Supporting Evaluation in Haiti
Mission Report

1. Introduction

The Haiti Evaluation Task Force, established jointly by the three evaluation networks of ALNAP, the OECD-DAC Evaluation Network, and the UN Evaluation Group, developed a Concept Note (Attachment 3) on supporting evaluation in Haiti following the earthquake and the humanitarian response to it.

The Task Force also agreed that it was important and necessary to discuss the ideas put forward in the Concept Note with stakeholders in Port-au-Prince. A team to undertake these consultations was composed of Hans Lundgren (OECD-DAC Secretariat), Patrick McManus (IrishAID) and Caroline Heider (WFP) supported by Francois Grünewald (Groupe URD). The team visited Haiti on behalf of the Task Force.

The consultations in Haiti took place from 18 to 22 October 2010. The team met a cross-section of stakeholders from the Haitian Government and civil society, bilateral and multilateral donors, the UN system, and non-governmental organizations. Nonetheless, the team recognizes that these consultations were limited and do not reflect a full-fledged stakeholder analysis, which may be part of next steps if the proposal for supporting evaluations in Haiti goes ahead. Attachment 1 provides a preliminary stakeholder analysis. Attachment 2 is a list of people met.

The objective of the mission was to determine the need for evaluation support in Haiti, to discuss the various evaluation support services that may be demanded and, if an evaluation support office was needed, issues around its location.

2. Context

Following the Haiti earthquake, a large-scale international relief effort has been mounted. One of the features of this response is that a number of evaluative efforts have already been initiated or are being planned by diverse stakeholders. These include various bilateral and multilateral donors, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, multilateral UN agencies, coalitions such as the UK’s Disasters Emergencies Committee, the Canadian Humanitarian Coalition as well as various individual NGO efforts. The number of evaluation initiatives will likely continue to grow. The consultation mission took place in a context of:

- Some 1.3 million people as yet living in tented camps in Port au Prince in difficult conditions exacerbated by often heavy rains. Women and children remain vulnerable and at-risk groups within the camps. A UNFPA report released during the mission shows a tripling of pregnancy rates in the camps. On the last day of the mission, a cholera outbreak in the Artibonite valley area of the country was declared and a number of cholera cases in Port au Prince were later confirmed.

- Political uncertainty in light of the forthcoming elections and a heightening awareness of, and sensitivity to, the approaching first anniversary of the earthquake among government, the humanitarian and development community, and the Haitian people.

- Growing pressure to explain and account for the results of aid efforts in Haiti. A complex and evolving institutional framework with many stakeholders in the relief, recovery, and development processes, with different perceptions of the institutional framework, its functioning, the role and powers of various stakeholders.

- An expressed sensitivity to critical evaluations as they might adversely affect funding and preparations of the forthcoming commemoration on the first anniversary of the earthquake, which will entail positive messaging to regain or retain support for the relief and recovery effort.
- The institutional context in Haiti can be characterised as emergent, complex and as yet very fragile. The government was severely and directly affected by the earthquake, with some 17% of central government staff losing their lives and most government buildings in Port au Prince and related infrastructure being destroyed. The UN and MINUSTAH mission was also devastated with 100 staff killed including the Head of Mission. These groups have worked hard to recover. Since the earthquake the international humanitarian system, including a new and large influx of NGOs, is now well established. To assist recovery and reconstruction, the Haitian Government and the international community have worked together to establish the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (CIRH) and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund to implement the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development.

3. Findings Concerning the Evaluation Support Office

There was no uniform perspective among the various stakeholders on the role and importance of evaluation: some were supportive and gave much importance to evaluation, others felt otherwise. The preliminary stakeholder analysis in Attachment 2 provides an overview of the potential services that an evaluation support office (ESO) could provide and issues that arose in the discussion with these stakeholders. In spite of varied views among the stakeholders about evaluation, the following issues were commonly raised:

- Co-ordination/planning of evaluation missions: Several stakeholders reported that already there were many evaluation missions arriving in Haiti (one stakeholder reported that they were receiving two per week). In this context stakeholders were of the view that, while it would be difficult to know of all evaluations being planned, some degree of scheduling of mission visits would be of great benefit.

