


# Joint Evaluation

## EVALUATION OF THE PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATION (PRS) FOR BURUNDIANS IN TANZANIA





# **Evaluation of the protracted refugee situation (PRS) for Burundians in Tanzania**

“We are now a branch on the tree called Tanzania”  
*(Headman, Katumba Settlement)*



Nordic Consulting Group

**October 2010**

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## Preface

In 2008, the High Commissioner (HC) launched a Special Initiative on Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) to promote durable solutions and improvements in the life of refugees in these situations.

The HC's Initiative focuses on five situations in different parts of the world where refugees have been living in exile for long periods of time. The initiative covered: the Croatian and Bosnian refugees in Serbia; the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh; the Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan; Burundian refugees in Tanzania; and Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

In 2010 UNHCR decided to evaluate the overall progress of the PRS Initiative. Due to an overlap in strategic interests, between Denmark and UNHCR, in evaluating the PRS initiative in Tanzania, a partnership agreement was established between the Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) in UNHCR and the Evaluation Department (EVAL) in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was agreed that the two evaluation departments would commission an independent joint evaluation of the protracted refugee situation initiative in Tanzania.

The Evaluation was carried out by team leader Anne-Lise Klausen from Nordic Consulting Group supported by independent Tanzanian consultant Grace Rwegoshora.

The Evaluation has been managed jointly by Gitte Robinson from EVAL and Maria Riiskjaer from PDES. In addition technical guidance has been provided by technical staff from the Department on Humanitarian Action and Regions of Origin Initiative in Danida. Yasuko Shimizu from OSTIS in UNHCR Geneva has acted as resource person and has provided technical support to the evaluation team.

PDES and Danida would like to thank the UNHCR office in Tanzania and Burundi, NGOs and government departments who assisted with the Evaluation. Special thanks go to the many newly naturalized Tanzanians who were willing to share their stories.

Jeff Crisp  
Policy Development & Evaluation Service  
UNHCR

Ole Winckler Andersen  
Evaluation Department  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Denmark

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## List of Abbreviations

<i>AGDM</i>	Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming
<i>BDI</i>	Burundi
<i>CCM</i>	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
<i>DAC</i>	Development Assistance Committee
<i>DaO</i>	UN Delivering as One
<i>DC</i>	District Commissioner
<i>DRC</i>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<i>DSA</i>	Daily Subsistence Allowance
<i>EAC</i>	The East African Community
<i>EVAL</i>	The Evaluation Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<i>ExCOM</i>	Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme
<i>FNL</i>	Forces Nationales de Libération
<i>GoT</i>	Government of Tanzania
<i>GTZ</i>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
<i>HC</i>	High Commissioner
<i>HQ</i>	Headquarters
<i>IBT</i>	Initial Budget Target
<i>JICA</i>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<i>JP</i>	Joint Project
<i>MoHA</i>	Ministry of Home Affairs
<i>NASCIP</i>	National Strategy for Community Integration
<i>NGO</i>	Non Governmental Organization
<i>NNT</i>	Newly Naturalized Tanzanians
<i>OECD</i>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<i>OPM</i>	The Office of the Prime Minister
<i>OS</i>	Old Settlements
<i>OSTF</i>	Old Settlements Task Force
<i>OSTS</i>	Operational Solutions and Transition Section
<i>PDES</i>	Policy Development and Evaluations Services
<i>PM</i>	Prime Minister
<i>PMO</i>	Prime Minister's Office
<i>PMO-RALG</i>	Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government
<i>PRS</i>	Protracted Refugee Situations
<i>TANCOSS</i>	Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
<i>ToR</i>	Terms of Reference
<i>UBU</i>	Umugambwe w'Abakozi b'Uburundi or Burundi Workers' Party
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNDP</i>	United Nations Development Programme
<i>UNDAF</i>	United Nation Development Assistance Framework
<i>UNDAP</i>	United Nations Development Assistance Plan
<i>UNEG</i>	United Nations Evaluation Group
<i>UNHCR</i>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<i>UNICEF</i>	United Nations Children's Fund
<i>UNIDO</i>	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
<i>USAID</i>	United States Agency for International Development
<i>WFP</i>	World Food Programme

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# Executive Summary

## Background

In 2008, the High Commissioner for Refugees (HC) launched a Special Initiative on Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) to promote durable solutions and improvements in the life of these refugees. The HC's initiative focused on five situations in different parts of the world, four of which have been selected for evaluation: the Croatian refugees in Serbia; the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh; the Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan; and the Burundian refugees in Tanzania. The four evaluations aim to assess how effectively UNHCR has exercised its mandate and the catalytic role performed in engaging other players in seeking durable solutions, as well as the progress UNHCR has made in improving the quality of life for the refugees. The evaluations also aim to identify examples of good practice, innovative approaches and lessons learned.

In addition to the stated aims above, the Evaluation of the Tanzania PRS assesses: i) the relevance and appropriateness of the strategies to refugees themselves, to host communities, and to national and local governments; ii) the effectiveness of the strategies pursued for Burundian refugees in Tanzania as well as the role of UNHCR in supporting these; iii) UNHCR engagement through the UN Delivering as One (DaO) reform process to which Tanzania is a pilot country; and finally iv) links between short-term humanitarian activities and the medium- and longer-term development activities.

The Evaluation is a joint effort of the Danish Government (the Evaluation Department in Danida) and UNHCR (the Policy Department and Evaluation Service). The Evaluation was conducted between May and October 2010 with fieldwork carried out in Tanzania between 4<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> June 2010.

