



2006 Survey on Monitoring The Paris Declaration

Country Chapters

BURKINA FASO

The 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration was undertaken in 34 countries that receive aid. The results of the survey are presented in two volumes. **Volume 1** provides an overview of key findings across 34 countries. **Volume 2** presents the baseline and key findings in each of the 34 countries that have taken part in the survey. This chapter is based primarily on the data and findings communicated by government and donors to the OECD through the Paris Declaration monitoring process. A more detailed description of this process, how this chapter was drafted and what sources were used is included in Volume 1, Chapter 2.

Both Volume 1 (Overview) and Volume 2 (Country Chapters) of the 2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration can be downloaded at the OECD website:

www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/monitoring

A second round of monitoring will be organised in the first quarter of 2008 and will be an important contribution to the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in September 2008.

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BURKINA FASO

THE PER CAPITA ANNUAL INCOME OF BURKINA FASO'S 13.9 MILLION PEOPLE is USD 400 (2004), and some 43% of the population fall below the national poverty line (2003). Burkina Faso has endorsed the Paris Declaration. Net official development assistance (ODA) to Burkina Faso in 2004 was USD 633 million, representing approximately 12.7% of gross national income. A total of 23 of the 27 resident donors responded to the 2006 baseline survey, including 13 of the top 15 donors, accounting for 91% of official aid flows to Burkina Faso. The United States, Cuba, Morocco and the West African Development Bank did not respond.

DIMENSIONS	BASELINE	CHALLENGES	PRIORITY ACTIONS
Ownership	Moderate	<p>A Poverty Reduction Strategy has been developed but it is not matched by implementation capacity.</p> <p>Government ownership of development policy has until recently been weak, though recent efforts have been stepped up (e.g. through establishment of the Technical Secretariat for Aid Effectiveness).</p>	<p>Implement action plan to address government weaknesses identified in the Aid Effectiveness Review, particularly lack of resources and capacity of development oversight departments</p> <p>Strengthen budget control systems, particularly in the area of revenue projections.</p>
Alignment	Moderate	<p>Very low alignment in the area of capacity building.</p> <p>Many different projects and programmes are not captured in the government recording system.</p> <p>Many different project implementation units still exist outside government.</p>	<p>Prepare government capacity-building initiative.</p> <p>Build up budget and resources of government audit function.</p> <p>Ensure that all projects are included in government financial public management system.</p> <p>Government should enact policies to reduce number of project implementation units.</p>
Harmonisation	Moderate	<p>In sectors with no programme-based approach, alignment is weak.</p>	<p>Develop programme-based approach with common procedures for all relevant sectors.</p>
Managing for results	Moderate	<p>Results managing system is hampered by weaknesses in statistical and monitoring and evaluation resources and capacity.</p>	<p>Donors and government should provide adequate funding and staff levels to the departments responsible for results-based management systems.</p>
Mutual accountability	Moderate	<p>Discussions on mutual accountability have only recently begun.</p>	<p>Ensure Technical Secretariat has resources and staff to properly oversee implementation of plans as they develop.</p>

OVERVIEW
Box 6.1
Challenges and priority actions

OWNERSHIP

INDICATOR 1

OWNERSHIP IS CRITICAL to achieving development results and is central to the Paris Declaration. It has been defined as a country's ability to exercise effective leadership over its development policies and strategies. Achieving this – especially in countries that rely heavily on aid to finance their development – is not a simple undertaking. Nor can it be measured by a single indicator. For donors, it means supporting countries' leadership, policies, institutions and systems. This is commonly referred to as "alignment" (see below). Donors are in a better position to do this when governments set out clear priorities and operational strategies (the main focus of Indicator 1 of the Paris Declaration).

Indicator 1 of the Paris Declaration measures the extent to which a country has an operational development strategy to guide the aid co-ordination effort and the country's overall development. The score for Indicator 1 is based on the World Bank's 2005 Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) Progress Report. In the CDF's terms, an operational strategy calls for a coherent long-term vision and a medium-term strategy derived from it; specific targets serving a holistic, balanced and well-sequenced development strategy; and capacity and resources for its implementation. Burkina Faso is considered to have some of these elements and not others, and is consequently placed, along with 58% of the countries covered, in category C of the CDF descending scale running from A to E. Only countries in categories A or B are considered to have an operational strategy.

