States of Fragility 2016
HIGHLIGHTS
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Disclaimers

This document contains highlights from the forthcoming report OECD States of Fragility 2016. Some results may be preliminary.

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This document draws on 2014 official development assistance data, the latest available data at the time of writing. All amounts referring to 2014 are denoted in current 2014 USD, unless specified otherwise. For time series, constant 2014 USD are used. Figures reflect OECD statistics unless indicated otherwise. Further, data on concessional flows reflect the different donor interpretations and OECD-DAC adjustments, as explained at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/concessionality-note.htm.
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Editorial

For the past year, the world’s policy makers and civil society have focused on two ambitious multilateral compacts – the climate change accord reached last December in Paris and Agenda 2030 approved last September at the United Nations General Assembly. Both of these agreements are critical to going from the world we have to the world we want.

The investment of so much human and capital resources in these historic efforts is essential. But at the same time, there is a very real risk that attention will be diverted from an equally pressing issue – the necessity of confronting the nexus of poverty, violence and fragility. Even the most well-meaning advocates can lose sight of the persistent vulnerabilities created by weak institutions, political violence, extremism and poverty in countries and regions prone to fragility, violence and conflict.

The central truth is that, if the challenges faced by these countries are not met, progress on combating climate change and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will be stalled and millions of people will remain mired in poverty and conflict, the migration crisis will not be resolved, and violent extremism will continue to increase.

Figures from the upcoming OECD report, States of Fragility 2016, tell the story. The data show that 2014 was the second-worst year for fatalities since the end of the Cold War; 2015 was the third worst. Armed conflict cost the lives of 107 000 people in the Middle East and Africa in 2015.

As anyone who follows the news from these regions knows, the most vulnerable people are civilians who live in weak states and those carrying out the violence are most likely to be militias of one stripe or another.

Breaking this deadly cycle requires nothing less than rethinking development assistance. What does that mean? It means developing a new, multi-dimensional model to measure and monitor fragility. The goal is to understand the forces behind the conflicts and poverty, from the rise of urban militias to widespread corruption. Only by analysing what is broken will we know how to fix it. And it means targeting development finance in fragile contexts and conflict zones across all sectors to fill gaps and concentrate efforts.

Only when policy makers and their partners in civil society and the private sector fully understand the risks will they be able to co-ordinate their efforts to reduce the gravest dangers and provide vital hope for populations who are at the biggest risk of being left behind.

Building a sustainable planet, from expanding education and closing the gap between the rich and poor to reducing the impact of climate change, is a vital goal. But it will not be accomplished unless equal attention is paid to the plight of people trapped in seeming intractable conflicts and situations of fragility that offer them no hope of a better life.

Douglas Frantz
OECD Deputy Secretary-General
Acronyms and abbreviations

ACLED  Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AIDB  the African Development Bank
BMZ  German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAC  Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DFID UK  Department for International Development
FARC  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDI  Foreign direct investment
GDP  Gross domestic product
GIS  Geographic information system
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
GNI  Gross national income
HSR  Human Security Report (Human Security Centre)
IDA  International Development Association (World Bank)
IDB  the Inter-American Development Bank
IDRC  International Development Research Centre (Canada)
IEP  Institute for Economics and Peace
ILPI  International Law and Policy Institute
INCAF  International Network for Conflict and Fragility (An OECD DAC network)
InFORM  Index for Risk Management
LAC  Latin America and the Caribbean
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEET  Not in education, employment, or training
ODA  Official development assistance
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOF  Other official flows
PCA  Principal components analysis
PoC  Protection of Civilians
SALW  Small arms and light weapons
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SGBV  Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Institute
UN  United Nations
UNDESA  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations International Children’s Relief Fund
UNOCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM  United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USAID  US Agency for International Development
USD  United States dollar
WHO  World Health Organization
1. Introduction
Introduction

The world has become a more dangerous place. Although long-term trends suggest the world is more peaceful than in previous centuries, evidence also indicates violence is on the rise and increasingly complex. Over the last 15 years, 53 countries have been or are now affected by some form of political violence. Nearly half the world’s population, or 3.34 billion people, live in proximity to or feel the impact of political violence. High homicide rates in Central America, ongoing crisis in Africa’s Great Lakes region, state failure and human trafficking in North Africa — these and other forms of violence overlap and continuously shift among actors, means and objectives. Neither wealth nor development renders countries immune. High violence rates also affect middle-income countries where political exclusion and unregulated urban growth have deepened horizontal inequalities, marginalising portions of the population and making them more vulnerable to exploitation, violent extremism or interpersonal violence. The unsettling reality is that the world is a more dangerous place than it has been for decades.

By 2030, well over 60% of the global poor will be in fragile contexts. The poorest people will be the first to directly confront the greatest challenges of our time. Vulnerability stems from a multitude of factors often including endemic poverty, weak government capacity, poor public service delivery, and economic exclusion and marginalisation. Political instability, recurrent cycles of violence targeting civilians, and entrenched criminal networks are increasingly common where there are economic shocks, weak rule of law and flagging institutions unable to provide the most basic services to their people. The picture grows starker still when the impacts of environmental disasters, climate change and forced displacement are added. Threats may take on a more acute form when they happen together, creating a loop of cause and effect and compounding risks that contribute to fragility.

Violence is increasingly driven by domestic political instability. The prevalence of political violence can often be traced to structurally weak institutions led by governments that practice systemic economic and political exclusion of sections of society. This in turn deepens the state’s legitimacy crisis, provokes the breakdown of the social contract between state and citizen, and virtually guarantees continued cycles of poverty and other forms of violence, including conflict. Criminal networks can take root in these circumstances, where weak rule of law allows perpetrators of homicide and interpersonal violence to act with impunity against vulnerable citizens. This type of social or criminal violence that has no overt political agenda is widespread and has reached epidemic proportions in some regions, particularly in Latin America.

Most lethal violence occurs in the form of interpersonal violence, outside of conflict settings and away from international attention. The negative feedback loop of social violence, political instability and criminal networks deepens vulnerabilities in new ways and with higher costs than ever recorded. These different forms of violence feed off each other: breakdowns in rule-of-law institutions resulting from conflict pave the way for higher tolerance of interpersonal violence, increased weapons and drug trade, and political corruption. As the evidence in this report suggests, the international community must broaden its focus beyond conflict to understand the multiple risk factors and dynamics associated with violence at the subnational and local level as well as interpersonal level.

In fragile and conflict-affected societies facing the most extreme risks, this trend in violence presents new threats that compound old ones by eroding coping mechanisms, functioning markets, access to public services, and citizens’ rights. The interplay of violence and fragility is often underestimated. Yet social violence and drug trafficking drive homicide rates and political corruption, for example. The inability of weak states, and weak justice institutions, to control weapons or penalise violence further heightens these risks. Even what appear to be low levels of violence may be symptomatic of fragility, as in the case of a highly criminalised state (Gastrow, 2011).

Multiple threats often emerge together. Civilians — and women, girls and youth in particular — are more at risk than ever, as intimate partner violence creates vulnerability at the individual level. Other forms of violence plague societies at the same time, with actors wielding violence as a tool for power, profit and manipulation. Violence includes terror, which criminals, states and non-state armed groups are increasingly adopting as a tactic.
Unmanaged risks and untreated consequences have dangerous and far-reaching spillover effects. Most refugees and internally displaced persons are living in various regions in Africa. But 2015 witnessed unprecedented numbers of people fleeing violence and persecution in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, desperate to get to Europe and safety. Population movements not only demonstrate the complex risk landscape in conflict-affected areas. They also have created new dynamics globally, including deepening fragility. As the *World Development Report 2014* succinctly concluded, “Unmanaged risks do not respect boundaries, and no one country or agent acting alone can deal effectively with a risk that crosses a national border” (World Bank, 2013). The problem of fragility has global effects.

The complex interaction between fragility and violence requires a shift in the international approach. Understanding that violence and fragility have a “contagious” relationship will lead to better informed decisions about development, crisis management, humanitarian aid, conflict and violence prevention and mitigation, and global security. Drivers and impacts of violence – social, interpersonal, criminal or political violence or violent extremism – overlap. This needs to be acknowledged and reflected in international interventions. Development financing is out of touch with this new reality: interpersonal violence, the leading source of human insecurity, typically falls outside its scope. The primary focus on political conflict, and on the capacity of state institutions, treats only one part of a much larger problem, and in consequence, may be doing more harm than good by empowering corrupt elites, deepening inequalities and/or perpetuating marginalisation. Development policies aimed at peacebuilding have become a greater priority in recent years, but they rarely encompass both rule of law and security elements. Violence reduction is not set out as their primary aim, but rather seen as an advantageous by-product of other development programming. Perhaps most significantly, they treat symptoms rather than root causes. Breaking these entrenched patterns requires deeper understanding of the complexity of violence, a willingness to embrace measured risk, and the courage to try new approaches.

The forecast may be gloomy, but unprecedented opportunities have emerged. Global agreements set in place in 2015–16 offer real cause for optimism. The world is converging toward common goals, as data on violence and fragility inform decision making on achieving the most effective type and scale of aid to societies beset by poverty, insecurity and weak governance. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasise the risks of violence to human security as well as to global peace and security. Understanding the role of violence and fragility is crucial to realisation of the SDGs. SDG 16 in particular, aims to course-correct for the evidence that a far greater number of people are exposed to violence than ever before and, as a foundation for all other SDGs, that sustainable development can only thrive where there is security and peace.

