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Challenging complexity, growing opportunity

As new international development co-operation structures are put in place, the challenges for development policy and programmes continue to grow in complexity. At the same time, new opportunities charged with potential are emerging. The shifting geography of poverty, the promise of green growth, the changing contexts of governance and rule of law, and the increasing pressure to curb illicit flows are some of the issues we look at in this issue of DACnews.

The new Global Partnership takes form

On 29 June the foundations for a new inclusive development partnership were cemented when the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation](#) created its new operating structure.

Supported by the OECD and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Global Partnership's governance structure reflects the increasingly multi-stakeholder nature of development. The three co-chairs will be chosen from, respectively, providers of development co-operation, recipients of development co-operation, and countries engaged in South-South co-operation. Andrew Mitchell, UK Secretary of State for International Development, was confirmed as one of these co-chairs.

"As a co-chair," said Mr. Mitchell, "I will be making sure that I keep the 'Busan agenda' at the forefront at home and abroad – in particular as I travel to different parts of the world where better development co-operation can make a difference to so many lives."

Consultations are ongoing among the other constituencies to identify the remaining co-chairs, with nominations expected by the end of July. In addition, a steering committee will include representatives from parliamentary, civil society and private sector organisations. The first ministerial-level meeting of the Global Partnership is expected to take place in early 2013.

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In a two-day meeting (28-29 June 2012), stakeholders endorsed the 10 global indicators and targets they will use to measure progress in implementing commitments made at Busan. This monitoring framework draws on previous DAC-supported monitoring, while at the same time incorporating

the broader focus of the Busan agreement on, for example, collaboration with civil society and the private sector.

In his opening remarks to the meeting, DAC Chair Brian Atwood stated, “For the DAC, the Global Partnership presents a key opportunity for engagement with a wide range of stakeholders [...] The DAC will contribute to the Partnership by leading the implementation of Busan commitments [and by sharing] our analyses and lessons learned with partner stakeholders – while at the same time learning from others.”

The meeting also endorsed a new common standard for transparency in development co-operation, drawing on a proposal prepared jointly by the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics and the [International Aid Transparency Initiative](#). This is an important step toward improving the public availability of information on development finance.

Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator, noted, “Predictable and catalytic development assistance can be such a powerful driver of development progress, helping countries to strengthen essential capacities, institutions, services and infrastructure, and to attract broader sources of development finance. It is important therefore that there is a global dialogue about this work.”

The [Working Party on Aid Effectiveness](#), which paved the way for the creation of the Global Partnership, held its final meeting on 28 June. Founded in 2003 under the auspices of the DAC, this international network grew to include over 80 member countries and organisations. It was the body behind major agreements on improving the quality of development aid, including the [Rome Declaration on Harmonisation](#) (2003), [the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness](#) (2005), the [Accra Agenda for Action](#) (2008) and the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation](#) (2011).

DAC Development Debates

On Wednesday 13 June the DAC hosted its third DAC Development Debate (DDD). Centring on the theme **New poverty patterns: Where will the poor live?** the DDD discussed new data on the changing patterns of poverty, and how to handle it.

Andy Sumner of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) affirmed that about three-quarters of the world’s people living below the USD 1.25 poverty line now live in middle income countries (MICs), partly because many low income countries (LICs) have now become MICs. Growth has largely bypassed the poor in these countries. The shift in the geography of poverty comes with other important changes: pockets of fragility within otherwise stable environments and exclusion within contexts of general prosperity.

All of this has evident consequences for development co-operation. The proportion of ODA in overall future flows will diminish, while the emphasis on concessional lending, policy coherence for development and global public goods is expected to grow. ODA will remain critical, however, and the different objectives and instruments for different groups of countries will present additional challenges.

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Looking beyond 2015, the challenges at hand are the following: ending global poverty by 2030, keeping inclusiveness at the core of development, expanding on [Millennium Development Goal 8](#) to develop a global partnership for development, and shifting the focus from ODA to policies.

Jane Sautter of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) pointed out that while most of the poor may be in MICs, LICs have higher incidences of poverty, and deeper poverty. She recommended tailor-made solutions (i.e. pro-poor policies) for each national context, avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches.