According to the World Bank's Aid Effectiveness Review (AER), Burkina Faso's policy framework is strong on vision and medium-term objective setting. The government wrote its first long-term development strategy, the Letter of Intent for Sustainable Development Policy, in 1995. This document gives conceptual underpinnings to the medium-term strategy, the *Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté* (CSLP). A further long-term vision study updating the Letter of Intent, Burkina 2025, was completed in December 2005 by a government-established *Groupe opérationnel*

d'experts de l'étude prospective, a UNDP-financed group of some 60 government and civil-society representatives. The most recent medium-term strategy, CSLP II, covers the years 2004-06 and functions as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). Policy activities are outlined in the accompanying matrix, the 2004-2006 Priority Action Plan (PAP), which is updated yearly to help reflect CSLP II priorities within the budget.

The five pillars of the CSLP II are (as with the previous CSLP) accelerated and equitable growth, better access for poor people to social services, employment growth, the environment and good governance. Millennium Development Goals are made more country-specific and linked to these priority pillars. The CSLP II puts greater emphasis on gender issues than the previous strategy, and includes regional development plans along with the national one. Annual reviews ensure that targets are modified according to lessons learned, and that resources are appropriate to those targets: for example, education and poverty reduction goals have been extended past 2015 to take into account country realities (low baseline achievement and poor capacity). Ten-year sectoral development plans for selected sectors (health, education, public expenditure reform) are also being developed, as well as 13 regional development plans.

The government, having historically been quite weak, has recently stepped up efforts to "own" development policy. A Technical Secretariat for Aid Effectiveness (STELA) has been established, which has collaborated with the National Co-ordinator on the OECD questionnaire. The government co-chairs (with the UNDP) round-table meetings on development assistance, most recently in March 2004, and has identified appropriate sectoral leads among donors. For example, the World Bank and European Commission are the government's choice to lead work on budget support (though this role is not necessarily limited to these two donors), while France was chosen to head education work. Through the planned framework for private-sector/civil-society involvement in development, as well as possible

legal reforms to enhance non-government participation, the government is soliciting inputs from non-government stakeholders. Overall, however, the World Bank's Aid Effectiveness Review notes that "civil society involvement has proven difficult to accomplish in a sufficiently representative fashion" across all sectors.

Until recently, the government's approach to stakeholder consultation was wide-reaching, yet inconsistent, as typified by its stakeholder consultations for the original CSLP. Consultations for CSLP II were more rigorous, and included 10 regional consultations and development of the regional strategies discussed above. Civil-society organisations (CSOs) and private-sector representatives were brought in and provided inputs to the CSLP II. The National Assembly reviewed both CSLP I and II, but does not review progress reports (it only provides budget approval). Line ministries also provide commentary on the CSLP progress during the annual budget session. The government plans to conduct annual CSLP revisions at the national and regional levels, with regional councils providing a permanent venue for dialogue. These regional efforts are expected to take on a more central importance since the introduction of a 2004 decentralisation law. At the national level, CSOs and the private sector may speak to their appointed representative on the Economic and Social Council, an advisory body to the government that is constitutionally responsible for Parliamentary review of all national development plans (and which reviewed CSLP I and II).

Further, the government has established an office tasked with overseeing the implementation of the national poverty alleviation plan, overseen by the Ministry of Economy and Development (MED), the Ministerial Steering and Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister and with participation from all ministries. The Committee develops policy and keeps sectoral strategies in line with the overall development policy. There are also six active Sectoral Commissions to monitor sectoral policy implementation, overseen by the *Direction Générale de l'Economie et de la Planification* within the MED.

However, of the six, only two produced reports that were used in preparation of the 2005 CSLP Progress Report. The *Secrétariat Technique pour la Coordination des Programmes de Développement Economique et Social (STC-PDES)* handles monitoring and evaluation as well as liaison with civil society, national consultations and regional councils. Originally a department within the MED, the STC-PDES was recently moved to the *Direction Générale de l'Economie et du Développement*. The government hosted 100 participants at a workshop in March 2006 to disseminate and discuss Burkina 2025 findings.

The government now links medium-and long-term strategies to the national budget through use of a three-year rolling Mid-Term Evaluation Framework (MTEF), which is integrated with the budget cycle. The latest MTEFs were prepared sufficiently in advance to be included in the annual budget submission. A sectoral MTEF has been developed for health, and others are planned in finance, water and transport. Budget expenditures have increased in line with priorities set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Poverty-reducing social expenditures have risen from 4.8% of gross domestic product in 2002 to 5.8% in 2004, and nearly half of all domestic revenue in 2006 went to financing the CSLP priority pillars.