- Learning: The importance of learning was highlighted by all stakeholders, many of whom remarked that not enough was learned, too many mistakes were repeated, the daily pressures did not allow enough time for reflection on what works and what needs to change, and too little time was available to actually follow up on evaluation recommendations. There are no mechanisms in place to hold stakeholders accountable for follow-up action, though a number of them felt it would be important to have such mechanisms in place. The potential is great for an Evaluation Support Office (ESO) to contribute to sharing lessons, including across stakeholders, producing synthesis evaluation briefs to highlight common findings, and pro-actively share evaluation findings, recommendations and lessons with stakeholders.

- Strengthening and Empowering Haitian Stakeholders: There was common agreement among stakeholders, including Haitians, that the weakness of the government institutions heightened the importance of working with and through government (ownership) and to develop capacities, whenever possible building on existing institutions rather than creating new ones. At the same time, it was recognized that the many international actors attract well qualified Haitians to work with them, or that Haitians who receive scholarships/training tend to leave the country altogether. This situation creates ultimate challenges for capacity development in any sector. Any effort at strengthening evaluation in Haiti will have to be mindful of this context and develop approaches to work within the structures to empower and strengthen them.

- Information Gap: All stakeholders remarked the absence of systematic and comprehensive information systems that allowed stakeholders to understand which projects were ongoing where, who was doing what, etc. In part, the government’s statistical office was affected by the earthquake, but even prior to the earthquake no comprehensive system existed to give an overview of the various agents and their projects. The ESO and Haiti Web Portal have the potential to contribute to filling this gap, but will equally face the challenge of a fragmented aid system, which does not recognize or report to one place. To contribute in this area the support office will need to reach out to find information (for instance, actively search for evaluations already available) and to communicate to the stakeholders.

The potential evaluation support services identified in the Concept Note (Attachment 3) were generally found to be appropriate, although the fourth function (research) was not commonly mentioned by stakeholders. The preliminary stakeholder map (Attachment 1) lists the various services as mentioned by each stakeholder group and can be used to refine the list, if necessary, of potential functions for an evaluation support office. One

\[1\] UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

\[2\] A multi donor trust fund managed by the World Bank.
additional point made, was that giving careful consideration as to how these services will be provided, will make all the difference for acceptability and utility.

The location of the ESO will be essential to ensuring its credibility and usefulness. Stakeholders had varying views on what would be the best location. Given the complex and evolving nature of the institutional framework, the team found it was essential that any future work on the ESO would continuously observe the institutional landscape, build useful alliances and opportunities to provide evaluation support, and explore a variety of options for operational form, including networks, internet platforms, etc. These alternatives should not be seen as exclusive alternatives to a physical office, but rather as possible compliments to an ESO because many stakeholders felt having a presence was essential to making a difference.

4. **Findings Beyond the Evaluation Support Office**

The team, invariably, came across issues that reached beyond its immediate concern of evaluation support to Haiti, but linked up well with other work streams of the *Haiti Evaluation Task Force*, including the following:

- A sense that the humanitarian system was not learning but repeating old mistakes which raises questions to the evaluation community about making its work more effective.

- Common agreements (e.g. the Paris Declaration and the Good Humanitarian Donorship), were generally not referred to and responses continue to apply standard approaches that in general may be considered good practice, but do require (often missing) contextualization. Local solutions and local actors continue to be under-utilized or simply ignored.

- The need to integrate relief—recovery—reconstruction—development assistance, from the planning through implementation and evaluation to ensure a coherent approach to the challenges faced by Haiti.

- A need to evaluate broader issues, which could lend themselves to joint evaluations, such as sector-based evaluations (education, food security, shelter), and the social impact of aid (important but seemingly not addressed by any evaluations).

5. **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The mission team confirms that there is an existing demand and likely increasing pressure for evaluation in Haiti. Further, a large majority of stakeholders in Haiti are supportive of the idea of providing support services on evaluation and that this should entail a physical presence of some sort.

However, given the complex and evolving institutional context, the team recommends that a progressive approach to the development of the evaluation support service be adopted. The approach should be highly participatory with respect to key Haitian stakeholders, be responsive to the context and itself be about building evaluation capacity.

The mission team notes that commemoration activities are being planned in Haiti for the first anniversary of the January 12th earthquake. Mindful of and sensitive to the importance of this time to the Haitian people, this may provide an appropriate opportunity to advance this work and therefore the team recommends that, as a next step, the Haiti Evaluation Taskforce organise in Haiti an Evaluation/learning event on or around this date.

