SECURITY AND JUSTICE
SECTOR REFORM
PROGRAMMING IN
AFRICA

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April 2007

PREFACE

This review was commissioned in order to provide a better understanding of the quality and effectiveness of UK assistance to Security and Justice Sector Reform in Africa. There are two principal driving forces behind the report. Firstly, there is increasing recognition of the need for high quality interdepartmental monitoring and evaluation of the work of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) and, following on from the publication of the ACPP Performance Report 2001-2005, the SJSR review forms an important element of ongoing annual reporting. Secondly, the UK has spent over £250m on SJSR programming since 2001. There was therefore a recognised need to take stock of work in this area and to feed back practical lessons learned to UK SJSR programme managers and practitioners.

In examining the work of three separate UK departments with differing procedures and working cultures, the review represented a major challenge. UK officials are therefore particularly grateful to the authors of the report for undertaking this piece of work in such a thorough and proficient manner. The review team were asked to be open and candid in their criticisms of UK work in order that the findings of the review would be of maximum value in informing SJSR programming at policy levels and on the ground in partner countries. We will use the findings of the report to develop and inform ongoing programming across Africa.

The review was commissioned by DFID’s Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU) on behalf of the ACPP, backed by a steering group representing DFID’s Evaluation Department (EvD), MoD/Directorate of Policy & Defence Relations South (PDRS) and FCO/Pan-Africa Policy Unit (PAPU).

ACPP Secretariat and Review Steering Group
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank the UK Country Teams in Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Sierra Leone for answering innumerable questions and facilitating the Review Team’s field visits to those countries. They also wish to thank London-based officials, representatives of host governments, local civil society organisations and the international community in DRC, Nigeria and Sierra Leone for assisting with this report. They are especially grateful to the Review Steering Group for their guidance throughout the review process. Finally, but by no means least, the authors wish to thank Morten Hagen, Conflict, Security and Development Group, King’s College London for his invaluable assistance in collecting and organising the information found in Annex 3.

Full responsibility for the text of this report rests with the authors. In common with all independent evaluation reports and reviews commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID) and, in this case, jointly with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the Departments or of the people consulted.
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<td>A2J</td>
<td>Access to Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACHU</td>
<td>Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit, Department for International Development</td>
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<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<td>ASDR</td>
<td>African Security Dialogue &amp; Research</td>
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<td>ASSN</td>
<td>African Security Sector Network</td>
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<td>BDAT</td>
<td>British Defence Advisory Team</td>
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<td>CCSSP</td>
<td>Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Programme</td>
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<td>CHAD</td>
<td>Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, Department for International Development</td>
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<td>CHASE</td>
<td>Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Department for International Development</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CISU</td>
<td>Central Intelligence and Security Unit (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Pool (UK)</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Defence Attaché/Defence Adviser</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>DAF</td>
<td>Defence Assistance Fund</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRAP</td>
<td>Defence Relations Activity Plan</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EvD</td>
<td>Evaluation Department, Department for International Development</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Financial Year</td>
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<td>GCPP</td>
<td>Global Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<td>GIMPA</td>
<td>Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration</td>
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<td>GOF</td>
<td>Global Opportunities Fund</td>
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<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Act (UK)</td>
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<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>IMATT</td>
<td>International Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JSDP</td>
<td>Justice Sector Development Programme</td>
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<td>MaSSAJ</td>
<td>Malawi Safety, Security and Access to Justice</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in DRC</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office of National Security (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td>OPR</td>
<td>Output to Purpose Review</td>
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<td>PAPU</td>
<td>Pan-Africa Policy Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>PCRM</td>
<td>Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit</td>
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<td>PDRS</td>
<td>Directorate of Policy &amp; Defence Relations South, Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Financial Management</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>Regional Conflict Adviser</td>
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<td>RCDS</td>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
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<td>RSLAF</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SILSEP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme</td>
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<td>SJG</td>
<td>Security, Justice and Growth</td>
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<td>SJSR</td>
<td>Security and Justice Sector Reform</td>
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<td>SLP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
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<td>SSAJ</td>
<td>Safety, Security and Access to Justice</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TORs</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNCIVPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S1 Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) has assumed an increasingly prominent role on the international policy agenda over the last decade. The UK Government has played a crucial role in championing SJSR – which combines, at the strategic level, work on ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) and ‘safety, security and access to justice’ (SSAJ). SJSR activities have been carried out in some 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000, primarily with funding from Department for International Development (DFID) bilateral accounts and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP).

S2 Between 2001 and 2005, the ACPP allocated at least £90.6 million to SJSR, or about 50 percent of total ACPP spend during this period. DFID spent some £149.8 million of its programme resources on SJSR. Sierra Leone accounted for 96 percent of ACPP SJSR outlays and 61 percent of DFID bilateral allocations.

S3 The ACPP partners decided to undertake a review of SJSR programming between 2001 and 2005 in order to identify lessons from past experience in three areas: 1) coherence; 2) effectiveness; and 3) impact. A four-person review team was appointed to review available documentation and undertake field work in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Contribution of Security and Justice Sector Reform to Security and Justice

S4 Security and justice are essential to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. They create an environment in which poverty-reducing development can occur and help reduce the incidence of violent conflict, both key UK objectives.

S5 SJSR is a people-centred approach to security and justice. Rule of law, accountability, transparency, accessibility and affordability are central to the SJSR agenda. The four key elements of that agenda are:

- Develop and implement an institutional framework;
- Establish and implement the principle of democratic control of the security sector through the practice of good governance, especially oversight, accountability, and transparency;
- Develop capable, professional and accountable security services and justice systems; and
- Foster a culture that is supportive of the above among the political, security and justice leadership.

S6 All key security services, the justice system, and security and justice management and oversight bodies are part of the sector, as are informal and traditional providers of security and justice where these exist. It is this view of security and justice as indivisible at the strategic level that underscores the importance of a coherent strategic approach to reform.
Mapping SJSR Activities

S7 The Review Team mapped the available documents on SJSR interventions to identify any trends that might emerge. The main findings of the mapping exercise, given some constraints as to accuracy and availability of data, are as follows:

- A large number of the activities are stand-alone projects and many of those do not appear to be related to broader programmes. Most stand-alone projects are found in countries in the early stages of recovery from violent conflict. Stand-alone projects are less likely to reflect all the attributes of a coherent approach or have the impact of programmes.

- ACPP resources are allocated primarily to defence-related projects. With the exception of Sierra Leone, DFID bilateral resources are allocated primarily to SSAJ programmes.

- Good international practice suggests that making choices about the most appropriate SJSR interventions and obtaining value for money in difficult political environments can be facilitated by the adoption of a coherent strategic approach. A rigorous political analysis that is regularly updated and supplemented by a risk mitigation strategy can help UK programming decisions reflect political conditions. A review of the documents suggests this is lacking from most SJSR programming in Africa.

Coherence

S8 In assessing coherence this review examines “the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies….” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001: p. 90, Box 13). Achieving coherence involves consistency in objectives, coordination of efforts, and cooperation among UK actors at Post and in London.

S9 Coherence is desirable because of 1) the cross-disciplinary nature of SJSR; 2) the desirability of avoiding gaps in UK assistance; 3) the concern to use UK resources effectively and efficiently; and 4) the benefits of reducing transaction costs for host governments.

S10 Although DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) have different mandates and policy objectives, they share sufficient interest in poverty reduction and conflict prevention at a strategic level to provide a coherent platform for SJSR, as demonstrated in UK SJSR work in Sierra Leone. SJSR is still a relatively new and developing concept. It is just one of the many aspects of cross-departmental work undertaken by Country Teams and Strategy Managers. Not surprisingly, it may not be perfectly understood by all UK actors.

S11 The most serious problem emerging from discussions with UK officials relates to the tension within DFID between the security and justice functions of policing. This has raised questions about whether justice is, or should be, part of the same sector as security, despite existing UK Government policy that clearly states that it is. This leads, in some cases, to uneven application of the policy within DFID. DFID selectivity in policy implementation in turn has led to confusion, particularly among field workers and practitioners.

S12 The lack of clarity surrounding the linkage between DFID’s justice system work and ‘SSR’ underscores the fact that DFID and ACPP activities are not always as well linked as they could be. FCO and MOD officials at Post frequently told the Review Team they were not, and did not expect to be,
consulted on the development of DFID bilaterally funded SJSR activities. Additionally, the ACPP is
intended to foster coherence among DFID, MOD and FCO but many ACPP activities are stand-alone
interventions that are neither linked to each other nor to DFID-funded interventions. Linkage between
SJSR and other mainstreamed themes is uneven. Gender, HIV/AIDS and public financial management
are three themes that require wider understanding by UK actors.

S13 Achieving SJSR objectives requires ensuring that Departments in Whitehall and officials at Post
work together efficiently and productively. For the most part, the Review Team found a range of positive
levels of cooperation among Departments, most notably in DRC, Sierra Leone and Sudan. The relative
priority devoted to SJSR issues by the Head of Mission and Head of DFID Office, reflecting instructions
from London, is critical. Colocation of offices also appears to be a significant factor. This review confirms
that both Regional Conflict Advisers (RCAs) (and/or country based DFID conflict advisers) and DFID
governance advisers should be involved in proposing, designing, implementing and monitoring SJSR
programmes and activities under the guidance of the Country Team leader, preferably the Head of
Mission.

S14 The unevenness in the coherence of the UK approach to SJSR is not surprising. SJSR is still
relatively new and the body of practical experience from worldwide interventions is still quite small.
Nonetheless, the UK’s experience with SJSR in sub-Saharan Africa does offer a number of lessons that
can be built upon to improve coherence of effort.

Effectiveness

S15 In assessing effectiveness, this review examines the objectives of UK interventions and the extent
to which they have been achieved or are expected to be achieved (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2002). Five issues emerged as particularly important for achieving effective
UK SJSR interventions: 1) understanding the country context, 2) programme design and
implementation; 3) contribution of UK interventions to achievement of objectives; 4) monitoring and
evaluation; and 5) collaboration with other international actors.

S16 One theme that runs throughout the examination of effectiveness is the need to understand the
highly political nature of SJSR processes and to shape programming accordingly. This is a critical aspect
of country context and is essential to designing and implementing effective SJSR interventions.
Additionally, since the UK is often the only or the major external actor supporting SJSR, experience
suggests that UK interventions will be more effective to the extent that they are part of a strategic
approach that links with other SJSR interventions or with reforms in governance, the public sector or
public finance management and draws to the extent possible on civil society expertise. In doing so,
however, Sierra Leone’s experience with including security in Pillar 1 of its Poverty Reduction Strategy
underscores the importance of clarifying the implications of these linkages with all relevant actors,
national and international.

S17 Despite the fact that the UK plays a dominant role in SJSR in sub-Saharan Africa, experience has
shown that harmonisation of international efforts is often necessary to maximise the effectiveness of SJSR
programming. In the DRC it was evident from the outset that the Country Team would need to devote
considerable effort to harmonisation of international efforts. In Sierra Leone, this lesson was learned over
time, particularly with regard to the international financial institutions (IFIs).

S18 Overall, this review has found that UK SJSR interventions have been partially effective within
different programmes (with the possible exception of Sierra Leone). ‘Partial effectiveness’ means that
programmes generate some useful outcomes but cannot produce a multiplier effect given political
blockages. For various reasons, it is often difficult to make course corrections in large, expensive programmes even when it becomes obvious that the political environment is not conducive to the pursuit and achievement of the desired outcomes.

S19 In this regard, Sierra Leone stands out as offering the most positive outcomes in terms of effectiveness. The main interventions – Justice Sector Development Programme, Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) and the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) support – were clearly designed to achieve SJSR outcomes and they have increasingly connected all strategic-level actors that have a role to play in the delivery of overall SJSR outcomes. It should be stressed however that this is the result of incremental progress and continuous learning of lessons.

S20 Ultimately, the programmes implemented can only be as good as the extent to which the UK actors share the vision underpinning SJSR, are coherent and respond to the need for change on the ground.

Impact

S21 In assessing impact, this review examines the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by UK interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2002).

S22 Assessing impact requires the passage of time. This is particularly the case for SJSR, which entails political, institutional, attitudinal and behavioural changes that, by their very nature, are long-term processes. Because this review covers only four years, it focuses on assessing movement toward longer-term objectives in order to make some tentative judgements about impact. From this perspective, three factors appear to have an important effect on impact: 1) a strategic approach that reflects local priorities; 2) financial sustainability; and 3) application of appropriate and adequate human resources.

S23 Developing a strategic approach to the security and justice sector does not require that the UK Government engage in all parts of the sector. It does, however, require a review of the entire sector, with the host country’s national priorities in mind to the extent they are known. This review should prioritise and sequence interventions based on conditions in the host country. This will help identify political blockages to reform and the key actors and institutions that need to be part of reform if it is to have a positive, long-term impact. It is essential that UK officials are willing to exert leverage remove blockages and help develop support for reform among key actors.

S24 Financial sustainability of SJSR interventions requires financial accountability. While host governments will often resist this linkage, it is essential that the UK Government and other international actors clarify that the long-term financial sustainability of their investments is a central concern. Sierra Leone demonstrates that this will require more attention to the capacity of ministries of finance and budgeting, which often have considerable power in highly resource constrained countries, and external oversight mechanisms, including civil society. Sierra Leone also underscores that DFID’s regulations on transferring funds to host governments should be consistent both with the need for accountability to the British public and with the objective of strengthening the capacity for financial accountability within host governments.

S25 Lastly, achieving positive impacts requires not only well designed, locally owned and financially sustainable programmes and projects. It also requires appropriate and adequate support from UK officials and contractors in country. DFID in particular has experienced difficulties in this regard,
especially with SSAJ programmes and projects, which represent the majority of DFID bilaterally financed SJSR activities in Africa. It is essential that DFID provide adequate administrative support for the SJSR interventions it supports.

S26 As with effectiveness and coherence, the quality of the senior Departmental representatives at Post is extremely important and it is essential that DFID, FCO and MOD advisers adopt a developmental rather than an executive approach to providing support and prioritise ‘learning by doing’. Much progress has been recorded in this regard in Sierra Leone and in Nigeria among the police and military advisors and it is important that this lesson be extended to other SJSR interventions as necessary.

Major Recommendations

S27 Five main lessons and 15 recommendations have emerged from this review.

S28 Lesson 1: The coherence, effectiveness and impact of UK SJSR interventions will benefit from a strategic approach to the security and justice sector.

S29 A strategic approach requires strategic thinking, joint working and improved staff training.

• Recommendation 1: We recommend that where SJSR is agreed to be an important component part of the overall UK policy toward a country that the Country Team develops a strategic approach to SJSR.

The components of a strategic approach would include:

o a strategic framework prioritising and sequencing UK support across the entire security and justice sector developed on the basis of a rigorous political assessment and containing a clear statement of potential risks and a risk mitigation strategy;

o a clear process for regularly reviewing progress in implementing the framework;

o flexibility in the application of resources;

o an agreed method of coordinating the activities of different UK actors, making best use of the Regional Conflict Advisers;

o a strategy for promoting harmonisation of international community interventions; and

o a team that is capable of addressing the full spectrum of security and justice sector needs and that possesses an appropriate mix of technical and policy/strategic skills. In particular, the ability of the Ambassador/High Commissioner to promote team building and strategic thinking is essential.

And, in addition:

o in post-conflict environments, strategy development should begin early in the peace process to identify all critical stakeholders whose participation in the broader SJSR process is essential and to develop plans for engaging them in SJSR as the political/security situation evolves;
• in political transition countries, the strategic framework should be in place before major security and justice programmes are designed;

• the Regional Conflict Advisers (RCAs) should always be involved in order to ensure coherence with other regional and sub-regional activities; and

• the DFID governance advisers should always be involved in order to ensure adequate attention to the governance aspects of SJSR.

• **Recommendation 2:** We recommend that once DFID has clarified its position on the linkage between security and justice work, senior management in DFID strongly support the agreed approach, develop plans for mainstreaming the approach within DFID and put in place incentives to promote implementation.

• **Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the ACPP adopt guidance for developing and reviewing bids on SJSR activities. Such guidance should be developed as a matter of priority and might include a brief overview of the strategic framework for SJSR in the country in question, how and where the activities to be funded fit into that framework, and evidence of a detailed political analysis underpinning the proposed activity and a substantive risk mitigation strategy.

• **Recommendation 4:** We recommend that DFID, FCO and MOD seek to increase staff exposure to public and other debates relating to SJSR concepts and operational practices by reviewing existing in-house training courses to ensure they reflect operational experience, using the Global Facilitation Network, among others. Where feasible, efforts should also be made to increase cross-departmental learning in this area, for example through staff secondments.

• **Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ theme on Public Financial Management and Whitehall mainstream themes on HIV/AIDS and gender be incorporated into all SJSR interventions, not only those specifically dealing with SSAJ.

Lesson 2: Effectiveness and impact will benefit from the UK Government prioritising the achievement of national ownership of SJSR reforms.

National ownership of reform processes is one of the key principles of international engagement in the security and justice sector. Any UK strategic approach to SJSR must be grounded in and aim to support the national priorities of the reforming country. National ownership involves promoting host government support for reform, helping national actors clarify their security and justice goals and establishing a process that enables non-governmental actors to participate in SJSR.

• **Recommendation 6:** We recommend that the SJSR strategic framework developed by Country Teams includes an explicit assessment of support for SJSR at the highest level of government and a plan – that would be subject to periodic review and revision – for achieving and maintaining high-level host government buy in.

• **Recommendation 7:** We recommend that Country Teams encourage the host government to include advisers and stakeholders from key management and oversight institutions in SJSR planning from the start. This should include representatives of non-security ministries, oversight bodies and parliamentary committees. The Country Team’s strategic SJSR framework should include consideration of the means of achieving this outcome.
Such planning should include the means, channels of communication and any supporting capacity building required to achieve stated objectives about local financial ownership, manage expectations of donor support in future, set up fiduciary risk management procedures, and make sure that both users and financial staffs in spending and budget/finance ministries understand the medium and long-term implications.

The Country Team’s strategic SJSR framework should include consideration of the means of achieving this outcome.

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend that Country Teams build on existing relationships to systematically cultivate local and regional civil society actors as potential contributors to the design and implementation of SJSR initiatives. An assessment of the government’s attitude toward engagement with civil society and plans for promoting broader participation should be included in strategic SJSR frameworks.

Lesson 3: Effectiveness and impact will benefit from greater harmonisation of external interventions.

Effective harmonisation of external interventions is an issue in virtually all aspects of providing assistance to developing countries. Reaching agreement among external actors is particularly complex when dealing with SJSR given the political nature of security issues and the sensitivity surrounding individual interventions.

**Recommendation 9:** We recommend that Country Teams promote the creation of in-country donor groups focused specifically on SJSR, with a nominated lead country/organisation. To the extent possible, these groups should include senior host government officials. Where feasible, a host government official should chair the group. Ideally the lead donor would be active within the SJSR sector and have experience of working with local actors on SJSR.

**Recommendation 10:** We recommend that DFID, FCO and MOD seek to reinforce the understanding of and need for SJSR as a component of donor policy in sub-Saharan Africa, in Washington (for the IFIs) and in New York (for the United Nations).

Specifically with regard to the World Bank and the IMF, we recommend that DFID deepens their collaboration with these two institutions in the area of incorporating SJSR fully into their public finance management and poverty reduction strategy work. This collaboration could take the form of participating in public expenditure and public finance management review missions and undertaking joint research on issues relating to the linkages between SJSR, on the one hand, and public finance management and poverty reduction strategies, on the other hand. This collaboration should involve all relevant departments within DFID.

Lesson 4: Strengthening ACPP management procedures will lead to greater coherence and an improved capacity to assess effectiveness and impact.

The current unevenness in the ACPP project management cycle procedures means that it is difficult to assess the impact of some ACPP funded interventions.

**Recommendation 11:** We recommend that ACPP partners agree a common project cycle management methodology for all ACPP funded activities.
• **Recommendation 12:** We recommend that in its annual portfolio review the ACPP reviews programming in each country against the objectives established in the Country Team’s strategic framework.

• **Recommendation 13:** We recommend that ACPP officials seek Treasury approval to extend the financial planning horizon for ACPP expenditure to four years plus one as for the MOD’s Short Term Plan.

S36  **Lesson 5:** Strengthening programme management will improve the capacity to deliver effective programmes and maximise their longer-term positive impact.

S37  Managing SJSR activities is human resource intensive. It is essential that adequate and appropriate human resources are available.

• **Recommendation 14:** We recommend that DFID, FCO and MOD ensure that adequate administrative resources are allocated to SJSR programmes. To this end, the SJSR strategic framework prepared by the Country Team should assess staffing needs and demonstrate how these will be met. In the face of likely reduction in staff numbers, both in DFID offices and Defence Attachés/Defence Advisers in sub-Saharan Africa, full use needs to be made of the Security Sector Development Advisory Team and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. The use of long-term contracted experts should be considered as well.

• **Recommendation 15:** In order to promote tighter UK Government control over programme management, we recommend that DFID staff in country invite managers of large bilateral programmes managed and/or implemented by external contractors (including SSAJ programmes in countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone) to attend relevant DFID management meetings, including, where desirable, SJSR committee meetings. This would reinstitute the procedures followed previously by DFID designed large-scale programmes managed by DFID contracted Technical Cooperation Officers or their equivalents. Contractors would be expected to recuse themselves where issues of national security or commercial interest were to be discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) has assumed an increasingly prominent role on the international policy agenda since the end of the 1990s. It has been linked with debates on poverty alleviation, sustainable development, professionalisation of the security services, democratic governance, post-conflict reconstruction, and conflict mitigation. This involves a significant departure from the Cold War era when the emphasis in international security policy was on the East-West strategic rivalry and state security rather than on broad-based, people-centred security and justice.

1.2 The UK Government has played a crucial role in championing SJSR over the last decade. SJSR consists of work carried out under the headings of ‘security sector reform’ (SSR) (United Kingdom 2003) and ‘security, safety and access to justice’ (SSAJ) (Department for International Development 2000) [Box 1]. Formal linkages between these two policy areas are currently under discussion. The creation of the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) and the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) are viewed as highly innovative by other donor governments and institutions (Annex 2). However, the concept of SJSR and its practice is still new. Understanding it and incorporating it into policy and practice in the UK, no less than elsewhere among donors, international organisations, international financial institutions (IFIs) and, above all, in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, is still a matter of debate and experimentation.

1.3 SJSR is now a key area of work for the UK Government, with some form of SJSR work being carried out in approximately 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000. There were several reasons for undertaking a strategic review of the Department for International Development (DFID) and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools (ACPP) SJSR portfolios during 2006: 1) the substantial resources that have been allocated to SJSR between 2001 and 2005; 2) the need to confirm that the intention to increase resources allocated to SJSR is well-founded; and 3) DFID’s commitment to prioritising support for effective and accountable security and justice systems and strengthening collaboration with other Departments in this area.

1.4 Between 2001 and 2005 the ACPP spent at least £90.6 million on SJSR programmes, or about 50 percent of total ACPP spend during this period. Sierra Leone accounted for £87.2 million, or over 96 percent of the total ACPP spend on SJSR.