Despite recent progress, however, weaknesses remain. Capacity to implement strategy, for example (particularly at the local government level), is much weaker than that available for strategy formulation. For sectoral policies to be formulated and implemented, priority needs to be placed squarely on building up skills in the areas of decentralisation, civil-service reform and training. More resources are needed to implement CSLP targets, as well as more technical assistance. Further, budget control systems need to be honed, particularly in the area of revenue projections. The MTEF still requires more results-based sectoral programmes, as only one has been developed to date. Lastly, aid disbursements need to be more closely attuned to the results of monitoring and evaluation work.

Such weaknesses have their roots in Burkina Faso's overall policy environment (in particular, the country's limited monitoring and evaluation capacity, poor inter-ministerial co-ordination, lack of "discussion space" in Parliament in which to discuss budget programming, etc.) Nonetheless, there are positive signs on the horizon: the health sector MTEF was finalised in 2005, and annual CSLP reviews have improved the MTEF. Most line ministries are now beginning to prioritise their planning in line with the poverty alleviation plan.

ALIGNMENT

ALTHOUGH BURKINA FASO AND ITS DONORS have put in place a number of the elements necessary to align aid with country policies and systems, this process remains incomplete in some important respects. On the one hand, country systems still fall short of providing a robust framework into which aid can be easily integrated. On the other hand, donors will need to step up their efforts if the Paris Declaration commitments on alignment are to be fully realised in Burkina Faso.

BUILDING RELIABLE COUNTRY SYSTEMS

INDICATOR 2a

The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment gives Burkina Faso a current score of 4.0 – "moderately strong" – for the quality of budgetary and public financial management. This is slightly above average for International Development Association countries. The AER reports that public financial management has improved significantly since 2002, when the first budget reform plan, the *Plan de Réforme de la Gestion Budgétaire*, was launched to help strengthen the budget process as outlined in the CSLP. The plan is helping to decentralise budget preparation to the sectors, and, thanks to the establishment of a Supreme Audit Institution (the *Cour des Comptes*), strengthening budget oversight. The *Cour des Comptes*, a very recently established institution, is independent, and undertakes audits of all public enterprises and ministries including regional branches. Sectors in the CSLP are scrutinised more regularly. Nonetheless, the *Cour des Comptes* is understaffed and under-funded, creating a backlog on budget audits.

The government now has a computerised expenditure management system, and is introducing a payroll information system for local and central governments. An electronic debt management system is also being introduced, along with an integrated revenue management system.

INDICATOR 2b

A procurement code was introduced in 2002-03 to strengthen transparency and efficiency, and a procurement reform commission established, bringing together government representatives and other stakeholders to co-ordinate and monitor these reforms. Since then, procurement responsibility has been transferred to local units, such as local governments and sectoral planning units. Procurement units are given sufficient resources thanks to a well-functioning cash management system, though capacity in some units is limited. Other outstanding problems include the paucity of regular audits: only 5% of procurement contracts were audited in 2005.

In 2006, government introduced an action plan to operationalise the findings of the 2005 Country Procurement Assessment Review, aiming for the creation of a regulatory agency and specialised procurement units for major contracting authorities, as well as a functional and administrative overhaul of the Central Directorate for Public Procurement.

Corruption remains a serious issue in Burkina Faso. Though it ranks in the top half of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (79th of 163), it rates just 3.2, on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). In 2002, the government established a High Authority for the Coordination of the Fight Against Corruption, hampered by a limited mandate to prosecute cases, and tight resources. A civil-society organisation, the National Anti-Corruption Network, has raised public awareness of the issue. A National Anti-Corruption Strategy was developed in 2005, and the High Authority intends to put it into action.

ALIGNING AID FLOWS ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Burkina Faso's poverty reduction strategy provides a basis for external partners to align their support in a general way with the country's policies. The country's five biggest donors are the World Bank, France, the European Union, the Netherlands and the African Development Bank (AfDB); together they accounted for 74% of aid in 2002-03. They have aligned their assistance with the CSLP. The World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy 2000-03 and Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report 2004-05 are based on the CSLP and the strategies of the European Commission (EC), Netherlands, Austria, United Nations and AfDB. The Millennium Challenge Corporation of the United States invited Burkina Faso to apply for a Threshold Program in 2005, to help it become eligible for Millennium Challenge Account funding; the government is now preparing a proposal for funding that is aligned with CSLP II priorities. Several donors, including the EC, UNDP, France and AfDB, have aligned to the Plan de Réforme de la Gestion Budgétaire (the government's budget strengthening plan).