This Evaluation/learning event should have a number of objectives;

- To provide an opportunity to share lessons from evaluative work to date
- To stimulate debate about how to strengthen an evaluative and learning culture in Haiti
- To make recommendations about the operational form, location and functions of a future evaluation support service in Haiti

The outputs of this event should guide the Task Force and other stakeholders as to next steps thereafter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Clients of the ESO</th>
<th>Needs Identified</th>
<th>Concerns/Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Government                  | Being informed about ongoing projects and evaluations, including their findings  
|                             | Being involved – claim back ownership of processes  
|                             | Capacity development  
|                             | Learning – sharing lessons in ways that can be absorbed  
|                             | Implementation of recommendations – consistency of recommendations and their implementability, follow-up                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Importance of learning (and the role of evaluation in that process) is well recognized within Government, although it is seen as absent: “we don’t have a culture of learning”  
|                             | Two consultation mechanisms (round table meetings of sectors and departments/provincial) exist and are functioning; evaluation efforts, including feedback on findings, need to link to these mechanisms (among others)  
|                             | Communication/link across various stakeholders – CIRH, the emergent Performance & Accountability Office (PAO) of CIRH, Ministry of Planning, line ministries & their M&E units, NGOs etc. – is problematic and needs to be considered in any evaluation support  
|                             | Fragmentation of aid – weak capacity for selection, administration, and evaluation – “engorgement de l’aide” without control of quantity and quality  
|                             | Disempowerment of government by external structures/partners; apparently an analysis of existing capacities was done, but not used; new institutions get created without using existing ones that need strengthening; potentially, some institutions exist that could provide evaluation training  
|                             | NGOs not following legal requirements for registration, though formal process is slow; some donors work directly with NGOs and circumvent government; limited reporting by NGOs on their work programme (planned and delivered)  
|                             | Clusters create parallel structures with limited real participation of Haitian stakeholders  
|                             | Positive example(s) exist of cooperation with counterpart agencies in the region (for instance, civil protection agencies) where exchanges have been mutually respectful and useful                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Local Civil Society         | Capacity development  
|                             | Bring problems and issues to key decision makers – use of evaluation findings in decision-making, advocacy  
|                             | Communication  
<p>|                             | Complement monitoring work done (to be done) by others                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Politicization of evaluation and processes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Clients of the ESO</th>
<th>Needs Identified</th>
<th>Concerns/Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing lessons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination (multiple mission), rationalize objectives and coverage of evaluations (avoid evaluating the same thing 5 times)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potentially joint evaluations, especially of higher level issues (e.g. evaluations of specific sectors such as health, education, or humanitarian sector-wide issues)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening government capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-up to evaluation recommendations (accountability checklist to ensure action is taken)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No institutional memory – no learning, evaluations repeat the same lessons and recommendations, but the problems are not getting resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of integrating with and not weakening government structures (Paris Declaration and principles of humanitarian assistance), but highly variable perspective on the role, function, importance and capacity of various government entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The visibility of the UN is important – they are a key player in Haiti, influence policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure linkage between earthquake response and other development programmes (before and after)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Large number of projects and stakeholder: could a single evaluation support office keep track of all (over-ambitious)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many other needs apart from evaluation coordination, namely the capacity to select the right projects, coordinate and administer them – maybe one should start there, rather than at evaluation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taking evaluation lessons out of context hinders positive learning, and can be counter-productive (ensure high quality of evaluations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilaterals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advise on the timeliness of evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mapping of different evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination of evaluation could possibly result in not evaluating the same thing several times over</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Help understand how to do joint evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing evaluation information, put information into public domain, making evaluation results available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advocacy – providing credible evaluations that help promote good practice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Learning the hard way – the “system” is not learning easily, although it would need to; importance of situational analysis and adaption of responses to the context rather than use standardized approaches (too narrow application of standards); no time to reflect, as the “system” is in constant emergency response mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Universal laws of respect for public knowing (participatory approaches, working with the people, their needs and in their social structures) are being ignored; instead international actors are coming in with ready-made answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of enlightened and accountable leadership (CIRH and Government), who should be informed by evaluation findings and who should make decisions that stick; add public transparency and possibly pressure (if needed) when evaluation findings show the need for change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Importance of speaking with one voice rather than given diverse/conflicting advice to government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Importance for ESO to have a presence – have a face – for it to be useful; location will be important to ensure credibility and visibility (needs to be carefully analyzed; think about sustainable funding from outset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use of clusters and roundtables to identify issues for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Clients of the ESO</td>
<td>Needs Identified</td>
<td>Concerns/Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not all multilateral stakeholders were in agreement with the initiative to support evaluation in Haiti, notably WFP and WHO were sceptical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>Information source, systematize information (but in ways that relates to the rest of the system)</td>
<td>Information and its management are important but non-existent; everybody is lacking access to information; no project database exists; CIHR is supposed to be the clearing house for all projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-institutional learning</td>
<td>NGOs don’t write/publish evaluations; they remain in the drawer and do not serve actual learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing of lessons to stimulate learning</td>
<td>In some sectors (e.g. cash), discussions take place among NGOs about methodology to develop good practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communicate in an accessible way (messages, language including Creole)</td>
<td>Two NGO networks exist in Haiti, which could become the conduit for the ESO to access this group of stakeholders: CLIO, and joint ICVA-InterAction network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ Evaluation departments</td>
<td>Use to support evaluation missions sent to carry out evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Networks, Evaluation Community</td>
<td>Drawing lessons from evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synthesis of evaluation findings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lessons on utility of evaluation (the role of ESO in increasing utility), development of possible options or models</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attachment 2: List of People Met