The report starts with a descriptive account of the operational context and an analysis of the comprehensive solutions strategy, TANCOS, and its three pillars. This is followed by an assessment of the role of UNHCR and the role of the High Commissioner's Special Initiative on PRS in the planning and implementation of the strategy. The analyses are then assessed against selected key OECD/DAC evaluation criteria followed by some lessons to be learned from the Tanzanian PRS.

## Operational context

The protracted refugee situation in Tanzania concerns the 160,000 Burundian refugees who arrived in 1972 and who had increased to approximately 220,000 by 2007. The Government of Tanzania had welcomed them as guests of the country, and gave them plots of land in three settlement areas in the Tabora and Rukwa Regions. These circumstances gave the refugees an opportunity to re-establish their rural livelihoods and live in a non-camp environment. Over the years they achieved economic self-sufficiency and became socially accepted in the host communities to whom they were ethnically and linguistically affiliated. Through education they also adopted a Tanzanian way of life.

In 2006, the Government raised the issue of their future and requested UNHCR, which had not been present in the settlements since 1985, to re-engage.

The circumstances of the 1972 group are not comparable to the situation of later waves of refugees. The approximately 340,000 Burundians, who fled to Tanzania in 1993, have lived in camps throughout their stay.

### **The Tanzania comprehensive solutions strategy (TANCOSS)**

TANCOSS, which specifically covered the 1972 group of Burundian refugees, was developed at the end of 2007 on the basis of a census, a registration exercise and a socio-economic study conducted in the settlements. Institutionally, the strategy was conceived in the setting of the tripartite cooperation between the Governments of Tanzania and Burundi and UNHCR. In 2007, as part of the planning process, the refugees were asked about their future wishes and intentions. Approximately 20% wished to repatriate and 80% to be naturalised as Tanzanian citizens. With regard to the naturalisation option there was a clause in the survey questions explaining that those who opted for naturalisation would have to agree to spread out, relocate and be integrated in communities elsewhere in Tanzania, as the Government intended to close the settlements. On this background, TANCOSS was formulated with three Pillars:

- Voluntary repatriation and reintegration in Burundi (*Pillar 1*);
- Naturalisation (*Pillar 2*);
- Full integration of the newly naturalised citizens (*Pillar 3*).

Implementation was planned to take place between January 2008 and December 2009 but has since been extended up to 2014.

### **Motivation for the strategy**

The broader motivation behind TANCOSS can be found in the Tanzanian Government policies aiming at becoming a refugee free zone, coupled with the advancing peace process in Burundi after 2000.

The motivation for the exceptional offer of naturalisation is linked to Government policies at the time of the refugees' arrival as well as to the experience gained with regard to co-existence, the refugees' economic contribution and the ethnic affiliation of the refugees with the host population. Commitment of high-level decision makers in the Government also played an instrumental role in offering naturalisation. Another motivating factor was the Tanzanian leadership's analysis of the larger political and security context in the Great Lakes region, where a return of all the refugees could potentially lead to security problems in Burundi and result in another wave of refugees coming back into Tanzania.

With regard to *Pillar 3*, the Government was of the view that a solution should be sought to avoid a Burundian enclave and that the group should be integrated in Tanzanian communities. Some interviews suggested that the Government was planning to use the land, being scarce state land, for commercial agricultural purposes.

## Implementation

The implementation of the repatriation to Burundi, part of *Pillar 1*, was relatively smooth and issues arising, such as underestimation of allowances and the cash grant, were swiftly solved. However, with regard to reintegration in Burundi, the second part of *Pillar 1*, the achievements seem to fall short of expectations. In general, Burundian refugees appear to have had difficulties in reintegration and the 1972 group has faced particular problems, because of their length of absence. They had lost their right to land, whilst family and cultural ties had weakened. The complications of settling these returnees appear to have been underestimated by UNHCR.

Naturalisation (*Pillar 2*) was the preferred option by most of the refugees, and was indeed an extraordinary step taken by a government towards solving a protracted refugee situation. Initially, the naturalisation process was planned as a “fast track” procedure involving mass naturalisation by decree. In the course of implementation the Government changed this to an “expedite” procedure, which follows the country’s general processes for individual naturalisation but with some steps being modernised and expedited. The modernisation (digitalisation) of procedures included a major capacity building exercise of officials and change of work processes in the immigration department.

The naturalisation process came to a halt in April 2010, when the Government announced the granting of citizenship on the one hand and on the other hand made it clear that citizen certificates would not be issued until the newly naturalised Tanzanians (NNTs) have been relocated (*Pillar 3*). *Pillar 2* is therefore likely to be completed at an unknown point in time. This decision has created frustration among the NNTs.

A strategy document for *Pillar 3* was finally launched at the end of June 2010. The document lists the areas to receive the NNTs, divides the total group into three segments according to their needs for assistance and protection and outlines a considerable support package. The strategy is, however, vague on the criteria defining the size of groups and who goes where and when and at which point in time and how the NNTs will receive their citizen certificates.

The Evaluation is of the view that relocation and in particular the local integration part of *Pillar 3* could become the most difficult part of the comprehensive solutions strategy to implement. The achievement of local integration depends both on a dignified relocation and suitable settlement conditions for the families as well as the proper reception by local governments and social acceptance by host communities. In a worst case scenario the strategy’s credibility, relevance and appropriateness could be questioned if the unresolved issues are not solved at the start of implementation and done so with adherence to the rights of the refugees.