Staffing and resources are also decentralising to a certain extent. The World Bank's country manager is based in Ouagadougou, along with technical specialists in environment, rural development, education and HIV/AIDS. The UNDP has transferred decision making to Ouagadougou. Technical expertise from several other donors, including the EC, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, are based locally and enhance technical group discussions. However, overall dialogue on harmonisation and alignment among offices could be stepped up to ensure a coherent overall strategy.

The government has tried to steer donor funding. The Ministry of Finance's Direction Générale de la Coopération has an electronic database of all development aid projects and disbursements, and publishes an annual report (though often delayed). Several formal sectoral working groups chaired by line ministries help co-ordinate sectoral budget support; these can be found in agriculture, budget support, education, energy, health, water and sanitation, vocational education and training, and transport. Recognising that different donors have different rules and decentralisation levels within their own organisations, the World Bank, UNDP and EC formed a Technical Secretariat for Aid Effectiveness that identifies stumbling blocks and areas where the group can help the government with its harmonisation and alignment plans.

One of the obstacles hindering further joint country programming in Burkina Faso is the difficulty of reflecting donor financial commitments fully and accurately in the national budget. This is the aspect of alignment measured by Indicator 3 of the baseline survey. The general target for this indicator set by the Paris Declaration (85%) calls for a high level of budget realism on the part of the country authorities, accompanied by a high degree of willingness and ability of donors to provide information in a timely fashion and in a suitable form.

Are government budget estimates comprehensive and realistic?

	Government's budget estimates of aid flows for FY05 (USD m) a	Aid disbursed by donors for government sector in FY05 (USD m) b	Baseline ratio* c=a/b (%) c=b/a
African Dev. Bank	58	58	99%
Austria	1	4	27%
Belgium	8	3	45%
Canada	8	8	97%
China	10	20	47%
Denmark	28	27	96%
European Commission	84	92	91%
France	9	43	20%
Germany	7	26	28%
IMF	0	10	0%
Italy	0	6	0%
Netherlands	15	43	34%
Sweden	3	11	29%
Switzerland	6	7	95%
United Nations	19	44	45%
World Bank	102	128	79%
Total	359	531	68%

* Baseline ratio is $c = a / b$ except where government's budget estimates are greater than disbursements ($c = b / a$).

INDICATOR 3
Table 18.1

The table provides government's budget estimates of aid flows for fiscal year 2005 (numerator) as a percentage of aid disbursed by donors for the government sector for the same period (denominator). This ratio tells us the degree to which there is a discrepancy between budget estimates and actual disbursements. The discrepancy can be in two directions: indeed budget estimates can be either higher or lower than disbursements. In order to have a single measure of discrepancy that is always less than 100%, the ratio is flipped when budget estimates are higher than disbursements. The baseline value for Indicator 3 in Burkina Faso is 68%. Achieving the target agreed in Paris of 84% (halving the gap) for this indicator will require concerted efforts by donors and government.

There are some sizeable discrepancies in both directions between the aid reported by donors as disbursed to the government sector. In general, only the projects or programmes that are managed by the state and those requiring a financial counterpart of the state are registered. Since 2006, the government has adopted a new policy to include development aid within the budget. However, many projects and programmes remain outside the budget structure. It seems clear that stakeholders will need to look closely at the realism of the budget and its reporting of donor funding.

INDICATOR 4
Table 6.2

How much technical assistance is co-ordinated with country programmes?

	Co-ordinated technical co-operation (USD m) a	Total technical co-operation (USD m) b	Baseline ratio (%) c=a/b
African Dev. Bank	0	0	0%
Austria	0	4	0%
Belgium	0	1	0%
Canada	0	5	7%
China	0	2	0%
Denmark	1	4	15%
European Commission	0	4	5%
France	0	8	0%
Germany	0	10	0%
IMF	0	0	--
Italy	1	6	18%
Netherlands	0	1	0%
Sweden	0	0	--
Switzerland	0	10	3%
United Nations	0	19	0%
World Bank	0	0	--
Total	3	75	3%

CO-ORDINATING SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN CAPACITY

Capacity constraints significantly undermine the ability of country systems to capture and co-ordinate aid flows more effectively. The Paris Declaration commits donors to providing more co-ordinated support to capacity development under country leadership, with a target of 50% provided in this form by 2010. The survey indicates that in Burkina Faso, currently just 3% of reported technical assistance is considered co-ordinated in this sense, pointing to a very large gap to close during the years to 2010.

