




Multilateral Aid Report



The Development Assistance Committee: Enabling effective development

FOREWORD

Multilateral co-operation plays a vital role in responding to today's global development challenges. Donors and governments use the multilateral system to invest and channel large amounts of money to help countries develop, and they have a responsibility to ensure that the people they are targeting reap the benefits. Yet this is an increasingly difficult task. The multilateral system is growing in complexity, with many types of organisations delivering assistance in a variety of forms. Today, more than 200 multilateral donors manage 40% of all aid in a complex mix of types, sizes and delivery systems that is often referred to as the "aid architecture". Understanding the functioning of this architecture – and its effects on aid efficiency – is a major, but essential challenge.

This fourth DAC Report on Multilateral Aid brings to light an important finding: the possible start of a downward trend in funding for multilateral aid, which reverses a trend of sustained growth over the past decade. Severe budget constraints in many OECD countries have brought all aid – including that provided through the multilateral system – under increasing scrutiny. This has led to increasing emphasis on – and proliferation of – criteria to measure the performance of these systems. Granted, aid "fragmentation" – a lack of coherence that limits its effectiveness – stems mostly from the policies and practices of bilateral providers. Yet multilateral aid is not beyond reproach. This report shows just how multilateral aid contributes to fragmentation. There are – of course – solutions, and these are outlined in this report: seven guiding principles that can limit the proliferation of multilateral channels, a leading source of fragmentation. These principles build on the commitments agreed in Busan in 2011 at the Fourth High level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.

The DAC Chair's annual Development Co-operation Report (DCR) focuses this year on an urgent task: the unfinished business of ending extreme poverty in the world. By providing a snapshot of individual DAC donors' policies and contributions to the multilateral system, the DAC Report on Multilateral Aid complements the DCR, helping readers understand global trends in multilateral funding and how this system can deliver more and better results.

The valuable information and guidance in this report can support collective efforts to improve aid, shaping policy decisions to forge a multilateral system that fulfils its goals fully and contributing to a more equitable world where extreme poverty is a thing of the past.



Erik Solheim, DAC Chair

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfDB – African Development Bank	OCHA - Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
AfDF – African Development Fund	ODA – Official Development Assistance
AFESD – Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	OFID – OPEC Fund for International Development
AsDB – Asian Development Bank	OPEC – Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
AsDF – Asian Development Fund	OSAGI – UN Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues
BADEA – Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	TCPR – Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (UN General Assembly)
COMPAS – Common Performance Assessment System	TT HAT – OECD Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector
CPA – Country Programmable Aid	UK – United Kingdom
DAC – Development Assistance Committee	UNAIDS – Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
DAW – UN Division for the Advancement of Women	UNDPKO – United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DFID – Department for International Development	UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
EDF – European Development Fund	UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
EU – European Union	UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme
EVALNET – OECD/DAC Evaluation Network	UNESCO – United Nations Education Social and Cultural Organisation
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation	UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
GAVI – Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation	UNICEF – United Nations’ Children’s Fund
GEF – Global Environment Facility	UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund
IADB – Inter-American Development Bank	UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	UNIFEM – UN Development Fund for Women
ICDO – International Civil Defence Organisation	UN-INSTRAW – UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross	UN-OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
IDA – International Development Association	UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development	WFP – World Food Programme
IFC – International Finance Corporation	WHO – World Health Organisation
ILO – International Labour Organisation	WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organisation
IMF – International Monetary Fund	WMO – World Maritime Organisation
LIC – Low-income country	
MAR – Multilateral Aid Review	
MIGA – Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	
MO – Multilateral organisation	
MOFCOM – Ministry of Commerce (China)	
MOPAN – Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network	
NGO – Non-governmental organisation	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Never before have donors relied on the multilateral system as much as they do today: the total use of the multilateral system (core as well as non-core resources) represents 40% of gross ODA. Multilateral aid plays a vital role in promoting governance based on global principles and standards, and in encouraging international co-operation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the multilateral system is becoming increasingly complex. Donors and governments that manage the system – and invest large amounts of money and resources in it – must ensure that it maintains its legitimacy and effectiveness.

This fourth OECD report on multilateral aid contributes to this effort by examining the increasingly fragmented nature of contributions to the multilateral system, and by offering a way forward in the form of guiding principles that can help limit the proliferation of channels (see box).

Multilateral core aid is still on the rise, but slowing

Multilateral ODA has grown over the past 20 years. In 2011, it reached almost USD 38 billion in core resources. Although 2011 saw the first drop in global ODA since 1997 (by 2.7%), there was in fact a 1% increase in real terms in multilateral aid compared to the previous year, which is likely to lead to increased outflows from the multilateral system to partner countries in 2012.

Nonetheless, the rate at which multilateral ODA is growing has slowed over recent years, mirroring the slowing overall growth in gross ODA: from 9% in 2008 it dropped to 5% in 2010 and then to only 1% in 2011. This slowing trend promises to continue as governments come under increasing pressure from legislative bodies and civil society to scrutinise and even limit multilateral aid. The OECD *2012-2015 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans* reported that seven DAC members expect to decrease their multilateral ODA in real terms in the coming years.

While investment in the multilateral system remains a significant part of almost every country's aid budget, within the current climate of budget restrictions governments are increasingly careful to choose channels where funds will target global priorities and where the risk of loss of influence over funds is limited.

Reducing proliferation is an agreed objective

At the Fourth High-Level Forum in Busan in 2011, countries and organisations agreed to “improve the coherence of our policies on multilateral institutions, global funds and programmes”. They set out to “reduce the proliferation of these channels and [...], by the end of 2012, agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts”. To do so, they pledged to “make effective use of multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well [...]”. This commitment follows a decade of efforts facilitated by the UN, the OECD-DAC, the health sector and others to identify good practices in funding, assessing, and delivering multilateral co-operation.

Today, however, two out of every five aid relationships are not “significant” in relative quantitative terms and is therefore a source of fragmentation of aid (the methodology used to measure fragmentation of aid assesses the financial significance of each aid relation in the context of the growing concern of having too many donors contributing too little in too many countries). Based on the analysis of such non-significance, this report finds that the rising non-core (earmarked) aid to multilateral organisations contributes to further fragmentation. Because it may not always be relevant, desirable or possible to increase (or shift) disbursements where aid relations are “non-significant”, it is important to understand the rationale behind non-core funding to live up to the Busan commitments, bilateral donors

will need to carefully consider their motivation and rationale in channelling financially “non-significant” levels of non-core funding through multilateral agencies.

At the same time, the number of assessments of multilateral organisations has multiplied. Over and above the regular evaluations undertaken by multilateral organisations’ own evaluation groups and divisions, numerous important bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral agencies have been undertaken over the past two years. Among these, the following have been key to understanding the current effectiveness of multilateral organisations: Australia’s Multilateral Assessment (2012); Denmark’s Engagement in Multilateral Organisations (2012); Sweden’s assessments of multilateral organisations (2011); the Netherlands’ scorecards of multilateral organisations (2011); the United Kingdom’s Multilateral Aid Review (2011); and, finally, the annual Assessments of organisational effectiveness by the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). A comparative analysis of these assessments shows a striking convergence in the criteria adopted.

The OECD encourages donors to enhance existing joint assessments rather than promoting new bilateral assessments. This can help to ensure that organisations are assessed against common objectives, enabling their recommendations to carry more weight in the broader governance context of the institution under review and inciting greater reform. In line with existing aid effectiveness commitments, these assessments would also place stronger emphasis on the evidence provided by developing countries or other “end-users” of the multilateral system.

The OECD work on good practices – related to different entry points in the relationship between bilateral and multilateral donors – has led to the following guiding principles for reducing proliferation of multilateral channels, in response to the Busan commitments.

Principles to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels

In line with the commitment set out in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Paragraph 25), we welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors, and agree to work to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels by using existing channels and frameworks for programme design, delivery and assessments, drawing on the following principles:

- 1 Use existing channels as the default, adjusting channels where necessary, and address any legal and administrative barriers that may prevent their use.
- 2 Use the international community’s appetite for new initiatives to innovate and reform the existing multilateral system, allowing for donor visibility.
- 3 Regularly review the number of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes with the aim of reducing their number through consolidation without decreasing the overall volume of resources.
- 4 Provide core or un-earmarked contributions to multilateral organisation, where relevant and possible.
- 5 Ensure that new multilateral programmes and channels are multi-donor arrangements; are time-bound, and should contain provisions for a mid-term review; and do not impose excessive reporting requirements if the creation of multilateral programmes and channels is unavoidable.
- 6 Support country-level harmonisation among all providers of development co-operation, including through representation on governing boards of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes.
- 7 Monitor trends and progress to curb the proliferation of channels at the global level; inform monitoring in partner countries.

CHAPTER 1. RECENT TRENDS IN MULTILATERAL AID

In 2011 members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) increased their level of multilateral aid, despite an overall decrease in ODA in 2011, as a consequence of fiscal austerity in OECD countries. Reinforcing this trend is the fact that country programmable aid (CPA) is set to recover in 2012, thanks mainly to multilateral outflows to developing countries.

The role of the multilateral system is considerably more important than the volume of multilateral official development assistance might suggest. When earmarked flows are included, it covers as much as 40% of all aid delivered worldwide. Such earmarked flows remain an important channel for donors to reach the poorest and most fragile countries.

Key to the future of multilateral aid is how the multilateral organisations are responding to an expected reduction in multilateral aid in the future. To date, they have been making an effort to diversify their funding base in order to mobilise more resources from middle-income countries, private foundations, and through innovative financing. This chapter also looks at the multilateral contributions of 21 countries that are not members of the DAC, as well as China's multilateral funding.

The level of donor investment in the multilateral system continued to increase in 2011 and is likely to lead to growth in outflows to partner countries in 2012. Although 2011 saw an overall decrease of 2.7% in official aid development (ODA) for the first time since 1997¹, there was a 1% real term increase in multilateral ODA – *i.e.* DAC members' un-earmarked contributions to multilateral agencies. So, while fiscal austerity in OECD countries put pressure on overall aid levels, multilateral ODA was spared the decrease.

Reinforcing that trend is the fact that, as the *2012-15 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans* (OECD, 2012a) indicates, country programmable aid (CPA)² will recover in 2012, thanks mainly to **multilateral** outflows³ to developing countries, which are expected to increase by 13% in real terms. This increase reflects the delayed effect since donors' previous replenishment efforts and – to some extent – the inclusion of contributions from outside the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

Box 1.1. How terms are used in this report

The following OECD/DAC definitions regarding multilateral organisations and multilateral aid are used in this report.

Multilateral organisations

"Multilateral organisations are international institutions with governmental membership. They include organisations to which donors' contributions may be reported, either in whole or in part, as multilateral ODA as well as organisations that serve only as channels for bilateral ODA" (OECD, 2010).

The DAC maintains the list of organisations to which donors' contributions may be reported either in whole or in part as multilateral ODA (see the "List of ODA-eligible international organisations": <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/listofoda-eligibleorganisations.htm>). Contributions should only be recorded as multilateral ODA if the recipient agency is included on the List.

In the context of DAC statistics and publications, the terms "agency", "organisation", or "institution" are used interchangeably. As the DAC reporting directives state, a "fund managed autonomously by such an agency" can also be considered a multilateral organisation in DAC statistics (OECD, 2007).

Flows: multilateral ODA, outflows, and non-core multilateral (multi-bi or earmarked) aid

A distinction is made between (a) multilateral ODA, which measures funding to multilateral organisations (*i.e.* inflows); and (b) outflows from those agencies to partner countries.

a) **Multilateral ODA** comprises official concessional contributions to multilateral agencies. These flows are also referred to as "core" contributions to multilateral organisations so as to distinguish them from "non-core" contributions described in detail below. They are sometimes also called "multilateral inflows". According to the statistical directives, if a contribution is to be classified as multilateral, it must be made to an institution that:

- "conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development;
- is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency; and
- pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets" (OECD, 2007).


Sources: OECD (2010), Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System, OECD, Paris; OECD (2007), Reporting Directives, paragraph 9, OECD, Paris; DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, www.oecd.org/dac/glossary.

Recent trends in multilateral ODA

Nonetheless, there appears to be a slowing-down and levelling-off of multilateral ODA. In the past decade, multilateral ODA has risen from USD 27 billion to USD 38 billion, accounting for close to one-third of gross ODA. Since 2007, however, the multilateral share of ODA has levelled off to 28% from a high of 32% in 2001. Along with the slow-down in overall growth of gross ODA, multilateral aid, too, has seen a deceleration in its annual growth rate – from 9% in 2008 to 5% in 2010, and down to only 1% in 2011.

Figure 1.1 represents the composition of DAC members' gross bilateral and multilateral ODA over the past decade. The bottom (yellow) dotted line shows multilateral aid, excluding contributions to EU Institutions. The amount that goes to EU Institutions⁴ (the darker portion above the yellow dotted line) is a growing trend, which accounted for the largest share (35%) of DAC members' multilateral ODA, estimated at USD 13.2 billion in 2010. Figure A.1 and Table A.1 in Annex A, which give overviews of disbursements to selected multilateral agencies from 2006 to 2010, bear out the rising trend of aid to EU Institutions.

Figure 1.1 Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries (2001-11)
(in constant 2010 prices)




* 2011 data are provisional

Source: OECD (2012b), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Total use of the multilateral system

In 2010, USD 37.6 billion was spent on funding multilateral agencies' core functions. An additional 12% of total ODA (USD 16.7 billion), though scored as bilateral, was in fact earmarked aid that was channelled through and implemented by multilateral agencies (Figure 1.2). Taken as a whole, use of the multilateral system (core and non-core multilateral aid) accounted for 40% of gross ODA, or USD 54.3 billion, in 2010, compared to USD 51.2 billion in 2009.

Figure 1.2 Gross ODA disbursements (2010)
(excluding debt relief and contributions from EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)



Source: OECD (2012b) *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris; OECD (2012b), OECD (2012c), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Non-core multilateral aid continued to grow in 2010, increasing by 8% in real terms from 2009. Humanitarian aid makes up 29% of non-core multilateral aid. Forty-five per cent of multi-bi aid is not allocated by country, but is earmarked for a specific region, theme, and/or sector (*e.g.* sub-Saharan Africa, food security, climate change, or education). Of the 55% that does go to countries, the bulk is disbursed to fragile and conflict-affected low-income countries (83%). The multi-bi channel has thus maintained its importance as a channel for donors to reach the poorest and most fragile countries.


Table 1.1 Advantages and disadvantages of non-core contributions

From the perspective of:	Advantages of non-core	Disadvantages of non-core
Developing countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can lead to more representative governance; • results in better harmonisation compared to bilateral initiatives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • could lead to less representative governance; • might blur lines of accountability.
Multilateral organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • preferable to numerous parallel bilateral initiatives when there are multiple donors; • preferable to the creation of new organisations or initiatives for specific, critical, time-bound purposes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • may weaken established governance mechanism by bypassing board decisions; • increases transaction costs (including reporting), especially for single-donor trust funds; • may conflict with the organisation's core policies or strategy; • may lead to the "bilateralisation" of multilateral aid.
Bilateral donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can be focused on specific sectors, regions or countries (including fragile states) where the bilateral donor may lack expertise or has no presence; • can make contributions more visible as the funding "keeps its identity" by not being pooled; • can bypass cumbersome board decisions; • can serve as "pilot" for stand-alone funds. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • core contributions may subsidise administrative costs of non-core funds.

Source: Based on: OECD (2011), *DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, OECD, Paris.

As can be seen in Figure 1.3, the largest volume of non-core or multi-bi flows is channelled through UN Funds and Programmes. In fact, according to the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on the funding of activities for development, 74% of total funding of UN operational activities for development (which includes humanitarian assistance) is non-core, a share that is still growing (UN, 2012). The second-largest recipient of earmarked ODA is the World Bank Group – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). It received over USD 4 billion in non-core funding in 2010. In an effort to consolidate its existing trust funds, the Bank has worked to group funds under umbrella arrangements, transform single-donor trust funds into multi-donor trust funds, and close empty trust funds. The EU only recently started to accept earmarked funds, which explains their very small share of non-core multilateral aid.


Figure 1.3 Total use of the multilateral system, gross ODA disbursements (2010)
(excluding debt relief and contributions from EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)



Note: Percentages refer to the share of multi-bi (non-core) aid as a proportion of multilateral and multi-bi ODA in that category.
Source: OECD (2012c), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris; OECD (2012b), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

In 2010 as Figure 2.4 shows, EU member states provided 19% of their total gross ODA to EU Institutions⁵, which includes core multilateral aid and earmarked contributions to the EU. Total earmarked ODA to the EU was USD 192 million in 2010. It was in Greece and Italy that had the highest shares of gross ODA to EU Institutions and the lowest were in Sweden and Luxembourg. In volume, Germany (USD 2.9 billion), France (USD 2.7 billion), and the United Kingdom (USD 2.1 billion) were the biggest ODA contributors to EU Institutions. Luxembourg (USD 36 million), Ireland (USD 166 million), and Portugal (USD 190 million) were the smallest.

Figure 1.4 Total contributions to EU institutions (core and non-core) as percentages of gross ODA disbursements (2010)
(excluding debt relief, in constant 2010 prices)




Source: OECD (2012b), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris; OECD (2012c), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Comparing and contrasting the share of multilateral aid in DAC members' gross ODA produces different results depending on whether the share includes or excludes ODA to the EU. Figure 1.5 shows members' share of multilateral and multi-bi ODA, excluding contributions to the EU. Although the DAC average is 33%, some donors – like Germany and France, whose share of multilateral ODA is normally high and multi-bi low – appear to contribute lower than expected proportions of the total use of the multilateral system, given the inclusion of multi-bi or non-core multilateral aid in the total. The total share of the non-EU multilateral system accounts for the highest portion of gross ODA in Italy (57%), Luxembourg (55%), and the United Kingdom (53%), and the lowest in Portugal (23%), Germany (22%), and Greece (11%). Figure A.3 in Annex A shows members' share of the total use of multilateral and multi-bi ODA, including contributions to the EU⁶.

While it may not be possible to draw conclusions as to donor preferences, donors on the right-hand side of the graph in Figure 1.5 tend to have bilateral programmes that are large relative to their multilateral aid and/or to contribute relatively less multilateral aid to non-EU Institutions. For example, some of the DAC members with an above-average share of aid to EU institutions⁷ (like Portugal, Belgium, France and Germany) fall well below the DAC average when contributions to EU institutions are excluded. That signifies, in this case, that multilateral contributions to EU Institutions as a proportion of their total multilateral aid portfolio are large.

Figure 1.5 Total use of the multilateral system as % gross ODA disbursements (2010)
(excluding debt relief and contributions to EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)



Source: OECD (2012b), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Future trends in multilateral aid

The *2012-15 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans* (OECD, 2012a) asked donors to report their multilateral spending intentions. Sixteen donors were able to provide this information through 2013.⁸ Compared to a baseline of 2010, 9 of the 16 planned to increase their multilateral ODA in real terms by 2013, while 7 predicted a fall in their multilateral spend. Although their estimates could be conservative, they constitute a clear break from the historic disbursement pattern where 12 of the same DAC donors had regularly increased their annual multilateral aid.

Estimates of a future reduction in multilateral aid are in line with the predicted fall in overall ODA, even if multilateral aid has not yet been affected by the overall fall in bilateral ODA confirmed in 2011. These projections may indicate the beginning of a drying-up of the traditional source of multilateral funding, a trend evidenced by multilateral organisations' effort to diversify their funding base in order to mobilise more resources from middle-income countries, private foundations, and through innovative financing. It is a path that United Nations operations for development appear to be pursuing: 17% of contributions to them in 2010 came from non-governmental organisations, public-private partnerships, and other multilateral organisations (including global funds) (UN, 2012). As an example of a broadening of the resource base, the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* cited the record of IDA's 16th Replenishment, of which 4.2% came from non-DAC members. The recent Asian Development Fund replenishment period, known as AsDF XI, attained a record USD 4.6 billion, with non-DAC members supplying 2%.

Table 1.2 Core and non-core contributions to multilateral organisations***

Voluntary core contributions	Assessed core contributions as a function of membership
EDF Global Fund GAVI Montreal Protocol Fund IDA AfDF AsDF IDB Special Funds IFAD IMF-PRGT UNAIDS UNCTAD UNDP UNFPA UNEP** UN-HABITAT* UNHCR** UNICEF UNRWA** UN-WOMEN WFP WHO*	IAEA EC-Budget AsDB AfDB IBRD IMF FAO ICAO ILO ITU UNDPKO UNESCO UNIDO UN Secretariat UPU WHO* WIPO WMO

*Both assessed and voluntary

**Small annual subsidy from regular budget of the UN used for administration

***The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification:

"The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy."

Source: OECD DAC secretariat.

Multilateral aid concentrated in top five clusters

As in previous years, data from 2010 confirm the historical pattern of DAC members directing most of their multilateral aid to five clusters of multilaterals. The total between 2006 and 2010 was 81%, which can be broken down as follows: the European Development Fund (EDF)-plus-European Union (EU) budget (36%)⁹; International Development Association (IDA) (22%); UN Funds and Programmes (9%), the African and Asian Development Banks (AfDB and AsDB) (5% and 3%), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (7%). Only 19% of total multilateral aid was allocated to the remaining 212 multilateral organisations, funds or trust funds, many of which have research or policy functions or serve a norms-based or standard-setting purpose. Table A.2 in Annex A shows the percentages contributed by each DAC member to these groups of organisations over the five-year period.

The many recent bilateral and joint reviews of multilateral organisations that co-exist alongside more comprehensive evaluations of multilateral organisations suggest that multilateral system funders are in search of suitable methods of comparing the effectiveness or efficiency of multilateral organisations in order to influence their multilateral spending decisions. At the same time, funders realise that it is particularly difficult to compare norms-based or standard-setting agencies that do not implement country programmes or for which results are less easily measured. The next chapter provides more detail on recent reviews of multilateral agencies.

Non-DAC multilateral aid

Twenty-one countries that are not members of the DAC reported their 2010 aid flows to the DAC. The eleven non-DAC EU members allocated 69% of their total ODA to multilaterals (25% excluding multilateral aid to EU institutions), while the average multilateral share of non-DAC donor states was 22%. In 2010, Saudi Arabia reported 17% (USD 609 million) of its total aid as multilateral and the UAE 7% (USD 32 million). The Russian Federation, the latest country to report its aid provision to the DAC, allotted 36% (USD 170 million) of its total aid to multilateral organisations. Table 1.3 sets out the total DAC and multilateral share of non-DAC donors that report to the OECD.

Table 1.3 Non-DAC gross ODA disbursements, 2010***
(excluding debt relief)

Non-DAC donor	Total ODA, excl. debt relief (in USD m)	Multilateral ODA (in USD m)	Multilateral ODA as share of gross ODA (%)	Multilateral ODA as share of gross ODA, excl. contributions to EU institutions (%)
Cyprus*	51	21	41	19
Czech Republic	228	148	65	32
Estonia	19	14	74	36
Hungary	114	86	75	40
Latvia	16	14	90	90
Lithuania	37	20	55	5
Malta	14	5	39	39
Poland	384	282	73	11
Romania	114	88	77	11
Slovak Republic	74	54	73	16
Slovenia	59	36	62	26
EU 11 total	1 108	768	69	25
Chinese Taipei	381	55	14	
Iceland	29	8	28	
Israel**	145	17	12	
Liechtenstein	27	5	18	
Russia	472	170	36	
Thailand	45	14	31	
Turkey	967	47	5	
Non-DAC (excl. Kuwait, Saudi, UAE)	4 378	1 357	31	
Kuwait (KFAED)	617	-	-	
Saudi Arabia	3 494	609	17	
UAE	571	32	6	
Total	9 060	1 999	22	

* Footnote by the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: "The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus."

Footnote by Turkey: "The information in this document under the heading 'Cyprus' relates to the southern part of the island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the 'Cyprus' issue."

** The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

*** The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: "The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy."

Source: OECD (2012b), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Neither Brazil, India, South Africa, nor China reported their development assistance to the DAC in 2010. The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* (OECD, 2011a) highlighted Brazil's use of multilateral agencies for supplying aid to neighbouring countries and circumventing laws against the provision of bilateral aid. In contrast, India and China have large bilateral programmes and very probably channel a share of aid through multilateral organisations that is well below the DAC average of 28%.

Any increase in the multilateral contributions of emerging donors is inextricably linked to governance and voice reform, at least as far as contributions to international financial institutions goes. In the absence of data from some of the emerging donors, it is difficult to ascertain whether the strong political support that they lend to the United Nations translates into large financial commitments. Box 1.2 shows, at a glance, which multilateral organisations received funding from China in 2010 and how much.