## The role of the High Commissioner’s Special Initiative

The HC’s Special Initiative was launched in the first quarter of 2008, i.e. a few months after TANCOS. TANCOS is likely to have been implemented without the contribution of the Special Initiative, but the initiative, nevertheless, played a facilitating role in the initial stages of strategy implementation. High-level missions by the High Commissioner and Assistant High Commissioner helped to build a bridge of trust and support to the Government of Tanzania, and the Tanzanian Prime Minister’s participation in the

Dialogue Meeting on PRS held in Geneva in December 2008 is a case in point of this cooperation.

### **Internal coordination in UNHCR**

Different stakeholders were of the view that internal coordination in UNHCR had worked relatively well throughout implementation, at least along vertical lines: field, country office, and headquarters. Nevertheless, the Evaluation would suggest that the apparent reintegration problems in Burundi could have been lessened, had UNHCR coordination between Burundi and Tanzania offices been stronger. The UNHCR country offices seem to work more in support of each country's national interest, rather than fully assessing the situation in a regional perspective.

### **Partnerships**

The central role of partnerships, especially cooperation with non-humanitarian partners is highlighted in the HC's Special Initiative on PRS which states that development related activities are central to viable management of protracted refugee situations, and that there is a need to engage with less traditional actors (i.e. humanitarian actors) in the search for solutions. This has been accomplished in the case of TANCOSS and UNHCR played an instrumental and catalytic role in engaging the different stakeholders and moving TANCOSS forward. Manager and 'energiser' of the different partnerships was the label put on the role of UNHCR.

### **The Role of UN Delivering as One**

UNHCR is committed to work through the UN Delivering as One (UN DaO) to which Tanzania is a pilot country. *Pillar 3* of the strategy will be implemented under these auspices and is included in the United Nations Development Assistance Plan. In this way it will be brought into the planning system of Government. Experience from a joint pilot project on "Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Sustainable Development" is not encouraging. The common approach and cooperation between the UN agencies have been difficult and implementation has been seriously delayed, both because of bureaucratic hurdles and internal difficulties among the UN organizations, as well as constraints in the government system. The teething problems of the pilot initiative will not necessarily continue in the implementation of *Pillar 3*, but there is some hesitation expressed in the strategy and within UNHCR of having UN Delivering as One taking the lead on *Pillar 3*.

### **Relevance and appropriateness**

The DAC criterion of relevance asks for an assessment of the validity of the objectives for the consistency of the internal logic of a programme (in this case the strategy) including the logic of the intended impacts and benefits. Appropriateness (a criterion especially added in evaluation of humanitarian assistance) refers to the tailoring of humanitarian activities for example to local needs and increased ownership.

The unique historical context has been the main determinant in the offer of a durable solution for the Burundians. The design of the strategy has at a general level been in accordance with UNHCR's mandate under its statute to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees and in the broader geopolitical context, the peace process in Burundi had advanced to the extent that the repatriation to Burundi was relevant.

The repatriation from the settlements appears to have been conducted in an appropriate manner and practical problems have been solved rather swiftly. However, the appropriateness support provided to the reintegration process in Burundi is of concern given the underestimation of the special conditions and needs of the 1972 group.

The naturalisation (*Pillar 2*) was a relevant gesture from Tanzania, given the affiliation of the refugees to the country and the wish by 80% of the settlement population to become Tanzanian citizens. The implementation of the naturalisation process has been both relevant and appropriate because the naturalisation process was handled as an individual process thus minimizing potential legal problems downstream, instead of by decree, treating the refugees as a collective group. The implementation was also appropriate because it included modernisation (digitalisation) and capacity building of the immigration authorities.

In relation to *Pillar 3* the relevance of forcing relocation of NNTs should be questioned, who for a large part, prior to the strategy, appeared to be well integrated with viable livelihoods, housing and interaction with Tanzanian society. Furthermore, the linking of naturalisation (*Pillar 2*) and relocation (the initial step of *Pillar 3*) raises concern from a rights perspective. It is noted that although it has been well known throughout the implementation of TANCOS that relocation was a condition for citizenship it was only after April 2010, when the citizenship certificates were withheld that civil society and some observers raised the rights issue more widely.

The strategy for *Pillar 3*, published in June 2010, takes on a broad partnership approach and envisages the implementation to be in the hands of the Government and UN DaO with UNHCR playing a role in monitoring the protection needs. These aspects of the strategy are relevant, but the timing and conditions for the issuance of citizen certificates are unclear in the strategy document, which unless made clear in the upcoming plan of operation could question the appropriateness of the strategy.

## **Coordination**

The Evaluation has found that the engagement of UNHCR including the HC's special initiative have been well coordinated with the efforts of the Government of Tanzania to develop and implement TANCOS. It is however suggested that if UNHCR had taken a regional approach instead of a "two country office approach", there would have been a more appropriate and realistic assessment of the absorption capacity in Burundi at hand.

NGOs have been working with UNHCR in implementation. In the case of repatriation and naturalisation these partnerships were reported by the parties involved to have worked well. However, there was also some frustration in the group of partners who felt that their knowledge and insights could be better utilised by UNHCR. It was indicated that UNHCR has a top down approach rather than a partnership approach, and does not sufficiently value the skills and knowledge of the implementing partners.

### Connectedness

The repatriation from the settlements to Burundi was a short-term humanitarian type activity but with a profound link to longer-term development, i.e. the reintegration of the returnees. In a nutshell this is the content of the connectedness criterion. It was found that this situation has not yet materialised because of the reintegration problems, while it is recognised that following the problems for returnees, UNHCR has worked with the Burundi Government, UNDP and other organizations to mitigate the situation. Naturalisation is by nature a long-term development measure and the introduction of the expedite procedures have underlined this.