1 The CPPS are joint FCO, DFID and MOD funding mechanisms (Annex 2). The Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) SSR Strategy is responsible for developing UK Government policy on SSR, building understanding of the issues and coherence across Whitehall and internationally, and developing resources to support the delivery of SSR programmes through GCPP and ACPP regional strategies and the programmes of individual departments. The annual budget for the GCPP SSR Strategy is around £7.0 million. Additionally, the Global Opportunities Fund (GOF), administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Defence Assistance Fund (DAF), administered by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), may provide a small amount of SSR-related resources in some African countries. Additional information on the UK Government’s role in promoting SJSR can be found in Annex 2 and in Ball and Hendrickson 2005a.

2 These and other figures in this report are derived from DFID and MOD sources. Further notes on the derivation and accuracy of the data are to be found in paragraphs 3.2 – 3.4 and Annex 3.
Box 1 UK Government SSR and SSAJ Definitions

1. SSR (United Kingdom 2003: 2, 3)

“In its simplest form, SSR addresses policy, legislative, structural and oversight issues set within recognised democratic norms and principles. The UK recognises security as a necessary and important function of the state and works from the premise that security should be provided in an appropriate, accountable and affordable way”.

Key SSR actors are: bodies authorised to use force (armed forces, police and paramilitary units); intelligence and security services; civil management and oversight bodies; judicial and public security bodies (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and prosecution services, prisons and corrections services, human rights commissions and customary and traditional justice systems); non-state security bodies (private security companies, political party militias, liberation armies, civil defence forces); and civil society bodies.

2. SSAJ (Department for International Development 2000:2, 20)

“The objectives of safety, security and accessible justice strategies are:

a) make all people safe from violence and intimidation in their communities, homes, work and schools;

b) make people’s property secure from theft and damage; and

c) ensure that everyone has access to systems which dispense justice fairly, speedily and without discrimination.”

Key SSAJ actors are: customary and traditional justice systems, judiciaries, “modern” alternatives for dispute resolution, legislatures, law commissions, other (e.g. human rights) commissions, the police, prisons and prosecution services and relevant line ministries, agencies responsible for non-custodial sentences, lawyers, paralegals and Civil Society Organisations/NGOs.

1.5 It is estimated that DFID spent another £149.8 million of its programme resources on SSR activities outside the ACPP between 2001 and 2005. Of this, some £92.1 million (61 percent) were allocated to Sierra Leone. SSAJ programmes and projects were allocated at least £124.4 million (83 percent) of the total DFID bilateral SJSR spend during this period, although not all of this was expended by the end of financial year (FY) 2005/2006.

1.6 A four-person Review Team was appointed in mid-2006 to conduct a review of SJSR programming in Africa between 2001 and 2005. (See Annex 1 for the Terms of Reference [TORs].) The ACPP partners decided to undertake a review, rather than an evaluation, since the time allotted for this work did not suffice to allow an in-depth investigation of SJSR work in Africa. The Review Team was tasked to examine the portfolio and to undertake field research in three countries, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sierra Leone. A Review Steering Group oversaw the work of the Review Team with representatives from DFID/Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU), DFID Evaluation Department (EvD), MOD/Directorate of Policy & Defence Relations South (PDRS), and FCO/Pan-Africa Policy Unit (PAPU).
Assessment Methodology

1.7 This review had two principal objectives:

- **Objective 1**: To assess the coherence, effectiveness and impact of UK security and justice sector reform programmes in Africa between 2001 and 2005, and
- **Objective 2**: To identify detailed, concrete lessons and recommendations for the strategic direction and management of future security and justice sector reform programmes in Africa and elsewhere.

**Objective 1**

1.8 The Review Team employed the following four assessment methods:

i. Fieldwork in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sierra Leone,

ii. Structured interviews with additional UK officials and consultants,

iii. Desk based literature review, and

iv. Mapping of interventions by DFID, FCO and MOD.

**Objective 2**

1.9 To identify lessons learned, the team has drawn on available lessons learned and evaluation studies, programme completion reports, and interviews with relevant UK officials and host country stakeholders. (Data constraints are discussed in Chapter 3.)

**Structure of Report**

1.10 This report begins by discussing the contribution of SJSR to security and justice (Chapter 2). It then reviews the findings of a mapping exercise that examined 126 individual SJSR interventions (Chapter 3). The coherence, effectiveness and impact of UK SJSR interventions in Africa are then reviewed (Chapters 4 – 6). The report concludes with a discussion of five key lessons and 15 related recommendations for the UK Government (Chapter 7).
2. CONTRIBUTION OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM TO SECURITY AND JUSTICE

2.1 Security and justice are essential for successful development. People and the communities and states they live in will not develop economically, socially or politically without an environment of safety and security or without equitable access to justice. Poor security and inequitable access to justice jeopardise the achievement of the UK Government’s poverty reduction objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals. They also have the potential to affect the achievement of UK political and security objectives.

2.2 Security and justice sector reform – the focus of this review – is an essential element of providing security. It is, however, by no means the only element. Strengthening the operational effectiveness of security services and addressing the multiple legacies of violent conflict are equally important. While some aspects of strengthening operational effectiveness and addressing the legacy of violent conflict may precede SJSR (see paragraphs 5.4 – 5.6), other activities, such as defence education, technical training of militaries, police and other security services, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) management, or training for peace support operations, may be part of SSAJ where they flow from a locally owned, sector-wide strategy. Even where the activities involved in these areas precede the higher level governance reforms which lie at the heart of SJSR, appropriately designed and targeted, they can promote or lead into sector wide reform. (Small Arms Survey, website n.d.).

2.3 Security and justice sector reform is also an essential element of providing justice. As with security, however, it is by no means the only element. Much of the SSAJ agenda fits comfortably within an ‘SSR’ approach to security: ensuring that policing is both effective and accountable, that justice institutions function according to the rule of law and are politically independent, that the penal system is structured to deter potential offenders and respect human rights, that security and justice are accessible to all citizens, and that the voice of civil society can be heard and influence the formulation and implementation of policy (Department for International Development 2002). At the same time, justice encompasses issues relating to economic growth, social exclusion, and property rights that fall outside an SJSR framework.

Defining SJSR

2.4 This review identifies security and justice sector reform broadly (Figure 1). SJSR is, above all, a people-centred approach to security. In introducing DFID’s new policy statement on security sector reform in 1999, then Secretary of State for Development Clare Short noted that in addition to state security:

“Security is also a priority concern of the poor themselves. Our participative poverty assessments … put safety and security, both in the home and in society, high on their agenda. The poorest people often live with terrible insecurity and violence. They need security to be able to improve their income, get their children to school and get access to health care for their families. This is another reason why security issues feature as a high priority in our new development agenda” (Department for International Development 1999a: 3).

The underlying motivation of DFID’s work on safety, security and access to justice is similar (Box 1).
Rule of law, accountability, transparency, accessibility and affordability are central to the SJSR agenda. The four key elements of that agenda are: 1) develop and implement an institutional framework; 2) establish and implement the principle of democratic control of the security sector through the practice of good governance, especially oversight, accountability, and transparency; 3) develop capable, professional and accountable security services and justice systems; and 4) foster a culture that is supportive of the above among the political, security and justice leadership. All key security services, the justice system, security and justice management and oversight bodies are part of the sector, as are informal and traditional providers of security and justice where these exist. Each country will decide the roles of each of its security services but there generally is some degree of functional cross-over, for instance, with the defence forces mandated to act in support of the civil authority under certain circumstances or police services fulfilling a range of both security and justice-related functions.

The definition used in this report is in line with those employed by the Organisation for Co-

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3 Relevant policy papers are clear that intelligence agencies form a core part of the security sector (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005 and Department for International Development 2002). Holistic approaches to security and justice sector reform therefore require attention to be paid to intelligence agencies and the governance and accountability framework within which they should ideally operate. UK funded activities have taken place in support of intelligence reform in a number of countries. In at least one African country this work has been closely linked to other SJSR activities and programmes, ensuring a more joined-up approach to security and justice sector reform (subject to independent review by DFID funded Output to Purpose Review [OPR]). All intelligence related activities, including development and training initiatives, are regarded as sensitive. Given the intended wide publication of this report, it has been agreed not to further elaborate on individual intelligence reform programmes.
operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for SSR and the UK Government itself, notably in the *SSR Policy Brief* and the *Justice and Poverty Reduction* (Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2004; Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2005a; Department for International Development, 2000; Department for International Development, 2006a; United Kingdom, 2003). As is increasingly the practice within DFID, the term ‘security and justice sector reform,’ or SJSR, is used in preference to the more commonly employed ‘security sector reform,’ or SSR to underscore the fact that security and justice work occurs under the same umbrella. (Additional information on conceptual issues is found in Annex 2.)

2.7 The breadth of this definition is not intended to suggest that the UK or any other actor should work simultaneously in all areas. It does, however, underscore the importance of a coherent strategic approach to reforming the security and justice sector (see paragraphs 7.4 – 7.7 and Recommendation 1, paragraph 7.8).
3. RESULTS OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE

3.1 A review of SJSR activity throughout sub-Saharan Africa of necessity has to rely heavily on documentary evidence. A mapping exercise was carried out to help analyse the available documents on SJSR interventions and identify any trends that might emerge. Annex 3 contains the mapping matrix used to order the data. This chapter outlines the main findings of the mapping exercise relating to 1) data constraints; 2) classification of intervention; 3) programmes versus projects; 4) ACPP versus DFID bilateral funding; and 5) coherent strategic approach.

Significant Data Constraints

3.2 In carrying out the desk survey, it was very difficult to gather the information necessary to assess some aspects of SJSR interventions, ranging from spend data to project/programme outputs and outcomes. The information retrieval systems of DFID and MOD, which together account for the vast majority of the expenditure on SJSR, do not appear to be designed for facilitating access to the data they contain, and they do not appear to contain all relevant documents. In some cases only the most basic information about specific interventions was provided. DFID staff members interviewed during this review have suggested that new systems being introduced – Electronic Document Records Management and Quest – will increase the accessibility of documentation in the future. Additionally, while DFID has a structure for storing and retrieving documentation, the systems appear to be much less well developed in MOD and FCO.

3.3 It was possible to obtain yearly breakdowns of expenditure on individual interventions from DFID for all financial years between 2001 and 2005 and from MOD primarily for only 2004-2005. Spending figures provided to the Review Team by officials in all three Departments were not always easy to reconcile. Figures for early years were missing in some cases. Actual spend figures were difficult to come by. Project/programme start and end dates were often unrecorded. As a result, some of the data, which appear in the table at Annex 3, may not be accurate. The general trends, however, are clear enough for the purposes of this review.

3.4 The practical outcome has been to limit the ability of the team to draw reasonably firm conclusions from this portion of the study. That said, several general observations can be made.

Classifying SJSR

3.5 The difficulty in identifying ‘SJSR’ interventions in existing UK Government databases derives in part from somewhat arbitrary classification systems. This is particularly the case for interventions financed through the ACPP. While no UK Government intervention has ever been designated ‘SJSR’ because the term is not in wide use, there are agreed UK Government definitions of its two components: SSR and SSAJ. As can be seen from Box 1 (Chapter 1), however, these definitions leave considerable room for individual interpretation and the ACPP does not provide guidance on what constitutes an SJSR activity or what is an appropriate SJSR bid. (See also paragraph 7.12 and Recommendation 3, paragraph 7.13.)

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* Data for financial year 2006/07 were also available from DFID and MOD. This year falls outside this study’s terms of reference TORs, and so has not been included in Annex 3. Some MOD expenditure for FY 2001 – 2003 is included in Annex 3.
3.6 SSR is one of the agreed ACPP spend themes (United Kingdom 2005). However, the ACPP Financial Reports to Ministers identify spend by country/region, not by themes. DFID does classify interventions in its PRISM database as SSR and SSAJ. In both cases it is unclear what definition is used to make those designations.

3.7 Searching the PRISM database under SSAJ and SSR did not identify all of the bilaterally funded interventions that are included in Annex 3. The lack of ACPP classification systems meant that the MOD official conducting the search for MOD documentation had to use his own judgment on what information to provide. In consequence, some information was provided on interventions that do not conform to the definition of SJSR used in this report (paragraphs 2.4 – 2.7 and Figure 1). The authors are unable to say what might have been omitted.

Programmes versus Projects

3.8 A large number of the interventions analysed in Annex 3 are stand-alone projects. (See Box 2 for definitions of projects and programmes.) While some projects are linked to each other or to programmes, it is difficult to ascertain such linkages from the documentary evidence alone. Nonetheless, the Review Team estimates that just over half of all UK Government SJSR interventions consist of stand-alone projects (Figure 2 and Table 1). With the exception of Sierra Leone, projects tend to cluster in countries in the early stages of recovering from violent conflict where the environment is generally not suited to significant institutional development interventions.

### Table 1. SJSR Spend, 2001-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spent on:</th>
<th>Including Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Excluding Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total planned expenditure (£K)</td>
<td>% age funded by ACPP and (P) Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total funds committed in period under review</td>
<td>240,408.40</td>
<td>60.5 Pg - 5 Pj - 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of this total for Sierra Leone</td>
<td>144,896.20</td>
<td>[is 60 % of total]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID Bilateral spending</td>
<td>149,758.50</td>
<td>96.30 Pg - 6 Pj - 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPP Spending</td>
<td>90,649.90</td>
<td>3.6 Pg - 3 Pj - 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Including Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Excluding Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total planned expenditure (£K)</td>
<td>% age funded by ACPP and (P) Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>2,476.50</td>
<td>3.6 Pg - 5 Pj - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis/Scoping</td>
<td>96.30</td>
<td>100 Pj - 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence + DDR</td>
<td>82,846.50</td>
<td>99.5 Pg - 5 Pj - 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2,586.00</td>
<td>- Pg - 3 Pj - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>18,531.00</td>
<td>- Pg - 6 Pj - 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAJ</td>
<td>124,473.00</td>
<td>- Pg - 7 Pj - 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR Programmes</td>
<td>9,399.10</td>
<td>86.1 Pg - 6 Pj - 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Box 2. Defining Programmes and Projects.

**Project:** An intervention designed to deliver a specific product with a clear beginning and end, for example, providing a place on a UK residential course for a senior government official or conducting a specific stand-alone and time bound activity.

**Programme:** A set of related projects, managed in a coordinated manner in order to obtain benefits and control not available when managed individually, for example SSAG programmes.

Source: Department for International Development 2001a.

3.9 Apart from Sierra Leone, most programmes are in the justice system. With the exception of Sierra Leone, programmes are more likely to be developed in countries that are not undergoing transitions from war to peace. (See Box 3 for definitions of these categories.) Programmes are also more likely to be developed in countries of particularly high political significance. At the same time, although efforts have been made to initiate programmes in some countries such as Ethiopia, the political environment – in the UK, the host country, or both – has not been sufficiently conducive for programmes to flourish. In these cases, the interventions devolve into little more than projects.

Box 3. Country Categories.

**War to peace transition countries** are either moving from conflict to peace implementation or from post conflict recovery to fragile development. **Primarily political transition countries** are moving from a non-participatory form of government to more democratic governance. These three categories are not mutually exclusive. Virtually all countries undergoing war to peace transitions are simultaneously undergoing political transitions. The political transition countries may also have experienced or be experience some degree of violent conflict, but it is the political transition that is currently dominant. Some countries in both of these categories are also of particularly high political significance to the UK.

**War to peace transition countries:** Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan.

**Primarily political transition countries:** Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia.

Source: Authors’ classification.

ACPP Funded versus Bilaterally Funded Programmes

3.10 Bearing in mind the data constraints discussed in paragraphs 3.2 – 3.4, it is still possible to identify a number of trends in ACPP and DFID SJSR funding.

3.11 During the 2001 – 2005 period, DFID bilateral expenditure accounted for just over 60 percent of SJSR-related spend (Figure 3). When the cost of interventions in Sierra Leone is removed, DFID bilateral expenditure accounts for 96 percent of SJSR-related spend (Figure 4).
Results of the Mapping Exercise

Figure 2. Number of Programmes and Projects by Funding Source

| Source: Analysis of data in Annex 3 |

Figure 3. DFID and ACPP SJSR Spend, Total, £240.4 million

Source: Analysis of data in Annex 3

Figure 4. DFID and ACPP SJSR Spend, minus Sierra Leone, £95.5 million

Source: Analysis of data in Annex 3
3.12 ACPP funding is allocated heavily to defence projects (Table 1). DFID bilateral interventions are heavily weighted toward programmes and, with the exception of Sierra Leone, tend to focus on the justice system and rule of law (Figures 5 and 6). The ACPP’s more frequent use of projects is probably related to the relatively short time frame for ACPP funding (two years with the possibility of one year extension). Given the preponderance of projects, ACPP interventions are sometimes not well connected, coordinated or coherent. Additionally, since most ACPP funded interventions tend to have a value of less than £1 million, even those implemented by DFID are not automatically subject to review.5 Once again, Sierra Leone is the exception, with several ACPP funded projects in excess of £1 million.

Figure 5. SJSR Spend by Category, all funding sources

![Diagram showing SJSR Spend by Category, all funding sources]

Source: Analysis of data in Annex 3
NOTE: Expenditure on Analysis/Scoping is less than 1%. See Table 1 for expenditure data.

3.13 Good international practice suggests that making choices about the most appropriate SJSR interventions and obtaining value for money in difficult political environments can be facilitated by the adoption of a coherent strategic approach (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005a and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006a: 24). There is little evidence of strategic planning from the documentation available to the Review Team. It is clear, however, from interviews conducted during the field visits to Sierra Leone and the DRC that the DRC Country Team does have a strategic approach and that the Country Team in Sierra Leone is increasingly making the linkages among the different parts of the security sector. This suggests that there may be more strategic thinking than is evident from the available documentation.

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5 DFID projects over £1 million are required to complete annual reviews and a project completion report (Department for International Development 2005a).
3.14 An important component of a strategic approach should be a political analysis to inform the feasibility and challenges of implementing SJSR (Law & Development Partnership 2006:20-21). At present, DFID routinely conducts risk analyses as part of the project cycle, and the ACPP common bidding and appraisal forms include a risk analysis section. MOD internal project forms also require risk analysis. Additionally, DFID periodically conducts Drivers of Change analyses which examine, among other things, the political landscape, although these are not tied to the project cycle and have not significantly altered ‘the shape and nature’ of DFID programming (Department for International Development 2005c: 2). However, it is clear that UK officials need to “attempt to determine who are likely to be effective change agents and who have the potential to become spoilers. Strategies for neutralising spoilers are just as important as strategies for working effectively with change agents” (Ball 2004: 34).

3.15 As for the DFID risk assessments, they are often overly optimistic. Certainly the assumptions included in log frames to justify approving large justice system programmes frequently appear to underrate known political problems. This was particularly evident in the SJG Programme in Nigeria, to take one example (Barker et al 2003: 8). Equally important, there appears to be unevenness in the application of risk analysis across ACPP interventions. This is linked to uneven project cycle management in the ACPP as discussed below (paragraphs 6.28 – 6.29 and 7.30 and Recommendations 11 and 12, paragraphs 7.31 and 7.32.)

3.16 Given the political nature of most of the activities, this is not surprising. Although project documentation was not universally available for review, the impression gained was that risk management plans developed during the design phase are frequently light on the mitigation part of the plan and, furthermore, are sometimes inadequately followed up during implementation. There is anecdotal evidence, too, that suggests there is a tendency to underplay risk in order to increase the chances of approval for programme expenditure in Whitehall. Constraints on the Review Team’s time and the lack of documentation mean that these observations remain inadequately substantiated in this report. It is an aspect of projects and programmes that, for ACPP funded work in particular, should be covered carefully in formal evaluations. The emphasis on ACPP funded programmes is because they appear to

**Figure 6. SJSR Spend Excluding Sierra Leone by Category, all funding sources**

Source: Analysis of data in Annex 3

NOTE: Expenditure on Analysis/Scoping and SSR Programming is less than 1%. See Table 1 for expenditure data.
have less attention paid to risk than in DFID bilaterally funded work. (See also Recommendation 12, paragraph 7.32.)

3.17 Variations in the political environment – new government, new ministers, new heads of security services and so on – can affect the speed with which programmes are implemented. Excessive delays between design and implementation increase the likelihood of this happening. Even with the best of risk assessments, it is not possible to foresee whether such political factors will arise or precisely how they will play out. A rigorous political analysis that is regularly updated and supplemented by a risk mitigation strategy can, however, help UK Government programming decisions reflect political conditions. (See Recommendation 1, paragraph 7.8.)

3.18 It is also important under such circumstances for financial resources to be available when the political climate enables programmes to proceed and for there to be sufficient flexibility for programme managers to adjust for changes in the political landscape. Recognising that Treasury rules make this kind of flexibility very difficult to achieve in practice, nonetheless the limitation on ACPP funding to two (plus one) years forward, compared to MOD’s four year horizon for its Short Term Plan, is an additional burden that limits flexibility unnecessarily. (See Recommendation 13, paragraph 7.33.)
4. COHERENCE

4.1 In assessing coherence this review examines “the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the defined objective” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2001: 90). Achieving coherence involves consistency in objectives, coordination of efforts, and cooperation among UK Government officials at Post and in London.

Why is Coherence Important?

4.2 The development and implementation of UK Government policy in all areas benefits from coherence within and among government Departments. In the case of SJSR, coherence is particularly relevant.

- Because of its cross-disciplinary nature, SJSR will fail without consistency of objectives within and among all UK actors, particularly at the strategic level. The absence of coherence can result in failure to address priorities, as well as in gaps or overlaps in assistance. Agreeing objectives requires cooperation among UK Government officials.

- The nearly 40 percent of the UK Government’s SJSR work that is funded from the ACPP requires cooperation among UK Government officials to develop and approve joint bids. This in turn demands consistency of objectives and, in some cases, ability to coordinate activities among Departments.

- The remaining SJSR interventions are funded by Departments (primarily DFID) bilaterally. This means there are direct functional links between ACPP and Departmental work. Consistency of objectives and ability to coordinate activities is needed to maximise the overall effect of the investments and in order not to contravene the International Development Act (IDA) (United Kingdom 2002) or DAC restrictions on Official Development Assistance (ODA).^6^

4.3 Coherence is closely linked to effectiveness and impact. Although these three topics are treated in separate chapters of this report, they are linked and interdependent.

4.4 Desirable as coherence is in principle, not all activities and programmes in the sector justify full joint collaboration of all departments and agencies at all times. Indeed, the ever present need to reduce transaction costs means that while consistency of objectives requires cooperation and coordination at the strategic level, implementation can, and often is, carried out by a single agency.

Consistency of Objectives

4.5 Although DFID, FCO and MOD have different mandates and policy objectives, there are sufficient synergies and mutual interest in poverty reduction and conflict prevention at a strategic level

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^6^ Funds provided under IDA must both be intended to further sustainable development and be likely to contribute to poverty reduction. In general, technical assistance to the military as part of SJSR programmes is not allowed under IDA; nor is it considered ODA-able. Nonetheless, DFID will consider technical assistance to militaries of partner countries “where there is a clear poverty reduction argument, and the Act [IDA] is satisfied” (Department for International Development 2005d: paragraph 17; see also paragraph 19).
to provide a coherent platform for SJSR. At the policy level, the *Security Sector Reform Policy Brief* underscores the three Departments’ “common interest in promoting peace and stability through good governance and through the development of democratically accountable, effective and affordable security structures” (United Kingdom 2003: 1). At the operational level, the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Sudan offer sound evidence in this regard. In each of these countries, representatives of the three Departments are working closely together toward mutually agreed objectives.7

4.6 At the same time, interviews conducted for this review suggest that SJSR itself is poorly understood in parts of the UK Government. There seem to be three main reasons for this.