Patterns and manifestations of violence globally offer a new path for policy makers. This report traces the current trends of violence and fragility globally. It also reflects on the manner in which aid is provided to states and societies affected by fragility, and how aid could be reformulated to better advance development, prevent crises and build resilience. In the process, it may offer a fresh perspective on the role played by violence, which is often coupled with protracted political crises and underdevelopment, in causing fragility. It also may help find ways to support and bolster local forms of resilience and manage risks differently.

The first part of this report presents global trends that demonstrate the complexity of violence and its relationship to fragility. The second part of the report reviews the new OECD fragility framework. A set of policy recommendations at the end of this report offers some guidance on how more effective programming might be achieved. The final report, *States of Fragility 2016*, will be launched at the High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in Nairobi in November. The research and analysis here aim to stimulate new thinking about how best to approach these risks as an international community and help in a re-evaluation of strategic partnerships, policy and research that will be required to deliver sustainable results.

### SDG 16

**Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels**

UN General Assembly, 2015.

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**Defining violence**

Violence manifests itself in multiple forms, modalities and patterns. As a result, it can be difficult to define. A broad, encompassing definition of violence captures this range of characteristics:

- The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.
- It takes the forms of self-directed violence, interpersonal violence, and collective violence (WHO, 2002).

**Political violence vs. social violence.** In this report, “political violence” describes the use of force towards a political end and that is perpetrated to advance the position of a person or group defined by their political position in society. Governments, state militaries, rebels, terrorist organisations and militias engage in political violence, as well as actors who may adopt both political and criminal motives. Here, the term “social violence” refers to the broad manifestation of grievances, criminal behaviours and interpersonal violence.
2. Major trends
Major trends

Ten trends show a broader, more complex violence landscape than has been considered in development policy to date. States and societies can experience multiple forms of violence simultaneously, each caused by related issues but with different locations, triggers and impacts on fragility. Across this landscape, variables may include increases in lethal violence, the adaptability and networking capacities of organised criminal networks, deepening political instability, the emergence of fragile cities, and the rise of violent extremism. All combine in a sort of “contagion” effect that has complicated the way in which the international community must view the effects of violence in every dimension of fragility. The following trends demonstrate the complex violence landscape that has emerged, and provide a roadmap for building an effective set of policies in response.

Trend one: There is more violence, and it is occurring in surprising places

Violence has been on the rise in recent years. The world has become more violent over the last decade, interrupting a long-term trend of increasing peace (IEP, 2016), and with a significant uptick since 2014. In terms of fatalities, 2014 and 2015 were the second- and third-worst years since the Cold War (Uppsala University, 2016; Melander, 2015). Over the last 15 years, 53 countries have been or are now affected by some form of political violence. These comprise 3.34 billion people, or almost half of the world’s population.

FIGURE 1
Global conflict fatalities, 2015

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
The emergence of violence in certain locations can surprise. Many countries now experiencing conflict fatalities have only recently become considered as fragile (e.g., Ukraine and Syrian Arab Republic, hereafter Syria). Research on “fragile cities” draws similar conclusions. Violence in various forms has also reached epidemic proportions in contexts unaffected by political armed violence and not typically considered fragile. The highest homicide and violent crime rates in the world are found in Central America and the Caribbean where urban gang violence and drug-related crime are features of everyday life (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015).

Globally, conflict is not the leading cause of violent death. Social violence in the form of homicide can be more deadly than war in some contexts. Of the 37 countries most affected by lethal violence in 2012, 65% were not emerging from or recently experiencing conflict (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). The sub-region most affected by lethal violence is Central America (with a rate of 33.6 violent deaths per 100 000 people), followed by Southern Africa (31.2), the Caribbean (20.5), and South America (17) (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). In fact, one-third of all homicides in the world occur in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), home to just 8% of the world’s population (Vilalta, 2015; Szabó de Carvalho and Muggah, 2016). In 2015, El Salvador’s murder rate climbed to 103 per 100 000 people (ICG, 2016). LAC is the only region in the world where rates of lethal violence have increased since 2000 (UNDP, 2014) (figure 2) and where homicide rates are projected to increase (Vilalta, 2015).

Development and violence are not mutually exclusive. Low- and middle-income countries bear a disproportionately high share of the burden of political and social armed violence, which often impedes development gains (De Martino, 2012). In these contexts, violent conflict and political instability prevent progress towards development targets, such as in Yemen or South Sudan. However, higher-income countries are also affected by high levels of social violence including intimate partner violence, crime and organised crime (such as narcotics and trafficking). Indeed, against a 5% declining global trend in intentional homicide, the Americas were the only region to show a significant increase (nearly 10%) in a comparison of data for the periods of 2004-09 and 2007-12 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). A major social issue in the United States is the high number of deaths and injuries related to armed violence. These bleak facts suggest that neither development nor wealth assures an escape from violence.

1 The Geneva Declaration Secretariat defines sub-regions in line with UN Statistics Division classification: Eastern, Middle, Northern, Southern and Western Africa; Caribbean, Central America and South America; Northern America; Central, Eastern, Southern, South-Eastern and Western Asia; Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western Europe; Australia and New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.
2 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.
3 In this report, homicide refers to “intentional homicide”, which UNODC defines as “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person”. See, for example, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/hs-rates-05012009.pdf.
The way violence is assessed only captures part of the picture. There is general consensus that the overall lethality of violence has increased. However, the way in which violence is measured fails to capture the interconnectedness of various forms of violence. This is particularly the case regarding large-scale criminal violence and low-level armed conflict, which may have similar levels of intensity and casualties, but are not considered within a single set of measurements (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). For example, the World Health Organization reports that more than 1.3 million people worldwide die each year as a result of self-directed, interpersonal or collective violence, accounting for 2.5% of global mortality (WHO, 2014). Other research concludes that both armed conflict fatalities and refugees are at their highest numbers in over two decades (Gates et al., 2016; Uppsala University, 2016; ICG, 2016). The IISS (2016) found that conflict-related deaths shot up by 27% in 2016, to 70 000 from 55 000. “Battle deaths” also tripled since 2003 (Gates et al., 2016; Uppsala University, 2016). (Figure 3) These different measurements provide at best a fragmented set of statistics and at worst a distorted picture of the reality on the ground. A coherent framework for bringing them together is needed.

Measuring violence requires a broad lens and systemic data. There is debate today over whether the world is seeing fewer but more deadly armed conflicts (IISS, 2015; Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015) or more conflicts overall (ICG, 2016; Uppsala University, 2016). Given that the most lethal form of violence is interpersonal, and that it often occurs in non-conflict contexts, this debate may be less relevant. Research into conflict-related violence produces wide-ranging results. One set of research, for example, concludes the

FIGURE 3
Micromort in select countries

Sources: Africa and Asia data, (ACLED, 2016); and ACLED Asia Version 1, 2016; Syrian Arab Republic data from Syria Tracker through 2015; Ukraine data, UN*

The number of active civil and transnational wars has declined (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Human Security Centre, 2005; Newman, 2009; Straus, 2012); other research concludes that civil conflicts almost tripled between 2007 through 2013 (Gates et al., 2016; Uppsala University, 2016), with an increase to 50 in 2015 compared to 41 in 2014. Similarly, while there is general consensus that traditional inter-state conflicts are decreasing, there is equally strong consensus that violence driven by domestic political instability and social violence is increasing (Uppsala University, 2016). A lack of systematised data makes it difficult to assess and compare the severity of concurrent violence across the world. A broad lens is needed to capture the spillover and interactions among different types of violence and in different contexts. More data on the gender dimensions of violence and conflict are also needed, given the disproportionate impact of violence on women.

The complex and changing nature of violence makes its forms difficult to define and measure. Social violence can often include a broad manifestation of some form of grievance, criminal behaviour, and interpersonal violence such as homicide, gender-based violence and self-directed violence (WHO, 2002). It can be collective, for instance gangs, or individual as in sexual and other gender-based forms of violence (SGBV).
Trend three: Violence is multidimensional, complex and evolving

Violence is shape-shifting. Even in post-conflict contexts, violence can simply change its form as settings, actors, and drivers change. Its versatility in the face of shifting risk landscapes, and ranges of non-state actors, challenges the international community’s best intervention efforts. Armed groups and militia organisations, often operating on behalf of political elites, are responsible for an increasing proportion of armed violence. Often they also engage in criminal and social forms of violence, spreading fear and instability while consolidating their own power in the process. A report recently published by the UN University advised the UN to “recognize the political power of criminal groups” in order to limit the influence of organised crime in transitional political processes (Bosetti et al., 2016). The compounding of these security risks, and their continuity in one form or another, challenges a state’s and a society’s coping response.

Violence is complex, and responses should not be based on simplistic narratives. Violence does not fit neatly into customary security frameworks or conflict narratives, and is often treated subjectively within different organisations. Approaches that view violence in terms of “perpetrators versus victims” and “criminals versus innocent citizens” are not helpful for understanding the complexity of violence (Adams, 2012). Violence is tremendously versatile, transforming itself according to changing circumstances and contexts. Responses to violence, then, can inadvertently compound it. Broad punitive measures can sweep up non-violent individuals or fail to account for social norms, motivations and other factors. As a result, they can deepen marginalisation, foster distrust for rule of law or incite more violence.

