateral and bilateral donor organizations evaluation publications. In cases where reports were not downloadable or were available in summary only, the relevant evaluation office was contacted to obtain a full report.

**Screening:** The initial data collection provided approximately 100 evaluations. These were then screened down to 26 evaluations (see Annex 1)<sup>9</sup> focused specifically on gender equality, mainstreaming and / or women in development at the thematic and organizational-wide level.

Other thematic evaluations, such as those focusing on education, health and agriculture were excluded, since they had insufficient focus on gender. Individual gender and / or WID focused project evaluations were also excluded, since the review sought thematic gender evaluations, preferably including country or project cluster case studies. This was in keeping with the intention to go beyond localized and specific project-based evaluation findings to look at the broader context of gender equality and mainstreaming within the development field<sup>10</sup>. Reviews and / or self-evaluations conducted by management or operations teams were excluded as having insufficient independence. Academic and non-evaluative studies were omitted. Non-English, and particularly French language thematic evaluations were sought, but none were found to include in the synthesis.

**Review Protocol:** A protocol was developed to record basic information about the evaluations such as organization, time period and methodology, and also to collect and summarize key information relating to findings, lessons and / or good practices and recommendations<sup>11</sup>. The protocol was initially tested on five evaluations to ensure it was appropriate and some adjustments were made. These included an input of a section on 'evidence base' and 'reviewer comments' relating to methodological and quality issues. Evaluation quality was not formally assessed, although the reviewers assessed the amount of desk (secondary) and field and survey (primary) data collection; such as the number of project or country case studies on which evaluation findings were based.

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<sup>9</sup> Note that country case studies, if part of thematic documents but produced as separate documents were also reviewed, however, they are counted as part of the thematic evaluation (to avoid double counting).

<sup>10</sup> Given the focus on non-Bank external evaluative data, the synthesis will not provide evaluative judgment on the past performance of the Bank with regard to gender mainstreaming.

<sup>11</sup> Title, organization, date of publication, timeframe under evaluation, evaluation type, evaluation goal(s) and objectives, evaluation methodology, findings, lessons / good practices, recommendations, results basis and definition, mainstreaming definition, evidence base for the evaluation and reviewer comments.

Analysis: On the basis of the definition and principles of gender mainstreaming, and review of donor organization reports, the reviewers devised a generic theory of change (see 2.4). The reports were then subjected to qualitative content analysis using codes developed from the theory of change (see Box 1). After coding was completed and relative prominences of issues were established report drafting commenced.

### **Box 1. Content Analysis Codes**

#### ***Mainstreaming***

- Senior management / leadership committed
- Gender specialists influencing projects and programs
- Financial resources available
- Human resources available
- Gender sensitivity and equality institutionalized in country / field offices
- Gender sensitivity and equality institutionalized in partner governments
- Incentives and accountability

#### ***Mainstreaming Activities and Tools***

- Policy and / or strategies in place
- Plans of action in place
- Gender analyses used in design / implementation of projects or programs
- Checklists / screening
- Guidelines
- Good practice notes
- Training programs
- Toolkits
- Gender sensitive monitoring frameworks
- Gender sensitive evaluation

#### ***Challenges / Opportunities***


- New aid modalities
- Infrastructure
- Private sector investment
- Policy evaporation
- Focus on women (back to WID)
- Understanding mainstreaming

## **2.4 Theory of Change for Mainstreaming Gender Equality**

The theory of change approach is an evaluation tool that maps out the logical sequence of means-ends linkages underlying a project, program or approach. This begins with the impact, which the process aims to achieve and then moves towards the outcomes that mainstreaming activities aim to directly deliver. Having identified the beginning and end of the results chain, the Theory then identifies the 'states' that must be passed through to move from the outcomes to reach the impacts. Finally, the theory incorporates the assumptions, which need to hold true if progress is to continue; and the forces that must be active to drive the whole process forward. These are labeled 'impact drivers'. In effective projects or processes assumptions are minimized, by providing inputs that can turn them into active impact drivers. Therefore, assumptions that 'leaders are actively promoting, gender mainstreaming' is turned into 'impact drivers' by measures to enable them to participate fully support the process.

The theory of change was developed early in the synthesis process; based on a review of the definition and principles of mainstreaming<sup>12</sup> (see Figure 1). The theory of change was used in the desk review of evaluations, to allow confirmation or rejection of progress along the causal pathways towards the intended impacts of mainstreaming; and to simplify the process of identifying the effects of assumptions and impact drivers with a particular focus on screening the data for confirming or disconfirming evidence of drivers and assumptions that need to hold true for mainstreaming to deliver outcomes and impacts. As a basic principle if impact drivers are not present, it is unlikely that the approach will produce impacts.

**Figure 1. Theory of Change for Gender Mainstreaming**



The theory of change identifies four key assumptions and / or drivers that need to be present to achieve the mainstreaming of gender equality. These are effective leadership; adequate financial and human resources; availability of appropriate procedures and processes; and finally appropriate organizational incentives and accountability structures. The evidence on the extent to which these assumptions were actively addressed through promotion of corresponding impact drivers was assessed under an overarching structure of content codes (see Box 1).

## 2.5 Limitations

<sup>12</sup> As laid out by UN ECOSOC

Despite the substantial evaluative data on donor approaches to gender equality and mainstreaming two significant and related limitations were encountered: Firstly, the reporting on results and good practices was uneven as most organizations do not have gender sensitive monitoring and evaluation systems in place to record outcomes or to document good practice systematically. Secondly, with the paucity of results data, most evaluations had little choice but to focus on processes and organizational factors relating to policy implementation and mainstreaming<sup>13</sup>. Therefore, there is a substantial bias toward process (as opposed to results) reporting; although this proved to be useful in view of the inextricable linkage between processes and the delivery of results.

In light of the limitations, the original objectives of the review with regard to documenting results were scaled back, and it was decided after an initial piloting of the protocol for assessing and extracting data from evaluation to concentrate on assumptions and drivers aspects of the theory of change that need to be present in order to move towards results.

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<sup>13</sup> Hunt & Brouwers (OECD) (2003: 37 – 39) drew similar conclusions from an earlier set of gender evaluations

### 3. CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING

This section provides a historical overview of gender and development (GAD); starting with its roots in the women in development (WID) movement in the 1970s through to gender mainstreaming. The first two sub-sections cover issues that are well documented, and as such the discussion draws from existing literature<sup>14</sup> and is not intended to add new perspectives or be exhaustive. The final section brief discusses the development of gender mainstreaming.

#### 3.1 Women in Development (WID): The Starting Point

The concept and practical use of Women in Development (WID) emerged in the early 1970s in reaction to the perceived exclusion of women from development interventions until that time. Impetus came from the emergence of the feminist movement<sup>15</sup> and the publication of Boserup's<sup>16</sup> influential work on women and economic development.

Under WID, women were perceived as neglected economic resources who had been ignored or sidelined into the 'non-productive sector' as carers of children or housewives. If incorporated into development processes, they would improve a country's economic development. WID was adopted across donor organizations and NGOs; and fed into the design of such project interventions as micro-credit, education and technology, for the purpose of improving the status and livelihood of women. Micro-credit projects were often designed and implemented with a strong WID focus, especially by NGOs, such as the Grameen Bank, which aimed to increase the productive roles of women. Although WID placed much needed attention on the role of women in development processes, it did not challenge existing gendered social structures or threaten fundamental change to male dominance and power. As a result women's projects were often promoted in isolation or as special interest sub-projects "bolted on" to traditional development interventions.

Many donor organizations such as the World Bank and USAID created WID units or departments to integrate women into projects. This was not without problems and internal resistance as USAID's experience from the 1970s illustrates:

*"Although the WID Office is charged with a broad mandate to integrate women through project review, studies, linkage with constituents, and international coordination, its annual program budget had been limited to one million dollars or less since inception. The WID office is constrained in its structural location to an exhorter role, rather than as a supplier of technical assistance or project monies. Monitoring is extraordinarily*

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<sup>14</sup> See, for example - Rathgeber (1989); Razavi & Miller (1995); Charlesworth (2005)

<sup>15</sup> The term "women in development" was coined in the early 1970s by the Women's Committee of the Washington, DC, Chapter of the Society for International Development, a network of development professionals.

<sup>16</sup> Boserup (1970) research showed that women were intimately involved in agricultural production and therefore debunked the commonly held belief that women were primarily carers and homemakers.

*difficult, and the data produced are not always reliable, due to dependency on resistant field missions for whom paper compliance is a developed art. Overlaying all this is the tokenism which the all women WID staff faces in a male-dominated bureaucracy.”<sup>17</sup>*

The WID approach was increasingly criticized because it did not attempt to change existing socio-cultural gender biases. Furthermore, female-focused projects did not always result in improved economic conditions. For example, most income-generating projects were found to be ineffective<sup>18</sup>, and women-focused production/ technology projects often added to their workloads rather than ‘lightening the load’; and involved trade offs with other responsibilities<sup>19</sup>. As a result, by the mid-1980s Gender and Development emerged as the successor to WID, with an underlying platform of explicitly challenging gender imbalances.

### **3.2 Gender and Development (GAD): From WID to GAD**

The criticisms of WID led to the development of the concept of ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD), which donor organizations adopted as a central element of their approach to development. GAD, in contrast to WID does not concentrate its attention exclusively on women; but examines ‘the social construction of gender and the assignment of specific roles, responsibilities, and expectations to women and to men’. The GAD approach aims to understand the power dynamics between men and women in different contexts – arguing that it is only by understanding gender power relations that development can empower women and thereby create positive and sustainable socio-economic change (see Table 1).

GAD places critical importance on the use of gender analysis to gather and analyse information on social roles based on gender, in order understand and redress gender-based inequities through development interventions.

Critiques of GAD, have argued that despite its conceptual power, it has been practically applied in donor organizations in similar way to WID, with a primary focus on women: through similar interventions such as micro-credit, education, health and legal reform<sup>20</sup>, while less attention is given to longer term goals of challenging gender based inequalities. In such processes, gender has become a synonym for women<sup>21</sup>, with little substantive analysis or investment in redressing gender inequalities between men and women (see Chapter 4 and 5).

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<sup>17</sup> Staudt (1981) – Staudt identifies a similar set of constraints that have been repeated 30 years later in attempts to institutionalize GAD through gender mainstreaming (see Chapter 4)

<sup>18</sup> Rathgeber (1989: 20 – 22)

<sup>19</sup> Razavi & Miller, 1995: 13)

<sup>20</sup> Many of the more recent evaluations of gender mainstreaming also reinforce this issue.

<sup>21</sup> Charlesworth (2005: 14 – 15) & <http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/re55.pdf> : 33

**Table 1: WID versus GAD<sup>22</sup>**

<b>Description</b>	<b>WID</b>	<b>GAD</b>
<b>Approach</b>	Takes situation of women as problem to be alleviated or redressed	Sees inequitable gender roles as a hindrance to development
<b>Focus</b>	Women	Gender based roles
<b>Problem</b>	The exclusion of women from development processes	Unequal power relations (rich and poor; women and men) that prevent equitable development
<b>Goal</b>	More efficient, effective development	Equitable sustainable development with both men and women as decision-makers
<b>Solution</b>	Integrate women into development processes	Empower the disadvantaged and women to transform unequal relations
<b>Strategies</b>	Women's projects; women's components in projects; Increase women's productivity; Increase women's income; Increase women's ability to look after the household	Identify/address practical needs determined by women and men to improve their conditions; At the same time address inequality affecting women; Address strategic interests of the poor through people-centred development

GAD, with its fundamental goal of equality, has been viewed as a more conflictual and threatening approach than WID: as it challenges male dominance and the subjugation of women, and can result in resistance and conflict within donor organizations and within development interventions (see Chapters 4 and 5). The mainstreaming agenda has been presented as a strategy and method to encourage more general acceptance and implementation of gender equitable approaches across donor organizations and interventions; and thus to push beyond an exclusive focus on women.

### **3.3 Getting Gender into Mainstream: Gender Mainstreaming**

*"Whereas the mainstream is the old order, mainstreaming seeks a new order."*<sup>23</sup>

The term 'mainstreaming' has its origins in approaches to education that include a diversity of learning abilities rather than segregating or excluding those who have disabilities<sup>24</sup>, from 'normal or accepted and mainstream education'.

Mainstreaming suggests changes in established order of procedures and cultures

<sup>22</sup> World Bank (1998: 6) – reproduced in Hafner-Burton & Pollack (2002: 349)

<sup>23</sup> Picciotto (2002: 323)

<sup>24</sup> Ibid: 2 & [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainstreaming\\_\(education\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mainstreaming_(education))

of organizations so that the 'old mainstream' is transformed or shifts as new ways of doing business and concepts are accepted. However, the process of mainstreaming implies flexibility, innovation, learning and acceptance of new cultural norms, which may not be readily embraced by the existing mainstream, therefore, the process often subject to resistance<sup>25</sup> as organization change takes place. This can lead to significant policy dissonance between high level statements of intention to create a new mainstream and real actions – what is often referred to as policy evaporation.

The concept mainstreaming began to be applied in a broader public-policy setting with regards to gender at the Third World Conference on Women, which took place in Nairobi in 1985<sup>26</sup>. The strategies for 'advancement of women' called for – "effective participation of women in development to be integrated in the formulation and implementation of mainstream programs and projects"<sup>27</sup>. By the time of the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 gender mainstreaming had become the key process and strategy to address gender inequity across sectors such as education, health, economic development, decision-making and human rights. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) formally defined mainstreaming strategy as:

*"Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality"*<sup>28</sup>

After Beijing, mainstreaming was endorsed and adopted by almost every multilateral and bilateral donor organization and most governments and became the central 'mantra' for GAD. ECOSOC outlined the series of principles to follow in mainstreaming gender processes in the UN system<sup>29</sup>:

- Issues across **all areas of activity** should be defined in such a manner that gender differences can be diagnosed—that is, an assumption of gender-neutrality should not be made.
- Responsibility for translating gender mainstreaming into practice is system-wide and rests at the **highest levels [senior leadership]**. **Accountability** for outcomes needs to be monitored constantly.
- Gender mainstreaming also requires that every effort be made to

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<sup>25</sup> See Picciotto (2002) for a comprehensive discussion on the meaning and processes of mainstreaming.

<sup>26</sup> See Hafner-Burton & Pollack (2002: 340 – 342) for a comprehensive discussion of the rise of gender mainstreaming in global governance

<sup>27</sup> <http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/00/000201-03.html>; The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, in World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women (UN (1985: 114)

<sup>28</sup> United Nations. "[Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997](#)". A/52/3.18 September 1997.

<sup>29</sup> Report of the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1997, supra note 21, at 24.

broaden women's participation at all levels of **decision-making**. Gender mainstreaming must be institutionalized through concrete steps, mechanisms and processes in all parts of the United Nations system.

- Gender mainstreaming does not replace the need for targeted, women-specific policies and programs or positive legislation, nor does it substitute for **gender units or focal points**.
- Clear **political will** and the allocation of adequate and, if need be, additional **human and financial resources** for gender mainstreaming from all available funding sources are important for the successful translation of the concept into practice

The ECOSOC principles made clear that to be effective mainstreaming needed to be backed by resources and leadership, combined with application of specialist knowledge across organizations centrally and in-country offices:

*"A combined strategy can be particularly powerful. This involves the synergy of a catalytic central gender unit with a cross-sectoral policy oversight and monitoring role, combined with a web of gender specialists across the institution. The building of alliances both within the institution and with outside constituencies, such as women's organizations, is crucial for success. Mainstreaming tools include gender training, introducing incentive structures which reward efforts on gender, and the development of gender-specific operational tools such as checklists and guidelines."*<sup>30</sup>

In the light, of donors focusing on the MDG's after 2000 (and MDG3), the link between mainstreaming gender and economic development has been stressed, particularly by the World Bank as part of 'smart economics', and pressing for greater consideration of gender issues in economic growth. The underlying economic argument is one of inefficiency caused by exclusion of women results in impaired economic development and poverty reduction:

*"To promote economic development and attain the MDGs—especially the overarching poverty reduction MDG and the gender equality MDG—the global community must renew its attention to women's economic empowerment and increase investments in women. Gains in women's economic opportunities lag behind those in women's capabilities. This is inefficient, since increased women's labor force participation and earnings are associated with reduced poverty and faster growth; women will benefit from their economic empowerment, but so too will men, children and society as a whole. Women's lack of economic empowerment, on the other hand, not only imperils growth and poverty reduction, but also has a host of other negative impacts, including less favorable education and health outcomes for children and a more rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. In sum, the business case for expanding women's economic opportunities is becoming increasingly evident; this is nothing more than smart economics."*<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/re55.pdf> : 12

<sup>31</sup> World Bank (2007: 2)

By strengthening the link between economic development and gender equality, the World Bank has implicitly sort to strengthen the rationale for mainstreaming, and thus to make it more appealing to the majority of its staff who are economists.