Robrecht Renard (University of Antwerp) questioned the rationale for allocation of ODA, recommending that ODA be calculated *per capita* rather than per country. He asserted that ODA (accompanied by redistributive taxation) is important for reducing poverty, as is funding for global public goods, and ODA is also the instrument *par excellence* to make progress on policy coherence for development.

The ensuing discussion led to several conclusions on the policy implications of shifting poverty patterns, with a call to donors to:

- focus on the structure of growth and examine where ODA can be most effective,
- pay attention to resilience and social security,
- work with national as well as international poverty lines,
- set the international poverty line at around USD 10/day (which would reveal that 10% of the global poor live in high income countries),
- focus on the multidimensionality of poverty,
- agree on a multidimensional indicator for poverty (for example, the Multidimensional Poverty Index [MPI] developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Index [OPHI]) and change the country classifications accordingly.

Jon Lomøy, Director of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD), concluded the debate by affirming that traditional aid (“compensatory ODA”) needs to evolve into “catalytic ODA”, with a focus on efficiency, rather than demand only.

Development co-operation, governance and the rule of law: The post-Busan challenge for the GOVNET

Based on a presentation by James Michel, Development Policy Expert, former DAC Chair and USAID Counselor, at the 16th DAC Network on Governance Plenary meeting, April 23-25, where the future role of GOVNET within the new Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was debated.

Good governance and rule of law have long been associated with stable, just and prosperous societies. Over the centuries, the core elements of good governance - peace and security, sound economic policy and fiscal management, fair and timely administration of justice and delivery of essential services – have enjoyed broad recognition as important factors for sustainable human progress. Since the early 1990s, assistance for democratic governance has been a growing part of the development co-operation agenda.

Today, however, there is concern about whether international efforts in governance have sometimes been overly technical and inadequately grounded in local political economy. Some have argued that governance has not been sufficiently integrated into development co-operation partnerships and that in many cases substantial investments have failed to overcome resistance to change.

Overall, development co-operation today is moving toward a framework of locally led partnerships that are results-oriented and that benefit from co-ordinated participation. The resulting structure is more a network than a hierarchy, and progress depends more on persuasion than on management.

In this sense, the open, participatory processes that we have seen in the DAC-hosted forums in Paris, Accra and Busan are encouraging. The increasingly diverse array of actors at these meetings has produced an impressive framework for collaboration based on agreed principles. Today, this framework is providing the foundation for a new collaborative and flexible architecture of development co-operation: the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation](#).

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The Global Partnership declaration addresses governance primarily through the lens of effective institutions and policies to facilitate resource mobilisation and service delivery. Two related areas stand out where the DAC's [GOVNET](#) can help ensure that good governance and rule of law are adequately addressed.

The first is integrating governance work into the broad development co-operation agenda. This also involves helping people to know their rights and to have access to information, supporting the ability to obtain fair treatment, and helping public institutions operate efficiently – actions that should increase the effectiveness of investments in any sector.

A second area is supporting effective institutions and policies that are conducive to creating and maintaining effective states. This goes beyond the scope of development co-operation programmes, involving core functions of the state and the allocation of powers, resources and responsibilities between national and local institutions, among executive, legislative and judicial functions, and between public and private institutions and individuals.

Point of view: Is green growth the fix we are looking for?

By William Hynes, Policy Analyst in the Policy Division of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate and Co-ordinator of the OECD [Green Growth and Developing Countries Report](#)

Twenty years ago, 11 year-old Severn Cullis-Suzuki addressed the Earth Summit with a strong and challenging call for world leaders to change their ways: “If you don’t know how to fix it, stop breaking it.”

This challenge was carried forward at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD, or Rio+20, 20-22 June 2012). The outcome document of this summit, *The Future We Want*, could undoubtedly “[make a tremendous difference in generating positive global change](#)” – if the actions

agreed upon there are implemented and follow-up measures are taken. Nonetheless, the document is the product of intensive protracted negotiations and as such is a text based on compromise.

There is wide agreement, in this sense, that Rio+20 fell short of delivering the substantive outcomes many had hoped for. The ongoing economic crisis in developed economies was partially at fault, as were tensions between rich, emerging and poor countries and the consequent unwillingness to enter into new commitments. Furthermore, the Rio+20 outcome document has been criticised for failing to adequately address serious environmental challenges. So while the agreement recognises problems and reaffirms and renews previous positions, it does not seriously push the sustainable development agenda forward, but rather presents piecemeal solutions.