Political transitions, even towards democracy, can provoke violence. As a state moves towards or away from democracy or devolution, the risk of different forms of violence also changes. Civil war violence often emerges from exclusive politics, where large sections of the population are disenfranchised or marginalised. In transitioning and democratising states, competition over “who sits at the table” and “who gets what” can also become violent. The risk of overlapping forms of violence also may increase during transition. The political violence of the Arab Spring was accompanied by SGBV and gendered repression. In Tunisia, for example, women protesters became the victims of sexual harassment or rape at the hands of security forces (Johansson-Nogués, 2013); in Egypt, politically motivated acts of sexual assault were witnessed in protest spaces (Tadros, 2015; Amar, 2013). Even where the trend is towards democracy, there may be an increased risk of domestic political instability (Choi and Raleigh, 2014). Both decentralisation and power distribution across parliaments, judiciaries and the military tend to increase the number and power of non-regime elites shaping government policy. They also lead to high levels of elite competition and fragmentation over access to state resources and power (Brancati, 2011). In the redistribution of political power, incumbents and opponents have incentives to design forms of violence to assure access to power (Schedler, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2012). Many agents in new democracies depend on violence to create cleavages in society, which elites can manipulate. The transition to democracy can thus dramatically increase the risk of violence, even while lowering the chance of interstate conflict. Studies looking solely at conflict ignore this.

Drivers of violence do not disappear when conflict is over. Political violence has a cyclical nature if the factors that provoked it remain unaddressed. Recent research suggests that factors affecting and producing the likely onset of civil war also influence other forms of non-political violence such as social violence (Rivera, 2016). Armed agents who engage in political violence during wars or periods of domestic instability are highly likely to be involved in organised crime in more peaceful periods, including racketeering, mercenary activity and illicit trafficking. These patterns are evident across both Africa and Asia. Violent actors in conflicts reconstitute themselves in post-conflict periods to take economic and political advantage of fragile and new political environments (von Einsiedel et al., 2014; de Boer, 2015b).
Political armed violence can more easily spill over between states. Global communications and transboundary criminal networks connect armed actors more easily than ever before, allowing for co-operation in motives and resources. Several of the world’s most persistent conflicts are regional, among them: historical conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa; Pakistan, India and Afghanistan; Syria and Iraq; and the transnational diffusion of violence in northern Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad across the Sahel. Violence affects regional stability, as neighbours’ domestic instability spills over borders, driven by linkages between aggrieved or armed groups that may share a common identity, loyalty or objective. Shared ideologies also bond groups across regions. Flows of financial, logistical and troop resources facilitate the linkages, extending the reach and consequences of violence. They also prompt states and armed actors to disregard boundaries, inciting intervention in one another’s domestic politics and wreaking devastating havoc on civilians in their wake.

FIGURE 4
Conflict events, Africa 1997-2015

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Violence is networked and knows no borders. The organised crime-political violence nexus allows political armed groups to finance themselves through proceeds from criminal activities, with illegal resource exploitation and the drug trade providing revenue (Hansen, 2014). Even informally organised groups engaging in targeted, armed competition and committing violence for political elites often engage in crime to sustain their own activities. Many of these criminal networks, particularly those engaged in organised illicit trafficking, cross borders: violence in various forms crosses borders with them. Organised criminal groups, within and among states, exploit networks to corrupt politicians and influence domestic politics. Illicit financial flows also travel across these networks, resourcing this negative feedback loop. Interlinkages among types of networked violence enable the continued presence of violence in a variety of contexts. For example, Mali’s political violence creates a governance and rule of law vacuum which South American drug cartels exploit for trafficking to European counterparts, prompting an increase in cocaine trafficking through the Sahel as a transit route (Ellis, 2009). This activity ignites local grievances, which Islamist extremists also exploit in the security vacuum, creating a deeper negative spiral of violence. In this context, nascent lucrative “business opportunities” for violence emerge, such as human trafficking along established drug trafficking routes (Shelley, 2014).

Violence drives millions from their homes, extending its impacts to often overburdened neighbouring countries in distress. Forced displacement is one of the most profound non-lethal impacts of violence. It is a direct consequence of violence in the form of war and persecution. In 2015, 65.3 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the UNHCR, the highest level recorded since the refugee organisation was established in 1950. On average, every minute 24 people had to flee their homes in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). The number of internally displaced people tripled between 2004 and 2014 (IER, 2015). While the last two years saw unprecedented numbers of refugees and migrants fleeing fragile and conflict-affected countries to Europe, most refugees are in developing countries, straining these countries’ already overburdened capacities. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, hosts more than 26% of the world’s refugees (UNHCR, 2016b). Many find refuge in neighbouring countries that are already fragile.
Trend five: Violence is increasingly driven by domestic political instability

State legitimacy, authority and capacity are primary root causes of political violence. Domestic political factors are among the most challenging causes of violence to effectively analyse and address. Yet the evidence suggests that domestic political dynamics determine whether a society tips into political violence. These may include corruption, financing opportunities, and external and internal shocks such as elections and demographic shifts (Clapham, 1996; Englebert, 2000). Along with poor governance, breakdown of order (Reno, 2011) and weak institutions (Sobek, 2010; Hendrix, 2010; Theis, 2010) these factors interact, creating openings for collective armed violence.

Weak state structures enable violence, potentially leading to a negative feedback loop between political fragility and violence. Weak institutions or those with entrenched patronage systems can create vacuums in which elites are able to siphon off public resources with impunity while also perpetuating economic exclusion. Criminal networks and armed groups can also fill these vacuums, exploiting local grievances while enabling other forms of social violence to spread. In fragile contexts, poor or unequal service provision may fuel unrest or violent crime, particularly when coupled with economic deprivation. Weak governance can also allow non-state actors to create parallel structures, increasing the risk of widespread criminality and related violence. The nature of local authorities differs. But conflicts such as the Chad Basin (Roitman, 2001), the Ituri province conflict in DRC (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004), and the onset of the crisis in northern Mali in 2011 all followed similar trajectories where the withering away of the state allowed local elites to replace state authority (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Justino, 2012; Justino, Brück and Verwimp, 2013; Kalyvas, 2003, 2008). In parts of Africa and the Middle East, a “rentier political marketplace”, as described by de Waal (2014), is a particular challenge. In these instances, violence, or the threat of violence, is used as a means of political bargaining when the government or political elites do not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

States can use identity politics to incite and exploit sectarian divisions. In fragile contexts, distinctions of ethnicity, religion or livelihood can be more pronounced and are often a source of political identity. As these identities are flexible, allegiances of convenience can form in a changing context, and can transfer long-standing grievances into new causes, and thereby serve as a driver of new forms of violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Political inequalities drive violence. A persistent problem is the tension between “excluded” and “included” groups that have different access to, and exercise of, power, with consequences for government policies and related socio-economic inequalities (Stewart, 2011). Exclusion along ethnic lines leads to limited representation in public offices (Bangura, 2006); poorer levels of health and education; greater income inequalities (Stewart, 2008); and limited public good provision (La Porta et al., 1999). Members of excluded groups are more likely to engage in civil war, particularly if they have recently lost access to power (Cederman et al., 2010).

Yet, the terms of inclusion can also drive violence. Increasingly, the terms of inclusion within governments – that is, the distribution of positions, authority and resources among included elites – can drive domestic political instability (Fischer, 2008; Lindemann, 2008) and violence. New evidence suggests that the effective participation of women in peace processes has increased the likelihood that agreements are reached and maintained over time (UN Women, 2015).

8 Contrary to perceptions of state inclusion, favouritism and nepotism, communities with co-ethnics in power do not consistently have disproportionate access to powerful positions or public goods over other areas without such standing (Kasara, 2007; Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2014). Hence, the “exclusion” argument can be quite difficult to prove.
Trend six: Civilians, especially women and children, are most at risk

In both political and social forms of violence, civilians are most at risk. Today 30% to 40% of political violence within states is directed against civilians (ACLED, 2015). In political armed violence, militias are particularly likely to target civilians. These armed groups are responsible for the majority of fatal attacks on civilians (von Einsiedel et al., 2014). This violence is most acute during periods of domestic political instability.

Civilians are targeted by a range of politically motivated actors. Domestic political instability is often dominated by militias, which seek to renegotiate or change the distribution of political power across elites but not entirely supplant the sitting regime. These differences produce divergent patterns in the targeting and nature of violence across different groups. Labeling a conflict as “ethnic”, “religious” or “resource-based” often diminishes the complexity of these collective groups. It also obscures important similarities and differences across agent type. For example, agent type affects how likely a group is to engage with state forces, target civilians or clash with other non-state groups. Across Africa and select Asian states in 2015, rebel forces typically engaged with the state in over half of their attributed violence, and targeted civilians in just over 20% of actions. In analysing patterns of violence against civilians comparatively, more than half (50.2%) of all anti-civilian violence recorded in 2015 was attributed to political militias, and just 16% of events attributed to rebel groups (ACLED, 2015).

As these types of violence grow more lethal, they disproportionately affect women, youth and children. Adult and young men are predominantly both perpetrators and victims of violence. But women, youth and children in particular are disproportionately affected, bearing the heaviest burden in terms of direct and indirect consequences. More than half of all global homicide victims are under 30 years of age. Much of this violence takes place in urban areas (UNODC, 2013) where concentrations of poverty and marginalisation, and more means for exploitation and violence, exist.