#### 4. GENDER MAINSTREAMING: INTENTIONS AND PRACTICE

*“... bridging the gap between policy and implementation continues to be an uphill climb. Despite progress, no agency fully matches its own political rhetoric and objectives on gender equality with the required human and financial resources or accountability measures to ensure progress towards gender equality and women’s empowerment.”<sup>32</sup>*

OECD 2007: 7

This chapter of the report presents the key findings from the review of evaluations. The findings are split into four issues covering the assumptions / drivers identified in the theory of change for gender mainstreaming that are essential to achieve outcomes, and to move from outcomes to gender equality results and / or impacts in development: firstly, procedures and practices covering tools, training, monitoring and evaluation; secondly, leadership addressing senior management commitment and prioritization, and careerism; thirdly, human and financial resources; and fourthly, accountability and incentive mechanisms. The evaluative data shows that these factors cannot be considered in isolation from one another, but are dynamically related, and where necessary we have flagged the relationships in the following sections. A final section addresses results reporting on mainstreaming gender equality.

##### 4.1 Procedures and Practice

###### Summary

This section addresses the procedures and practices of gender mainstreaming and gender policy, which consist of an array of related tools and activities such as plans, manuals, guidelines, toolkits and checklists, training, monitoring and evaluation.

**Many procedures and practices have been introduced, with the intention of assisting, firstly the incorporation of women into development activities and later, gender mainstreaming. The majority of these have been introduced following the adoption of new gender policies or strategies and have been actively pursued for a short period before gradually declining in use.** As a result, the link between the use and usefulness of procedures and practices and improved gender equality results has rarely been systematically established in development organizations. Experiences and derived good practice show that tools such as gender plans and analyses can be effective if they are integrated throughout the process encompassing design, implementation and evaluation. However, they tend to be fragmented or confined to particular sectors such as health and education,<sup>33</sup> with cross-sectoral learning and adoption limited, due to the absence of incentives and accountability systems.

**In large part, evaluations have reported that staff at all levels feel a sense of**

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<sup>32</sup> OECD (2007)

<sup>33</sup> See experience of ADB (2009; 2010) and World Bank (2010).

**“policy and procedure overload” and that they are therefore unable to pay detailed attention to all of the stated “priorities”. This results in a focus on “essential” priorities such as poverty reduction and on those currently at the top of policy discussions. Gender is rarely seen as a “top priority”, and even then not for long.**

### **Action Plans**

In recent years, Gender Action Plans (GAPs) have become one of the most common methods adopted to implement gender policy and / or promote the mainstreaming of gender in the design and implementation of donor-assisted activities. However, the evaluations reviewed show that the adoption of GAPs was not universal. Many bilaterals and some UN agencies preferred to mainstream gender into existing planning frameworks, although the results of this approach have been inconsistent at best<sup>34</sup>. In some organizations, such as the World Bank GAPs have been implemented in response to past policy implementation failures<sup>35</sup>. However, the emerging evaluative evidence indicates that GAPs themselves have not consistently produced the intended benefits. This is partly due to the lack of appropriate results orientation, resources and incentive structures to encourage consistent use of GAPs.<sup>36</sup> As an example, AusAid introduced its first GAP in 2001. This was updated in 2002 and was unevenly used within the organization, until the Second Gender and Development Action Plan was introduced in 2008; after which monitoring and annual reviews of use of the Plan became mandatory in programs<sup>37</sup>. The AusAid system of linking planning and accountability to implementation represents an emerging good practice with respect to making GAPs “come to life;” so that they become useful operational tools to facilitate the achievement of gender equality results.

Many evaluations note that the targets set in GAPs remain oriented to inputs and outputs rather than to outcomes. Furthermore, as shown by the experience of the Asian Development Bank, linking GAPs prepared during project design to the priorities of implementation, monitoring, supervision and evaluation remains a challenge. Accountability for implementing the GAP is often not clearly established; and even when it is, the necessary capacity within the organization takes time to develop<sup>38</sup>. In such circumstances, opportunities for effective tracking and learning from results are minimized.

Seven of the donor organizations, whose evaluations were reviewed, including BMZ<sup>39</sup>, CIDA and DFID, did not formally adopt the underlying structure offered by GAPs, opting instead to attempt to mainstream gender into existing planning frameworks. Evaluations of CIDA<sup>40</sup> and DFID<sup>41</sup> assistance found:

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<sup>34</sup> See for example the experiences of CIDA (2008), DFID (2006a), EC (2003), Sida (2010), UNDP (2006) and UNICEF (2008). Although UNDP and UNICEF have now switched to GAPs.

<sup>35</sup> World Bank (2007)

<sup>36</sup> For an example of the lack of utilization of GAPs see Norad (2009a: 4)

<sup>37</sup> AusAid (2002; 2008: 17; 27 – 28)

<sup>38</sup> ADB (2010: vii; 21; 24; 29); AusAid also report a lag between adoption of requisite accountability and performance measures and organizational capacities.

<sup>39</sup> BMZ (2006: 7)

<sup>40</sup> CIDA (2008: xiii)

*“Lack of or incoherent strategy for rolling out GE initiatives, with no concerted plan of action clearly defining roles and responsibilities across the Agency, Headquarters and the field” (CIDA)*

*“For the country and regional plans, policy evaporation is sometimes revealed in the weak mainstreaming of gender into background analyses guiding the plans, and in the plans themselves.” (DFID)*

These experiences echo the results of earlier attempts made in the 1980s and early 90s under the WID approach of the Netherlands DGIS; which set in motion an ambitious agenda through its Women and Development Program of Action (1987). This included the posting of WID specialists in Embassies, training for policy makers and adoption of policy papers and sector and country plans. A 1991 evaluation found that, although WID plans had been widely distributed, “in most cases the papers are familiar to the embassies and at the ministry, but they are not used. Project staff are not usually aware of the existence of the papers.”<sup>42</sup>

Norway produced a Gender Strategy in 1997, followed by an Action Plan. However, this did not fare well:

*“The evaluation team cannot find the action plan in Norad’s archive. All information on this topic has been given to the evaluation team by a former gender advisor. There is no systematic documentation in the archive on what happened to the action plan. From the information we have received, the action plan was never revised and died a quiet death.”<sup>43</sup>*

The current interest in GAPs as a tool to reinvigorate the implementation of gender policy and mainstreaming has the potential to provide for more effective integration of gender in programs and projects at the sectoral and country level. However, the evaluation evidence indicates that such plans need to be linked to accountability mechanisms that make their use mandatory throughout the activity cycle.

### **Gender Analysis**

The basic tool for implementation of gender policies and mainstreaming is gender analysis. This is currently mainly undertaken at the level of gender-specific target group analysis at intervention (and sometimes country) level, to determine potential benefits and negative impacts. In contrast, more fundamental gender analysis looks at the structure of power relations in society and the relative position of men and women. Such analysis can establish that interventions support and target improvements in gender equality and as a minimum ensure that they do no harm. Although such work is known to provide a firm foundation for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities at country level, 22 evaluations reviewed indicated that the use of

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<sup>41</sup> DFID (2006a: 15)

<sup>42</sup> Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Policy and Operations Evaluations Department (1998: 135)

<sup>43</sup> Norad (2005a: 30)

gender analysis was insufficient to effectively integrate gender into interventions. The prevalent challenge noted by evaluations was the inconsistent use of gender analysis in the project cycle and across sectors. Analysis, if used at all, tends to be undertaken during project design, but it is not followed up in implementation and monitoring. For example, while CIDA's gender policy calls for "systematic inclusion of gender analysis" in the organization's initiatives, an evaluation found that it was completely absent from 23% of interventions, while 67% had some analysis, but did not meet the policy requirements. Moreover, evaluation of the quality of gender analysis showed that it was more frequently used to identify "a package of activities to improve women's share as beneficiaries" than to assess differential effects by gender or to carry out risk assessments. It was therefore more appropriate for a WID perspective (see 4.5) than for gender mainstreaming, which had superseded this. Furthermore, the analysis was primarily confined to intervention strategy and design and was not carried through into implementation, and hence did not figure in indicators or results reporting<sup>44</sup>.

A major cause of the uneven use of gender analysis was reported to be the excessive administrative burdens placed on project managers and competing demands from within the organization, and from donors and partner governments, to address too broad a range of development issues. Other critical factors included lack of gender specialists and internal capacity to support project managers, and lack of dedicated budgeting for such analysis to be continued throughout the project or program cycle<sup>45</sup>. Similar failures in the use of gender analysis, caused by resource, capacity and knowledge factors were reported in evaluations of gender in EC, UNICEF, BMZ, SDC, Sida, UNDP and WFP<sup>46</sup> during the decade up to 2010.

As part of a "vicious cycle", the consistent lack of gender analysis promoted the view within some organizations that the issue is a "luxury", "add-on", "burden"<sup>47</sup> or a "problem" as summarized in one element of the Norad experience<sup>48</sup>:

*"In 2001-2002 Norad did identify private sector development (PSD) as an area for improved W&GE (Women and Gender Equality) efforts. A gender component was included in the common ToR for all PSD studies, but as a general rule W&GE was only addressed in the problem description, not in proposed activities".*

Overall, gender analysis has proved to be an element of mainstreaming, which has been widely introduced, but rarely implemented in a consistent manner from design through implementation, which enables it to make a major contribution to improved results across interventions.

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<sup>44</sup> CIDA (2008: xv; 50 – 56; 84 – 88)

<sup>45</sup> Ibid: 78 & 84

<sup>46</sup> EC (2003: 29 – 34); UNICEF (2008: viii; xii; 21; 36 – 38; 47 – 49); BMZ (2006: 6); SDC (2009: 8 – 11; 26 – 27); Sida (2010: viii – ix; 11; 16 – 17; 19); UNDP (2006: 15 – 16; 23 – 24); WFP (2008: ii – iii; 23 – 26; 49 – 50; 52 – 58); See also the World Bank (2010: xiii; 26 – 29)

<sup>47</sup> EC (2003: 39); UNICEF (2008: 21); BMZ (2006: 6); SDC (2009: 87); DFID (2006: 48)

<sup>48</sup> Norad (2005a: 32)

## **Toolkits, Handbooks, Manuals and Guidelines**

Toolkits, handbooks, guidelines and manuals are other common tools used to enable mainstreaming of gender in development agencies. The quality of such documents is usually assessed as good. However, once produced, they are infrequently used. For example, DFID produced a Gender Mainstreaming Manual (2002), which was evaluated as “an excellent resource document” and is freely available within and outside the organization. Nevertheless, it was found that “DFID staff that were interviewed as part of this evaluation reported a lack of familiarity and access to either DFID or externally produced toolkits and manuals”<sup>49</sup>. Moreover, the “gender tools made available by DFID do not meet knowledge needs expressed by staff.” The good intentions and high quality materials produced as part of mainstreaming efforts did not produce the intended results. Similarly, in Norad, the Gender Handbook did not lead to coherent activity<sup>50</sup>:

*“A Handbook on Gender and Empowerment Assessment was published in 2000, and systematic training sessions took place in 1999-2000. No other tools and methods have been developed, and little analytical work has been carried out in MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or Norad on how to mainstream gender concerns and work on W&GE in the new aid structure and new aid modalities; or to operationalise gender as a cross-cutting issue”*

By 2005, it was found that the official Norad/Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development Cooperation Manual made no reference at all to the earlier Gender Handbook. It is not surprising that country gender evaluations conducted by Norad in Zambia (2005) and Mozambique (2009) showed that embassy staff “lacked practical knowledge of good practice and relevant tools” to mainstream gender effectively in country programs.<sup>51</sup>

In the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), a gender toolkit was prepared and circulated. However, there “was no evidence in the field that these types of gender analysis tools were being used either intermittently or systematically, although there were reportedly no clear instructions from HQ ..... on the use and promotion of this toolkit”.<sup>52</sup>

Concerning the failures of various handbooks, sets of guidance and toolkits the evaluations reveal two broad causes. Firstly, the use of such knowledge products is not backed consistently by training or incentive systems. There are no sanctions for ignorance of or rewards for use of tools to support mainstreaming. Hence, their uptake is largely dependent on individual interest and not on the needs of the intervention or partner government<sup>53</sup>. Secondly, some evaluations found that the operational relevance of tools and guidelines was reported to be

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<sup>49</sup> DFID (2006a: 38)

<sup>50</sup> Norad (2005a: 7; 31 – 32; 41; 54)

<sup>51</sup> Ibid: 41; Norad (2005b: 29); Norad (2009b: 12). Similar findings were reported by Sida (2002b: 75); Sida (2002c: 27); Sida (2010: 12)

<sup>52</sup> SDC (2009: 136)

<sup>53</sup> See experiences of EC (2003: 21 – 23); DFID (2006a: 37 – 38); Netherlands DGIS (1995: 135 – 139); Norad (2005a: 7; 31 – 32)

low or in need of refinement<sup>54</sup>; and that field staff did not find them useful or user friendly, particularly in sectors (e.g., infrastructure) where there is a traditional reticence to include a gender perspective. Furthermore, tools were often “handed down” from headquarters “experts” to field level teams, creating “one-directional knowledge transfers” with little opportunity to adapt tools to local contexts<sup>55</sup>.

Lastly, there is an element of fatigue concerning the perceived ever-expanding number of priorities. A Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) evaluation summarized the perception that<sup>56</sup>: “When you have 50 priorities you have none”. This highlights the commonly held view among donor staff, according to this body of evaluations, that they are overloaded with work, associated with an ever-increasing collection of mainstreaming priorities, most of which come with their own toolkits and guidance. In the absence of any clear priority setting by leadership and of incentives systems to adopt mainstreaming procedures, such “priorities” have been commonly found to slowly lose impetus and eventually disappear and only resurface in periodic rhetorical usage.

### **Checklists**

Checklists are another widespread tool intended to ensure attention to gender issues. Their effectiveness has not been as frequently evaluated as other tools. From the early days of WID to present day GAD approaches checklists have moved in and out of favor, primarily as a project cycle screening tool to determine whether an intervention has appropriately incorporated gender issues into its components, activities and indicators.

Recently, there has been a revival of interest in gender checklists to screen interventions, to strengthen the integration of gender and to encourage a focus on outcome-based reporting. This has been the case, for example, in ADB<sup>57</sup> and SDC<sup>58</sup>, responding in part to the OECD DAC “gender marker”.

Experiences with checklists show that they often provide limited impetus for mainstreaming. For example, evaluations of EC and Netherlands<sup>59</sup> experience found that the practical use of checklists was “limited” to that of a screening, monitoring or reporting tool. In the case of the Netherlands, checklists were developed in the early 1980s, but their inconsistent use caused them to be discarded in 1992. They were succeeded by the “Development Screening Test”, which aimed to ensure that national policies, including WID were being applied. This test was also found to be ineffective as “most staff regarded the test and the criteria merely as administrative procedures that needed to be followed to get a proposed project through” or as “an administrative ritual”. After the application of the screening any emphasis on women in implementation tended to

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<sup>54</sup> DFID (2006a: 37 – 38); Sida (2002a: 74 – 75); Sida (2010: 12; 41 – 42); UNFPA (2008: 8; 36)

<sup>55</sup> See Sida (2010; 41 – 42) and also UNDP (2006: 15; 42)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid: 36

<sup>57</sup> ADB (2010: vi; 30)

<sup>58</sup> SDC (2009: 4; 24; 31)

<sup>59</sup> EC (2003: 7); Netherlands DGIS (1995: 133 – 136).

evaporate<sup>60</sup>.

Underlying the negative experiences of the EC and Netherlands is the fact that the tools have been required mainly at project design phases, with limited application to implementation or monitoring. This erodes the perception of their usefulness among operational staff, who are “insufficiently stimulated” or attracted by incentives to use or adapt the tools. The recent experience of the SDC<sup>61</sup> with new gender checklists based on the OECD-DAC gender marker system indicates that challenges arise if such systems are not backed by clear lines of responsibility and support from management:

*“As part of this action plan, the Gender Desk, in cooperation with external experts, drafted a checklist to assess gender equality mainstreaming in project [proposals] and published two gender responsive budget reports. The checklist is considered voluntary, and is being tested, and there has been no follow through by senior management.... Using the checklist and the gender marker will require a management decision to make it compulsory, as well as training and monitoring so that staff doing the scoring can apply it consistently.”*

The rather limited evaluative assessments of checklists indicated that they have many of the same challenges as other tools; and also require a supporting framework of enhanced capacity through training, incentives, accountability structures and leadership to enable their appropriate utilization and usefulness.

### **Training and Awareness Raising**

Training is one of the standard approaches used to raise the profile and practice of gender mainstreaming, particularly among non-gender specialists. All of the evaluations assessed training; and although good practices can be found, they tend to be fragmented in different pockets within organizations, so that successes cannot be readily scaled up to develop a coherent organization-wide approach to gender training.

An important dimension of such training is that its knowledge and expertise should reach down to the local field level, which has often proved a major problem. This is exemplified by a discussion in a 2001 ADB evaluation<sup>62</sup>.