Box 1.2. Chinese contributions to international organisations in 2010
(disbursements in constant 2010 prices)

Organisation	Core funding (USD million)
AsDB	277.4
AsDF	6.4
AfDF	34.2
FAO	13.2
IDA	4.7
WHO*	12.4
UNDP	3.6
WFP	3.1
Global Fund	2.0
UNICEF	1.2
UN-PBF	1.0
UNRWA	0.1

* Note: Assessed WHO contributions have an ODA coefficient of 76%.

Source: AfDB (2010, 2011), ADB (2010, 2011a, 2011b), FAO (2012), Global Fund (2011), IFAD (2011), IDA (2011), PRC (2011), UNDP (2011, 2012), WFP (2012a, 2012b), WHO (2011).

China has extended aid outside its borders since 1950 in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages outgoing bilateral aid and contributions to major United Nations institutions (such as the UN Development Programme [UNDP] and Children's Fund [UNICEF]), the Ministry of Finance co-ordinates China's multilateral contributions to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and the People's Bank of China oversees contributions to the regional development banks (with the exception of the AsDB). In April 2011, China issued its first white paper on aid, "China's Foreign Aid" (PRC, 2011). According to the white paper, China had supplied aid to 161 countries and to more than 30 international and regional organisations by the end of 2009. It describes China's foreign aid as "South-South co-operation" and "mutual help between developing countries".

The amounts in the table are based on information published in the main multilateral agencies' financial statements and annual reports for 2010. China contributes predominantly core resources to the multilateral system. After becoming a donor to the 15th replenishment round of the International Development Association (IDA15) in 2007, it pledged USD 160.8 million to the 16th round in 2010. China also provided USD 22 million to the 8th replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 2009 and contributes some non-core, or earmarked, funding to multilateral agencies. As a new donor to FAO in 2009, it released USD 10 million for the China Trust Fund for South-South co-operation over three successive years. This fund is used to provide developing countries – predominantly in Africa – with technical assistance, training, agricultural inputs, and small equipment from China. Further non-core funding went to UNDP (USD 3.7 million), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) multi-donor trust funds (USD 200 000), the Asian Development Bank's Technical Assistance Special Fund (USD 1.6m), World Food Programme (WFP) assistance to Haiti and Niger (USD 1 million), and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) which received USD 565 838.

Notes

- 1 At the time of writing this report, only aggregate DAC data were available (including multilateral aid) for 2011. Disaggregated data (which include non-core contributions) will be available in early 2013.
- 2 Disregarding years of exceptional debt relief.
- 3 Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is a sub-set of aid that measures actual transfers to partner countries. CPA is critical for delivering international aid commitments in support of the MDGs, but also represents the proportion of aid that is subject to country allocation decisions by the donor. For more information on CPA see Annex B and www.oecd.org/dac/cpa.
- 4 Based on outturns from 24 different multilateral agencies.
- 5 The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: “The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy.”
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Of the nine providing estimates through 2015, four predicted a real decrease of 11% and five a real increase of 16%.
- 10 The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: “The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy.”

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CHAPTER 2. FRAGMENTATION OF AID EFFORTS

This Chapter analyses the fragmentation of multilateral and bilateral outflows to partner countries. It finds that non-core (or earmarked) aid to multilateral organisations contributes to fragmentation and further complexity on the ground. Although this finding is based on a purely quantitative measure of fragmentation and does not question the motivation behind such non-core funding nor whether fragmentation actually causes problems on the ground, it is safe to conclude that the motivation and rationale behind both multilateral core and non-core funding should be given close consideration. Further work on the ground could help answer some of the open questions.

As Chapter 1 argued, the role of the multilateral system is considerably more important than the volume of multilateral official development assistance (ODA) alone would suggest. Multi-bi (or non-core) funding for multilateral organisations is becoming increasingly significant. In response to the commitment made by partners in Paragraph 25(b) of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to “make effective use of existing multilateral channels”, it is useful to examine just how fragmented aid implemented by multilateral organisations at the country level is – and what role non-core aid plays in that regard. This chapter considers how non-core multilateral aid affects fragmentation and reviews fragmentation in partner countries by region and income group.

Its analysis of concentration and fragmentation is, however, purely quantitative. It considers only financial relations between the 24 DAC donors, 26 multilateral agencies (shown in Table 1.2) and partner countries – not the political or qualitative aspects of these relations. This report fully recognises that the volume of ODA cannot alone determine whether an aid relationship is significant. Nevertheless, quantitative analysis is a necessary component of any comprehensive desk study and draws on the only comparable evidence available in examining relations between donor and ODA-eligible countries at the global level.

Fragmentation of multilateral and bilateral outflows

This section analyses the fragmentation of multilateral and bilateral outflows in partner countries and reviews it in partner countries by region and income group. Box 2.1 briefly describes how aid is measured and on what basis it is considered fragmented or concentrated.

Box 2.1. Measuring aid fragmentation and concentration of aid

The analysis is based on Country Programmable Aid (CPA) plus humanitarian aid and developmental food aid. An expanded concept hereafter referred to as CPA+, it reflects outflows of both multilateral and bilateral agencies to partner countries. Applied to multilateral agencies, CPA+ represents the outflows of their core-funded expenditure on operational activities.

Highlighting patterns of aid fragmentation and concentration requires close examination of how multilateral and bilateral agencies operate and the financial weight they carry at country level. A “significant” aid relationship is determined in one of two ways:

1. by comparing the volume of aid to a partner country to those of other donors in the same partner country,
2. by comparing the donor’s share of aid to a partner country relative to the same donor’s overall share of global aid.

A donor’s concentration ratio is determined by the number of “significant” as opposed to “non-significant” aid relationships it maintains.

For more information on the methodology, see the *2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour* at www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/aidfragmentation.html. For the same analysis based on CPA alone, see Annex B.


Source: OECD DAC secretariat.

The measures described in Box 2.1 are used in Annex D of this report to illustrate fragmentation of CPA+ (Country Programmable Aid [CPA] plus humanitarian aid plus developmental food aid) supplied by bilateral and multilateral donors. The matrices highlight donors’ significant aid relations in partner countries, and show that two out every five donor-partner country relationships are not financially significant. Although fragmentation stems mostly from bilateral sources (OECD, 2011a), multilateral agencies together represent over one-third of resource outflows at the global level. Consequently, they, too, are beginning to contribute to the global fragmentation picture.

In many countries, development co-operation could be more efficient if there were more significant and fewer non-significant aid relations. In this report, whether a donor is significant or non-significant in a particular country depends on the financial significance of other donors present in that same country. In addition, a significant or non-significant aid relationship is measured by a donor's global share of aid relative to that of other donors.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the total number of non-significant aid relations for all donors across countries. Countries shaded dark blue are those with the highest potential for efficiency gains because they have a high number of non-significant bilateral and multilateral aid relations. They are to be found mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Central and Far East Asia. Their average concentration ratio is 43% – in other words, more than one-half of their aid relations are financially non-significant.

Figure 2.1 Opportunities for aid concentration (2010)



On average, multilateral donors appear more concentrated than DAC members against the yardstick of core multilateral outflows. Their concentration ratio is 65% against 54% for DAC countries (Table 2.1), even though there are wide variations within both groups. The concentration ratio is determined by the number of partner countries where donors are present – often determined by their mandates.

Indeed, when comparing concentration ratios across organisations, it is important to take mandates into account. Many agencies have regional mandates, which confines their aid allocations to certain regions and results in high financial concentrations in limited sets of partner countries. Two examples of this regional requirement are the regional development banks, whose concessional finance aid activities show a concentration ratio of 90%, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), an organisation with a very narrow geographic scope and a 100% concentration ratio. On the other hand, because they have global mandates, most UN Funds and Programmes have a much lower average concentration ratio of 54%.

Geographically speaking, multilateral outflows probably contribute to the higher number of non-significant aid relations – i.e. greater fragmentation – in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In these regions, the average multilateral concentration ratio is 45% – well below multilateral agencies’ average concentration ratio of 65% – with the most fragmented agencies being UN Funds and Programmes.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the overriding trend in fragmentation and concentration between 2000 and 2010: the growth in aid relations has plainly increased fragmentation. There was a 50% increase in the number of non-significant aid relationships in low-income countries (LICs) and fragile and conflict-affected states. Over the same time span, significant relations increased by 14%, resulting in a six percentage point drop in the concentration ratio. In sub-Saharan Africa, each country had, on average, four more aid relationships in 2010 than in 2000, and 60% of those new relationships were non-significant.

Table 2.1 Measuring concentrations of multilateral agencies’ country programmable aid (core resources)

	CPA+* (USD 2010 million)	Share of Global CPA+* (in %)	No. of relations	No. of significant relations	Concentration ratio (in %)
Arab Agencies**	1 820	1.9	99	38	38
EU institutions***	9 875	10.3	149	128	86
GAVI	590	0.6	67	32	48
GEF	359	0.4	87	53	61
Global Fund	2 997	3.1	113	73	65
IDA	10 074	10.5	78	70	90
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	1 346	1.4	37	29	78
Montreal Protocol	21	0.02	10	7	70
Nordic Dev. Fund	52	0.1	18	17	94
Regional Development Bank Funds:	4 174	4.3	104	94	90
<i>AfDF</i>	1 515	1.6	38	31	82
<i>AsDF</i>	1 927	2.0	27	25	93
<i>CarDB</i>	69	0.1	14	14	100
<i>IaDB</i>	662	0.7	25	24	96
UN Funds and Programmes:	2 438	2.5	534	288	54
<i>UNDP</i>	515	0.5	136	75	55
<i>UNFPA</i>	282	0.3	117	75	64
<i>UNHCR</i>	187	0.2	86	43	50
<i>UNICEF</i>	768	0.8	120	51	43
<i>UNRWA</i>	452	0.5	4	4	100
<i>WFP</i>	235	0.2	71	40	56
Other UN:	615	0.6	298	201	67
<i>IAEA</i>	51	0.05	98	67	68
<i>IFAD</i>	462	0.48	79	53	67
<i>UNAIDS</i>	51	0.05	103	65	63
<i>UN Peacebuilding Fund</i>	51	0.05	18	16	89
Total multilaterals	34 360	35.7	1 594	1 030	65
<i>Total multilaterals excl. EU</i>	24 485	25.5	1 445	902	62
Total DAC countries	61 764	64.3	1 719	933	54
<i>Total DAC members incl. EU</i>	71 639	74.5	1 868	1 061	57


* Note that this analysis also includes humanitarian and food aid, but excludes regional allocations from CPA.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: “The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy.”

Source: OECD (2012), *Country Programmable Aid*, OECD, Paris.

Figure 2.2. Trends in concentration ratios against aid relations (2000-10)



Source: OECD (2012), *Country Programmable Aid*, OECD, Paris.

Reattributing non-core funding to multilaterals

Bilateral ODA earmarked for a specific region, country, theme or sector, and channelled through multilateral agencies, is usually attributed to bilateral donors when assessing fragmentation. In this way, bilateral donors appear to deliver a more significant share of development assistance than they probably in fact do, since much of it is not in reality implemented by DAC members alone. By reattributing earmarked funding to the multilateral agencies which channel funding, a more true-to-life picture of fragmentation and its sources emerges. Box 2.2 captures the two scenarios through which fragmentation can be observed at the country-level.

Box 2.2. Two scenarios for classifying non-core funding

This analysis looks at the impact of multilateral and non-core multilateral CPA+ (country programmable aid plus humanitarian aid plus developmental food aid) on country-level fragmentation. By definition, non-core multilateral aid is earmarked for a country, region, theme or sector, and channelled through a multilateral agency.

The base-case scenario presented in the previous section examined a fragmentation picture which included non-core resources with bilateral donors, given that such flows are bilateral ODA.

In another scenario, non-core funding is re-attributed from the bilateral donor to the multilateral agency which channels it and is generally responsible for implementing it. This approach reflects the actual implementer at country level. It is worth keeping in mind that some of these agencies may, in turn, pass non-core resources on to local NGOs or other implementing entities not captured in these statistics.


As with all desk-study analyses, results should be verified at the country level.

For an analysis that is similar, but re-attributes CPA+ flows to the multilateral agency, see Annex B.

Source: OECD secretariat.

Figure 2.3 illustrates the impact of non-core funding on the number of aid relationships once it is attributed to the implementing multilateral agencies: it increases the volume of their presence in countries where they are already present. However, when their non-core funding is factored in, their overall presence becomes less concentrated (or more fragmented). Figure 2.3a illustrates the number of aid relationships. It shows that, between 2007 and 2010, multilateral aid relations increased by 4% to a par with bilateral aid relations, which fell by 3%. Figure 2.3b illustrates the patterns of concentration in these aid relations.

Figure 2.3. How re-classifying core and non-core funding affects the number and concentration ratios of aid relationships (2007-10)



Source: OECD (2012), *Country Programmable Aid*, OECD, Paris.

Table 2.2 shows that, when non-core multilateral aid is reattributed to multilateral agencies, the concentration ratio for multilateral ODA dropped from 65% to 58%, while for bilateral aid it fell from 54% to 53%. Over time, the concentration ratio has fallen across all partner-country income groupings, but is particularly dragged further down by increased fragmentation in LICs. One reason why re-attributing non-core or multi-bi funding reduces multilateral donors' overall concentration ratio is as follows: reattribution increases their global share of aid and, at the same time, the threshold of resources required to attain significance as measured against the yardstick of the donor's relative concentration at country level. Despite higher volumes and in contrast to the base-case scenario, multilateral agencies and bilateral donors see their concentration ratios drop as they fall short of the level of resources required to be among the top donors that together provide 90% of all aid to partner countries.

Table 2.2. Impact of non-core ODA on fragmentation

	No. of relations	No. of additional relations due to earmarked funding	Donor's share of Global CPA+*	Concentration ratio (in %)	
Arab Agencies**	99	0	1.9%	37	↓
EU institutions***	149	0	10.4%	86	→
GAVI	67	0	0.6%	48	→
GEF	87	0	0.4%	61	→
Global Fund	113	0	3.1%	65	→
IDA	96	18	12.0%	79	↓
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	48	11	1.4%	60	↓
Montreal Protocol	10	0	0.0%	70	→
Nordic Dev. Fund	18	0	0.1%	94	→
Regional Development Bank Funds:	112	8	4.5%	86	↓
<i>AfDF</i>	40	2	1.6%	80	↓
<i>AsDF</i>	33	6	2.1%	79	↓
<i>CarDB</i>	14	0	0.1%	100	→
<i>IaDB</i>	25	0	0.7%	96	→
UN Funds and Programmes:	558	24	8.2%	39	↓
<i>UNDP</i>	144	8	2.0%	26	↓
<i>UNFPA</i>	119	2	0.4%	60	↓
<i>UNHCR</i>	94	8	0.7%	38	↓
<i>UNICEF</i>	123	3	1.8%	33	↓
<i>UNRWA</i>	4	0	0.6%	100	→
<i>WFP</i>	74	3	2.7%	42	↓
Other UN:	300	2	0.7%	67	↓
<i>IAEA</i>	98	0	0.1%	68	→
<i>IFAD</i>	79	0	0.5%	66	↓
<i>UNAIDS</i>	105	2	0.1%	62	↓
<i>UN Peacebuilding Fund</i>	18	0	0.1%	89	→
Total multilaterals	1 657	63	43.2%	58	↓
<i>Total multilaterals excl. EU</i>	1 508	63	32.9%	56	↓
Total DAC countries	1 670	- 49	56.8%	53	↓
<i>Total DAC members incl. EU</i>	1 819	- 49	67.1%	56	↓

* Note that this analysis also includes humanitarian and food aid, but excludes regional allocations from CPA.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA.

***The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: "The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy."

Source: OECD (2012), *Country Programmable Aid*, OECD, Paris.

Interestingly, DAC countries' average concentration ratio also slipped slightly to 53% after non-core aid was attributed to multilateral agencies. This was primarily due to the fact that bilateral donors provided some aid in many partner countries to which they also channelled multi-bi aid through multilateral agencies. Re-attributing this aid from bilateral to multilateral donors thus means that the bilateral donor is likely to be displaced from the top 90% of donors because of the larger flows emanating from multilateral and non-core funding.

To test whether humanitarian aid earmarked for a specific crisis response is behind the increased fragmentation that occurs when non-core multilateral aid is reattributed from bilateral to multilateral donors, analysis was replicated without humanitarian aid by the DAC secretariat. The findings confirmed that multilateral agencies were more fragmented when non-core contributions were taken into account,

even when humanitarian non-core aid was not included. Without humanitarian aid, the multilateral concentration ratio dropped from 66% to 61% after reattribution (rather than sliding from 65% to 58%, as in Table 2.2), while the bilateral concentration ratio stays the same at 54%. The impact on individual agencies is detailed in Annex B.

More fragmentation – for good reason?

To recapitulate: the fragmentation of bilateral and multilateral aid increases when multi-bi aid is attributed to the multilateral implementer. Even in comparison to a theoretical baseline scenario, where bilateral and multilateral disbursements are examined without the inclusion of multi-bi aid in either category, fragmentation increases. If both bilateral and multilateral donors are relatively worse off when non-core funding is taken into consideration, how can sense be made of the benefits of multi-bi aid? It is important to keep in mind that this reattribution-based measure of fragmentation, as with most quantitative desk studies, does not capture other important factors, such as the motivation behind funding or whether fragmentation is the cause of real co-ordination problems on the ground. Further DAC-led work could examine fragmentation directly at the country level.

Previous reports (*e.g.* OECD, 2011b) have examined the manifold, context-specific advantages and disadvantages of non-core multilateral aid. In reality, however, non-core aid has many positive effects. In 57% of the multilateral aid relations that evolved from financially significant to non-significant after reattribution, resources actually increased – though not enough to meet the new (higher) benchmarks, or to make it into the top 90% of donors in a given country. There are also some cases where multi-bi funding has made existing non-significant aid relations between a multilateral and a partner country significant. This development is true of 33 aid relations of which 21 are in fragile or conflict-affected states.¹ Assuming that managing aid from different sources within one multilateral agency does not add to transaction costs, reattribution analysis demonstrates that multi-bi aid strengthens a multilateral agency's existing presence.

Re-classifying non-core funding to multilateral organisations creates 50 new, but non-significant, multilateral aid relations. Many of these relations are in countries that otherwise receive non-concessional or blend financing from the multilateral development banks and where non-core disbursements can have an important leveraging effect (*e.g.* South Africa and China). Other countries are in arrears, and thus non-eligible for additional concessional financing from core resources (*e.g.* Zimbabwe), or unable to receive core resources due to their non-sovereign status (West Bank and Gaza). Geographically isolated regions like the Pacific Island States (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru and Vanuatu) would have extremely limited sources of external assistance without earmarked assistance channelled through multilateral organisations. Finally, many such non-significant aid relations also include specific targeted technical assistance programmes that typically operate on the basis of earmarked funding.

In conclusion, analysis finds that multi-bi or bilateral ODA channelled through multilateral agencies contributes to fragmentation, whether or not humanitarian aid is included. In many cases, it may render the delivery of resources more complex on the ground. In others, non-core resources are an important lifeline. Similarly, increasing disbursements where aid relations are “non-significant” may be neither relevant, desirable, or possible. It is therefore impossible to generalise on the value of non-core funding from data alone. What is clear is that the motivation and rationale behind both multilateral ODA and multi-bi funding should be given close consideration. Further work on the ground could enlarge on the reattribution analysis, with future editions of this report examining the results. Such work could include:

- deepening the analysis of fragmentation among different multilateral agencies (see Table 1.2);
- analysing the effect of non-core funding on the institutional dynamics of multilateral organisations, including their corporate strategies and transaction costs;

- exploring the effects of institutional fragmentation in partner countries and the conditions under which fragmentation poses a problem to different categories of partner countries.

The UN's "Delivering as One"² and the EU's Joint Programming Initiative³ are both schemes designed to reduce the adverse impact of too many country-level aid channels and reducing the load on partner country governments. Chapter 4 considers these initiatives and concludes with suggestions on emerging principles to reduce proliferation.

Notes

- 1 Examples include UNDP, UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP) in Afghanistan; the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and WFP in Haiti; IDA in Timor-Leste; the Global Fund in Honduras and Mongolia; and IFAD in Mali.
- 2 For more on "Delivering As One", go to www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/.
- 3 For more on European Union Joint Programming Initiatives, see http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/joint-programming_en.html.

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OECD (2011b), *DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, OECD, Paris

CHAPTER 3. ASSESSMENTS OF MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

The proliferation of bilateral assessments reflects today's increased scrutiny of public financial resources and heightened demand for directing scarce aid towards the most effective multilateral channels. This chapter looks at the bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral organisations that DAC members have undertaken in the past year. Even though some of these assessments play a role in domestic policy insofar as they make the case for multilateralism vis-à-vis taxpayers, this chapter finds that different reviews and assessments strongly converge in the criteria they adopt. It therefore suggests that there is great potential for more joint approaches and assessments. Such approaches would enable assessments to carry more weight and incite greater reform. In going forward, mutual and international accountability would also require evidence from clients or "end-users" of the multilateral system.

There have been a number of major bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral organisations in the past year: *Australian Multilateral Assessment* (AusAID, 2012); *Denmark's engagement in multilateral development and humanitarian organisations 2012*; Sweden's assessments of multilateral organisations; the Netherlands' scorecards of multilateral organisations in 2011; the United Kingdom's *Multilateral Aid Review* (DFID, 2011); and, finally, *assessments* by the annual Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN, 2012). Some of these reviews are more comprehensive than others and/or serve different purposes, as will be discussed below. These efforts come in addition to the regular assessment by the evaluation groups and departments of multilateral organisations themselves.

While assessment methodologies vary, the three areas that they generally consider are organisational effectiveness, development results, and how well an organisation matches donor preferences. (The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* terms the donor-organisation match the "principal-agent model"). This chapter reports on DAC members' approaches to assessing the multilateral development system, suggests points of methodological convergence, and takes a special look at the *Australian Multilateral Assessment* (AusAID, 2012). Also addressed is how results from assessments could and should be used in future policy making.

Types of assessments

The assessments of multilateral organisations discussed in this chapter are not necessarily formal evaluations undertaken by aid agencies and ministries.¹ Rather, they have involved officials from across a wide range of departments within bilateral governments. While few can claim to be rigorous evaluations of multilateral organisations' performance, they do nonetheless afford a diversified base of facts, perceptions and experience that may guide donors' multilateral investment decisions. These assessments were based on already existing information, interviews with stakeholders, document reviews and focus groups, and on new and proven analytical tools. As such, they offer a body of evidence upon which government policies can draw.

The bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral organisations that DAC members have undertaken in the past year can be classified into three categories:

- comprehensive assessments of some or all the major multilateral agencies to which the DAC member contributes and based in part on own methodologies – *e.g.* Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, together with MOPAN;
- annual information updates, as practiced by Norway;
- analyses of multilateral engagement by the Danish government.

Although comprehensive assessments are the primary focus of this chapter, the Norwegian and Danish practices are examples of the kind of evaluation of engagement with multilateral organisations that many DAC donors regularly undertake.

Norway's updated information sheets on specific multilateral agencies draw on information from embassy officials in partner countries, multilateral agency headquarters, and existing documentation published by agencies and other actors. They contain each organisation's history, mandate, financial information (including Norway's contributions), results achieved in the past year, and organisational effectiveness and financial accountability.

Denmark's strategy for engagement aims to reinforce the multilateral system and ensure it supplies multilateral assistance primarily as core or non-earmarked contributions where organisations' core mandates align with Danish development policy priorities. These priorities include a co-ordinated, coherent multilateral system to address the challenge of conflict-affected and fragile states; a holistic approach to security, humanitarian needs and development; and transition to a green economy through

channels such as the formulation of sustainable development goals. Its engagement strategy encourages continued monitoring of organisations' contributions to development results.

Some DAC members (such as France, Germany and Spain) stated that they were currently reviewing their multilateral aid policies or developing strategies. Others, like Switzerland and Ireland, said they were using existing reviews, particularly those of MOPAN, to inform their decision making and did not therefore find it necessary to undertake assessments of their own. Canada conducted a comprehensive review of the different multilateral organisations to which it contributes, while an outsourced report aimed at improving the Government of Japan's assessments of multilateral organizations was published in 2010. The next section addresses comprehensive assessments of multilateral organisations.