### Effectiveness

Effectiveness is understood as an assessment of whether the objectives were achieved or are likely to be achieved based on the planned outputs, as well as major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement. With regard to *Pillar 1*, the logistics of moving a large number of families and their belongings, was accomplished in an effective manner. However, the tasks and challenges of reintegration appear to have been underestimated both in the planning (including information available and given to the families) as well as in implementation in Burundi, having said that UNHCR has continuously reacted to problems arising and engaged in the seeking solutions.

The naturalisation process of *Pillar 2* was effective and UNHCR took on the challenge of assisting the Government of Tanzania with the comprehensive expedite naturalisation process. UNHCR was instrumental in adjustments and setting up the logistics, so the process could be effectively implemented. Furthermore, UNHCR managed to play a successful role in diffusing resistance to naturalisation among local authorities and police and immigration officers, and striking a balance between mitigating xenophobia towards refugees and identifying positive spin-offs. Nevertheless, the non-issuance of citizen certificates questions the overall effectiveness and shows that effectiveness is hampered, when political issues are at play.

With regard to *Pillar 3*, it could be foreseen that if the NNTs have to spend considerable time in their new locations, before they “qualify” to receive their certificates, they would continue to have a semi refugee status. There could also be other factors, which could erode the potential achievement of long-term and sustainable livelihoods. Such factors include difficulties in acquiring land, poor quality of land, social exclusion and insufficient funding to fully implement what is envisaged. Such potential risks are flagged by the Evaluation but obviously it is premature to draw conclusions.

### Impact

The Evaluation was told that there are economic benefits of repatriation to the receiving communities in Burundi. The returnees are described as an injection of a productive, skilled and self-sufficient agricultural and trading labour force into a depressed and resource scarce society. At the same time, the group of 1972 returnees to Burundi appears, as mentioned, to struggle themselves because of the considerable problems they face in setting up sustainable livelihoods.

In Tanzania the community representatives in the vicinity of the settlements (host communities) found that closing of the settlements could lead to a reduction in produce flowing to the local markets, a decline of social services and a reduction of tax revenues in the respective districts. Such sentiments are backed by the findings of a research project carried out at the University of Dar es Salaam in North-western Tanzania, which found that the positive impacts of refugee presence outweigh the negative impacts.

Naturalisation (*Pillar 2*) could both have positive and negative impacts on refugees and host communities. It was said that, once the NNTs have their certificates, their options should be equal to others, including access to education and employment opportunities.

The expectations of *Pillar 3* are based on the interviews with NNTs, who did not have much information on what was going to happen. Their views were that relocation and local integration could lead to loss of family ties, traditions and culture and have negative economic consequences, if they were not able to access adequate land in the new location. For some people relocation was seen as an opportunity to move on, with UNHCR staff mentioning that young persons expected to leave farming and go to town once they have relocated and received their certificates.

## Lessons learned

Several lessons can be drawn from the Tanzanian experience. The lessons do not claim to be universal in scope but should only be seen as sources of inspiration for other UNHCR offices and governments facing similar challenges:

*Strong commitment of top-level officials in the Tanzanian Government.* The Government was the driving force and played a crucial role in shaping durable solutions for the protracted refugee situation. Finding durable solutions to refugee situations can only be achieved if governments are driving the process and are supportive – i.e. political will and leadership is key.

*Appropriate timing.* The implementation of a durable solutions strategy in Tanzania illustrates that several factors have to be in place in order to move forward. The ongoing peace process in Burundi and the political will to find durable solutions both from the Burundian and the Tanzanian Government created a window of opportunity to draw up the strategy and embark on implementation. Repatriation is only possible if there is peace and stability in the country of origin, and naturalisation is only possible if the political will is present in the host country.

*Presence of a UNHCR country team with strong networking and engagement skills.* This point was reiterated again and again in interviews and was found to be crucial in initiating the discussions with the Tanzanian Government and in reaching an agreement for the Burundian refugees. The staff configuration seems to have been incidental rather than strategic. In the future, UNHCR could consider applying a more systematic deployment of staff members with professional experience in acting as “catalysts” to find solutions in protracted refugee situations.

*Need for a regional approach by UNHCR.* A regional approach instead of a “two country office approach” with the particular perspectives of national policies could have led

to a more appropriate and realistic assessment of the absorption capacity in Burundi. UNHCR's advocacy role could also have been more balanced than was the case.

*The importance of undertaking a thorough contextual analysis.* It is proposed (without having analysed the Burundi operation first hand) that the reintegration difficulties in Burundi could have been better assessed and analysed beforehand, if the coordination had been stronger. The situation in Tanzania was well studied but the reintegration problems appear to have been underestimated. UNHCR's catalytic role in the process could have been more balanced if the situation and in particular the constraints of reintegration in Burundi, had been thoroughly analysed and advocacy for a durable solution had been based on a fuller picture.