*“Projects with good, gender-inclusive design can still fail to meet their objectives if those objectives are not fully accepted by the government agencies concerned. This is particularly so if insufficient resources are allocated to staff recruitment and training, and to raise beneficiary awareness. This study found that, in most cases, Implementing Agencies at field level recognized the need for improved training in social and gender aspects and social mobilization for staff and beneficiaries, but lacked the skills and resources needed for these activities. Most of the projects did not provide adequate, item-specific budgets for “software” such as training in*

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<sup>60</sup> Netherlands DGIS (1995: 26; 139 – 140)

<sup>61</sup> SDC (2009: 24; 31)

<sup>62</sup> ADB (2001: 21)

*skills and social awareness, or for changing attitudes and practices to support development innovations. Budgetary constraints impeded the successful implementation of the "software" required for the sustainability of "hardware" such as clinics or irrigation infrastructure, or water supply systems".*

The ADB's follow-up evaluation of gender conducted in 2009 – 10, found that training was still not functioning effectively to aid mainstreaming. One problem identified was that at higher levels of the organization, particularly among headquarters operational staff, who are responsible for the planning and monitoring missions, which should keep track of gender-related performance in programs, the key staff rarely attend the appropriate training, often citing their burdensome travel schedules. The evaluation found that "the challenge to intensify GAD training to ADB staff remains, particularly on the need to expand the frequency and the number of trainees, targeting headquarters staff including mission leaders" <sup>63</sup>.

Training of staff is adversely affected by the common tendency to employ less gender specialists than intended or to gradually scale down gender specialist staffing positions as the immediate incentive of new policies or procedures fades<sup>64</sup>. An ADB finding from a 2009 evaluation is illustrative of the direct relationship between resources and training intensity:

*"Four gender specialist positions (two that were existing and two additional positions) were envisaged in the Policy but, between 2005 and 2008, ADB operated with two gender specialists. Consequently, the expected training of operational staff and the dissemination of knowledge on GAD were much less intensive than expected".*

Well-articulated mainstreaming policies, such as that of DFID,<sup>65</sup> lose their effectiveness if not supported by training. An evaluation notes that there has been "little or no training by DFID in gender mainstreaming" since such mandatory training was curtailed in the late 1990s and changed to being:

*"... mainstreamed in principle into existing training programmes with the objective of rendering the training more effective by linking gender with technical competencies. However, the gender mainstreaming of the training effort has never been reinforced, and DFID's gender training has effectively come to a halt".*

In DFID, this proved even truer at country level than at headquarters – evaluation case studies of three substantial DFID Country Offices (Bosnia-

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<sup>63</sup> ADB (2009: 14 – 15). Similar training experiences were reported by the EC (2003: 20) and the World Bank (2005 xiii – xiv; 39 – 40); World Bank (2010: xiv; 35 – 36). In the World Bank poor attendance of senior management contrasted with good attendance by often transient consultants and junior staff, who have little influence over the mainstreaming of gender.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid; iii

<sup>65</sup> DFID (2006a: 31 – 32)

Kosovo, India, Nigeria) found that none of them could recall having received any gender training<sup>66</sup>.

Another commonly raised problem with training is that it is not sufficiently targeted for its participants. An EC evaluation noted that the “main weakness of the training was that it was not based on a sufficiently good training needs assessment. Participants were too heterogeneous and the training material was “pre-cooked”, so it was not adapted to the EC’s needs. In the view of the Gender Desk “it would have been better if the training had been very focused and worked with smaller specially selected groups who had the same training needs.” An uncommon example of good practice in gender training is that presented for the European Commission in Madagascar. This shows the degree of effort required to achieve intended results; the absence of which is responsible for the low achievement of many such courses<sup>67</sup>.

*“An example of a successful gender training course in the context of European Commission development co-operation is a residential five-day training course in “gender-integrated PCM” (Project Cycle Management) organised for programme and project managers of EC co-operation in Madagascar in July 2000. This well- targeted training course was developed in response to an identified need and demand by partners and by the ... project, and was based on a solid training needs assessment .... The investment in preparing the training, in adapting the training materials to the specific context of EC-MAD (Madagascar) co-operation and in evaluating and following-up the training was substantial, but this appears to have paid off in view of the results of the evaluation of the training. Follow-up training was provided in 2002....”.*

However, all training programs are susceptible to the effects of attrition as staff are promoted, transferred or leave, or focus their work on other priorities. As the same EC evaluation notes<sup>68</sup>:

*“While one-off courses can have positive effects, the impact of the training is limited and can be difficult to sustain. Although two training sessions had been organised for Delegation, Programme Managers and key counterparts in Jordan in 1999 and 2001, staff and partners felt that further training was needed particularly with the high turn over of staff and the large numbers of new staff”.*

Another challenge highlighted by many evaluations is the perception of training overload felt by some officers in international organizations<sup>69</sup>. At country level, a complex set of barriers to training effectiveness may be perceived. For example, an ILO<sup>70</sup> evaluation noted the following difficulties:

*“... organizational and recruitment difficulties amongst constituents;*

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid: 32

<sup>67</sup> EC (2003: 21)

<sup>68</sup> Ibid: 21

<sup>69</sup> See, EC (2003: 44)

<sup>70</sup> ILO (2005: 11).

*difficulties to identify trainers and local language training materials; the need to train at operational levels rather than at the macro level; project staff turnover; the need for better targeting of the groups for gender sensitization; the need for ILO support to be more decentralized; the need for project documents and structure to provide better guidance for project implementation and evaluation”.*

The question of where gender equality training “fits” is another, which has raised major difficulties. As noted an evaluation of Norad<sup>71</sup>:

*“... it seems that stand alone women and gender equality (W&GE) courses have little appeal, and should be avoided. Since also mainstreaming W&GE into all lectures have met much resistance, the option seems to be specific W&GE sessions to be integrated into core and obligatory courses and training sessions”.*

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

Deficiencies in results reporting, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were widely found by the evaluations reviewed; with no systematic organization-wide good practices yet observable<sup>72</sup>. In those organizations such as ADB, Norad, Sida and the World Bank<sup>73</sup> that have come under the scrutiny of several rounds of organization-wide gender evaluations, M&E remains a stubbornly challenging area. This has serious implications for gender equality mainstreaming; for without systematic results measurement it is impossible to learn systematically from successes and failures. Moreover, good results could be used to advocate for and support mainstreaming.

As noted in a Norad evaluation<sup>74</sup>: “With few exceptions, the projects lacked specific monitoring requirements to assess gender impacts”. This has been a common occurrence, which has been well analyzed, for example, by the Asian Development Bank<sup>75</sup>:

*“Both the Policy itself and the associated section of the Operations Manual presume sound monitoring of GAD activities. So far, despite efforts of GAD specialists on their own to track GAD activities in ongoing TAs and projects, little has been done in terms of standard official documentation to ensure that monitoring takes place. .... project performance reports that track project implementation have no specific category or section for GAD indicators. As a result, progress, or the lack of it, in GAD activities is simply not recorded ....GAD progress is often not covered in back-to-office reports of regular or midterm reviews”.*

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<sup>71</sup> Norad (2005a: 31 – 32)

<sup>72</sup> Repetitive failures seem to be common within the development banks covered with reviews and evaluations covering over 20 years of the ADB and World Bank’s operations.

<sup>73</sup> See ADB (2001: iii; 27 – 28); ADB (2009: iv – v; 25; 48); Sida (2002a: 7; 13; 35; 66); Sida (2010: viii; 7; 11 – 13; 16 – 18); World Bank (1995: 3; 39; 111); World Bank (2005: xiii; 24; 27; 37; 54); World Bank (2010: viii – ix; 29 – 31; 39 – 40)

<sup>74</sup> Ibid: 44

<sup>75</sup> ADB (2009: 25)

Only where GAD advisers had made specific inputs into project M&E systems did this situation improve. The failure to monitor and report gender outputs and outcomes relates to the lack of attention given to GAPs and gender analyses, which could provide the basis for development of intervention baselines and indicator frameworks. In general, it is mainly in the human development sector (covering education, health and social protection), and to a lesser extent in microfinance, that project design analysis, monitoring and evaluation systems have come together to provide a coherent basis for results reporting; and thus a body of experience and practice with the potential to be adapted in other sectors<sup>76</sup>. Monitoring of gender results has often not followed the good intentions of mainstreaming policies and remains a major area for improvement.

The weaknesses in monitoring are mirrored in evaluation, where inclusion and assessment of gender is generally lacking. This is the case for the European Commission, for which it is reported that<sup>77</sup>:

*“Evaluations provide very little information on gender. An assessment was undertaken of final reports of sectoral/programme evaluations, which should be an important source of information on the effects of EC development interventions on target groups and beneficiaries. However, these produced very limited information concerning this evaluative question ... most evaluations had not addressed gender, or even women ...”.*

This was despite the EC evaluation guidelines recommending that cross-cutting issues, including gender be assessed as standard<sup>78</sup>. Several evaluations have also noted that by the time gender interests reach the level of field implementation activities, monitoring is of the “bean counting” variety, rather than providing any useful information about processes and outcomes<sup>79</sup>, that can be evaluated. A Norad review of 63 evaluations showed that 38 did not include any reference to gender. Even in the 24 evaluations that were specifically focused on gender related issues, only 12 contained information about women’s needs and interests. Interestingly, the review found that even when evaluation teams included a female, it made little difference to the adoption of a gender sensitive perspective. The lack of such a perspective appeared not to be generally caused by deliberate exclusion, but rather to derive from the lack of integration of gender into intervention design and monitoring, which enabled it to be overlooked in evaluation. Perceived topic overload and competing demands within Terms of Reference also played a role<sup>80</sup>:

*“Most evaluations are overloaded with tasks to be investigated and assessed and ToRs are usually full of competing demands. Gender issues are not the only policy that evaluation teams have to respond to”.*

A recent World Bank evaluation also found low consideration of gender in

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<sup>76</sup> See particularly the World Bank (2010)

<sup>77</sup> EC (2003: 41)

<sup>78</sup> EC (2003: 35)

<sup>79</sup> Netherlands DGIS (1995: 145)

<sup>80</sup> Norad (2005c: 7 – 8; 28)

implementation completion reports (ICRs); one of the Bank's main self-evaluation tools. Country Assistance Strategy Completion Reports (CASCRs) also more often than not failed to capture gender related outputs or outcomes<sup>81</sup>. But the experience of CIDA's evaluation functions does provide an emerging good practice. Here it was found that evaluation Terms of Reference are more likely to require some form of gender analysis, even for projects not specifically designated as Gender Equality activities, than are monitoring systems<sup>82</sup>:

*"Gender equity appears to be more consistently assessed (generally as a cross-cutting theme) in evaluations of non-GE projects, than in their monitoring. This may be due to the apparently more systematic inclusion of GE among standard evaluation Terms of Reference".*

#### 4.2 Leadership: The Critical Factor

*"You learn far more from negative leadership than from positive leadership, because you learn how not to do it and, therefore, you learn how to do it."*

Norman Schwarzkopf<sup>83</sup>

##### Summary

The evaluative story of gender mainstreaming that emerges from the review is that consistent leadership from management is critical to integrate gender at an organizational, country and intervention level. **When management within donor organizations has not consistently supported the implementation of gender mainstreaming policy, this has not been translated into concrete actions at headquarters or at field level and has experienced what has become widely described as "policy evaporation".**

**Evaluations indicate that gender "champions" need to be situated within senior and middle management; and therefore to have sufficient power to support and influence the implementation of gender mainstreaming policy by technical staff and to ensure necessary assistance to partner governments.** The often-tried technical "fix" to provide "leadership" by increasing the number of gender specialists or by creating dedicated units has not resulted in effective leadership (see following section on resources). This is because the human resources and skills created are not backed up with the power to influence operations. The result has often been the marginalization of gender staff and in some cases the eventual disbanding of such units.

In contrast, to the technical "fix", the review of evaluations indicates that leaders need to go beyond advocacy and develop an organizational structure in which staff motivation, incentives, performance and accountability benchmarks are closely aligned to learning opportunities, resources, and knowledge management in order to effectively support policy implementation. In practice, such alignment has rarely occurred and, in general, the leadership record on gender

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<sup>81</sup> World Bank (2010: 39 – 40)

<sup>82</sup> CIDA (2008: xvii)

<sup>83</sup> [http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/n/norman\\_schwarzkopf.html](http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/n/norman_schwarzkopf.html)

mainstreaming in development organizations demonstrates how not to do it. This section highlights some key leadership issues that emerged from the review.

### **Ups and Downs of Leadership: Evaporation of Mainstreaming Policy**

The importance of management leadership for the effective implementation of gender mainstreaming in donor organizations was cited to varying degrees in all 26 evaluations included in this review. The focus of the majority of the evaluations was on leadership within donor organizations, but it was also an important factor within partner government ministries and agencies as reported by the DFID, Norad, Sida and SDC<sup>84</sup>.

Leadership has not been explicitly defined in the evaluations, but associated with a mix of soft characteristics such as “vision and commitment”, “decision-making and prioritization”, “motivation”, “recognition”, “communication and giving voice” and of hard measurable indicators, such as financial and human resource allocation(s), “incentives” for staff, policy development and dialogue, accountability and performance systems and results targets.

Evaluations judged leadership to be weak or at best variable over time with regard to gender mainstreaming and this had a detrimental impact on its effectiveness. The evaluations noted strong leadership commitment to gender issues at certain times, such as in the years building up to and following the Beijing 4<sup>th</sup> World Conference on Women (1995). During this period of commitment, the mainstreaming agenda was adopted, as evidenced by increased policy emphasis and organizational resource allocations. However, this leadership commitment was not sustained, so that by the end of the 1990s the interest of agencies waned at the senior management level, allowing considerable policy evaporation in most organizations<sup>85</sup>. This evaporation<sup>86</sup> eroded many of the positive organizational changes that had been achieved in the 1990s and constrained the actions of technical staff in advancing gender equality in partner countries. The experience of WFP is illustrative of the experiences across the multilateral and bilateral agencies:

*“WFP started with extraordinary corporate leadership, and staff committed to women’s empowerment. Subsequently, however, leadership has diminished. Staff and partners describe a prolonged quiet regarding gender mainstreaming. They refer to a downward slide over the last couple of years. Many interpret the recent disbanding of the Gender Unit as a dramatic signal of decreased importance – and they have questions about*

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<sup>84</sup> DFID (2006a: xii; 25 – 28); Norad (2005a: 25; 37; 51) Norad (2009a: 29; 37); Sida (2002a: 152 - 160); SDC (2009: 18; 29)

<sup>85</sup> See particularly the experiences of Norad (2005a) and DFID (2006b)

<sup>86</sup> Evaporation is also referred to as ‘vaporisation’ in the corporate world – “In nearly 75 percent of the companies, the leadership team has not made gender parity a stated and visible priority and nearly 80 percent of the firms have not committed resources to the initiatives. One Europe-based female senior manager in a global energy firm says: “Unless senior leaders of the organization are sincerely and genuinely committed to achieving gender parity and putting some metrics and muscle behind it-it won’t ever happen in my lifetime.” See Bain (2010) The Great Disappearing Act: Gender Parity Up the Corporate Ladder. Bain Consulting. Boston.

*the adequacy of current staffing to oversee a new policy and coordinate experience.”<sup>87</sup>*

Decisions to disband gender departments, reduce or not replace gender specialists, or operate with low and often junior or part-time staffing have been reported in evaluations of ADB, Norad, EC, DFID, UNDP, UNICEF, CIDA and Sida<sup>88</sup> in the last 10 years. This shows that, in comparison to other issues, such as governance, poverty reduction, new aid modalities and the private sector, gender is not a priority of leadership.

The leadership failure to move beyond policy to implementation is explored further in the sections below.

### **Competing Leadership Priorities: Sidelining of Gender Mainstreaming**

One of the causes of the erosion of leadership on gender mainstreaming cited by 16 of the evaluations is overload of, or competing development [and leadership] priorities, which have tended to supplant gender equality. As already mentioned, gender mainstreaming gained much attention in the mid to late 1990s, but was soon sidelined by the rise of new priorities, which senior management perceived to be more important. These included the MDGs, including poverty reduction concerns, new aid modalities such as General Budget Support (GBS) and, more recently, such issues as governance, anti-corruption and climate change. Norad’s<sup>89</sup> experience is illustrative. It highlighted women and gender equality as one of its priorities post-Beijing in 1997; but by the mid-2000s this had almost completely disappeared and had been replaced by a new set of priorities; including the MDGs, anti-corruption, HIV-AIDs, environment and rights. Some of these, such as environment, were also promoted as cross-cutting issues with their own mainstreaming agenda<sup>90</sup>. A Norad evaluation of gender in its Zambia program indicated that, whilst gender remains a consideration in core areas such as education, embassy staff “have other priorities” and pay only “lip-service” to gender, which faces a “real danger of donor fatigue”<sup>91</sup>.