Comprehensive assessments of multilateral organisations

This section analyses what the existing comprehensive assessments have in common. Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom² have all conducted assessments built in part on their own methodologies. As for MOPAN, it, too, has its own methodology, known as the "Common Approach", which it adopted since 2009. In 2011, it used the Common Approach to evaluate five multilateral agencies in 2011 – the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP,) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). It assessed a further six in 2012 – the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UNDP, UNICEF, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI).

Close examination reveals considerable overlap between the Australian, Dutch, Swedish, British, and MOPAN assessments. Table 3.1 shows the criteria and benchmarks against which the four donors and MOPAN evaluated multilateral agencies. They share core commonalities even though their priorities within the multilateral system differ.

Table 3.1. Commonalities between five multilateral assessments

		Australia	Netherlands	Sweden	United Kingdom	MOPAN
Macro-level	Effective leadership	x		x	x	
	Governing body effective in guiding management	x	x		x	
	Innovative approaches	x				
	Likelihood of change			x	x	
	Lesson learning	x				x
	Managing for results	x	x	x	x	x
	Strategic management	x	x	x	x	x
Operational	Transparency and accountability	x		x	x	
	Corruption		x	x		
	Cost / value consciousness	x			x	
	Delegated decision-making					x
	Effective HR	x	x	x	x	x
	Evaluation function for delivery and external results	x	x	x	x	x
	Evidence-based programming					x
	Financial accountability	x	x	x	x	x
	Transparent information sharing			x		x
	Operates within mandate, international commitments	x	x	x	x	x
	Organisational performance			x		x
Country-level	Promotes transparency in partners	x				
	Align and contribute to national country priorities / systems	x		x		x
	Partnership behaviour	x	x	x	x	x
	Participatory approach with partners, marginalised groups	x			x	
	Progress towards results				x	x
	Relevant to major stakeholders					x
	Results at country level		x	x	x	x
Relevance to donors' national aid objectives	Transparency, predictability of allocations	x			x	x
	Environment / Climate Change / Sustainability	x	x	x	x	
	Economic growth			x	x	
	Fills a policy gap	x				
	Fragility	x		x	x	
	Gender	x	x	x	x	
	Good governance		x	x	x	
	Focus on poor countries				x	
	Food security		x			
	Human rights			x		
	Humanitarian			x		
	MDGs	x			x	x
	People with disabilities	x				
	Poverty reduction	x		x		
	Security / legal		x		x	
	Social development			x		
	Sexual and reproductive health		x			
	Water		x			

Source: DAC secretariat.

Points of convergence

First among the shared assessment criteria is an organisation's strategic management and its capacity to manage for results – *i.e.* to incorporate results-based management in planning, managing, and developing programmes that deliver the best results. Almost all assessments take the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty reduction objectives as benchmarks of success and all consider whether human resource policies are designed for optimal organisational and operational effectiveness. Measuring an organisation's impact through an evaluation function, assessing its financial accountability and how closely it meets its mandate and international commitments are also common to all assessments. Finally, all five appraise the partnership behaviour of multilateral agencies. "Partnership behaviour" denotes an agency's contribution to policy dialogue with its various partners, its ability to co-ordinate and

harmonise approaches with other programming partners, and how it seeks to improve the wider international aid architecture.

Most of the assessments also examined organisations' leadership, the effectiveness of its governing body, and how easily it aligns with and contributes to countries' priorities and systems. The results agencies achieved at the country level, the transparency and predictability of their allocations, and the relevance of their action to the MDGs were also shared considerations. Some criteria in the table refer specifically to donors' own national aid objectives, which encompass a wide range of thematic and geographic preferences.

The convergence in all five assessments is significant, especially when the elements unique to each donor's national aid objectives are discounted. Of course, joint evaluations tend to look at a larger number of components and cross-cutting themes, partners, and modalities in order to reflect the different donors' priorities, which can increase the methodological challenges. Joint evaluations may also be associated with high transaction costs for donors. However, if the alternative is a large number of single-donor evaluations for multilateral organisations and partner countries, cost is less of an argument against joint assessments (Andersen and Broegaard, 2012). There thus appears to be a significant rationale for undertaking joint assessments such as MOPAN.

Despite significant convergence, some of the challenges of comprehensive assessments lie in determining the effectiveness of organisations with normative mandates (*e.g.* human rights, health, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, etc.) for which there is no suitable measure of performance on the ground, which is where most comprehensive assessments are concentrated. Another challenge is the question of how to address "path dependence", whereby an organisation whose mandate may still be relevant suffers from the adverse effects of past political decisions. This may lead to inefficiencies that are difficult to reverse (Isenman, 2012). Adopting an analytical framework may go some way towards adapting the analytical tools to address these and other challenges that arise from assessing development results.

Against the background of the assessment criteria described above, their degrees of convergence, and the challenges they may raise, the following sections explore the Dutch, Swedish, Australian, and MOPAN assessments in further detail.

The Netherlands' scorecards

The Netherlands use scorecards in their assessments of multilateral organisations. They start from the premise that multilateral aid is a government priority for complementing its bilateral co-operation, but needs to be justified and better co-ordinated. The 2011 assessment looked at agencies' organisational effectiveness – co-operation with other stakeholders, lesson-learning and evaluation function, transparency, the fight against corruption, internal financial control, and focus on the mandate and its implementation. The other chief component of the assessment was how well an organisation's mandate reflected the geographic and thematic priorities of the Netherlands – food security, water, security and the rule of law, sexual and reproductive health and rights, gender, good governance, sustainability, and international development architecture. Based on reports from embassy officials, multilateral agencies themselves, and MOPAN, assessments evaluate an organisation against the criteria of its effectiveness and mandate, as well as on how likely it is to effect change.

As a consequence of the assessment, IDA, UNDP and UNICEF will remain pillars of the Netherlands' multilateral aid provision. The country considers other agencies to be critical in delivering its objectives and priorities and will remain an important channel: the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), GAVI, the Global Fund, UNHCR, Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the WFP. Equally, the mandates of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNAIDS continue to make them important channels of

Dutch aid even if there is still room for improvement in their performance. In contrast, the Netherlands will carefully monitor its contributions to UNIDO, UN-HABITAT, and IaDB and may even reduce them.

Sweden's organisational assessments

Sweden evaluated four organisations in 2011 (GAVI, IFAD, OCHA, and UNICEF) against three broad criteria. The first criterion was an organisation's relevance to eight priority themes: human rights, democracy and good governance, gender equality, sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment, economic growth, social development and security, conflict management, and humanitarian operations. On that score, Sweden found all four organisations highly relevant in 2011.

The second criterion focused on internal effectiveness examined against the yardsticks of organisational structural factors, results-based management and evaluation, and transparency, auditing and procurement. The third criterion assessed external effectiveness through aid effectiveness principles and actual results based on internal documents, external evaluations, and the impressions of Sweden's representatives in the field.

The results of the Swedish assessment were:


- UNICEF – high internal and external effectiveness;
- OCHA – good internal effectiveness and high external effectiveness;
- GAVI – very high internal and external effectiveness;
- IFAD – good internal and external effectiveness.

Finally, the fourth criterion assessed the likelihood of change in the overall direction of the multilateral organisation – whether it had changed for better or worse over the past three years.

Australia's Multilateral Assessment

Australia published the Australian Multilateral Assessment (AMA) on 30 March 2012 after agreeing a methodology in August 2011. The AMA was prompted by the independent review of Australia's aid programme commissioned in November 2010. The independent review recommended that Australia make greater use of the multilateral system, and that it indicate the rationale for the funding of different multilateral organisations.

Figure 3.1. Findings of the Australian Multilateral Assessment



Source: AusAID (Australian Aid) (2012), *Australian Multilateral Assessment*, Government of Australia, Canberra, www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Pages/693_6999_8205_7111_6531.aspx.

The AMA found that 13 of the 42 organisations rated very strongly or strongly across at least six of the seven components; 16 were very strong or strong across at least four of the components; 8 were at least satisfactory on every component; and 5 rated as weak on at least one component. Broadly speaking and with some exceptions, ratings place most development banks and humanitarian organisations in the strong-to-very strong zone, most UN agencies and global funds in the satisfactory-to-strong zone, and a few UN agencies in the weak zone.

The findings of the AMA will feed into the Australian Government's aid budget process and will be an important element in informing funding decisions related to core funding. Other key factors include existing funding levels; the organisation's need for additional funding; sectorial, thematic or geographic priorities; and the prospects for reform. The findings of the AMA are also helped inform the development of the Multilateral Engagement Strategy for the Australian aid programme. The Strategy highlights the rationale for Australia's work with multilateral organisations in the aid programme and the high-level priorities for engaging with multilateral organisations through to 2016.

Box 3.1. Methodology of the Australian Multilateral Assessment

The AMA considered 42 multilateral organisations against an assessment framework that includes seven components.

Results and relevance

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate.
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests.
3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system.

Organisational behaviour

4. Strategic management and performance.
5. Cost and value consciousness.
6. Partnership behaviour.
7. Transparency and accountability.

The seven components were broken into 24 criteria. Ratings of "Very strong", "Strong", "Satisfactory", "Weak", or "Not Applicable" were given for each organisation.

Source: AusAID (Australian Aid) (2012), *Australian Multilateral Assessment*, Government of Australia, Canberra, www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Pages/693_6999_8205_7111_6531.aspx.

The Government of Australia underscored the fact that the AMA was undertaken in the spirit of collaboration – sharing information with partners throughout the process rather than at the end of the assessment. In this way, Australia was at the same time able to strengthen its relationship with multilateral partners as it conducted this assessment, making the dialogue around the results of the AMA more constructive.

MOPAN's key performance indicators

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), in existence since 2002, is one example of joint efforts to assess the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. MOPAN aims to generate relevant, credible information that helps its members meet domestic accountability requirements. It supports the dialogue between MOPAN members, multilateral organisations, and their direct clients and partners. Members undertake between four and six joint assessments each year, share information, and draw on each other's experience in monitoring and evaluation.

In 2009, MOPAN adopted its current "Common Approach" assessments build on a new methodology. The key performance indicators of the Common Approach can be separated into four broad categories: strategic management, operational management, relationship management, and knowledge management. In addition, starting in 2012, the Common Approach will include an assessment of progress towards results as identified in organisations' strategic plans and in country strategies, and contributions to relevant MDGs. The Common Approach includes an assessment of how multilateral organisations' objectives and programmes of work are relevant to major stakeholders. Annex D considers the methodology behind the Common Approach in further detail.

The Common Approach is informed through responses to survey questions based on the key performance indicators. Respondents to the surveys are donors in headquarters and partner countries, and direct partners or clients at the country-level (partner government, civil society, etc.). In addition, a review of documents, as well as interviews and consultations with multilateral organisations at headquarters and in partner countries, complement the survey results.

DAC Evaluation Network's development effectiveness reviews

The OECD/DAC Evaluation Network (EVALNET) works with members of the Evaluation Co-operation Group and the United Nations Evaluation Group (which bring together the evaluation departments of multilateral development organisations) to strengthen **existing** systems in ways that include peer reviews of UN organisations' assessment functions. New joint reviews were also developed by a group of DAC EVALNET members, led by Canada, to examine the development effectiveness of multilaterals. The group tried out the joint approach on the Asian Development Bank (AsDF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The reviews produced independent, evidence-based assessments of the two multilaterals' development effectiveness and, at its June 2011 meeting, DAC EVALNET endorsed the joint methodology. It was used for development effectiveness reviews of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP) and, in 2012, the Netherlands-led review of UNICEF. The reviews are co-ordinated with other assessment efforts like those of MOPAN.

Challenges of multiple assessments

By nature, bilateral assessments are anchored in donor priorities, so it is not unusual for different assessments by the same multilateral agency to prioritise different criteria and/or for similar criteria to yield different results. Of course, political motives should not be understated. Donors that have invested substantially in reviews have done so partly to make the case for maintaining or increasing aid budgets in a time of tight fiscal constraints; increased scrutiny of public spending would likely exist even if donors found that existing assessments produced adequate and relevant results. Some donors have suggested that a regularly updated "menu" of indicators of organisations' multilateral effectiveness would enable them to prioritise and weigh elements according to their own priorities.

Notwithstanding the understandable rationale for multiple assessments, divergent scores for the same multilateral agency may send mixed signals to agencies, especially those which are serious about change and reform. Two broad approaches appear to drive multiple assessments:

1. the "value for money" approach that measures the intrinsic value of an agency by direct return on investment;
2. the approach that sees an organisation's value in its ability to deliver its mandate.

While these approaches are not mutually exclusive, a donor seeking value for money may be prompted by its government's domestic accountability over a given public investment to stand firm on increasing or withholding funds. A donor leaning more towards the second approach may advocate a strengthening of the agency in question, perhaps relying more on collective action of donors and the agency to lead reform efforts.

The approach, methodology, presentation of results, and the conclusions drawn from multiple assessments depend to a large extent upon how the donor country views its engagement. As Table 3.2 shows, a donor's thematic or geographical priorities often determine its preferences and can greatly influence the conclusions it draws from assessments. For example, the United Kingdom's multilateral aid reviews, examined in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, uses agencies' focus on poor countries as one of its chief assessment criteria, while Australia looks at multilaterals' presence in the Asia-Pacific

region as a key criterion. The two countries' reviews are two of the most comprehensive and Table 3.2 gives a pictorial comparison of the results of how they rate the effectiveness of multilateral agencies against their preferred criteria.

Table 3.2. A comparison of how Australia's Multilateral Assessment and the UK's Multilateral Aid Review rate multilateral agencies*

Acronym	Multilateral Agency	Australian Multilateral Assessment (March 2012)	UK Multilateral Aid Review (April 2011)
AfDB	African Development Bank	●	●
AsDB	Asian Development Bank	●	●
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank		●
CERF	Central Emergency Relief Fund		●
CIFFs	Climate Investment Funds	●	●
ComSec	Commonwealth Secretariat Development Programmes	○	○
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	●	
	Extended Financing Window (MDG Fund)		●
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		●
ECHO	European Common Humanitarian Organisation		●
EC Budget	European Commission - Budget		●
EDF	European Development Fund		●
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation	○	○
GAVI	GAVI Alliance	●	●
GCDT	Global Crop Diversity Trust	●	
GEF	Global Environment Facility	●	●
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery	●	●
Global Fund	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	●	●
GPE	Global Partnership for Education (formerly FTI)	●	●
IaDB	Inter-American Development Bank	●	●
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	●	●
IDA	International Development Agency		●
	International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent		●
IFC	International Finance Corporation	●	●
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	●	●
ILO	International Labour Organisation	●	○
IMF - TA	International Monetary Fund Technical Assistance Trust Funds	●	

Acronym	Multilateral Agency	Australian Multilateral Assessment (March 2012)	UK Multilateral Aid Review (April 2011)
IOM	International Organisation for Migration	●	○
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS	●	●
Adaptation Fund	Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund	●	
Montreal Protocol	Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol	●	
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	●	●
PIDG	Private Infrastructure Development Group	●	●
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees	●	●
	UNITAID		●
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund	●	
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund	●	●
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	●	●
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation	○	○
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme	●	●
UNFCCC - LDC Fund	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - LDC Fund	●	
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme	○	○
	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation		○
UNISDRR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat	●	○
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service	○	
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (comprising the CERF for Australia)	●	●
UNODC	United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime	●	
Peacebuilding Fund	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund	●	●
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund	●	●
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency	●	
UN WOMEN (UNIFEM)	United Nations Women		○
World Bank	World Bank	●	
WFP	World Food Programme	●	●
WHO	World Health Organisation	●	●

* The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: "The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy."

Note: Illustration is authors' own based on performance indicators from each review. A full moon or pie represents the maximum score for which an agency is eligible.

Source: DFID (Department for International Development) (2011), *Multilateral Aid Review*, Government of the United Kingdom, London; AusAID (Australian Aid) (2012), *Australian Multilateral Assessment*, Government of Australia, Canberra.

How can evidence from assessments be used in policy making?

It is too early to tell whether there will be any discernible shift in aid allocation patterns to multilateral organisations arising from assessments of multilateral organisations. How research ultimately informs policy has been studied extensively by social researchers in the past decades, notably by Weiss (1979). Three models may help explain the different influences at play in decision-making: the problem solving, the interactive and the political models.

The reason for a **problem-solving model** is that policy-makers will look for information when faced with a decision. This information may already be accessible or require further research to fill the knowledge gap. Figure 3.2 illustrates the logical sequence of progression in the problem-solving model.

Figure 3.2. The problem-solving model used in assessment research



Source: Weiss, C. (1979), "The Many Meanings of Research Utilization", *Public Administration Review*, Volume 39, No. 5, pp. 426-431.

In practice, the sequence leads to over-optimistic expectations because its completion relies on the convergence of a number of factors and circumstances that seldom occurs. They are: a set of policy makers with the authority to make policy decisions; clear, unambiguous research findings at an opportune time; and findings that do not contradict powerful political interests. The model is not necessarily ideally suited to illustrating how decisions on multilateral aid allocations are made since such decisions, where they are discretionary,³ already take place regularly. In other words, the need for information is not new. There is, however, arising from the budget constraints faced by the large investors in the multilateral system, a greater need for assurance that money is well-spent.

In this regard, less linear research models – where assessments, reviews and other forms of research are just one element among others (such as experience, political insight, pressure, social technologies and judgment) – may offer a model that more realistically reflects the actual process of aid-allocation decision making within governments. Weiss refers to this as the **interactive model** of decision-making. The value and importance of bilateral assessments of multilateral organisations, for example, are best seen in this context – as one piece of the puzzle that guides decisions on contributions to multilateral agencies. Tracing the direct effect of evidence to decision-making from start to finish – as the problem-solving model suggests is possible – is not a realistic option when diffuse decision points and politics enter into the equation.

The **political model** would also suggest that information such as assessments may also help support and/or debunk past levels of contributions to specific multilaterals. The few agencies that rated poorly in the Australian *Multilateral Assessment* and the United Kingdom's *Multilateral Aid Review* are not generally being singled out for the first time. Thus, even if the findings are not surprising for these agencies, making them "official" may spur serious reform that would not otherwise have been politically justified. Whatever the original motivation for assessing multilateral organisations, looking at areas of divergence and convergence may help prompt some complementary and even collective action.

Conclusions

The proliferation of bilateral assessments reflects today's increased scrutiny of public financial resources and heightened demand for directing scarce aid towards the most effective multilateral channels. In line with aid effectiveness commitments, mutual and international accountability requires assessments to put a stronger emphasis on the evidence from partner countries or “end-users” of the multilateral system.

While there is certainly a political dimension to assessments and the demand for evidence, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that there is a strong degree of convergence in the criteria adopted by different reviews and assessments. This suggests that there is great potential for joint approaches and assessments.

Collective efforts (such as MOPAN) to assess the effectiveness of multilateral organisations, or (like the DAC EVALNET initiative) their evaluation functions, require collective work to define methodology, frameworks, financing, and other parameters of joint assessments. They therefore have higher initial transaction costs. On the other hand, they also offer a number of significant advantages. Enhancing existing joint assessments – for example, through a shared, regularly updated “menu” of assessment criteria – rather than promoting comprehensive bilateral assessments with new criteria stems the proliferation of assessments, thereby easing the significant administrative burden for development actors, who include partner countries and multilateral agencies themselves. Also, joint approaches can help ensure that an organisation is assessed against collective objectives and that collective efforts, undertaken to make tough decisions within its broader governance setting, incite reform.

The following concluding points could be a basis for further discussion and reflection towards increased donor collaboration on multilateral assessments:

- Continue to work within the DAC membership and with multilateral partners to develop more coherent approaches multilateral effectiveness assessments that build on existing frameworks.
- Place greater emphasis on partner country perspectives in assessing the effectiveness of multilateral organisations' delivery on the ground, where possible. For organisations without country operations, agree on a framework that can measure its effectiveness.
- Use the results of multilateral assessments systematically as part of funding members' formal and informal decision-making processes.

Notes

- 1 For more information, the DAC Evaluation Research Centre ([DEReC](#)) is a respository of different evaluations.
- 2 The UK completed its *Multilateral Aid Review* in 2011, as highlighted in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*.
- 3 This includes all voluntary contributions to UN Funds and Programmes (UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, and UNRWA), replenishments of large concessional funds (IDA, EDF, AfDF, AsDF), and to global funds (Global Fund, GEF, and GAVI).

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CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MULTILATERAL AID

Governments jointly govern and fund multilateral organisations and therefore have a responsibility to ensure their effectiveness for the benefit of developing countries. Building on a decade of efforts by many actors, at the Fourth High Level Forum (HLF4) in Busan in 2011 the international community agreed on collective action to make the multilateral system more effective. This Chapter reviews the key initiatives within the conceptual framework for multilateral effectiveness: funding and governance of multilateral organisations, effective delivery of multilateral aid and country-level harmonisation and alignment. It concludes by putting forward “emerging guiding principles to reduce multilateral proliferation” as part of the DAC’s efforts to help meet the commitment made in Paragraph 25(b) of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.

Governments jointly govern and fund multilateral organisations and therefore have a responsibility to ensure their effectiveness for the benefit of partner countries. They can bring about reforms if they act together. The returns of such joint action for multilateral aid are high. The DAC has stressed at several of its meetings in the past that it wishes to take collective action to rationalise the architecture of multilateral aid.

At the Fourth High-Level Forum (HLF4) in Busan in 2011, the international community agreed on collective action to make the multilateral system more effective (Box 4.1):

Box 4.1. Busan HLF4 commitment to reducing the proliferation of aid channels

"We welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors. Developing countries will lead consultation and co-ordination efforts to manage this diversity at the country level, while providers of development assistance have a responsibility to reduce fragmentation and curb the proliferation of aid channels. We will ensure that our efforts to reduce fragmentation do not lead to a reduction in the volume and quality of resources available to support development. To this end:

[...]

b) We will improve the coherence of our policies on multilateral institutions, global funds and programmes. We will make effective use of existing multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well. We will work to reduce the proliferation of these channels and will, by the end of 2012, agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts. As they continue to implement their respective commitments on aid effectiveness, multilateral organisations, global funds and programmes will strengthen their participation in co-ordination and mutual accountability mechanisms at the country, regional and global levels."


Source: Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) (2011), "Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation", Paragraph 25(b), Busan, 29 November to 1 December.

This commitment builds on a decade of efforts facilitated by many actors, among them the United Nations, OECD/DAC, and the Health Sector.¹ Suggestions and good practices have emerged to guide aid effectiveness at different levels:

1. funding and governance of multilateral organisations;
2. effectiveness of multilateral organisations;
3. effective delivery of multilateral aid at the country level; and
4. harmonisation and alignment among development partners at the country-level.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the conceptual framework for classifying the efforts undertaken so far.

Figure 4.1. Conceptual framework for classifying key initiatives for multilateral effectiveness to date



Source: OECD DAC secretariat.

Chapter 4 of this report focused on existing efforts to assess multilateral organisations' effectiveness (level 2). This chapter addresses the other three levels. Levels 1 and 4 are in DAC members' direct sphere of influence, while level 3 may be indirectly influenced by DAC members' funding decisions.

The following section traces discussions on good practice at all three levels and highlights key recommendations that have emerged.

Managing multilateral organisations: global level

Governments shape multilateral institutions in two ways: political and financial. They establish them and, through representatives on their boards, influence and steer their strategies and operations. The funding of multilateral agencies' core budgets strengthens their work in pursuance of their primary mandate. That being said, governments can shape activities that lie outside organisations' core mandates. They may do so by concluding specific framework agreements with them, providing heavily earmarked funding for thematic or country-specific programmes, and, sometimes, by setting up single-donor trust funds within agencies. This is sometimes referred to as the "bilateralisation" or "privatisation" of multilateral aid. While some non-core funding clearly adds value, the previous chapter also illustrated how it can contribute to the fragmentation of multilateral aid. Accordingly, donors to the multilateral system have focused their efforts on defining organisations' good behaviour at headquarter level on how to limit fragmentation. Three guiding principles have emerged:

1. use and strengthen existing channels and think twice before establishing new ones;
2. pursue coherence in taking decisions within government on what multilateral activities to fund;
3. use existing co-ordination mechanisms rather than creating sector-specific global co-ordination mechanisms.

Use and strengthen existing channels by “thinking twice”

At the Busan HLF4, supporters of the Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation² reconfirmed Paragraph 19c of the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), which urges donors to “think twice” before creating new (separate) aid delivery channels.

“As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level.”³

They called on donors to use evidence to work towards a more coherent, less fragmented multilateral (and bilateral) system for development co-operation. While innovative finance could address funding and aid problems, it should not be channelled through new, single-purpose institutions.