**Gouvernement**

**Primature République d’Haïti**
Dr. Jean Palème MATHURIN, Economist en Chef
Mme Tatiana WAH, Conseillère

**CIRH**
M. Gabriel VERRET, Conseiller économique du Président de la République, Directeur Exécutif CIRH

**Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe**
M. Claude GRAND-PIERRE, Directeur du Cabinet du Ministre
Mme Bernice KAVANAGH CLEMENT, Directrice de Projet

**Direction de la Protection Civile**
Mme Alta Jean Baptiste, Directrice

**Bilatéral**

**Ambassade du Brésil à Port-au-Prince**
M. Daniel R. PINTO, Conseiller
M. Igor da SILVA BARBOSA, Secrétaire
M. Luis Guilherme NASCENTES DA SILVA

**Ambassade du Canada à Port-au-Prince**
M. Dominique ROSSETTI, Chef de la Coopération
M. Raymond CHANTIGNY
M. Roberts WADDLE, Ph.D., Expert Gouvernance et Coordination, Section Coopération
Roger Roome, First Secretary, ACDI

**Ambassade du France à Port-au-Prince**
M. Bernard SMOLIKOWSKI, Attaché de Coopération chargé du Développement
Christophe QUENTEL, Premier Conseiller

**Coopération Suisse, Direction du Développement et de la Coopération DDC**
Mme Sabine ROSENTHALER, Coordinatrice suppléante

**USAID**
M. Harry FRANCOIS, Mission Monitoring & Evaluation Officer

**Multilatéral**

**Banque Interaméricaine de Développement**
M. Vladimir Radovic, Conseiller Spécial,
M. Gilles DEMAIS

**DG ECHO HAÏTI, Commission Européenne**
M. Damien BERRENDORF, Chef de Bureau
M. Olivier BROUANT
M. Samy CECCHIN

**Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH)**
Mme Nicola DAHRENDORF, Chef du Bureau Intégré du Représentant Spécial Adjoint

**UNDP**
Mme Jessica FAIETA, Directrice principale

**UN Habitat**
M. Jean Christophe ADRIAN, Coordinateur des programmes en Haïti
M. Vincent GRAMMONT, Conseiller en mobilisation sociale

**UN OCHA**
M. Kazimiro RUDOLF-JOCONDO Chef de Bureau

**UN WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**
M. Stephen Kearney, Deputy Country Director

**Organisations non-gouvernementales et société civile**

**Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG (CLIO)**
M. Philippe BÉCOULET, Président
Mme Myra DE BRUIJN, Secrétaire

**CONCERN**
Mme Elke LEIDL, Country Director
Mme Sue Hodgson, Assistant, Country Director Systems

**Haïti Aid Watch**
M. Jean Louis KARL

M. Bernard Crenn
Former M&E consultant to CAR
Attachment 3: Concept Note

Supporting Evaluation in Haiti

Concept Note

1. Background and Rationale

The earthquake that struck the Western Province of Haiti on January 12th 2010 devastated the capital of Port au Prince and the towns of Jacmel, Leogane and Gressier. Some 250,000 people lost their lives and several millions were made homeless or displaced to rural areas. Already a country of chronic poverty, vulnerability and fragile government, the earthquake also saw 17% of central Haitian government employees lose their lives, as well as 100 members of the UN Stabilisation Mission and other members of the international community. All but one government building in Port au Prince were also destroyed.