4.7 First, the lack of ACPP guidance on what is an acceptable SJSR bid and the fact that bids are only classified by countries, not by themes (paragraphs 3.6 – 3.7), means that representatives of the different departments can be talking about quite different types of activities as they prepare their joint bids. For example, the bid for a small-scale project to help reduce violence in the Delta region in Nigeria prepared by FCO refers to the “Niger Delta SSR Strategy.” The Review Team could find no evidence of any jointly agreed objectives for such a strategy or how the Country Team linked it with other, perhaps Federal level, SJSR objectives in Nigeria.

4.8 Second, there may be a lack of awareness of current debate and literature on security and development. Some of the individuals interviewed referenced recent OECD publications and other relevant SJSR sources. Others seemed to be unaware of the outcome of discussions over the last decade on the linkages between ‘security’ and ‘justice’ that produced the definition of SJSR used in this report, the UK Government’s *Security Sector Reform Policy Brief,* and various recent OECD documents (Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2004; Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2005a; Department for International Development, 2000; Department for International Development, 2005a; Department for International Development, 2006a: 44-54; United Kingdom, 2003).

4.9 Third, and most serious, there appears to be a tension within DFID between the security and justice functions of policing that may reflect a conceptual disagreement about the linkages between security and development. At a minimum it indicates a disagreement about the advisability of placing security and justice under the same umbrella, despite the fact that SSR policy clearly does just that. This has led in some cases to DFID’s uneven application of SSR policy. This selectivity in policy implementation has led to confusion, particularly among field workers and practitioners.8

4.10 The tension between security and justice functions in DFID was evident in interviews conducted by the Review Team in Abuja, Freetown and London, as well as the discussion at the November 2006 justice conference in Nairobi. It reflects the concern that the post 9/11 emphasis on the security functions of policing is resulting in inadequate attention being given to the justice functions of policing. In an effort to correct that perceived imbalance, some DFID officials are proposing that DFID deliver only justice-related support to the police, where impact on poverty may be more clearly measured, and leaving security-related support for policing to other UK Government Departments. Clarity on this matter is required. (See also paragraphs 7.9 – 7.10 and Recommendation 2, paragraph 7.11, and Annex 2.)

4.11 Finally, there are mainstream themes that are part and parcel of DFID bilateral programmes,

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7 On Sierra Leone and DRC see Annex 4. On Sudan, authors’ interviews.

8 Comments from DFID on drafts of this report also demonstrated different interpretations of the policy framework guiding SSR and its constituent parts. In FCO and MOD policy and policy implementation are more closely aligned and less likely to be subject to personal dictate than in DFID.
including SSAJ, that have relevance to much of the work funded by ACPP. The most prominent are HIV/AIDS and gender. Other themes, such as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and public financial management (PFM) are also often directly relevant. In the case of SALW and DDR, the linkages are usually obvious and are considered where relevant to SJSR programming, as they have been, for example, in DRC.

4.12 In contrast, gender, HIV/AIDS and public financial management are generally not well represented in SJSR programming, apart from SSAJ which generally includes consideration of HIV/AIDS and gender (Annex 2). PFM was recognised in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as one of the areas where greater collaboration was desirable between donors and partner governments (High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2005: paragraphs 25 – 27). (See also paragraphs 6.15 – 6.19, and 7.16 as well as Recommendation 5, paragraph 7.17 and Recommendation 10, paragraph 7.29.)

4.13 Although gender and HIV/AIDS are often not part of the strategic considerations underlying SJSR programmes, effective implementation of SJSR policy and programmes can produce potentially positive outcomes in relation to gender and HIV/AIDS. In Northern Nigeria (Jigawa State), for example, community policing initiatives have reportedly resulted in greater access for women, with improved market security. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the alternative dispute resolution systems implemented as part of the SJG programme have generated increased access and awareness for women (authors’ interviews). In the same vein, professionalisation of the armed forces, for example through peacekeeping training, invariably exposes military personnel to HIV/AIDS awareness programmes as well as gender and child protection training. However, these benefits can be better harnessed if gender and HIV/AIDS form an integral part of SJSR strategy.

Coordination of Efforts

4.14 The need for balance between the justice and security functions of the police is an important issue that needs to be resolved with the UK Government. The Review Team is strongly of the opinion that splitting assistance to the police among different UK Government Departments – or, in the words of one UK official, seeing policing ‘through two lenses’ – runs a serious risk of creating negative impacts in the medium to longer term. In Sierra Leone, the DFID-funded Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) deals solely with the justice aspects of policing while the DFID-funded Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP) supports the security functions. (See also Annex 2.) This sets up a situation where the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) are in danger of misunderstanding the important linkage between their security and justice functions and creates opportunities for the SLP to play one part of the UK Government off against the other. Rather, there needs to be coordination of efforts between the different UK Government officials who are responsible for the security functions and those responsible for the justice functions.

4.15 This problem with the lack of clarity around support to the police is an indication of that fact that, as one UK official interviewed noted, “DFID and ACPP activities are not always as well linked as they could be”. The Review Team was consistently told by FCO and MOD officials at Post that they were not, and did not expect to be, consulted on the development of DFID bilateral funded SJSR activities. While one would not expect these officials to discuss the details of programming, it is clear that a certain level of cross-departmental discussion is desirable for “the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions” aimed at “creating synergies towards achieving the defined objective.”

4.16 Although the Pool is intended to foster coherence and SJSR interventions funded by the ACPP are agreed jointly by Pool partners, some continue to be viewed as separate MOD, DFID or FCO spheres
of activity. The large number of stand-alone SJSR interventions in Annex 3 is in part a reflection of this, as is the disconnected nature of ACPP interventions in countries such as Nigeria.

4.17 Country Teams are tasked with ensuring that SJSR interventions funded by ACPP resources actually meet high priority SJSR needs as identified in SJSR strategies (explicit or implicit) for individual countries. If this does not occur at Post and if, as is sometimes the case, officers at Post choose to deal directly with training providers, coherence at country level may be damaged. Although Whitehall intervenes when it is aware of this problem, the fact remains that it is not always easy for the three Departments to spot the problem and correct it quickly. Ensuring coherence at Post is clearly the most efficient and appropriate means of avoiding this problem.

4.18 It is also desirable that opportunities for SJSR spin-off from non-SJSR activities funded by DFID or ACPP be sought where possible. For example, peace support operation training at Jaji, Nigeria, might provide some SJSR spin-off for improved police – military relations in that country once the training courses are fully underway and Commander British Defence Assistance Team (BDAT) and his Nigerian counterparts judge that the time is right.

4.19 Programme legacies can complicate efforts to achieve greater coordination of effort. Long standing engagement in some countries, such as the UK’s defence relations with Ghana and Kenya, build their own patterns and expectations on both sides. While such sustained engagement ensures access and builds confidence, the legacy relationship can also risk diverting attention from newer SJSR challenges, restricting the way in which Defence Attachés/Advisers do business, and acting as a drag on change.

Cooperation among UK Government Actors

4.20 Coherence at Post is variable. There are examples of good and close cooperation between FCO officials, Defence Attachés/Advisers and DFID staff on SJSR issues. There are also examples of less good and less close cooperation. In the main, however, the picture is one of a range of positive levels of cooperation (Annex 4). Not surprisingly, colocation of offices appears to be a significant factor in promoting good relations and coherence. The relative priority devoted to SJSR issues by the Head of Mission and Head of DFID Office, reflecting their instructions from London, is critical.

4.21 The terms of reference of Regional Conflict Advisers (RCAs) in Abuja, Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Pretoria assign them a leading role in proposing conflict prevention activities. This is often interpreted to include SJSR, although the terms ‘SSR’ and ‘SJSR’ are not mentioned in their job description (Department for International Development 2005e). While circumstances are likely to differ from situation to situation and it was possible to interact only with one of the four RCAs in preparing this report, available evidence suggests that RCAs can play an important role in promoting coherence among local and regional stakeholders. There is a clear expectation on the part of ACPP Officials in Whitehall that RCAs should be closely involved with the planning and execution of ACPP funded SJSR programmes and projects within their respective sub-regions. The Review Team found no evidence that current RCAs fell short in this respect. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case in general. However, newly appointed RCAs may need to have their roles clarified, and it may be helpful to revise Terms of Reference accordingly, when the opportunity arises.

4.22 At the same time, SJSR demands the input of a wide range of competencies, among which those of DFID’s governance advisers would appear to be equally important. Both RCAs (and/or country based DFID conflict advisers) and governance advisers should be involved in proposing, designing, implementing and monitoring SJSR programmes and activities under the guidance of the Country Team.
leader, preferably the Head of Mission. (See Recommendation 1, paragraph 7.8.) Given the acknowledged important role of the RCAs and their broad TORs, a review of their future roles and activities and geographical responsibilities (and operating locations) may be a useful exercise to conduct.

Conclusions

4.23 Coherence is desirable for a number of reasons. This includes reducing the potentially contradictory aspects of UK policy and making sure that there are no gaps. To achieve these objectives requires ensuring that Departments in Whitehall and officials at Post work together efficiently and productively. Good personal relationships, strong leadership from Heads of Mission and DFID Heads of Office are clearly important, but they are not virtues needed just to achieve effective SJSR. Coherence also has the potential for increasing the effective use of UK resources, although harmonisation of activities within the international community and support for reform throughout the host government are also essential here. (See paragraphs 6.20 – 6.25.)

4.24 Coherence is also desirable from the perspective of the host government. As with other forms of external assistance, coherence can reduce transaction costs for the government.

4.25 In terms of achieving coherence within and between Whitehall Departments, differences of opinion on the scope, utility and methodology of SSR/SJSR persist.

4.26 In DFID there is certainly a range of views as to whether and to what degree the justice system should be considered as part of the security sector, and what constitutes the justice system. This might reflect a view that security should not be part of development policy. While there already is established policy on both these points, the debate needs to be resolved. In MOD there is a growing coherence about the nature and purpose of SSR, added to by recently circulated drafts of Joint Service doctrine on the subject. All this debate is neither surprising, nor without benefit, since SJSR is still relatively new and the body of practical experience from worldwide interventions is still quite small.

4.27 More and concerted effort is required to take the themes of PFM, HIV/AIDS and gender into account when designing SJSR interventions, particularly those that affect security institutions.

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9 Joint Service doctrine is produced by military staff based at the MOD’s Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre in consultation with other Government and non-government experts. It takes the form of written pamphlets and other media giving direction and guidance to commanders in all three Services and at all levels on the conduct of operations, to planning staffs on future requirements and to commanders of training and education establishments on their work.
Coherence
5. **EFFECTIVENESS**

5.1 In assessing effectiveness, this review examines the objectives of UK interventions and the extent to which they have been achieved or are expected to be achieved (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2002).

**Introduction**

5.2 In assessing the effectiveness of SJSR interventions across Africa, the Review Team focused on UK Government programming at the strategic level. Five issues have emerged as particularly important for achieving effective UK SJSR interventions: 1) country context; 2) programme design and implementation; 3) contribution of UK interventions to achievement of objectives; 4) monitoring and evaluation; and 5) collaboration with other international actors.

**Country Context**

5.3 There are two issues that appear especially important in terms of country context: 1) the degree to which SJSR is possible in different transitional environments; and 2) the need to understand the political environment in host countries. Most African countries receiving SJSR support are undergoing one or more types of transition (Box 3): war to peace and/or political. In many cases countries are undergoing both simultaneously, which complicates the process of prioritising interventions. Additional complications may arise due to broader UK priorities in a country (paragraphs 5.11, 5.12 and 5.21).

**SJSR opportunities in different transitional environments**

5.4 In the early stage of war to peace transitions, it is difficult to set comprehensive SJSR objectives due to factors such as political manoeuvring and capacity weaknesses. Initial SJSR objectives tend – at best – to focus on stabilisation and consolidation of peace. In DRC, both the Rejusco project, which focuses on strengthening rule of law institutions, and UK support to the police for electoral security are examples of the limited objectives attainable during this type of transition (authors’ interviews). Similarly, the focus in Burundi has primarily been on small, relatively short term projects. Three short term projects were completed and funds agreed for advisers to help design a broader SJSR programme, which has not yet (after more than three years) got under way (Annex 3).

5.5 The latter stages of war to peace transitions tend to offer the best opportunities for comprehensive SJSR. Sierra Leone, which has experienced SJSR undertaken at levels not previously seen or perhaps likely to be seen anywhere else for sometime to come, is the best example of this. Here, the opportunity for reform was matched by UK’s commitment and reasonably comprehensive objectives consistent with the UK Government’s overall SJSR strategy.

5.6 Perhaps the least permissive reform environment is encountered in non-aid dependent countries at various stages of ‘voluntary’ political transition (Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda) where an appetite for significant governance-related reform is sometimes hard to find. It is interesting to note that despite the often non-permissive environment, the objectives of SJSR interventions in such settings have often been fairly ambitious. Guinea Bissau is one example. Others, where ambitious objectives for SJSR have been considered in the face of difficult political, economic and social conditions, even war-to-peace transitions, include Burundi, Rwanda, Guinea Bissau, Sudan, DRC and, above all from a UK point of view, Sierra Leone. (On DRC and Sierra Leone, see Annex 4.)
Political context

5.7 In all of these transitional environments it is essential to take into account the deeply political nature of SJSR processes. The lack of high-level political acceptance of the need for and shape of reform often creates blockages to programme implementation that can be difficult to address, especially within the context of stand-alone interventions. If inadequate attention is given to removing these blockages, both the effectiveness of individual interventions and the longer-term impact of those interventions can be compromised. As discussed in paragraphs 3.13 – 3.18, it is essential to give adequate attention from the outset to developing a strategy to overcome political resistance to reform and to prioritise activities. An important element in a strategic approach should be a rigorous political analysis. (See also paragraphs 7.4 – 7.7 and Recommendation 1, paragraph 7.8.)

Project/Programme Design and Implementation

5.8 Four factors stand out as particularly important in maximising effectiveness through programme design and implementation: 1) accurately assessing the commitment to reform on the part of the political leadership in the host country; 2) accounting for uncertainties in the political environment; 3) factoring in the UK Government’s own priorities in the target country; and 4) reflecting the extent of UK leverage and ability to use it in the long term.

5.9 In war to peace transitions, these factors tend to be present in the minds of external actors. In contrast, these issues tend to be underplayed in political transition settings such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Uganda. At the best of times, the Nigerian government is difficult to engage at any level, not least at the Federal level. Obtaining the political commitment of the Inspector General of Police and the Federal Minister of Justice, for example, would require consistent high-level engagement on the part of the UK Country Team. It does not appear that such intensive involvement was factored into the design of the Security, Justice and Growth Programme. It certainly has not been manifest in programme implementation over the last two years (Annex 4 and authors’ interviews).

5.10 It is extremely important for Country Teams in both of these environments to make a realistic assessment of the leverage the UK actually has and is willing to exert when designing an intervention. In the DRC, for example, there is potential for effective SJSR interventions because the UK seems to have reasonable leverage with the key Congolese actors, who do not perceive that it has a vested interest in the DRC in comparison to some other key players such as Angola, Belgium, or South Africa (Annex 4 and authors’ interviews).

5.11 Ambitious SJSR programming may be feasible in political transition countries if the Country Team is prepared to use the leverage it has to achieve high-level political buy into a reform process. This was done at an early stage in Uganda and contributed to the relative effectiveness of the defence review process. In a country where issues of defence and security were far from transparent, it was possible to put in place an inclusive process involving wide representation of stakeholders in government, civil society and academia in which there was reasonable openness at every stage. While a number of significant challenges remain in terms of transition from Defence Review to implementation (such as resistance to change among key actors and management of expectations), the fact that all these were achieved in a difficult political setting underscores the relative effectiveness of the British intervention in Uganda (Baly and Chalmers 2004, Uganda Defence Reform Unit 2003). (See also paragraph 7.19 and Recommendation 6, paragraph 7.20.)

5.12 This stands in sharp contrast to Ethiopia and Nigeria. In Ethiopia it is events that have
intervened: internal tensions and continuing border frictions not only led to UK Ministers’ decision to suspend the SJSR activities, but also exposed the gulf in the apparent views of senior officials in Addis Ababa towards SJSR. In Nigeria, both the BDAT led programme and the SJG programme have suffered from insufficient buy in from senior Nigerian officials (authors’ interviews).

5.13 Uganda is considerably more aid dependent than either Ethiopia or Nigeria and therefore more susceptible to external pressure from major donors. While the security and justice sector can be difficult to influence, the UK Government would appear to have more leverage in Nigeria than it has exerted in aid of the SJG programme to date. The Obasanjo government is concerned to give the international community an impression of openness and democratic change that could be exploited in this regard. Willingness to exert influence is of course linked to the UK Government’s policy priorities. In Nigeria, responding to the crisis in the Delta seems to have assumed priority over any SJSR goal. This situation is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. In contrast, promoting poverty reduction and development are top UK priorities in DRC, and SJSR is seen to be a necessary component of reaching these objectives.

**Contribution of UK Interventions to Achievement of Objectives**

5.14 There are many factors that influence the achievement of objectives. A well-designed and implemented SJSR intervention may be one of them, but it is likely to be only one component of success and perhaps not even the most important one. Assigning a relative weight to the influence of a particular UK intervention is difficult. Nonetheless, this review suggests that UK SJSR interventions are most effective when the UK: 1) acts as a catalyst for change; 2) adopts a strategic approach; 3) involves civil society; 4) accords high priority to SJSR; and 5) collaborates with international actors.

**Catalyst for reform**

5.15 Often, the UK is the only or the major external actor supporting SJSR. This situation allows the UK to act as a catalyst for reform. It is reasonably clear that without UK support, reform in Sierra Leone (sector wide), Uganda (defence review), Ghana (several of the SJSR programmes), and perhaps even Guinea Bissau (SJSR planning) very likely would not have been attempted. To the extent that these interventions have been effective, it is possible to attribute their outcomes to UK involvement.

5.16 It is more difficult to assess the UK’s contribution when there are multiple actors supporting SJSR. Even in Sierra Leone, other international actors have contributed albeit in a limited way to achieving the outcomes. This includes, for example, Canadian participation in IMATT and UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) mentoring of senior police officers. Similarly, pockets of effectiveness found at the local and state levels in Nigeria cannot be entirely attributed to UK interventions, but to efforts by state and local governments (authors’ interviews).

**Strategic approach**

5.17 Experience suggests that UK SJSR interventions are more effective to the extent that they are part of a strategic approach that seeks linkages with other SJSR interventions and with other interventions in areas such as governance, public sector reform, or public financial management reform. While UK SJSR interventions in Sierra Leone have generally been effective, current UK interventions have to be assessed in light of the evolution of objectives over the last five years. Starting with creating capable security institutions, the objectives have progressed to ensuring affordability, accessibility and accountability of the security and justice sector. With the benefit of hindsight, programme design and initial implementation could have targeted other important stakeholders and actors whose roles are critical to
the success of SJSR at an earlier stage. These include, for example, particular oversight institutions such as the parliament, line ministries like finance and internal affairs and civil society, who will serve as the repository of knowledge on SJSR in the long run. (See also paragraphs 3.13 – 3.18, 7.4 – 7.7 and Recommendation 1, paragraph 7.8.)

Involvement of civil society

5.18 The experience of South Africa during its transition in the 1990s indicates that SJSR interventions are more effective to the extent that they involve civil society (Cawthra 2003: 41, 53). In particular, the South African experience demonstrates that the success of SJSR programmes and the sustainability of SJSR related outcomes across Africa will depend very much on the capacity within civil society to support the process and provide much needed expert support to parliaments and other oversight institutions. This requires civil society to move beyond polemics and to provide thoughtful intellectual and practice input to reform processes. Many members of civil society organisations have experience in the security services or in government. Others are well respected because of long-term support for human rights and democratisation. Since many sub-Saharan African countries are not well endowed with human capacity, they risk losing an important resource by failing to engage civil society in policy development and implementation.

5.19 Overall, the UK is not making systematic use of African civil society expertise across SJSR programmes (authors’ interviews). One reason might be that external actors such as the British Government are sometimes reluctant to attempt to engage civil society actors in environments where their participation has not previously been welcomed by the authorities. However, since a major objective of SJSR is democratising security and justice sector, it is important to make the effort to find ways of demonstrating to host governments the benefits of engagement with civil society. Another reason might be that the capacity of civil society in many of the African countries where the UK is engaged in SJSR work is quite low. Both Sierra Leone and DRC each have one very small NGO that specialises in security-related issues, for example. Groups concerned with human rights, legal and small arms issues tend to be more plentiful but still face considerable capacity constraints.

5.20 Efforts have been under way since the mid-1990s to strengthen civil society capacity in the areas of security and justice, and the UK has played an important role in this regard (Box 4). Leveraging the expertise available in the ACPP funded African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and other civil society groups during programme design and implementation might contribute to the effectiveness of SJSR programmes by bringing contextual knowledge and experience of other SJSR processes in Africa to the table (Box 4). (See also paragraphs 7.23-7.25 and Recommendation 8, paragraph 7.26.)

Priority accorded to SJSR

5.21 UK SJSR interventions are clearly more effective to the extent that they are a high priority for the UK Government. Ghana, where the environment has been more permissive than any other non-conflict setting, does not appear to be a high priority in terms of SJSR for the UK Government.10 Uganda and Sierra Leone, which have more difficult political environments, have been high priorities. The UK Government has invested much of the necessary support in both countries, especially financial and technical assistance and high-level political attention (Annex 3 and authors’ interviews).

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10 A significant investment has been made by the ACPP in the form of BMATT West Africa, which provides resident instructors and financial support to the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College. Although the curriculum includes instruction on subjects within the SJSR field, there has been little evidence of any measurable SJSR outcomes. This may be for lack of evaluation rather than for lack of result. The Review Team noted that plans to revive the overall strategic SJSR effort in Ghana are being prepared.
There are encouraging signs in terms of the UK Government bringing civil society expertise to bear.

African Security Sector Network input has been sought as part of the effort to support SJSR in Sudan although this is still at a very early phase. ASSN has also begun to assist the Government of Liberia’s effort to develop a security sector framework with UK support by providing technical assistance to the Governance Reform Commission, which is leading that effort.

The UK has also supported South-South workshops in Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda as an input to SJSR activities in those countries. Indeed, civil society in Ghana is particularly actively involved in SJSR initiatives by providing technical support and information on good practice, in part with UK assistance.

Supported by the UK, the African Security Dialogue & Research (ASDR) and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) have collaborated with the Ghana MOD to develop SSR training for defence and security personnel and key oversight institutions like Parliament. Civil society has also sought to link these training activities to capacity building for the Ghana Armed Forces in peacekeeping in order to maximise SJSR outcomes by involving some MOD officials in the training courses.

Source: Authors’ interviews

Collaboration with international actors

5.23 Good international practice calls for “co-ordination, harmonisation and an effective division of labour” among external actors engaging in SJSR (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005a: 13 and High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2005: paragraphs 32-42). Experience has shown that harmonisation of international efforts is often necessary for UK SJSR programming to be effective.