The “sidelining” effect of new and competing priorities has been compounded by the poor implementation of gender policies. This has been characterized by missed opportunities to link gender to the new priorities, particularly in the case of GBS. Other symptoms include lack of communication and cooperation between “established” sectors within organizations and gender technical staff (the often reported “silo-effect”), leading to the exclusion of gender from projects and programs; and capacity and mainstreaming overload, compounded by insufficient capacity owing to cuts in gender resources. DFID’s and SDC’s experiences are representative of those of other donors:

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<sup>87</sup> WFP (2008:49)

<sup>88</sup> Norad (2005a: 28 – 29); DFID (2006a: 31; 49); ADB (2009: iii; vii); EC (2003: ii – iv; 14; 20 – 22); UNDP (2006: vi – ix; 12 – 13 – 15; 19); Sida (2002a: 20 – 21; 24); Sida (2010: viii; 12 – 13); UNICEF (2008: vii – viii; 36 – 38); CIDA (2008: 23)

<sup>89</sup> Norad (2005a: 19 – 22; 24)

<sup>90</sup> See also DFID (2006b: 118 – 119); EC (2003: ii; iv; 48 – 50); UNICEF (2008: viii; 21); UNDP (2006: vi – vii; 40)

<sup>91</sup> Norad (2005b: 9 – 10)

*“A common judgment is that after Beijing [1995], DFID engagement in gender issues faded. They did not follow up with resources to governments and civil society to implement the Platform for Action. An opinion is that this process was deepened since top management’s focus was on Poverty Reduction, with no connection seen between Poverty Reduction and women’s rights”.<sup>92</sup>*

*“Gender is widely perceived as just one of a continual stream of thematic requirements, guidelines and priorities. New issues – youth, access to information, corruption, climate change, generate policy discussions and guidelines which are meant to be implemented without anything being removed from the plate.<sup>93</sup>*

*There is also limited cooperation between government departments on gender equality issues. Gender focal points sitting in national, regional and local governments lack the capacity and institutional leverage to strengthen their analysis and integration of gender issues at the policy and program levels.<sup>94</sup>*

*“Innovations in GBS are difficult to implement. In the context of working in aggregation, it is difficult to push certain issues that may not be viewed as the core business of development or sectoral priorities. Donor fatigue aggravates this situation. Changes are hard to introduce into the annual work cycle of planning, budgeting and monitoring. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is little demand to address gender equality issues – the government does not ask for it and gender equality has in reality been pushed to the back burner of the donor agenda, particularly after the introduction of donor harmonization.”<sup>95</sup>*

Country-led and country specific programming has allowed senior management to engage with greater sensitivity and inclusion, but has also resulted in focusing on what countries perceive as their most important short-term issues. Gender equality tends to be an area of low or niche demand from partner countries and this is reflected in donor programming. The only area where gender has maintained a strong operational emphasis is in human development (see 4.5 and Chapter 5), where it is more straight-forward to integrate operationally.

### **Career Incentives and Leadership**

For many of the evaluations reviewed, one of the root causes of leadership failure is the lack of performance benchmarks or delivery standards to hold leaders accountable. This is exacerbated by the lack of monetary and non-monetary incentives to encourage a sustainable focus on and performance enhancement for gender mainstreaming processes and gender equality results.

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<sup>92</sup> DFID (2006b: 119)

<sup>93</sup> SDC (2009: 32)

<sup>94</sup> Ibid: 135

<sup>95</sup> Ibid: 64

Managers, like all staff in donor organizations, respond to their perceptions of the reward and accountability systems; and to how these relate to implementation of their organizations' current development priorities. In cases where managers do not see clear organizational links between gender policy, incentive systems, sanctions and career rewards, the leadership focus on gender has proved unsustainable<sup>96</sup>. The experience of UNICEF demonstrates this<sup>97</sup>:

*"The majority of senior managers noted that there are no real institutional rewards for promoting gender equality within a programming context. In general, they observed that UNICEF tends to reward its senior managers for being efficient in addressing administrative as opposed to substantive issues".*

The World Bank's most recent gender evaluation completed in 2010 finds almost identical accountability, incentive and leadership failures to those identified in its previous (1995 and 2005) evaluations of gender and women's empowerment. The recurring findings demonstrate that senior management progress on developing accountability and incentive systems for gender equality has been slow, despite clear and consistent evaluation findings:

*"The rather elaborate accountability system outlined in the Gender Strategy [2001] was not institutionalized. No standard systems or processes were put in place to assess, reward, or sanction staff and managers' work engagement or outputs." <sup>98</sup>*

*A staff [and management] accountability framework is normally provided by a series of reviews at different stages of processing to ensure that policy is implemented during the preparation of assistance, as in safeguard policies. This evaluation found no similar processes or procedures explicitly requiring a review of the handling of gender issues at any given stage of product processing, including supervision ... As a result, there has been very little institutional accountability for failure to integrate gender considerations. Between fiscal 1996 and fiscal 1997, each Region was asked to prepare and implement gender action plans, but this implementation was not systematically monitored, possibly because of the subsequent reorganizations and changes in management." <sup>99</sup>*

*Current thinking is that more attention needs to be paid to the organizational context, and that incentives to use these new skills should be built into an organization's incentive structure. Another flaw was the lack of provision for follow-up by either the Training Division, the WID unit, or senior management ... First and foremost, a successful gender training program requires a firm commitment from management. This includes senior management participation in the design of the World Bank's gender*

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<sup>96</sup> See experiences of EC (2003: 48 – 49); DFID (2006a: 26 – 27); Norad (2005a: 35 – 36); UNDP (2006: ix; 34 – 35; 39 – 40)

<sup>97</sup> UNICEF (2008: 34)

<sup>98</sup> World Bank (2010: 34)

<sup>99</sup> World Bank (2005: 33 – 34)

*policy and training. It includes the participation of senior management in the training courses. It also includes the provision of incentives through program or personnel reviews for using these skills.”<sup>100</sup>*

In view of the absence of incentive and accountability systems, the implementation of gender mainstreaming and equity policies becomes largely a voluntary exercise, dependent on the commitment and interest of individuals. Few careers advance or fall based on the success or failure of the implementation of gender mainstreaming or gender policy. Ambition, motivation and personal interest to advance are focused on issues that are seen as more important to the organization. These are priorities that may be in-line or at least not conflicting with the current organizational culture. Leaders and aspiring leaders do not see the value of commitment to a cause, which is not valued or promoted within the organizations they serve; with no rewards for its implementation or sanctions for ignoring it. This being so, “gender equality is often left to the hazards of personal interest and chance”.<sup>101</sup>

### **Gender Equality in the Leadership of Donor Organizations**

The question of gender equality within donor organizations was not assessed by all evaluations. However, from those that did it is clear that gender equality at management level is not in sight. Men overwhelmingly occupy the positions of power and influence, at the highest levels of leadership. For example, in UNDP women occupied only 26% of Resident Representative positions<sup>102</sup> and 31% of P5 (senior technical level) positions as of 2006<sup>103</sup>. Similarly, an earlier evaluation (1995) of women in development in Netherlands’ overseas assistance found that “the higher the rank, the smaller the percentage of female staff – only a few percent of the highest ranking staff in the Ministry are women”<sup>104</sup>.

Such low figures are often attributed to the competing social roles of women, which mean that a sustained career path is not always possible. However, this also indicates that many organizations do not have the right human resource policies to assist professionals to achieve work-life balance. An evaluation of UNICEF seems to support this conclusion<sup>105</sup>:

*They [staff] did not see how UNICEF could practice gender equality externally in its programs without also practicing it internally. They also noted that UNICEF was not a particularly child or family-friendly organization for staff, citing long work hours as a challenge for those with*

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<sup>100</sup> World Bank (1995: 109 – 110)

<sup>101</sup> Sida (2002a: 103)

<sup>102</sup> Although not reported in any of the evaluations, this review looked at former and present presidents of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). We found that since their creation, only men have been selected as presidents of the World Bank, ADB, AfDB, IADB, IsDB, EIB or the EBRD. Whilst this may be an anecdotal measure of gender equality as there are many factors at play in selecting presidents of MDBs it seems gender equality has not played a significant role, despite the increasing availability of well-qualified women leaders within the development, corporate and political fields.

<sup>103</sup> UNDP (2006: 20)

<sup>104</sup> Netherlands DGIS (1995: 24)

<sup>105</sup> UNICEF (2008: 22)

*children or other family responsibilities and the fact that there was little attention to the work-life balance throughout the organization.*

An SDC evaluation reported that women's advancement and equal opportunities within the organization improved significantly in the period it covered. Many more women were recruited, and there were more holding senior management positions. Furthermore, the SDC put in place family friendly policies such as telecommuting and part-time work options. However, although these are good concepts, they have yet to be fully translated into 'good practice'; and the evaluation reported that their application has been skewed by deeply embedded cultural norms regarding the position of women and traditional attitudes to work<sup>106</sup>.

*The very success of the women's advancement and equal opportunity efforts has created a new series of challenges that only attention to more deeply embedded ways of working can address. Staff reported that although it is possible to work part-time, job responsibilities are seldom reduced to match: in other words, they feel they are expected to carry the load of a full-time worker. This means that there is little time for learning or reflection. The administrative work required to facilitate decisions and program implementation dominates the agenda. In addition, it is mainly women who take advantage of part-time work: their male counterparts feel less able to do so, or are only beginning to consider that possibility ... Tele-work is grudgingly allowed or refused by some managers, and there is no perceived consistency in permission or refusal. Some senior managers see little possibility of any way of working other than the model they themselves have lived: having a primary commitment in time and dedication to work at the expense of work/life balance. Many of these men come from a tradition of wives whose job it is to raise the children and support their husband's career. Few of the senior women have young children.*

Although SDC has increased its ranks of women professionals, this has not resulted in systematic improvements in the mainstreaming of gender equality in interventions in partner countries.

### **4.3 Resources for Delivery**

#### **Summary**

This section addresses financial and human resources provided to mainstream gender equality. **The majority of the evaluations indicate that resources have been insufficient to enable effective mainstreaming of gender equality within donor organizations.** While less information is available from the country-level, what there is suggests that resources within partner governments for gender equality mainstreaming are constraining their ability to achieve sustainable results.

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<sup>106</sup> SDC (2009: 30)

**Human resources in organizations, in terms of the numbers of gender specialists, have remained at a low level or been cut. Personnel responsible for gender mainstreaming in many organizations are often relatively junior or part-time staff. This has made mainstreaming difficult due to lack of influence such staff have on senior management. Furthermore, gender expertise and activities have not been integrated into the roles and responsibilities of non-gender specialist staff, so that gender has failed to become everyone's business**

**There is no established good practice 'baseline' for financial resource commitments to enable effective mainstreaming.** Most evaluations highlight the financial resource challenge, but there are scant data available on resourcing gap(s), because most agencies do not have budgeting, which can readily identify commitments to gender mainstreaming at the administrative or intervention level.

### **Human Resources for Mainstreaming**

Human resources are central to mainstreaming gender equality at the organizational and field level. Skilled personnel are needed to deliver appropriate knowledge and to conduct analysis and monitoring functions in the design and implementation of interventions; as well as to provide policy and technical advice to partner governments. Evaluations indicate that a comprehensive approach to mainstreaming would require gender specialists at headquarters and country level (for those agencies with such a structure) with budgets and a mandate to influence the design and implementation of interventions, and to provide technical support to partner governments. With the exception of the IOM<sup>107</sup>, evaluations tended to report that human resources were not sufficient to support mainstreaming of gender equality<sup>108</sup>. Staffing levels in many organizations had undergone cuts or experienced reorganizations<sup>109</sup> that reduced the ability to deliver intended results. The timing and pattern of cuts is broadly related to the management, leadership and prioritization issues already highlighted. The prevalent human resource challenges are a symptom of the inconsistent leadership focus on gender.

Organizations that have not cut back on gender-focused staff, tend to be those that started off with relatively low human resources in this area. A recent World Bank evaluation stated<sup>110</sup>:

*A rough estimate by the Gender Group in PREM suggests that staff at the Bank working on gender full or part time number about 64 full-time staff (about 0.59 percent of total staff as of fiscal 2006). This is broadly confirmed by an examination of recruitment figures in the Bank between fiscal 2003 and*

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<sup>107</sup> IOM (2006: 8 – 25) – although the mandate of IOM is tightly-focused and the extent of mainstreaming activities is limited.

<sup>108</sup> ADB (2009: viii; 13) BMZ (2006: 5); DFID (2006a: 31 – 32); EC (2003: iv – xvii; 25 – 27); Norad (2005a: 6; 30); Norad (2009a: 4; 44); Sida (2002a: viii; xv; 20 – 21; 25); Sida (2010: viii; 11 – 12); UNDP (2006: 12 – 13); UNICEF (2008: viii; 26; 28 – 29); World Bank (2010: 34 – 35)

<sup>109</sup> See experiences of Norad (2005a); UNDP (2006) and UNICEF (2008)

<sup>110</sup> World Bank (2010: 35)

*2009—staff recruited and mapped to the Gender Network constitute 0.50 percent of all staff recruited.*

*At a Regional level, those with gender skills included regional gender coordinators (RGCs); at the country level, country focal points were the locus of those skills. Interviews with RGCs suggest that the time spent on gender work has declined over the evaluation period, with RGCs and country focal points taking on multiple responsibilities unconnected with gender, or the gender responsibility being added to the work of staff fully engaged with other responsibilities.*

*It is difficult to conclude whether the Bank maintained adequate gender specialists during the evaluation period. During the same period (fiscal 2003–09), the Bank hired almost four times the staff for the environment sector, and as of May 2009, there are more than 16 times the staff formally mapped to environment (267) than to gender (16).”*

Although mainstreaming should result in gender becoming everyone’s business, therefore effectively making the role of dedicated gender specialists largely redundant, this organizational status has not been realized in practice. DFID, for example, did not build a cadre of gender specialists, but made this area part of the remit of social development advisers (SDAs). A DFID evaluation found that, although gender specialist staff resources were limited, DFID was active at the international policy and strategic level, and with research on gender equality. This did not filter down to the country implementation level, where the availability of resources and training for staff was minimal. The SDAs, who had overall responsibility for gender mainstreaming, tended to be more focused on other priorities, notably a poverty focus and the MDGs. Although in principle, all DFID staff were responsible for gender mainstreaming, “diffused responsibility all too easily equates to no responsibility, no DFID staff members [including SDAs] are held accountable for the attainment of gender policies in practice”. To cope with the lack of in-house human resources, DFID outsourced many gender responsibilities, resulting in a loss of institutional memory in this area. Furthermore, the social development practice gradually weakened in comparison with the economics, conflict and governance departments through the attrition of key staff. The evaluation concluded “that the current level of staffing is not appropriate for broad based gender mainstreaming”<sup>111</sup>. It is clear that the diffused responsibility structure adopted by DFID did not work in the absence of incentive and accountability measures.

Many organizations adopted a structure of “Gender Focal Points,” in part to substitute for dedicated gender specialists. The intended use of focal points has been to disseminate gender-based knowledge resources across sectors at the country or field level; as well as to provide informal backstopping and advice to supplement formal training. The SDC, EC, UNDP and UNICEF evaluations found<sup>112</sup> that many Gender Focal Points did not possess enough knowledge on

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<sup>111</sup> DFID (2006a: xviii; 31 – 32)

<sup>112</sup> EC (2003: 50-51) and SDC (2009: 32; 153 – 154). Sida (2002a: 69 – 70; 149); Sida (2010: 12); Norad (2005a: 27 – 30); UNICEF (2008: ix); UNDP (2006: vi; 12 – 13)

gender issues to assist other staff or to provide advice to partner governments. In the case of UNDP, for example, gender focal points were often the “most junior staff, with no job description or clear sense of role”, and in many cases their gender responsibilities were one task among many, making them very much part-time focal points. In Norad, the network of gender focal points in regional departments was created in the late 1990s but had “disintegrated” by 2004, due to “lack of status, mandate and management support”.

Although the gender focal point system of deploying human resources for mainstreaming has the potential to work, it will only do so if the focal points have the time, knowledge and support from management to influence their colleagues. The example of Sida indicates that, although it has persisted with the focal point system, the organizational result has not changed. An early Sida evaluation (2002) shows that, while focal points possessed detailed gender knowledge, other staff in the embassies viewed gender mainstreaming as the responsibility of the “focal point” and not themselves. Therefore mainstreaming stopped at the focal point. The follow up evaluation of gender in 2010 again reported that focal points were finding it difficult to influence colleagues and that they were overburdened with other responsibilities<sup>113</sup>.

At the country and field level, evaluations show a similar situation to that at headquarters, with few gender specialists. As previously discussed, most organizations established a structure of part-time gender focal points in embassies or country offices to assist partner countries and their colleagues to mainstream gender equality, often with limited or non-existent back up<sup>114</sup>. In general, full time gender specialists are few in number, have not been decentralized to field positions and are remote from the design and implementation of the interventions they need to influence and support. As a complementary approach, the ADB has had some success with the recruitment of national gender specialists through its regional technical assistance funds<sup>115</sup> in six<sup>116</sup> of its member countries. These personnel enabled it to serve the needs of partner countries and incoming missions more effectively<sup>117</sup>:

*“The consensus is that these experts provided valuable support to the Resident Missions themselves, operational staff from headquarters, and the individual governments. However, the sustainability of this measure is in question since funding comes from a series of Regional Technical Assistance funds, and is, thus, time-bound and could end once the technical assistance is completed.”*

While national gender specialists somewhat strengthened the ADB approach, until 2008 it functioned with only two full time gender specialists in its

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<sup>113</sup> Sida (2010: 12); Sida (2002a: 70; 111; 149; 153)

<sup>114</sup> See for example, UNICEF (2008); Norad (2005a & 2009a); Sida (2002a & 2010).