Rio+20 suggests that the international community is in denial about the extent of the global environmental problem. According to Oxford scholar Avner Offer, there are three forms of denial: rational denial (“It’s not really happening”); emotional denial (“I don’t want to know”); and technological optimism (“Something will turn up”). In order to address those critical issues remaining post Rio, such denial needs to be countered.

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There were, however, positive outcomes from Rio+20. In particular, there was widespread recognition of the importance of green economy and growth and their potential contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction. While the value of growth and its ecological and social consequences have long been queried, it is increasingly evident that green and growth do not necessarily need to contradict.

The starting point for greening growth has to be a reconsideration of the way we define and value growth. To make green growth a reality, we need to: mainstream environmental concerns into economic planning; build capacities; and deploy specific instruments that can take advantage of green growth opportunities and in so doing speed up progress towards sustainable development. Finally, we need to adopt this concept across the globe. Developing countries in particular can benefit from such a transition, and DAC members are supporting their efforts in doing so.

To grow green, we need to think and act differently. We need a growth strategy that will allow us to continue to progress while preserving the environment. Policy makers can create incentives – through regulation and market-based instruments – that can help to change the way we consume and the way we do business. We can make bad practices more expensive through environmental fiscal reform and by removing fuel subsidies. And we can provide incentives for good practices by creating value for eco-system services, encouraging the sustainable and efficient use of resources, introducing incentives for innovation and new energy systems, and promoting markets for green goods and services.

So while green growth seems to offer much potential, we have to ask ourselves: What will it take to make this the fix we are looking for? Maybe not a revolution, but certainly a serious recalibration of how we think, act and grow.

FEATURE ARTICLE by Peter Reuter

Peter Reuter is Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology at the University of Maryland. He is the editor of [Draining Development?: Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries](#), a new collection of World Bank research papers. In this article, adapted from the essay "Dirty laundry", which appeared on the Democracy Lab page of the Foreign Policy magazine web site, he shares insights on illicit financial flows and how to control them.

Controlling illicit financial flows

In case you haven't noticed, there is little enthusiasm left for sending money to the governments of developing countries as a means of digging their economies out of extreme poverty. In part, that's because some emerging-market countries (think China and India) are growing nicely without aid, while some big recipients (think Tanzania and Pakistan) have largely squandered it. Worse, aid programmes are dogged by scandal, as corrupt elites appropriate the goodies – and in some ironic cases, return the loot to their own bank accounts in donor countries.

Indeed, if these wayward funds could be redirected into productive uses in recipient countries, they could eventually replace a good chunk of the aid that now comes from governments. Reducing the portion of the dollars that arrive as foreign aid and flow out as predators' assets would also help rebuild the case for official development assistance (ODA). Hence the new interest in measuring (and containing) illicit cash-crossing borders.

Illicit fund flows (IFFs) come from many sources, but the most prominent associations are with infamous kleptocrats – among them General Sani Abacha of Nigeria; Vladimiro Montesinos, the former head of Peru's secret police; and, most recently, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. All three dipped freely into their countries' treasuries, parking much of their booty overseas in the form of luxury houses in the south of France or London, or as bank deposits in Jersey or Switzerland.

Kleptocracy, however, is by no means the only source of IFFs. Tax evasion is almost ubiquitous in the developing world (at least among the wealthy), and it is likely that much of this money also ends up in deposits overseas. Transfer pricing within multinational enterprises, although in most cases not strictly illegal because of weak legislation in developing countries, is another important channel for moving corporate profits overseas into less heavily taxed jurisdictions. Finally, trade mispricing – e.g. the manipulation of invoices linked with imports/exports among unrelated parties – is one more way to move cash out of a country.

How large are IFFs in total? The phenomenon has been much-discussed at G20 meetings and other high-level confabs since the 2005 publication of [Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free Market System](#) by Raymond Baker. Yet startlingly, no research on the subject has appeared in the mainstream economics literature. The only estimates come from the advocacy community and are troublingly, even implausibly, large. Global Financial Integrity (GFI) [says the figure is about \\$1 trillion per annum](#) – dwarfing total official development assistance, which reached just over USD 130 billion in 2011.