This call was not the first of its kind. In December 2006, at a pre-meeting of the Global Forum on Development Activities, which focused on global programmes in the health sector, the World Bank (2008) tabled a *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level*. It went beyond the health sector to make recommendations for global programmes on selectivity, the governance of global programmes, ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and results and accountability. On selectivity, it put forward a checklist and introduced the notion of “thinking twice” presented in Box 4.2.

Box 4.2. The World Bank’s notion of thinking twice for improved selectivity

Think twice. Funders, in consultation with partner countries and other concerned stakeholders, give serious analytic and decision-making attention to the need for another global programme.

- Is there a compelling need for a new collective global or regional action?
- If so, does that global action require earmarked global financing for country programmes?
- If so, can the financing be channelled through an existing institution, or is a new global programme needed?
- If so, is there a clear rationale for the scale of financing proposed?

Source: World Bank (2006), *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programs at the Country Level – “Work in Progress”*, World Bank contribution, Policy Workshop on Global Programmes and the Paris Agenda, Paris, 5 December, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/51/37739410.pdf.

Five years later, in June 2011, the OECD’s Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector (TT HATS) recommended in its final report, *Progress and challenges in aid effectiveness – what can we learn from the health sector?*, that the principle of thinking twice should be pursued (Box 4.3).

Box 4.3. Think twice: recommendation from OECD’s Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector

Think twice: Avoid establishing new global funds and programmes that potentially duplicate or compete with existing organisational mandates and programmes, leading to fragmentation. Recognise that global approaches to country problems must be based on a clear analysis of the existing global and national institutional context.

Source : OECD (2011a), *Progress and challenges in aid effectiveness – what can we learn from the health sector?*, final report of Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), OECD, Paris, p. 11, June.

Despite the call to “think twice” before launching new programmes, the number of separate channels has continued to increase in recent years. Why is the problem getting worse, not better?

One reason is that there are a multitude of – often very legitimate – factors that drive individual donors’ decisions to supply earmarked funding to an increasing number of multilateral programmes or establish new delivery channels. These include the need to respond quickly to pledges; leverage and channel more resources; innovate and take risks; overcome administrative and legal requirements; gain greater political visibility; and, circumvent problems within existing organisations.⁴ It is therefore important for donors to be clear about the rationale or incentive for a new multilateral programme and determine first whether it can be satisfied through other means.

Using existing channels as the default course of action requires finding or creating incentives, adjusting channels where necessary, and addressing any legal and administrative barriers (*e.g.* through governing bodies) that may prevent their use. To harness the political appetite for new initiatives and the desire for visibility, it is important that donors innovate within the existing multilateral system, and support reform where needed.

Working towards a more coherent, less fragmented multilateral system also requires multilateral organisations themselves to find innovative ways of using existing structures. This report does not look at the efforts made by executive boards or management structures of multilateral agencies. However, this chapter does mention a number of recent initiatives to consolidate multilateral channels – including those of the World Bank and the UN.

Coherence in government decisions on what multilateral activities to fund

A second set of efforts to define good donor behaviour at headquarter level and reduce fragmentation has focused on decision processes within donor governments. Donors’ individual policies in funding multilateral organisations have remained fragmented and contribute to the incoherence of the system as a whole. The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* (2011b) found that most DAC member countries have a number of ministries that have the competence to supply multilateral aid. However, they make what often appear to be very separate funding decisions because they lack structured opportunities for joint decision making in their national governments’ budget arbitration and policy bodies. To improve the multilateral system, a more closely co-ordinated approach among ministries will be necessary to reach the common agreements that will enable aid allocations to become strategic investments. The World Bank’s *Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programs at the Country Level* (2006) suggests donors pursue coherence in selecting the programmes they fund: “Donor governments establish internal processes in deciding on support for global programs among relevant ministries or agencies.”

The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* listed eight good-practice lessons for bilateral donors striving for greater coherence within their governments (Box 4.4).

Box 4.4. Eight good practice lessons for good multilateral donorship from the DAC

- 1** **Articulate, publicise and regularly revisit your specific national case for multilateral contributions.**
Stating and publicising the national case for multilateralism is important: the general public, legislators, and civil society should know what they are getting in exchange for less direct control.
- 2** **Review the balance between your multilateral and bilateral programmes.**
Explicitly reviewing and revisiting the balance between multilateral and bilateral aid allocations helps inform public debate.
- 3** **If fixed shares guide spending decisions, ensure they have broad coverage and are evidence-based.**
While they may be used as a tool to focus aid, caps, or ceilings, on multilateral aid, can also generate disproportionate transaction costs, or distort budgets. Where they exist, they should have a clear rationale and be amended when new evidence becomes available.
- 4** **Make maximum use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings and third-party analyses.**
Before considering additional analytical work it makes sense to use common assessments, databases and evaluations so as to minimise transaction cost and duplication.
- 5** **State clearly and publicly the indicators and ratings that influence your future multilateral allocations.**
This is important for transparency vis-à-vis taxpayers, and allows other donors to repeat or upgrade the exercise.
- 6** **Assess multilateral performance against collective international, as well as national, priorities.**
Performance of multilateral agencies is best measured against its mandate; but individual donors' spending decisions also depend on the extent to which the programmes of the multilateral agency dovetail with the donor's national priorities.
- 7** **Periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if they are semi-automatic.**
Assess allocations to multilateral organisations rather than taking preceding funding levels from past arrangements (including replenishments) as a default.
- 8** **Have a dedicated body periodically review all public spending through multilaterals.**
It is important for cross-government discussions to take place in a single manageable (and, ideally, existing) body at sub-ministerial level to regularly review all contributions to multilateral agencies, to as to ensure an overview of all – core and earmarked – contributions made to each agency.

Adapted from OECD (2011b), 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/61/49014277.pdf.

Group multilateral organisations and use existing co-ordination mechanisms

A third component in the drive to control fragmentation relates to grouping and co-ordination within the multilateral sector. Over recent years, new agencies or umbrella facilities have grouped agencies and funds. In November 2010, for example, UN Women was created to merge the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI), and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW). In the same way, merging single-donor trust funds into multi-donor trust funds can create stronger organisations and, at the same time, reduce fragmentation. In this context, the World Bank's efforts to consolidate existing trust funds, group funds under umbrella arrangements, transform several single-donor trust funds into multi-donor trust funds, and close empty trust funds, are noteworthy initiatives in the right direction.

Co-ordination among multilateral organisations within the same sector must be improved. The final report of the Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector (OECD, 2011a) advised against creating separate, sector-specific global co-ordination initiatives. Drawing on the experience of the Health Systems

Funding Platform,⁵ it called for a stronger mandate for existing co-ordination mechanisms, emphasising that they should be sufficiently flexible to incorporate new actors (Box 4.5).

Box 4.5. Recommendations from the Health as a Tracer Sector initiative

Improve co-ordination of the global aid architecture – There is an urgent need for more efficient co-ordination of the global aid architecture for health and for more effective collaboration on policy and decision-making concerning global initiatives ... This requires high-level leadership, greater alignment of accountabilities and incentives, and a stronger mandate for existing mechanisms such as the OECD-DAC, rather than the creation of a separate global co-ordination initiative. Measures to ensure that countries are in the lead and their perspectives are taken into account, need to be more consistent ... Greater efforts are also needed to capitalise on the experience and comparative advantage of the diversity of actors in the health sector.

*Source: OECD (2011-1), *Progress and challenges in aid effectiveness – what can we learn from the health sector?*, final report of Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), OECD, Paris, June, p.11.*

Of course, efforts to reduce fragmentation at the government-to-multilateral level inevitably have to contend with limited room for manoeuvre. At a seminar on multilateral aid effectiveness held in October 2011 in Paris, stakeholders cautioned that gaps and overlaps, fragmentation and inequality cannot be reduced by information alone. Much hinges on political will and realistic expectations for change when both inclusiveness and strategic management are highly sought after.

Effective delivery of multilateral aid

There have also been significant initiatives to improve the multilateral system in the field. While DAC donors do not have a direct say in implementation. Rather, they influence the design stage through multilateral agencies' (inter-governmental) governing boards, as well as through their support and funding of specific initiatives.

Efforts led by OECD/DAC for aid effectiveness in the field

The past decade has seen much work aimed at bringing multilateral co-operation into line with the principles of aid effectiveness. At the First High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Rome in 2002, participants committed to promote "harmonised approaches in global and regional programmes. The Statement of Resolve of the Paris Declaration two years later included a commitment to address the "insufficient integration of global programmes and initiatives into partner countries' broader development agendas", and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) reiterated similar concerns (Box 4.6).

Box 4.6. Accra Agenda for Action, Paragraph 19c

The contributions of all development actors are more effective when developing countries are in a position to manage and co-ordinate them. We welcome the role of new contributors and will improve the way all development actors work together by taking the following actions:

[...]

c) Global funds and programmes make an important contribution to development. The programmes they fund are most effective in conjunction with complementary efforts to improve the policy environment and to strengthen the institutions in the sectors in which they operate. We call upon all global funds to support country ownership, to align and harmonise their assistance proactively, and to make good use of mutual accountability frameworks, while continuing their emphasis on achieving results. As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level.

In support of the Paris Declaration, Global Health Partnerships adopted *Best Practice Principles for Engagement of Global Health Partnerships at Country Level* at their High-Level Forum on Health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Paris in 2005. These were health-specific guidelines based on the Paris Declaration that outlined how Global Health Partnerships should implement the five principles of effective aid at the country level. These principles, outlined in Box 4.7, segue towards another global initiative: the International Health Partnership (IHP+), established in 2007 to bring together public and private entities to improve aid effectiveness. It sought to achieve the health-related MDGs, guided by country ownership and using existing planning, co-ordination, delivery and management mechanisms at the country level. The responsibilities of international organisations, bilateral donors, governments, and other funders were spelled out in IHP+'s global compact and endorsed by 26 signatories.

Box 4.7. Best practice principles for engagement of global health partnerships at country level

The following “best practice principles” have been derived from the Global Health Partnership’s adaptation of the five key areas in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness:

- **Ownership:** Global Health Partnerships respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.
- **Alignment:** Global Health Partnerships base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures.
- **Harmonisation:** Global Health Partnerships’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective; Global Health Partnerships collaborate at the global level with other partners to address cross-cutting challenges such as health system strengthening.
- **Managing for results:** Global Health Partnerships work with countries to adopt and strengthen national results-based management.
- **Accountability:** Global Health Partnerships provide timely, clear and comprehensive information.

Source: Global Health Partnerships (2005), *Best practice principles for global health partnership activities at country level*, report of the Working Group on Global Health Partnerships, High-Level Forum on the Health Millennium Development Goals, Paris, 14-15 November.

Towards more effective UN operations: “One UN” and “Delivering as One”

The most prominent efforts in improving the delivery of multilateral aid have been those of the UN. Thirty-six UN bodies – including funds, programmes, specialised agencies and entities of the UN Secretariat – have been involved. In the General Assembly’s triennial comprehensive policy reviews (TCPR) on operational activities for development of the UN system in 2001, 2004, and 2007, and in the Outcome Statement of the 2005 World Summit (A/RES/60/1), UN member states called for reforms to bring about a more effective, coherent, and better-performing United Nations. In response, the Secretary-General appointed the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment. In its report, *Delivering as One* (UN, 2006) the Panel put forward a series of recommendations for overcoming the fragmentation of the UN and developing approaches that would enhance its coherence, efficiency and effectiveness at country level and reduce transaction costs for host countries.

Eight countries originally piloted the “One-UN” scheme from 2006. Others soon followed suit and voluntarily adopted the recommendations of *Delivering as One*, which involved adopting the “four ones” – one leader, one programme, one budget and, where appropriate, one office.

Though never adopted, the recommendations of *Delivering as One* triggered an “intense debate among Member States on system-wide coherence between 2007 and 2010” (UN, 2012a) and catalysed the adoption of resolutions on system-wide coherence in 2008, 2009 and 2010. An independent evaluation of

UN “Delivering as One” pilots in 2011 concluded that there had been moderate success (2012b). Reforms had enhanced national ownership, moderately reduced competition for funds, and enhanced capacity for strategic approaches. However, they had achieved little progress towards reducing fragmentation and duplication or towards reducing transaction costs for countries, the UN system, and other partners (*ibid.*).

To some extent, the evaluation found that the reason for the limited impact of reforms at country-office level lay in the lack of accompanying reform “higher up” the UN system. The Fifth High-Level Forum on Delivering as One, held in June 2012, concluded that an appropriate framework at headquarters was needed to enable UN country teams to successfully implement the Delivering as One approach (UN, 2012a). To this end, UN member states are engaged in the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and impact of UN operational activities for development and to establish system-wide policy orientations for the development co-operation and country-level modalities of the UN system.

The example of One-UN is a good reminder for the DAC in its discussions on guiding principles that bilateral donors have an important role to play in mandating (and funding) multilateral organisations to co-ordinate implementation in the field. But it also demonstrates that efforts to reduce fragmentation in the field cannot make up for the lack of co-ordination at headquarter level.

Country-level harmonisation among multilateral and bilateral donors

The third level at which donors will be looking for guidance is in their interaction with multilateral agencies in the field. Only when donors – both bi- and multilateral – achieve coherence and work together can they bring about effective change. The co-operation between bilateral and multilateral aid at country level is an area where little “good practice” has been in evidence, but where the DAC could discuss what has worked best. The examples in Boxes 4.7 and 4.8 could be inputs for such discussion.

Broadly speaking, efforts to build co-operation between bilateral and multilateral donors should naturally be in line with suggestions for “building more effective partnerships” set out in Paragraph 16 of the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and endorsed by both donor countries and heads of multilateral agencies.

Box 4.8. Building partnerships

Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development actors - bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs, and the private sector. To support developing countries' efforts to build for the future, we resolve to create partnerships that will include all these actors.

Source: Accra Agenda for Action (2008), www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm.

The *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level* (World Bank, 2006) has spelled out what some of these commitments mean in practice.

Box 4.9. Harmonisation – excerpts from *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level*

Harmonise pro-actively.

- Join with other donors in simplified and common arrangements to support and strengthen government-led processes and systems. These include joint reporting, analyses, strategies, missions, and capacity development.
- Participate actively in multi-donor coordination mechanisms. This may include delegation to a relevant donor with adequate field presence.

Take global programmes seriously. Donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral) take account of global programmes in country support strategies and work closely with them for better integrated support of national development programmes.

*Source: World Bank (2006), *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programs at the Country Level – “Work in Progress”*, contribution by World Bank, Policy Workshop on Global Programmes and the Paris Agenda, Paris, 5 December.*

The DAC could look into practical examples of in-country efforts to co-ordinate harmonisation among development partners. In this regard, recent efforts to ensure a better division of labour between various United Nations and World Bank thematic funds and financing instruments in fragile states are a step in the right direction. In addition, countries such as Rwanda, Bangladesh, Ghana, Bolivia, or Mozambique may have lessons on harmonisation to teach donors. In that respect, it could be helpful to consider the following two issues:

- What is the donor experience with obligatory programming where all donors must verify that their programmes do not contradict, overlap with, or duplicate other programmes?
- How can bilateral staff in the field be incentivised to co-ordinate their work with that of multilateral agencies and how might funds better co-ordinate implementation on the ground? How can such co-ordination be rewarded?

Emerging guiding principles

Stakeholders of different multilateral agencies, funds, and programmes have a collective responsibility to address the most important challenges of the multilateral architecture that they fund and govern and to ensure effective funding, delivery and results at country level. In response to the commitment made in Paragraph 25(b) of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to “agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels,” the DAC drew on a first draft of this report to hold a workshop in October 2012 on how to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels. Participants attending the workshop drew up seven emerging principles, informed by the commitments of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development:

Box 4.10. Principles to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels

"In line with the commitment set out in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Paragraph 25), we welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors, and agree to work to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels by using existing channels and frameworks for programme design, delivery and assessments, drawing on the following principles:

- 1 Use existing channels as the default, adjusting channels where necessary, and address any legal and administrative barriers that may prevent their use.
- 2 Use the international community's appetite for new initiatives to innovate and reform the existing multilateral system, allowing for donor visibility.
- 3 Regularly review the number of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes with the aim of reducing their number through consolidation without decreasing the overall volume of resources.
- 4 Provide core or un-earmarked contributions to multilateral organisation, where relevant and possible.
- 5 Ensure that new multilateral programmes and channels are multi-donor arrangements; are time-bound, and should contain provisions for a mid-term review; and do not impose excessive reporting requirements if the creation of multilateral programmes and channels is unavoidable.
- 6 Support country-level harmonisation among all providers of development co-operation, including through representation on governing boards of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes."
- 7 Monitor trends and progress to curb the proliferation of channels at the global level; inform monitoring in partner countries.

Notes

- 1 Several other initiatives could be listed here. They include the "New Deal for engagement in fragile states", concluded in 2011, which requires players involved in post-conflict support to harmonise their goals and processes; the Learning Group of Global Programs, a forum established in 2006 to share best practices in improving the effectiveness of global programmes, and the Evaluation Co-operation Group, in existence since 1995, which seeks to harmonise evaluation work among its member institutions.
- 2 To find out more about the Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation see www.oecd.org/dac/aideffectiveness/49476643.pdf.
- 3 Accra Agenda for Action (2008), Paragraph 19c.
- 4 These factors were identified by participants at the workshop on multilateral aid, organised by the OECD/DAC on 4 October 2012.
- 5 The Platform was developed by the GAVI Alliance, the Global Fund and the World Bank, and facilitated by the World Health Organisation (WHO), in consultation with countries and other key stakeholders, including civil society. It is based on the principles of the International Health Partnership Plus (IHP+), in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. (Source: World Bank website)

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
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ANNEX A. STATISTICAL FIGURES AND TABLES ON THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEMS

The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: “The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy”.

Figure A.1. Gross ODA disbursements from DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals (2006-10)
(in constant 2010 prices)




Source: OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Table A.1. Total use of the multilateral system (2010)
(excluding debt relief)

Donor	Bilateral ODA	of which, channelled through multilateral agencies (non- core)	Multilateral ODA (in USD m)	Total use of the multilateral system	Core multilateral ODA as % of gross ODA	Multilateral ODA and non-core as % of total ODA	Core as % of total use of the multilateral system
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(B+C)	(C/(A+C))	(B+C)/(A+C)	(C/(B+C))
Australia	3,234	813	585	1,397	15%	37%	42%
Austria	462	99	597	697	56%	66%	86%
Belgium	1,543	234	953	1,187	38%	48%	80%
Canada	3,912	1,367	1,282	2,650	25%	51%	48%
Denmark	2,139	241	790	1,032	27%	35%	77%
Finland	839	250	494	744	37%	56%	66%
France	7,446	39	5,220	5,259	41%	42%	99%
Germany	9,220	480	4,950	5,430	35%	38%	91%
Greece	212	6	296	302	58%	59%	98%
Ireland	585	103	310	413	35%	46%	75%
Italy	694	92	2,237	2,329	76%	79%	96%
Japan	14,954	1,251	3,684	4,935	20%	26%	75%
Korea	931	45	273	318	23%	26%	86%
Luxembourg	262	98	141	239	35%	59%	59%
Netherlands	4,453	719	1,516	2,235	25%	37%	68%
New Zealand	271	31	71	102	21%	30%	70%
Norway	3,544	1,035	1,019	2,053	22%	45%	50%
Portugal	428	51	253	304	37%	45%	83%
Spain	3,933	1,349	1,951	3,300	33%	56%	59%
Sweden	2,923	736	1,618	2,355	36%	52%	69%
Switzerland	1,698	292	588	879	26%	38%	67%
United Kingdom	8,200	2,961	5,037	7,997	38%	60%	63%
United States	27,199	4,383	3,775	8,157	12%	26%	46%
Total DAC donors	99,083	16,677	37,638	54,316	28%	40%	69%

Source: OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris; and OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure A.2. Gross multilateral ODA provided by DAC member countries as share of total ODA (1991-2010)
(in constant 2010 prices, excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Table A.2. Core contributions from DAC member countries to major multilateral agencies (2008-10)
(annual average in USD million, constant 2010 prices)


DAC country	EU Institutions	The World Bank Group	UN Funds / Programmes	Other UN	Regional Dev. Banks	The Global Fund	Other mult. Agencies	Multilateral ODA, total
Australia	0	202	59	67	63	28	79	497
Austria	306	140	16	26	55	0	12	554
Belgium	546	187	61	58	48	22	44	966
Canada	0	398	123	131	294	147	162	1256
Denmark	268	132	212	83	45	32	98	870
Finland	201	55	96	40	42	2	36	471
France	2598	662	80	173	215	400	753	4881
Germany	2774	937	96	234	273	269	190	4771
Greece	261	25	2	12	15	0	9	324
Ireland	149	30	63	27	12	17	15	314
Italy	1649	435	49	139	120	0	74	2465
Japan	0	1611	165	468	791	220	178	3433
Korea	0	99	10	53	92	3	13	271
Luxembourg	37	22	34	31	5	3	9	140
Netherlands	583	195	381	179	78	90	76	1582
New Zealand	0	13	23	19	5	0	22	82
Norway	0	148	365	175	95	64	127	973
Portugal	172	21	4	8	25	2	4	237
Spain	1049	297	151	147	153	89	72	1957
Sweden	356	327	423	203	99	85	105	1599
Switzerland	0	245	111	55	66	7	77	561
United Kingdom	1933	1110	217	274	293	240	173	4240
United States	0	1118	250	586	307	873	380	3514
Total DAC	12,883	8,410	2,989	3,187	3,189	2,592	2,708	35,958
<i>Share of total multilateral ODA (%)</i>	36	23	8	9	9	7	8	100

Note: Korea made its first contribution to the Global Fund in 2009, so this amount is a 2-year average.

Source: OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Figure A.3. Total UN operational activities for development (2010)


Main UN entities: comparison core, non-core and total



Note: These figures include total contributions to the UN agencies identified. Contributions include resources from non-DAC members and other multilateral organisations. For this reason, the figures differ from those reported to the OECD/DAC and published elsewhere in this report.

Source: United Nations (2012b), *Independent Evaluation of Lessons Learned from Delivering as One*, draft final report, International Evaluation Team for the Evaluation Management Group, www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/pdf/draftreport.pdf.

Figure A.4. Total use of the multilateral system in percentages of gross ODA (2010)
(excluding debt relief, constant 2010 prices)



Source: OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris; and OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Table A.3. DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five year period (2006-10)
(in USD million, constant 2010 prices)

	Total multilateral ODA 2006-2010	Share of EU budget + EDF 2006-2010	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA, excluding to the EC	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA	IDA	EU budget + EDF	UN Funds and Programmes*	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB	% allocated to largest six multilateral clusters
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>					24	15	24	23	21	23	
Non-EU members	51,359	-	47%	30%	34%		11%	12%	6%	8%	71%
Australia	2,439	-	2%	1%	37%		10%	5%	0%	16%	68%
Canada	6,157	-	6%	4%	31%		11%	11%	11%	5%	70%
Japan	17,702	-	16%	10%	40%		6%	6%	5%	14%	71%
Korea	1,099	-	1%	1%	28%		4%	1%	7%	17%	56%
New Zealand	391	-	0%	0%	15%		29%	0%	0%	7%	51%
Norway	4,766	-	4%	3%	15%		40%	6%	9%	1%	71%
Switzerland	2,678	-	2%	2%	43%		21%	1%	10%	2%	77%
United States	16,127	-	15%	9%	33%		8%	23%	5%	3%	72%
EU members	119,625	60,702	53%	70%	16%	51%	8%	5%	4%	1%	85%
Austria	2,611	1,446	1%	2%	25%	55%	3%	0%	8%	2%	92%
Belgium	4,330	2,456	2%	3%	18%	57%	6%	2%	4%	1%	88%
Denmark	4,462	1,348	3%	3%	11%	30%	26%	3%	4%	1%	75%
Finland	2,245	956	1%	1%	12%	43%	20%	0%	7%	1%	83%
France	22,273	12,139	9%	13%	12%	55%	2%	9%	4%	1%	82%
Germany	22,362	13,117	8%	13%	20%	59%	2%	5%	4%	1%	91%
Greece	1,519	1,211	0%	1%	9%	80%	1%	0%	0%	0%	89%
Ireland	1,647	649	1%	1%	15%	39%	20%	5%	0%	4%	82%
Italy	12,000	7,946	4%	7%	10%	66%	3%	5%	2%	1%	86%
Luxembourg	653	163	0%	0%	10%	25%	19%	2%	0%	5%	61%
Netherlands	7,616	2,795	4%	4%	8%	37%	24%	6%	2%	0%	77%
Portugal	1,118	781	0%	1%	8%	70%	2%	1%	7%	3%	92%
Spain	9,594	5,015	4%	6%	14%	52%	7%	5%	4%	2%	84%
Sweden	7,441	1,649	5%	4%	18%	22%	28%	6%	6%	1%	81%
United Kingdom	19,753	9,030	10%	12%	25%	46%	6%	5%	5%	2%	88%
DAC Total	170,984	60,702	100%	100%	22%	36%	9%	7%	5%	3%	81%

Source: OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

ANNEX B. COUNTRY TABLES AND FIGURES ON MULTILATERAL AND NON-MULTILATERAL ODA

The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: “The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy.”