Following the earthquake, a large-scale international relief effort has been mounted. One of the features of this response is that a number of evaluative efforts have already been initiated or are being planned by diverse stakeholders. These include various bilateral and multilateral donors, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, multilateral UN agencies, coalitions such as the UK’s Disasters Emergencies Committee, the Canadian Humanitarian Coalition as well as various individual agency efforts. The number of evaluation initiatives will likely continue to grow as pressure to explain and account for the results of aid efforts in Haiti mount.

One of the lessons of the Indian Ocean Tsunami response is that high accountability pressure led to a high number of fragmented, individual evaluations. This type of fragmentation not only results in duplication and wasted effort, but can overwhelm local systems and undercut opportunities for learning about broader impacts. Following discussions at the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Development Evaluation in Paris in February 2010, it was suggested that the OECD-DAC Evaluation Network, the United Nations Evaluation group (UNEG) and ALNAP host a meeting to bring together the key players involved in ongoing and planned evaluation efforts in Haiti. Following this meeting, which was held in May 2010, the ‘three networks’ agreed to come together to form the Haiti Evaluation Task Force.

Immediately, the Task Force initiated a number of work streams one of which was to discuss the appropriateness and feasibility of establishing a continuous presence in Haiti through an Evaluation Support Office (ESO). The rationale for a continued presence rather than repeated support missions comes from experience from both humanitarian situations and country evaluation capacity building best practice. This note brings together the content of these discussions and thinking to date and is presented as a vehicle for dialogue with other interested parties.

2. Principles of Engagement

A number of principles have been identified to guide the development of the Evaluation Support Office in Haiti:

---

3 The Observatory of Humanitarian practice in Chad, URD, 2010; “A strategic approach to Evaluation Capacity Development for the DAC Network on Development Evaluation: What is known and suggestions for moving forward” Background paper by the Secretariat for the 9th Meeting of the OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation (June 2009) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/13/42974509.pdf
**Aid Effectiveness**: the establishment of the ESO in conception and implementation should conform to the international Aid Effectiveness Agenda of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Particular attention should also be given to the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Good Humanitarian Donorship.

**Ownership**: as one of the five ‘Paris’ commitments, Ownership requires particular attention for development of the ESO. Early and continued dialogue with Government of the Republic of Haiti and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) (and later the Authority for the Development of Haiti (ADH), will be critical for success of the initiative. How closely the ESO should relate structurally to Government of the Republic of Haiti and the IHRC/ADH and how it relates to the Action Plan for National Recovery will be important considerations. The relationship with Haitian Civil Society will also be critical.

**Credibility**: the ESO should have a high level of credibility in the eyes of all key stakeholders. It should have principled support from Government of the Republic of Haiti, the UN system, OECD donors, The World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, European Community, NGOs (international and local), and representatives of the Haitian people, and have strong linkages to their evaluation functions while maintaining a credible degree of independence. The financial resources required should be significant and assured over a reasonable period of time. The ESO should also promote credibility through the recognisable profile and high technical competence of the team that will be drawn from different backgrounds to provide assurances to the cross-section of stakeholders it is to serve.

**Utility**: the ESO should promote a locally orientated utilisation focused approach to evaluation, be demand led and add value to current evaluation, capacity development and learning support organisations/initiatives/mechanisms in Haiti. It needs to be timely in establishment and its products and services should be easily accessible and useful in terms of contributing to more effective reconstruction and development work.

**Accountability**: the ESO itself will be evaluated for the continued relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.

3. **Mission**

The overarching Mission of the Evaluation Support Office is stated as;

To support the Government and people of Haiti and the international community in their efforts for Haitian national recovery and development, through improved evaluation co-ordination and support, learning, research and national capacities for evaluation.