But even if the estimates are many times too high, IFFs are surely large enough to raise the question of whether stemming them might serve as a substitute for (or supplement to) foreign aid. The argument is straightforward. Assume that government stealing, tax evasion and other criminal activities continued apace in developing countries, but that international controls were able to prevent the money being transferred overseas. Then, it would at least be available for domestic investment and could be used to solve a major problem of development – namely, the lack of capital.

Consider, too, that bottling up the illicit funds at home would (ironically) help strengthen the rule of law: If the rich no longer had sanctuaries for their assets overseas, they would have a greater interest in the security of property in their own countries. Perhaps stemming the flow would also reduce predation by rulers. If Mobutu Sese Seko, the long-time absolute ruler of what is now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, had been unable to buy villas in Nice, perhaps he would have stolen less – though one suspects that, after a while, Mobutu's theft became a matter of habit rather than a deliberate decision.

An elaborate, almost universal system of money laundering regulation – aimed at just this kind of activity – already exists. Every senior government official with access to illicit cash is supposed to be on a list of "politically exposed persons" (PEPs) and thus subject to extra scrutiny when they make bank transactions. But the record is spotty: numerous banks have been caught handling transactions for PEPs that should have stirred the suspicions of even the most oblivious banker. Numerous efforts have also been made to press developing countries to stem IFFs. Asking foxes to board up the chicken coops, however, is not a recipe for success. Even if they agreed to put in place the relevant institutional arrangements, a corrupt domestic judiciary could ensure that few cases moved forward.

One of the attractions of making IFFs a policy target is that the West would have to clean up its own act in the process of helping poor countries – tax havens are important to scoff laws in rich countries as well as developing ones. In any event, pressing jurisdictions such as Lichtenstein, the Cayman Islands and Jersey to fulfil their treaty obligations to obtain information about their depositors and to pass on "suspicious activity reports" to other nations seems much more feasible than improving government standards of ethics in some of the worst governed countries.

So far there has been little movement beyond handwringing and a few general statements of good intent by global initiatives such as the G20. The OECD has recently put IFFs on the agenda, including through support to a [Tax and Crime Task Force](#), and more recently, through the DAC's work to examine how development co-operation can play a role on this complex issue. But, truth is, the subject isn't very high on the agenda of most rich countries.

For the DAC, the challenge is to think of creative ways to use ODA to increase compliance with the international instruments in place to fight IFFs. Many development agencies have already supported NGOs that have managed to draw political attention to the issue through their effective activism. Now, with the issue firmly on the political agenda, the time has come to look at how development agencies can support effective implementation.

News in brief

Orientations and principles on development co-operation, accountability and democratic governance

On 12 July the DAC welcomed this draft document, which distils the findings and conclusions of a two-year process engaging a range of leading donors, partner countries and experts working to support accountability. Mindful of the responsibility of donors to act in ways that strengthen, rather than undermine, domestic accountability, it takes stock of experience, emerging trends, and leading international and academic thinking and literature, and identifies promising leads and tips. It also includes in-depth country case-studies carried out in Mali, Mozambique, Peru and Uganda to better understand the accountability system(s) and, in particular, to assess donor support for two essential features of state-citizen relations: budgeting and service delivery in sectors. The final publication will be issued shortly. For more information contact lisa.williams@oecd.org.

New international network promotes ODA 7% target

A new network of countries that have reached the UN target of providing 0.7% of GNI to official development assistance (ODA) or are on track to meet it – the [g07](#) – was established during the Rio+20 conference. The members of the g07 – Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, and the UK – hope to encourage others to make efforts to achieve this target and to draw attention to the major gap that currently exists between this international commitment to the world’s poor – which was established 42 years ago – and the handful of countries actually fulfilling it.

OECD Consultations with Developing Countries on Green Growth

The OECD [Green Growth and Developing Countries Report](#) proposes practical policy instruments countries can draw upon in making the transition to green growth, including: harnessing natural resources more sustainably for poverty alleviation and for supporting livelihoods; reducing burdens on public finance, while improving the environment; reducing vulnerability to environmental shocks; and fostering new growth opportunities.

The OECD worked with developing country officials and other organisations in a consultation process to determine whether and how these policy instruments can be implemented in specific developing country contexts. A first consultation took place in Seoul, in co-operation with the [Global Green Growth Institute](#), in May. This was followed by a Ministerial side event on the margins of the Rio+20 conference, chaired by OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría.