Australia

Table B.1. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Australia	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	200	25%
Country / region specific	613	75%
- of which regional allocations	73	9%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	14	3%
South of Sahara	68	13%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	3	1%
North & Central America	17	3%
Asia, unspecified	5	1%
Far East Asia	178	35%
Middle East	45	9%
South & Central Asia	189	38%
Europe	0	0%
Oceania	95	19%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	50	6%
Developmental Food Aid	12	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	64	8%
Education	65	8%
Environment	26	3%
General Budget Support	43	5%
Government and Civil Society	92	11%
Health	62	8%
Humanitarian Aid	183	22%
Multi-sector	41	5%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	34	4%
Other Social infrastructure	37	5%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	26	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	77	9%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	320	59%
Other	220	41%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.1. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.2. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	-
World Bank Group	202	303
UN Funds and Programmes*	103	267
of which:		
UNDP	17	49
WFP	32	53
UNICEF	23	103
UNFPA	8	10
UNHCR	13	29
UNRWA	9	9
Other UN	60	82
of which:		
FAO	5	6
IFAD	-	-
ILO	3	21
OHCHR	2	0
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	4	1
UN	5	-
UNOCHA	n/a	7
WHO	24	18
Regional Development Banks	94	71
of which:		
African Development Bank	5	10
Asian Development Bank	89	59
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	126	89
Total	585	813

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris; OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Austria

Table B.3. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Austria	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	18	18%
Country / region specific	81	82%
- of which regional allocations	55	55%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	8	12%
South of Sahara	15	20%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	3	4%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	5	7%
Asia, unspecified	1	1%
Far East Asia	0	0%
Middle East	2	3%
South & Central Asia	11	15%
Europe	36	50%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	3	3%
Developmental Food Aid	0	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	38	39%
Education	0	0%
Environment	3	3%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	11	11%
Health	0	0%
Humanitarian Aid	10	10%
Multi-sector	18	18%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	6	6%
Other Social infrastructure	2	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	8	8%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	16	59%
Other	11	41%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris. OECD.

Figure 1. Figure B.2. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.4. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	325	15
World Bank Group	151	39
UN Funds and Programmes*	16	12
of which:		
UNDP	10	4
WFP	0	1
UNICEF	2	3
UNFPA	2	1
UNHCR	1	2
UNRWA	1	-
Other UN	36	8
of which:		
FAO	2	1
IFAD	15	-
ILO	2	1
OHCHR	-	1
UNDPKO	5	-
UNECE	0	-
UNESCO	2	0
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	2
WHO	3	0
Regional Development Banks	58	14
of which:		
African Development Bank	44	6
Asian Development Bank	11	3
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	12	12
Total	597	99

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris; OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Belgium

Table B.5. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	58	25%
Country / region specific	177	75%
- of which regional allocations	16	7%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	1	1%
South of Sahara	120	69%
North of Sahara	6	3%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	1	1%
North & Central America	11	6%
Asia, unspecified	3	2%
Far East Asia	0	0%
Middle East	16	9%
South & Central Asia	17	10%
Europe	1	1%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	12	5%
Developmental Food Aid	4	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	6	2%
Education	7	3%
Environment	16	7%
General Budget Support	12	5%
Government and Civil Society	38	16%
Health	4	2%
Humanitarian Aid	91	39%
Multi-sector	9	4%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	15	6%
Other Social infrastructure	8	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	6	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	7	3%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	122	76%
Other	38	24%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.3. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.6. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	546	20
World Bank Group	151	13
UN Funds and Programmes*	71	102
of which:		
UNDP	26	29
WFP	-	38
UNICEF	25	12
UNFPA	7	-
UNHCR	11	12
UNRWA	3	11
Other UN	75	43
of which:		
FAO	6	22
IFAD	9	6
ILO	3	1
OHCHR	1	0
UNDPKO	5	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	2	2
UN	3	-
UNOCHA	n/a	1
WHO	12	3
Regional Development Banks	39	3
of which:		
African Development Bank	35	-
Asian Development Bank	2	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	70	53
Total	952	234

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Canada

Table B.7. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Canada	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	52	4%
Country / region specific	1,316	96%
- of which regional allocations	289	21%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	15	1%
South of Sahara	561	43%
North of Sahara	3	0%
Americas, unspecified	38	3%
South America	40	3%
North & Central America	222	17%
Asia, unspecified	54	4%
Far East Asia	32	2%
Middle East	52	4%
South & Central Asia	285	22%
Europe	13	1%
Oceania	1	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	397	29%
Developmental Food Aid	22	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	59	4%
Education	119	9%
Environment	6	0%
General Budget Support	4	0%
Government and Civil Society	192	14%
Health	216	16%
Humanitarian Aid	251	18%
Multi-sector	33	2%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	31	2%
Other Social infrastructure	4	0%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	11	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	21	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	875	85%
Other	152	15%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Table B.4. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.8. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	2
World Bank Group	423	477
UN Funds and Programmes*	115	551
of which:		
UNDP	49	108
WFP	18	254
UNICEF	17	122
UNFPA	17	6
UNHCR	14	34
UNRWA	-	15
Other UN	166	129
of which:		
FAO	15	8
IFAD	61	0
ILO	2	6
OHCHR	3	0
UNDPKO	21	2
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	5	0
UN	10	8
UNOCHA	n/a	6
WHO	-	63
Regional Development Banks	168	98
of which:		
African Development Bank	98	14
Asian Development Bank	46	35
Inter-American Development Bank	7	-
Other multilaterals	411	110
Total	1,282	1,367

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Denmark

Table B.9. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Denmark	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	92	38%
Country / region specific	149	62%
- of which regional allocations	28	12%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	16	12%
South of Sahara	50	38%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	13	10%
Asia, unspecified	1	1%
Far East Asia	5	4%
Middle East	23	17%
South & Central Asia	38	29%
Europe	2	1%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	1	0%
Developmental Food Aid	3	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	1	1%
Education	34	14%
Environment	42	18%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	60	25%
Health	2	1%
Humanitarian Aid	53	22%
Multi-sector	11	5%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	5	2%
Other Social infrastructure	4	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	12	5%
Water Supply and Sanitation	13	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	99	82%
Other	22	18%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.5. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.10. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	279	2
World Bank Group	98	89
UN Funds and Programmes*	200	107
of which:		
UNDP	63	44
WFP	33	3
UNICEF	32	23
UNFPA	36	2
UNHCR	23	28
UNRWA	12	3
Other UN	77	27
of which:		
FAO	2	0
IFAD	4	-
ILO	4	6
OHCHR	2	1
UNDPKO	4	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	5	0
UN	2	0
UNOCHA	n/a	11
WHO	10	2
Regional Development Banks	47	1
of which:		
African Development Bank	31	1
Asian Development Bank	16	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	89	16
Total	790	241

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

European Union Institutions

Table B.11. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	EU Institutions	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	301	13%
Country / region specific	1,976	87%
- of which regional allocations	455	20%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	51	3%
South of Sahara	898	47%
North of Sahara	49	3%
Americas, unspecified	11	1%
South America	30	2%
North & Central America	96	5%
Asia, unspecified	8	0%
Far East Asia	76	4%
Middle East	169	9%
South & Central Asia	412	21%
Europe	171	9%
Oceania	5	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	170	7%
Developmental Food Aid	231	10%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	126	6%
Education	112	5%
Environment	55	2%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	416	18%
Health	81	4%
Humanitarian Aid	623	27%
Multi-sector	210	9%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	132	6%
Other Social infrastructure	49	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	24	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	45	2%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	3	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	1,181	78%
Other	340	22%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.6. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.12. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	191
World Bank Group	-	334
UN Funds and Programmes*	113	1,020
of which:		
UNDP	-	374
WFP	-	283
UNICEF	-	133
UNFPA	-	17
UNHCR	-	110
UNRWA	113	71
Other UN	9	436
of which:		
FAO	0	179
IFAD	-	32
ILO	-	18
OHCHR	3	1
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	0	-
UNESCO	-	9
UN	-	20
UNOCHA	n/a	20
WHO	-	46
Regional Development Banks	55	107
of which:		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	-	32
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	75	189
Total	251	2,277

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Finland

Table B.13. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Finland	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	87	35%
Country / region specific	163	65%
- of which regional allocations	34	13%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	6	4%
South of Sahara	60	38%
North of Sahara	1	0%
Americas, unspecified	1	1%
South America	2	1%
North & Central America	10	6%
Asia, unspecified	7	4%
Far East Asia	8	5%
Middle East	12	8%
South & Central Asia	44	28%
Europe	13	8%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	8	3%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	19	8%
Education	8	3%
Environment	13	5%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	56	23%
Health	7	3%
Humanitarian Aid	91	36%
Multi-sector	15	6%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	18	7%
Other Social infrastructure	5	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	8	3%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	107	83%
Other	23	17%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.7. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.14. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	200	22
World Bank Group	74	51
UN Funds and Programmes*	102	81
of which:		
UNDP	25	15
WFP	8	19
UNICEF	21	16
UNFPA	33	2
UNHCR	9	17
UNRWA	5	2
Other UN	42	74
of which:		
FAO	1	9
IFAD	4	1
ILO	1	2
OHCHR	0	2
UNDPKO	3	0
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	1	2
UN	3	-
UNOCHA	n/a	3
WHO	2	15
Regional Development Banks	35	4
of which:		
African Development Bank	26	0
Asian Development Bank	9	1
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	40	17
Total	494	250

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

France

Table B.15. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	France	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1	4%
Country / region specific	38	96%
- of which regional allocations	7	18%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	5	16%
South of Sahara	19	59%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	2	7%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	0	0%
Middle East	5	14%
South & Central Asia	1	3%
Europe	5	16%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	-	0%
Developmental Food Aid	22	56%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	5	13%
Education	-	0%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	5	12%
Health	-	0%
Humanitarian Aid	0	1%
Multi-sector	3	7%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	1	3%
Other Social infrastructure	3	7%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	21	69%
Other	9	31%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B. 8. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.16. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	2,661	5
World Bank Group	872	-
UN Funds and Programmes*	66	26
of which:		
UNDP	24	3
WFP	-	17
UNICEF	13	2
UNFPA	3	-
UNHCR	20	-
UNRWA	7	3
Other UN	189	4
of which:		
FAO	15	-
IFAD	15	-
ILO	14	3
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	32	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	14	-
UN	17	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	30	-
Regional Development Banks	210	3
of which:		
African Development Bank	175	3
Asian Development Bank	32	-
Inter-American Development Bank	2	-
Other multilaterals	1,223	1
Total	5,220	39

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Germany

Table B.17. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Germany	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	211	44%
Country / region specific	269	56%
- of which regional allocations	32	7%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	8	3%
South of Sahara	82	31%
North of Sahara	11	4%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	2	1%
North & Central America	7	3%
Asia, unspecified	1	0%
Far East Asia	6	2%
Middle East	23	9%
South & Central Asia	114	44%
Europe	16	6%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	4	1%
Developmental Food Aid	11	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	126	26%
Education	5	1%
Environment	45	9%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	145	30%
Health	12	2%
Humanitarian Aid	89	18%
Multi-sector	16	3%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	8	2%
Other Social infrastructure	9	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	7	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	1	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	215	91%
Other	22	9%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.9. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.18. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	2,926	18
World Bank Group	763	166
UN Funds and Programmes*	110	148
of which:		
UNDP	30	66
WFP	31	46
UNICEF	9	1
UNFPA	20	3
UNHCR	11	9
UNRWA	11	2
Other UN	261	42
of which:		
FAO	21	10
IFAD	21	-
ILO	19	7
OHCHR	3	0
UNDPKO	44	0
UNECE	0	0
UNESCO	18	1
UN	19	1
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	34	4
Regional Development Banks	299	7
of which:		
African Development Bank	205	-
Asian Development Bank	75	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	591	99
Total	4,950	480

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Greece

Table B.19. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Greece	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	4	63%
Country / region specific	2	37%
- of which regional allocations	2	33%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	0	0%
South of Sahara	0	0%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	2	70%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	0	0%
Middle East	0	0%
South & Central Asia	0	0%
Europe	1	29%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	-	0%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	0%
Education	0	0%
Environment	4	65%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	-	0%
Health	-	0%
Humanitarian Aid	1	12%
Multi-sector	1	22%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	0%
Other Social infrastructure	-	0%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	-	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	0	97%
Other	0	3%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.10. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.20. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	278	-
World Bank Group	-	-
UN Funds and Programmes*	1	0
of which:		
UNDP	-	-
WFP	-	0
UNICEF	0	-
UNFPA	0	-
UNHCR	1	-
UNRWA	0	-
Other UN	12	2
of which:		
FAO	1	-
IFAD	-	-
ILO	-	-
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	0	-
UNESCO	2	-
UN	2	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	2	-
Regional Development Banks	1	1
of which:		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	-	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	4	3
Total	296	6

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Ireland

Table B.21. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Ireland	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	30	29%
Country / region specific	73	71%
- of which regional allocations	1	1%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	1	1%
South of Sahara	49	67%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	3	5%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	11	16%
Middle East	2	3%
South & Central Asia	6	8%
Europe	1	1%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	14	14%
Developmental Food Aid	1	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	1	1%
Education	6	5%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	12	12%
Health	8	8%
Humanitarian Aid	37	36%
Multi-sector	1	1%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	2	2%
Other Social infrastructure	17	16%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	4	4%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	57	80%
Other	15	20%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.11. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.22. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	164	2
World Bank Group	26	24
UN Funds and Programmes*	51	44
of which:		
UNDP	12	27
WFP	13	7
UNICEF	11	9
UNFPA	4	-
UNHCR	8	0
UNRWA	4	0
Other UN	36	21
of which:		
FAO	2	1
IFAD	3	3
ILO	1	6
OHCHR	-	1
UNDPKO	3	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	0
UN	1	0
UNOCHA	n/a	6
WHO	2	1
Regional Development Banks	12	-
of which:		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	12	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	21	12
Total	310	103

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Italy

Table B.23. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Italy	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	22	24%
Country / region specific	70	76%
- of which regional allocations	2	3%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	0	0%
South of Sahara	16	23%
North of Sahara	2	2%
Americas, unspecified	2	2%
South America	3	4%
North & Central America	2	3%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	3	4%
Middle East	16	23%
South & Central Asia	26	37%
Europe	1	2%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	7	8%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	4	4%
Education	3	3%
Environment	-	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	21	23%
Health	2	2%
Humanitarian Aid	30	32%
Multi-sector	16	18%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	4	4%
Other Social infrastructure	2	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	1	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	51	75%
Other	17	25%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.12. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.24. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	1,557	-
World Bank Group	439	19
UN Funds and Programmes*	43	35
of which:		
UNDP	4	14
WFP	13	8
UNICEF	11	6
UNFPA	3	1
UNHCR	6	2
UNRWA	6	3
Other UN	127	20
of which:		
FAO	21	6
IFAD	45	0
ILO	3	0
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	-	0
UN	0	-
UNOCHA	n/a	1
WHO	28	1
Regional Development Banks	6	-
of which:		
African Development Bank	5	-
Asian Development Bank	-	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	65	18
Total	2,237	92

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Japan

Table B.25. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Japan	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	45	4%
Country / region specific	1,206	96%
- of which regional allocations	70	6%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	46	4%
South of Sahara	295	26%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	49	4%
Asia, unspecified	20	2%
Far East Asia	8	1%
Middle East	35	3%
South & Central Asia	741	64%
Europe	1	0%
Oceania	11	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	49	4%
Developmental Food Aid	215	17%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	27	2%
Education	68	5%
Environment	2	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	388	31%
Health	90	7%
Humanitarian Aid	346	28%
Multi-sector	41	3%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	5	0%
Other Social infrastructure	19	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	1	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	1	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	1,104	97%
Other	32	3%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.13. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.26. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	-
World Bank Group	1,931	-
UN Funds and Programmes*	159	1,005
of which:		
UNDP	75	331
WFP	7	295
UNICEF	16	197
UNFPA	26	2
UNHCR	16	131
UNRWA	18	7
Other UN	359	125
of which:		
FAO	42	37
IFAD	-	-
ILO	37	-
OHCHR	0	-
UNDPKO	67	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	26	26
UN	35	7
UNOCHA	n/a	3
WHO	59	7
Regional Development Banks	924	24
of which:		
African Development Bank	182	24
Asian Development Bank	719	-
Inter-American Development Bank	23	-
Other multilaterals	311	98
Total	3,684	1,251

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Korea

Table B.27. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Korea	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	11	25%
Country / region specific	34	75%
- of which regional allocations	29	65%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	7	30%
South of Sahara	12	49%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	0	1%
North & Central America	1	3%
Asia, unspecified	5	22%
Far East Asia	0	2%
Middle East	0	1%
South & Central Asia	2	7%
Europe	4	16%
Oceania	2	9%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	0	0%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	-	0%
Education	1	2%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	1	3%
Health	4	8%
Humanitarian Aid	5	12%
Multi-sector	25	56%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	-	0%
Other Social infrastructure	1	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	0	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	7	15%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	3	72%
Other	1	28%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.14. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.28. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	-
World Bank Group	111	2
UN Funds and Programmes*	11	14
of which:		
UNDP	6	7
WFP	0	3
UNICEF	3	3
UNFPA	0	-
UNHCR	3	1
UNRWA	0	0
Other UN	66	12
of which:		
FAO	7	1
IFAD	2	0
ILO	5	2
OHCHR	-	0
UNDPKO	10	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	5	1
UN	6	0
UNOCHA	n/a	0
WHO	11	5
Regional Development Banks	67	11
of which:		
African Development Bank	14	7
Asian Development Bank	43	-
Inter-American Development Bank	8	-
Other multilaterals	18	7
Total	273	45

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Luxembourg

Table B.29. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Luxembourg	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	41	47%
Country / region specific	46	53%
- of which regional allocations	8	9%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	6	14%
South of Sahara	19	47%
North of Sahara	1	2%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	1	2%
North & Central America	3	7%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	6	16%
Middle East	2	5%
South & Central Asia	5	12%
Europe	4	9%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	2	2%
Developmental Food Aid	1	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	4	4%
Education	5	6%
Environment	2	2%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	4	5%
Health	15	17%
Humanitarian Aid	21	24%
Multi-sector	14	16%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	3	3%
Other Social infrastructure	1	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	14	16%
Water Supply and Sanitation	1	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	20	54%
Other	18	46%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.15. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.30. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	36	3
World Bank Group	27	4
UN Funds and Programmes*	33	53
of which:		
UNDP	11	16
WFP	5	12
UNICEF	7	5
UNFPA	8	8
UNHCR	2	8
UNRWA	-	2
Other UN	28	24
of which:		
FAO	0	3
IFAD	1	1
ILO	-	2
OHCHR	0	-
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	0	-
UN	-	0
UNOCHA	n/a	0
WHO	11	13
Regional Development Banks	6	1
of which:		
African Development Bank	0	-
Asian Development Bank	3	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	11	3
Total	141	88

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Netherlands

Table B.31. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Netherlands	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	257	36%
Country / region specific	461	64%
- of which regional allocations	20	3%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	4	1%
South of Sahara	195	43%
North of Sahara	2	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	8	2%
North & Central America	16	3%
Asia, unspecified	1	0%
Far East Asia	57	13%
Middle East	23	5%
South & Central Asia	137	30%
Europe	17	4%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	12	2%
Developmental Food Aid	18	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	30	4%
Education	146	20%
Environment	8	1%
General Budget Support	15	2%
Government and Civil Society	167	23%
Health	23	3%
Humanitarian Aid	100	14%
Multi-sector	65	9%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	6	1%
Other Social infrastructure	20	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	46	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	58	8%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	4	1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	322	73%
Other	119	27%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Table B.16. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.32. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	610	8
World Bank Group	82	243
UN Funds and Programmes*	369	312
of which:		
UNDP	122	141
WFP	53	13
UNICEF	46	102
UNFPA	72	44
UNHCR	56	2
UNRWA	20	7
Other UN	207	104
of which:		
FAO	5	10
IFAD	24	2
ILO	17	8
OHCHR	10	1
UNDPKO	-	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	4	16
UN	6	1
UNOCHA	n/a	9
WHO	16	11
Regional Development Banks	92	20
of which:		
African Development Bank	0	1
Asian Development Bank	-	17
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	155	32
Total	1,516	719

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

New Zealand

Table B.33. 2010 non-core multilateral aid by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	New Zealand	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1	3%
Country / region specific	30	97%
- of which regional allocations	12	38%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	0	0%
South of Sahara	4	31%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	0	0%
South America	1	4%
North & Central America	1	5%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	6	39%
Middle East	0	1%
South & Central Asia	3	20%
Europe	0	0%
Oceania	16	107%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	0	1%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	5	15%
Education	2	8%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	10	31%
Health	3	8%
Humanitarian Aid	6	18%
Multi-sector	1	3%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	3	8%
Other Social infrastructure	0	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	2	7%
Water Supply and Sanitation	0	1%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	9	50%
Other	9	50%

Source: OECD (2012), Creditor Reporting System Database, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.17. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.34. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	-
World Bank Group	12	6
UN Funds and Programmes*	20	14
of which:		
UNDP	6	8
WFP	-	2
UNICEF	4	4
UNFPA	4	-
UNHCR	4	-
UNRWA	1	-
Other UN	15	4
of which:		
FAO	1	0
IFAD	-	-
ILO	0	-
OHCHR	2	-
UNDPKO	1	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	0
UN	1	-
UNOCHA	n/a	1
WHO	1	2
Regional Development Banks	-	2
of which:		
African Development Bank	-	-
Asian Development Bank	-	2
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	24	5
Total	71	31

Source: OECD (2012), Creditor Reporting System Database, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Norway

Table B.35. 2010 non-core multilateral aid by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Norway	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	437	42%
Country / region specific	598	58%
- of which regional allocations	74	7%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	48	9%
South of Sahara	160	29%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	1	0%
South America	35	6%
North & Central America	58	11%
Asia, unspecified	7	1%
Far East Asia	40	7%
Middle East	73	13%
South & Central Asia	157	29%
Europe	17	3%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	13	1%
Developmental Food Aid	1	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	40	4%
Education	126	12%
Environment	77	7%
General Budget Support	60	6%
Government and Civil Society	189	18%
Health	22	2%
Humanitarian Aid	123	12%
Multi-sector	144	14%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	180	17%
Other Social infrastructure	16	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	17	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	28	3%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	412	79%
Other	112	21%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.18. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.36. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	0
World Bank Group	147	320
UN Funds and Programmes*	359	460
of which:		
UNDP	127	227
WFP	24	18
UNICEF	74	144
UNFPA	55	19
UNHCR	54	26
UNRWA	25	12
Other UN	218	149
of which:		
FAO	2	20
IFAD	13	0
ILO	0	15
OHCHR	26	8
UNDPKO	-	1
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	1	10
UN	2	2
UNOCHA	n/a	20
WHO	42	13
Regional Development Banks	95	45
of which:		
African Development Bank	83	40
Asian Development Bank	12	1
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	200	61
Total	1,019	1,035

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Portugal

Table B.37. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Portugal	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	3	5%
Country / region specific	48	95%
- of which regional allocations	3	6%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	0	0%
South of Sahara	3	7%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	1	2%
South America	0	0%
North & Central America	0	0%
Asia, unspecified	0	0%
Far East Asia	12	26%
Middle East	0	0%
South & Central Asia	14	30%
Europe	17	35%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	0	0%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	0	1%
Education	0	0%
Environment	0	0%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	46	91%
Health	-	0%
Humanitarian Aid	-	0%
Multi-sector	2	4%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	0	1%
Other Social infrastructure	2	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	0	0%
Water Supply and Sanitation	-	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	33	72%
Other	12	28%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.19. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.38. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	185	5
World Bank Group	21	-
UN Funds and Programmes*	4	2
of which:		
UNDP	2	2
WFP	-	-
UNICEF	0	-
UNFPA	-	0
UNHCR	2	-
UNRWA	0	-
Other UN	10	42
of which:		
FAO	1	0
IFAD	-	-
ILO	1	1
OHCHR	0	-
UNDPKO	1	38
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	1	-
UN	1	-
UNOCHA	n/a	-
WHO	2	-
Regional Development Banks	28	-
of which:		
African Development Bank	16	-
Asian Development Bank	6	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	5	2
Total	253	51

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Spain

Table B.39. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Spain	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	549	41%
Country / region specific	792	59%
- of which regional allocations	543	40%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	57	8%
South of Sahara	188	26%
North of Sahara	13	2%
Americas, unspecified	278	38%
South America	35	5%
North & Central America	90	12%
Asia, unspecified	3	0%
Far East Asia	25	3%
Middle East	24	3%
South & Central Asia	67	9%
Europe	6	1%
Oceania	5	1%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	409	30%
Developmental Food Aid	6	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	88	7%
Education	114	9%
Environment	92	7%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	135	10%
Health	17	1%
Humanitarian Aid	164	12%
Multi-sector	124	9%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	34	3%
Other Social infrastructure	29	2%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	25	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	101	8%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	2	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	198	79%
Other	52	21%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.20. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.40. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	1,012	18
World Bank Group	272	204
UN Funds and Programmes*	150	329
of which:		
UNDP	49	72
WFP	24	54
UNICEF	32	107
UNFPA	21	22
UNHCR	14	24
UNRWA	11	10
Other UN	137	463
of which:		
FAO	0	37
IFAD	-	379
ILO	7	8
OHCHR	3	2
UNDPKO	2	-
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	8	9
UN	9	0
UNOCHA	n/a	5
WHO	27	1
Regional Development Banks	165	212
of which:		
African Development Bank	57	13
Asian Development Bank	40	1
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	214	115
Total	1,951	1,341

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

Sweden

Table B.41. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Sweden	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	198	27%
Country / region specific	539	73%
- of which regional allocations	95	13%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	39	8%
South of Sahara	194	39%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	1	0%
South America	11	2%
North & Central America	38	8%
Asia, unspecified	10	2%
Far East Asia	25	5%
Middle East	32	6%
South & Central Asia	108	22%
Europe	80	16%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	5	1%
Developmental Food Aid	6	1%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	50	7%
Education	77	10%
Environment	50	7%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	204	28%
Health	28	4%
Humanitarian Aid	180	24%
Multi-sector	57	8%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	26	3%
Other Social infrastructure	6	1%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	22	3%
Water Supply and Sanitation	18	3%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	8	1%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	338	76%
Other	106	24%

Source: OECD (2012), Creditor Reporting System Database, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.21. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.42. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	394	13
World Bank Group	299	7
UN Funds and Programmes*	415	265
of which:		
UNDP	87	139
WFP	67	14
UNICEF	65	59
UNFPA	59	4
UNHCR	89	22
UNRWA	48	8
Other UN	251	91
of which:		
FAO	3	22
IFAD	33	-
ILO	2	4
OHCHR	-	-
UNDPKO	6	7
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	2	3
UN	3	1
UNOCHA	n/a	20
WHO	9	17
Regional Development Banks	25	4
of which:		
African Development Bank	6	-
Asian Development Bank	15	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	234	356
Total	1,618	737

Source: OECD (2012), Creditor Reporting System Database, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris.