5.24 This is because there are barriers to international cooperation and coordination, which only a common approach is likely to overcome. These barriers may include: different political and commercial objectives, including the commercial activities of some major global companies in the extractive industries; legislation and administrative rules preventing the co-mingling of development funds with
military assistance; and particular relationships between donor and partner countries stemming from
colonial history. Furthermore, the mandates of international organisations may overlap in some areas of
SJSR activity leading to delay and uncertainty in harmonising policy, as in DRC. Some actors, notably
China, but also other significant regional actors such as Angola in the case of DRC, may not yet be as
ready to align their policies with the general thrust of SJSR as western donors. South Africa appears to
be an exception, since thinking on SJSR there is in some respects better developed than it is in the case
of non-regional actors.

5.25 The number of international players and their various institutional capacities and preferences
means that support provided by different actors in the same sector is often not compatible (authors’
interviews). The absence of harmonisation of donor efforts makes it easier for the host nation to play
donors off against each other. Additionally, the absence of effective collaboration among international
actors can raise the transaction costs of the assistance received for the recipient government. This should
be weighed against possible increases in transaction costs for the UK Government in achieving greater
coherence of effort.

5.26 In DRC there are a relatively large number of international actors involved in different aspects of
SJSR work and harmonisation of international support will be a primary determinant of the
effectiveness of any UK SJSR intervention there. The DRC Country Team recognises this problem and
has prioritised fostering common international approaches to SJSR to the extent possible (Annex 4). In
Sierra Leone, where the UK leads on supporting SJSR, particularly its defence and
intelligence components, the need to engage and collaborate with other international players was neither
immediately apparent nor deemed necessary. It is now clear that there is a need for a strategic
engagement with the IFIs on critical issues relating to budgeting and financial planning, and that this
engagement should almost certainly have begun early on in the war to peace transition period.

5.27 The IFIs have failed to help the UK Government overcome resistance at the highest levels of the
Sierra Leone government to developing a sector-wide budget for SJSR in order to develop an affordable
and sustainable security and justice. Additionally IMF benchmarking – especially poverty reduction
criteria for expenditure and its linkage to Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief – has had
the perverse effect of penalising the Government of Sierra Leone for taking the highly innovative step of
including security in Pillar 1 of its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a step strongly supported
by the UK Government (authors’ interviews). Rather than being assessed on its contribution to security
or cost effectiveness, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) is having its budget scrutinised
line by line for contributions to poverty reduction so that Sierra Leone can meet HIPC benchmarks
agreed with the International Monetary Fund.

5.28 The approach adopted by the Sierra Leone government has been recommended for other
countries receiving SJSR support from the UK Government. For example, the Uganda Defence Review
OPR proposed: “HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] and donors, including the World Bank, should
consider drawing lessons from Uganda’s experience with regard to the integration of defence and
security issues into the design of country-level PRSPs” (Baly and Chalmers 2003: 13). For this to make
sense, it is essential that the IFIs move away from viewing SJSR as a technical issue and understand that
their actions have ramifications for the ability of host governments to provide a safe and secure
environment for poverty reducing development. The UK Government should actively promote a more
constructive approach by the IFIs. (See also Recommendations 9 and 10, paragraphs 7.28 and 7.29.)

5.29 Finally, the situation in the DRC, with many competing donor governments and agencies,
underscores the importance of having a lead donor with an understanding of SJSR, especially the
governance component, and a coherent approach that prioritises local ownership of and broad
participation in the process (Annex 4). Neither the United Nations Mission (MONUC) nor the European Union (EU) representation is entirely suitable for the lead role for different reasons, although they are making efforts to overcome their difficulties. Similarly, the experience with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) lead on DDR and United States lead on SSR in Liberia since 2003 demonstrates the dangers of lead donors that lack some of these critical characteristics. The initial strategic DDR plan of October 2003 (which was developed primarily by UN specialised agencies and did not involve any of the Liberian warring factions or the leaders of the government security forces) was bypassed by UNMIL due partly to what the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General perceived as a highly volatile security environment and partly to UNMIL’s interpretation of its mandate. In consequence, an ill-prepared DDR process was launched on December 7, 2003 and suspended on December 15, 2003, in part because militia commanders flooded disarmament centres in retaliation for their exclusion from the planning process. The security situation deteriorated, rather than improved (Ball and Hendrickson 2005b: 7 – 34 and authors’ interviews).

Monitoring

5.30 Monitoring and evaluation is not consistent across the ACPP. Whereas DFID institutional practice includes rigorous assessment and evaluation of programmes exceeding £1 million in value, this has not been the case with MOD or FCO. Both MOD and FCO have in the past argued that the difficulty in measuring political outcomes, which drive their interventions, precludes rigorous measurement or assessment, including the SJSR-related activities of DAs. This is beginning to change. MOD is currently developing an evaluation methodology that will be applied to ACPP activities.

5.31 Output to Purpose Reviews and sectoral evaluations and lessons learned studies have been conducted for SSAJ interventions, SILSEP, and the Uganda Defence Review. The inconsistency in evaluation practice across the UK Government means that it is difficult to learn lessons in the same way and at the same pace. The new MOD monitoring and evaluation methodology should help strengthen the process of measuring effectiveness and impact across the UK Government’s SJSR interventions. The adoption of a strategic approach to SJSR by Country Teams could also enable the totality of SJSR interventions to be reviewed annually, irrespective of the value of individual projects or programmes against objectives. At the same time, as the 2006 lessons learned study of SSAJ interventions programmes and projects has underscored, measuring outcomes is difficult (Law & Development Partnership 2006: 35-37). The lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation assessments and lessons learned exercises should be incorporated into SJSR work as a matter of priority. (See Recommendation 4, paragraph 7.15.)

Conclusions

5.32 Given the variations in context, uneven targets and absence of overarching SJSR outcomes, it is difficult to conclude that the UK Government’s SJSR interventions have been effective across the board. Rather, it is possible to speak of ‘partial effectiveness’ within different programmes in the various transitional settings (with the possible exception of Sierra Leone). ‘Partial effectiveness’ means that programmes generate some useful outcomes but cannot produce a multiplier effect given political blockages. For various reasons, it is often difficult to make course corrections in large, expensive

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11 SSAJ programmes are DFID bilateral financed; SILSEP was initially ACPP financed but is currently DFID financed; the Uganda Defence Review is ACPP financed but has a DFID PRISM tracking number.
programmes even when it becomes obvious that the political environment is not conducive to the achievement of the desired outcomes.\textsuperscript{12}

5.33 Sierra Leone stands out as offering the most positive outcomes in terms of effectiveness. The main interventions – JSDP, SILSEP and IMATT support – were clearly designed to achieve SJSR outcomes and they have increasingly connected all strategic level actors that have a role to play in the delivery of overall SJSR outcomes. It should be stressed however that this is the result of incremental progress and continuous learning of lessons.

5.34 Ultimately, the programmes implemented can only be as good as the extent to which the UK actors share the vision underpinning SJSR, are coherent and responsive to the need for change on the ground as defined in a participatory manner by national actors.

\textsuperscript{12} Since this review has not been able to access many of the OPRs and evaluations conducted of major programmes, it can only speculate on the causes of this inertia in large programmes. Some of the factors that have been relevant in other situations and may have been operative in some of the large SJSR programmes in Africa include lack of human resources to propose and manage changes, institutional reluctance to halt expensive programmes, and a lack of leadership, particularly in following up OPR recommendations. It may be useful to undertake a further study to understand how best to change or stop programmes and projects that are not proving effective.
6. IMPACT

6.1 In assessing impact, this review examines the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by UK interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2002).

Introduction

6.2 This chapter examines impact issues in four key areas: 1) strategic approach; 2) sustainability; 3) linkage between UK Government interventions and host government strategies, including incorporation of local priorities; and 4) monitoring/evaluation. It concludes by identifying those factors that appear to have a particularly strong influence on impact.

6.3 Assessing impact requires the passage of time. This is particularly the case for SJSR, which entails political, institutional, attitudinal and behavioural changes that, by their very nature, are long-term processes. This review covers four years. The ultimate outcomes and impacts of many kinds of SJSR interventions will not be fully observable in that timeframe. To help overcome this constraint, rather than simply focusing on whether specified outputs and outcomes have been achieved, an effort has been made to assess movement toward longer-term objectives during the period under study. Based on this approach, it is possible to make some tentative judgements about impact.

Strategic Approach to SJSR

6.4 As with effectiveness, UK Government interventions are more likely to have a positive impact if they are grounded in a strategy for overcoming political resistance to reform that is based on a rigorous political analysis and includes a risk mitigation strategy. (See also paragraphs 3.13 – 3.18, 5.17, 7.4 – 7.7 and Recommendation 1, paragraph 7.8.)

6.5 A central tenet of good international SJSR practice is “Facilitate partner country-owned and led reform efforts” (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005a: 13). If national actors are not committed to reform, the positive impact of activities supported by external actors will be reduced, as for example with the SJG programme in Nigeria (paragraph 6.24 and Annex 4) and the Defence Review programme in Uganda (paragraph 6.25).

6.6 Failing to develop such a strategy risks slowing project implementation due to inadequate political support for reform. This creates its own pressures in terms of the ability to meet agreed benchmarks in a timely fashion. More seriously, a lack of strategic direction from the outset can limit positive impact. A 2006 lessons learned review of SSAJ programming noted a lack of strategic direction resulting in some success at the project level but limited strategic impact (Law & Development Partnership 2006). This is borne out by the Review Team’s analysis of the SJG programme in Nigeria (Annex 4 and authors’ interviews).

6.7 Ensuring that a strategy examines all parts of the security and justice sector and links to host government strategies will help maximise opportunities for positive impact. The Sierra Leone Country Team is progressively moving toward a strategic approach that seeks coherence among its security and

13 Collaboration with international partners has the potential of improving outcomes and enhancing impact. The issues discussed in paragraphs 5.23 – 5.29 in relation to effectiveness also have an important bearing on impact.
justice pillars. At the time this review was conducted, the Country Team was in the process of discussing how to integrate these two pillars more closely, provide flexibility in determining financing priorities, and adjust Country Team staffing to meet emerging priorities.

6.8 Among these emerging priorities are to bring the justice institutions (especially the Ministry of Interior) up to the same level of capacity as has been achieved with the military and intelligence institutions (Box 5) and to ensure the affordability of the security and justice sector. The recently completed report on security and justice expenditure commissioned by DFID has highlighted a number of sustainability issues (see paragraphs 6.15 – 6.19) and the Country Team plans to address these and other issues raised by this report at senior levels of the Government.

Box 5 Gaps in Justice System Support in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, IMATT restructured the RSLAF while the SILSEP programme developed the ministry of defence. Both activities have been successfully guided at the strategic level by the Country Team leaders, largely through the work of the Security Sector Review. In contrast, the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Programme (CCSSP) was designed to strengthen the police. Although the CCSSP foresaw creating a Police Directorate within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there was no effort to strengthen the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole and the 2005 SILSEP III OPR described the Ministry as in need of fundamental reform (Stegman et al 2003:14; Thompson et al 2005: 19). This situation had not changed by the time of the Review Team’s visit one year later and constrains the ability of the Government of Sierra Leone to deliver accessible justice.

6.9 A strategic approach will help determine how to sequence assistance. One sequencing problem frequently encountered involves the need to balance support for capacitating the bodies mandated to deliver security with assistance for strengthening rule of law, justice, and democratic governance (Figure 1). Narrow entry points such as strengthening security force professionalism and capacity are often preferred by the UK Government and host governments alike, with democratic governance of the sector, a systemic approach to the criminal justice system or participation of civil society typically receiving less attention (Law & Development Partnership 2006: 22). However, the experience in both Sierra Leone and Uganda suggests a need to set the conditions of interventions with an eye on the sector wide, longer-term impacts from the outset. For example, the SILSEP III OPR found: “The SLP currently operate within an accountability vacuum” (Thompson et al 2005: 19. See also Baly and Chalmers 2004: 2).

6.10 Another sequencing problem encountered occurs when decisions on programming are made before the host government has identified its priorities. Experience with SSAJ in Africa demonstrates that when DFID undertakes a large programme in the justice sector before the host government has identified its own priorities, it can complicate the process of developing a sector-wide approach, which is intended to prioritise resource allocation across the entire sector (Law & Development Partnership 2006: 11).

Sustainability

6.11 If interventions are not sustainable, it is self-evident that they will have limited longer-term impact. Sustainability is promoted by a political environment that permits reform and by the application of adequate and appropriate human and financial resources. The importance of fostering a pro-reform
political environment is discussed in paragraph 5.7. This section focuses on financial and human resources.

**Human resources**

6.12 The availability of human resources to support programme implementation has at times been problematic, especially in view of the shift to increased project management by contractors and consultants. DFID in particular moves staff frequently, tends not to allocate adequate staff time for supporting complex interventions involving significant institutional change, and has experienced difficulty in filling all governance positions. Gaps of between 12 and 24 months have occurred between governance advisers and, taken together with the dissolution of the SSAJ unit in London, have left UK justice system consultants and contractors without the necessary guidance and political support in countries such as Malawi and Nigeria (see paragraph 5.10). This suggests that DFID should review the staffing and advisory support it provides to large programmes. (See also paragraph 7.34 and Recommendation 14, paragraph 7.35.)

6.13 Mentoring has also experienced difficulties. Early on in its mandate, IMATT staff assumed executive functions in the RSLAF command structure and the Ministry of Defence in Freetown. This was necessary since in effect there was no indigenous capacity. Output–to-Purpose Reviews have been critical of what was seen as IMATT’s slowness to provide host country nationals with support and advice to enable them to grow into their positions (Thompson et al 2005: 14 and Department for International Development 2002c). IMATT has subsequently handed over many of its executive functions to RSLAF and Sierra Leone MOD staff. The intention by Commander IMATT, fully supported by the Country Team, to continue, with due caution, in the transfer of his remaining responsibilities to RSLAF staff is recognised. The appointment of a civilian adviser in the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence after a gap is welcome. The effects and impact of this process will be seen after the forthcoming election. Ongoing evaluation of the SILSEP/IMATT programme (an OPR report is due in April 2007) will be better able to judge the outcomes than the Team was able to manage here.

6.14 In general, the possible conflict of interest between the developmental approach, including mentoring, and the executive role is always likely to cause difficulties. It may be unavoidable. Host country staffs will naturally want fewer controls but no less financial support, not always for the best reasons. This is why the Sierra Leone experience is so important as the UK confronts similar situations in Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and elsewhere.

**Financial resources**

6.15 It appears that in general the UK invests adequate financial resources in SJSR over the life cycle of a specific intervention. This is particularly true of major programmes of high political importance. In Uganda, when new needs arose in the course of the defence review programme, for example, additional resources were often provided. At the same time, the fact that major long-term activities – such as SILSEP in Sierra Leone – have had to bid for resources annually means that important programmes are effectively without any guarantee of continuity.
While SSAJ-related activities are ODA-able, ODA cannot be used ‘for military purposes’. Because development assistance ministries and agencies in many OECD countries have resources that far exceed those available to other ministries engaged in supporting SJSR, the inability to use ODA-able resources for some security-related activities reduces the ability of OECD governments to support SJSR fully. As donor governments have become more involved in security-related work, pressure has grown to clarify which security-related expenditures can be counted as ODA and which cannot. In 2005, the DAC agreed that technical cooperation and civilian support for the following six items are ODA-able:

1. Management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure.
2. Enhancing civil society’s role in the security system to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance.
3. Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers.
4. Security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control.
5. Civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
6. Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.


6.16 However, problems have arisen with the financial sustainability of the security bodies that the UK has helped to set up and develop. While UK programmes have sought to develop financially accountable security bodies, they have for the most part not created the foundation for financial sustainability. The review of available documentation suggests that there has not been adequate engagement with ministries of finance or budgeting, offices of the auditor general, public accounts committees in parliaments or the World Bank and the IMF (paragraphs 5.27 – 5.28). This leads to inadequate oversight, arbitrary decisions on budget levels and composition, and inefficient use of resources.

6.17 While DFID has been able to fund both the Sierra Leone Security Sector Review and running costs of the Sierra Leone Office of National Security (ONS), it has experienced difficulty in transferring full financial ownership of portions of the SILSEP programme to the Government of Sierra Leone, due to regulations governing transfer of public funds to host governments. DFID has also been constrained by prohibitions on using ODA-able resources on the defence services (Box 6). DFID is engaged in discussions about its internal accounting rules. In 2007 the DAC will again take up the question of ODA definitions. In the past, there has been little support among DAC members for defining expenditures on defence-related activities as ODA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005b). Nonetheless, DFID may wish to pursue this issue with like-minded DAC Member governments.

6.18 Additionally, while UK practice is to link security reforms to national security reviews and strategic planning, Sierra Leone and Uganda demonstrate just how difficult it can be to convince key local stakeholders of the need to consider the financial implications of decisions on size, tasking, and
equipment (authors’ interviews). Similarly, the 2006 SSAJ lessons learned study reported that in Kenya: “sector implementation arrangements are not aligned to Government’s resource allocation (medium term expenditure framework) processes and … Government is highly resistant to donors moving beyond provision of development funding to engagement with its recurrent budget” (Law & Development Partnership 2006: 11).

6.19 Inadequate clarity over external financing for SJSR causes still more problems from the perspective of financial sustainability. Failure to share full information on the amount and allocation of donor assistance has made it difficult for host governments to understand the full cost of the security and justice establishment being created as well as the longer-term fiscal implications of those investment decisions. The situation is probably quite common, but it has been particularly evident in Sierra Leone, where the Deputy Minister of Defence raised the matter with the Review Team. Part of the problem appears to be assessing which costs are important to the plan for developing self-sustaining, locally funded delivery of security and justice in the future and which, clearly, are not. The capitation costs14 of IMATT, for example, should not be part of the Government of Sierra Leone’s long-term plan, since they will never accrue to Freetown. Transparency needs to be accompanied by clarity and explanation with the object of long-term affordability in mind. World Bank and IMF representatives are also important contributors to such discussions.

Linking SJSR to Other UK National Policies/Strategies and to Local Priorities

6.20 In common with other external support, SJSR interventions are likely to have a greater impact to the extent that they are embedded in national policies and strategies for the sector and reflect local priorities. The record for SJSR interventions in both regards is mixed.

Linkage to national policies/strategies

6.21 One of the key challenges for external actors engaged in SJSR work identified by the OECD DAC is “Ensuring that SSR work is effectively integrated into wider development programming and supports partner country-led reforms” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005a: 17). Few UK SJSR interventions appear to be explicitly linked to national strategies for governance, financial management, or poverty reduction, although there is growing interest within DFID for linking SJSR to PRSPs (Table 2). Sierra Leone’s experience in this regard (paragraphs 5.27 – 5.28) strongly suggests this linkage must be approached with caution. Linkages to DDR are primarily informal, while linkages to sectoral policies and strategies are difficult to make since most African countries do not have SJSR policies/strategies or policies/strategies for the constituent parts of the sector – justice, defence, and intelligence.

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14 Capitation costs are essentially the overheads met, in the case of IMATT, by ACPP. They include the costs of pay and allowances, housing, travel and welfare for the UK based and locally engaged staff in IMATT. They make up by far the largest part of the overall ACPP expenditure for Sierra Leone.
Table 2. Linkage to National Policies and Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/strategy</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone, Pillar 1 recognises linkages between security and development</td>
<td>Security spending, especially military spending, arbitrarily constrained because of need to reach HIPC benchmarks agreed with IMF. DFID/CHASE examining feasibility of linkages in other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan (informal); DRC (formal through tronc commun</td>
<td>DDR seen as essential for restructuring security services but restructuring only beginning of a SJSR process; links to governance and institutional framework components weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJSR policies/strategies</td>
<td>Sierra Leone, Uganda, Nigeria</td>
<td>Most African countries do not have formal SJSR policies or strategies; key element of UK Government work in a number of countries aimed at helping host government develop such policies/strategies. Sierra Leone: security sector review being implemented. Uganda: justice sector strategy developed and being implemented. Uganda: security sector review carried out; linkage to justice sector strategy unclear. Nigeria: effort to create high-level support for defence review ongoing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Local priorities

6.22 Good international practice calls for “a nationally-owned and led vision of security” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005a: 23). At root is the notion that security is measured by the level of safety and security perceived by the citizen. In other words, it is “people centred”. Helping host governments develop such a vision so that they can articulate their priorities either for the entire security and justice sector or for its constituent parts has been an important part of UK Government efforts in a number of African countries – Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda – with mixed results.

6.23 In most cases, however, it has not been feasible to develop broad sectoral strategies, or programming is started before strategies are in place (Law & Development Partnership 2006). In some of those cases, efforts have been made to maximise local participation in project/programme development and implementation. DFID bilaterally funded programmes developed under the SSAJ rubric have tended to involve a broader spectrum of national stakeholders in the design phase than most other UK Government SJSR interventions. They have frequently foreseen an inception period during which the
intervention is designed in collaboration with a range of local stakeholders. The design phase is intended in part to develop relationships with those stakeholders. (See paragraph 7.21 and Recommendation 7, paragraph 7.22).

6.24 That said, there is no guarantee that a programme that has developed some degree of local buy in will not be subject to changes by DFID. The Nigeria SJG programme, which had an economic growth component grafted on to it following a Drivers of Change analysis, illustrates this problem (authors’ interviews and Annex 4). While such changes may not eliminate positive longer-term impact, they almost certainly mean that it will take longer to materialise. In this regard, one can wonder whether the ultimate outcomes of the SJG programme would not have been more sustainable if programme management had been required to give more attention to linking the ‘security’ and ‘justice’ pillars of the project, rather than figuring out how to add a growth pillar. What is more, it appears likely that strengthening the horizontal linkages between the security and justice pillars in line with good international practice would have responded more to local needs, by providing more effective access to justice for ordinary Nigerians.

6.25 A high degree of stakeholder involvement does not guarantee full buy in from senior level officials of the host government. Without that buy-in, impact will be variable. The DFID bilaterally funded SJG programme in Nigeria (Annex 4) and the ACPP funded Uganda Defence Review process exemplify this problem. The initial phase of the Uganda Defence Review process, during which a security sector review was undertaken, was very participatory, both as far as official stakeholders and civil society were concerned. Nonetheless, top level blockages meant that the full outcomes of that review have not yet been achieved. In particular, despite the formal linkage between the Defence Review and recent defence budgets, the continued existence of the unpublished ‘confidential’ budget indicates that the Defence Review has not been accepted at the highest levels of government. At the same time, the Defence Review Secretariat, created as part of the Defence Review process, continues work to develop the corporate plan and to use the corporate plan to develop budgetary proposals. As with the SJG programme, some positive impact has been recorded, but additional attention from the UK Government will be required to remove high-level blockages to achieve even greater impact (authors’ interviews).

Monitoring/Evaluation

6.26 Three issues stand out in terms of the impact of monitoring and evaluation on SJSR in Africa: 1) the importance of influencing implementation; 2) the importance of reducing differences in project cycle management among ACPP members; and 3) the retention of institutional memory.