FIGURE 5
Effect of violence on women in Iraq, 2003-11

Source: (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015; Moyes, 2012)
The new mental health crisis among displaced Syrian children

More than half of Syrians displaced by the violent upheaval in their country are children, many experiencing mental trauma with long-lasting effects. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has found that among the anxiety disorders caused by exposure to violence, post-traumatic stress disorder was most common in children and affects more than 50% of them. A study for International Medical Corps found 54% of the displaced had severe emotional disorders and 27% of these children faced developmental challenges (Karasapan, 2016; Save the Children, 2014; UNHCR, 2015c; Weissebecker and Leichner, 2015).

Among the most insidious forms of violence is that committed against children. Children experience multiple forms of violence inside and outside the home, with dire consequences. Every five minutes, somewhere in the world, a child dies as a result of violence (UNICEF, 2016). A conservative estimate states at least 275 million children worldwide are exposed to violence in the home with resulting physical injuries, disability or premature death (UNICEF, 2006). Research shows as many as half of all sexual assaults globally are perpetrated against girls under the age of 16 (UNFPA / UNICEF, 2011). Almost one-quarter of 15-19 year-olds have been victims of physical violence (UNICEF, 2016).

Children bear the longest lasting, and often most severe, consequences of violence. In addition to injuries that affect millions of children and youth directly each year, murder ranks as the fourth leading cause of death among youth globally. Approximately 200 000 young people aged 10 to 29 years old are victims of homicide (WHO, 2015). The mental and physical health of children exposed to violence and exploitation (at home, school or work or in the community) suffers, and that deeply impacts their overall well-being and future opportunities. Research shows that children who have been subjected to violence are more likely to be violent (Spano, Rivera and Bolland, 2010). For these reasons, young people also hold the key to ameliorating the inter-generational effects of the same chronic violence that they witness or perpetrate (Batmanglich, 2015).

Over half of the refugees in the world today are children. Every day children around the world are exposed to some form of violence with long-term and devastating consequences, affecting their physical and mental health, their education and their overall well-being. The effects are lasting for the child and the family. It may take generations for the family to recover.

Youth violence is driven by an interplay of risk factors most prevalent in fragile communities with highest concentrations of poverty. Those factors include the presence of local trade in small arms and drugs, organised violent groups (e.g. gangs), high unemployment rates, and economic and political marginalisation (WHO, 2015). Youth recruitment into criminal, terrorist or armed political groups tends to be based on similar factors. It is more often a result of unemployment,
Self-protection, lack of respect or idleness (World Bank, 2011b) than ideology, belief in a cause or revenge. For example, in Somalia research by the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) revealed religion and ideology are not the main drivers for recruits to Al-Shabab; rather it is the promise of a good salary (Anyadike, 2016). As a livelihood coping strategy, this can be directly linked to poverty but also to other forms of marginalisation.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and especially intimate partner violence, is extremely prevalent across conflict, non-conflict, low- and high-income contexts. It poses an immense burden across conflict-affected contexts and societies considered “peaceful”. Globally an estimated 35% of women have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime (WHO, 2016b). Regarding intimate partner violence, little change in prevalence has been observed over time and regions, although it is not reliably tracked. In countries with low rates of female homicide, intimate partners make up the majority of perpetrators, in some cases over 60% (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Intimate partner violence is estimated to cost USD 4.423 trillion or 5.18% of world GDP – more than political violence and interpersonal violence (i.e. homicides) combined. Political violence is estimated to cost USD 167.19 billion or 0.19% of world GDP; interpersonal violence is estimated to cost USD 1.245 trillion or 1.44% of world GDP (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014).

While sexual and gender-based violence is prevalent across “peaceful” societies, political violence can further aggravate it. Sexual violence can be employed as a weapon of war – a deliberate strategy by armed groups to torture and humiliate opponents; terrify individuals; destroy societies; incite flight from a territory; and reaffirm aggression, brutality, and domination (Bastick, Grimm and Kunz, 2007). Gender norms also drive SGBV and contribute to other forms of violence and conflict. Although men comprise most of homicide victims (by predominantly male perpetrators), women are the majority of victims of intimate partner homicide. By highlighting these dynamics, a gender perspective points to the connections between political and social violence, between violence in times of peace and conflict, and between violence at all levels of society.

Violent extremism and radicalisation are attributed to a combination of factors. On the one hand, there are “push” factors including unemployment, poverty, clan/social/political marginalisation, corruption and youth frustration. On the other hand, “pull” factors appeal to the individual and include access to material resources, weapons and protection, a sense of belonging and empowerment and strong governance (Glazzard et al., 2016).
The rise in urban violence will continue. Over the past 20 years, rural violence has been declining while violence becomes increasingly concentrated in urban areas (Raleigh, 2015). Governance, security and services have not kept pace with rapid population growth in urban areas, providing opportunity, means and space for non-state actors to vie for political power and patronage. Criminal networks can then take root more easily, enabling illicit flows of arms or drugs. Concentrated pockets of violence can appear as youth criminal gangs or militias emerge. Together, they can cause localised fragility that results from the chain reaction of social discord, increased interpersonal violence, heightened risk of youth recruitment, and deteriorating overall safety and security. Various forms of violence most strikingly collide in cities, creating a negative cycle of mutually reinforcing factors that pose the greatest risks to civilians. Political violence is more prevalent where it coincides with poverty, inequality and poor rule of law, and where its implications and risks can multiply. For example, densely populated urban areas in Africa experience almost twice the rate of political violence than rural areas and other towns. However, when factoring in social, interpersonal and criminal-related violence, 45 of the top 50 most violent (and therefore fragile) cities are actually found in North, Central and South America (Muggah, 2015d). The biggest cities in fragile contexts are likely to be the world’s most vulnerable (de Boer, 2015a). Violence is especially visible in “fragile cities” where a lack of growth, security and welfare is associated with higher levels of conflict and violence (Muggah, 2015d Vidal, 2015). Rapid and unregulated urbanisation, income and social inequality, concentrated poverty, youth unemployment, policing and justice deficits, and real and perceived insecurity are all factors (Muggah et al., 2015). Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries are among the most urbanised in the world, with more than 80% of the region’s population living in cities. This contributes to the region’s high homicide rates; the vast majority of homicides globally are concentrated in fast-growing mid- and large-sized cities of the Americas.

Individual and collective forms of violence co-exist in urban areas. This is most evident where the capacity gaps in providing basic and accountable security services are a key determinant in shaping urban violence. For example, Soares and Naritomi (2010) observed the influence of low incarceration rates, among other factors, in shaping “cultures of impunity”. Riots and protests also overwhelmingly occur in urban contexts (ACLED, 2015) where population, power and wealth are most concentrated and municipal authorities are often ill-equipped to cope. In addition, states and cities that have failed to reform their security sectors after conflicts are exposed to complex forms of violence. Urbanisation can act as a trigger for violence. Economic development brings rural poor to cities where they often live in slums. In the Sustainable Development Goal period a huge demographic shift will occur towards urban areas. The most populated cities in the world are also likely to be the most fragile as structural inequalities and social exclusion become more apparent. Within fragile cities, violence is unevenly distributed, and particularly acute in lower-income informal areas (Muggah, 2012). In Bogota, for example, roughly 98% of all homicides occur in less than 2% of street addresses (Igarapé Institute, 2015). By contrast, the middle and upper classes more commonly experience abductions and disappearances, even though they often resort to private security for self-protection (Alvarado and Santiso, 2015).

Economic, political and social violence also occur in large towns and on the edges of cities. Upwardly mobile populations and marginalised social groups, breaking free of village hierarchies and gaining access to urban and peri-urban employment, often come into conflict with traditional elites whose dominance is threatened. In India, for example, riots and protests account for over 75% of the country’s violence (ACLED, 2016). Incidents of social instability are geographically widespread, but are especially prevalent in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as Uttar Pradesh, Gujrat, Punjab and West Bengal. A significant proportion of these incidents occur in cities with a population of larger than one million people.
FIGURE 7
Global city distribution in 2015
Populations over 500 000

Politically violent actors take advantage of geography for attacks, retribution, and recruitment. Political violence tends to cluster in strategic and target areas where opposing forces can openly contest each other, such as large towns and cities and areas with high road mass and dense populations (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009). Cities have large, potentially aggrieved populations available to participate in and potentially support conflict (Goldstone, 2002; Urdal and Hoeschler, 2012). Peripheral and distant areas are more likely to experience the emergence of insurgent and separatist actions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Armed battles are also more common in rural areas, while urban areas see more riots and protests (Figure 8).

New spaces of violence are the result of new agendas, actors (e.g. gangs and militias) and organised responses to violence (Rodgers, 2009).

Several countries most affected by fragility and conflict will see rapid population growth in their cities before 2030. According to some projections, the urban populations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Pakistan will grow by up to 50 million by 2030 (UNDESA, 2014b). Traditional aid approaches focused on armed conflict at the national level need to realign accordingly. In light of these stark assessments, it appears likely that future crises in the SDG era will be more likely to occur in cities.