A Rio+20 “launch” of the Busan Building Block on Climate Finance and Development Effectiveness

As part of the [4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in December 2011](#), a range of countries signed up to the “[Busan Building Block](#)” initiative to enhance the effective management of climate finance at the country level through knowledge exchange and joint work. At Rio+20, Honduras organized a side event to present and “launch” the [Busan Building Block on Climate Finance and Development Effectiveness](#), which to date comprises 27 countries and organizations. Presentations at the side event focused on: the use of aid effectiveness principles to manage climate finance at the country level; lessons learned; and using regional platforms to facilitate information sharing among countries.

International Dialogue meeting in Nairobi

The Steering Group of the [International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding](#) met in Nairobi on 8 June to agree on a political strategy to promote the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), a key pillar of the [New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States](#). The meeting, hosted by the new [World Bank Global Centre for Conflict, Security and Development](#) and Co-chaired by Minister Emilia Pires from Timor

Leste and Minister Christian Friis Bach from Denmark, brought together ministers and senior officials. The participants also agreed on how to make progress on developing indicators for the PSGs and enhancing country-level implementation. The next high-level appointment for the International Dialogue members will be a side event on the PSGs at the UN General Assembly in September 2012.

Mr. Johannes Jütting appointed Manager of the PARIS21 Secretariat

Johannes Jütting took up his duties as Manager of [Paris21](#) on 1 May 2012. He will guide the partnership's work in supporting developing countries in the use of statistical data for policy-making and monitoring of development outcomes. He will also contribute to the Organisation's work related to the implementation of the OECD Development Strategy and the post-2015 development framework. A German national, he holds a PhD in Development and Agricultural Economics and a Masters in Agriculture from the Humboldt University in Berlin.

The DAC in recent blogs and articles

There was wide coverage of the 2012 peer review of Canada (see Peer Reviews below), including:

[“OECD criticises Canada for aid budget cuts and lack of transparency”](#), *The Guardian*, 20 June 2012.

[“Reverse cuts to foreign aid, OECD tells Ottawa”](#), *The Globe and Mail*, 20 June 2012.

[“Canada’s foreign aid program needs clarity, more funding, says new OECD report”](#), *The Star*, 19 June 2012.

[“Changes to Canada’s aid package hurting developing nations: OECD”](#), *Postmedia News*, 19 June 2012.

[“Far East Energy Corporation: Canada’s development aid: focused and effective but should be more generous and efficient”](#), *4-traders*, 19 June 2012.

[“L’OCDE incite le Canada à reculer sur ses coupes dans l’aide internationale”](#), *La Presse Canadienne*, 19 June 2012.

[“OECD calls on Canada to reverse aid cuts, to avert damage to past progress”](#), *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 June 2012.

Other blogs and articles:

[“The case for conflict and stabilization operations today”](#), *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, 12 July 2012.

[“Australia’s foreign aid: money well spent?”](#), *Special Broadcasting Service*, 6 July 2012.

[“Global development in the Asian century”](#), speech by DAC Chair [J. Brian Atwood](#) for the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 4 July 2012.

[“Development aid and recession”](#), *China Radio International – People in the Know*, 03 July 2012.

[“Busan Global Partnership and development co-operation’s future”](#), *The Korea Herald*, 28 June 2012.

[“OECD launches ‘green economy’ consultation with developing countries”](#), *Science and Development Network*, 18 June 2012.

[“Not just for the rich: Green growth and developing countries”](#), *OECD Insights*, 12 June 2012.

[“The Euro Zone Crisis and its Impact on ODA”](#), speech by DAC Chair [J. Brian Atwood](#) for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 7 June 2012.

[“The Global Partnership and Effective Development Co-operation”](#), *Brookings Institution*, June 2012.

[“New aid effectiveness indicators agreed at post-Busan meeting”](#), *The Guardian*, 23 May 2012

[“The vital contribution of transparency for development effectiveness”](#), speech by DAC Chair [J. Brian Atwood](#) for [Development Initiatives](#), 25 April 2012.

Find a more complete list of blogs and articles featuring the DAC online [here](#).

Peer reviews

[Canada](#): A new review of Canada’s aid programme commends the country’s strong stand on human rights, particularly its effective efforts in Afghanistan and Haiti. While Canada doubled its aid from 2001 to 2010, from 2010 to 2011 aid fell by just over 5% to USD 5.3 billion. The recent federal budget will cut off another 7% in 2014-15. The Review recommends that Canada increase its aid as soon as possible and work to meet the international target of 0.7% of GNI.