Retaining influence over implementation

6.27 Large programmes are increasingly being outsourced to external implementers because of pressure on UK Government departments to reduce overheads and head-counts. The UK Government retains a firm grasp on policy making, particularly at the centre, but its connection to implementation is weakened. Implementation is, however, arguably the point where delivery takes place and the greatest positive impact on poverty can be achieved. When the external contractor is unable for one reason or another to respond to changes in the local context, or key DFID advisory personnel have not been appointed, it may prove difficult or impossible to make necessary course corrections. This will then affect the longer-term impact of that intervention. (See also the discussion in paragraph 5.22.)

Unevenness of project cycle management across ACPP funded interventions

6.28 SJSR programmes funded by DFID bilaterally or implemented by DFID using ACPP resources
are designed, implemented and evaluated in accordance with long-standing DFID project cycle management procedures. These are widely consultative in design, use standard logical framework methodologies together with risk/assumption matrices, and contain measurable impact indicators. This standard approach to programme design promotes buy in and ownership in host countries and provides measurable impacts of achievement to be evidenced during annual and end-of-project reviews.

6.29 ACPP initiatives not implemented by DFID have different procedures. The ACPP approach is rightly seen to be flexible in design and requires a relatively short lead-in time. While these advantages should not be underestimated, consultation and evaluation tend to be less rigorous. In particular, because a logical framework approach (with all its component parts) is not used, accurately measuring impact is often difficult if not impossible. (See also paragraph 7.30 and Recommendations 11 and 12, paragraphs 7.31 – 7.32.)

Institutional memory

6.30 Retention of institutional memory is problematic across all UK Government institutions. The combination of rapid staff turn-over and poorly maintained or non-existent central recording systems makes lesson learning and retention of institutional knowledge difficult and almost certainly raises transaction costs in implementing interventions. When assessments are undertaken, reviewers experience problems accessing relevant information. Even where documents are known to exist, they may not be readily available, creating an over-reliance on oral interviews with individuals not directly involved with the original decision making process.

6.31 This is a problem that the Review Team confronted in a number of instances. Most documents accessed came from country teams or from SSDAT. It was possible to put together a reasonably full documentary record only for the three countries visited (Annex 3). OPRs, annual reviews, and lessons learned studies for other countries were mostly not available. Once again this means that assessing impact is difficult. It would be helpful if ACPP bidding forms could identify projects and programmes by themes, in this case SJSR. It would also be helpful if PRISM and other databases, used to archive bids and other papers, used SJSR as a search field.

Conclusions

6.32 While it is too early to make definitive judgments about the ultimate impact of UK SJSR interventions carried out between 2001 and 2005, it is possible to identify three factors that appear to have an important effect on impact: 1) a strategic approach that reflects local priorities; 2) financial sustainability; and 3) application of appropriate and adequate human resources.

6.33 It is important to recall that developing a strategic approach to the security and justice sector does not require that the UK Government engage in all parts of the sector. It does, however, require that the UK Government reviews the entire sector, with the host country’s national priorities in mind to the extent they are known, and prioritises and sequences interventions based on conditions in the host country. This will help identify political blockages to reform and the key actors and institutions that need to be part of reform if it is to have a positive, long-term impact. Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda illustrate these points particularly well. It is essential that UK officials, particularly at Post but also in London, are willing to exert leverage to remove blockages and help develop support for reform among key actors.

6.34 In order to promote sustainability and local ownership, it is desirable that the UK’s strategic approach link, to the extent possible, to existing strategies in the security and justice sector and in other
relevant sectors, such as poverty reduction or financial management. In doing so, however, it is essential, as the example of Sierra Leone’s inclusion of security in Pillar 1 of its PRSP indicates, that efforts are made to clarify the implications of these linkages with all relevant actors, national and international.

6.35 Financial accountability has been an important objective within the different security services that the UK Government has helped restructure and reform and in some cases within the ministries responsible for managing these security services. Considerably less attention has been given to other aspects of financial accountability, notably ministries of finance and budgeting that often have considerable power in highly resource constrained countries and external oversight mechanisms, including civil society. The need to engage earlier on this issue is an important lesson that has been learned from Sierra Leone. Indeed, UK efforts to assist host governments in developing strategies for the component parts of the security and justice sector should be based not only on an evaluation of the countries’ security and justice needs but also on a realistic appraisal of likely financial resource availability. While there is ample evidence that host governments will resist this linkage, it is essential that the UK and other international actors make it clear that the long-term financial sustainability of their investments is a central concern.15

6.36 Sierra Leone also underscores the importance that DFID’s regulations on transferring funds to host governments are consistent with both the need for accountability to the British public and the objective of strengthening the capacity for financial accountability within host governments.

6.37 Achieving positive impacts requires not only well designed, locally owned and financially sustainable programmes and projects. It also requires appropriate and adequate support from UK Government officials and contractors in country. DFID in particular has experienced difficulties in this regard, especially with SSAJ programmes and projects – which represent the majority of DFID bilaterally financed SJSR activities in Africa. It is essential that DFID provide adequate administrative support for the SJSR interventions it supports.

6.38 In order to maximise the opportunities for a long-term positive impact, it is also essential that advisors provided by DFID, FCO and MOD help national actors to learn how to carry out their duties rather than carry out those duties themselves in the name of efficiency. Much has been done to adopt this approach in Sierra Leone and in Nigeria among the police and military advisors and it is important that this lesson be extended to other SJSR interventions as necessary. In particular, it would be useful to include and monitor capacity building in advisory posts. At the same time, there may be occasions when operational factors intervene in the way advisors go about their task. These should be kept to the minimum or long-term impact is likely to suffer. Adopting the development approach and using it, especially for short tour lengths, is often counter-intuitive to the ethos found in uniformed organisations. Pre-tour training and the guidance available for SSR practitioners’ courses should be widely available.

15 Annex 1: Terms of Reference.
7. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Objective 2 of this review’s terms of reference called for: “detailed, concrete lessons and recommendations for the strategic direction and management of future security and justice sector reform programmes in Africa and elsewhere.”

7.2 Five main lessons have emerged from the review:

i. The coherence, effectiveness and impact of UK SJSR interventions will benefit from a strategic approach to the security and justice sector.

ii. Effectiveness and impact will benefit from the UK Government prioritising the achievement of national ownership of SJSR reform.

iii. Effectiveness and impact will benefit from greater harmonisation of external interventions.

iv. Strengthening ACPP management procedures will lead to greater coherence and an improved capacity to assess effectiveness and impact.

v. Strengthening programme management will improve the capacity to deliver effective programmes and maximise their longer-term positive impact.

7.3 Each of these lessons is discussed in turn, and recommendations pertaining to each lesson are identified.

Adopt a Strategic Approach to the Security and Justice Sector

Strategic thinking

7.4 SJSR involves a wide range of institutions, stakeholders and objectives. It is impossible for any government to reform the entire sector simultaneously, and it is impossible for any single external actor to support the full range of activities that form part of an SJSR agenda. UK experience with SJSR to date strongly argues in favour of developing a strategic approach to the entire sector. This conclusion emerges both from the UK Government’s experience in Sierra Leone – where the UK has come closest to sector wide engagement – and from its experience in countries where interventions have focused on one part of the security and justice sector. It is also consistent with emerging international good practice as described by the OECD DAC.

7.5 A strategic approach is desirable to prioritise UK SJSR interventions and maximise the effective and efficient use of UK resources. It is also desirable to maximise the positive impact of UK interventions on the quality of local populations’ safety, security and access to justice, especially the poor and marginalised. If the UK Government is unable to provide high-level strategic support and advice to host governments, there is the strong risk that UK efforts will be diluted because they lack coherence. There is the additional risk that the UK Government’s partners will themselves fail to see the importance of developing their own sector-wide strategy, and as a consequence their reform process will be partial and unsustainable.

7.6 The ability to develop a strategy that encompasses the entire security and justice sector is essential, not only because of the complexity of that sector itself. It is also essential because, to be both
effective and have a positive longer-term impact, a reform process will need to identify the main security and justice needs and to sequence a series of intervention aimed at addressing those needs. It will also help identify the entry points for SJSR, which will vary from country to country, and the different actors that need to be engaged at different points along the reform path. For example, in countries undergoing war to peace transitions, it is often necessary to start by professionalising and capacitating the country’s security services and addressing wartime legacies. However, it will eventually be necessary to address the other parts of the SJSR agenda (Figure 1): developing the institutional framework and capacitating those actors and institutions that will deliver accessible justice and democratic governance of the security and justice sector. The experience in Sierra Leone demonstrates that engaging these actors sooner rather than later will be beneficial.

7.7 A strategy that prioritises needs for the entire security and justice sector will help identify both the transition between different priorities and the implications of such shifts for the composition and organisation of Country Teams. It will also assist Country Teams in determining how best to use the leverage the UK Government has to influence host government decisions relating to SJSR.

7.8 **Recommendation 1:** We recommend that where SJSR is agreed to be an important component part of the overall UK policy toward a country the Country Team should develop a strategic approach to SJSR.

The components of a strategic approach would include:

- a strategic framework prioritising and sequencing UK support across the entire security and justice sector developed on the basis of a rigorous political assessment and containing a clear statement of potential risks and a risk mitigation strategy;

- a clear process for regularly reviewing progress in implementing the framework;

- flexibility in the application of resources;

- an agreed method of coordinating the activities of different UK actors;

- a strategy for promoting harmonisation of international community interventions; and

- a team that is capable of addressing the full spectrum of security and justice sector needs and possesses an appropriate mix of technical and policy/strategic skills. In particular, the ability of the Ambassador/High Commissioner to promote team building and strategic thinking is essential.

And, in addition:

- in post-conflict environments, strategy development should begin early in the peace process to identify all critical stakeholders whose participation in the broader SJSR process is essential and to develop plans for engaging them in SJSR as the political/security situation evolves;

- in political transition countries, the strategic framework should be in place before major security and justice programmes are designed;

- the RCA should always be involved in order to ensure coherence with other regional and sub-regional activities; and
Joint working

7.9 In order to facilitate the development of a strategic framework, it is essential that the key actors speak the same language and operate on the basis of the same knowledge. The review raised two issues in this regard.

7.10 First, interviews conducted for this report demonstrate clearly that there is a lack of agreement within DFID that ‘security’ and ‘justice’ form part of one sector, despite agreed government policy to this effect. DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) is currently preparing a paper on SJSR to clarify some of these issues.

7.11 **Recommendation 2:** We recommend that once DFID/CHASE has clarified its position, senior management in DFID strongly support the agreed approach and develop plans for mainstreaming the approach within DFID and put in place incentives to promote implementation.

7.12 Second, although Country Teams make joint bids for ACPP funds and the bids are jointly reviewed, there is no guidance available to Country Teams describing what the Pool considers SJSR activities. This results in a lack of clarity on what is classified as SJSR. It also has the potential for undermining coherence. Decisions on what to include in an ACPP SJSR bid will vary across Departments and across countries, but a lack of clarity on what is SJSR will complicate the efforts of Country Teams to develop a joint strategic approach to SJSR.

7.13 **Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the ACPP adopt guidance for developing and reviewing bids on SJSR activities. Such guidance should be developed as a matter of priority and might include a brief overview of the strategic framework for SJSR in the country in question, how and where the activities to be funded fit into that framework, and evidence of a detailed political analysis underpinning the proposed activity and a substantive risk mitigation strategy.

Improved training

7.14 Staff turnover, coupled with the development of the SJSR agenda, not least the frequent change of nomenclature, makes it difficult for those involved in both donor and partner countries to fully understand the issues and have confidence to develop well-founded projects and programmes on SJSR. Broader exposure to the SJSR process not only helps to underscore the importance of the comprehensive approach, which the MOD has done much to develop in Whitehall, but fosters the habit of interdepartmental cooperation and helps to overcome the difficulty of maintaining a cross-departmental team in the face of rapid staff turnover and gapping of posts.

7.15 **Recommendation 4:** DFID, FCO and MOD should seek to increase staff exposure to public and other debates relating to SJSR concepts and operational practices by reviewing existing in-house training courses to ensure they reflect operational experience, using the Global Facilitation Network and the associated Governance and Social Development Resource Centre at Birmingham University, among others. Efforts should also be made to increase cross-departmental learning in this area. DFID’s in-house governance course is a model for what might be opened to a wider cross-government catchment, if resources, possibly from GCPP’s SSR thematic strategy, were to be found. MOD’s education resources grouped in the Defence Academy and the conceptual work of the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre should continue to develop their coverage of the
SSR/SJSR topics on courses and in development of doctrine, especially in view of the current emphasis on the Comprehensive Approach.

7.16 There are a number of cross-cutting themes, already identified in Whitehall and recognised internationally, which have increasing relevance to all aspects of SJSR. Public Financial Management was picked out in the Paris Declaration as one such. In Whitehall, HIV/AIDS is seen as having ever more doleful influence in sub-Saharan Africa’s security and justice sector. Gender too cannot be ignored given the terrible consequences for non-combatants of conflict and other forms of violence in the Continent.

7.17 • **Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ theme on Public Financial Management and Whitehall mainstream themes on HIV/AIDS and gender be incorporated into all SJSR interventions, not only those specifically dealing with SSAJ.

**Prioritise Achieving National Ownership of Reform Processes**

7.18 National ownership of reform processes is one of the key principles of international engagement in the security and justice sector. Any UK strategic approach to SJSR must be grounded in and aim to support the national priorities of the reforming country. National ownership involves promoting host government support for reform, helping national actors clarify their security and justice goals and establishing a process that enables non-governmental actors to participate in SJSR.

**Host government buy in**

7.19 In view of the political sensitivity of issues pertaining to security and development and the human resource weaknesses in the sector, host government support for reform cannot be taken for granted. The main lesson of this review for Country Teams, with whom the responsibility for achieving host government ownership primarily resides, relates to the need for buy in to SJSR at the highest state government level.

7.20 • **Recommendation 6:** We recommend that the SJSR strategic framework developed by Country Teams includes an explicit assessment of support for SJSR at the highest level of government and a plan – that would be subject to periodic review and revision – for achieving and maintaining high-level host government buy in.

7.21 At the same time, important as high-level buy in is, it is also essential to ensure that key stakeholders throughout the entire security and justice sector are brought into the SJSR process and have the opportunity to participate fully. Financial managers and oversight bodies are often not included in discussions of SJSR, although they have important roles to play (Figure 1).

7.22 • **Recommendation 7:** We recommend that Country Teams encourage the host government to include advisers and stakeholders from key management and oversight institutions in SJSR planning from the start. This should include representatives of non-security ministries, oversight bodies, and parliamentary committees.

- Such planning should include the means, channels of communication and any supporting capacity building required to achieve stated objectives about local financial ownership, manage expectations of donor support in future, set up fiduciary risk management procedures, and make sure that both users and financial staffs in spending and budget/finance ministries understand the medium and long-term implications.
The Country Teams strategic SJSR framework should include consideration of the means of achieving this outcome.

Civil society participation

7.23 The important role of civil society both as agents of change and as the repository of knowledge on SJSR-related issues is increasingly understood by SJSR actors in host governments and the international community. Nonetheless, there is still a tendency to leave civil society out of key reform processes, in part because host governments do not have the habit of interacting closely with civil society. Under these circumstances, the UK Government and other international actors should seek to empower responsible civil society actors and voices and demonstrate to host governments the benefits of drawing on civil society to support SJSR.

7.24 Engaging civil society at an early stage in the SJSR process not only strengthens their capacity and understanding of the process, it allows them to make valuable contributions to oversight and policy development and other aspects of democratic security and justice sector governance. Additionally, civil society groups – whose membership frequently enjoy a degree of stability – can act as a bridge between the host governments and external actors, both of whose institutional memories are affected by frequent shifts of personnel and inadequate record keeping.

7.25 The UK has supported a number of important initiatives in Africa. This provides an excellent base for further developing civil society capacity throughout Africa and bringing local knowledge and experience to bear through South-South exchanges and initiatives.

7.26 • Recommendation 8: We recommend that Country Teams build on existing relationships to systematically cultivate local and regional civil society actors as potential contributors to the design and implementation of SJSR initiatives. An assessment of the government’s attitude toward engagement with civil society and plans for promoting broader participation should be included in strategic SJSR frameworks.

Promote Harmonisation of External Interventions

7.27 Effective harmonisation of external interventions is an issue in virtually all aspects of providing assistance to developing countries. Reaching agreement among external actors is particularly complex when dealing with SJSR given the political nature of security issues and the sensitivity surrounding individual interventions. Some donor countries, despite espousing transparency, are still very cautious about revealing their support to certain sections of the security sector. In many countries donor coordination does not include representatives of the host nation. In some instances, individual international or bilateral donors themselves lack the capacity to make an overall positive contribution to effort.

7.28 • Recommendation 9: We recommend that Country Teams promote the creation of in-country donor groups focused specifically on SJSR, with a nominated lead country/organisation. Ideally, these groups would include senior host government officials. Where feasible, a host government official should chair the group. Ideally the lead donor would be active within the SJSR sector and have experience of working with local actors on SJSR.

7.29 • Recommendation 10: We recommend that DFID, FCO and MOD seek to reinforce the understanding of and need for SJSR as a component of donor policy in sub-Saharan Africa, in Washington (for the IFIs) and in New York (for the United Nations).
Specifically with regard to the World Bank and the IMF, we recommend that DFID deepens their collaboration with these two institutions in the areas of incorporating the security and justice sector fully into their relating to public finance management and poverty reduction strategy work. This collaboration could take the form of participating in public expenditure and public finance management review missions, undertaking joint research on issues relating to the linkages between SJSR, on the one hand, and public finance management and poverty reduction strategies, on the other hand. This collaboration should involve all relevant departments within DFID.

Strengthen ACPP Management Procedures

7.30 The current unevenness in the ACPP project management cycle procedures means that it is difficult to assess the impact of some ACPP funded interventions. In general, DFID procedures are more rigorous than those applied by MOD or FCO. MOD is currently developing a monitoring methodology, which will bring MOD managed ACPP interventions more in line with DFID procedures in this area. Similar developments relating to project design and implementation do not appear to be contemplated at present.

7.31 • **Recommendation 11**: We recommend that ACPP partners agree a common project cycle management methodology for all ACPP funded programmes.

7.32 • **Recommendation 12**: We recommend that in its annual portfolio review the ACPP reviews programming in each country against the objectives established in the Country Team’s strategic framework.

7.33 • **Recommendation 13**: We recommend that ACPP officials seek HMT approval to extend the financial planning horizon for ACPP expenditure to four years plus one (as applied to the MOD’s Short Term Plan).

Strengthen Programme Management

7.34 Managing SJSR activities is human resource intensive. This review demonstrates that all too often, the UK Government does not allocate adequate staff time to SJSR projects and programmes. This is particularly true for DFID, which manages most of the large SJSR programmes. Inadequate human resources can reduce the effectiveness of individual projects or programmes. It can also reduce the positive longer term impact of seemingly effectively implemented activities, as political blockages that are beyond the scope of contractors to overcome do not receive adequate attention. This problem is not unique to the security and justice sector; rather it affects all UK Government institutions. While this makes it difficult to resolve, as it reflects a culture of “doing more with less,” it does not make this problem any less important.

7.35 • **Recommendation 14**: We recommend that DFID, FCO and MOD ensure that adequate administrative resources are allocated to SJSR programmes. To this end, the SJSR strategic framework prepared by the Country Team should assess staffing needs and demonstrate how these will be met. Given that the number of posts in country filled from UK departmental staff is not likely to increase in future, and may well continue to decline, full use of the SSDAT, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and long-term contracted experts should be considered.
7.36  • **Recommendation 15:** In order to promote tighter UK Government control over programme management, we recommend that DFID staff in country invite managers of large bilateral programmes managed and/or implemented by external contractors (including SSAJ programmes in countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone) to attend relevant DFID management meetings, including, where desirable, SJSR committee meetings. This would reinstitute the procedures followed previously by DFID designed large-scale programmes managed by DFID contracted Technical Cooperation Officers or their equivalent. Contractors would be expected to recuse themselves where issues of national security or commercial interest were to be discussed.
REFERENCES

Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (nd a) ACPP Main Allocations and Reserve Bidding Form. “Ghana: Professionalisation and Peace Support Operations Capacity building.”

Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (nd b) ACPP Main Allocations and Reserve Bidding Form. “Nigeria: Tackling the spiral of violence in the Niger Delta.”


References


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ANNEX 1 : TERMS OF REFERENCE

Internal review of UK support to Security and Justice Sector Reform work in Africa

Terms of Reference

1. BACKGROUND

Security and Justice Sector Reform has become a key area of work for the UK Government. This is based on the recognition that security is an essential condition for sustainable development.

The UK’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) policy paper – Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform – defines SSR as assistance aimed at increasing partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SJSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing.

The UK recognises security as a necessary and important function of the state and works from the premise that security should be provided in an appropriate, accountable and affordable way. SJSR programmes are therefore intended to address policy, legislative, structural and oversight issues set within recognised democratic norms and principles. Ensuring that support for capacity building within the security sector is balanced by support for the development of effective governance structures is crucial. Without effective governance and management of the security sector improved capacity is unlikely to be sustainable or held properly accountable.

In addition, DFID’s recent Security and Development policy paper - Fighting poverty to build a safer world: a strategy for security and development - recognises that poor people suffer disproportionately from insecurity and that this, combined with lawlessness, crime and violent conflict, is one of the biggest obstacles to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The policy paper commits DFID to the following key actions:

- DFID will consider security as a basic entitlement of the poor, like health or education. To this end, we will make support for effective and accountable security and justice systems a more regular feature of our work. This means expanding the number of countries where we support security sector reform (SSR) and safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ) initiatives, either directly or through the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools.

- Security and justice sector reform should be routinely considered in our programme design, and DFID will promote stronger collaboration between UK development, diplomatic and defence professionals in supporting these reforms. We will also explore how SSR and SSAJ programmes can be integrated into a single framework which incorporates human rights.

There is a significant amount of SJSR activity undertaken by the UK in Africa (including Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, South Africa, Senegal and Gambia). There are two principal sources of funding for SJSR programmes- DFID’s bilateral aid budget for Africa and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), a joint Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Ministry of Defence (MOD) mechanism for funding and coordinating the UK’s contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. Between 2001 and 2005 the ACPP spent a total of £82,174,747 on SSR programmes- note once Sierra Leone is excluded the total spend is £13,485,561. There is also a Global Conflict Prevention Pool SSR Strategy that is responsible for developing UK policy on SSR; building understanding of the issues and coherence across Whitehall and internationally; and developing resources to support the delivery of SSR programmes through GCPP and ACPP regional strategies and the programmes of individual Departments; with an annual budget for the SSR Strategy of around £7,000,000.
2. WHY REVIEW NOW?

Some country level review work has been undertaken but DFID and the ACPP have not undertaken a strategic review of their respective portfolios and engagements on SJSR programming in Africa.

As a result of the new commitments to set out in DFID’s security and development paper there is now an increased interest in scaling up our engagement on SJSR. This is therefore a particularly timely moment to take stock of our work in this area. This will involve undertaking some evidence based analysis on what does and does not work (distilling best practice and lessons learned from the design and implementation of SJSR programmes and assessing their impact and effectiveness) with a view to improving the effectiveness and coherence of the Africa division’s SJSR work.

SJSR accounts for a large proportion of programme spend within the ACPP and in DFID’s Africa Division and therefore merits a comprehensive review to assess the extent to which value for money is being achieved.