<sup>115</sup> Regional Technical Assistance funding is not part of the ‘core’ ADB administrative budget.

<sup>116</sup> Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Vietnam.

<sup>117</sup> ADB (2009: 27)

headquarters,<sup>118</sup> which limited the amount of time and training that could be devoted to integrating gender concerns into its interventions.

Findings concerning national governments were inconsistently reported across the evaluations reviewed, due to differences in their focus and design. However, where information is available, it shows that similar human resource challenges to those found in donor organizations are common within Ministries and government departments; including low numbers of staff with gender equality skills, attrition of staff, and male-bias in management and performance perspectives, which constrain opportunities for gender equality. Sida's experiences in Bangladesh, South Africa and Kenya are illustrative<sup>119</sup>:

*"The overt policy environment for advocacy relating to gender equality in Bangladesh must be seen as very positive. For most external development partners in Bangladesh, the difficulties in promoting gender equality have been much more on the operational side than in the basic policy framework. They have noted that the very large scale and limited resources of many ministries, agencies and programmes has often meant that priorities expressed at the national level are not followed-through with specific actions within development interventions. Or, alternatively, those actions are frustrated by operational issues relating to staff turnover, availability of resources, training and the need to serve very large programme constituencies with very limited resources."*

*"There are no plans in place to ensure that [South African] legislation is implemented and monitoring systems are very weak. In addition, the gender structures in government remain relatively weak and under-resourced."*

*In Kenya, "Trainers also remarked that while the training on cross-cutting issues [gender] often was "a real eye-opener" to some of the (exclusively male) District Engineers, it would be unrealistic to expect them to champion the issue since their primary concern is the quality of roads, which is what they will be evaluated on in their own reporting systems and performance contracts".*

### **Recruitment Processes**

Recruitment processes also reflect the absence of serious attention to gender expertise and experience, with relatively few gender specialists within most organizations. Gender does not feature as a cross-cutting issue in recruitment of non-gender specialists. For example, in UNICEF<sup>120</sup>:

*"HQ is responsible for preparing generic job descriptions of the different positions held by UNICEF staff. With the exception of the GFPs (Gender Focal Points) at the HQ level, these job descriptions do not include any reference*

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<sup>118</sup> It was originally envisaged that four gender specialists would work across the Bank, but 2 positions were not filled because of internal reorganizations. The situation remained the same until steps were taken in 2009 to recruit extra full-time staff. See ADB (2009: iii; 26 – 27)

<sup>119</sup> Sida (2002a: 12 – 13) & Sida (2010: 15)

<sup>120</sup> UNICEF (2008: 34)

*to staff responsibilities for incorporating gender as a cross-cutting issue in their specific area of work. This means that during recruitment, staff are not routinely asked about their competencies in relation to gender, and there is nothing in their job description to hold them accountable for their performance in relation to gender equality.”*

A common “remedy” to the continuing absence of the required distribution of gender expertise throughout donor organizations is simply to “hire in” consultants or junior staff<sup>121</sup> to address these issues as needed<sup>122</sup>. Although such practices may be more cost-effective and provide organizations with much needed flexibility, the problem with this approach is that the knowledge and overview of the institution gained by the consultants almost always stays with them, rather than permeating the institution itself. Therefore, it is not a real solution to internal human resource deficiencies. Furthermore, junior staff and consultants often have very limited influence on organizations, as they are either not sufficiently embedded or are “on the outside”.

So, overall the low status of gender equality expertise in the recruitment patterns of international development institutions has tended to reinforce the perception of other staff that gender is not a high priority.

### **Financing for Gender Mainstreaming**

Financing for gender mainstreaming is another critical factor, to ensure adequate budgets for gender specialist staff positions and consultants; as well as for capacity building resources, such as tools and training. Furthermore, funds need be available at the intervention level; to provide for incorporation of gender analysis, supervision and M&E. The evaluations reveal two issues that are discussed below: Firstly, the tracking of financing is weak meaning there is no established good practice on the costs of effective mainstreaming or the funding gaps. Secondly, despite the lack of financial data, on the basis of proxy indicators most evaluations conclude financial resources are not sufficient to support organizational changes required to mainstream gender equality.

The availability of evaluative data on financing at the organizational and intervention level is relatively weak, as it was not possible for all evaluations to get a clear picture of administrative or intervention level budget commitments. Some data are not reported<sup>123</sup>, while other evaluations noted deficiencies in internal tracking of budgets and expenditures<sup>124</sup>, such as the absence of any formal budget line for implementing gender policy, which meant that there was no specific and traceable allocation within the system.

Among the evaluations reviewed, there are some emerging good practices. For example, AusAid and CIDA have put in place financial tracking through a ‘marker’ on gender expenditures in interventions, although less detailed information is

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<sup>121</sup> UNDP (2006: vi; 13); SDC (2010: 59); UNICEF (2008: ix)

<sup>122</sup> See particularly the experience of the EC (2003: iii; 22; 27; 33 – 34)

<sup>123</sup> Norad (2005a: 7; 9); Sida (2002a & 2010);

<sup>124</sup> ADB (2001: iii; 21 – 22); DFID (2006a: 33 – 34); UNDP (2006: 17); WFP (2008: 54 – 55; 83);

available on administrative budgets<sup>125</sup>. However, even when tracking systems have been put in place they can be undermined by uneven record keeping and interpretation as the experience of DFID shows<sup>126</sup>:

*“... the system, or the way it is applied, has many limitations. The GE score mainly represents intentions at the project design stage and does not reflect the actual implementation of a project nor its achievements. There is also some evidence indicating that there are differences in the interpretation of GE markers (and hence inconsistencies in their application) between countries. This was evident in the Nigeria country study and in interviews with country office and HQ staff: ‘the markers are applied in a non-coherent manner’, was a typical comment. The gender marking of some of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) expenditure also supports the view that the GE marker is applied inconsistently. The PRBS to Uganda is ‘principal’ gender marked, the PRBS to Ethiopia is ‘significant’ gender marked, while more than 80% of DFID’s total PRBS expenditure is not gender marked at all. Altogether, the relationship between GE marked expenditure, the incorporation of gender objectives into project documents and actual results is uneven.”*

However, despite the problems with establishing how much and in what way financial resources are deployed, with or without hard data, most of the evaluations concluded that not enough financing was provided to mainstream gender equality. This was concluded on the basis of proxy indicators: such as level of human resources, training and inclusion of gender in interventions<sup>127</sup>; inconsistent or lack of use of procedures and tools to enable gender mainstreaming; lack of monitoring and absence of observable results. The recent WFP, UNICEF and Sida<sup>128</sup> evaluations are illustrative of some of the financing issues, which contribute towards mainstreaming failure:

*“With a fixed budget structure and no line for the gender policy, WFP has not fully mainstreamed gender in budgeting or decentralized it at the operational level This means limited opportunities to initiate opportune initiatives, adjust to changes, and meet emerging needs at the operational level ..” (WFP 2008)*

*“Resources have been inadequate for the Gender Policy implementation. HQ’s support for and commitment to the policy should mean: consultation, resources for programs, especially M&E and finally resources to target women.”(WFP 2008)*

*“There is a gap between corporate policies and their practical implementation at the CO level, which is partly due to a lack of financial and technical resources. Support for gender mainstreaming is often hampered*

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<sup>125</sup> AusAid (2008: 19); CIDA (2008: 10 – 12)

<sup>126</sup> DFID (2006a: 33)

<sup>127</sup> BMZ (2006: 4); EC (2003: 24 – 25); Norad (2005a: 7 – 9); Sida (2010: viii; ix); UNDP (2006: 14 – 19); UNICEF (2008: viii; x; 3 – 4; 38 – 39); WFP (2008: iii; 54 – 55)

<sup>128</sup> WFP (2008: 83) – direct quotes from interviewees; UNICEF (2008: 3); Sida (2010: 18)

*by the perception that it is a complex and redundant strategy in the face of high workloads. The unconditional support of senior managers at the CO level, which is necessary for effective implementation of the Policy, is not always forthcoming.” (UNICEF 2008)*

*“At field level, a clear limitation is the lack of in-house capacities in terms of human and financial resources to provide ongoing support and coaching, given that Sida does not have full-time gender advisers available in-house even for large country programs like Kenya and Ethiopia. There is also no flexible fund available to source such support from the outside.”(Sida 2010)*

The financial challenges facing mainstreaming have been well reported earlier in the last decade. A widely circulated EC<sup>129</sup> evaluation stated:

*“Financial resources have also been seriously insufficient. Rather than increasing the budget allocation to gender to match the new demand, the main financial resource to support gender mainstreaming was reduced just at the moment when the program of action was required to come into effect” (EC 2003)*

In many organizations, evaluation findings on insufficient financing for gender mainstreaming have not led to an appropriate response; whether because of insufficient management commitment and resistance or of weak evaluation systems or both is difficult for this review to determine.

#### **4.4 Accountability and Incentives**

##### **Summary**

A broad conclusion from the evaluations reviewed is that **gender mainstreaming has not been consistently incorporated into overall organizational reform processes, designed to improve development effectiveness, but advanced as a separate category with no incentives or accountability**<sup>130</sup>.

Many evaluations have echoed the Norwegian finding, “that mainstreaming is an uphill struggle and requires top management’s commitment, middle managers’ priority setting and dedicated staff on the ground, and good management systems”<sup>131</sup>. Incentives are a potential tool to secure commitment and raise the priority of gender equality amongst the many other objectives to which development institutions strive to contribute. It cannot be said that the evaluations reviewed found in any agency the full combination required to deliver on the policy commitments made.

**Although the absence of incentive systems has been strongly emphasized by evaluators as one of the key factors limiting the achievement of results for gender equality, it is important to note that discussions about the**

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<sup>129</sup> EC (2003: 24)

<sup>130</sup> See for example, BMZ (2006); UNDP (2006); AusAid (2008);

<sup>131</sup> Norad (2009a: 7)

**effects of such systems are almost entirely hypothetical. In practice, they do not seem to exist in any coherent form.** For this reason, the status they have acquired as a solution to the broad failure of gender mainstreaming should be approached with some caution.

A number of concrete features would need to be in overall institutional systems to generate a coherent response. These would include gender-focused Terms of Reference for staff and consultants, support services to provide tailored expert advice, time and financial budgets to enable quality implementation; and incentive systems to provide motivation to personnel at all levels, who currently see gender mainstreaming as just one priority amongst many. This section focuses on the importance of incentive systems and their relationship to accountability.

### **The Importance of Incentives**

The importance of incentives for the success of gender mainstreaming was emphasized in 20 of the evaluations reviewed<sup>132</sup>. Most attention is focused on their role within donor organizations, although a few studies have noted that such incentives are just as necessary among national partners at Central Government level (Ministries, Departments and Agencies) and among field level implementing organizations.

The concept of incentives covers a broad spectrum: including such direct and “tangible” benefits as pay level and promotion; as well as less tangible factors, such as “recognition” and access to increased budgets for activities seen to promote gender mainstreaming. In addition to personal incentives, the value of recognition or reward systems for high performing teams, departments or projects is widely noted. Staff interpreted the lack of such incentives as an indicator of the lack of top management commitment. For example, in the European Commission<sup>133</sup>:

*“Staff members believe that gender is very low on the list of priorities of the institution. While there is widespread awareness of the necessity of making formal references to “gender as a cross-cutting issue” in texts, there are no incentives or encouragement to address gender substantively in the management of EC development co-operation.”*

### **Institutional Commitment to Incentives and Accountability**

An important consideration for gender mainstreaming is who “owns” this priority within the organization? Is ownership clearly identified and does the owning entity have sufficient weight to make things happen? A fully-fledged incentive system needs to be initiated and supported by senior management.

The absence of such commitment has been recorded at all levels of donor organizations. In the EC, it is seen as trickling down from “top management” into the key middle management level, where there is little “championship” of gender

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<sup>132</sup> See for example, Norad (2005a: 7; 57 – 58); DFID (2006a: xv; 26 – 27; 56 – 60); ADB (2001: 23); ADB (2009: viii; 6 – 7; 16); UNICEF (2008: 31 – 32); SDC (2009: 153; 283 – 284)

<sup>133</sup> EC (2003: iv)

equality, which might bring in an element of “distributed leadership”. This supports the conclusion that “mainstreaming results and experiencing changes in gender equality on the ground require staff and other resources, especially at country level, as well as incentives to promote the pursuit of synergies between different goals”<sup>134</sup>. So the perceived lack of genuine commitment at the top of development institutions has been found to work its way down throughout the system, even to the field level.

This failure to institutionalize intentions to mainstream is well illustrated by the case of the World Bank, where the most recent evaluation found that<sup>135</sup>:

*“... the gender policy was weakly institutionalized within the Bank. The accountability framework, well laid out in the Gender Strategy, was not operationalized, and the monitoring system was not fully established. On gender-related staffing, budgeting, and partnerships, there is little information. At the corporate level, no control systems were established for gender integration. .... Further, some Regional processes to monitor gender integration during the previous evaluation were eliminated during this period. Thus, there are few or no control systems at any level to ensure implementation of the gender policy”.*

Even at the level of preparing policy and strategy documents, the inclusion of gender is seen as optional since, for example, this “does not make any difference in terms of sanctions or rewards and recognition within the organization. DFID staff have acknowledged the fact that there is too little or no incentive to address gender equality in policy and strategy work”<sup>136</sup>.

Thus the absence of effective incentives to promote gender mainstreaming, which is a prevalent finding among the evaluations reviewed, forms part of a more all-embracing symptom of failed commitment. This lack of incentives passively supports the failure to use the gender tools and procedures necessary to achieve results, the effects of which become self-reinforcing. As documented earlier, procedures and processes have been developed without clear accountability mechanisms to ensure their use and this approach has not met with success. A Norad (2009) mid-term review of gender initiatives reports that GAPs were planned to be undertaken between 2007 and 2010, but that this did not happen because management resisted separate planning and reporting lines; and there was no accountability mechanism to force managers to follow the policy. The Norad evaluation concluded: “Using regular established management lines seems not to be easy when one wants to introduce new innovative thinking and practices/praxis”<sup>137</sup>.

### **Lack of Monitoring as a Disincentive**

Monitoring of the achievements of mainstreamed programs is an important dimension; since it provides feedback on intervention progress and the

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<sup>134</sup> EC (2003: 49)

<sup>135</sup> World Bank (2010: 34)

<sup>136</sup> DFID (2006a: 54)

<sup>137</sup> Norad (2009a: 39)

foundation for lesson learning. However, as already discussed, it is often reported to be weak or non-existent. A “vicious circle” is set in motion; in which the “lack of visible results in the field of gender equality (as a result of lack of monitoring and communicating results) serves in itself as a disincentive for staff to promote the gender equality in their work”<sup>138</sup> In other words, the lack of reported results from gender work feeds a lack of interest in promoting such work, which in turn leads to a low level of results (see also 4.5).

### **Personal Development Incentives**

Another prevalent aspect across the evaluations reviewed is the lack of gender specific performance indicators in staff personal development plans, terms of reference or job descriptions<sup>139</sup>; with the exception of those specifically engaged as gender experts. There is a need for clear guidelines on mainstreaming, strong incentive systems and performance tracking to ensure that these are producing the desired increased commitment and activity. A particular problem identified is that gender is largely absent from the competency assessments of senior management so that they rarely have sufficient knowledge or commitment to the area to ensure that those below them in the system are pressured to perform with regard to gender mainstreaming.

In addition to this gap in competencies, the evaluations found that few managers include gender as a key element of their annual objectives; and that this gap feeds into the objectives of the staff they supervise, who also largely ignore gender. For example, an evaluation in UNICEF found that only 2 out of 94 people interviewed (who were not Gender Focal Points) had gender equality as one of their key assignments<sup>140</sup>. A WFP evaluation found that the inclusion of gender in individual performance tracking systems was “very low”. However, in order to appear to be in line with required competencies, staff indiscriminately scattered standard phrases from the gender policy in their performance tracking reports in a manner, which made it impossible to track actual capacities and gaps<sup>141</sup>. Such practices reduce the value of performance tracking tools to hold staff accountable for policy-related actions.

The evaluations found no clear accountability for implementation of the ubiquitous mainstreaming policies and strategies; since these are excluded from the Job Descriptions, Terms of Reference and personal performance targets, which drive most development organization systems.

### **Learning as an Incentive**

Individual and group incentives to learn about gender equality and mainstreaming are also generally low; leaving the ubiquitous toolkits, manuals

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<sup>138</sup> Sida (2010: 18); see also experiences of the World Bank (2010: 34 – 36);

<sup>139</sup> See for example DFID (2006a: 25); EC (2003: ix; 48 – 49); UNDP (2006: vi - x); SDC (2009: 31); Sida (2005a: 81 – 82; 169)

<sup>140</sup> UNICEF (2008: xiv; 34 – 35)

<sup>141</sup> WFP (2008: 161)

and training on good practices to gender specialists and consulting staff<sup>142</sup>. In UNDP<sup>143</sup>:

*“... the Gender Unit and BDP practice areas provide guidance; there is an internet forum and country-based knowledge management networks. Guidance is also available in person from a variety of sources. However, staff have no incentive to use these resources or take opportunities for training”.*

Learning is not mandatory but left to personal motivation, which reduces an institution’s capacity to implement its mainstreaming policy. This has been seen as particularly important at Country Office level, where learning incentives for gender mainstreaming approaches are seen as essential for the sustainability of positive gender outcomes.