**FIGURE 8**
Political violence and protest data
Trend eight: Violent extremism and terrorism are on the rise

Forms of terrorism or extremist acts against civilians are increasingly common features of violent conflict. Terrorism occurs far more often within established conflicts and as such, these are where most terrorism victims are found. Terrorism-related deaths rose by 61% in 2013, encompassing 18,000 victims of terrorist attacks globally; most victims were in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria (IEP, 2015). Women and girls are particular victims of this form of violence: religious extremist groups attack the rights of women and girls, with notable increases in forced marriage, restrictions on education and participation in public life, and systematic sexual and gender-based violence (UN Women, 2015).

The global scale of Islamist extremism is unprecedented. The outbreak of violent extremist networks claiming Islamist ideology has led to politically motivated and criminal violence across a vast region of territory in the Sahel region of Africa, North Africa and the Middle East in particular. In Syria and Iraq, as well as in Somalia and northern Nigeria, Mali and the Sahel, these religious extremists are sowing widespread violence, frequently using terror tactics. Although the underlying drivers of these conflicts may not be new, this ideological violence reflects recent shifts and adaptations (Dowd, 2015). These extremist groups have been able to mobilise large numbers of fighters under a transnational Islamist identity rather than a narrower communal, national or ethnic identity. This, in turn, has improved their ability to attract financial, logistical and troop support for global violent actions. Claiming opportunities to create alternative governance structures under Islamist rule in collapsing or profoundly fragile contexts has also been a useful mobilisation strategy.

Terror is increasingly a tactic to further a range of political aims, not a separate form of violence. While terrorism is often considered a separate and distinct form of political violence, it is more accurately understood as a tactic employed within and across different forms of conflict. Any armed, organised agents can engage in the use of terror to mount large-scale attacks on civilians. Terror tactics are commonly used in contexts where violence is already present. In spaces and periods of domestic political instability, agents employ terror tactics against local populations; in civil and transnational wars, the use of terror tactics against transnational or global targets and populations is common.

Extremist groups such as Boko Haram and the so-called Islamic State rebrand pre-existing local conflicts or grievances as global causes. The reach of extremist groups is expanding, but there is no global consensus on whether or how to engage these groups in negotiations about peaceful means of addressing grievances.
Trend nine: The cost of violence is rising

The global costs and effects of violence are much greater in non-conflict than in conflict settings. Beyond mortality and physical injury, the effects of violence are far-reaching and can be devastating in their impact (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). These costs also continue to manifest over time. The immediate consequences are mortality, injury and displacement. In the medium term violence impacts the health and viability of individuals and their productive capacity. Over the longer term it throws up obstacles to social and economic development and overall well-being. Moreover, the psychological wellness of individual and households is severely compromised with exposure to violence, as vulnerabilities are transferred to the broader society. Violence threatens the resilience capacity of a society by sapping social capital (e.g. through forced displacement) and economic capital (e.g. financial losses and security costs, damage to infrastructure). Although violence may disproportionately affect fragile contexts with high poverty rates, its high costs are also borne by middle- and high-income countries not considered fragile. For example, across the United States, the total cost of gun violence resulting from 33 000 gun deaths and 75 000 injuries each year in 2015 was estimated at USD 229 billion - approximately the size of Portugal’s GDP - of which USD 8.6 billion are direct costs of emergency medical care (Follman et al. 2015).

FIGURE 9
Economic cost of violence
The economic impact of conflict

In fragile contexts

Per capita, average

Yet development assistance - one of the key tools for dealing with violence - invests only marginally in violence reduction outside of conflict. Programmes aimed at preventing conflict and building and sustaining peace are chronically under-prioritised and underfunded (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014). Social violence faces greater gaps, in part because, as Cockayne (2013) describes it, “its heaviest costs fall on those furthest from the outsiders’ gaze: the children who are killed working corners for drug gangs, and the wives and women terrorized by the violent male criminal culture”.

The global cost of violence is staggering. The Institute of Economics and Peace, which provides a global aggregate of the costs of violence containment, says the global economic impact of violence was a staggering USD 13.6 trillion in 2015, equivalent to 13.6% of global GDP or USD 1 876 for every person in the world (IEP, 2016). In its World Development Report 2011, the World Bank found that “poverty reduction in countries affected by major violence is on average nearly a percentage point lower per year than in countries not affected by violence” (World Bank, 2011a). It has been estimated that the global cost of homicide in 2010 was USD 171 billion and that roughly USD 2 trillion in global violence-related economic losses could have been saved had homicides rates dropped to what they call “normal” levels (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015).

Individual social forms of violence cost the world more than collective political violence. Writing for the Copenhagen Consensus, Hoeffler and Fearon (2014) estimated interpersonal violence (e.g. homicides) at USD 1.245 trillion or 1.44% of world GDP; intimate partner violence USD 4.4 trillion or 5.18% of world GDP; and reported sexual violence against women as USD 66.7 million or 0.078% of world GDP. Strikingly, intimate partner violence alone carries a greater global cost than collective political violence and homicides combined (Hoeffler and Fearon, 2014). This evidence makes a clear case for focusing on prevention, and on intimate partner violence in particular, as a development priority. Development policies and violence intervention measures without a gender component will ultimately fail to make any meaningful differences in the incidence and consequences of this costliest form of violence.

The long-term cost of violence far exceeds the estimated cost of prevention. Violence is costly – in terms of conflict-related GDP loss; military spending; aid to displaced people and refugees; private security for businesses and individuals; and spending on law enforcement and internal security. A recent study estimates the consolidated costs associated with various forms of violence against children, for example, to be as high as USD 7 trillion (Pereznio et al., 2014). This startling figure reveals the magnitude of the toll incurred by children due to physical, psychological and sexual violence. In 2014, more than 3 000 children were forcibly recruited by armed forces (UNGA, 2014). The annual global costs from children’s association with armed forces or groups can be up to USD 144 million annually (Pereznio et al., 2014). These costs far exceed the estimated investments believed necessary for the prevention of that violence. If global violence were to decrease by 10% uniformly, an additional USD 1.43 trillion would effectively be incorporated into the world economy each year. This is more than six times the total value of Greece’s bailout and loans (IEP, 2015).

10 Other associated social service, judicial or health costs are excluded from this estimate due to lack of data.
Trend ten: Violence is a behaviour reinforced by social norms which acts like a contagion

Violence is an epidemic and is contagious. Research reveals that violence behaves like an epidemic, sharing the same characteristics of clustering, spread and transmission (Slutkin et al., 2015). Violence clusters occur in “hot spots” where people have been exposed to violence - just as cholera typically clusters around water sources where people are exposed to bacteria that causes the disease. It can mimic epidemic spread across time or geographically across space and has a transmission mechanism in which exposure correlates to risk: those exposed to violence are at increased risk of perpetuating it themselves (Spano, Rivera and Bolland, 2010).

Recurring cycles of violence persist because of regular exposure to violence. Research shows that violent behaviour is “dose dependent”. Violence of all types increases immediately following conflict when community violence and spouse and child abuse are higher (Dubow, Huesmann and Boxer, 2009). Children who are exposed to violence are more likely to engage in violence than children who have not been exposed, and the likelihood of involvement in violence increases when exposed to higher amounts of violence (showing signs of “dose dependence”) (Spano, Rivera and Bolland, 2010). Because all behaviour is contagious, exposure to violence leads to unconscious modeling and adoption of like behaviour (DuRant et al. 1994; Kelly 2010). Repeated over multiple exposures and viewed collectively, this raises the risk. At the same time it creates social norms in which social pressure and a permissive environment condone, and even encourage, violent responses to even minor disagreements, particularly in areas of chronic violence (Slutkin et al., 2015; Finkelhor et al., 2011). These social norms reinforce this contagion by encouraging violent behaviour to spread (Cure Violence, 2016).

Drawing insights and lessons from the health approach may be useful in guiding violence prevention efforts in conflict and non-conflict settings. Strategies associated with disease control have yielded dramatic results, detecting and “interrupting conflicts”, identifying and treating the highest risk individuals, and changing social norms in violence hotspots in North, Central and South America (Slutkin, 2015). Independent evaluations have demonstrated reductions in shootings and killings in a range of 41% to 73%. These contributed to gradual shifts in social norms and expectations (Skogan et al, 2009). The approach to violence programmes can benefit from applying the knowledge that relationships between perpetrator and victim can shift, and that violence is a learned behaviour reinforced by norms. Where perpetrators are the products of a learned undesirable behaviour in contexts where violence may have come to be accepted as “normal”, it can be effective to shift responses to treat the causes and means of its transmission, rather than its manifestations and symptoms.
BY THE NUMBERS: VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

**FIGURE 10**

The number of people internally displaced increased over 300% from 2004 to 2014. 

**UNHCR, 2016**

The number of people forcibly displaced increased over 300% from 2012. 

**ACLED, 2015**

The world has become less peaceful from 2008 to 2015, with a Global Peace Index average country score deteriorating by 2.4% down. 

**IEP, 2015**

Global humanitarian needs amounted to 19.3 billion USD in 2015. 

**UNOCHA, 2016b**

1.3 million people die annually worldwide through self-directed, interpersonal or collective violence, representing 2.5% of global mortality. 

**WHO, 2014a**

More than 3,000 children were forcibly recruited by armed forces in 2014. 

**UNGA, 2014**

35% of women worldwide experienced intimate partner or non-partner sexual violence. 