On a definitional note, many donors noted during discussions with the National Co-ordinator their confusion over what is regarded as joint capacity building as outlined in Indicator 4 of the questionnaire. The government and nine donors are now beginning to formulate a more co-ordinated approach.

INDICATOR 5
Table 6.3

How much aid for the government sectors uses country systems?

	Aid disbursed by donors for government sector (USD m) a	Public financial management				Procurement	
		Budget execution (USD m) b	Financial reporting (USD m) c	Auditing (USD m) d	Baseline ratio (%) avg (b,c,d) / a	Procurement systems (USD m) e	Baseline ratio (%) e / a
African Dev. Bank	58	8	8	8	14%	58	100%
Austria	4	0	0	0	0%	0	0%
Belgium	3	0	0	0	0%	2	60%
Canada	8	2	0	0	10%	2	29%
China	20	13	13	13	63%	13	63%
Denmark	27	11	4	4	24%	17	64%
European Commission	92	52	95	52	72%	52	57%
France	43	18	7	7	25%	30	70%
Germany	26	16	16	16	61%	16	61%
IMF	10	10	10	10	100%	10	100%
Italy	6	0	0	0	8%	0	8%
Netherlands	43	20	20	20	45%	38	87%
Sweden	11	7	7	7	63%	7	63%
Switzerland	7	7	7	7	100%	7	100%
United Nations	44	11	16	8	27%	9	20%
World Bank	128	60	60	60	47%	60	47%
Total	531	234	263	212	45%	321	60%

USING COUNTRY SYSTEMS

Indicator 5a is a measure of the use of three components of country public financial management systems by donors. According to the survey data, the average rate of utilisation across the three components is 45%. Given Burkina Faso's relatively strong Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score for public budgetary and financial management, the target of 63% by 2010 seems, though challenging, within reach.

This promising performance is in part a reflection of the growing role of budget support. Approximately 30% of development assistance is now budget support: the EC, for example, provides exclusive budget support within the education sector. Donors contributing aid through sector-wide approaches (SWAs) have also begun to use country systems. For example, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UNFPA use national procurement systems in their health and HIV/AIDS SWAp. They have agreed on a list of 35 indicators to monitor progress. An Education SWAp supported by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the World Bank uses national financial management,

monitoring and procurement measures where possible. The World Bank has adopted national procedures for national bids but uses its own systems for international bids.

Increasing use of government systems reflects the government's *Plan de Réforme de la Gestion Budgétaire*, that encourages all development partners to use the government's own financial planning and procurement systems. However, widespread utilisation of the public financial management system is still hindered by rigidities of donor procedures.

According to the survey results, 60% of aid for the government sector made use of Burkina Faso's procurement system and development partners are increasingly following national procurement procedures. Donors have also heeded the call for adherence to national procurement procedures found in the World Bank's 2003 Country Procurement Assessment Report. Ultimately, though, Burkina Faso (like many aid-dependent countries) still faces a multiplicity of donor administrative procedures.

INDICATOR 6
Table 6.4

How many PIUs are parallel to country structures?

	Parallel PIUs (units)
African Dev. Bank	21
Austria	9
Belgium	5
Canada	12
China	3
Denmark	13
European Commission	9
France	12
Germany	--
IMF	0
Italy	2
Netherlands	7
Sweden	5
Switzerland	4
United Nations	16
World Bank	13
Total	131

AVOIDING PARALLEL
IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURES

The Paris Declaration calls for a substantial reduction in the number of project implementation units (PIU) that are parallel, where appointment decisions and accounting relationships involve the donor alone. The current baseline figure for Burkina Faso is given as 131 such structures. However, this is partly due to definitional issues: in Burkina Faso, four criteria are used to establish the list of PIUs, and they are defined as such if they meet even one of these criteria. The National Co-ordinator reports that some questionnaire respondents had a tendency to minimise the number of PIUs in their portfolio as defined by these criteria. Additionally, six respondents (Canada, France, China, Switzerland, Sweden and Italy) provided a number of PIUs without furnishing a detailed list. In general, the government approves these structures, and the structures collaborate strictly according to government procedures. The usual reasons for setting up parallel structures are raised, primarily surrounding the administrative burdens of government which delay timely execution of projects and programs.