### **Recognition as an Incentive**

The increased focus on high-level development goals, notably the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has also been found to detract from monitoring of gender mainstreaming results. In DFID, for example, staff achievements are mainly rated by senior management in connection with their contribution to the Department’s Public Service Agreement; which only considers gender to the (limited) extent that the issue is specifically mentioned in the MDGs. This was found to translate at Country Office level to a very low priority, when compared with such issues as debt relief<sup>144</sup>.

In some cases, decentralization of decision making to country level has allowed corporate policies, such as gender mainstreaming, to be pushed to the periphery, unless there are compulsory directives that they should be implemented as a matter of priority.

### **Gender Equality and Development Effectiveness**

The main opportunity to encourage adoption of gender equality measures at operational levels is where there is clear evidence that these give programs or projects higher development effectiveness. Such improved results, rather than gender dimensions in themselves, can generate recognition within the system, with its anticipated linkage to an improved career path. It can be seen from this that one of the over-arching failures of mainstreaming gender is to show clear results linkages with overall development effectiveness, an area that organizations do value and reward. If this had been done more effectively, the impetus for gender mainstreaming could have been greatly increased, since its contribution to system rewards could have been secured.

In addition to the potential or actual connection between recognition and rewards, is the positive feeling that gender-focused staff receive when it is clear that they are listened to by supervisors and managers and their advice leads to improved approaches.

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<sup>142</sup> See for example World Bank (2010: 35 – 37)

<sup>143</sup> UNDP (2006: vi; 14 – 15)

<sup>144</sup> DFID (2006a: 49 – 50)

### **Recognizing Exceptional Work**

Another missed possibility to raise the profile and status of gender equality work is that of corporate awards or budgetary incentives for exceptional work in the area. Discretionary funds could be set aside to provide support for innovative or effective programs through a “Gender Challenge Fund” or Gender Awards<sup>145</sup>. The area of budgeting in general is one, which has not been widely used in support of gender equality work. An allocation solely for this purpose in program or project budgets, which is lost if appropriate activities are absent, could provide a strong incentive to pay adequate attention to a gender perspective. Such resources should be earmarked and traceable, to allow for monitoring of results, as well as to act as an incentive. If some units or offices are enjoying additional budgets in recognition of the strength of their gender equality work, this would place pressure on others to step up their efforts.

### **Coherence of Mainstreaming Approaches Across Systems**

Hardly any evaluations cover this dimension, presumably because their Terms of Reference focus on mainstreaming issues in development organizations themselves. However, it is important to note that, even if the formidable barriers to effective mainstreaming within donor organizations were overcome, the next two levels in the system, of partner governments and field implementation agencies face as many or more challenges. So substantive achievement is still far away. Box 2 below shows some of the problems encountered at country level.

#### *Box 2: National Level Barriers to Gender Mainstreaming*

The issue of national level barriers to gender mainstreaming was addressed in an Asian Development Bank Evaluation, which included case studies of nine projects. The evaluation notes:

“A common problem observed in most of the nine projects evaluated was the difficulty government departments appeared to have in implementing the “software” provisions due to institutional barriers. Design assumptions were made that the EAs (Executing Agencies) were committed to and could manage and supervise gender provisions, and that the IAs (implementing Agencies) had the capacity to implement them. However, the incentive structure of the institutional system was not geared to achieving such implementation”. (P.22)

“There was insufficient policy commitment and too few staff incentives to achieve the gender objectives. Closer supervision from ADB is required, along with extra design components for training health staff to understand the need for innovation and change. New staff incentives are required in the structure and organization of health and family planning service provision, as the current system of incentives deters change”. (P.23).

The need to strengthen accountability at country level has been inconsistently addressed. The Australian aid system is one, which has tried to do so<sup>146</sup>:

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<sup>145</sup> UNDP (2006: 46)

<sup>146</sup> AusAid (2008: 27 – 28)

*“The aid program has taken steps to institutionalise a more consistent response, including, importantly, by improving accountability at country program level through the annual program and thematic performance reporting processes. At initiative level, the quality reporting process is proving to be a valuable accountability mechanism. ... Strengthened institutional processes and accountability mechanisms will continue to be an important determinant of success. In the short term, attribution of gender equality results to Australia’s aid program will continue to rely on monitoring inputs and processes”*

Many evaluations covered by this review paid remarkably little attention to the need for incentives at field level to include gender dimensions. The only specific observation on this issue is again from the ADB<sup>147</sup>:

*“... although financiers may not favour the integration of microfinance with other projects, it provides a powerful incentive for women to form groups, associations, and cooperatives, and to become involved in community management activities. In gender-segregated communities, it also gives husbands an incentive to allow their wives to take part”.*

At this field level, difficulties in recruiting female field workers also pose problems in many projects, where broader cultural norms restrict the activities of women. Again in the experience of the ADB, solutions were felt to be far away<sup>148</sup>:

*“Ultimately, the answers to providing female field staff for rural development programs and finding more responsive EAs and implementing agencies may lie in public sector reforms that permit greater flexibility in recruitment processes and incentives. Meanwhile, in the short term, ADB may have to consider training and employment of women field workers as an integral component of all rural development projects. In countries where the shortage of female field staff is not as problematic, the requirement to deploy or recruit and train women field staff should be included as a loan covenant”.*

#### **4.5 Results Reporting**

*“A gender problem is a problem for everyone and women’s issues are people’s issues”.<sup>149</sup>*

#### **Summary**

The main focus of reviewed evaluations **has tended to place the focus on process issues relating to mainstreaming, as they are constrained by poor or non-existent monitoring and evaluation data.**

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<sup>147</sup> ADB (2009: 15)

<sup>148</sup> ADB (2009: iii)

<sup>149</sup> ILO (2005: 16)

**The results that are reported tend to be in traditionally strong areas for gender such as education and health where there is good understanding of linkages with gender equality and clear donor and country ownership. Mainstreaming results have not been scaled-up and / or transferred coherently to other important areas such as infrastructure. Furthermore, results tend to be reported at the individual project level, hence are easily atomized within and across organizations and resistant to dissemination or scale-up.**

**Resonating with the earlier synthesis conducted by Norad<sup>150</sup>, this review finds that reported results in many evaluations tend to focus on women as opposed to gender** reinforcing the critique that GAD is largely reduced to WID in practice.

### **Limited, Fragmented and Invisible Results**

The recording and systematic documentation of gender equality results overtime across sectors would perhaps be single most powerful tool for development practitioners to give mainstreaming purpose and power. However, one of the most common themes of this evaluative synthesis has been the lack of monitoring and evaluation, and supervision systems across donor organizations, which has resulted in limited, anecdotal results reporting and / or 'invisible results'. Lack of monitoring has already been discussed as creating vicious circle of disincentives to integrate gender into the design or implementation of interventions (see 4.4), however it also constrains the production of good practices and an evidence-base from which inspiration can be taken and disseminated across organizations<sup>151</sup>. The second evaluation of Sida's gender policy completed in 2010 is illustrative of the challenges:

*"In the absence of country-level gender strategies and indicators, it is difficult to assess the overall results in gender especially in relation to Sweden's four priorities for gender equality. There is also no framework by which individual projects can assess progress towards these objectives, share lessons learned, or identify synergies among projects. In general, gender objectives and indicators are weak or non-existent, and are consequently rarely monitored or reported on. As a result, many of the good gender results encountered were at an anecdotal level and were invisibilized. Therefore, there was neither feedback into institutional learning nor was there any use made of them to demonstrate the impact of gender equality on development results."<sup>152</sup>*

Furthermore, evaluations spanning the last decade indicate that donor organizations have major internal challenges to disseminating results even when they are well-documented, with an often limited or traditional emphasis on

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<sup>150</sup> Norad (2006: 10 – 12)

<sup>151</sup> See EU (2003: 22 – 23; 52); DFID (2006: xiii; 20 – 21); ILO (2005: 9 – 11); Norad (2005: 8; 41); Norad (2007: 7); SDC (2009: 285)

<sup>152</sup> Sida (2010: vii)

gender equality in education and health sectors<sup>153</sup>. For example the third World Bank gender evaluation (2010) stated:

*“Quantitative data to help understand results were available mainly for outcomes in health, education, and labor force participation. The evaluation had to rely on qualitative data in other areas.”<sup>154</sup>*

In the World Bank where there is a strong internal cultural bias towards quantitative data, the lack of such data outside of health and education creates a barrier to mainstreaming of gender in other sectors as qualitative results are often perceived as lacking rigor, rendering results less powerful and / or invisible<sup>155</sup>.

In DFID, the documentation of results in education and health sectors has dominated mainly because staff adopted a narrow view on mainstreaming gender equality based on responding to the MDGs. Furthermore, DFID had significant experience in mainstreaming of gender equality into those sectors and thus the bias was reinforced, in contrast the result performance in other sectors such as pro-poor growth and budget support (see Chapter 5) has been much less systematic because of lack of gender focus and therefore a lack of monitoring<sup>156</sup>: ‘The narrower the interpretation, the more limited its [gender] application will be as a result’.

Where gender results are reported they tend to be at the micro or project level and retained at the country or sector level, coupled with lack of reporting tools or systems to enable pooling or aggregation of available data centrally to demonstrate coherent response to gender policy objectives and expected results. The effect of this has been fragmentation or isolation of gender equality results across organizations with no clear picture of what works and why for the purposes of scaling up or learning from good results<sup>157</sup>. UNICEF’s experience is illustrative:

*The organizational review noted a general need for UNICEF to be more systematic in its sharing of good practices, etc. The self-assessment exercise similarly concluded that knowledge management systems for gender mainstreaming did not provide enough information to build UNICEF staff competency to effectively implement the 1994 Policy. This is particularly important for gender equality as the majority of UNICEF’s successes in increasing gender equality through its programming take place in relative isolation, primarily (although not exclusively) at the country level. It is currently not possible to capture many of these lessons learned and good*

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<sup>153</sup> ADB (2009: 29 – 34); AusAid (2002: 8); DFID (2006a: 20 – 21; 52); EU (2003: iii; vii; 52); UNDP (2006: vii; 24); World Bank (2005: xiv; 41 – 47); World Bank (2010: 41 - 46)

<sup>154</sup> World Bank (2010: 42)

<sup>155</sup> See also CIDA (2008: xv – xviii) for problem of results invisibility

<sup>156</sup> DFID (2006a: xiii; 21 – 23; 38 – 39)

<sup>157</sup> See for example, CIDA (2008: 64 – 65); UNICEF (2008: 40)

*practices in UNICEF's existing reporting systems because explicit gender equality results are often not included in programme documentation.*<sup>158</sup>

Lastly, only AusAid and CIDA evaluations pay some attention to the underlying challenge of achieving gender equity results, which requires a long term perspective that goes beyond traditional the 3 – 5 year lifespan of most interventions and also beyond normal practices of monitoring and evaluation:

*“Inequality is the product of a complex web of forces and cannot be addressed by isolated interventions. There is real debate about what equality between men and women should look like across regions and within each nation. In addition, equality is a long-term goal that must be seen as the work of generations. The complexity and long horizons make the identification and assessment of results inherently challenging, particularly over the short term.”*<sup>159</sup>

This would seem to imply that donor organization would need to adopt more substantive time commitments to achieving gender equality in their programming and place the emphasis on building sustainability over 10 to 20 year time period as opposed to 3 to 5 years as is the norm presently.

### **Women's Results not Gender Results**

In line with Norad's earlier synthesis<sup>160</sup>, the review found a strong propensity for results reporting to be focus exclusively on women with less attention given to men, or indeed changes in gender relations between women and men<sup>161</sup>. There are multiple reasons for this: Firstly, mainstreaming gender equality is often misinterpreted as a focus on women, which has been related to the culture of operations that tend to favor WID and are slow to adopt new conceptions of gender and ways of working. For example, the World Bank 2005 gender evaluation showed that through the 1990s Bank operations placed a strong emphasis on WID despite the conceptual and practical criticisms of the approach, which emerged through the 1980s, and the consequent development GAD<sup>162</sup>. Secondly, the women-only focus seems to be reinforced in many donor organizations through the dominance in traditional ways in which women have been included in programming through education, health<sup>163</sup> and micro-finance / credit interventions as they offer relatively straight-forward but narrow women-centered design and implementation opportunities. DFID's experience illustrates the issue in that WID approaches exert a simplifying influence over in-country strategy and also DFID strategies:

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<sup>158</sup> UNICEF (2008: 40)

<sup>159</sup> AusAid (2008: 8); See also CIDA (2008: 64 – 67; 75) for a similar discussion on results, sustainability and measurement.

<sup>160</sup> Norad (2006: 9)

<sup>161</sup> ADB (2001: 29); CIDA (2008: xv; 50 – 56; 84 – 88); DFID (2006a: 21 – 22); EC (2003: v); ILO (2005: 16); UNDP (2006: vii) UNICEF (2008: viii); WFP (2008: 59 – 60)

<sup>162</sup> World Bank (2005: 34 – 36)

<sup>163</sup> Ibid: 34 – 36; DFID (2006a: 21 – 22)

*In the Tanzania PRSP references to gender aspects are almost absent. The only exceptions are: 'Achieved gender equality in primary and secondary education by 2005' and 'reduced maternal mortality.' Moreover, the approach resembles that of the Women in Development (WID) approach with its narrow focus on women rather than gender. In addition, the PRSP does not seem to recognise that other initiatives (e.g. infrastructure services and micro-finance facilities) are not gender neutral and have gendered implications.<sup>164</sup>*

*'Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century' is not a specific justice and human rights policy paper. However, as DFID's key poverty reduction policy, the paper addresses some of the gender equality concepts in the justice and rights field by recognising that poor people – particularly women – are the most vulnerable to all forms of crime and civil conflict, including domestic violence; and that in very many cases formal justice systems fail to protect them.*

*The White Paper's inclusion of a women's focus in relation to justice is the result of internal and external negotiations and lobbying. There was not necessarily a clear consensus at the time as to which gender-related concepts to include. Some groups lobbied for gender equality following the momentum achieved as a result of the Beijing conference in 1995, while others were more in favour of retaining a strong women's empowerment focus. A weakness of the paper is that it failed to integrate the progress made in Beijing in terms of making a clear transition from or alternatively explaining the co-existence between WID and GAD approaches to development.*

DFID's internal experience leads into the third factor involved in the reduction of gender to women, as UNICEF, UNDP and WFP evaluations<sup>165</sup> report the understanding and conception of gender and gender mainstreaming is often uneven within donor organizations. In-depth knowledge of approaches to the inclusive of gender in interventions often resides with a few gender specialists, and with a lack of specific knowledge, coupled with time and budget constraints operational staff are more likely to fall back to an WID-like approach which leads to WID-like results.

The challenge of putting in place monitoring and supervision systems that can provide gender disaggregated data that is able to provide the foundation for reporting gender sensitive results is ubiquitous issue in all evaluations. Because of the lack of attention to this area those results which are reported tended to be focused on the easiest relevant point – women, whose participation and reception of project benefits can be most easily quantified at an output level. Therefore, invisibilization of gender equality results or under reporting is the endpoint. In the absence of gender sensitive monitoring and evaluation it

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<sup>164</sup> DFID (2006b: 22) – similar findings were also reported in the evaluations Ethiopia and Mozambique case studies.

<sup>165</sup> See particularly the discussion in WFP (2008: 59 – 60)

becomes difficult to recalibrate the system to achieve more. UNICEF's experience is illustrative:

*In particular, annual reports tend to report mainly on the participation levels of boys and girls or women and men as opposed to qualitative changes in gender equality. Specific programmes show little analysis of whether programme activities would affect girls and boys and men and women differently, and there is limited analysis of the underlying causes of gender inequality and how these should be addressed.<sup>166</sup>*

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<sup>166</sup> UNICEF (2008: x)

## 5. CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR GENDER MAINSTREAMING

The chapter concludes the review and focuses on three issues: Firstly, it looks at the emerging evaluative data on the challenges and opportunities of integrating gender into new aid modalities. Secondly, it looks back to the roots of mainstreaming failure and in doing so places the emphasis on the disconnection between theory and practice; priority overload within development organizations; management failure and finally evaluation failure. Next it discusses some emerging organization-wide good practices that have the potential to be applied more broadly, and in doing so put gender mainstreaming on the road to results. Finally, it looks briefly at possible options to break the current impasse.

### 5.1 A Place for Gender in the New Aid Architecture?

This section looks at the emerging evaluative data on mainstreaming of gender equality into the aid effectiveness principles of the Paris Declaration<sup>167</sup> and new aid modalities such as GBS, PBL, DPO and / or SWAPs<sup>168</sup>. However, the data points in the synthesis are limited with only CIDA, DFID, Norad, Sida, SDC and the World Bank providing some observations from the field level.