**WHO, 2014b**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has the highest homicide rate of over 100 per 100,000 people. 

**ICG, 2016**

437,000 homicides in 186 countries in 2012. 

**UNODC, 2013**

Central African Republic had the highest homicide rate of over 100 per 100,000 people from 2001 to 2013. 

**ICG, 2016**

US citizens killed through self-directed, interpersonal or collective violence in 2014 totalled 406,496. 

**US CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2015**

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**ICG, 2016**

US citizens killed through self-directed, interpersonal or collective violence in 2014 totalled 406,496. 

**US CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2015**
Understanding violence in epidemiological terms may unlock new insights and solutions. By using the same approach that the WHO uses to stop epidemics — interrupt transmission, change behaviour, change norms — policy makers can gain more traction upstream before the violence is able to manifest. This breaks the recurrent cycle of violence, stopping its “transmission”. Treating violence with a health approach shifts the optimal point of intervention where prevention is viable and enables mitigation efforts to intercept the contagion immediately. (See figure 11 above.) This represents a paradigm shift in thinking about violence as an inevitable condition; as only a domestic law enforcement, political or international security problem; or as related only to underlying causes or under-development. The strategy is relevant for political or social violence contexts where community and individual resilience to violence is made possible.
3. Understanding trends through a violence lens
FIGURE 12
The violence lens

Capacity and means both to commit violence and make it feasible, but also to absorb and mitigate its harmful effects.

Vulnerable individuals, families, communities and societies, as well as agents of violence.

The various kinds of marginalisation including exclusion and horizontal inequalities.

Societal power dynamics and the domestic political context.

Source: OECD, 2009
Violence – in all its complexity – is clearly a major issue. A better understanding of its trends and manifestations will help practitioners design more effective programmes to reduce the fragility of states and societies. The Violence Lens, developed by the OECD in 2009, is an analytical tool that can help frame the cause and effect relationship between the different factors influencing the emergence and persistence of violence, in order to identify options for violence prevention and reduction. It is updated here to reflect new research findings.

The updated Violence Lens includes (i) societal power dynamics and the domestic political context; (ii) the various kinds of marginalisation including exclusion and horizontal inequalities; and (iii) the capacity and means both to commit violence and make it feasible, but also to absorb and mitigate its harmful effects. A geographic dimension provides scope. But at the centre of the lens is people: both the vulnerable individuals, families, communities and societies who bear the greatest consequences of violence, and the agents of violence. Together, these conditions for violence become a risk framework, which can act to detect and predict trends, and can offer clues for more effective prevention efforts.

**Power**

Much of the conflict and violence experienced today is a function of “competition” politics, corruption and poor state-society relationships. As outlined in trend five, violence is increasingly fueled by domestic political instability. The terms of access to power, including between elites and their proxies, can be an important driver of violence. This competition can play out at regional, state and/or local level.

**Marginalisation**

Inequality and division deepen social cleavages and increase the propensity for violence. Socio-economic marginalisation derived from horizontal inequalities, uneven development and economic exclusion can lead to multiple forms of interpersonal, criminal, and social violence as well as collective armed political violence. Marginalisation can result from exploitation of religious and ethnic identities, human rights abuses, lack of access to or poor quality public services, impunity, insecurity, and neglect. It can also occur as people seek alternatives or adopt negative coping strategies, or when the dominant group exploits the context for their own gains or agendas. Especially in fragile contexts, poor or unequal service provision may fuel unrest or violent crime, particularly when coupled with economic deprivation. Chronic poverty can reduce the mobilisation capacity of the poorest, and also increase their exposure to interpersonal violence and criminal predation. Marginalisation can be particularly acute in cities; this will potentially become a major issue, given the huge demographic shifts expected during the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) era.

**Capacity**

The feasibility of violence and conflict is an important determinant for their emergence. The availability of weapons and ammunition (Small Arms Survey, 2016), and access to money through such means as natural resource exploitation and organised crime, do not in themselves cause violence. But they are risk factors that enable its emergence. Added to this, the capacity of groups to mobilise human and financial resources, logistics, and military capability is also important for armed political violence.

Power, marginalisation and capacity all interact with one another – and with the normative environment in which they co-exist – to form a risk context in which violence may emerge or subside. People in turn interact with the risk environment they find themselves in and may become perpetrators or victims of violence depending on the dynamics of these interrelationships. A full picture of the complexity of violence emerges only by closely analysing these interactions on all geographical levels.
4. Introducing the States of Fragility Framework
RESULTS OF THE OECD STATES OF FRAGILITY FRAMEWORK

There are 56 countries and economies identified as having fragile situations using the OECD’s States of Fragility Framework.
Introducing the States of Fragility Framework

The OECD characterises fragility as the accumulation and combination of risks combined with insufficient capacity by the state, system, and/or communities to manage it, absorb it, or mitigate its consequences.

The OECD’s States of Fragility Framework is built on five dimensions described in Table 1. The choice of these dimensions is based on expert judgment. It is one of the key outcomes of the consultation process underlying the new OECD States of Fragility Framework.

Results of the new OECD Fragility Typology

The OECD Fragility Framework’s approach to identifying fragile contexts and situations follows several methodological steps. These are outlined below in non-technical terms; for a technical description and more detailed statistical results, see the forthcoming States of Fragility 2016.

As discussed earlier, the approach is based on the five dimensions deemed most relevant for measuring and identifying fragility: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. Each dimension is evaluated according to a number of indicators that measure the most important facets of risks and coping capacities relevant to fragility.

A principal components analysis (PCA) is applied in each dimension, using the indicators for all countries, conditional on data availability. The PCA is a statistical procedure used to uncover structural relations among quantitative variables and to summarise those relations in the form of new variables (i.e. “principal components”). The PCA thus allows the model to capture the majority of the information in the input data via a lower number of principal components, making possible the visualisation of multidimensional datasets in two-dimensional graphs. The horizontal axis, which represents the first principal component, identifies the strong correlation between indicator variables such as “perception of corruption” and “voice and accountability”, and captures a large share of the information provided by these variables.

Of course, some information is lost in the process, but the appropriate use of PCA ensures that most of the relevant information is kept and helps to describe the “model” underpinning the data.

For this, the new principal components have to be interpreted. This was the next step in the OECD States of Fragility Framework: for each dimension, the first two components (the horizontal and vertical axes in the plot) were interpreted based on their relationships with the original input variables as measured by various metrics. The first component in the political dimension was strongly related to “voice and accountability”, “judicial constraints on executive power”, “political terror” and “perceptions of corruption”, and was therefore interpreted as a measure of “accountability and restraint”.

Based on the interpretations of the first two components in each graph, countries having similar characteristics with regard to the particular dimension of fragility were grouped together. This leads to insights into possible types of economic, environmental, political, security and societal fragility.

The last steps consisted of a cross-dimensional principal components analysis that used as input data the ten “summary variables” (principal components) derived from the five dimension-specific PCAs, and summarised the information again via principal components. These second-level principal components again required interpretation in order to assess the positioning of countries in terms of fragility. The two levels of PCA, each with its phase of qualitative interpretation and grouping of countries, represent the way in which the OECD States of Fragility Framework conceptualises and measures fragility within and across dimensions.

The result is a fragility continuum in which only an arbitrary line can separate those contexts labeled fragile from those that are not. Our criterion singles out 56 states and territories as fragile across dimensions. These are presented in Figure 13, ordered counterclockwise by level of fragility, together with their dimensional fragility scores ranging from 6 (moderately fragile) to 1 (extremely fragile).

Therefore, the OECD States of Fragility Framework measures not only exposure but ability to cope with future negative events. Figure 13 presents countries identified as fragile, on the basis of a synthesis of their performances in the five dimensions of fragility. The ordering of countries provides an indication – rather than a precise measure – of overall fragility.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Vulnerability to risks stemming from weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital including macroeconomic shocks, unequal growth and high youth unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Vulnerability to environmental, climatic and health risks that affect citizens’ lives and livelihoods. These include exposure to natural disasters, pollution and disease epidemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Vulnerability to risks inherent in political processes, events or decisions; lack of political inclusiveness (including of elites); transparency, corruption, and society’s ability to accommodate change and avoid oppression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Vulnerability of overall security to violence and crime, including both political and social violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>Vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from both vertical and horizontal inequalities, including inequality among culturally defined or constructed groups and social cleavages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Figure 14, of the states considered in fragile situations, 35 are in sub-Saharan Africa; four are in Latin America and the Caribbean; and seven are in East Asia and the Pacific. While 55% of these are low-income countries, there is not a linear link between fragility and levels of economic development. The remaining 45% are lower middle and upper middle income countries.

Authoritarian regimes are the most prominent form of government type among those states considered fragile, followed by hybrid regimes and then flawed democracies (EIU, 2016).

Countries facing fragile or extremely fragile situations experienced lower levels of Millennium Development Goal (MDG) achievement, on average, than the rest of the world.

FIGURE 14
Numbers of people living in fragile situations, number of countries in fragile situations by region
Over 1.6 billion people, around 22% of the global population, live in fragile situations. Of these countries measured fragile, the majority are located in sub-Saharan Africa.