The government and partners are now making efforts to integrate PIUs into country structures and to reduce the size of remaining PIUs. The goal of many PIUs is changing from implementation to capacity building and co-ordination. The use of single PIUs to execute multiple projects (community development, transport, water and rural development, for example) is also being tested.

PROVIDING MORE PREDICTABLE AID

There is a need to improve the predictability of support and the measurement of performance in this regard. Indicator 7 focuses on the government's ability to record disbursements in its accounting system for the appropriate year, for which 92% is the total recorded value for Burkina Faso. While this total might point to a high level of predictability together with a high level of accuracy in the recording, the breakdown by donor reveals a high level of both under- and over-accounting of disbursements by the government. Even more surprising is the lack of comparability between some donors' own scheduled aid plans versus their actual disbursements. It is clear that some of Burkina Faso's biggest donors, including the EC, France, Germany and the UN, have very different planned versus actual disbursements.

The table looks at predictability from two different angles. The first angle is donors' and government's combined ability to disburse aid on schedule. In Burkina Faso, donors scheduled USD 477 million for disbursement in 2005 and actually disbursed – according to their own records – significantly more than expected (USD 531 million). The discrepancy varies considerably among donors and is mainly due to late disbursements carried over to 2005 and to delays in implementing programmes. The second angle is donors' and government's ability to record comprehensively disbursements made by donors for the government sector. In Burkina Faso, government systems recorded USD 438 million out of the USD 531 million notified as disbursed by donors (83%), indicating that a significant proportion of disbursements were not captured, either because they were not appropriately notified by donors or because they were inaccurately recorded by government.

INDICATOR 7
Table 6.5

Are disbursements on schedule and recorded by government?

	Disbursements recorded by government in FY05 (USD m)	Aid scheduled by donors for disbursement in FY05 (USD m)	Aid actually disbursed by donors in FY05 (USD m)	Baseline ratio*
	a	b	FOR REFERENCE ONLY	(%) c=a/b c=b/a
African Dev. Bank	58	58	58	99%
Austria	0	5	4	0%
Belgium	8	--	3	
Canada	0	8	8	0%
China	10	20	20	48%
Denmark	14	27	27	51%
European Commission	108	113	92	96%
France	30	0	43	0%
Germany	7	9	26	70%
IMF	15	10	10	66%
Italy	0	6	6	0%
Netherlands	46	47	43	98%
Sweden	8	11	11	77%
Switzerland	6	7	7	95%
United Nations	0	30	44	0%
World Bank	128	127	128	99%
Total	438	478	531	92%

* Baseline ratio is $c = a / b$ except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement ($c = b / a$).

Indicator 7 on predictability has been designed to encourage progress against both of these angles so as to gradually close the predictability gap by half by 2010. In other words, it seeks to improve not only the predictability of actual disbursements but also the accuracy of how they are recorded in government systems – an important feature of ownership, accountability and transparency. In Burkina Faso, this combined predictability gap amounts to USD 39 million (8% of aid scheduled for disbursement). Closing this predictability gap will require donors and government to work increasingly together on various fronts at the same time. They might work at improving:

- the realism of predictions on volume and timing of expected disbursements;
- the way donors notify their disbursements to government;
- the comprehensiveness of government's records of disbursements made by donors.

Nearly half of all public expenditures are financed through external flows, often in the form of direct budget support. By 2005, most development partners were making multi-year budget commitments,

contributing to budget predictability. However, only one-third of this expenditure was committed before the annual budgetary framework. SWAp are also helping to align aid disbursements with the annual budget: for example, donors in the education SWAp conduct joint reviews during annual budget preparation. Disbursements under the SWAp are committed on the basis of the Ministry of Education's yearly action plan; donors monitor timeliness of disbursements.

To address these issues, the government approved a Memorandum of Understanding for joint budgetary support, the Cadre general pour l'appui budgétaire, in the area of public financial management. Participants include the AfDB, France, Denmark, the EC, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the World Bank.

UNTYING AID

In Burkina Faso, all multilateral and most bilateral aid is untied. Untied bilateral aid may be set to increase because of anticipated aid increases from donors that provide only untied aid.