Switzerland

Table B.43. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	Switzerland	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	70	24%
Country / region specific	222	76%
- of which regional allocations	35	12%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	4	2%
South of Sahara	50	23%
North of Sahara	6	3%
Americas, unspecified	2	1%
South America	8	4%
North & Central America	8	4%
Asia, unspecified	3	1%
Far East Asia	26	12%
Middle East	17	8%
South & Central Asia	42	19%
Europe	54	25%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	17	6%
Developmental Food Aid	-	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	37	13%
Education	5	2%
Environment	12	4%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	87	30%
Health	1	0%
Humanitarian Aid	71	24%
Multi-sector	26	9%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	19	6%
Other Social infrastructure	0	0%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	3	1%
Water Supply and Sanitation	14	5%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	0	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	116	62%
Other	70	38%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.22. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.44. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	6
World Bank Group	271	66
UN Funds and Programmes*	108	86
of which:		
UNDP	52	21
WFP	2	39
UNICEF	19	5
UNFPA	13	0
UNHCR	11	12
UNRWA	11	6
Other UN	60	45
of which:		
FAO	3	3
IFAD	7	3
ILO	3	3
OHCHR	0	1
UNDPKO	6	2
UNECE	-	0
UNESCO	3	2
UN	3	0
UNOCHA	n/a	4
WHO	5	2
Regional Development Banks	68	6
of which:		
African Development Bank	56	1
Asian Development Bank	13	-
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	80	84
Total	588	292

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

United Kingdom

Table B.45. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	United Kingdom	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1,564	53%
Country / region specific	1,397	47%
- of which regional allocations	251	8%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	101	8%
South of Sahara	748	58%
North of Sahara	0	0%
Americas, unspecified	1	0%
South America	1	0%
North & Central America	31	2%
Asia, unspecified	5	0%
Far East Asia	65	5%
Middle East	113	9%
South & Central Asia	320	25%
Europe	11	1%
Oceania	0	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	43	1%
Developmental Food Aid	2	0%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	165	6%
Education	194	7%
Environment	814	27%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	327	11%
Health	274	9%
Humanitarian Aid	338	11%
Multi-sector	91	3%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	150	5%
Other Social infrastructure	284	10%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	176	6%
Water Supply and Sanitation	103	3%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	-	0%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	978	85%
Other	168	15%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.23 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.46. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	2,009	55
World Bank Group	1,441	1,632
UN Funds and Programmes*	219	754
of which:		
UNDP	85	288
WFP	-	140
UNICEF	32	215
UNFPA	31	72
UNHCR	29	23
UNRWA	42	3
Other UN	354	261
of which:		
FAO	33	20
IFAD	13	-
ILO	15	-
OHCHR	2	0
UNDPKO	33	5
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	14	2
UN	17	0
UNOCHA	n/a	23
WHO	44	156
Regional Development Banks	324	162
of which:		
African Development Bank	225	27
Asian Development Bank	67	10
Inter-American Development Bank	-	-
Other multilaterals	690	98
Total	5,037	2,961

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris; OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

United States

Table B.47. 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(in 2010 USD million)

	United States	
Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified	1,427	33%
Country / region specific	2,956	67%
- of which regional allocations	373	9%
REGIONS		
Africa, unspecified	0	0%
South of Sahara	1564	53%
North of Sahara	17	1%
Americas, unspecified	8	0%
South America	87	3%
North & Central America	173	6%
Asia, unspecified	18	1%
Far East Asia	116	4%
Middle East	112	4%
South & Central Asia	795	27%
Europe	65	2%
Oceania	1	0%
SECTORS		
Agriculture	173	4%
Developmental Food Aid	108	2%
Economic Infrastructure and Services	30	1%
Education	55	1%
Environment	408	9%
General Budget Support	-	0%
Government and Civil Society	282	6%
Health	258	6%
Humanitarian Aid	2,689	61%
Multi-sector	10	0%
Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism)	7	0%
Other Social infrastructure	144	3%
Population Policies and Reproductive Health	99	2%
Water Supply and Sanitation	2	0%
Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugees in donor countries)	118	3%
FRAGILE / CONFLICT*		
Fragile	2,254	87%
Other	329	13%

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

Figure B.24. 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)




Table B.48. 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(in 2010 USD million)

Total use of the multilateral system in 2010	Core	Non-Core
EU	-	0
World Bank Group	1,263	687
UN Funds and Programmes*	288	2,818
of which:		
UNDP	101	91
WFP	-	1,546
UNICEF	132	174
UNFPA	55	1
UNHCR	-	709
UNRWA	-	278
Other UN	660	429
of which:		
FAO	57	101
IFAD	30	-
ILO	50	51
OHCHR	7	2
UNDPKO	144	-
UNECE	-	-
UNESCO	50	1
UN	72	1
UNOCHA	n/a	31
WHO	81	202
Regional Development Banks	389	7
of which:		
African Development Bank	155	1
Asian Development Bank	-	-
Inter-American Development Bank	234	-
Other multilaterals	1,176	442
Total	3,775	4,383

Source: OECD (2012), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris;
OECD (2012), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

ANNEX C. GLOBAL BILATERAL DONOR FRAGMENTATION

The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: “The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy.”

Table C.1. Global bilateral donor fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2010 disbursements in current USD

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Row	Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	CPA (USD million)	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Korea	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	DAC countries	Nb. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	Nb. of multilateral agencies	Grand total	
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6																													
2	Number of partner countries						67	28	37	57	71	79	120	112	24	38	66	140	79	56	65	35	87	13	77	91	90	89	129	1670		1667		3327	
3	Number of significant relations						30	21	18	20	27	27	63	65	17	17	39	111	30	24	25	18	32	8	43	41	42	33	113	884		967		1851	
4	Number of non-significant relations						37	7	19	37	44	52	57	27	7	21	47	29	49	32	40	17	55	5	34	50	48	56	16	786		690		1476	
5	Concentration ratio (in %)						45	75	49	35	38	34	53	76	71	45	45	79	38	43	38	51	37	62	56	45	47	37	88	59		58		56	
6	CPA (USD million)						1817	79	447	978	1145	319	4767	4369	48	296	496	12139	827	159	1002	162	1221	354	1614	1160	658	3336	17209	54592		41556		96148	
7	Average CPA (USD million)						27	3	12	17	16	4	40	39	2	8	6	87	10	3	15	5	14	27	21	13	7	37	133	33		25		639	
8	Donors' share of global CPA (in %)						19	0.1	0.5	1.0	1.2	0.3	5.0	4.5	0.1	0.3	0.5	12.6	0.9	0.2	1.0	0.2	1.3	0.4	1.7	1.2	0.7	3.5	17.9	56.8		43.2		100.0	
							%-----																								% No		% No		
Europe																																			
	Albania	28	13	15	54	313	-	0.8	-	-	0.5	0.1	0.3	11.6	3.1	-	19.4	2.0	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	1.4	3.5	4.4	0.3	9.6	58.0	15	42.0	13	100.0	
	Belarus	18	12	6	33	102	-	-	-	-	1.7	0.2	-	7.7	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	2.2	-	-	16.9	0.7	-	29.1	58.9	8	41.1	10	100.0	
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	28	16	12	43	445	-	1.2	-	-	0.3	0.2	0.6	4.2	0.1	-	0.9	0.7	5.6	-	2.1	-	4.0	-	4.6	5.8	3.2	2.4	6.4	42.2	16	57.8	12	100.0	
	Croatia	15	4	11	73	137	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.2	1.7	14.8	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	0.2	-	-	0.8	0.8	21.9	9	78.1	6	100.0	
	Kosovo	22	10	12	55	544	-	0.3	-	-	0.7	0.3	0.3	4.9	-	-	0.3	0.2	-	1.3	0.3	-	3.8	-	-	2.2	9.6	1.7	13.9	39.9	14	60.1	8	100.0	
	Macedonia, FYR	21	11	10	48	150	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	1.1	6.6	0.3	-	2.1	17.1	-	-	-	4.0	-	-	-	4.4	6.5	0.8	13.8	56.9	11	43.1	10	100.0	
	Moldova	28	12	16	57	437	-	0.4	-	-	0.6	0.1	0.2	1.5	0.1	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.1	0.8	-	0.7	-	-	2.8	1.9	3.1	4.9	17.5	15	82.5	13	100.0	
	Montenegro	21	16	5	24	66	-	2.6	-	-	1.1	-	0.6	24.5	-	-	0.6	1.0	-	9.2	0.7	-	4.7	-	6.9	2.0	-	10.3	64.1	12	35.9	9	100.0		
	Serbia	27	12	15	56	640	-	0.7	0.1	-	-	0.1	2.0	21.3	1.8	-	0.3	0.8	-	0.1	0.4	-	2.9	1.8	0.3	2.7	1.7	0.7	9.0	46.9	17	53.1	10	100.0	
	Turkey	21	5	16	76	1310	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	8.5	3.8	0.4	-	-	56.5	0.8	-	0.0	-	-	-	4.4	0.5	-	0.3	1.1	76.5	11	23.5	10	100.0	
	Ukraine	24	11	13	54	519	-	-	-	2.9	0.5	0.1	1.3	9.0	0.2	-	-	10.1	0.3	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	5.9	1.3	0.2	28.0	60.4	13	39.6	11	100.0	
North of Sahara																																			
	Algeria	20	12	8	40	154	-	-	4.9	0.6	-	-	16.0	6.9	-	-	3.2	10.1	1.9	-	-	-	0.5	-	10.0	1.0	-	1.3	1.3	57.5	12	42.5	8	100.0	
	Egypt	30	9	21	70	1108	0.4	-	-	0.7	0.8	0.1	12.5	9.9	0.7	-	0.5	15.1	0.4	-	0.9	-	0.1	-	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.4	25.1	68.5	17	31.5	13	100.0	
	Libya	10	9	1	10	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.8	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.5	18.6	29.3	4	70.7	6	100.0	
	Morocco	25	10	15	60	1214	-	-	1.0	0.4	0.1	0.0	22.8	5.2	-	-	1.0	14.4	0.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	6.3	-	0.2	0.2	5.9	59.9	14	40.1	11	100.0	
	Tunisia	19	9	10	53	755	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.8	4.6	-	-	3.3	15.7	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	21.7	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	65.1	9	34.9	10	100.0	
South of Sahara																																			
	Angola	29	20	9	31	251	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.8	1.9	1.6	-	-	1.6	10.0	7.6	-	0.3	-	3.2	5.4	3.0	0.5	0.2	0.4	19.7	56.2	15	43.8	14	100.0	

Row	Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	OPA (USD million)	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Korea	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6																												
	Benin	28	19	9	32	673																												
	Botswana	19	11	8	42	162	0.4																											
	Burkina Faso	32	20	12	38	1023																												
	Burundi	32	23	9	28	607																												
	Cameroon	28	17	11	39	542																												
	Cape Verde	21	12	9	43	326																												
	Central African Rep.	29	18	11	38	213																												
	Chad	33	18	15	45	522																												
	Comoros	15	11	4	27	45																												
	Congo, Dem. Rep.	35	18	17	49	1996	0.1																											
	Congo, Rep.	20	13	7	35	132																												
	Cote d'Ivoire	31	13	18	58	621																												
	Djibouti	19	12	7	37	132																												
	Equatorial Guinea	9	6	3	33	31																												
	Entrea	22	14	8	36	140																												
	Ethiopia	38	16	22	58	3390	0.1																											
	Gabon	13	8	5	38	93																												
	Gambia	21	15	6	29	124																												
	Ghana	33	17	16	48	1670	0.0																											
	Guinea	24	15	9	38	224																												
	Guinea-Bissau	21	15	6	29	119																												
	Kenya	36	19	17	47	1797	0.2																											
	Lesotho	23	12	11	48	272	0.2																											
	Liberia	29	17	12	41	491																												
	Madagascar	25	19	6	24	453																												
	Malawi	29	16	13	45	982	0.2																											
	Mali	32	19	13	41	1048																												
	Mauntania	23	14	9	39	366																												
	Mauritius	13	5	8	62	128																												
	Mayotte	2	1	1	50	611																												
	Mozambique	37	24	13	35	1909	0.1																											
	Namibia	22	13	9	41	259																												
	Niger	32	21	11	34	689															</													

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Row	Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	CPA (USD million)	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Korea	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6																												
2	Number of partner countries						67	28	37	57	71	79	120	112	24	38	86	140	79	56	65	35	87	13	77	91	90	89	129	1670		1657		3327
3	Number of significant relations						30	21	18	20	27	27	63	86	17	17	39	111	30	24	25	18	32	8	43	41	42	33	113	884		967		1851
4	Number of non-significant relations						37	7	19	37	44	52	57	27	7	21	47	29	49	32	40	17	55	5	34	50	48	56	16	786		690		1476
5	Concentration ratio (in %)						45	75	49	35	38	34	53	76	71	45	45	79	38	43	38	51	37	62	56	45	47	37	88	53		58		56
6	CPA (USD million)						1817	79	447	978	1145	319	4767	4369	48	286	496	12139	627	159	1002	162	1221	354	1614	1160	658	3336	17209	54592		41556		96148
7	Average CPA (USD million)						27	3	12	17	16	4	40	39	2	8	6	87	10	3	15	5	14	27	21	13	7	37	133	33		25		633
8	Donors' share of global CPA (in %)						1.9	0.1	0.5	1.0	1.2	0.3	5.0	4.5	0.1	0.3	0.5	12.6	0.9	0.2	1.0	0.2	1.3	0.4	1.7	1.2	0.7	3.5	17.9	56.8		43.2		100.0
							%																						%	No.	%	No.		
	Senegal	34	22	12	35	842	-	0.1	1.3	4.0	-	0.1	13.2	2.5	-	-	0.7	6.5	1.8	1.8	2.4	-	-	0.0	3.8	0.1	0.1	0.2	11.5	50.0	17	50.0	17	100.0
	Seychelles	9	8	1	11	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.6	2.7	-	-	1.8	23.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.7	4	61.3	5	100.0
	Sierra Leone	28	20	8	29	424	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.1	2.5	-	0.4	-	2.9	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	12.0	6.8	26.1	11	73.9	17	100.0
	Somalia	28	19	9	32	477	0.7	-	1.2	0.8	2.8	1.6	0.7	1.4	-	0.8	1.4	1.2	-	0.2	0.4	-	4.4	-	0.6	3.4	1.1	7.2	7.0	36.8	18	63.2	10	100.0
	South Africa	33	14	19	58	1016	0.3	0.1	0.4	1.3	1.3	0.4	8.0	5.4	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	3.4	-	0.8	-	0.1	1.0	0.6	2.5	52.1	79.1	21	20.9	12	100.0
	St. Helena	1	1	0	0	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0	1	0.0	0	100.0	
	Sudan	35	19	16	46	1981	0.4	-	0.3	1.2	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.2	2.8	0.0	0.1	-	-	2.4	-	0.3	1.5	0.4	3.0	20.8	36.3	19	63.7	16	100.0
	Swaziland	15	7	8	53	94	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	0.4	4.5	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	25.4	31.3	6	68.7	9	100.0
	Tanzania	35	19	16	46	2879	0.0	0.0	0.6	3.1	4.3	1.5	0.8	4.4	-	1.5	0.2	3.5	0.7	-	2.0	-	3.5	-	-	2.9	0.5	7.5	15.2	52.3	18	47.7	17	100.0
	Togo	24	15	9	38	214	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2	8.5	1.2	-	-	0.7	3.1	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.4	-	1.7	16.6	10	83.4	14	100.0
	Uganda	37	23	14	38	1675	0.1	0.7	1.2	0.1	4.1	0.3	0.2	2.0	-	2.6	0.6	3.5	0.1	0.0	2.1	-	3.4	-	0.1	2.4	0.1	7.7	21.6	52.9	20	47.1	17	100.0
	Zambia	33	21	12	36	884	0.2	-	-	0.4	2.4	2.2	0.1	3.6	-	2.9	0.2	5.1	0.1	-	3.9	0.1	5.0	-	-	1.6	0.1	8.6	25.5	62.1	17	37.9	16	100.0
	Zimbabwe	35	18	17	49	701	3.8	0.1	0.0	0.6	3.0	0.2	0.4	3.1	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.3	-	0.7	0.2	1.0	-	0.2	3.1	0.8	7.3	19.3	45.2	21	54.8	14	100.0
	North and Central America																																	
	Anguilla	2	2	0	0	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0	100.0	2	100.0
	Antigua and Barbuda	3	3	0	0	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.9	1	65.1	2	100.0
	Barbados	6	5	1	17	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.4	1	92.6	5	100.0
	Belize	12	11	1	8	28	1.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.0	39.6	3	60.4	9	100.0
	Costa Rica	16	11	5	31	132	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.1	16.7	-	-	-	59.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.9	0.4	0.3	-	4.6	89.1	7	10.9	9	100.0
	Cuba	23	15	8	35	110	-	-	0.4	2.6	-	-	1.4	1.2	-	-	0.8	4.1	-	0.3	-	-	0.4	-	28.2	-	4.6	0.4	14.9	59.3	12	40.7	11	100.0
	Dominica	7	3	4	57	35	-	-	-	-	-	9.7	-	-	-	-	-	7.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	18.0	3	82.0	4	100.0

Row	Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	CPA (USD million)	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Japan	Korea	Luxembourg	Netherlands	New Zealand	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	United Kingdom	United States	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total	
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6																													
	Dominican Republic	17	11	6	35	227							1.9	1.7			0.7	4.6	1.2						17.0			25.0	%	No.	%	No.	100.0		
	El Salvador	23	13	10	43	353	-	0.1					0.8	4.3			0.3	8.3	1.2	1.8			0.1		15.6	0.4	0.4	45.7	52.1	7	47.9	10	100.0		
	Grenada	7	5	2	29	38	1.1											15.3											16.4	2	83.6	5	100.0		
	Guatemala	29	18	11	38	383	-	0.3		0.5	0.1	0.1	0.8	3.3			0.8	12.6	1.4		3.4	0.1	0.8		15.2	4.2	0.8	29.1	73.4	16	26.6	13	100.0		
	Haiti	37	14	23	62	2739	0.2		0.4	5.7	0.6	0.2	4.8	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.2	1.6	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.7		1.2	1.3	0.6	0.8	57.3	21	42.7	16	100.0		
	Honduras	27	16	11	41	530				1.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	2.2			0.2	2.6	1.2						11.4	1.2	0.9	19.4	40.9	13	59.1	14	100.0		
	Jamaica	17	11	6	35	177	0.2			1.5								10.5							0.2		2.0	11.0	25.3	6	74.7	11	100.0		
	Mexico	21	7	14	67	602	0.1					0.1	43.2	4.1			0.2	2.4	0.1						6.4		0.0	0.6	91.3	11	8.7	10	100.0		
	Montserrat	4	3	1	25	29																					67.9		67.9	1	32.1	3	100.0		
	Nicaragua	34	25	9	26	572	-	1.3		1.6	5.4	2.4	0.2	4.2		0.1	0.2	5.3	1.0	1.4	3.7		1.7		14.1	1.8	2.3	0.7	56.9	18	43.1	16	100.0		
	Panama	16	9	7	44	143							0.3	0.4				76.2	0.5						5.1			10.0	92.4	6	7.6	10	100.0		
	St. Kitts-Nevis	3	2	1	33	15												4.1											4.1	1	95.9	2	100.0		
	St. Lucia	8	3	5	63	48	1.3						1.2					5.3											7.8	3	92.2	5	100.0		
	St. Vincent & Grenadines	6	3	3	50	20												4.4										1.3	5.7	2	94.3	4	100.0		
	Trinidad and Tobago	8	8	0	0	3	12.4						13.3															37.9	63.6	3	36.4	5	100.0		
	South America																																		
	Argentina	19	15	4	21	132	-						5.4	11.0	0.4			5.3	32.9			0.4				24.0		0.4	2.9	82.7	9	17.3	10	100.0	
	Bolivia	31	16	15	48	609			1.8	1.1	6.5	0.2	1.8	5.3		0.1	0.8	8.4	0.3	0.2	6.9		0.2		5.9	3.9	3.2		14.2	60.6	17	39.4	14	100.0	
	Brazil	30	15	15	50	622		0.1		0.7		0.1	4.5	24.1	0.1			1.5	5.3	0.1	0.3	0.0		38.5	1.3	3.2	0.3	0.6	1.0	5.2	86.9	18	13.1	12	100.0
	Chile	25	19	6	24	184	3.3			1.1		0.4	4.5	43.4	0.2			1.5	8.0	1.3	0.3		0.4	0.9		4.5	0.9	0.9	0.4	7.2	79.1	17	20.9	8	100.0
	Colombia	31	14	17	55	890				0.7	0.0	0.2	16.6	3.5			0.7	1.1	0.8	0.1	2.8		1.1		4.1	2.5	1.3	0.3	45.2	81.0	16	19.0	15	100.0	
	Ecuador	25	20	5	20	201			2.2			0.4	3.0	11.7			0.7	9.5	2.2	0.2	0.2	0.2			23.9		1.3		18.2	73.8	13	26.2	12	100.0	
	Guyana	16	9	7	44	157				1.1				0.3				4.1					0.2						13.6	19.3	5	80.7	11	100.0	
	Paraguay	17	11	6	35	165							0.4	3.7			0.2	26.6	7.0						11.0	0.9			16.9	66.8	8	33.2	9	100.0	
	Peru	28	16	12	43	637				1.3		0.4	1.7	6.5			0.7	40.4	1.0	0.2	0.2		0.1		10.3	0.2	3.0	0.0	21.5	87.5	15	12.5	13	100.0	
	Suriname	9	4	5	56	103							1.0								74.1								1.6	76.6	3	23.4	6	100.0	
	Uruguay	15	11	4	27	55							3.5	5.4				18.5	23.3						19.0				2.1	71.8	6	28.2	9	100.0	
	Venezuela	17	13	4	24	37	-						7.4	9.8				0.9	7.1						8.5			2.9	23.0	59.7	7	40.3	10	100.0	
	Middle East																																		
	Iran	19	13	6	32	67	0.4						4.0	8.9				19.7	0.5		4.9					0.7			2.3	41.4	8	58.6	11	100.0	
	Iraq	30	6	24	80	2075	0.7		0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.4	1.0		0.0	0.5	6.7	0.6	0.0		0.0	0.3			0.7	0.1	0.9	77.2	89.8	18	10.2	12	100.0	
	Jordan	28	11	17	61	1015				0.5	0.5	0.0	1.1	5.5	0.1		0.3	5.6	1.2		0.1		0.0		0.9		0.2	0.2	37.1	53.4	15	46.6	13	100.0	
	Lebanon	29	16	13	45	401	0.2			0.3	0.4	0.2	10.4	3.5	0.1	0.4	5.5	2.6	0.5		0.2	0.2	2.1		5.6	0.2	0.7	1.0	20.8	54.9	19	45.1	10	100.0	
	Oman	9	9	0	0	8							5.8	9.4				18.8			3.5							11.6	36.4	85.4	6	14.6	3	100.0	