The challenges that emerge from these evaluations are:

**Ownership and alignment** through the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) has resulted in gender equality being pushed further down the list of priorities because for many partner countries it is not a high priority in their PRSs. Sida, CIDA and DFID reported that ownership of gender equality issues is often seen to reside with the donors and not with the country:

*“Gender is an area that is frequently seen as donor driven. Even where governments have signed and ratified all the international agreements, and promote gender equality in national legislations, ownership may still be weak due to factors such as a low priority on gender in face of a range of demands, lack of capacity or experience, or a general feeling – not unusual in male run governments – that it is a women’s problem.”<sup>169</sup>*

Consequently the design and implementation of new aid modalities<sup>170</sup> that respond to the PRS<sup>171</sup> tend not to systematically mainstream gender equality. DFID’s experiences found that the extent of gender orientation in budget support depended on the quality and depth of its integration into the country PRS noting:

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<sup>167</sup> Ownership; alignment; harmonization; managing for results and mutual accountability

<sup>168</sup> Designed to operationalize and support implementation of the principles in accordance with national Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) and partner country led programming.

<sup>169</sup> Sida (2010: 25); see also similar comments in DFID (2006a: 17) and CIDA (2008: xi; xxvi)

<sup>170</sup> See also UNIFEM (non-evaluation report) which soon after the Paris Declaration reported similar issues: UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), *Promoting Gender Equality in New Aid Modalities and Partnerships: Experiences from Africa, Burundi Consultation Outcome Report*, July 2006, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46cadad10.html>

<sup>171</sup> CIDA (2008: xxvi; 146 – 149); DFID (2006a: 12 – 19); Norad (2005a: 56); Norad (2009a: 24); Sida (2010: 24 – 26)

*“It requires considerable effort (Policy dialogue, influencing and advocacy) to make the implementation of the PRS more gender focused than the PRS itself. Hence in view of the generally limited attention given to gender issues within the PRSs examined... , DFID’s ability to promote GE through PRBS and to assess achievements needs to be strengthened and better documented.... We found no evidence on the impact of DFID’s work on GE in any of the documents reviewed for the study. In Mozambique, DFID decided to provide PRBS knowing that Mozambique’s PRS is largely gender blind... The evidence from Uganda shows that stakeholders in the PRBS arrangements were principally concerned with fiduciary risk, budgeting and financial management ....”<sup>172</sup>*

Ownership and mainstreaming of gender tends have a better performance in DPLs and SWAPs which can be targeted at specific sectors, but it is not surprising that gender fares best in education and health for much the same reasons as it does under project-based interventions in the same sectors<sup>173</sup>. A World Bank evaluation (2010) reported that out of 307 DPOs gender concerns were mainstreamed into 53 (17%), which included at least ‘one women-in-development or gender related measure, constituting less than 1% of the total measures designed in all DPO operations, with the majority being in education, health and social safety net sectors’<sup>174</sup>.

Building ownership of gender in new aid modalities is also reported to be difficult because of the amount of ‘front-end analysis and work’ needed to mainstream gender into objectives, actions, indicators and resource allocations within new aid modalities. Therefore, assisting and demonstrating to partner governments that gender sensitive modalities have the potential to result in more sustainable outcomes has proved extremely difficult<sup>175</sup>. Critically, some evaluations<sup>176</sup> have reported that “non-technical” operational staff do not have the appropriate analytical tools and procedures to integrate gender into GBS or PBL. Furthermore, many of the procedures and tools developed to conduct gender analyses, such as plans, checklists and training are focused on traditional project approaches and still have to catch up with new aid modalities.

**Harmonization and dialogue** are important aspects of the design and implementation of new aid modalities, particularly in response to and aligning donor priorities and resources with partner government priorities. The extent to which gender is mainstreamed into dialogue between donors and partner-countries receiving budget support or SWAP modalities is reported by evaluations to be variable. This is mainly because not all donors place equal importance on the inclusion of gender in new aid modalities and as already

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<sup>172</sup> DFID (2006a: 16 – 17)

<sup>173</sup> Noted by DFID (2006a & 2006b), Sida (2010), SDC (2008) and World Bank (2010) in relation to SWAP and DPOs.

<sup>174</sup> World Bank (2010: 28 – 30) – DPO implemented between 2002 – 2007 constituting 33% of all Bank lending.

<sup>175</sup> This may also be related to weak economic and sector analyses not making the ‘gender case’, but equally to priority overload within partner governments.

<sup>176</sup> CIDA (2008: 77; 146 – 149); DFID (2006a: 49); Norad (2009a: 53); SDC (2008: 74); Sida (2010: 26 – 27)

reported above, the partner governments do not demand it consistently through their PRSs. Under such situations gender tends to be left to the attention of the particular donor or group of donors who want to support it. Sida (2010) positively reports in relation to the design of multi-donor operations in Ethiopia:

*Sida's key challenge in donor harmonization is the level of heterogeneity of the donor community in terms of its understanding and prioritizing of gender equality. Its response is to work most closely with a group of like-minded donors... which have dedicated resources to mainstream gender in dialogue, to influence the donor groups to take a strong and effective joint approach. Largely with CIDA and Irish Aid support, the PSNP donor group was able to carry out a gender analysis of the program which provided documented evidence for dialogue on gender results with the donor group and government, and to improve the incorporation of the gender in the PSNP II.*<sup>177</sup>

However, in the above case, once implementation of the budget support began, joint donor supervision missions tended to focus on administrative issues rather than tracking progress toward outcomes. Irish Aid noted the problem and circulated preparatory notes on gender prior to each mission to ensure it was included in monitoring. Although such backstopping is clearly needed, it illustrates a similar problem to that of traditional projects – gender can be integrated into design but without consistent attention and a champion during implementation it can be easily sidelined.

One of the issues highlighted by Sida, Norad and DFID is that the dialogue required to get gender 'a place at the table' during the design of budget support operations requires the presence of staff with the requisite personal interest, a level of continuity and seniority, technical and / or tactical knowledge to influence the process. Unfortunately this is not always the case, as resources are not available at the right level or are spread too thinly; and opportunities to harmonize gender into new aid modalities are missed, moved to the periphery or left to the attention of single donor<sup>178</sup>. Given the low overall priority of gender equality at an organizational level and exhibited in traditional project-based approaches it is not surprising that efforts to harmonize and promote gender sensitive dialogue on new aid modalities are proving challenging.

The evaluations indicate that **managing for results and accountability for results** in relation to gender equality is still, at best, a work in progress and at worst not even on the agenda. Presently, results and reporting on results through monitoring and evaluation frameworks reflect the bias towards traditional areas of strength for gender equality. The World Bank's experience is typical:

*"In assessing results of Bank support, IEG examined 29 closed DPOs in 8 of the 12 focus countries. Gender-aware DPOs helped deliver results in*

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<sup>177</sup> Sida (2010: 26)

<sup>178</sup> CIDA (2008: 77: 144 – 146); DFID (2006b: 16 – 17); Norad (2009a: 53) Sida (2010: 26)

*education and social protection in Bangladesh, Benin, Ghana, Peru, and Turkey. Outside these areas, it was less common to find evidence of any sustained results. In Yemen, for example, a DPO supported studies on gender and land, but there was little evidence of gender-aware outcomes. In Benin, there was some discussion of gender-aware interventions in the water sector, but, once again, ICRs did not discuss the issue.”*

More often than not, gender equality is currently not systematically included in monitoring and evaluation frameworks for budget support, even where it is relevant to do so.

With the increasing focus on “managing for results” within donor organizations, which includes the new modalities, gender equality sits somewhat uncomfortably. It requires a long term sustained commitment, yet donor organizations operate on short-term funding, planning and operational cycles. Many new aid modalities are also rapid disbursing interventions with a short timeframes, which in itself presents serious results measurement difficulties, even without adding in gender. Monitoring and evaluation systems are currently not set up by donors or partner governments to systematically track long-term progress toward gender equality. Furthermore, subtle changes in gender equality relating to power between men and women are not amenable to the traditional concentration within donor organizations on measuring only what can be counted, with minimal reflection on qualitative data. The pressure the Paris Declaration places on donors to show results may well cause them to shy away from changes, which difficult to measure; which will include changes in gender equality in all but the most straight-forward sectors.

Finally, despite the challenges outlined above the aid effectiveness principles and new aid modalities have offered some opportunities to strengthen gender mainstreaming as outlined in the Sida evaluation<sup>179</sup>, based on a limited number of cases:

- Encourages a more participatory and coherent PRSP, resulting in increasingly mainstreamed policy commitments in national development policy and planning;
- Harmonization and alignment, encourages a shared analysis and more coherent approach to policies, including gender equality, if incorporated in the PRSP and supported by national leadership;
- Provide a more comprehensive framework for dialogue on these issues;
- Promotes and visibilizes gender results, if incorporated established common results frameworks at the national or SWAP level and monitored effectively<sup>180</sup>.

However, it is clear that the **first step or option for gender is to get a place at the policy dialogue ‘table’ between donor organizations and partner**

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<sup>179</sup> Sida (2010: 26) – see Table 2.

<sup>180</sup> Although these opportunities are encouraging they are based on a limited set of observations, and as expressed by the CIDA evaluation ‘the jury is still out’ with regard to mainstreaming gender into new aid modalities CIDA (2008: 146)

**governments, so that it can be incorporated into PRSPs and other national policies, which lead to the development of PBL, GBS and SWAPs interventions.** The most coherent approach would be to continue to build on SWAPs in the education and health sectors alongside, integration of gender in related policy reforms and government capacity building (see 5.3).

## **5.2 The Roots of Mainstreaming Failure**

### **Too Much Theory to Practice**

Mainstreaming gender equality is in large part a theory about how development assistance can be more effective, efficient, inclusive and equitable in its delivery and results. However, it is a more complex and all-embracing theory than the one it was intended to replace, the “Women in Development” (WID) theory.

WID tried to ensure that women were included in development interventions and that they thereby received a “fair share” of the benefits. Development was to be moved from a situation of gender-blindness or male-centredness to one in which the particular needs of women were addressed and a degree of female empowerment through the increased role of women, particularly in terms of explicit economic engagement would be achieved. Women would move from silent partners to full participants in development activities. In this process, overall development effectiveness could be improved, because a more complete range of stakeholders was benefitting.

The theory that including women fully in activities would improve their effectiveness and results was not in itself threatening at any of the key levels in the process: to national governments, managers of development institutions or at field level. However, it often involved additional work that to some extent were reduced as WID elements could be “bolted on” to the traditional development approaches and projects. Furthermore, in terms of monitoring, the effects of a WID approach on an intervention could be quite easily counted by seeing to what extent women had participated and what benefits this had brought. Such results could be aggregated in a rough and ready manner to show the cumulative benefits obtained by women from the work of a project, development agency, NGO, government or other entity.

However, it can be seen that the WID approach had major advantages: Stakeholders could understand broadly understand WID and project design could incorporate it without much change. From a management perspective, WID presented opportunities for substantial gains with minimal organizational change. But, WID did require human and financial resources and these resources were eroded as other priorities pushed WID down the list. Over time, it was found that WID was not having the degree of impact that had been intended. It had become marginalised in development organisations and its results were mainly disconnected and individualized sets of benefits to target groups of women, but with little evidence that it was changing societies around

the world. Top management gradually let it slip down the list of priorities, which could substantially contribute to the reputation of their organisations<sup>181</sup>.

The decline and fall of WID led to a response, in the form of Gender and Development (GAD) approaches. These introduced a more complex and fundamental critique of development processes and assistance. This critique noted that WID had neither attempted to nor succeeded in changing the underlying dynamics of power and inequality in societies. Therefore, despite good results of individual interventions, or even at higher levels of national policies, social structures had rarely moved significantly towards gender equity or truly equal opportunities. GAD sought to introduce the concept of explicit analysis of power and imbalances within societies on the basis of attributed gender characteristics and roles.

Despite GAD being a more comprehensive approach than WID it has fared no better. Moreover, it had some inherent disadvantages compared with its predecessor. Firstly, it has been perceived as a concept driven by “academics” or intellectuals and difficult to operationalize. The evaluations reviewed report that development organization staff and consultants did not always understand GAD, regarded it as a concept whose interpretation is often ‘down to the individual’<sup>182</sup>, consequently most donor interventions have lacked the level of coherence and sensitivity necessary to gain results and / or report results related to GAD<sup>183</sup>. Furthermore, having struggled for many years to “sell” WID to partner countries, the ‘gender’ is often perceived as another ‘new concept’ to understand and ‘develop ownership of’ by partner governments, with many reported to find it easier to address women rather than GAD<sup>184</sup>. Secondly, GAD approaches appeared to challenge male dominance at all levels. Evaluators have noted the paradox existing in many donor organizations, most of which are male dominated at the level of senior management, placing implicit pressure on partner countries to undertake deep-rooted analysis of their gender-based power structures; and to take measures to change these to better reflect equality concerns. Partner country governments showed a mixed inclination to take concerted measures to change their national power structures to conform to the latest donor imperatives. This being so, local level partners, with the exception of some gender focussed NGOs, also felt slight commitment to the GAD agenda and it became difficult to ensure field level impetus to deliver on the new priority. In many instances, projects have practically reverted to WID principles, ensuring some role and benefits for women and reporting these under the GAD banner (see 4.5).

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<sup>181</sup> See for example, Netherlands DGIS (1995) and Staudt (1981) for a non-evaluative case study of WID in USAID.

<sup>182</sup> Individual interpretation of gender equality are wide-spread even if development organizations have a gender policy clearly mapping out the concepts and practice. This is mainly caused by voluntary nature of such policies under which almost anything from WID to GAD can fit operationally.

<sup>183</sup> See for example, CIDA (2008: 26; 80); DFID (2006a: xiv; 50); EC (2003: iii; viii; 31); SDC (2009: 27; 33; 89; 111 – 112; 121; 153); Sida (2002a: xiv;); Sida (2010: 12; 27); UNDP (2006: vi; ix; 15 – 16; 40); UNICEF (2008: viii; 3; 31 – 32; 38; 43); World Bank (2010: 14; 61)

<sup>184</sup> ADB (2009: 23); CIDA (2008: 74; 81; 104; 139); DFID (2006a: xiv; 50); Norad (2005a: 26); Norad (2006: 41; 43); Sida (2002a: 72 – 73)

Having introduced a theoretically-driven approach calling for detailed social analysis and fundamental changes in power structures, donor organizations exacerbated the situation by requiring this to be “mainstreamed” within their internal structures and interventions. This would require a gender perspective to be introduced into all aspects of the organisation’s activities, from policy to field level; with the intention that partner governments and stakeholders should follow the same path. In theory, gender would thereby become so entrenched throughout international development stakeholders that the necessary processes of social, political and economic change would necessarily follow in due course. The theory has not been widely practiced in the development field, and from the multiplicity of findings presented earlier in this report, three key issues that have contributed to failure are highlighted below.

### **Too Many Priorities to Mainstream**

A major challenge to gender mainstreaming, reported widely in evaluations, is the strong perception of “priority and / or mainstreaming overload” felt by staff throughout development organisations (see 4.1 and 4.2). Each “priority” comes with associated policies and procedures, backed up by tools and often training. Once the first wave of organizational enthusiasm for a new priority subsides, staff take stock of where the issue settles in the hierarchy of concerns within top management and of their own immediate managers. The great majority of evaluations reported that, once pressures associated with specific initiatives or events have passed, gender falls to a relatively low position in the order of priorities, as a ‘cross-cutting issue or priority’ to be attended to in niche sectors of education and health, but very much an optional and frequently forgotten issue in others.

Some noted that the incorporation of gender into the MDGs is weak (with the exception of health and education) and that these form their overarching framework of concentration, along with issues of aid effectiveness<sup>185</sup>. This challenge appears to be increasing, as more and more organizations try to establish the meaning of development effectiveness for such modalities as General Budget Support (GBS), Policy Based Lending (PBL) or Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) (See 5.1). Faced with many pressing and complex issues, all levels of management have to make decisions concerning where to put their resources, including staff and administrative budgets. Even those who may have some inclination to place gender on their list of priorities, often struggle to do so because they cannot easily locate appropriate technical expertise or overcome internal resistance and competition. This is a knock on effect of the inadequate resources placed in this area, because of its low priority among top management, hence moving it from a low to a higher priority becomes more and more challenging.

### **Management Failure**

The key challenge to gender mainstreaming has proved to be the failure of management and particularly high level leadership to move beyond policy and

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<sup>185</sup> See DFID (2006) and SDC (2009).

rhetorical 'lip-service' to fully and actively commit to the organizational changes that mainstreaming requires and its staffing and resource implications. Although management have stimulated the assembly of an impressive number tools and procedures to facilitate implementation of the concept, most of these have failed to achieve their intended results. This is largely because they have not been applied consistently or for long enough to work, but rather in a fragmented and / or occasional manner. Coherent management strategies for mainstreaming and sustained implementation have been absent from the development field.