4. **Key Functions**

In its fullest expression so far, four possible areas of work have been identified for the ESO;

1. **Coordination, support and advice**: with respect to on-going and planned evaluation missions. This would include maintenance of a database of evaluations to minimise duplication and fragmentation, promote coherence, and help identify gaps and synergies; advice on the scope and design of evaluations to promote coherence and good/best practice for independence, credibility and utility; and the promotion of the evaluation framework, context analysis and Haiti Learning Portal developed by ALNAP 5.

2. **Sharing of knowledge, learning and evaluative information**: to proactively disseminate the results and recommendations of evaluations and other evaluative data and thereby extending the timeframe in which one given evaluation report remains a point of reference for the different actors. By continuing to highlight and promote evaluation findings and recommendations, the evaluation itself has a greater impact, and can lead to affecting real change on the ground. This work area could involve the maintenance of a web portal, the

---

4 For example Disaster Response Support Service – a collaboration of RedR-Sphere-HAP
5 http://www.alnap.org/current/Haitilearningportal.aspx
organisation of workshops or other fora, email distribution, and making presentations at /through other coordinating mechanisms/fora. Support to learning from experience in other countries, emergencies and other situations would also be part of this work area.

3. **Building Capacity for Evaluation:** with respect to Government of Haiti and related recovery/reconstruction entities, Haitian NGO community/Civil Society, international development partners in Haiti and others. With a view to the longer term, the ESO should in itself be seen as an important intervention for the building of sustainable in-country capacity for evaluation at individual, institutional and enabling levels. International good practice in applying principles and developing strategies for supporting national capacity building for evaluation should be brought to bear.

4. **Research:** to identify and carry out /commission appropriate research studies /surveys on emerging and critical issues to improve contextual knowledge and the overall evidence base for evaluation.

The eventual combination and evolution of functions will require further careful consideration of the Haitian context, and the financial resources made available.

5. **Timeframe and Implementation**

   In view of the Fragile States Principles of ‘staying long enough to give success a chance’, and of placing ‘state building’ as the central objective and of the longer term evaluation capacity building objective of the initiative, it is proposed that the ESO could be developed over three stages;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Likely main demands</th>
<th>Focus of activities of ESO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.1</td>
<td>Immediate term- up 12 mths</td>
<td>Initial set up of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For coordination and support of new evaluation missions</td>
<td>Work Areas 1,2 &amp; 4 (as outlined above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many individual agency evaluations, some inter agency/ collaborative evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need for a high level of dissemination of learning to Haitian and international partners to improve Real Time or near Real Time response and assist transition from emergency to recovery and reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Medium term- yrs 2-3</td>
<td>Work Areas 1,2,3 &amp; 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System wide Evaluations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing out- learning to international humanitarian community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing demand through this period for targeted capacity building for evaluation, and for evaluation of the structural and developmental challenges in Haiti.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Longer term yrs 4-7</td>
<td>Work areas 3 &amp; 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In- country capacity building for evaluation Evaluation of reconstruction, recovery and development programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

6 Conceptual Framework for Developing Evaluation Capacities; C Heider, WFP, 2010
7 Evidence for Children; Developing national capacities for Country Led evaluations systems M Segone, UNICEF, 2010; Supporting partner country ownership and capacity in development evaluation, H Lundgren & M Kennedy, OECD-Dac evaluation network, 2009
A visit to Haiti by members of the Haitian Evaluation Task Force in mid October 2010 is envisaged in order to open dialogue with Government of Republic of Haiti and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission and assess general demand and level of support. The mission will also meet with World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, the UN Stabilisation Mission and Country team, OCHA, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF,WHO, EC/ECHO, USAID, CIDA, Embassies of Brazil, US, France, Canada, UK, Haitian Civil Society, and larger International NGOs.

Subject to agreement that such an office is required at the country level, and given the elections scheduled for November, it is unlikely that the Evaluation Support Office could be opened in Port au Prince before early 2011.

6. **Resources and Management**

The ESO team should ideally:

- Have strong knowledge of French and English, with Haitian Creole being highly desirable
- Be a mixed international and national team- with high levels of knowledge of the Haitian political, social and cultural context
- Have strong political, negotiation and communication skills
- Have strong training, knowledge transfer and evaluation capacity building experience
- Have strong disaster management experience and experienced in the transition from emergency to recovery and development
- Have experience and skills related to gender analysis and incorporation of gender into evaluation work.

A management group made up with members of the Task Force together with one or more representatives of GoRH/IHRC will be established.

*Haitian Evaluation Task Force 20th September 2010*