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Row	Partner countries																				Number of donors					Number of significant relations					Number of non-significant relations					Fragmentation ratio (in %)					CPA (USD million)					Australia					Austria					Belgium					Canada					Denmark					Finland					France					Germany					Greece					Ireland					Italy					Japan					Korea					Luxembourg					Netherlands					New Zealand					Norway					Portugal					Spain					Sweden					Switzerland					United Kingdom					United States					DAC countries					No. of DAC countries					Multilateral agencies					No. of multilateral agencies					Grand Total																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																									
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[illegible]

Table C.2. Global multilateral donor fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2010 disbursements in current USD

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Row	Partner countries	2 Number of donors	3 Number of significant relations	4 Number of non-significant relations	5 Fragmentation ratio (in %)	6 CPA (USD million)	ADF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAM	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNPBF	UNRWA	WFP	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total		
1	Column 1																																			
2	Number of partner countries						40	99	33	14	149	67	87	113	25	98	96	79	48	10	18	105	144	119	94	123	18	4	74	1670		1657		3327		
3	Number of significant relations						32	37	26	14	128	32	53	73	24	67	76	52	29	7	17	65	37	71	36	40	16	4	31	884		967		1851		
4	Number of non-significant relations						8	62	7	0	21	35	34	40	1	31	20	27	19	3	1	40	107	48	58	83	2	0	43	786		690		1476		
5	Concentration ratio (in %)						80	37	79	100	86	48	61	65	96	68	79	66	60	70	94	62	26	60	38	33	89	100	42	53		58		56		
6	CPA (USD million)						1544	1820	2038	69	9967	590	359	3004	692	51	11523	473	1362	21	52	57	1909	346	660	1764	52	595	2607	54592		41556		96148		
7	Average CPA (USD million)						39	18	62	5	67	9	4	27	28	1	120	6	28	2	3	1	13	3	7	14	3	149	35	33		25		633		
8	Donors' share of global CPA (in %)						1.6	1.9	2.1	0.1	10.4	0.6	0.4	3.1	0.7	0.1	12.0	0.5	1.4	0.0	0.1	0.1	2.0	0.4	0.7	1.8	0.1	0.6	2.7	56.8		43.2		100.0		
Europe							----- % -----																								%	No.	%	No.		
	Albania	28	13	15	54	313	- 5.9	-	-	- 23.9	0.1	0.3	0.2	-	-	- 0.1	8.5	1.0	-	-	-	- 0.0	1.1	0.2	0.1	0.5	-	-	-	58.0	15	42.0	13	100.0		
	Belarus	18	12	6	33	102	-	-	-	- 14.9	-	-	- 4.5	12.5	-	-	- 0.5	5.9	-	-	-	-	- 0.2	1.2	- 0.4	0.3	0.8	-	-	-	58.9	8	41.1	10	100.0	
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	28	16	12	43	445	- 0.9	-	-	- 25.9	0.1	-	2.0	-	-	- 0.2	26.0	0.8	-	-	-	-	0.0	1.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	-	-	-	42.2	16	57.8	12	100.0	
	Croatia	15	4	11	73	137	-	-	-	- 76.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	- 0.3	-	-	-	-	-	- 0.1	0.7	-	0.2	0.3	-	-	-	21.9	9	78.1	6	100.0	
	Kosovo	22	10	12	55	544	- 0.1	-	-	- 53.3	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	- 4.6	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	1.2	0.1	-	0.4	-	-	-	39.9	14	60.1	8	100.0
	Macedonia, FYR	21	11	10	48	150	- 0.4	-	-	- 36.8	-	0.3	1.3	-	-	- 0.1	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	-	-	-	56.9	11	43.1	10	100.0	
	Moldova	28	12	16	57	437	-	-	-	- 31.4	0.2	0.3	4.2	-	-	- 0.2	15.7	1.4	27.9	-	-	-	- 0.0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.2	-	-	-	17.5	15	82.5	13	100.0	
	Montenegro	21	16	5	24	66	-	-	-	- 20.9	-	-	- 2.3	2.3	-	-	- 0.4	4.7	-	-	-	-	-	- 0.1	3.3	-	- 0.8	1.1	-	-	-	64.1	12	35.9	9	100.0
	Serbia	27	12	15	56	640	- 0.0	-	-	- 46.6	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	- 0.3	4.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.2	-	-	-	46.9	17	53.1	10	100.0
	Turkey	21	5	16	76	1310	- 0.2	-	-	- 22.5	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	- 0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	-	-	-	76.5	11	23.5	10	100.0
	Ukraine	24	11	13	54	519	- 0.1	-	-	- 30.5	-	-	-	6.3	-	-	- 0.1	1.0	-	0.3	-	-	-	- 0.1	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.2	-	-	-	60.4	13	39.6	11	100.0
North of Sahara																																				
	Algeria	20	12	8	40	154	-	-	-	- 33.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	- 0.7	-	-	-	-	-	- 0.1	0.7	0.1	- 1.0	0.7	-	- 5.5	57.5	12	42.5	8	100.0		
	Egypt	30	9	21	70	1108	- 14.9	-	-	- 12.3	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	- 0.1	1.1	0.2	0.0	-	-	-	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.4	-	-	1.1	68.5	17	31.5	13	100.0
	Libya	10	9	1	10	35	- 61.4	-	-	- 3.0	-	-	-	- 2.6	-	-	-	- 1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	- 1.4	-	-	-	29.3	4	70.7	6	100.0	
	Morocco	25	10	15	60	1214	- 19.1	-	-	- 18.8	-	-	-	0.8	0.5	-	-	- 0.0	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	59.9	14	40.1	11	100.0
Tunisia	19	9	10	53	755	- 20.4	-	-	- 12.2	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	- 0.1	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	-	-	-	65.1	9	34.9	10	100.0	
South of Sahara																																				
	Angola	29	20	9	31	251	- 3.1	0.8	-	-	- 10.0	3.1	0.8	10.3	-	-	- 0.1	4.4	0.2	-	-	-	-	- 0.3	2.8	0.8	0.3	- 6.8	-	-	-	56.2	15	43.8	14	100.0

Row	Partner countries	Number of donors	Number of significant relations	Number of non-significant relations	Fragmentation ratio (in %)	CPA (USD million)	ADF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev.Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNFPA	UNRWA	WFP	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
	Benin	28	19	9	32	673	7.1	2.5	-	-	190	0.8	0.4	6.5	-	0.0	12.8	0.6	2.4	-	-	0.1	1.4	0.3	0.1	1.0	-	-	0.5	44.5	12	55.5	16	100.0
	Botswana	19	11	8	42	162	-	4.3	-	-	24.2	-	0.8	1.3	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.9	0.5	-	-	-	64.7	9	35.3	10	100.0
	Burkina Faso	32	20	12	38	1023	8.0	4.0	-	-	16.0	0.6	0.3	6.1	-	0.1	18.8	0.4	2.1	-	0.3	0.1	1.1	0.3	-	2.8	-	-	1.4	37.7	16	62.3	16	100.0
	Burundi	32	23	9	28	607	2.9	0.7	-	-	21.7	0.3	0.3	3.8	-	-	21.6	1.3	3.3	-	-	0.1	3.6	0.6	1.9	2.1	1.0	-	1.8	33.0	16	67.0	16	100.0
	Cameroon	28	17	11	39	542	10.7	1.1	-	-	13.7	2.2	0.7	2.2	-	0.1	15.6	0.7	-	-	-	0.1	1.8	0.8	0.6	1.5	-	-	1.8	46.5	13	53.5	15	100.0
	Cape Verde	21	12	9	43	326	5.7	1.5	-	-	11.3	-	0.5	0.6	-	-	7.8	0.5	-	-	-	-	1.7	0.4	-	0.1	-	-	0.0	69.9	10	30.1	11	100.0
	Central African Rep.	29	18	11	38	213	0.3	0.0	-	-	39.7	0.4	-	3.4	-	0.3	8.3	-	6.2	-	-	0.2	6.5	1.4	1.3	4.4	2.7	-	7.7	17.1	14	82.9	15	100.0
	Chad	33	18	15	45	522	3.9	6.4	-	-	19.5	0.6	0.2	6.2	-	0.0	2.8	0.8	-	-	-	0.1	1.5	0.8	3.7	4.8	-	-	26.4	22.3	18	77.7	15	100.0
	Comoros	15	11	4	27	45	0.8	1.7	-	-	23.9	0.7	-	10.4	-	-	11.0	2.5	5.3	-	-	-	3.5	1.8	-	2.5	6.6	-	-	29.3	3	70.7	12	100.0
	Congo, Dem. Rep.	35	18	17	49	1996	4.7	0.0	-	-	18.3	2.1	-	4.3	-	0.0	16.0	0.2	3.8	-	-	-	7.8	0.5	1.5	5.7	0.3	-	5.7	29.1	20	70.9	15	100.0
	Congo, Rep.	20	13	7	35	132	3.5	0.8	-	-	24.6	0.5	0.8	15.4	-	-	16.2	2.2	1.4	-	-	1.3	1.4	1.8	1.4	5.9	-	-	10.0	12.7	5	87.3	15	100.0
	Cote d'Ivoire	31	13	18	58	621	1.8	1.1	-	-	10.8	0.4	0.3	10.2	-	0.1	36.3	0.4	8.8	-	-	0.1	1.1	0.8	0.3	2.3	0.1	-	0.7	24.3	14	75.7	17	100.0
	Djibouti	19	12	7	37	132	5.0	9.0	-	-	7.6	0.2	-	1.4	-	-	1.6	0.6	-	-	-	0.2	0.9	0.6	1.7	2.1	-	-	3.7	65.4	6	34.6	13	100.0
	Equatorial Guinea	9	6	3	33	31	-	-	-	-	0.9	-	-	22.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.1	3.5	-	1.5	-	-	-	69.9	4	30.1	5	100.0
	Entrea	22	14	8	36	140	4.9	-	-	-	26.4	1.3	-	29.4	-	0.3	3.9	3.0	-	-	-	0.3	6.5	3.0	0.9	9.3	-	-	-	10.9	10	89.1	12	100.0
	Ethiopia	38	16	22	58	3390	4.4	0.5	-	-	7.0	0.6	0.1	7.6	-	0.0	25.1	0.5	3.6	-	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.3	0.3	2.4	-	-	10.6	36.0	21	64.0	17	100.0
	Gabon	13	8	5	38	93	-	2.0	-	-	14.1	-	-	2.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.9	1.3	0.6	0.8	-	-	-	77.4	4	22.6	9	100.0
	Gambia	21	15	6	29	124	4.9	15.7	-	-	18.3	1.4	0.8	15.0	-	-	9.5	2.5	2.4	-	-	0.2	2.4	1.1	0.4	1.4	-	-	0.3	23.8	6	76.2	15	100.0
	Ghana	33	17	16	48	1670	8.1	0.5	-	-	6.3	0.4	-	3.4	-	0.0	19.6	0.7	7.5	-	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.0	1.7	-	-	1.2	49.3	17	50.7	16	100.0
	Guinea	24	15	9	38	224	8.8	7.0	-	-	32.4	1.7	-	7.0	-	-	0.0	1.9	-	-	-	0.3	3.1	1.1	0.5	4.9	2.4	-	3.6	25.3	10	74.7	14	100.0
	Guinea-Bissau	21	15	6	29	119	7.0	-	-	-	14.1	0.6	-	14.0	-	-	7.1	0.6	13.2	-	-	-	3.3	1.4	0.1	10.9	1.0	-	-	26.8	9	73.2	12	100.0
	Kenya	36	19	17	47	1797	5.6	0.8	-	-	5.6	1.9	-	3.7	-	0.0	13.0	0.6	-	-	0.1	0.0	1.8	0.3	1.5	2.3	0.0	-	7.8	54.9	20	45.1	16	100.0
	Lesotho	23	12	11	48	272	5.2	1.5	-	-	27.3	0.3	0.3	9.2	-	-	15.2	1.0	4.4	-	-	0.3	1.1	0.6	-	0.5	-	-	1.5	31.7	9	68.3	14	100.0
	Liberia	29	17	12	41	491	0.9	0.1	-	-	18.5	0.4	-	4.2	-	-	17.4	0.2	2.8	-	-	0.1	4.3	0.7	0.3	3.5	1.3	-	1.8	43.5	14	56.5	15	100.0
	Madagascar	25	19	6	24	453	3.5	3.4	-	-	8.8	2.1	-	13.6	-	0.1	17.8	2.1	-	-	-	0.1	1.2	0.8	-	4.1	-	-	2.3	40.0	12	60.0	13	100.0
	Malawi	29	16	13	45	982	4.3	1.1	-	-	21.2	0.8	-	5.1	-	0.0	13.4	0.6	2.2	-	-	0.1	1.2	0.4	0.1	2.2	-	-	0.5	46.7	14	53.3	15	100.0
	Mali	32	19	13	41	1048	6.9	2.6	-	-	9.4	2.1	0.1	1.0	-	0.0	14.9	0.6	0.6	-	-	0.1	1.5	0.3	0.0	1.8	-	-	0.7	57.4	16	42.6	16	100.0
	Mauntania	23	14	9	39	366	4.3	36.4	-	-	6.9	0.6	-	0.3	-	0.1	10.6	1.1	9.2	-	-	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.1	1.0	-	-	1.3	26.6	8	73.4	15	100.0
	Mauntius	13	5	8	62	128	-	0.1	-	-	53.0	-	1.6	1.6	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	42.3	5	57.7	8	100.0
	Mayotte	2	1	1	50	611	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	99.8	1	0.2	1	100.0
	Mozambique	37	24	13	35	1909	4.0	1.2	-	-	10.7	0.6	0.0	4.1	-	0.0	9.9	0.2	1.1	-	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.0	1.0	-	-	0.6	65.3	20	34.7	17	100.0
	Namibia	22	13	9	41	259	-	-	-	-	4.2	-	0.7	11.4	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.3	-	-	0.1	81.4	12	18.6	10	100.0
	Niger	32	21	11	34	689	3.6	3.7	-	-	21.9	1.2	0.3	0.8	-	0.1	10.5	0.7	0.7	-	-	0.1	2.6	0.7	-	5.3	-	-	14.9	32.9	17	67.1	15	100.0
	Nigeria	31	9	22	71	2004	1.2	0.2	-	-	3.0	0.4	0.5	2.4	-	0.0	49.9	0.2	0.1	-	-	0.1	0.8	0.6	0.0	3.8	-	-	-	36.7	16	63.3	15	100.0
	Rwanda	32	16	16	50	949	4.6	1.0	-	-	11.0	0.2	0.2	15.1	-	-	15.5	1.5	-	-	0.1	0.1	1.3	0.3	0.2	1.3	-	-	0.8	46.9	17	53.1	15	100.0
	Sao Tome & Principe	16	10	6	38	46	0.6	6.8	-	-	12.9	0.2	-	2.3	-	-	4.6	3.4	1.2	-	-	-	2.9	1.3	-	1.5	-	-	0.2	62.0	4	38.0	12	100.0

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Row	Partner countries	2	3	4	5	6	ADF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNPBF	UNRWA	WFP	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total	
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	ADF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNPBF	UNRWA	WFP	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total	
2	Number of partner countries						40	99	33	14	149	67	87	113	25	98	96	79	48	10	18	105	144	119	94	123	18	4	74	1670		1657		3327	
3	Number of significant relations						32	37	26	14	128	32	53	73	24	67	76	52	29	7	17	65	37	71	36	40	16	4	31	884		967		1851	
4	Number of non-significant relations						8	62	7	0	21	35	34	40	1	31	20	27	19	3	1	40	107	48	58	83	2	0	43	786		690		1476	
5	Concentration ratio (in %)						80	37	79	100	86	48	61	65	96	68	79	66	60	70	94	62	26	60	38	33	89	100	42	53		58		56	
6	CPA (USD million)						1544	1820	2038	69	9967	590	359	3004	692	51	11523	473	1362	21	52	57	1909	346	660	1764	52	595	2607	54592		41556		96148	
7	Average CPA (USD million)						39	18	62	5	67	9	4	27	28	1	120	6	28	2	3	1	13	3	7	14	3	149	35	33		25		633	
8	Donors' share of global CPA (in %)						1.6	1.9	2.1	0.1	10.4	0.6	0.4	3.1	0.7	0.1	12.0	0.5	1.4	0.0	0.1	0.1	2.0	0.4	0.7	1.8	0.1	0.6	2.7	56.8		43.2		100.0	
							% %																					%	No.	%	No.				
	Senegal	34	22	12	35	842	7.7	3.6	-	-	10.0	0.6	0.7	2.2	-	0.1	14.4	0.6	5.9	-	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.3	0.4	1.7	-	-	0.8	50.0	17	50.0	17	100.0	
	Seychelles	9	8	1	11	19	-	16.7	-	-	24.7	-	18.1	-	-	1.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.7	4	61.3	5	100.0
	Sierra Leone	28	20	8	29	424	4.5	3.7	-	-	18.9	1.9	0.4	4.2	-	0.1	14.9	1.0	10.1	-	-	0.2	1.4	0.7	0.2	9.7	1.2	-	0.9	26.1	11	73.9	17	100.0	
	Somalia	28	19	9	32	477	-	0.3	-	-	26.6	-	-	5.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	9.0	0.4	3.4	11.4	0.1	-	6.3	36.8	18	63.2	10	100.0	
	South Africa	33	14	19	58	1016	0.0	-	-	-	15.1	-	0.1	4.3	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.3	-	-	-	79.1	21	20.9	12	100.0	
	St. Helena	1	1	0	0	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1	0.0	0	100.0	
	Sudan	35	19	16	46	1981	0.1	4.1	-	-	14.4	1.3	0.2	3.8	-	0.0	1.2	0.6	-	-	-	0.0	10.2	0.5	1.3	5.5	0.1	-	20.4	36.3	19	63.7	16	100.0	
	Swaziland	15	7	8	53	94	-	-	-	-	22.8	-	0.8	38.8	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	0.7	1.3	1.4	-	1.1	-	-	1.4	31.3	6	68.7	9	100.0	
	Tanzania	35	19	16	46	2879	4.9	0.5	-	-	6.7	0.9	0.1	5.0	-	0.0	24.4	0.6	1.1	-	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.4	0.1	0.9	-	-	0.7	52.3	18	47.7	17	100.0	
	Togo	24	15	9	38	214	0.7	8.2	-	-	22.9	1.4	0.6	8.8	-	-	14.0	-	20.4	-	-	0.2	2.7	0.7	0.3	1.9	-	-	0.5	16.6	10	83.4	14	100.0	
	Uganda	37	23	14	38	1675	6.1	0.1	-	-	7.7	0.5	0.0	3.4	-	0.0	21.3	1.2	-	-	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.9	0.8	1.5	0.0	-	2.6	52.9	20	47.1	17	100.0	
	Zambia	33	21	12	36	884	6.3	0.0	-	-	10.5	0.9	-	4.6	-	0.1	4.1	0.5	6.4	-	0.3	0.1	1.0	0.4	0.3	1.3	-	-	1.0	62.1	17	37.9	16	100.0	
	Zimbabwe	35	18	17	49	701	4.0	0.0	-	-	15.6	0.9	-	10.6	-	0.1	0.5	-	0.0	-	-	0.1	6.1	0.7	0.2	8.9	-	-	7.1	45.2	21	54.8	14	100.0	
	North and Central America																																		
	Anguilla	2	2	0	0	8	-	-	-	-	0.7	99.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0	100.0	2	100.0	
	Antigua and Barbuda	3	3	0	0	19	-	-	-	-	2.0	63.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.9	1	65.1	2	100.0	
	Barbados	6	5	1	17	16	-	-	-	-	0.7	76.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.8	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.4	1	92.6	5	100.0	
	Belize	12	11	1	8	28	-	3.4	-	-	15.6	26.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	2.2	-	-	4.8	-	-	-	39.6	3	60.4	9	100.0	
	Costa Rica	16	11	5	31	132	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.7	-	-	-	89.1	7	10.9	9	100.0	
	Cuba	23	15	8	35	110	-	1.8	-	-	-	22.6	-	-	1.3	10.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	1.6	0.6	0.1	0.8	-	-	0.7	59.3	12	40.7	11	100.0	
	Dominica	7	3	4	57	35	-	-	-	-	14.2	66.1	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.0	3	82.0	4	100.0