[Supporting partners to develop their capacity: 12 lessons from DAC peer reviews](#) draws out some common themes or lessons regarding capacity development from peer reviews, including technical co-operation, which is one of the main forms of DAC members’ assistance to partner countries. It includes examples of DAC members’ practices and experiences and sketches out the challenges donors still face as they move towards better support for capacity development.

>> [Watch the presentation](#)

[Towards better humanitarian donorship: 12 lessons from DAC peer reviews](#) outlines the 12 most important humanitarian lessons from the DAC peer reviews, profiles examples of good donor behaviour highlighted in the peer reviews, and looks at the challenges donors still face to improve humanitarian donorship. Humanitarian action – saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining human dignity during and in the aftermath of crises – remains a clear priority for DAC donors. Over USD 11.2 billion of public funds were disbursed as humanitarian aid in 2009 by the 24 DAC members, representing nearly 9% of the total ODA allocation.

>> [Watch the presentation](#)

And coming soon:

[Partnering with civil society: 12 lessons from DAC peer reviews](#) draws on findings of DAC peer reviews, the OECD study on *How DAC members work with CSOs (OECD, 2011)* and a workshop organised in October 2011 with DAC members and civil society representatives. The booklet will group analysis and good practice examples around 12 “lessons” concerning the need for a strategic framework, delivering effective support, and learning and accountability. It will be published this autumn.

Publications

[Ensuring fragile states are not left behind: 2011 Report on financial resource flows](#) provides evidence on the main resources in fragile situations, how they interact, and what issues and countries should be of concern. The DAC [International Network of Conflict and Fragility \(INCAF\)](#) began to monitor resource flows in fragile situations in 2005. While originally focused on ODA, this annual report has evolved to include sources of development co-operation from beyond DAC membership, as well as domestic revenues, peacekeeping expenditures, private flows and illicit outflows.

[Improving rural water and sanitation: Lessons from evaluation](#) outlines main findings on health impacts, results for women and girls, sustainability of project outcomes and governance in the water and sanitation sector. A key finding is that health impacts are undermined by the failure to simultaneously increase drinking water access *and* improve basic hygiene (use of toilets, hand washing), which often results in water being re-contaminated before use.

[Green growth and developing countries: A consultative draft report](#) aims to help developing countries identify opportunities for more inclusive growth while acknowledging the particular challenges they face in designing and implementing green growth strategies. It explores how these strategies can be developed, taking into account differences in natural resource endowments, levels of socio-economic growth and institutional capacity.

[Poverty reduction and pro-poor growth: The role of empowerment](#) aims to build donor understanding of empowerment and presents good practices in supporting empowerment processes through development assistance. It includes a Policy Guidance Note and ten Good Practice Notes with sector-specific practical advice.

[Mapping support for Africa's infrastructure investment](#) looks at how partners use aid to help African countries mitigate the risks associated with private sector investment in infrastructure. In particular, it examines ODA for infrastructure; financial tools such as export credits, blending mechanisms, guarantees and investment funds; the contribution of emerging economies such as China; and how donors implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in their support for infrastructure.

[From aid to development: The global fight against poverty](#) explores the multi-faceted world of aid and development co-operation, tracing the history of these efforts and examining ways in which they can be made more effective.

OECD DAC countries' net ODA in 2011
USD 133.5 billion, down by -2.7 % in real terms and 0.031 % of DAC members' combined GNI

Vacancies

Senior Policy Analyst/ Team Leader: Effective Governance, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding ([Reference 08255](#)): The Senior Policy Analyst will manage a specialist team, providing the intellectual leadership to design, develop and implement the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate's work on effective governance, peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Statistical Project Officer ([Reference 08267](#)): The Statistical Project Officer will contribute to the implementation of the work programmes of two satellite programmes hosted by PARIS21: the International Household Survey Network (IHSN) and the Accelerated Data Program (ADP).

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The OECD [Development Assistance Committee](#) (DAC) is a unique forum for defining and monitoring global standards in key areas of development, sharing views and exchanging lessons. The [Development Co-operation Directorate](#) (DCD) supports the DAC, contributing to developing better policies for better lives through transparent data on development finance, and improved development co-operation practices and policies.

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