FIGURE 15
Number of countries by income and government type
While the majority of countries facing the most fragile situations are low income, 45% are lower-middle and upper middle-income countries. These countries are largely authoritarian but also include hybrid regimes and flawed democracies.
Violence and fragility

Violence is one of the most visible outcomes of a society that has lost its ability to perform core functions (Vallings and Moreno-Torres, 2005). However, violence cannot be regarded only as an outcome of fragility; it is also as a driver of fragility. In some cases, trends in violence indicators do not necessarily represent net positive or net negative outcomes for a society, making analysis of the relationship between violence and fragility even more complicated. For example, the number of homicides may drop because criminal cartels establish their form of order. But that could actually be an indication of increasing fragility because criminal cartels erode the state’s authority and its capacity to enforce order and legitimacy, and the cartels may fracture community structures. Secondary effects of violence, including forced displacement of people, loss of investment and the creation of fear, further amplify drivers of fragility.

FIGURE 16
Extreme fragility is associated with lower MDG achievement
Countries facing fragile situations have made less progress in achieving the MDGs.

FIGURE 17
Countries with high security fragility
More attention is now focused on the interplay of criminal activity and political violence. The traditional approach viewed these two elements independently and based on motive, with political violence defined as violence directed against the state and criminal violence seen as primarily profit-driven (de Boer, 2015a). However, studies of the conflict-crime nexus find the distinction has become blurred. The so-called Islamic State group, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other militant organisations have used criminal activity as a means of financing political violence.

Given the complexities involved, the starting point of the OECD States of Fragility Framework has been the World Health Organisation’s definition of violence: the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation (WHO, 2002). The security dimension in the model aims at capturing “the vulnerability of citizen security emanating from social and political violence”. As such it includes indicators of citizen exposure to direct political and social violence. The indicators selected have been chosen based on their relevance to fragility and data availability considerations, with the latter precluding some forms of violence from inclusion in the Fragility Framework. These are presented in Table 2.

As discussed in the first part of this paper, multiple forms of violence, ranging from armed conflict and economic criminal violence to high interpersonal violence, negatively affect the lives of millions. Currently, 46 countries are assessed as having high fragility in the security dimension.

While these forms of violence have clear implications for fragility, focusing solely on them does not provide a complete picture. Violence according to the WHO definition also includes acts of deprivation and neglect. Such violence, often termed structural violence, includes any form within a social structure that prevents some of its members from meeting basic needs (Galtung, 1969). Taking this broader view, structural inequality as a form of violence therefore needs to be included in any measure of fragility. In the OECD Fragility Framework, such forms of violence are included in the political, economic and social dimensions.

To explore the links between violence and the other dimensions of fragility, the correlations between violence and indicators of fragility are shown in Figure 18. Homicide tends to be linked more with vertical inequality while political violence is more linked to horizontal inequality. Organised crime, as a form of violence, and gender physical restrictions, are the most correlated to indicators of fragility in other dimensions.

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security dimension indicators</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of violent criminal activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence from non-state actors[^1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle-related deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Conflict Risk Index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^1]: The use of armed force against civilians by the government of a state or by a formally organised group that results in at least 25 deaths in a year.
Figure 18
Violence and fragility correlations (r > 0.3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISKS</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory quality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic vulnerability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males in labour force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in labour force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government gross debt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NEET</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Remoteness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource rent dependence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aid dependency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENVIRONMENTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uprooted people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic vulnerability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core civil society index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of infectious disease (deaths per 100 000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political terror</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralised elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial constraints on executive power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative constraints on executive power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime persistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over territory</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent conflict risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers per 100 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed security officers per 100 000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal alliances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIETAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uprooted people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to justice</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanisation growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender inequality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal inequality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI coefficient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core civil society index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

- 0.72-0.86
- 0.58-0.72
- 0.44-0.58
- 0.3-0.44
5. Recommendations
**Recommendations**

While conflict is a driver of fragility, more attention must be paid to the important impact of violence in its many forms on fragility. *States of Fragility 2016*, aims to reframe fragility as a combination of risks, with violence as perhaps its most frequent instigator and its most frequent outcome.

The treatment of violence must take into account the interconnected nature of different forms of violence and their shared root causes. This will involve a shift in development practice – moving from interventions that are focused primarily on conflict and its aftermath, to ones that address violence, and its prevention, in all its forms. To do this effectively, programming will need to target prevention and address root causes, and shift focus to people and politics, rather than focusing primarily on structural causes and factors. Practitioners must also recognise that the ultimate objective of these efforts is behaviour change, and thus that these types of programmes will require longer time horizons. Finally, approaches to violence should aim to simultaneously target multiple levels (from individual to societal), factoring in local power dynamics, external influences, shifting roles, social norms and underlying grievances, as well as the interplay between these factors in a given context.

Civilians who suffer the most devastating impacts of violence and pay the highest costs must be at the centre of this work. However, the focus must also be on those who perpetrate violence, often themselves products of exposure to violence and learned behaviours, social norms and/or marginalisation. Both of these groups – traditionally labeled victims and perpetrators – must be allowed to shape the interventions designed for their welfare, and break out of their passive roles. Here development experts may benefit from other fields (e.g. anthropology, epidemiology and criminal justice) for guidance.

Given the breadth of this report, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of specific recommendations however it is possible to highlight some areas where the development community can more effectively address fragility and violence. Good practice does exist; these examples need to be shared, discussed and improved upon.

The following recommendations benefit from the valuable insights of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and its members:

1. **Recognise that fragility is multidimensional**

There is increasing recognition that fragility has many dimensions with many aspects and facets. These dimensions – both the exposure to different types of risks, and the lack of capacity to absorb them or to adapt – can affect developing and richer countries alike. A state or society can face one risk, or an accumulation or combination of risks – and if that state, society, or system cannot manage, absorb or mitigate the consequences of those risks, then it shows signs of fragility. The OECD States of Fragility Framework has highlighted five dimensions of fragility: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. The resulting multidimensional model provides an important new framework to consider and assess how fragility is framed and monitored.

Recognising that fragility is multidimensional can help practitioners design better theories of change and programming in at-risk contexts. To start with, practitioners need to – at the very least – invest in a better, more holistic analysis of the context. In turn, a better analysis will help support better programme design, ensuring that programmes support the capacity of state and society systems to manage, absorb and mitigate potential risks across all the different dimensions of fragility.

Using a multidimensional framework will also help different actors in a particular context understand how their individual actions and programmes are interdependent. If all the facets of fragility are to be addressed, different actors will need to plan, design and implement programmes in a more collaborative way.
2. Put people first

The 2030 Agenda, and its theme of “leave no one behind”, aims to ensure that marginalised, excluded and vulnerable groups are prioritised. To foster inclusion and ownership, and to promote sustainability, local actors must therefore not only be allies but full partners, capable of co-ordinating external actors, engaging with local and national authorities, and monitoring and evaluating interventions. Experience shows that context-specific, longer-term local partnerships – supplemented by community support, participation and oversight – tend to be more effective. They also better manage the risks of interventions by external actors. Local actors have the knowledge and legitimacy to handle sensitivities, and are best-informed and positioned to address societal violence. In fragile situations where risks of violence are greater, involving them in the programming cycle will ensure that fragility assessments, planning, data collection and research, and evaluation reflect their particular needs.

Unfortunately, structural responses to fragility tend to be favoured over societal ones. This is because they are more visible, easier to manage and measure, and may yield more immediate results. However, development actors who favour central capacity building must recognise that the state is often a non-neutral actor, and that enhanced state capacity could – perversely – also have a detrimental effect on economic exclusion, and increase marginalisation and insecurity. For example, where strong law enforcement is not accompanied by commensurate social investments, communities may feel betrayed and even empathise with criminals. Investing in community capacity and mobilisation can help counter these effects. Evidence shows that cohesive civil society organisations can be effective in mitigating urban violence when they co-operate with state structures (DFID, forthcoming). In this way, donors should prioritise locally defined solutions that draw upon the sources of resilience that naturally exist in all societies.

3. Confront dominant narratives

Dominant narratives about violence can oversimplify what are inherently complex multi-causal dynamics, leading to facile assumptions about how to most appropriately respond. Not all development work has an impact on violence, and structural factors are not necessarily the main drivers of violence. The international community should thus better distinguish between development gains (e.g. education, jobs) that have potential long-term yields for violence prevention, on the one hand, and more immediate and significant, measurable reductions in violence, on the other. Both are necessary in order to foster a context in which sustainable development can take hold, and in which societal norms evolve to eventually discourage violence. In order to distinguish between these, analysis must be based on contextual and push-pull factors, including the oftentimes individual motivations that collectively sustain violence within a community or society. Indeed, the first step to better addressing violence is to frame it in a way that takes full account of its complexity.

Likewise, this will entail adopting a broader definition of violence, with a people-centred focus that explicitly avoids attributing labels of “good” and “bad” to populations and places, while also recognising the mutability of roles, actors and circumstances. This approach opens entry points for interventions, and empowers people to change those roles, and norms, in positive ways.

4. Target accurately and humanely

Policy makers should adopt a “do no harm” approach to targeting, so as to avoid labelling and categorisation, instead favouring context-specific analysis that is based on evidence and better informed engagement with local communities. In addition, a more sophisticated approach to engagement with elites is needed. This will avoid sweeping generalisations that may do little to reduce violence in the short term and may risk undermining peace in the longer term.