INDICATOR 8

HARMONISATION

USING COMMON ARRANGEMENTS

The National Co-ordinator responsible for collating donor responses noted that, as with some other portions of the questionnaire, respondents had definitional questions regarding “co-ordinated programme under government leadership” and interpretations of the phrase varied widely. Harmonisation of external partners’ procedures come in the form of joint annual CSLP reviews, common project performance indicators, common financing arrangements and joint implementation mechanisms. The proportion of reported government sector aid using programme-based approaches and hence employing common arrangements is currently reported as 45%, mostly in the form of sectoral approaches.

The Government’s Cadre general pour l’appui budgétaire provides a framework to assess budget support and measures macroeconomic performance, public sector resource management and CSLPII rollout. The PAP also provides a joint performance mechanism: the World Bank’s upcoming Poverty Reduction Support Credit will be based on this.

Finance is being co-ordinated particularly closely through SWAp in education, vocational education and training, water and sanitation, and health, all of which involves multiple donors and joint performance reviews. For example, an upcoming agricultural SWAp (World Bank, Denmark, Germany and IFAD) will feature joint financing mechanisms. In the area of vocational education and training, some co-ordination of parallel financing is provided through the Cadre de Concertation sur l’Enseignement Technique et la Formation Professionnelle. In sectors where there is no sectoral approach in place, however, there are many examples of stand-alone projects where there is little or no co-ordination. The government has found it challenging to establish a list of programmes considered relevant to programme-based approaches, since complete data on current programmes are not available and such programmes are not necessarily included in national monitoring systems.

INDICATOR 9
Table 6.6

How much aid is programme based?

	Budget support (USD m) a	Other PBAs (USD m) b	Total (USD m) c=a+b	Total disbursed (USD m) d	Baseline ratio (%) e=c/d
African Dev. Bank	8	--	8	58	14%
Austria	0	4	4	4	100%
Belgium	0	0	0	12	0%
Canada	0	2	2	15	17%
China	0	0	0	20	0%
Denmark	6	27	33	33	100%
European Commission	51	19	70	104	67%
France	10	1	11	47	23%
Germany	0	0	0	29	0%
IMF	0	0	0	10	0%
Italy	0	1	1	6	18%
Netherlands	20	8	28	47	58%
Sweden	7	5	12	12	100%
Switzerland	7	2	9	19	45%
United Nations	0	15	15	48	31%
World Bank	60	17	77	128	60%
Total	168	101	269	593	45%

CONDUCTING JOINT MISSIONS AND SHARING ANALYSIS

The baseline figure for co-ordination of donor missions is just 26%, versus the Paris Declaration target of 40%. The government does not at present have control over mission schedules, and decisions to travel rest at the level of the donors. Developing joint sectoral approaches will no doubt help to improve this picture. For example, donors undertake joint missions in education, health/HIV/AIDS and water and sanitation.

Joint analytical work is also becoming more common, and the baseline proportion is as high as 60%. The World Bank and Strategic Partnership for Africa conducted a joint Country Financial Accountability Assessment in 2002 in partnership with at least seven other donors. In 2004, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund jointly updated the Accountability Assessment and Action Plan to track poverty indicators. In January 2005, the government and nine partners agreed to provide joint budgetary support to implement Burkina Faso's Poverty Reduction Strategy, and a Country Procurement Assessment Review.

SWAPs are commonplace, involving up to 13 external partners (as with education). Environmental impact assessments have been undertaken jointly in the power sector, and analytical work has been conducted in child nutrition, child labour and trade. The EC will co-ordinate responses to improve financial management through the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability framework in 2007.

How many donor missions are co-ordinated?

	Co-ordinated donor missions (missions) a	Total donor missions (missions) b	Baseline ratio (%) c=a/b
African Dev. Bank	3	8	38%
Austria	1	1	100%
Belgium	2	4	50%
Canada	4	41	10%
China	2	4	50%
Denmark	3	16	19%
European Commission	2	6	33%
France	5	38	13%
Germany	7	20	35%
IMF	2	10	20%
Italy	--	--	--
Netherlands	2	4	50%
Sweden	2	3	67%
Switzerland	4	6	67%
United Nations	43	179	24%
World Bank	15	35	43%
Total (discounted*)	63	375	17%

* The total of co-ordinated missions has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 35% has been applied.

INDICATOR 10a
Table 6.7

How much country analysis is co-ordinated?