*The need to carefully assess when a durable solution has actually been successfully accomplished.* TANCOS is already being communicated as a success story, although the most difficult steps are still ahead. Politicisation of the strategy and delays associated with this could jeopardise the completion of the strategy with the unfortunate end result that the expected solution is not durable. This would have disastrous consequences and turn an existing durable solution – experienced by the 1972 group of refugees having lived in the settlements in Tanzania for about 40 years, into a situation resembling internal displacement.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Evaluation setting and focus

This Evaluation of the protracted refugee situation in Tanzania is part of a broader evaluation initiative of four evaluations undertaken by UNHCR. In 2008, the High Commissioner (HC) launched a Special Initiative on Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) to promote durable solutions and improvements in the life of refugees in these situations. The initiative aims to address the appalling global refugee situation, described by UNHCR as *“unacceptably high. According to the latest available statistics, some 5.2 million of the world’s refugees have been living in exile for more than five years”*<sup>1</sup>. The initiative was also motivated *“by the fact that long-term refugee situations have a variety of seriously prejudicial consequences. Many refugees caught up in these situations live in remote and insecure areas, with limited opportunities to move around, or to have access to land, the labour market and educational opportunities. It is unsurprising that, as one result, protracted refugee situations are often characterized by personal trauma, social tension, sexual violence and negative survival strategies”*<sup>2</sup>. The HC’s initiative aimed to capitalise on emerging new opportunities for solutions. Set to this background the initiative focuses on five situations in different parts of the world where refugees have been living in exile for long periods of time. At the launch in 2008, a commitment to “review the overall progress of the PRS Initiative and report on its findings and recommendations in 2010” was also made<sup>3</sup>.

The four evaluations have common aims, i.e. to assess how effectively UNHCR has exercised its mandate in finding durable solutions for refugees, to determine whether the search for solutions has been consistent with UNHCR’s protection mandate, to examine the catalytic role UNHCR has played in engaging other players in the resolution of the refugee situation, to assess the progress UNHCR has made in improving the quality of life for the refugees and to identify examples of good practice, innovative approaches and lessons learned.

## 1.2 Background and objective of the Tanzania PRS Evaluation

The protracted refugee situation in Tanzania concerns the Burundian refugees, who arrived in 1972 and the Evaluation covers the implementation of the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS) for this group of refugees. The strategy includes, voluntary repatriation and reintegration in Burundi (Pillar 1), naturalisation i.e. granting of Tanzanian citizenship (Pillar 2) and full integration, i.e. relocation and local integration of the newly naturalised citizens (Pillar 3).

The Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of the Tanzania PRS build on the generic Terms of Reference introduced above. In addition the focus is on the catalytic role UNHCR has played by engaging through the UN Delivering as One (DaO) process – to which Tanzania is a pilot country, the relevance and appropriateness of the strategies to refugees themselves and to other relevant stakeholders such as host communities, the

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- 1) Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme: Standing Committee, 42<sup>nd</sup> meeting: 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2008, p 2, (paragraph 10).
  - 2) Ibid p 3, (paragraph 12).
  - 3) Ibid p 8, (paragraph 31).

local and national government and finally the link between short- and medium-term activities and objectives of repatriation and integration strategies on one hand, and longer term development goals on the other<sup>4</sup>. The Tanzania Terms of Reference have extensive requirements on the methodology to be applied and explicitly include selected OECD-DAC evaluation criteria. The generic Terms of Reference however resemble more of a review of progress, as indeed seems also to be the ambition stated at the launch of the PRS initiative in 2008<sup>5</sup>.

### 1.3 Structure of the report

The report has been organized as follows: The evaluation methodology is presented in Chapter 2, a snapshot of the historical context and an overview of refugee policies and asylum climate in Tanzania is described in Chapter 3, followed by an assessment of the strategic framework, its motivation and the catalytic role of UNHCR in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is an assessment of the implementation of the strategy and the role of UNHCR in implementation including an assessment of the internal coordination and staffing in UNHCR. Chapter 6 discusses the role of partnerships and the potential role of UN Delivering as One (DaO). Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7 by assessing the TANCOS initiative as well as the role of UNHCR against selected OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of particular relevance to this Evaluation. The chapter also offers the Evaluation's proposal of lessons learned, which could have wider applicability.

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4) The ToR for the Evaluation are included as Annex 1.

5) Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme: Standing Committee, 42<sup>nd</sup> meeting: 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2008, p 82, (paragraph 31)

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## 2 Methodology

This chapter provides a brief overview of the methodology. The chapter is supported by annexes, of which Annex 2 includes a list of interviewees and a narrative on the interview process. Annex 3 contains a list of documents, including a discussion on data sources informing the Evaluation on the reintegration of the refugees in Burundi, and Annex 4 presents the itinerary of the fieldwork of the Evaluation.

### 2.1 Evaluation questions

The Evaluation asks nine main questions with a number of sub-questions attached to the main questions. In total the Evaluation poses 39 questions, some of which were found to be overlapping. A regrouping of the questions was done in order to establish coherence in the work process and in the reporting.

### 2.2 Evaluation criteria

The Evaluation applies the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness and partly impact. The methodology also adds the supportive criteria developed for evaluating humanitarian action in complex emergencies, i.e. appropriateness (tied to the relevance criterion), coordination and connectedness. The latter refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and inter-connected problems into account.

The application of the evaluation criteria is not uniform across the strategy, because of the different stages of implementation: Pillar 1, regarding voluntary repatriation to Burundi, has been completed (only a small group remains to be expatriated), however, the reintegration in Burundi is still ongoing. In Pillar 2, naturalisation, most processes have been completed, except for the final step of handing over the citizen certificates. This action is tied to the implementation of Pillar 3, dealing with the relocation from the settlements to selected areas and the local integration of the newly naturalised Tanzanians (NNTs) into “new” communities, which has not yet started.