Efforts to prevent multiple types of violence will not be effective unless governments and the international community address those who are most at risk, but without stigmatising them. Careful targeting will allow the development community to more accurately define where it has a comparative advantage in violence reduction. Focusing on those individuals most likely to engage in violence can be an effective prevention strategy, as it positively influences social norms in a community affected by violence.
One important lesson is that effective policies and strategies must not only target at-risk young people, but instead also promote young people and local communities working together to break the cycle of violence (UNODC, 2013). Community mobilisation programmes, when combined with support services and media outreach, have also had success in changing social norms in high-violence areas, with greater reporting of violence and reduced impunity (WHO, 2016a). Like other development efforts, multi-year financing that allows for longer term strategic theories of change will go a long way to facilitating this work. Additionally, investing in context and problem analysis as core donor behaviour will help ensure this targeting is systematically used and is based on the best available evidence (OECD, 2016).

5. Break down the silos once and for all

The teams and disciplines tackling the many dimensions of violence must be as diverse and robust as the challenges they face. Across a range of priority areas, a broad coalition of actors is needed for effective engagement on issues such as access to small arms control and disarmament, gender-based violence, child protection, organised crime, and combating violent extremism, among others. Where impacts and/or causes are comparable, lessons and methodologies from other fields (e.g., rule of law, social violence, criminal and behavioural science, health, and anthropology) can be useful references.

Better collaboration among those engaged in tackling social, criminal and interpersonal violence and those working on the issues of conflict, peace and security will provide valuable synergies. Such cross-fertilisation can draw on an immense evidence base of global experience connecting different approaches and streams of violence programming. For example, there are long-running violence reduction efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean that can be tested and adapted to other contexts. These initiatives include localised, data-driven programmes that focus on improving public safety rather than implementing punitive measures. These types of programmes could serve as incubators for innovative preventative approaches that can be adapted or scaled up elsewhere (Muggah et al. 2016).

Horizontally and vertically integrated implementation approaches should accompany joint and co-ordinated planning. The OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and Governance Network (GovNet), which link up donor policy communities, encourage the providers of development co-operation across different organisations to exchange lessons from past and parallel interventions, and also help promote coherence across their own internal structures. Multi-year strategic planning is thus made more viable, as is prevention-oriented programming, with common strategy and shared instruments in a global common toolbox.

6. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure

Investing in prevention saves lives, resources and money. It is not only logical: it is simply more effective. A prevention culture must permeate all levels of aid planning and decision making, including investment in resolving the root causes of conflict. An important part of this is early engagement in emerging crises; this is key to both prevention and to the protection of civilians affected by violence.

Violence is cyclical in nature, and evidence shows that exposure to violence often leads to more violence down the line. Early intervention, focusing on changing behavioural and societal norms, is therefore essential to break this cycle of violence before it picks up unstoppable momentum. Young people, with the most to lose and gain, are the key to realising these generational shifts.

One good example is the United Nations’ “sustaining peace” approach, which shifts the focus away from stabilising post-conflict situations and towards ongoing prevention efforts with longer-term horizons (UNSG, 2015a). Sustained and committed political diplomacy for violence prevention and resolution must also be part of a more comprehensive package of responses that deal with the factors that led to violence in the first place (UN, 2015b; UNOCHA, 2016). Political influence can...
be leveraged to protect civilians from violent threats, particularly if it supports national inclusion or reconciliation efforts to break or prevent cycles of violence. Bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements to share violence risks among states can also aim to build national prevention and coping capacity by involving the private sector and civil society as well as the state.

7. Don’t be afraid to pilot

People are at the centre of violence-related threats and solutions – and yet human behaviour is often difficult to foresee and anticipate. Therefore, programming in this area – and the budgets that support it – will need to remain flexible enough to be adapted or dropped when it is not working and scaled up when showing signs of success. (OECD, 2016; OECD, 2012; European Commission, 2015). Becoming comfortable with a measure of well-calculated risk, and even programming failure, can have big payoffs. This includes learning from rather than penalising failure, as well as incentivising innovation and marginal risk acceptance. A strategy with high potential for success and, often, cost savings is one that emphasises learning by doing; testing and incubating various experimental approaches; monitoring and collecting feedback; and growing an evidence base and then gradually scaling up.

Courageous leadership is also important, helping leverage multi-sector investments and draw on shared resources, including strategic partnerships with the private sector (World Economic Forum, 2016). Lessons from the Latin American “citizen security” model are relevant here. First, a clear strategy is critical. Second, these interventions are successful when they are tightly focused on high-risk places and behaviours, and set short- and long-term horizons (Abt and Winship, 2016; Muggah et al., 2016).

8. Build a strong evidentiary foundation for addressing fragility

Donor investments to counter fragility must be built on a foundation of both qualitative and quantitative evidence and real data, rather than assumptions (OECD, 2011). Surprisingly, this is not the case today. A recent study for the World Economic Forum, for example, concludes that fewer than 6% of public security and justice measures undertaken across Latin American and the Caribbean have any evidentiary base (Szabó de Carvalho and Muggah, 2016). A broad foundation is required: analyses should include information related to individuals, organisational dynamics and local political economies. Much of this is difficult to measure, and thus understand, because rates of reporting non-lethal violence are low. Better outreach to produce and use such data – particularly at the local level – would help fill these critical gaps. It is important to find and test innovative approaches to understanding the drivers of violence and how to respond to violence, despite the data gaps. These demand flexibility, experimentation and calculated risk-taking, as highlighted above.

Because violence cuts across a broad spectrum of fields and institutions, key data for measuring trends and dynamics tend to remain inside professional silos. This disaggregation means it is difficult to ascertain the complex ways in which violence drives and contributes to fragility. A common database allowing for information sharing on the range of violence related to fragility could be considered a public good (OECD, 2016).

Furthermore, there may be more effective ways to gather data using existing tools, if international donors are willing to be flexible and innovative. Even well-known technology, like geographic information systems (GIS), can be leveraged in new ways, such as for geo-referenced violence “hot spots” and mobile telecommunications. Qualitative measures like perception-based surveys are also becoming common and could be repurposed to reflect the violence-fragility nexus. Strategic partnerships should therefore be built on an interdisciplinary approach that utilises the full range of tools available, not limiting fragility to a single field of study.
9. Risk frameworks for fragility

A key finding of this report is that violence has a more substantial and complex relationship with fragility than previously understood. When designing programmes and policies to address fragility, the international community should give greater weight to violence metrics, weight and more differentiated consideration. Importantly, in the process of looking at the ability of societies to absorb and mitigate risks, analytic frameworks for risk management must be built upon an evidentiary foundation including the full scope of violence. This should take account of World Bank recommendations regarding analytical risk management (World Bank, 2014).

International policy on fragility should integrate risk management, not simply pay it lip service. Long-term determinants of violence and conflict then move front and centre, with a renewed focus on prevention rather than on responses after the fact. To do this, the international community will need to invest in institutional risk management capacity and better understand, anticipate, detect and respond to risks, both in its programme design and execution (OECD, 2016).

10. Find common ground on violence and fragility

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 urges action to achieve “peaceful and inclusive societies” a goal that requires systematic, comprehensive and transparent data on violence. Any approach to measuring violence must recognise the multidimensional nature of fragility and the special role that the many forms of violence play in fragile contexts. To achieve the SDGs, and “significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere”, (UNSG, 2014) violence must be measured as well as conflict. These violence systems are complex, interact in complex ways, and cannot be considered in isolation; importantly, complex systems have patterns that can be anticipated (Kleinfeld, 2015). For example, considering multiple variables can help detect revealing patterns across disciplines, such as links between domestic violence and criminal violence, in a way that is more relevant to the nonlinear nature of violence and fragility.

This report calls on international donors to prioritise work to find common ground on measuring violence, and peaceful and inclusive societies. This will mean developing broad-based and qualitative indicators for progress in these areas, and working with societies affected by fragility to develop a reliable, robust system (Nygård et al., 2016) to measure and enable progress. This report offers the basic building blocks for such an approach and further action. Ideally, they may enable donors in one context to use common measures to design and monitor complementary programmes in violence prevention, economic development and other areas. Agreement on basic metrics can be a powerful tool for coherence. Common metrics encourage common solutions.
Conclusion

The stakes have never been higher. Violence wrecks destruction on human lives and societies, preventing people from fully achieving their potential. Violence obstructs development, stalls recovery from conflict, compounds the risks of fragility, and plants the seeds of new violence: restarting the devastating negative cycle. The international policy response to violence must recognise the varied risks, impacts and causes. Unless the international community rises to this challenge – adapting traditional approaches where feasible, embracing risk, testing innovative models, working across boundaries and disciplines, and building evidence – then the trend of increasing ever more costly violence will continue.

Indeed, this violent world could become more so in an exponential way, given that it will likely face more stresses from climate change, fragile cities, and the regionalisation of violence and conflict. Getting it wrong will not just leave the unsatisfactory status quo in place. It may indeed make matters worse. As long as human suffering due to violence continues to rise, the international community cannot afford to miss this opportunity to do better.
DFID (forthcoming) Draft Report Rapid Evidence Assessments for Conflict Prevention, Governance, Social Development, Conflict and Humanitarian (GSDCH PEAKS) consortium led by Coffey International Development for DFID


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