	Co-ordinated donor analytical work (units) a	Total donor analytical work (units) b	Baseline ratio (%) c=a/b
African Dev. Bank	2	4	50%
Austria	0	0	--
Belgium	0	0	--
Canada	4	9	44%
China	0	0	--
Denmark	10	10	100%
European Commission	5	6	83%
France	0	1	0%
Germany	10	15	67%
IMF	0	2	0%
Italy	--	--	--
Netherlands	1	1	100%
Sweden	0	2	0%
Switzerland	0	0	--
United Nations	14	24	58%
World Bank	1	4	25%
Total (discounted*)	35	78	45%

* The total of co-ordinated analysis has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 25% has been applied.

INDICATOR 10b
Table 6.8

Some 30 documents have been posted on the shared Country Analytic Work website as of October 2006. However, to date, responsibility for joint work has rested mostly with donors; the

national government has had less leadership in this area than desirable. For their part, donors should use the government's own periodic reviews of sectoral policies rather than preparing their own.

MANAGING FOR RESULTS

INDICATOR 11 **THE PARIS DECLARATION URGES** partner countries and donors to work together to manage resources on the basis of desired results, and to use information to improve decision making. This means both strengthening the capacity to undertake such management and helping to increase the demand for a focus on results. Indicator 11 targets one component of this effort: the establishment of cost-effective results-oriented reporting and assessment systems by the country.

Burkina Faso does not have a "largely developed" results monitoring system, according to the World Bank's CDF Progress Report. It falls in category C of this assessment, along with the 42% of the sample that have some but not all of the elements of such a system. This reflects particular strengths and inadequacies in three areas: the quality of the available development information, the degree to which stakeholders have access to it, and the extent of co-ordinated monitoring and evaluation of the country's development efforts.

MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

INDICATOR 12 **THE PARIS DECLARATION CALLS** for donors and partner countries to be accountable to each other for the use of development resources, and in a way that strengthens public support for national policies and development assistance. This in turn requires governments to improve country accountability systems and donors to be transparent about their own contributions. Indicator 12 seeks to establish whether there is a country-level mechanism permitting joint assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including those in the Declaration itself.

The AER reports that the government is improving its data collection system, including a national statistical development strategy supported by the World Bank through a Statistical Capacity Building Project. However, this project is not yet fully funded, limiting the ability of the project to enact meaningful reforms. A communications strategy to inform the public about the CSLP II was agreed in 2005 and is being implemented through media coverage and interaction with civil-society organisations. A monitoring and evaluation system associated with the CSLP has brought improvements, but remains weak. Lastly, the government has updated monitoring indicators to be more relevant to the CSLP II: this revamped set of 28 indicators is now included in the PAP.

In Burkina Faso, it is too early for donors and governments to agree on a plan for mutual responsibility, as discussions of concepts and definitions began only recently. Additionally, the move towards joint budget support is also contributing to the establishment of mutual assessment frameworks, thanks to independent performance reviews and agreed criteria. The government has signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and a Technical Secretariat has been established to develop strategies for its implementation. The country is also a member of the African Peer Review Mechanism.

BASELINES AND TARGETS

THE TABLE BELOW presents the 2005 baselines and the targets for Burkina Faso. The baseline values are taken from the discussion above, which draws on various sources of information. The main source is the baseline survey undertaken in Burkina Faso under the aegis of the National Co-ordinator (Justin Hien).

INDICATORS	2005 BASELINE	2010 TARGET
1 Ownership – Operational PRS	C	B or A
2a Quality of PFM systems	4.0	4.5
2b Quality procurement systems	Not available	Not applicable
3 Aid reported on budget	68%	85%
4 Co-ordinated capacity development	3%	50%
5a Use of country PFM systems (aid flows)	45%	63%
5b Use of country procurement systems (aid flows)	60%	Not applicable
6 Parallel PIUs	131	44
7 In-year predictability	92%	96%
8 Untied aid	92%	More than 92%
9 Use of programme-based approaches	45%	66%
10a Co-ordinated missions	17%	40%
10b Co-ordinated country analytic work	45%	66%
11 Sound performance assessment framework	C	B or A
12 Reviews of mutual accountability		

Table 6.9
Baselines
and targets

ACRONYMS

AER	Aid Effectiveness Review
AfDB	African Development Bank
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CSLP	<i>Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté</i> (medium-term strategy)
CSO	Civil-society organisation
EC	European Commission
MED	Ministry of Economy and Development
MTEF	Mid-Term Evaluation Framework
ODA	official development assistance
PAP	Policy Action Plan
PIU	project implementation unit
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
STC-PDES	<i>Secrétariat Technique pour la Coordination des Programmes de Développement Economique et Social</i>
SWAp	sector-wide approach