Row	Partner countries					Donors																				DAC countries		Multilateral agencies		Grand Total				
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	ADF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CaDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNPBF	UNRWA	WFP	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	
																														%	No.	%	No.	
	Dominican Republic	17	11	6	35	227	-	0.0	-	-	35.6	-	-	7.7	2.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.1	0.7	-	-	-	52.1	7	47.9	10	100.0
	El Salvador	23	13	10	43	353	-	-	-	-	14.9	-	0.3	2.7	1.0	0.1	-	0.8	-	-	-	0.1	0.3	0.4	-	0.3	-	-	0.2	79.1	12	20.9	11	100.0
	Grenada	7	5	2	29	38	-	-	-	19.6	32.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.7	-	16.9	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	16.4	2	83.6	5	100.0
	Guatemala	29	18	11	38	383	-	0.2	-	-	9.8	-	0.4	2.0	1.7	0.0	0.1	1.4	-	-	-	0.2	6.6	1.0	-	0.8	-	-	2.4	73.4	16	26.6	13	100.0
	Haiti	37	14	23	62	2739	-	0.1	-	0.2	10.4	-	0.0	0.4	7.7	0.0	7.1	0.3	4.5	-	-	0.0	1.1	0.5	-	2.7	0.1	-	7.4	57.3	21	42.7	16	100.0
	Honduras	27	16	11	41	530	-	0.1	-	-	11.0	1.4	0.2	1.6	20.9	0.1	20.8	-	-	-	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.4	-	0.7	-	-	0.7	40.9	13	59.1	14	100.0
	Jamaica	17	11	6	35	177	-	6.8	-	9.4	47.4	-	1.3	6.6	1.5	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.6	0.1	-	0.5	-	-	-	25.3	6	74.7	11	100.0
	Mexico	21	7	14	67	602	-	-	-	-	1.2	-	4.4	0.6	1.8	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.2	-	-	-	91.3	11	8.7	10	100.0
	Montserrat	4	3	1	25	29	-	-	-	2.2	29.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.9	1	32.1	3	100.0
	Nicaragua	34	25	9	26	572	-	0.3	-	-	3.8	1.0	0.7	1.9	19.3	0.1	8.4	0.8	3.4	-	0.5	0.0	1.1	0.8	-	0.7	-	-	0.3	56.9	18	43.1	16	100.0
	Panama	16	9	7	44	143	-	-	-	-	1.1	-	1.1	-	2.2	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	-	-	0.3	92.4	6	7.6	10	100.0
	St. Kitts-Nevis	3	2	1	33	15	-	-	-	38.2	57.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.1	1	95.9	2	100.0
	St. Lucia	8	3	5	63	48	-	-	-	20.9	48.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.3	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	7.8	3	92.2	5	100.0
	St. Vincent & Grenadines	6	3	3	50	20	-	-	-	33.1	52.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.7	2	94.3	4	100.0
	Trinidad and Tobago	8	8	0	0	3	-	-	-	2.0	13.9	-	-	-	11.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.0	4.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.6	3	36.4	5	100.0
	South America																																	
	Argentina	19	15	4	21	132	-	-	-	-	6.0	-	2.2	-	5.0	0.6	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	-	-	-	82.7	9	17.3	10	100.0
	Bolivia	31	16	15	48	609	-	0.2	-	-	10.6	0.5	-	1.3	16.1	0.0	7.7	0.4	-	-	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.3	-	1.4	-	-	0.2	60.6	17	39.4	14	100.0
	Brazil	30	15	15	50	622	-	-	-	-	3.4	-	4.6	1.4	2.4	0.1	0.2	0.0	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	-	-	86.9	18	13.1	12	100.0
	Chile	25	19	6	24	184	-	-	-	-	8.8	-	6.4	-	3.6	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.9	0.1	-	0.6	-	-	-	79.1	17	20.9	8	100.0
	Colombia	31	14	17	55	890	-	3.4	-	-	6.0	-	1.2	1.2	1.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	-	-	0.0	0.7	0.2	2.6	0.7	-	-	1.1	81.0	16	19.0	15	100.0
	Ecuador	25	20	5	20	201	-	-	-	-	12.3	-	0.5	4.0	3.9	0.2	-	1.0	-	-	-	0.1	0.5	0.5	2.0	0.4	-	-	0.7	73.8	13	26.2	12	100.0
	Guyana	16	9	7	44	157	-	-	-	3.8	18.6	0.4	0.2	3.4	31.0	-	20.3	0.3	-	-	-	0.4	1.5	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	19.3	5	80.7	11	100.0
	Paraguay	17	11	6	35	165	-	-	-	-	18.1	-	-	-	5.3	4.9	0.1	-	2.8	-	-	0.0	0.9	0.6	-	0.6	-	-	-	66.8	8	33.2	9	100.0
	Peru	28	16	12	43	637	-	0.0	-	-	4.0	-	0.5	3.7	1.9	0.1	1.0	-	0.0	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.3	-	0.7	-	-	0.0	87.5	15	12.5	13	100.0
	Suriname	9	4	5	56	103	-	0.0	-	-	16.8	-	1.0	3.0	2.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	76.6	3	23.4	6	100.0
	Uruguay	15	11	4	27	55	-	0.3	-	-	12.9	-	1.8	-	7.4	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	1.9	1.5	-	1.5	-	-	-	71.8	6	28.2	9	100.0
	Venezuela	17	13	4	24	37	-	0.1	-	-	15.8	-	10.0	-	0.6	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	0.9	1.7	3.4	3.4	3.7	-	-	-	59.7	7	40.3	10	100.0
	Middle East																																	
	Iran	19	13	6	32	67	-	0.1	-	-	5.1	-	15.5	12.2	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	1.3	2.2	16.8	2.3	-	-	1.9	41.4	8	58.6	11	100.0
	Iraq	30	6	24	80	2075	-	0.0	-	-	2.6	-	-	0.5	-	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.1	-	-	-	0.5	0.2	1.5	1.4	-	-	0.4	89.8	18	10.2	12	100.0
	Jordan	28	11	17	61	1015	-	20.4	-	-	12.8	-	0.3	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.0	-	0.0	0.2	0.1	1.8	0.1	-	10.5	-	53.4	15	46.6	13	100.0
	Lebanon	29	16	13	45	401	-	9.6	-	-	13.3	-	0.9	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.0	-	-	-	1.7	0.2	1.6	0.2	-	17.4	-	54.9	19	45.1	10	100.0
	Oman	9	9	0	0	8	-	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.0	-	-	-	-	-	85.4	6	14.6	3	100.0

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

Row	Partner countries	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534	535	536	537	538	539	540	541	542	543	544	545	546	547	548	549	550	551	552	553	554	555	556	557	558	559	560	561	562	563	564	565	566	567	568	569	570	571	572	573	574	575	576	577	578	579	580	581	582	583	584	585	586	587	588	589	590	591	592	593	594	595	596	597	598	599	600	601	602	603	604	605	606	607	608	609	610	611	612	613	614	615	616	617	618	619	620	621	622	623	624	625	626	627	628	629	630	631	632	633	634	635	636	637	638	639	640	641	642	643	644	645	646	647	648	649	650	651	652	653	654	655	656	657	658	659	660	661	662	663	664	665	666	667	668	669	670	671	672	673	674	675	676	677	678	679	680	681	682	683	684	685	686	687	688	689	690	691	692	693	694	695	696	697	698	699	700	701	702	703	704	705	706	707	708	709	710	711	712	713	714	715	716	717	718	719	720	721	722	723	724	725	726	727	728	729	730	731	732	733	734	735	736	737	738	739	740	741	742	743	744	745	746	747	748	749	750	751	752	753	754	755	756	757	758	759	760	761	762	763	764	765	766	767	768	769	770	771	772	773	774	775	776	777	778	779	780	781	782	783	784	785	786	787	788	789	790	791	792	793	794	795	796	797	798	799	800	801	802	803	804	805	806	807	808	809	810	811	812	813	814	815	816	817	818	819	820	821	822	823	824	825	826	827	828	829	830	831	832	833	834	835	836	837	838	839	840	841	842	843	844	845	846	847	848	849	850	851	852	853	854	855	856	857	858	859	860	861	862	863	864	865	866	867	868	869	870	871	872	873	874	875	876	877	878	879	880	881	882	883	884	885	886	887	888	889	890	891	892	893	894	895	896	897	898	899	900	901	902	903	904	905	906	907	908	909	910	911	912	913	914	915	916	917	918	919	920	921	922	923	924	925	926	927	928	929	930	931	932	933	934	935	936	937	938	939	940	941	942	943	944	945	946	947	948	949	950	951	952	953	954	955	956	957	958	959	960	961	962	963	964	965	966	967	968	969	970	971	972	973	974	975	976	977	978	979	980	981	982	983	984	985	986	987	988	989	990	991	992	993	994	995	996	997	998	999	1000
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534	535	536	537	538	539	540	541	542	543	544	545	546	547	548	549																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																			

Row	Partner countries	2	3	4	5	6	ADF	Arab Agencies	AsDF	CarDB	EU institutions	GAVI	GEF	Global Fund	IADB	IAEA	IDA	IFAD	IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	Montreal Protocol	Nordic Dev Fund	UNAIDS	UNDP	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNICEF	UNPBF	UNRWA	WFP	DAC countries	No. of DAC countries	Multilateral agencies	No. of multilateral agencies	Grand Total
1	Column 1	2	3	4	5	6																												
	Far East Asia																																	
	Cambodia	35	18	17	49	727	-	0.4	10.1	-	3.8	0.5	0.2	8.4	-	0.0	9.1	0.5	-	0.5	0.1	3.4	0.8	0.0	1.7	-	-	1.4	59.0	19	41.0	16	100.0	
	China	33	13	20	61	2057	-	-	0.0	-	2.1	-	1.7	5.8	-	0.1	-	1.2	-	0.7	-	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	-	-	0.1	87.3	20	12.7	13	100.0
	Indonesia	34	8	26	76	3379	-	0.4	3.6	-	3.1	-	0.2	2.5	-	0.0	8.7	0.3	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	1.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	-	0.0	78.9	18	21.1	16	100.0	
	Korea, Dem. Rep.	16	12	4	25	73	-	-	-	-	20.3	2.7	-	25.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	1.8	-	5.0	-	22.8	20.6	9	79.4	7	100.0		
	Laos	27	23	4	15	440	-	1.4	14.1	-	3.6	0.8	0.6	1.6	-	-	13.1	0.7	-	1.0	0.1	2.7	0.5	-	1.2	-	2.3	56.3	13	43.7	14	100.0		
	Malaysia	20	8	12	60	192	-	0.1	-	-	0.6	-	5.2	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.0	0.3	0.2	1.6	0.3	-	-	91.0	10	9.0	10	100.0	
	Mongolia	29	17	12	41	308	-	0.1	10.0	-	4.4	0.4	0.1	2.0	-	0.3	11.8	0.6	-	0.3	-	1.5	0.8	0.0	0.7	-	-	-	67.1	15	32.9	14	100.0	
	Philippines	32	12	20	63	1420	-	0.0	0.0	-	3.7	-	-	4.2	-	0.0	0.9	1.3	-	0.0	-	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.7	-	1.3	87.0	18	13.0	14	100.0	
	Thailand	26	13	13	50	414	-	0.1	-	-	5.8	-	2.9	10.3	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.2	0.5	0.4	1.5	0.4	-	-	77.3	15	22.7	11	100.0	
	Timor-Leste	24	15	9	38	283	-	-	2.0	-	5.1	-	-	1.7	-	-	6.2	-	0.2	-	-	3.7	1.1	0.0	1.1	0.3	-	1.4	77.2	13	22.8	11	100.0	
	Vietnam	37	15	22	59	3362	-	0.4	7.7	-	1.2	0.6	0.0	0.4	-	0.0	28.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	-	-	60.1	20	39.9	17	100.0	
	Oceania																																	
	Cook Islands	5	3	2	40	14	-	-	4.3	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	93.4	2	6.6	3	100.0	
	Fiji	14	9	5	36	74	-	-	0.2	-	8.5	-	1.4	4.0	-	-	0.9	-	-	-	0.8	6.2	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	77.8	6	22.2	8	100.0	
	Kiribati	10	5	5	50	22	-	-	1.3	-	3.6	0.1	4.6	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	1.9	-	-	87.7	3	12.3	7	100.0		
	Marshall Islands	6	3	3	50	92	-	-	10.8	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	88.5	3	11.5	3	100.0		
	Micronesia, Fed. States	6	2	4	67	126	-	-	0.8	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	98.7	3	1.3	3	100.0		
	Nauru	6	2	4	67	27	-	-	-	-	4.0	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	95.8	3	4.2	3	100.0		
	Niue	4	2	2	50	15	-	-	-	-	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	92.2	2	7.8	2	100.0		
	Palau	5	3	2	40	26	-	-	-	-	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	97.0	3	3.0	2	100.0		
	Papua New Guinea	18	8	10	56	502	-	-	2.9	-	10.0	0.5	0.2	1.4	-	-	2.0	-	-	-	0.1	1.9	0.4	0.1	0.6	-	-	80.0	7	20.0	11	100.0		
	Samoa	9	5	4	44	152	-	0.2	20.7	-	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	16.4	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	54.6	4	45.4	5	100.0		
	Solomon Islands	10	6	4	40	341	-	-	5.1	-	7.3	0.0	-	0.4	-	-	1.6	-	2.8	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	82.1	3	17.9	7	100.0		
	Tokelau	3	2	1	33	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	99.2	2	0.8	1	100.0		
	Tonga	8	5	3	38	71	-	-	8.7	-	2.3	-	-	-	-	-	17.7	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	71.2	4	28.8	4	100.0		
	Tuvalu	6	5	1	17	13	-	-	2.5	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.3	-	-	-	-	-	93.4	3	6.6	3	100.0		
	Vanuatu	10	5	5	50	105	-	-	0.4	-	1.9	-	0.9	-	-	-	2.1	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	94.5	5	5.5	5	100.0		
	Wallis & Futuna	2	1	1	50	128	-	-	-	-	3.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96.6	1	3.4	1	100.0		

ANNEX D. FRAGMENTATION ON THE BASIS OF CPA

Tables D.1 and D.2 two consider country programmable aid (CPA). They look at the concentration of core resource outflows of multilateral agencies (Table D.1) and how the re-allocation of non-core resources from bilateral agencies to multilateral agencies affects fragmentation (Table D.2).

This data complement the analysis undertaken in Chapter 2 of this report, where the same comparison is made on the basis of CPA+ (which includes humanitarian aid).

Table D.1. Concentration of multilateral agencies (core resources)

	CPA* (USD 2010 million)	Share of Global CPA* (in %)	No. of relations	No. of significant relations	Concentration ratio (in %)
Arab Agencies**	1 812	2.1	98	38	39
EU institutions***	8 113	9.5	149	123	83
GAVI	590	0.7	67	33	49
GEF	359	0.4	87	55	63
Global Fund	2 997	3.5	113	72	64
IDA	10 068	11.8	78	70	90
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	1 346	1.6	37	31	84
Montreal Protocol	21	0.02	10	7	70
Nordic Dev. Fund	52	0.1	18	16	89
Regional Development Bank Funds:	4 161	4.9	104	93	89
<i>AfDF</i>	1 515	1.8	38	31	82
<i>AsDF</i>	1 921	2.2	27	24	89
<i>CarDB</i>	69	0.1	14	14	100
<i>IaDB</i>	656	0.8	25	24	96
UN agencies:	1 909	2.2	377	205	54
<i>UNDP</i>	458	0.5	136	74	54
<i>UNFPA</i>	282	0.3	117	76	65
<i>UNHCR</i>	0	0.0	0	0	
<i>UNICEF</i>	740	0.9	120	51	43
<i>UNRWA</i>	429	0.5	4	4	100
<i>WFP</i>	0	0.0	0	0	
Other UN:	611	0.7	296	201	68
<i>IAEA</i>	51	0.06	98	67	68
<i>IFAD</i>	462	0.54	79	51	65
<i>UNAIDS</i>	51	0.06	103	68	66
<i>UN Peacebuilding Fund</i>	47	0.06	16	15	94
Total multilaterals	32 040	37.4	1 434	944	66
<i>Total multilaterals excl. EU</i>	23 926	27.9	1 285	821	64
Total DAC countries	53 469	62.5	1 605	865	54
<i>Total DAC members incl. EU</i>	61 582	71.9	1 754	988	56

* Note that this CPA analysis excludes regional allocations.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: "The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy."

Table D.2. Impact of non-core multilateral aid on fragmentation

	No. of relations	No. of additional relations due to earmarked funding	Donor's share of Global CPA*	Concentration ratio (in %)	
Arab Agencies**	98	0	2.1%	39	→
EU institutions***	149	0	9.6%	83	↑
GAVI	67	0	0.7%	49	→
GEF	87	0	0.4%	63	→
Global Fund	113	0	3.5%	63	↓
IDA	96	18	13.3%	79	↓
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	48	11	1.6%	65	↓
Montreal Protocol	10	0	0.0%	70	→
Nordic Dev. Fund	18	0	0.1%	89	→
Regional Development Bank Funds:	112	8	5.0%	86	↓
<i>AfDF</i>	40	2	1.8%	80	↓
<i>AsDF</i>	33	6	2.4%	79	↓
<i>CarDB</i>	14	0	0.1%	100	→
<i>IaDB</i>	25	0	0.8%	96	→
UN agencies:	401	24	4.7%	39	↓
<i>UNDP</i>	144	8	1.9%	29	↓
<i>UNFPA</i>	119	2	0.4%	56	↓
<i>UNHCR</i>	8	8	0.3%	75	→
<i>UNICEF</i>	123	3	1.6%	33	↓
<i>UNRWA</i>	4	0	0.5%	100	→
<i>WFP</i>	3	3	0.0%	100	→
Other UN:	298	2	0.7%	67	↓
<i>IAEA</i>	98	0	0.1%	68	→
<i>IFAD</i>	79	0	0.6%	66	↑
<i>UNAIDS</i>	105	2	0.1%	64	↓
<i>UN Peacebuilding Fund</i>	16	0	0.1%	94	→
Total multilaterals	1 497	63	41.8%	61	↓
<i>Total multilaterals excl. EU</i>	1 348	63	32.2%	58	↓
Total DAC countries	1 575	- 30	58.1%	54	→
<i>Total DAC members incl. EU</i>	1 724	- 30	67.7%	56	→

* Note that this CPA analysis excludes regional allocations.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The European Union (EU) has provided the following clarification: "The EU is unique among DAC members in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a full DAC member and a donor of ODA in its own right, with its own development policy and own resources, it is often presented as a multilateral in DAC publications for statistical purposes. This report reflects this dichotomy".

ANNEX E. THE MOPAN COMMON APPROACH METHODOLOGY

The MOPAN Common Approach was designed to assess the organisational effectiveness of multilateral organisations (MOs). The objective of the approach is to generate relevant, credible information which MOPAN members can use to meet their domestic accountability requirements and fulfil their responsibilities and obligations as bilateral donors. The Common Approach also seeks to support dialogue between donor countries, MOs, and their direct clients and partners in order to improve organisational effectiveness and learning over time.

Box E.1. Organisational effectiveness according to MOPAN

MOPAN defines **organisational effectiveness** as the extent to which a multilateral organisation is organised to contribute to development results in the countries where it operates. It examines the organisation systems, practices and behaviours that MOPAN believes are important for aid effectiveness and that are likely to contribute to results at the country level.

Source: Mopan website, www.mopanonline.org.

In 2012, MOPAN tested an expanded assessment framework for evaluating multilateral organisations' effectiveness and the results. The assessment of results focused on the degree to which progress was being made towards the organisations' stated objectives and the relevance of its programming.

The MOPAN Common Approach is not meant as a formal evaluation. Instead, its aim is to respond to the information needs of a group of donors by collecting and producing information that would not otherwise be available about the organisational effectiveness of an MO. It **does not** compare multilateral organisations since their mandates and structures vary too much in scope and nature. Nonetheless, since MOPAN assessments are repeated at regular intervals, they can help determine the direction of an MO's performance over time.

The following sections below cover the objective, survey structure, survey respondents, choice of MOs and partner countries, and finally, a brief description of the complementary document review.

Objective

Findings of the MOPAN Common Approach are used to:

- build a better understanding of the effectiveness of the multilateral organisation;
- support discussions between partner country governments, bilateral donors and MOs as part of an ongoing dialogue process to strengthen mutual accountability, in particular at country-level;
- inform the direction and discussion as well as to enhance participation in the governance of MOs (*e.g.* at an executive board or governing body meeting);
- strengthen relationships between bilateral donors, MOs, and countries where they operate;
- contribute to policy-making; and
- contribute to wider debates about MO effectiveness.

Survey structure and organisation

The instrument used to conduct the survey is a computer-aided web interviewing (CAWI) package. It is administered online and can be completed in English, French or Spanish. When it is not possible for respondents to complete the online survey, off-line methods are used. Intellectual service providers manage the survey process.

The main part of the survey consists of a series of closed questions based on the key performance indicators below. Respondents are asked to rate the performance of the multilateral organisation on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 6 (very strong). In addition, respondents are invited to respond to open-ended questions on what they consider to be the particular strengths and areas for improving the organisation.

The Common Approach framework examines four quadrants of performance, which includes the key performance indicators. In addition, it complements respondents' survey data with a review of documents published by the multilateral organisations assessed. From 2012 it also includes consultation with the relevant staff in multilateral organisations. The key performance indicators (KPIs) listed in each category below are tailored to both the type of respondent and the type of multilateral organisation assessed.

Key performance indicators

Strategic management

- The MO executive management provides direction for the achievement of external result.
- The MO's corporate strategies and plans are focused on the achievement of result.
- The MO maintains focus on the cross-cutting priorities identified in its strategic framework, and/or based on its mandate and international commitments.
- The MO's work in countries and regions is focused on results.

Operational management

- The MO makes transparent and predictable resource allocations.
- The MO's financial management is linked to performance management.
- The MO has policies and processes for financial accountability (audit, risk management, anti-corruption).
- Performance information on results is used by the MO to (a) revise and adjust policies and strategies; (b) plan new interventions; (c) manage poorly performing programmes, projects or initiatives; (d) report to the executive committee and acted upon by responsible units.
- The MO manages HR using methods to improve organisational performance.
- The MO's programming processes are performance-oriented.
- The MO delegates decision-making authority (to the regional- or country-level).

Relationship management

- The MO coordinates and directs its programming (including capacity building) at the country-level in support of agreed national plans or partner plans.
- The MO's procedures take into account local conditions and capacities.
- The MO adds value to policy dialogue with its partners.
- The MO harmonises arrangements and procedures with other programming partners.

Knowledge management

- The MO consistently evaluates its delivery and external results.
- The MO presents performance information on its effectiveness.
- The MO encourages identification, documentation and dissemination of lessons learned.

Demonstrating progress towards results

- Extent of MO progress towards its institutional / organisation-wide outcomes (identified in strategic plans).
- Extent of MO contributions to country-level goals and priorities (identified in country strategy).
- Extent of MO contributions to relevant MDGs.

Relevance to an organisation's stakeholders

- MO objectives and programme of work are relevant to major stakeholders.

Survey respondents

Depending on the indicator, different respondents or groups of respondents are targeted. Respondents include:

- **Donors in headquarters:** Professional staff working for a MOPAN (donor) government with responsibility for overseeing and observing a multilateral organisation at the institutional level (in the donor capital or permanent mission of the MO).
- **Donors in country offices:** Professional staff working for a MOPAN (donor) government in a partner country who work closely with the multilateral organisation at the country level; and
- **Direct partners / clients:** partner country government, civil society, other relevant stakeholders.

Respondents are identified either by MOPAN members or the multilateral organisations themselves on the basis of familiarity of the organisation assessed. This is confirmed by a “screener” question at the start of the survey asking respondents to identify their level of familiarity with the assessed MO.

Selection of organisations and partner countries

MOPAN selects multilateral organisations for the Common Approach assessment on the basis of three criteria:

1. Perceived importance and interest to all MOPAN members;
2. Medium-term strategic planning and replenishment cycles so that organisations are assessed before the beginning of the planning process, or prior to the start of the replenishment negotiations; and
3. MOs should be selected on the basis of the criteria above and re-assessed on a 3-5 year cycle.

Partner countries cannot be surveyed two years in a row and must be representative of a wide geographical spread. They also must have a significant number of MOPAN donors and selected multilateral organisations present in that country.

Document review

Included in the MOPAN Common Approach is a review of documents to complement the survey data. The MOPAN document review explores evidence that the multilateral organisations have the necessary systems in place for an organisation to be effective. The review examines publicly available documents, including those that the organisations provide.

Three types of documents are reviewed: (i) documents from the multilateral organisation relevant to the indicators above; (ii) organisational reviews or assessments – both external and internal – about the organisation's performance on the dimensions of the MOPAN framework; and (iii) external assessments such as the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (2008), the Common Performance Assessment (COMPAS) report (2008), and previous MOPAN surveys. In effect, the document review serves to triangulate the survey data with other sources of available information.

Interviews

In 2012, MOPAN complemented the survey data and document review with selected consultations and interviews at the Headquarters and country offices of the multilateral organisations being assessed.

Finalisation and dissemination of the reports

The findings from the survey, the document review, and the interviews are triangulated to prepare the draft reports which are shared with the multilateral organisations. The response from the multilateral organisations constitutes the final stage of the data validation process. The MOPAN Steering Committee approves the final version of the reports which are published on the MOPAN website together with the associated management responses from the multilateral organisation.

The final reports provide the basis for consultations with the multilateral organisation at their headquarters and at country level to discuss the findings and identify how the recommendations can best be implemented. Representatives from partner country governments which have participated in the survey are included in these consultation meetings.

ANNEX F. LIST OF FRAGILE STATES

The list of fragile states used for the purpose of this report is reproduced below. It is not an official list, merely a compilation of two recent ones: the 2012 Harmonised List of Fragile Situations from the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and the 2011 Failed States Index by the Fund for Peace. The list is also used in DAC's *2012 Fragile States Outlook*. Formerly, DAC used the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and the Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Index. However, those two sources no longer exist.

Table F.1. List of fragile states used in this report

1	AFGHANISTAN	25	KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
2	ANGOLA	26	LIBERIA
3	BANGLADESH	27	MALAWI
4	BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA	28	MARSHALL ISLANDS
5	BURUNDI	29	MICRONESIA
6	CAMEROON	30	MYANMAR
7	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	31	NEPAL
8	CHAD	32	NIGER
9	COMOROS	33	NIGERIA
10	CONGO, Dem. Rep.	34	PAKISTAN
11	CONGO, Rep.	35	RWANDA
12	COTE D'IVOIRE	36	SIERRA LEONE
13	ERITREA	37	SOLOMON ISLANDS
14	ETHIOPIA	38	SOMALIA
15	GEORGIA	39	SOUTH SUDAN
16	GUINEA	40	SRI LANKA
17	GUINEA BISSAU	41	SUDAN
18	HAITI	42	TIMOR-LESTE
19	IRAN	43	TOGO
20	IRAQ	44	UGANDA
21	KENYA	45	WEST BANK & GAZA
22	KIRIBATI	46	YEMEN
23	KOREA, Dem. Rep.	47	ZIMBABWE
24	KOSOVO		

Source: Combination of the 2012 Harmonised List of Fragile Situations from the World Bank, African Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank and the 2011 Failed State Index by the Fund for Peace.