States of Fragility Report 2016: Understanding Violence

Presentation on Report Key Findings and Recommendations

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Thank you for attending

Copies of the report are in the room and available online also

Built around the OECD Fragility Framework

- Broad consultations
- Indicators from a wide range of international sources
- Measuring exposure to risk, and capacity

Results this year – 56 contexts are fragile, 15 (in dark blue) are extremely fragile

Built around a multidimensional model with five dimensions of fragility

- **Political** is exposure to risk inherent in political processes eg lack of political inclusiveness, transparency, corruption and political oppression
- **Societal** is around social cohesion eg inequalities amongst ethnic or cultural groups, and social cleavages
- **Economic** is weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital eg youth unemployment, unequal growth and macroeconomic shocks
- **Environmental** is environmental, climatic and health risks such as natural disasters, pollution and disease epidemics
- **Security** includes both political and social violence, including crime, gangs and interpersonal violence

This year’s report places a spotlight on violence, as an important factor that can affect fragility

Data about violence is unequal and we especially need more data on the impact of violence on women and girls, given their unequal treatment

Despite this, violence is increasing around the world, and we must address it in our programming. We must also remember that violence does just happen in situations of conflict – gang violence, interpersonal violence can happen anywhere, and so we need to broaden the way we look at violence and fragility

Often we see the end of a conflict as the end of violence, but this is not the case - armed actors may move to crime, and political transitions create competition over who gets what and who sits at the table. We must not let our focus slip post-conflict

The world is interconnected – through communications, ideologies and financial flows – this often makes violence a regional problem: not to mention the impact of refugees fleeing violence on regional, often fragile, neighbours
Power dynamics are important. Weak institutions and patronage can create vacuums that can be filled by violent criminal networks and armed groups – and rivalry for inclusion can also lead to violence. Political actors should not always be treated as neutral.

We need to put people at the centre of programming – strong states are not enough to tackle the risks of violence to civilians, especially to women and children. We also need to fight against weapons like IEDs, which increasingly target civilians.

Many fragile contexts will see huge growth in their cities over the coming decades. We need to urgently develop ways to tackle urban inequality and poverty, youth unemployment and police/justice deficits if we are to fend off the growing risk of urban violence.

In OECD countries, we think of terrorism as something mostly happening inside our own borders. But this is not the case – most victims of terrorism are in fragile developing countries.

If for nothing else, we need to tackle violence because of its enormous cost – as DSG Frantz mentioned, the global economic impact of violence was USD 13.6 trillion in 2015.

One way to do this is to look at violence as a behavioural problem, and to interrupt its transmission from one violent person to another. This includes the intergenerational effect – research shows that children exposed to violence are more likely to commit violent acts when they grow up.

Are there links between violence and the different dimensions of fragility? Of course violence does not manifest itself in the same way everywhere, but some general observations can be made.

As contexts become more economically fragile, we tend to see higher homicide rates and social violence.

The links between environmental fragility and violence need more study, but certainly there are links with higher rates of armed conflict.

High political fragility often equates with contexts that are currently in – or recovering from recent – conflict.

Contexts marked high on the security dimension of the fragility model are among the most violent in the world – Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

Where societal fragility is high, we see higher rates of homicide. Interestingly, when there are greater levels of gender equality in a society, we tend to see a lower risk of civil conflict – another reminder that gender is of critical importance in these environments.

We need effective financing if we are to really tackle fragility effectively.

A lot of money – remittances, FDI and ODA – flows into fragile contexts. We need to spend this money effectively.

ODA is a critical financial flow for fragile contexts – more of it flows to fragile contexts than other developing countries - although these flows are unequal between fragile contexts. We need to get it right, target it well, and use it to deliver better programming for better results.

This is all the more important as on average, fragile contexts are much more aid-dependent than other developing countries.
And there is the middle income country issue – we tend to think of fragile countries as lower income, and design our programmes with that in mind. However, over half the fragile contexts are middle income. Have we got the right programming and financial tools for these contexts?

And are we investing in the right things? Our research shows that in fragile contexts, ODA is too often focused on fighting fires, rather than addressing the underlying causes of fragility. In addition, it is often counter-intuitive: for example in economically fragile contexts, we rarely invest in financial systems and the banking sector, precisely because the country is not economically stable. But by avoiding these key drivers of fragility, we are also perpetuating its existence.

Of course we have recommendations, and we will work with OECD members and partners to put these into action.

On the policy side, and thankfully this is now globally recognised, the evidence shows that we must invest more in prevention.

We can also do work at home to promote global peace and security, by working on domestic policies such as greater transparency of the sale of natural resources and shutting down tax havens, thereby reducing funds for those who can perpetuate violence; reducing deforestation to reduce our impact on environmental fragility; and providing work visas for people who work in areas where skills are in short supply – such as care of the elderly – to increase flows of remittances.

Other useful actions include continued work to promulgate global norms like war crimes, landmines and small arms and torture, and protecting the freedom of the press.

Our programmes in fragile contexts may also need recalibration.

Reconciliation – healing the social cleavages that can facilitate violence, and supporting successful political transitions, is one key area.

We need to also remember to put people at the centre of our programming. Often we favour structural responses over societal ones – and focus on national level systems and institutions rather than municipal and community structures.

We must be bolder in our programming, be prepared to take risks, and be strategically patient to deliver results in “soft” areas, rather than just quick, tangible wins.

We can also do better on financing

We have often said that we need to deliver adequate long-term finance so our colleagues and partners can deliver real transformational change. Now we have the evidence to prove it.

We must also ensure that we have the right financial tools to fund the real – and sometimes rather intangible and difficult – drivers of fragility

And finally – we have to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the types of financial portfolios we need for really tackling fragility. The OECD will focus on this in 2017-2018.

And that is the States of Fragility Report 2016. Thank you.