One of the common tools applied by management is the Gender Action Plan (GAP). Although GAPs are currently 'in fashion' as a antidote to the shortcomings of mainstreaming, what evaluative evidence currently exists indicates the GAPs, lacked a results orientation, have been inadequately resourced and have not been supported by incentive structures, which could encourage their consistent use. Hence, although they are in theory a good technical fix, they are likely to fail if management do not address the underlying structural causes of mainstreaming failure.

Gender analysis is another ubiquitous tool used in pursuit of mainstreaming. Evaluations found that this has mostly been applied at the level of individual interventions, but rarely in a sufficiently detailed manner to allow effective and system-wide integration of gender issues. Even in cases where gender analysis has been effectively undertaken at project design stage, its findings are rarely followed up during implementation or monitoring. Furthermore, what gender analysis is undertaken usually misses the fundamental and distinctive element of the approach, namely analysis of the power relations of society. Thus, this aspect of gender mainstreaming is often actually implemented through WID analysis, designed to increase women's share of benefits, thereby negating the original advances intended to be delivered under the GAD approach. Gender analysis has not therefore made a substantive contribution to mainstreaming (see 4.1 and 4.5).

The next array of support systems for mainstreaming consists of handbooks, guidelines, manuals and toolkits. These have often been of good quality, but evaluations have found them to be infrequently used by their target groups. Barriers have been reported to include the view that they have been handed down from headquarters "experts" to country and local level, where they do not address the relevant issues or are not culturally adapted. Also, that they are out of date by the time they appear and have only peripheral relevance in the light of new aid structures and modalities.

Checklists have also been widely installed into administrative systems. They have largely been used as a project cycle screening tool, intended to ensure that official requirements for gender inclusion have been followed in project concepts and designs. However, since the staff of international development agencies are well-practiced in complying with official requirements, the checklists soon fall into the category of "administrative rituals". Since the checklists are only used at the design stage and usually have no carry over into project management and monitoring, they are not valued by staff. Staff in many organisations also noted

that there is no impetus from management to make any constructive use of the checklists, so they are rapidly lost in the “background noise” of the increasingly complex system of management and administration.

Training in Gender and Development is the next tool put in place by management to mainstream the approach. Evaluations have noted good practice in this area, but fragmented across different parts of the organisations concerned, in a manner that does not permit scaling up of the knowledge gained to make any substantial difference in the way gender equality is promoted within and by the agencies. Furthermore, such training was rarely found to be readily available at country level, was often of a generic nature, which did not fit the needs of staff at different levels and places, and did not get down to field level, where new approaches to gender are ultimately delivered. Overall, it was shown that there is no simple solution to the problem of where gender training “fits” in development bodies and that, even if new ways of addressing the issue are learned, they often run into resistance or disinterest at the level of partner governments, which gradually reduces commitment of country level staff, who have a broad range of policy imperatives to promote.

The mainstreaming approach has also largely defeated the intentions of Results Based Management systems. As noted above, gender analysis has also been very partially undertaken. With this basis, monitoring of gender results is characteristically weak at activity level. Some country offices have attempted to assemble some results data, but this is so unsystematic that it cannot be accurately scaled up to multi-country or organisation level. Where aggregated gender results are presented, they are almost inevitably based on poor quality data. In this situation, it is extremely difficult to assemble coherent body of good practice or go beyond evaluation of process (see 4.1 and 4.5).

Overall, having decided to mainstream gender, managers have characteristically put in place a repertoire of tools intended to enable this to be achieved. However, management has not supported these tools with adequate staffing, resources or budgets; there are weak mainstreaming strategies, unsupported and largely unmonitored GAPS, and few systems of accountability for performance in this area. Furthermore, it is clear from the many evaluations reviewed that all levels of staff in organisations develop a sense of what are the real priorities of management, for which the system will reward performance. In no evaluated case was gender mainstreaming reported by staff to be seen as a true and consistent priority of top management. This was because of the lack of incentives, recognition or accountability on the issue. High individual or unit performance on gender was therefore seen to be driven by strong personal interest or by individuals in the few positions in an organisation for which gender is a monitored performance priority area (See 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).

### **Evaluation Failure**

Evaluations of gender mainstreaming have often noted that evaluation itself has failed to systematically incorporate the issue into its body of evidence. Outside of specific gender policy and / or mainstreaming evaluations, Evaluation Offices of donor organizations have tended to place gender on their list of topics for

occasional coverage rather than integrating systematically into all their evaluative work. With specific thematic evaluation of gender, only in a few cases has been relatively frequent; and organisations such as AusAid, ADB, Norad, Sida and the World Bank now have a series of such evaluations. These evaluations have allowed the organizations concerned to at least track internal 'process' responses to mainstreaming gender. But as demonstrated (see Chapter 4) with the exception of AusAid, the other evaluations show many reoccurring challenges.

Evaluation failure is in two main categories. Under the first, Terms of Reference for regular project or thematic evaluations do not systematically require gender effects to be addressed, even where this is an organizational requirement. This can be attributed to inadequate priority for gender among Evaluation Offices or other entities commissioning and managing evaluations. Like all parts of development institutions, they have more priorities than they can handle. Secondly, the management response to evaluation findings on gender has usually been minimal, and/or ineffective. For example, Sida, Norad and the World Bank's series of evaluations on the topic tend to report similar findings each time<sup>186</sup>. This shows that evaluation findings do not in themselves necessarily lead to improved systems and practices. In response to evaluations, senior managers at Norad, Sida and the World Bank across seem to have established approaches to convey renewed commitment to the area (e.g., the GAP). Some promise to do better in future<sup>187</sup>, but put in limited or no changes in the underlying corporate accountability or incentive structures, which would drive change, preferring to apply technical fixes such as the GAP<sup>188</sup>. No substantial change occurs and gender mainstreaming continues down 'the road to nowhere'.

Part of the problem associated with the failure of evaluation to change and promote more systematic positive changes in mainstreaming gender is lack of follow up through tools such as – annual performance evaluations or mid-term evaluations two to three years after the initial 'gender policy or mainstreaming evaluation'. Although it is encouraging the AusAid and Norad have followed up evaluations through more proactive means, only AusAid seems to demonstrate that management are making the important link between accountability for implementation and use technical tools such as GAPs and gender analyses to improved the effectiveness of interventions. In contrast, the World Bank and Sida's approach of launching successive 'waves' of thematic evaluation does not seem to have the same impact on management perhaps because the gaps are too long between evaluations, and the evaluations themselves tend not to place enough focus on leadership or management response and accountability failure and importantly ascertaining why? These are often uncomfortable and difficult issues to evaluate, whereas focus on traditional areas of relevance of policies and strategies, effectiveness of projects and processes are more familiar ground for

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<sup>186</sup> See Norad (2005a & 2009a); Sida (2002a; 2010); and World Bank (1995; 2005; 2010)

<sup>187</sup> For example the World Bank management envisioned a monitoring framework and accountability system for implementation of the 2001 Gender Policy. This was not done (see World Bank, 2010)

<sup>188</sup> Norad (2009a) mid-term evaluation of its GAP shows indifferent organizational response to the previous (2005a) evaluation and to the action plan.

development evaluators (who are not organizational performance or change management specialists).

### **5.3 Good Practice and Options – What next for Gender?**

The final section presents some good practices and options for mainstreaming gender equality across donor organizations (not at the intervention level).

#### **Good Practices**

Many of the evaluations contain relevant lessons and good practices which are targeted at improving the inclusion of gender equality into design and implementation of interventions, however the focus below is on organization-wide good practices:

- **Linking accountability measures to implementation of the measures to support gender equality: AusAid** is currently the only donor organization to report on enhanced resources, processes and accountability mechanisms at managerial level to ensure more systematic mainstreaming of gender equality through GAPs, and results reporting. Measures have included raising the profile of gender equality to ‘an overarching principle of the aid program’ so that senior and middle management are directly responsible for implementation and results; quality reporting tool to improve results reporting and focus on accountability; and increased the number of gender specialist from one to six persons including at director level.
- **Gender specialists at Headquarters and country level: ADB** despite having a small cadre of permanent gender specialists based at the Headquarters, the bank has used trust funds to provide the resources to recruit and place gender specialist at country / regional level to support the mainstreaming of gender equality into interventions. The use of nationally recruited gender specialists has resulted in great contextual relevance to gender equality programming.
- **Use of Gender Action Plans at project intervention level: ADB** has institutionalized GAPs for projects as part of the design process. Although linking accountability to ensure systematic follow up during implementation is still incomplete. Furthermore, taking GAPs to micro-level may be good approach to further promote gender equality concerns in projects from a relatively low baseline organizational situation, but in the long-term gender will need to be placed within staff performance evaluation systems to ensure procedures are backed with regularized action.
- **Use of follow up Mid-Term Reviews and / or Annual Performance Report to provide additional pressure to management: AusAid and Norad** followed up evaluations with mid-term or annual performance reports. AusAid's use of performance report is linked to accountability mechanisms provides a strong push to management on mainstreaming. Norad's mid-term follow up the organizations GAP ensured that gender

remained in sight of management but was not linked to any clear accountability framework and hence is not as effective as an agent of change.

- **Draw on positive experiences in the education and health sectors and transfer lessons and good practices more systematically to additional sectors: Various donor organizations** - to transfer and apply good practices to additional sectors. Many of the evaluations highlight the need to take experiences from education and health sectors and apply them more broadly. However, given the challenges of taking a broad / mainstreaming approach, a good practice would be to focus on one two additional sectors in line with resource and leadership commitment (see below: 'gender focusing')

### **Are there Options for Mainstreaming Gender?**

Given the substantial challenges, which have prevented gender mainstreaming from operating effectively, the evaluation evidence suggests that it may be time to adopt a different approach. The “bottom line” for mainstreaming in development organizations is that it requires the full commitment of management, including top management; and that this must be converted into human and financial resources, accountability and incentive systems, detailed planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In essence, major organizational change. To date, progress along these lines in almost all agencies has been minimal; and in those which have had a series of evaluations over time, it is also clear that such progress has not been cumulative – The World Bank’s experience being a major example of the varying management commitment at an operational level to gender.

Lessons and good practices are often provided at the micro-level and insufficient to drive fundamental change. Furthermore, most activities that have been identified as “good practices” or “lessons” are somewhat hypothetical (e.g., accountability and incentives are needed, yet no comprehensive systems exist in practice from which to learn and draw real lessons). Many evaluations have pointed out what has not worked and then assumed that an alternative approach will be more effective. However, there is little evidence that these alternatives have actually been implemented; and still less of any results. Furthermore, evaluations have usually noted there is minimal demand from country level partners to engage in the gender mainstreaming approach, so that the efforts of international agencies are largely lost in terms of national development, in the absence of genuine commitment.

These evaluation findings lead us to ask “what could be tried next”? The simplest solution would be to draw on the common operational practice to simplify GAD to women-centered or women’s empowerment approach: This might be called “**WID Plus**”. This would build on those elements of WID, which did deliver results: but with the proviso that these should incorporate more fundamental analysis of gender power structures; and try to produce interventions that could deliver direct benefits as well as raise issues of women’s economic and political empowerment and equitable development more systematically. In particular

circumstances, the focus of such activities could be on males; for example, in situations of male under-achievement in education. The main change from gender mainstreaming would be the return to concentration on interventions, which can deliver early benefits to women (and men where appropriate), with the expectation of radical social change placed in a longer time frame.

A second, rather different option might be called “**gender focusing**”. This would focus on those areas where gender equality appears to be sufficiently embedded and has made some progress. To a large extent, this would also replicate some of the achievements of the WID era, by initially focusing on health and education through project or SWAP based interventions. In these sectors, there is often an encouraging history of positive results, which has made them less problematic to partner governments. Sectors that could be added at different times in different countries would include microfinance, which is often to some extent accepted as an area of women’s empowerment and economic participation; and labor market and investment policy reform (e.g., through projects or PBL), with involvement from the private sector. The latter may find some government support, even in relatively resistant countries, as part of processes designed to increase international market competitiveness and economic development at a macro-level.

Building on the labor market area, the broader issues associated with the role of women in the private sector and as business leaders is another, which could benefit from a specific focus in developing countries. This would again be placed under the banner of international competitiveness; and the emphasis on private business would remove it from the appearance of imposing external social and political concepts, which do not match national priorities. In the current economic climate and with the emphasis on globalization and outsourcing, interventions supporting the business environment may attract a more positive reception than prescriptions on government policies and programs. In doing so, it would tap into the considerable movement linking corporate performance drivers, social sustainability and equality. Although at the same time achievement of improved gender equality in corporate world faces many a set of similar issues, with pockets of good practice and lots of inertia with regard to removal of ‘gender based glass ceilings’.<sup>189</sup>

**Central to improving results and learning within organizations would be through enhanced M&E within the context of the options outlined above.** In that respect monitoring of gender would be targeted in sectors where gender equality and women’s empowerment is the focus. Evaluation, would also respond similarly, but enhanced efforts could be made to integrate gender more broadly across all evaluative activities to uncover unintended results enhance cross-sectoral learning and reduce blindness.

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<sup>189</sup> See Bain (2010); McKinsey (2007; 2010)

## **Annex 1: Evaluation Studies Included in Synthesis**

1. ADB (2001) Special Evaluation Study on Gender and Development, OED, Manila
- 2a. ADB (2009) The Asian Development Bank's Support to Gender and Development: Phase 1 – Relevance, Responsiveness and Results to Date. OED. Manila
- 2b. ADB (2010) The Asian Development Bank's Support to Gender and Development: Phase 2 – Results from Country Case Studies. OED. Manila
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5. BMZ (2006) Taking Account of Gender Issues in German Development Cooperation: Promoting Gender Equality and Empowering Women. Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. Berlin
6. CIDA (2008) Evaluation of CIDA's Implementation of its Policy on Gender Equality. Final Report and Synthesis. Evaluation Division. Gatineau
- 7a. DFID (2006a) Evaluation of DFID's Policy and Practice in Support of Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment. Volume 1 Synthesis Report. Evaluation Office. East Kilbride
- 7b. DFID (2006b) Evaluation of DFID's Policy and Practice in Support of Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment. Volume 3 Thematic Studies. Evaluation Office. East Kilbride
8. EC (2003) Thematic Evaluation of the Integration of Gender in EC Development Co-operation with Third Countries. European Commission. Brussels
9. ILO (2005) Thematic Evaluation: Gender Issues in Technical Cooperation. ILO. Geneva
10. IOM (2006) Evaluation of the Gender Mainstreaming Policy and Strategy in IOM. Office of the Inspector General. Geneva
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- 12a. Norad (2005a) Evaluation of the Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997 – 2005). Norad. Oslo
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- 12c. Norad (2005c) Evaluation of the Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997 – 2005): Country Case Study: Zambia. Norad. Oslo
- 12d. Norad (2005d) Gender and Development – A Review of Evaluation Reports: 1997 – 2004. Norad. Oslo
- 12e. Norad (2006b) Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation. Norad. Oslo
13. Norad (2009a) Mid-term Review of the Norwegian Action Plan for Womens Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (2007 – 2009). Norad. Oslo.
14. Norad (2009b) Mainstreaming Gender and Women’s Rights in the Development Portfolio of the Norwegian Embassy in Mozambique. Norad. Oslo.
15. SDC (2009) Evaluation of SDC’s Performance in Mainstreaming Gender Equality. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Bern
- 16a. Sida (2002a) Mainstreaming Gender Equality: Sida’s Support for the Promotion of Gender Equality in Partner Countries. Sida. Stockholm
- 16b. Sida (2002b) Mainstreaming Gender Equality: Sida’s Support for the Promotion of Gender Equality in Partner Countries – Country Report Bangladesh. Sida. Stockholm
- 16c. Sida (2002c) Mainstreaming Gender Equality: Sida’s Support for the Promotion of Gender Equality in Partner Countries – Country Report South Africa. Sida. Stockholm
17. Sida (2010) Evaluation of Support to Gender Equality in Swedish Development Cooperation. Final Report. Sida. Stockholm
18. UNDP (2006) Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP. Evaluation Office. New York
19. UN-HABITAT (2003) Forward Looking Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming in UN-HABITAT. UN-HABITAT. Nairobi
20. UNICEF (2008) Evaluation of Gender Policy Implementation in UNICEF. Evaluation Office. New York

21. UNFPA (2006) *Focusing on Gender: An Assessment of Gender Integrating in UNFPA Materials*. UNFPA. New York
22. World Bank (1995) *Gender Issues in World Bank Lending*. OED. Washington DC
23. World Bank (2005) *Evaluating a Decade of World Bank Gender Policy: 1990 – 1999*. OED. World Bank
24. World Bank (2010) *An Evaluation of World Bank Support 2002 – 08 Gender and Development*. IEG. World Bank
25. WFP (2002) *Thematic Evaluation of the WFP Commitments to Women – 1996 – 2001*. OEDE. Rome
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## **Annex 2: Supplementary Non-Evaluative Reports and Articles**

Aasen, B. (2009) *Gender Equity and the Multilateral Development Banks: How the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank work on Women's Empowerment and Gender Equity*. NIBR. Oslo.

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