There is a need to improve the overall coherence of our security sector work. This review will provide us with the opportunity to assess the extent to which our SJSR work is (a) integrated into DFID’s broader safety, security and access to justice and public financial management work and (b) how all of this is linked to ACPP funded SSR work delivered by the MoD against their Defence Relations Activity Programme (DRAP) and (c) delivered against national security strategies, where these exist and takes into account informal security and justice mechanisms and institutions.

3. OBJECTIVES

Against this background this review has two principal objectives:

- to assess the coherence, effectiveness and impact of UK security sector reform programmes in Africa over the past 4 years, and
- to identify lessons and recommendations for the strategic direction and management of future security sector reform programmes in Africa and elsewhere. Note: Recommendations should be as concrete and detailed as possible to ensure that the review is operational and policy relevant to UK programmes.

4. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The following approach is proposed for this review exercise:

a) Phase I: Pre-assessment preparation (up to 30 days)

i. Consultants will undertake a desk review of secondary sources, including proposals, regional and country strategies, project reports and existing evaluations and reviews, etc. A preliminary list of documents will be prepared and made available at the start of the consultancy;

ii. Consultants will identify key issues for the evaluation, develop an evaluation framework, including appropriate tools, and identify key stakeholders for interviews, identify country case studies and plan field visits. In developing the assessment framework, we encourage the consultants to draw on the draft OECD- DAC SSR Implementation Framework. Other key issues to consider in developing the framework include the following:

- To what extent are ongoing programmes and activities informed by an overall national SSR strategy and as part of a coordinated donor effort?
- How are programmes designed? What are their objectives and timeframes? Who is typically involved and what sort of consultation process is followed?
• An assessment of the quality of programme/project design, implementation and sustainability.

• Analysis of the institutions and mechanisms used to deliver SSR programmes and projects.

• How do we identify and manage risks associated with SSR programmes?

• To what extent are SSR programmes linked to wider governance, justice, civil service reform and public financial management programmes? Are Security and Justice sector reform issues reflected in national development planning processes such as I-PRSP’s, PRSP’s, PEAP’s and, in a post-conflict environment, Transitional Results Matrixes? Are there opportunities to promote the integration of security-related issues into broader development programming. What would be the benefits and risks of supporting such an approach?

• An assessment of the accuracy of the classification of SSR projects and programmes.

• How do we monitor progress and measure the outcomes, impact and effectiveness of our programmes?

• Analysis of how we undertake SSR programming in post-settlement contexts and whether there are effective links with other military/security transition programmes, e.g. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Do we distinguish between stabilisation programmes and broader, longer-term security sector reform/development programmes? How do we manage the transition between the two?

• How do we work with international partners, bilaterals and multilaterals, in supporting SSR?

• How do we address regional challenges to security through SSR programmes? How do we engage with regional institutions and the AU?

iii. The Steering Group will provide feedback on the proposed assessment framework and preliminary findings in a meeting following the submission of the inception report. Decisions on country case studies will be taken at this meeting.

b) Phase II: Assessment (up to 40 days)

i. This will include country visits and interviews in London. For the field work, consultants will prepare country review plans in consultation with country teams. Agreed plans should be forwarded to the steering group.

ii. Consultants will produce aide memoires for discussion with country teams at the end of each visit and prior to departure. These should be forwarded to the steering group following each visit.

c) Writing up and presentation of findings (up to 20 days)

The consultants will present review findings to the steering group in a feedback session in London before producing a final draft.

5. OUTPUTS

An inception report will be presented 14 days after the pre-assessment phase. The inception report will be 15 - 20 pages long (including an executive summary), and present preliminary findings from the desk review and set out the assessment framework to be used for the review.

The final report will not be more than 25 pages long (including an executive summary but excluding annexes). A draft report will be presented to the Steering Committee and relevant country teams no later than 15 October.
2006. Following discussion a final report will be completed by 5 November 2006.

The annexes should include detailed, but concise, country studies (of no more than 20 pages) setting out review findings and recommendations for country programmes.

All documents should be sent electronically to the Steering Group.

6. **TIMING**

The consultants will allocate up to 90 person days to the review over the period June to 30 November 2006.

7. **MANAGEMENT**

This review will be lead by the Africa Conflict & Humanitarian Unit (ACHU) and will cover ACPP and DFID bilateral SSR funding in Africa.

Key contacts are: Ciru Mwaura, Conflict Adviser: c-mwaura@dfid.gov.uk and Malcolm Hood Programme Manager: m-hood@dfid.gov.uk.

A steering group including ACPP partners, DFID’s Evaluation Department and Conflict Humanitarian and Security department (CHASE) will also be established to oversee the review.
ANNEX 2: THE SJSR CONCEPT

1. BACKGROUND

The UK has long provided traditional security-related assistance, helping other governments to build up and maintain their security services in the form of armed services, police and security and intelligence agencies. During the Cold War, the UK and the other main players in the East-West conflict provided security assistance to obtain support for their foreign, security, and commercial policy objectives.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU made adherence to principles of democratic civil-military relations a condition for membership. The UK and other NATO and EU members began to support efforts to strengthen the accountability of the armed forces in candidate countries and to improve the capacity of the civil authorities to manage the defence sector (Cottey and Forster 2004).

Until the 1990s, UK policing assistance was consisted primarily of technical assistance with the emphasis on capacity building. Equipping police services was never a priority, nor was restructuring. "Reform" involved making police services more efficient. Though generally on a smaller scale, the same applied to support for intelligence agencies. In this case, the interest was more often than not how local agencies might supplement the efforts and support the operations of the UK's agencies.

Bilateral and multilateral development donors sought to avoid involvement with the military and intelligence components of the sector to the greatest extent possible during the Cold War. Development specialists in academia and the broader research community gave virtually no attention to the security sector or the relationship between security and development during the Cold War period.

Once the Cold War ended, however, issues such as governance, poverty reduction, and conflict prevention began to find a place on the development assistance agendas of OECD countries. This in turn enabled the development donors to begin to discuss the linkages between security and development and the appropriate role of development assistance in strengthening security in developing and transition countries, for some modification in security assistance policies, and the beginning of a dialogue between development and security donors, both in OECD and host governments.

Security donors, for their part, found that conflict prevention, civil – military relations, peace support operations and above all post-conflict reconstruction, encapsulated in the 1998 UK Defence White Paper under the rubric, 'a force for good', meant that issues previously left to development agencies and NGOs became vital for the successful conduct of campaigns. These could be ignored, as recent experience so bitterly shows, only at great peril. Military and security establishments recognised, in addition, that to combat the new range of global threats, loosely but not exclusively in the so-called Campaign against International Terrorism, meant that it was as important to tackle the root causes of terrorism, piracy, trafficking and proliferation as it was to protect against and pursue the perpetrators.

The grounds emerged from the late 1990s for a compelling set of shared interests to drive the efforts of the foreign, development and defence ministries in the UK and some other countries towards a set of coherent and mutually supporting policies particularly in developing and transitional countries.

2. EMERGENCE OF SSR

Security sector reform was initially championed by DFID following the election of the Labour Government in 1997. The UK White Paper on International Development of November 1997 identified security as central to sustained development and poverty reduction. Among the areas highlighted for UK action were to “help other countries to develop democratically accountable armed forces” and to “discourage excessive military expenditure

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16 Additional information can be found in Ball and Hendrickson 2005.
in developing countries” (United Kingdom 1997: paras. 3.48, 3.49, 3.52 and 3.55).

In May 1998, the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, announced the need for “a partnership between the development community and the military” in order to address the “inter-related issues of security, development and conflict prevention” (Short 1998). By early 1999, DFID had produced a policy note on poverty and the security sector that outlined the conditions under which development assistance could be used to engage in security sector reform and the specific criteria for DFID engagement (Department for International Development 1999a and Department for International Development 1999b). In 2002, DFID’s published SSR guidelines, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform (Department for International Development 2002a).

DFID’s SSR policy initially did not include “police carrying out their normal law enforcement activities.” It did, however, include “those responsible for policing and the administration of justice.” The reason for this was that “Improved policing is already covered in DFID’s good governance work” (Department for International Development 1999b: 1). DFID could, of course, have chosen to integrate all of its security-related work into governance. Instead, for administrative reasons, the Secretary of State gave responsibility for SSR to the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), now the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE).

3. EMERGENCE OF SSAJ

Parallel to its work on SSR, DFID developed a policy on safety, security and access to justice. Like SSR, SSAJ’s roots lie in the 1997 White Paper on Development, as well as in DFID’s 2000 Strategy Making Government Work for the Poor (Department for International Development 2001b). One of the seven governance capabilities highlighted in the latter as essential if governments of developing countries are to meet the Millennium Development Goals was: “ensure personal safety and security with access to justice for all” (p. 9). This was followed by an Issues Paper (Department for International Development) and implementation guidelines, Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting policy into practice (Department for International Development 2002b). The SSAJ policy reflected good international practice in the area of justice sector reform, which recognised the need for horizontal linkages between policing, justice, and the penal system. Its pro poor perspective was – and to a large degree remains – innovative. Policy responsibility for SSAJ was given to the Governance Department in DFID’s Policy Division.

In 2003 the results of a DFID-funded project were published as Measuring Progress Toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the Design of Performance Indicators across the Justice System (Vera Institute of Justice 2003). In 2004 DFID published a briefing note on non-state justice and security systems, in recognition of the complementarity between formal and informal justice and security.

4. IMPLEMENTING SSR AND SSAJ

SSR and SSAJ have, to a large extent, been implemented on parallel tracks. One reason for this is that the primary responsible for developing SSR policy rests with the SSR Strategy in the Global Conflict Prevention Pool while DFID retains full responsibility for SSAJ work. In consequence, SSR interventions have most frequently occurred in conflict affected countries and, particularly at the outset, were closely associated with restructuring and capacitating defence and intelligence services. Support to the “civilian structures responsible for oversight and control of the security forces” has lagged (Department for International Development 1999b: 1).

As a result, the democratic governance core of SSR – which is what made SSR different from traditional security assistance – has frequently appeared to take a backseat to efforts aimed at enhancing professionalism and capacity of the security services themselves, particularly the military. This has given the impression that SSR is not focused on improving security for the poor, delivering justice, or promoting human rights protection even though the Security Sector Reform Policy Brief clearly indicates that SSR is grounded in promotion of the rule of law and protection of human rights:

17 A second key governance capability highlighted in this report was: “manage national security arrangements accountably and resolve differences between communities before they develop into violent conflicts.
“With the end of the Cold War, a new understanding of the concept of peace and security has emerged. A broader focus on the nature of sustainable peace and its building-blocks, such as social and economic development, good governance and democratisation, the rule of law and respect for human rights, is supplementing the traditional concept of collective security. Security is necessary for people to go about their lives without fear or harassment and it is the responsibility of the state to provide this security. Security sector reform (SSR) describes the process for developing professional and effective security structures that will allow citizens to live their lives in safety” (United Kingdom 2003: 2).

Added to this, the emphasis on counterterrorism that has emerged in international security policy since the attacks of September 11, 2001, has introduced both a heightened attention to security issues in donor discourse and moved substantive shifts in aid conditionality and spending in terms of country, regional and sector allocation. The emphasis on counterterrorism in the security policies and programs of OECD countries has placed the security and justice sector reform agenda under considerable pressure. In particular, pressures from OECD countries to reshape the security services – especially intelligence services and internal security bodies – to meet the demands of the ‘war on terror’ is elevating operational effectiveness above the development of democratic accountability and oversight mechanisms (Ball and Hendrickson 2005a: 18).

Those developing countries that have joined the ‘coalition against terrorism’ and that are seen to harbour political elements that may be a threat to the major Western powers have received increased support to bolster their intelligence and internal security capacity. However, even those that are not necessarily obvious havens of potentially anti-Western groups can also be tempted to ‘join up’ since this approach is politically less demanding and may also carry more tangible benefits than the SJSR approach (Ball and Hendrickson 2005a: 18). Some of the counterterrorism-related reforms directly contradict SJSR reforms, for example by strengthening the state’s powers of arrest and surveillance authority.

SSAJ appears to have sought to protect itself from the impact of the counterterrorism emphasis on ‘hard security’ issues by focussing on delivering services to the poorest members of society and by delinking the ‘security’ elements of policing from the ‘justice’ elements of policing. This, however, is problematic, since the police as an organisation have traditionally fallen entirely within, and make their strongest linkage, to the justice family. The risk is great that justice will suffer more by delinking policing from justice than by its inclusion in the broader security and justice sector. Isolating the justice function will, at best, create inefficiencies and hamper the delivery of justice, since the necessary horizontal linkages from the police to the judiciary to the prisons will not be made. At worst, it will encourage the police charged with ‘pure’ security functions to act more like soldiers with a correspondingly higher risk of human rights abuse.

5. MAINSTREAMING POLICY THEMES INTO SJSR

There are mainstream themes that are part and parcel of DFID bilateral programmes that have relevance to much of the work funded by ACPP. The most prominent are HIV/AIDS and gender. Other themes, such as Small Arms and Light Weapons and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and public financial management are also often directly relevant. In the case of DDR and SALW, the linkages are usually obvious and are considered where relevant to SJSR programming, as they have been, for example, in DRC.

HIV/AIDS and gender, on the other hand, though strongly represented in the case of SSAJ programming, have been largely absent from programmes dealing with defence and police or those with wider remit such as the SILSEP SSR programme in Sierra Leone. Public finance management for the security sector is largely absent from UK programming in Africa.

HIV/AIDS. Reform in the security and justice sector of sub-Saharan African countries is strongly influenced by the effects of HIV/AIDS. Many of the same debilitating factors apply to the security and justice sector as apply to any other people-intensive areas of reform, whether education, social welfare or trade and industry. Usually, the military and police are among the groups worst affected. It may be because the problems are so intractable and widespread that they do not seem to be mentioned very often in documentation dealing specifically with SJSR.

18 Minutes of the 17th Meeting of the Programme Coordinating Committee, UNAIDS, June 2005.
However, HIV/AIDS has made deep and damaging inroads into the manning, capacity and effectiveness of all security forces in sub-Saharan Africa.

Where in some sectors these challenges have at least been recognised and strategies have been developed to answer them, the indications are that it is still not dealt with honestly and openly in Africa militaries and police forces, at least, not until recently (United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 2006). In the early years, UK officials working with the Uganda defence review process reported that there was little recognition of HIV/AIDS in the reform agenda and a definite reluctance by Ugandan counterparts to discuss the issues. In late 2006 the Ugandan military authorities began to show greater awareness and interest in donor support. But it is probable that the reluctance to recognise the problem or to deal with it transparently remains widespread throughout the Region.

Although UK stakeholders in SJSR programmes are well aware of the HIV/AIDS issue – in fact the UK Defence Intelligence Service carried out a thorough survey of its likely effects on African military forces in the mid 1990s – expertise in this area tends to lie in DFID, not in MOD. HIV/AIDS is not a topic that features in the work of the ACPP in any of its thematic areas, though it clearly affects many of them. It is indicative that the Terms of Reference for this Review (Annex 1) contain no reference to HIV/AIDS. It is possible that with UK work on HIV/AIDS largely confined to DFID bilateral programmes, military and police victims of the disease and the risks that their characteristic activities tend to be excluded, at least institutionally if not individually.

In Uganda it is proposed that the UPDF AIDS/HIV work be subsumed into a national programme supported by DFID so that the terms of the International Development Act IDA) are not contravened. This suggests that the IDA is not likely to be a major constraint. It is more likely that a combination of lack of widespread knowledge outside specialist areas within DFID, coyness by African counterparts and the lack of recognition in UK’s ACPP official policy have led to the evident omission of HIV/AIDS from most SJSR work. It would be appropriate for ACPP officials to look again at the implications, not just for SJSR but against all the Pool’s policy objectives, in order to identify activities and resources appropriate to the needs.

Gender. In many ways gender, although an entirely different set of issues, suffers the same blockages as HIV/AIDS when it comes to inclusion in SJSR policies and programmes. SSAJ programmes are the exception. There, gender issues have been successfully mainstreamed. Unfortunately, the Team had little opportunity to gather evidence during field research. Available documentation revealed only that there was minimal treatment of gender issues in ACPP papers. It remains an area that needs further study. However, in the meantime the recommendations pertaining to closer cooperation and joint working within country teams may help. Experience from SSAJ programmes may provide read-across to ACPP programme design on inclusion of gender issues in future.

Public financial management. Governance and public sector management issues gained prominence starting in the early 1990s. More recently, the development assistance agencies, including the World Bank, have come to understand that poverty-reducing economic and social development is sustainable only if it occurs in an environment characterised by security for the state and its citizens. Since security and justice are public goods, it is both appropriate and necessary for the state to allocate resources to the security and justice sector. That sector must, however, be financially sustainable if the desired benefits are to accrue to populations. For this to occur, the security and justice sector must be integrated into the planning, policy-making, and budgeting systems and processes of a country in a manner consistent with democratic, civil control of the security and justice sector (Ball and Holmes 2002).

Although a central premise is that, from a public policy and process perspective, the security and justice sector shares many of the characteristics of other sectors and that the citizens of any country will benefit from a security and justice sector that is subject to the same broad set of rules and procedures of other sectors, donors have been slow to incorporate the security and justice sector into their support for public financial management. The World Bank, which is the major donor supporting PFM, has been highly resistant to interacting in any way with the security sector, particularly the military. The Bank has, however, responded to direct requests for assistance in this area, as occurred in Afghanistan in 2004 (World Bank 2005). There are some signs that the Bank may become more open to incorporating the security and justice sector into its PFM work. It has, for example, agreed to a request from international partners to examine security expenditure in DRC, although it is unclear at this writing.
exactly how that will occur. DFID has also begun to engage in this area in Sierra Leone, notably by promoting sector wide budgeting and reviewing the affordability of the security and justice sector. Neither DFID nor the Bank, however, is actively pursuing the question of security and justice sector financial sustainability. No other donor has engaged in this sector at all.

6. MOVING TOWARD INTEGRATION

Although SSR and SSAJ have been implemented largely in parallel by the UK Government since the two concepts emerged, experience with SSR demonstrated early on that a holistic approach to the security and justice sector was required. The 2004 evaluation of the GCPP’s SSR Strategy noted: “There also seems to be a growing recognition that there is considerable overlap between democratic civil-military relations (Ministry of Defence’s Defence Diplomacy work) and SSR (Department for International Development), as well as DFID’s work on safety, security and access to justice” (Ball 2004: 4).

There are several reasons for this:

• The first relates to the nature of security. If security is measured by the sense of well-being that the average citizen feels about his or her existence, and it is the state that is responsible for answering most of the threats that challenge the sense of well-being, then the state must consciously balance the resources at its disposal to optimise the security it provides. This optimisation process, which is in broad terms determined by democratic means and overseen democratically, will balance the response to internal and external threats. Response to the latter will include military power, diplomacy and negotiation. Response to the former will include access to justice and domestic security of the kind ideally provided by a community-based police service, among other policing agencies, including traditional providers of security where relevant. This optimum balance is likely to be dynamic in response to events, the legitimate variations between elected governments’ manifestos and fluctuations in the resources available. The dynamic nature of the government’s activity, as well as the need to present it in a comprehensible form to the electorate, calls for a national strategy that considers justice and defence, as well as many other things, under the same head at the strategic level.

• The second reason relates to the independence of the judiciary, a cherished constitutional concept in many countries. This argument conflates the independent delivery of justice, in the form of judgments, with its physical provision and accessibility. Provision and accessibility are of course highly desirable. They may even be enshrined as rights. But they concern the practical application of government-controlled resources and, all too often in Africa, the necessary security conditions for courts to sit, prisoners to be handled safely and humanely and magistrates to deliver their independent judgments free from threats of retribution and so forth. Therefore, although, SSAJ need not be concerned with national security policy for the most part at the working level, at the strategic level, it must be.

• A third reason for close linkages between security and justice relates to curbing the powers of the security services, particularly the military. Most of the insecurity afflicting sub-Saharan African countries stems from poorly controlled, ill-led, deprived and aggrieved, armed groups. Many, if not most, are or pretend to be official or in some other way legitimated forces. Even when such group acquire or inherit the trappings of legitimacy, order and structure – such as armies patterned on their colonial predecessors – they frequently constitute a major threat to security or are only marginal contributors to security. Their influence on the democratic process is often malign. Their budgets are often hidden. They use state secrecy to conceal corruption and malpractice. They deny the civil authority jurisdiction over military transgressors of the law. Protected by immunity and secrecy, they are the danger to security, not its provider and protector. African militaries, more than others, need to be subordinated to a national security policy, not allowed to operate outside of it.

The UK Government has, accordingly, taken a number of steps at the conceptual/policy level and at the operational level to bring security and justice under the same umbrella.
Conceptual and policy level. The SSR Policy Brief of 2003 (which had been preceded by the SSR Strategy of June 2002), clearly indicated that the security sector included “Bodies authorised to use force (the armed forces, police, and paramilitary units)” and “Judicial and public security bodies (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and prosecution services, prisons and corrections services, human rights commissions and customary and traditional justice systems)” (United Kingdom 2003: 3).

Similarly, DFID’s SSR guidelines define the security sector as including, among others, the ‘core security actors’ (the armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias) and the ‘justice and law enforcement institutions’ (judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems) (Department for International Development 2002a: 7). A discussion is currently underway within DFID on bringing SSR and SSAJ work under the same umbrella.

This is very much in line with strategic level thinking that has emerged over the last decade through the OECD Development Assistance Committee. In April 2004, DAC member governments accepted a policy statement on security system reform that committed their governments to working according to the following five principles:

“SSR should be:

- People-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear.
- Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing states and their populations through more integrated development and security policies and through greater civilian involvement and oversight.
- Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state.
- Developed adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform such as transparency and accountability.
- Implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function effectively” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004: 12).

The UK Government has actively supported the DAC’s work in this area.

Operational level. The UK Defence Advisory Team (DAT) was established in February 2001 to provide defence management assistance in host countries in three core areas: defence policy reviews, financial management and civil-military relations. It has been one of the UK Government’s key instruments for implementing the SSR policy (Ball 2004: 15). By 2003 it became apparent that the focus on defence was inadequate to meet the needs of client countries and the DAT received permission to add a policing/justice adviser and an intelligence/security adviser. It also changed its name to Security Sector Development Advisory Team. In Sierra Leone, where the UK Government has invested heavily in many aspects of SJSR, the Country Team recently began discussing the need to better integrate work on ‘security’ and ‘justice.’

The Conflict Prevention Pools are a joint FCO, MOD and DFID mechanism for funding and managing UK work in the area of violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool covers sub-Saharan Africa. The Global Conflict Prevention Pool covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established in April 2001. The rationale behind the CPPs is that bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of the three departments will lead to greater effectiveness. The CPPs’ joint Public Service Agreement target is: “improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential.”
In June 2002, Ministers approved a Security Sector Reform Strategy under the GCPP. The objective of the SSR Strategy is “to help governments of developing and transition countries fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence (2002). Security bodies that adhere to professional standards and the norms of democratic accountability and are effective in fulfilling their security roles will promote conflict prevention by:

- helping provide adequate protection to people and states;
- contributing effectively to regional peace support operations;
- ensuring that the security bodies do not themselves become a source of insecurity (Ball 2004: iii, 1).