### 2.3 Data sources and methods

The Evaluation is based on a combination of methods including a desk review of relevant documents. The documents consulted include official documents (of the Government of Tanzania and UNHCR), internal UNHCR documents, studies related to implementation, academic research, NGO blogs, articles and statements. As the fieldwork only included Tanzania, written documentation on “the impact on the lives” of the 1972 refugees, repatriated to Burundi, has been used. This includes consultancy and study reports, as well as UNHCR reports (see Annex 3 for more details).

The Evaluation has applied a methodology of validation by triangulation. The aim has been to have three sources of information for all questions asked (at times combining written documentation with interviews and at times triangulating interviews of different stakehold-

ers). The use of historic data sources and independent research aims to broaden perspectives and to qualify and strengthen the validity of the viewpoints in the Evaluation.

Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders (refugees, host communities, local authorities, national authorities and UNHCR). NGOs/think tanks and international development partners' country missions were also interviewed (see Annex 2 for further details). The Evaluation visited Mtabila camp (hosting 1993 refugees) and Katumba settlement (NNTs of the 1972 group of refugees), and one of the project sites of the UN DaO pilot programme (Joint Project (JP) 6.1).

### 2.4 Limitations

There is lack of clarity in the Terms of Reference with regard to the assessment of the Burundian refugee group of 1993. These refugees have been repatriated in waves since 2002, and some of them simultaneously with the 1972 group of refugees. However, the 1993 group is not included in TANCROSS. The Evaluation therefore discusses this group as a reference point for the comprehensive solution offered to the 1972 refugees, but does not cover their repatriation.

It has been time consuming and a point of frustration for the Evaluation that TANCROSS – the most central document of the Evaluation – was found in (at least) four versions, all said to be **the** TANCROSS. One version was made available at the start of the fieldwork, while others appeared during the fieldwork and one version afterwards. The versions are not markedly different from each other in substance. However, length, wordings, level of details, and time of issue of the documents differ enough to have created confusion. In this report the four versions used, are referred to as TANCROSS I, II, III, IV.

Written sources – in combination with interviews – have enabled the Evaluation to cover most aspects of the ToR. However, the coverage of the reintegration in Burundi (Pillar 1) is limited, as the Evaluation did not travel to Burundi.

It was anticipated that the visit to Mtabila camp in Kabuli District (hosting the residual group of 1993 refugees) would be a proxy to inform the Evaluation of the situation of the 1972 refugees prior to repatriation. However, the situation and circumstances of the two groups differ so much, that parallels cannot be drawn. Having said that, the visit to Mtabila camp exposed the different situations of the two refugee groups and gave a perspective on the uniqueness of TANCROSS and the offer given to the 1972 refugee group<sup>6</sup>.

Another point to note is the fielding of the Evaluation in the middle of strategy implementation (TANCROSS now runs from 2008 to 2014), but already is most UNHCR staff involved in the conceptualisation of TANCROSS was no longer posted in Tanzania. Only a few staff had been involved in the repatriation (Pillar 1) and in the naturalisation processes (Pillar 2), the same can be said about the international development partners. The strategy for Pillar 3 was not available during the fieldwork, which limits the analysis of Pillar 3. Lastly, the Evaluation did not interview senior level decision makers in the Tanzanian Government. Such interviews would have enabled a more in depth assessment of the role of the HC's Special Initiative.

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6) There are a number of camp-based refugees originating from the 1972 group. They re-entered Tanzania in the 1990s, following multiple displacements, mainly via Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, but some also through Uganda (information from UNHCR field staff in Kasulu).

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## 3 The operational context

This chapter includes a short analytical overview of the operational context. The historical setting is paramount in explaining the particular solutions offered to the 1972 group of refugees. The chapter also gives a brief overview of Tanzania's refugee policies and asylum climate.

### 3.1 Tanzania – host to a large number of Burundian refugees

Tanzania's proximity to refugee generating countries has made the country highly susceptible to large influxes of refugees and since the 1960s large refugee populations have been hosted. The refugees have mainly come from Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Burundians have over time been the largest number of refugees in Tanzania. It was common practice to cross the border and settle in villages and designated settlements in Tanzania without going through formalised asylum procedures and therefore without receiving documents confirming their status. This was also the case with the 160,000 Burundians who arrived in Tanzania in 1972<sup>7</sup>.

A second wave of refugees arrived in the early and mid nineties. They constituted the large influxes of refugees following the unprecedented civil strife and killings, which took place in Burundi in 1992/93 and in Rwanda a year later.

### 3.2 Tanzania's reception and approach to the 1972 Burundian refugees

The conflict that started the displacement in Burundi in 1972 escalated because an ethnic Hutu organization attacked ethnic Tutsi with the declared intent of annihilating the whole group. This genocide against the Tutsi was responded to by large-scale reprisals by the Government (Tutsi dominated). The total number of casualties was never established, but estimates for both the Tutsi genocide and the reprisals on the Hutus are said to exceed 100,000<sup>8</sup>.

The majority of the Burundians were settled in planned villages in Ulyankulu in Tabora Region and in Katumba and Mishamo in Rukwa Region (often called the "Old Settlements"). Some (today they are counted at 24,000) were given permits to reside in villages in Kigoma Region. In the three settlements each family was allocated about five and some up to ten hectares of land. Initially the refugees received financial assistance from UNHCR<sup>9</sup> and with the assistance of the international community, core infrastructure such as roads, water points, school buildings, dispensaries and administrative centres were

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7) Rutinwa, Bonaventure: *Addressing Irregular Settlement in North Western Tanzania: A legal and Protection Perspective*. International Migration management Project Working Paper No 1. March 2010. p 28.