The development of these instruments has also been in line with DAC thinking on operationalising SSR. Indeed, DFID has been heavily involved in supporting the development of an implementation framework for SSR, which was approved by DAC member governments in December 2006 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006b).
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<tr>
<th>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Programme/ activity</th>
<th>Project Purpose</th>
<th>Agent and Linkages</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Main Issues</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
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<th>Total projected costs</th>
<th>Total Actual Costs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001570016</td>
<td>AFRICA SOUTHERN WIDE</td>
<td>Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) - Education and Training for Security Sector Governance</td>
<td>To strengthen Peace &amp; Security in Southern African countries by building capacity for sound Security Sector Governance through the provision of Senior-in-Service &amp; Post-Graduate Education &amp; Training in Security Sector Governance to be accredited by the University of Witwatersrand, for the SADC region.</td>
<td>University of Witwatersrand</td>
<td>completed?</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/09/2005</td>
<td>01/03/2009</td>
<td>£565,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>001570018</td>
<td>AFRICA WIDE</td>
<td>Africa Security Sector Transformation Network (ASSN) (sic)</td>
<td>To strengthen and promote regional security and conflict prevention within the ECOWAS sub-region</td>
<td>ASDR and Centre for Democracy and Development (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2008</td>
<td>£1,500,000</td>
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1 Items with MIS codes are DFID led and items with DRAP codes are MOD led.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001570011</td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>Africa Security Sector Governance Network (ASSGN) - Benin workshop</td>
<td>To strengthen Security Sector Governance Across Africa</td>
<td>GFN (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/04/2004</td>
<td>01/04/2005</td>
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<td>001570010</td>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td>GFN-SSR/ASDR</td>
<td>To provide a series of publications analysing the security sector that misuse, have direct and negative consequences on peoples personal security that can be used to help strengthen Security Reform</td>
<td>[GFN] ASDR (GCPP funded)</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>Change of GFN provider 2006?</td>
<td>00/00/2003</td>
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<td>£50,000</td>
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<td>BPS6032</td>
<td>BPST (EA) - Peace Support Trg Centre</td>
<td>Military Justice and Rule of Law (50 x 2 weeks)</td>
<td>BPST(EA) - (ACPP funded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>011570021</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>Police Capacity for Integ. Police Comd</td>
<td>Strengthening the Cohesion and Managerial Capacity of the Integrated Police Command</td>
<td></td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£46,600</td>
<td>£45,391</td>
<td>£1,209</td>
<td>97%</td>
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<td>011570023</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>Police Follow-up Training</td>
<td>Support to Leadership Training Programme, and Police Follow-up Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/11/2005</td>
<td>01/01/2006</td>
<td>£75,000</td>
<td>£71,394</td>
<td>£3,606</td>
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<td>Start Date</td>
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<td>Cost Details (estimated)</td>
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<td>011570013</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>Integrating Conflict Analysis and Programme Planning in Burundi</td>
<td>Integrating Conflict Analysis and Programme Planning in Burundi. Intended to promote sensitisation.</td>
<td>Contractor (CDA) (US based) (planned ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>£18,300</td>
<td>£18,034</td>
<td>£266</td>
<td>99%</td>
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<tr>
<td>011570006</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>Strategic Leadership Training Workshops</td>
<td>A contribution to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWIC) toward the cost of staging two strategic leadership training workshops in Burundi specifically targeting, firstly, the Cabinet and top-level Parliamentary leadership following the mid-term change-over of the Transitional National Government, and secondly, a select group of Army and rebel leaders promoting sensitisation for future SSR work</td>
<td>Contractor (UK based?) (ACPP funded) [Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]</td>
<td>completed?</td>
<td></td>
<td>05/11/2003</td>
<td>25/08/2004</td>
<td>£75,000</td>
<td>£60,150</td>
<td>£14,850</td>
<td>80%</td>
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<td>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</td>
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<td>Programme/activity</td>
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<td>Main Issues</td>
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<td>Cost Details (estimated)</td>
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<tr>
<td>011570004</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>Support to the Peace Process in Burundi</td>
<td>To provide sound advice on DDR and SSR issues during the critical early stages of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. An adviser, with experience of these issues will work closely with the DFID representative in Burundi. The adviser will be required to establish relationships, familiarise himself with Government thinking on SSR issues, advise on opportunities for achieving and maintaining progress on SSR, and where necessary make suggestions for donor support.</td>
<td>Same contractor as above (?) or maybe a part of the Terms of Reference of Jan Vanheukelom</td>
<td>completed (but no link to any output)</td>
<td>quality of contractor? Time allowed?</td>
<td>01/02/2003</td>
<td>01/03/2003</td>
<td>£12,500</td>
<td>£8,185</td>
<td>£4,315</td>
<td>65%</td>
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<tr>
<td>011570012</td>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>TA for SSR Cell [Technical Assistance]</td>
<td>A consultancy to provide the UK’s input, an SSR adviser, into the establishment of the Security Sector Reform Cell and the planning of the Journees des Reflexions, provide recommendations on the nature of further UK support,</td>
<td>Contractor (UK Based) working to DFID office and RCA (DFID (Framework) Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>Choice of contractor/commitment</td>
<td>25/06/1905</td>
<td>26/06/1905</td>
<td>£64,500</td>
<td>£64,498</td>
<td>£2</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Programme/ activity</td>
<td>Project Purpose</td>
<td>Agent and Linkages</td>
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<tr>
<td>BURUNDI</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Consultant attached to EU Mission</td>
<td>UK consultant (ACP Funded) reporting to Head of EU mission to DRC but also to London (DFID, MOD, FCO)</td>
<td>In progress</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/06/2005</td>
<td>01/05/2006</td>
<td>£350,000</td>
<td>£241,956</td>
<td>£108,044</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Advisory visit</td>
<td>DAT/SSDAT reporting to MONUC and DAT/SSDAT reporting to Post and to DFID Prog Mgr (ACP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>£8,000</td>
<td>£8,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>EUPOL Adviser</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK Contractor</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/08/2003</td>
<td>01/09/2003</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
<td>£17,010</td>
<td>£7,990</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>071570036</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Restoration of Rule of Law</td>
<td>To contribute to establishing political and security institutions necessary for effective and accountable government and state</td>
<td>responsiveness to the DRC Government of National Unity &amp; Congolese National Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27/07/2005</td>
<td>31/12/2006</td>
<td>£10,900,000</td>
<td>£10,062,902</td>
<td>£837,098</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>071570023</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Rule of Law in DRC (Justice Sector)</td>
<td>To contribute to the institution of a Rule of Law in the DRC, specifically on assistance to the Institutions and civil society dealing also with prisons, military and civil justice systems</td>
<td>REJUSCO for DFID (as part of UNDP and EC funded programme)</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/10/2003</td>
<td>01/03/2004</td>
<td>£675,000</td>
<td>£655,724</td>
<td>£19,276</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>071570038</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>SSR Programme Proposals for: - Initial support to Transitional Government; advice to MONUC; participation in multinational SSR work To help establish functioning coordination and planning mechanisms to enable the Temporary National</td>
<td></td>
<td>CA based in Kinshasa</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>1.International agreement on SSR difficult. 2.MONUC hesitant. 3.UK not in the lead.</td>
<td>01/02/2005</td>
<td>01/07/2005</td>
<td>£90,000</td>
<td>£12,065</td>
<td>£77,935</td>
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<td>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government (TNG) meet its commitments in relation to Security Sector Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£29,226</td>
<td>£20,774</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>071570020 DRC</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>To assist MONUC in ensuring that a national policing seminar leads to a sound process for developing and implementing a nationally owned strategy for police reform.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/01/2004</td>
<td>01/04/2004</td>
<td>£85,000</td>
<td>£59,615</td>
<td>£25,385</td>
<td>70%</td>
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<tr>
<td>071570033 DRC</td>
<td>TA Justice Sector [Technical Assistance]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo to contribute to work of justice reform</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/05/2005</td>
<td>01/04/2007</td>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
<td>£656,662</td>
<td>£343,338</td>
<td>66%</td>
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<tr>
<td>071570039 DRC</td>
<td>Restoration of Justice in Katanga</td>
<td></td>
<td>Justice is administered more and more satisfactorily within the legal system and in everyday life</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/05/2005</td>
<td>01/04/2007</td>
<td>£1,100,000</td>
<td>£109,925</td>
<td>£75</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>071570029 DRC</td>
<td>Support to a National Reintegration and Community Seminar in Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>To provide technical assistance to the National Commission of DDR in developing a reintegration policy for the</td>
<td></td>
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<td>13/06/2003</td>
<td>01/11/2003</td>
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<td>£109,925</td>
<td>£75</td>
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<td>Cost Details (estimated)</td>
<td>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.1</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Programme/ activity</td>
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<td>Agent and Linkages</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Total projected costs</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs</td>
<td>Balance Spent</td>
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<td>£550,000</td>
<td>£406,461</td>
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<td>01/02/2006</td>
<td>01/03/2004</td>
<td>£70,000</td>
<td>£31,830</td>
<td>£38,170</td>
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<td>01/05/2004</td>
<td>01/03/2004</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£14,068,000</td>
<td>£12,419,551</td>
<td>£1,698,479</td>
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</table>

Democratic Republic of Congo. Marginally SSR but some governance input.
Rejusco/CTB

Contribute to the rehabilitation of the administration of justice by promoting access to justice in favour of disadvantaged peoples; to ensure that the voice of the defence heard; to establish the link between justice and the means of mobile courts.

Consultancy to participate in the multi donor mission to establish a part of the justice sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

DRC £14,068,000 £12,419,551 £1,698,479 88%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Programme/ activity</th>
<th>Project Purpose</th>
<th>Agent and Linkages</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Main Issues</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total projected costs</th>
<th>Total Actual Costs</th>
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<th>Spent %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>020542052</td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Consultant for DFID team</td>
<td>To provide DFID Ethiopia with Peace and Security Advisory Input</td>
<td>a consultant short term working to DFID Addis. (Half funded by DFID, half by ACPP)</td>
<td>completed ?</td>
<td>Multi-skilled team of experts</td>
<td>01/03/2005</td>
<td>01/08/2005</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£26,354</td>
<td>£3,646</td>
<td>88%</td>
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<tr>
<td>000618547 000618595 000618298</td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Defence Transformation (capacity bldg in EMOND) [Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence]</td>
<td>Capacity building; professionalisation; civil-military relations; intuitional appraisal</td>
<td>SSDAT working to in-country DFID/FCO/MOD Team (ACPP Funded) [Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT)]</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>Multi-skilled team of experts</td>
<td>25/06/2005</td>
<td>26/06/2005</td>
<td>£115,000</td>
<td>£114,028</td>
<td>£972</td>
<td>99%</td>
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<td>020542038</td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Governance and SSR Transformation programme</td>
<td>To provide GoE with recommendations for Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>Multi-skilled team of experts (funded £800K by DFID and £150K by ACPP)</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>Multi-skilled team of experts</td>
<td>27/06/2005</td>
<td>28/06/2005</td>
<td>£115,000</td>
<td>£114,028</td>
<td>£972</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included in 020542038 (?)</td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Justice Sector Reform Programme</td>
<td>see above</td>
<td>not clear from papers</td>
<td>completed ?</td>
<td>Multi-skilled team of experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>included in 020542038 (?)</td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>More consultant for DFID and Joint Ethiopia Team</td>
<td>as above plus specialist Police advice</td>
<td>as above but DFID funded</td>
<td>completed ?</td>
<td>Multi-skilled team of experts</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£45,000</td>
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<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Total projected costs</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Spent %</td>
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<tr>
<td>020542048 ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Support SSR within EMOND and MFA [Ethiopian Ministry of National Defence and Min. of Federal Affairs]</td>
<td>To provide GoE with assistance for planning and implementing security sector reform</td>
<td>SSDAT working to in-country DFID office (DFID framework Funded)</td>
<td>planned</td>
<td>Political crisis in Addis; receptivity of EMOND senior officials</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£37,083</td>
<td>£12,917</td>
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<td>020542049 ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Further Design Work on Capacity Building in Ministry of Federal Affairs, for Conflict Management</td>
<td>Building the Capacity of the Ministry of Federal Affairs on Conflict Management</td>
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<td>06/10/2004</td>
<td>12/04/2005</td>
<td>£87,659</td>
<td>£73,293</td>
<td>£14,366</td>
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<td>ETH6011 ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Implementation of the military pillar of SSR: STTT (SSDAT); courses in UK; and visits.</td>
<td>DA Addis Ababa</td>
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<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>£377,659</td>
<td>£300,758</td>
<td>£76,901</td>
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<td>GHA5009 GHANA</td>
<td>GMoD Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) AS OF NOV 05, £10K FUNDING TRANSFERRED TO GHA5024 - APPROVED BY PDRS</td>
<td>Assist develop PIP and ultimately produce a Defence Review</td>
<td>SSDAT (ACPP funded)</td>
<td></td>
<td>00/09/2002</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£40,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<td>Programme/ activity</td>
<td>Project Purpose</td>
<td>Agent and Linkages</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Total projected costs</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Spent %</td>
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<td>GYA/003</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Place on Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
<td>ITP / RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£62,000</td>
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<td>GHA5024</td>
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<td>ITP / RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td>ITP / RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£79,500</td>
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<td>GHA/013</td>
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<td>GMoD Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) - This is a three year project.</td>
<td>To develop a sustainable security sector governance and management course in Ghana.</td>
<td>DAT (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>19/07/2004</td>
<td>00/08/2004</td>
<td>£90,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHA5010</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>GMoD Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) - 40 students for 3 weeks</td>
<td>To develop a sustainable security sector governance and management course in Ghana.</td>
<td>SSDAT (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/07/2005</td>
<td>00/08/2005</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>GHA5011</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>GMoD Performance Improvement Plan (PIP)</td>
<td>Phase 2 of GMOD intranet</td>
<td>SSDAT members as required (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£35,000</td>
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¹ DRAP No. refers to Development Research and Action Programme Number.
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Spent %</th>
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<td>BWA6012</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Facilitate Defence Management module - 90 students - 2 weeks</td>
<td>To develop a sustainable security sector governance and management course in Ghana.</td>
<td>Policy and Defence Relations South (PDRS) - (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/04/2006</td>
<td>00/03/2007</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£44,000</td>
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<td>GHA6014</td>
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<td>GMoD Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) - 45 students for 3 weeks</td>
<td>To develop a sustainable security sector governance and management course in Ghana.</td>
<td>Policy and Defence Relations South (PDRS) - BMATT WA - Short-Term Training Teams (STTT) - (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/07/2006</td>
<td>00/08/2006</td>
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<td>025542051 (?)</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Justice Sector Development (SRAJ?)</td>
<td>Rule of Law; strengthening civil society</td>
<td>MAP Consultancy (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>Separate from almost all other SSR work in Ghana</td>
<td>00/00/2001</td>
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<td>GHANA SOUTH- SOUTH SSR Dialogue</td>
<td>Governance; capacity bldg;</td>
<td></td>
<td>ASDR (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2003</td>
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<td>000618547 000618595 000618298</td>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>SSR Education (Managing Defence in a Democracy (MDD ) Export Course)</td>
<td>Sensitisation to SSR and governance principles; civil-military relations</td>
<td>Cranfield University (ACPP Funded). Linked to Ghana SSR programme and PIP</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>Commitment of Ghanaian authorities (especially Parliamentarians)</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
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<td>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</td>
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<td>Spent %</td>
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<td>Support to Ghana Police Service (GPS) [source: See ACPP Allocations 2006/2007]</td>
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<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td>Fact Finding mission</td>
<td>Governance; capacity bldg; SSDAT reporting to UNOGBIS (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>Outside UK Government sphere of interest</td>
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<td>00/00/2005</td>
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<td>£12,000</td>
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<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td>Legal Sector Reform Programme</td>
<td>Umbrella programme on legal sector reform: To provide Access to justice through legal aid services to poor women. Governance; Access to Justice; Justice sector and Police reform.</td>
<td>Consultancy for TA and local actors (DFID Funded) [Technical Assistance]</td>
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<td>00/00/2001</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
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<td>KENYA</td>
<td>National Training for Kenyan Armed Forces [source: See ACPP Allocations]</td>
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<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Total projected costs</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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<td>00/12/2005</td>
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<td>00/00/2006</td>
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<td>KENYA</td>
<td></td>
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<td>ITP/RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td>00/00/2007</td>
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<td>KENYA</td>
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<td>Def Dip Export Course, incl scoping/advisor y visits for Course</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to prepare MOD and Def HQ for Defence Review</td>
<td>ACPP Funded</td>
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<td>£70,000</td>
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<td>Defence Diplomacy Scholarship Scheme: Managing Defence in a Democracy - export course - 2 weeks</td>
<td>Short-Term Training Teams (STTT) / ITP (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td>04/12/2006</td>
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<td>£70,000</td>
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KENYA | £1,570,500 | £1,146,500 | £42,000 | 30% |
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<th>Spent %</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>032542031</td>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td>Community Safety and Security Improvement Project</td>
<td>To strengthen GoL’s capacity to provide an effective, efficient and accountable policing service that is responsive to the needs of the community.</td>
<td>UK based consultants and TA in country (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>police mainly</td>
<td>25/06/2005</td>
<td>25/06/2005</td>
<td>£1,075,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>032542037</td>
<td>LESOTHO</td>
<td>Justice Sector Development Programme</td>
<td>To develop the Lesotho Justice Sector so that pro poor policies are developed and implemented as above (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>ongoing?</td>
<td>police mainly; some other justice sector work</td>
<td>25/06/2005</td>
<td>27/06/2005</td>
<td>£5,500,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>033570003</td>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td>Disband Unqualified Police</td>
<td>To strengthen the rule of law through the deactivation of non-qualified police officers who have not met the basic standards of service.</td>
<td>not explained (UNDP possibly) (DFID Thematic Trust Fund (?))</td>
<td>complete</td>
<td>01/03/2006</td>
<td>01/04/2006</td>
<td>£2,100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>037035001</td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>SSAJ</td>
<td>Justice Sector Strategic Planning; HR; Consultant supporting DFID in-country (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>on going</td>
<td>programme management in country not strategic enough (OPR)</td>
<td>24/06/2005</td>
<td>29/06/2005</td>
<td>£16,908,713</td>
<td>£4,747,809</td>
<td>£12,160,904</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>037035001</td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>MASSAJ FA</td>
<td>Improved safety of the person security of property and access to justice particularly for the poor and</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td>19/09/2003</td>
<td>01/03/2007</td>
<td>£16,908,713</td>
<td>£4,747,809</td>
<td>£12,160,904</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<td>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</td>
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<td>Agent and Linkages</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Cost Details (estimated)</td>
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<td>Total projected costs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£34,738,213</td>
<td>£20,272,015</td>
<td>£14,466,198</td>
<td>58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>037542051</td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>MASSAJ TC</td>
<td>Improved safety of the person security of property and access to justice particularly for the poor and vulnerable</td>
<td></td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td>25/08/1999</td>
<td>01/12/2007</td>
<td>£17,750,000</td>
<td>£15,444,706</td>
<td>£2,305,294</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW16001</td>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies – 1 student</td>
<td>ITP/RCDS</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£79,500</td>
<td>£79,500</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£20,272,015</td>
<td>£14,466,198</td>
<td>£5,705,294</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>048542035</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Justice Programme (Security Justice &amp; Growth)</td>
<td>To enhance safety, security and access for poor and marginalised people in Nigeria.</td>
<td>British Council (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>on going</td>
<td>OPR Oct 06</td>
<td>01/03/2002</td>
<td>01/08/2006</td>
<td>£30,092,000</td>
<td>£13,494,375</td>
<td>£16,597,625</td>
<td>45%</td>
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<tr>
<td>048542035</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Access to Justice Programme</td>
<td>See above</td>
<td>Consultant working to in-country advisers (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>on going</td>
<td>24/06/2005</td>
<td>24/06/2005</td>
<td>24/06/2005</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>BDAT [British Defence Advisory Team]</td>
<td>To support the development of professional Nigerian Armed Forces, capable of fulfilling its role as a national defence force and as a significant provider of peacekeeping forces. Efforts also include support to MOD Mil Team (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td></td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>000618547 000618595 000618298</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Scoping Visit by DAT [Defence Advisory Team] to assess prospects for Sector Wide review</td>
<td>DAT/SSDAT (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>No pick up in Whitehall?</td>
<td>00/00/2003</td>
<td>25/06/2005</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NIG/022</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Capitation and in-country costs</td>
<td>BDAT (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£365,000</td>
<td>£365,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIG/001</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Place on Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
<td>ITP / RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/01/2005</td>
<td>00/12/2005</td>
<td>£60,000</td>
<td>£60,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NIG/5001</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies - 1 student</td>
<td>ITP / RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£62,000</td>
<td>£62,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NIG/6001</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies - 1 student</td>
<td>ITP / RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£79,500</td>
<td>£79,500</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NIG/014</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Visit to UK - Def HQ and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)</td>
<td>PDR(S)VIDT(A) - BDAT - (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/04/2004</td>
<td>00/05/2004</td>
<td>£5,000</td>
<td>£5,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