8) Three main sources have been used in this section: Rutinwa, (March 2010); Milner, James: *Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa – Chapter 6 on Tanzania*, Palgrave Macmillan Press, December 2009.

Milner (2009) and Sundar, Chaulia Sreeram: *The politics of Refugee Hosting in Tanzania: From Open Door to Unsustainability, Insecurity and Receding Receptivity*. Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol 16, No 2, 2003. Sundar's work has particularly informed the earlier periods described in this section.

9) UNHCR Fact Sheets.

established. By 1985, the 1972 Burundian refugees had become agriculturally independent and were returning significant taxes to the host districts, which in turn continued to provide basic services such as health care and education. The settlements were placed under full government administration in 1985 and material assistance by UNHCR and its partners was terminated. There have been restrictions of movement outside the settlement throughout, and higher education was almost impossible to access until about 1990. However, overall the situation was one of acceptance and peaceful living within the regions of settlement<sup>10</sup>.

Researchers see the political context and the Government's openness combined with the features of permanence, such as access to land and the education system, which were arranged soon after their arrival, as key factors leading to Tanzania offering the group naturalisation. Milner notes that Tanzania's village settlement ("ujamaa") policies were announced in 1973, more or less the same time as the arrival of the Burundian refugees, and the cordial reception granted to the refugees was part of this political philosophy. Milner also quotes other research, which has found that the Government's response included an element of a strategy to develop agriculture and human settlement in remote areas. The Government encouraged the production of cash crops, such as coffee and tobacco and in this way the arrival of the Burundians, known as skilled agriculturalists, was a blessing. The refugee settlements were also "expected" to attract development funding for the infrastructure and services to these remote areas. Right from the start the children of the settlement followed the Tanzanian school curriculum, and Swahili was thereby introduced as the main language. This also spurred integration.

Zarjevski (quoted by Milner) finds that: "From the start, the settlement of refugees in Tanzania was guided by the concepts of permanence and productivity, stemming, no doubt, from the principles on which Julius Nyerere hoped to develop his country"<sup>11</sup>. Rutinwa, in a broader perspective, explains how "in the early years of Independence, the Government took a relatively laissez-faire approach to the presence in the country of aliens from neighbouring countries"<sup>12</sup>. Host communities, headmen in the Katumba settlement, and UNHCR field staff in Mpanda informed the Evaluation that ethnic affiliation, ("we are like cousins" as remarked by a headman), as well as the understanding of each other's mother tongue had been important factors promoting acceptance and integration in the local areas.

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10) Interviews with host communities, UNHCR staff, and MoHA.


11) Milner (2009), p 110.

12) Rutinwa (March 2010), p 5 and 11.


**Figure 3.1 Economic contribution – 35 years later**

As an illustration of the contribution of the 1972 Burundian refugees to the local economy, the socio-economic survey conducted at the end of 2007 confirmed that the expectations of the economic contribution some 30 years earlier had been valid. The pie charts show the contributions of the settlements in relation to the land area held and in relation to their relative size of the total district population. The charts from the survey are self-explanatory and confirm the positive contributions of the settlements to the local economy – and the tax base.

**Productivity in Urambo District by land area, population and agricultural output**



**Productivity in Mpanda District by land area, population and agricultural output**



SA3 Ltd: Study of Tanzania's Old Settlements Hosting the 1972 Burundian Refugees (December 2007)

**3.3 The 1993 Burundian refugees**

In 1993, due to ethnic conflicts in Burundi, another major influx of refugees (about 340,000) arrived in Tanzania. Burundians have over time been the largest number of refugees in Tanzania.

From 2000 onwards, with the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement<sup>13</sup>, peace and stability started to return to Burundi. In 2002 an organized repatria-

13) [www.issafrika.org/AF/profiles/Burundi/Arusha/pdf](http://www.issafrika.org/AF/profiles/Burundi/Arusha/pdf).

tion programme started for this group, who by then had lived in camps for about ten years. Today, about 35,000 remain in Mtabila camp in Kasulu District. Although the camp was officially closed in June 2009, it continues to operate because of the refugees refusing voluntary resettlement. All formal education facilities in the camp have been closed down, but since June 2010 an agreement with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) to carry out non-formal education activities has been in place. The school closures have spurred social problems and subsequent questions of whether the situation adheres to human rights standards.

#### 3.4 Refugee policy periods from independence to the present

Researchers find that Tanzanian refugee policies generally fall into three distinct periods from Independence to the present. The first period was from 1962 to 1985, when the refugee policies were integral to the pan-African policies under President Nyerere. During this period the policy towards refugees and the asylum climate was open and welcoming. The second period came in 1985 with the economic disarray and the end of President Nyerere's presidency. This policy period lasted a decade. When President Mwinyi started his term as President in 1985, he embarked on the Economic Recovery Programme, which was associated with a number of hard felt measures aimed at reducing public spending<sup>14</sup>. Scarcity of resources is said to be one important factor leading to more restrictive refugee policies. The public position in Tanzania became less open towards refugees and internationally Tanzanian ministers also requested a greater burden sharing. Milner refers to Amnesty International reporting in 1990, which talks about 'the hardening of attitudes towards refugees from Burundi'<sup>15</sup>. Such was the political situation, which met almost one million refugees who came to Tanzania in the early 1990s, at the time of the Great Lakes crisis and the enormous displacements in the region.