The refurbishment and further development of the Nigerian Peacekeeping Training Wing in Jaji.
<table>
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<th>Balance</th>
<th>Spent %</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIG/023</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Def Dip Export Course including scoping and advisory visits for course - 1×1 week for each visit</td>
<td>to prepare MOD and Def HQ for Defence Review</td>
<td>PDR(S)YDAT - BDAT - (ACPP funded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>£70,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NIG6045 NIG6046</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Advisory Visit.</td>
<td>In support of anticipated Nigerian Security &amp; Defence Review.</td>
<td>BDAT Nigeria/ SS DAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIG6048</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>BDAT Infrastructure/ Running Costs</td>
<td>BDAT Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£365,000</td>
<td>£365,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£31,118,500</td>
<td>£14,385,875</td>
<td>£16,597,625</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td></td>
<td>SSR Programme</td>
<td>1. Advise GoR on sector wide Security Policy formulation.</td>
<td>SSDAT working to in-country DFID office.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2004</td>
<td>26/06/2005</td>
<td>1. GoR thought not to be playing fair in Eastern DRC, therefore programme halted. 2. Potential multilateral programme with NL.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Total projected costs (£)</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs (£)</td>
<td>Balance (£)</td>
<td>Spent %</td>
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<tr>
<td>057542069 / SIL5119</td>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>Accommodation for RSLAF (Op Pebu) D6 Bulldozer and Drawbar trailer, and heavy plant transporter IMATT capitalisation and running costs £90k funding transferred from SIL5001</td>
<td>To provide all members of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) provided with adequate personal and operational accommodation, basing the RSLAF in semi-permanent battalion-sized barracks located to conform to the local government structure.</td>
<td>IMATT (SL) - (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>in progress ?</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/03/2003</td>
<td>01/04/2006</td>
<td>£3,900,000</td>
<td>£3,265,825</td>
<td>£634,175</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>057990001</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP)</td>
<td>To improve safety, security and respect for people’s rights by re-establishing an effective and accountable police service through SLP effectiveness; Police - Civil Society relations; HR; Ethics</td>
<td>TA (mainly on short-term attachment) (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>subsumed into Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)</td>
<td>Effectiveness reduced because of turbulence at high-level in Min of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>00/00/2000</td>
<td>27/06/2005</td>
<td>£27,148,000</td>
<td>£27,148,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Equipment for RSLAF [Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces]</td>
<td>Essential non-weapons equipment (trucks and computers)</td>
<td>MOD (DLO) (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£746,832</td>
<td>£746,832</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>IMATT [International Military Advisory and Training Team]</td>
<td>To create effective and democratically accountable Armed Forces; preventing a return of instability.</td>
<td>MOD Team of Mil and Civ advisers (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>Initially, special relationship cmd IMATT to President,</td>
<td>01/03/2001</td>
<td>31/03/2004</td>
<td>£39,000,000</td>
<td>£39,000,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
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<td>(Sierra Leone) to conflict through enhancing capacities, skills and resources of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, thereby ensuring that in future Sierra Leone can guarantee her own security and prevent/deal with any threat of return to conflict</td>
<td>size, cost (overheads) approach to SL Counterparts</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>on an annual cost of £13M For years 2001-2003/4 inclusive</td>
<td>01/08/2004</td>
<td>01/12/2009</td>
<td>£25,000,000</td>
<td>£2,079,336</td>
<td>£22,920,664</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<td>057542066</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)</td>
<td>To improve safety, security and access to justice for the people of Sierra Leone, especially the poor. General and wide ranging improvements in police, prisons, high-level planning capacity and HR management</td>
<td>DFID Funding for Local Steering Cttee (Justice Sector Task Force) with broad International representation (USAID, ICRC, UNDP, UNAMSIL +</td>
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<tr>
<td>057542015</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Law Development Project</td>
<td>The Law Development Project will help consolidate and institutionalise the rule of law in Sierra Leone by helping the court and legal system to function effectively. Emphasis on capacity building in legal profession and courts.</td>
<td>British Council (DFID Funded) subsumed in Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23/06/2005</td>
<td>26/06/2005</td>
<td>£1,961,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Police Mentoring and Monitoring</td>
<td>Capacity of SLP Senior officers through 1on1 links</td>
<td>UNCIVPOL supported by DFID</td>
<td>ongoing?</td>
<td>25/06/2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£8,080,100</td>
<td>£6,749,059</td>
<td>£1,331,041</td>
<td>84%</td>
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<tr>
<td>057542037</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>SILSEP II Programme [Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project]</td>
<td>To establish effective and disciplined armed forces, controlled and accountable to the democratic Government of Sierra Leone, in the interests of lasting peace and stability. Full range SSR in DEFENCE and INTELLIGENCE areas and HIGHER SS Management (ONS) and Governance (esp. Civ control and democratic accountability.)</td>
<td>DFID &amp; MOD (IMATT) advisers (ACPP Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>Sislow progress on capacity building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£8,080,100</td>
<td>£6,749,059</td>
<td>£1,331,041</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>057542037  also: 000618547</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>SILSEP III Programme [Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Project]</td>
<td>To establish effective and disciplined armed forces, controlled and accountable to the democratic Government of Sierra Leone, in the interests of lasting peace and stability</td>
<td>Now DFID Country Framework funded</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>Resolved issues identified in SILSEP II</td>
<td>01/07/2003</td>
<td>01/04/2005</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Top level Police Mentoring</td>
<td>Capacity of Inspector of Police (IGP)</td>
<td>Retired Senior UK Police Officers (DFID Funded)</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>24/06/2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>26/06/2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>057542049</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission Project (SLACP)</td>
<td>To assist the Government of Sierra Leone with the implementation of an Anti-Corruption Strategy through the creation of an effective and efficient Anti-Corruption Commission.</td>
<td>DFID Funded and DFID managed</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Lack of effect</td>
<td>01/11/2000</td>
<td>29/06/2005</td>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>057542050</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Security Sector Project: Refurbishment MoD HQ Paramount Hotel</td>
<td>To provide Sierra Leone MoD with new Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29/11/2000</td>
<td>01/06/2006</td>
<td>£100,000</td>
<td>£99,980</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>057015001</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Refurbishment of the Paramount Hotel as the new Ministry of Defence Headquarters</td>
<td>To provide the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defence with new headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/06/2000</td>
<td>30/04/2006</td>
<td>£1,024,000</td>
<td>£1,005,935</td>
<td>98%</td>
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<td>057532011</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Promoting Peace, Security and Stability in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>To reduce violence in Sierra Leone by stressing themes of peace, reconciliation and democratisation in the sub-region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01/06/2002</td>
<td>01/07/2005</td>
<td>£100,000</td>
<td>£99,980</td>
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<td>057542072</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Support for Judges and Prosecutor</td>
<td>To provide financial support for the provision of judges and prosecutor recruited by Commonwealth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>£350,000</td>
<td>£106,622</td>
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<td>End Date</td>
<td>Total projected costs</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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<td>057542034</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
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<td>SIL/001</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Place on Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL/005</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Sustainment of IMATT - Capitation costs, running costs, etc</td>
<td>PDR(S) - (ACPP funded)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>SIL5001</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>IMATT Sustainment costs</td>
<td>PDRS - IMATT (SL)</td>
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<td>Programme/ activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction of barracks, etc; routine maintenance of existing IMATT projects and facilities - IMATT capitation and running costs</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>PDRS / IMATT (SL)</td>
<td>00/00/2005 00/00/2006</td>
<td>£1,765,000</td>
<td>£1,765,000</td>
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<td>RSLAF uplift - purchase of vehicles and communications - IMATT capitation &amp; running costs</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>PDRS / IMATT (SL)</td>
<td>00/00/2005 00/00/2006</td>
<td>£1,410,000</td>
<td>£1,410,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMATT Sustainment costs</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>IMATT (SL) (ACPP funded)</td>
<td>00/00/2006 00/00/2007</td>
<td>£2,781,700</td>
<td>£2,781,700</td>
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<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training courses in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>PDRS / IMATT (SL)</td>
<td>00/00/2005 00/00/2006</td>
<td>£147,000</td>
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<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Cost Details (estimated)</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Spent %</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5036 to SIL5051</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Training courses in Ghana at Various Ghana Armed Forces Training Schools</td>
<td>PDRS / IMATT (SL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£133,000 £133,000 £0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5052</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>International Logistic Officers’ Course - 2 students</td>
<td>IDT(A) - IMATT (SL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£28,000 £28,000 £0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5053</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>International Ammunition Technical Course - 2 students, 1 course, 6 months</td>
<td>IDT(A) - IMATT(SL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£65,000 £65,000 £0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5054</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>EME Pl Comd Course in UK - 3 students, 1 course, 3 weeks</td>
<td>IDT(A) - IMATT(SL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£13,000 £13,000 £0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5055</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Media Operations Course in UK - 3 students, 1 course, 4 weeks</td>
<td>IDT(A) - IMATT(SL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£24,000 £24,000 £0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5056</td>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>Systems Approach To Training Managers Course in UK - 1 students, 1 course, 1 week</td>
<td>IDT(RAF) - IMATT(SL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£2,000 £2,000 £0</td>
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<td>Programme/ activity</td>
<td>Project Purpose</td>
<td>Agent and Linkages</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Main Issues</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Total projected costs</td>
<td>Total Actual Costs</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5057 to SIL5068 (1)</td>
<td>SIERRALEONE</td>
<td>Training courses at RSLAF Staff Academy</td>
<td>The Horton Academy, GAFCSG and KAIPTC</td>
<td>PDRS / IMATT SL</td>
<td>00/00/2005</td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>£283,000</td>
<td>£283,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>SIL5118</td>
<td>SIERRALEONE</td>
<td>Defence Diplomacy Scholarship Scheme:</td>
<td>Managing Defence in a Democracy</td>
<td>ITP / IDT(A) - GCPP (SSR)</td>
<td>19/09/2005</td>
<td>04/11/2005</td>
<td>£4,300</td>
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<td>SIERRALEONE</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£143,935,600</td>
<td>£74,799,100</td>
<td>£69,136,500</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>058542014</td>
<td>SOMALIA</td>
<td>UNDP: Rule of Law and Security 2006</td>
<td>To further strengthen the rule of law and security in Somalia by</td>
<td>UNDP + UK Contract TA</td>
<td>01/01/2006</td>
<td>00/01/2006</td>
<td>£740,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>supporting the Somali Land Security Sector Reform (SSSR) and the planning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>process for the formation of a Somali Police Force. Providing monitoring</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and evaluation experts</td>
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**Total Cost Details (estimated)**

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<th>Total projected costs</th>
<th>Total Actual Costs</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Spent %</th>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5057 to SIL5068</td>
<td>£283,000</td>
<td>£283,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIL5118</td>
<td>£4,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIERRALEONE</td>
<td>£143,935,600</td>
<td>£74,799,100</td>
<td>£69,136,500</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>058542014</td>
<td>£740,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£740,000</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Programme/activity</td>
<td>Project Purpose</td>
<td>Agent and Linkages</td>
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<td>059542080 (?)</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Safety Security and Accessible</td>
<td>In relation to policing: To assist the DoSS, the SAPS, and the ICD develop</td>
<td>not known (DFID Funded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Justice (SSAJ)</td>
<td>strategies and implementation plans to enhance effective, open and accountable</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>policing services. (Rauch papers)</td>
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<td>SOA/001</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Place on Royal College of Defence</td>
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<td>ITP/RCD'S (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td>Studies.</td>
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<td>SOA5001</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Place on Royal College of Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td>ITP/RCD'S (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Studies.</td>
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<td>SOA6003</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Place on Royal College of Defence</td>
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<td>ITP/RCD'S (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Studies - 1 x SANDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOA/027</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Project Clipper - 70 civil servants x 2 weeks</td>
<td>Ashridge (funding source to be determined - by PDR(S) and DA Pretoria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.</td>
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<td>Programme / Activity</td>
<td>Project Purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOA5015</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Project Clipper</td>
<td>- higher level management courses to develop civil servants - 70 civil servants x 2 weeks</td>
<td>PDRS (ACPP funded)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOA6016</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>Project Clipper</td>
<td>- higher level management courses to develop civil servants - 70 civil servants x 2 weeks</td>
<td>PDRS (ACPP funded)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUD/007</td>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>TNA for Integrated Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>BPST(EA) (ACPP funded)</td>
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**Cost Details (estimated)**

<p>| Country       | Proposals For: 1. Advise development of Security Policy for GoS and GoSS (in-waiting) 2. Justice sector capacity building (separate DFID funding £7.2M (NOT from ACPP) over 3 years) | RCA plus DFID/FCO team (Sudan Unit) together with (briefly) DAT (SSDAT). Linked to DDR Programme: Strengthening regional Orgs; Nuba Monitor Mission Verification Monitoring Teams; support for special Peace Envoy | in abeyance (no work beyond 2 scoping visits) 1. Poor response from GoS 2. Settlement insufficiently developed. 3.DAT/SSDAT left out of programme. | 26/06/2005 | 26/06/2005 | £1,436,500               | £311,500             | £1,125,000 | 22%     |</p>
<table>
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<th>Total Actual Costs</th>
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<th>Spent %</th>
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<td>SUD5007</td>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>SSDAT assistance with reform/modernisation programme - SSDAT members as required</td>
<td>SSDAT (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td>00/00/2005 00/00/2006</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
<td>£0</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>067570012</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>Defence Review</td>
<td>Enhance the integration of defence into the budget process, accountability and better governance in the security sector especially HR and procurement</td>
<td>DAT/SSDAT + KCL (ACPP Funded) see Bradford University report</td>
<td>01/02/1998 01/09/2005</td>
<td>£75,000</td>
<td>£55,440</td>
<td>£19,560</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<tr>
<td>067570008</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>Scoping Contib Defence Review</td>
<td>Re appraisal of Uganda Defence Policy , Strategy and defence forces leading to a more open, accountable and transparent policy, procedures and practices</td>
<td></td>
<td>17/12/2001 01/09/2005</td>
<td>£532,914</td>
<td>£538,444</td>
<td>-£5,530</td>
<td>101%</td>
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<tr>
<td>067542069</td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>Defence Expenditure Efficiency Savings Study (ESS)</td>
<td>Examination of Uganda’s defence budget and expenditures to identify efficiency savings for redeployment to</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/02/1998 01/06/1998</td>
<td>£146,500</td>
<td>£146,281</td>
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<td>Project Purpose</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform Programme</td>
<td>Place on Defence Diplomacy Scholarship Scheme MSc in Global Security - 1 x 1 year</td>
<td>ITP (ACPP funded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/08/2004</td>
<td>00/07/2005</td>
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<td>Royal College of Defence Studies - 1 student</td>
<td>ITP/RCDS (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£79,500</td>
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<td>PDRS (ACPP funded)</td>
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<td>£269,249</td>
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¹ DRAP No. stands for Development Request Project Number.
<table>
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<th>Mis code / Serial No. / DRAP No.¹</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Programme/ activity</th>
<th>Project Purpose</th>
<th>Agent and Linkages</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Main Issues</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Cost Details (estimated)</th>
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<td>SSA6013 ZAMBIA</td>
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<td>Defence Diplomacy Scholarship Scheme: Managing Defence in a Democracy - export course - STTTAs of Jan 06, removed from DRAP 06 - resource constraints but may be reinstated after discussions between DADV Harare and SSRG, defence academy in Feb. 06. Also, venue might be moved to Mzuzu University, Malawi.</td>
<td>ITP (ACPP funded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>00/00/2006</td>
<td>00/00/2007</td>
<td>£70,000</td>
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**Cost Details (estimated)**

- **Total projected costs**
- **Total Actual Costs**
- **Balance**
- **Spent %**
ANNEX 4 : MAIN FINDINGS FROM FIELD RESEARCH

DRC

Since the signing of the Pretoria Accord in late 2002, the UK’s engagement in DRC has grown in significance and effect. It is evident that as the largest bilateral donor, the UK is a leading actor in the critical transition from conflict to stability and the path to development.

Conditions in DRC are not conducive to a measured developmental approach to SJSR. There is continuing violence in the East. The political landscape remains uncertain following the completion of the presidential elections. Violence is threatened daily in the capital. The human resource pool in government and its institutions are barely able, and in many cases possibly reluctant, to carry out their duties for the Congolese people as a whole. Nevertheless, the success of the incoming government and the prospects for development depend on the success of a strategically directed, inclusive and internationally supported programme of SJSR.

Priorities are:

- Growth of the rule of law, supported by an effective and non-partisan police force and justice system, and
- Integration of the former armed forces of the conflict parties into a democratically controlled, affordable and effective national armed force. This process in closely linked to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. Hence, unusually, DDR is part of the SJSR process in DRC.

The UK’s ability to strongly influence the course of progress on SJSR in DRC is promoted by the spirit of cooperation and unity of purpose among all the different departmental representatives at Post under the leadership of Her Majesty’s Ambassador.

Effective sector wide SJSR will only work in DRC if the international community acts in unison. Leadership of the international community efforts in SJSR, involving coordination, coherent advice to the highest levels of Government, and best use of resources is one of the major challenges at present. The motives and attitude towards SJSR on the part of the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC), the European Union (EU), and significant bilateral actors such as Belgium, South Africa and Angola as well as the IFIs are at variance, despite recent efforts to bring them together. While not taking the overall lead, the UK, with recognised expertise, a growing reputation as an honest broker, and a strong and coherently expressed line on SJSR, is likely to become ever more closely involved in SJSR work in DRC.

The form of support for which the UK is best suited is to drive a process approach to SJSR. Presently much international effort is expended on programmes of doubtful long-term benefit or sustainability such as the national police forensic training centre. A strategic approach is needed and local ownership, still very much at an early stage will have to be developed.

Nigeria

UK Government engagement with the Federal Government of Nigeria became more active following the election of a civilian regime in 1999. The UK Government’s commitment to promoting democratic accountability across national institutions has been evident from the start of UK re-engagement with the Government.

However, neither the individual UK policies or strategies guiding UK engagement in Nigeria nor the sum of these strategies appears to provide the sector wide approach at the strategic level that is required. This includes both the Cabinet level SSR Strategy, which focuses on the Niger Delta, and the Nigerian conflict prevention strategy, which forms part of UK’s overall strategy for Nigeria. The conflict prevention strategy outlined in 2001 envisaged SSR as a key part of the UK effort to promote conflict prevention. However, SSR as it was conceived focused largely
on the military without linkage to the Access to Justice (A2J) Programme, which was in its inception phase at the
time.

The DFID funded, British Council managed Access to Justice Programme began in March 2002, following a six
month pre-inception phase. The programme had been designed to support the DFID(N) Country Strategy Paper.
It incorporated: 1) a seven year sector-wide approach; 2) federal level engagement and activities initially in four
(now six) DFID focal states; 3) a “process” approach; 4) an extended eighteen month inception phase, allowing
key relationships to develop; and 5) the basic presumption that political will for reform existed across the justice
sector.

At the conclusion of the inception period, and following the Drivers of (pro-poor) Change analysis DFID(N)
identified the need to add a growth component to the programme. This change caused understandable disruption
to existing programme planning and implementation, though the programme management team, fielded by the
British Council, appears to have successfully made the transition from A2J to the Security, Justice, and Growth
(SJG) Programme. The growth component is developing and beginning to have effect. The programme has
recently been further extended and will now end in March 2008.

The relationship between DFID(N) and the SJG management, though cordial, has been distant. This in part may
be explained by a substantial period during which there was no senior governance adviser in post (two years). The
recent appointment of a senior governance adviser with an SSAJ background to DFID(N) will hopefully do much
to remedy this state of affairs and further improve the synergy between SJG and other DFID programme activity.
The SJG programme is achieving many of its objectives at a local level in the six states where the programme
operates. Ordinary Nigerians have seen improvements in the quality of service provided by the police. However,
without a critical mass of police officers committed to change, the programme will not be sustainable and its
primary objective of enhancing safety, security and access to justice for the poor and marginalised will not be
achieved. Only by removing political opposition to broad based police reform will this critical mass be created.

Additionally, the compartmentalisation of UK efforts in the security and justice sector in Nigeria means that the
individual programmes and activities supported by the UK Government are less effective than they could be. SJG
and the defence-related component of UK support have operated without any strategic linkages, while their
effectiveness and impact have been limited to the types of opportunities for influence with the Nigerian
Government and how such opportunities have been managed.

The defence component of UK support to SJSR-related interventions in Nigeria targeted three main areas of
activity, including 1) Defence Review (DR), 2) Professionalisation, and 3) Training the Armed Forces of Nigeria
for Peace Support Operations. Although it is disappointing that to date there has been no pick-up by the Nigerians
on UK offers to assist with the conduct of a Defence Review, the assessment by the DA and Commander British
Defence Advisory Team (BDAT) that a defence review is needed appears valid. Accepting that in effect there is no
realistic chance of a DR getting off the ground at least until after the 2007 elections, the implied task for the
Defence Adviser (DA) and BDAT, working in the two other lines of activity, defence relations and peace support
operations training, is to continue to prepare the ground for possible Nigerian acceptance of a DR starting in
2007/8 is appropriate.

A strategic approach to SJSR in Nigeria – or indeed any country – might be expected to include:

- a sector wide, strategic framework to assist UK officials in prioritising their interventions (including
  consideration of how best to gain commitment to reform on the part of senior government officials
  at the federal and state levels)
- a strategy for maximising international community coherence, and
- a mechanism for coordinating the activities of different UK actors

The absence of a strategic approach to SJSR will, in the medium to long-term, reduce the impact of UK efforts in
this area. The team understands that sector wide SJSR is very hard to implement in a country such as Nigeria.
Nonetheless, such an approach is essential to maximise impact.

The coherence of the UK's SJSR programmes and activities in Nigeria is weakened at present by three main factors: the relatively lower priority accorded to SJSR by both the High Commission and DFID; the compartmentalisation of programmes and activities, both cross-departmentally and, to date, within DFID’s main SJSR programme, the SJG; and insufficient attention to finding cross-departmental synergy. UK officials have faced a number of serious difficulties in influencing senior officials at the federal level in Nigeria on security issues. This has led them to seek targets of opportunity within their own spheres of influence. Either because of this or because of general scepticism, they have not yet adopted a strategic approach to SJSR. Seeking targets of opportunity and a strategic approach are, however, not incompatible.

Sierra Leone

Since 1999, the UK Government has allocated a substantial amount of diplomatic, security and development assistance to Sierra Leone. The SJSR work in Sierra Leone has been the UK’s flagship programme and has significantly influenced how the UK Government has approached SJSR worldwide. UK SSR interventions since 2001 have been concerned with vital operational improvements to the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Sierra Leone Police infrastructure rehabilitation, and longer-term institutional development and reform efforts. In addition to the RSLAF and the SLP, the UK has worked closely with the Ministry of Defence, the Office of National Security (ONS) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU).

Over the period under examination, UK actors have progressively recognised the need to work more closely with the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Finance, Parliament, and civil society. They have also recognised the desirability of developing a sector wide approach.

There is a good measure of success in achieving coherence at Post. There has been an increasing coherence in the overall UK approach to SJSR in Sierra Leone. Initial discussions have taken place on how the existing security focused programmes and the Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) could better support each other with a view to linking all SJSR interventions into a consistent whole.

Overall, UK interventions have achieved a high level of effectiveness and this is highly visible. Interventions with RSLAF, MOD, ONS, CISU and SLP all seem to be achieving their objectives. All of these institutions were either non-existent or highly ineffective with very limited capacity before the start of the UK engagement in 1999/2000 and the official signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UK and the Sierra Leone government in 2002.

The outcome of the 2007 elections will set the direction that Sierra Leone will take in the medium term. The effectiveness and longer-term impact of UK interventions in the security sector will be conditioned by the willingness of the new government to move forward with a reform process.

While there is an understandable focus on how to work with the new government, there is also a question of how to interact with Sierra Leone stakeholders in the run up to the elections. It will be difficult to press for significant progress in SJSR prior to the elections. It may, however, be possible to engage with Sierra Leone stakeholders outside the executive, and the Country Team has plans to work more closely with the Parliament and civil society. Capacitating both of these is a long-term undertaking, and it is desirable to start as soon as possible to do so. Engaging new and emerging political actors and placing SJSR on the pre-electoral agenda will be useful in generating some interest and commitment from political office holders and the parliamentarians who emerge from the 2007 elections.

Progress in SJSR also critically depends on engaging government departments that do not have primary

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20 The SJSR work in Sierra Leone consists of IMATT, an SSR programme and a justice sector programme.
responsibility for security but whose remit affects the ability of the government to provide a secure environment for development. A particular concern in this regard is the Ministry of Finance, which was cited frequently in interviews conducted for this report as a major blockage to SJSR reform efforts. It will also be essential to help other development partners such as the World Bank and the IMF develop a more constructive approach to affordability in the security and justice sector.

Finally, progress in security and justice sector reform will depend critically on the ability to deepen the sense of ownership on the part of the Sierra Leone government, the security services and the people of Sierra Leone.

Overall there appears to be a growing coherence of HMG efforts in the security and justice sector. This increases the likelihood that individual interventions will be effective and that the longer-term impact of SJSR will be positive. A more integrated approach would enable critical gaps to be identified – both within the security and justice sector and between that sector and non security actors and institutions that must function effectively if the full benefits of SJSR are to be realised. The ongoing discussions about a mechanism to formalise linkages among the different parts of the security and justice sector and provide flexibility in determining financing priorities has the potential to increase the long-term impact of UK support to SJSR in Sierra Leone.
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ISBN: 1 86192 890 4