This influx resulted in a further change in asylum climate and refugee policies in 1995, which marks the start of the third period of refugee policies. The first signal of the third period came when the Government closed its border with Burundi. In 1996 it was announced that all Rwandan refugees should leave the country by the end of that year. Milner explains the change in Tanzanian policy in 1995-96 with the magnitude of the influx, but he also sees the changed environment as a consequence of the introduction of multi-partyism. With this came a change in political culture and a focus on internal security as a result of the large number of refugees, coupled with lack of international support to deal with the problem<sup>16</sup>. In 1996, a new Government was sworn in, and with President Mkapa coming to office the anti-refugee rhetoric became common in the public domain. The Government's foreign policy emphasised good relations with all neighbouring countries irrespective of the nature of their policies and behaviour towards citizens.

By 1997 Tanzania was hosting 570,000 refugees, this number included the 1972 Burundians as well as a large group of Burundians who had arrived in 1993. Human Rights Watch noted, according to Milner, that refugees were considered a security threat and they were rounded up and told to remain in the settlements and in the camps. In 1998, Tanzania passed restrictive refugee legislation. A tough approach was taken especially towards Burundians and the Tanzania military issued an order that all Burundians in-

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14) Milner (2009) p 115.

15) Ibid p 116.

16) Ibid p 118.

cluding those who had arrived in 1972 should be moved to camps<sup>17</sup>. This was not implemented, but Tanzania increasingly pressed for repatriation of the refugees. UNHCR did not immediately agree to repatriation, because of unrest and insecurity in some parts of Burundi but eventually recommended voluntary repatriation.

In 2003 Tanzania issued a National Refugee Policy, which restricted movements for refugees in camps and limited economic activity. This increased the hardships for refugees, who then had limited livelihood possibilities. In the last five years the Government has pushed for the implementation of Tanzania as a refugee free zone. Since 2002, a total of 363,000 Burundians from the camps were repatriated with UNHCR assistance. In addition UNHCR repatriated 53,000 refugees from the Old Settlements (in 2008 and 2009). Nevertheless, the statistics in Table 3.1 show that Burundians also today, both camped and naturalised, constitute a large share of ‘persons of concern’ for UNHCR.

**Table 3.1 Persons of concern to UNHCR in Tanzania in 2010**

Type of Population	Origin	Total	Of whom assisted by UNHCR	Per cent female	Per cent under 18
Refugees	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	63,300	63,300	52	59
	Burundi	53,800	53,800	46	65
	Somalia	1,400	1,400	62	57
	Various	190	190	50	43
Asylum-seekers	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	800	800	50	55
	Various	60	60	55	45
Others of concern	Naturalised Burundian refugees (NNTs)	155,100	155,100	-	-
<b>Total</b>		<b>274,650</b>	<b>274,650</b>		

Source: UNHCR Fact Sheet, Tanzania.

Efforts to promote regional cooperation in seeking durable solutions are increasingly coming into focus. In March 2010, UNHCR and the East African Community (EAC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the aim of establishing an operational framework to protect “forcibly displaced people” and promote coordination around the regulatory regimes affecting inter alia the movement of persons, immigration and refugee management<sup>18</sup>, work permits and visas. There is a five-year regionalisation scheme of freedom of movement in the EAC, and the Memorandum of Understanding should be seen in light of the general efforts to ease movement across the borders among the EAC member countries in areas such as visa free zones, residence and work. It was suggested in an interview that the deployment of a UNHCR member of staff at the EAC Secretariat in Arusha could be instrumental in placing emphasis on protection issues and building capacity in this respect at the EAC, thereby implementing the Memorandum of Understanding<sup>19</sup>. It appears (from interviews) that the role of the EAC and therefore the regional perspective towards refugee policies and asylum climate is playing an increasing role in Tanzania.

17) Ibid p 121.

18) Joint press release UNHCR, EAC, Dar es Salaam, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2010.

19) Interview with senior UNHCR official.

#### 3.5 Conclusions on the operational context

A historical setting of village settlement policies, available land and pan-African views of the Nyerere government gave the 1972 group of Burundian refugees an opportunity to reestablish their rural livelihoods and live in a non-camp environment, so that they emerged as a resource rather than a burden to Tanzania. The 1993 group of refugees has followed the more traditional restrictive conditions for refugees applied globally. They came in the early 1990s, when the Great Lakes region was the scene of multiple conflicts with large numbers of refugees from several countries entering into Tanzania<sup>20</sup>.

Researchers find that Tanzanian refugee policies generally fall into three distinct periods from Independence to the present. In the first period, from 1962 to 1985, the refugee policies were integral to the Pan-African policies spearheaded by President Nyerere. The second period came with the economic disarray and the end of Nyerere's presidency in 1985 and runs until 1995. Scarcity of resources is said to be one important factor leading to more restrictive refugee policies. This was the political situation, which met almost one million refugees, who came to Tanzania in the early 1990s. The third period started in 1996, when the Government closed its border with Burundi and also announced that all Rwandan refugees should leave the country by the end of that year. As a result the number of refugees in Tanzania dropped considerably.

In 1998, Tanzania passed restrictive refugee legislation and increasingly pressed for repatriation of the refugees. In 2003 Tanzania issued a National Refugee Policy, which restricted movements of refugees in camps and limited economic activity. In the last five years the Government has pushed for the implementation of the country as a refugee free zone.

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20) See for example press from Amnesty International 29<sup>th</sup> June 2009. [www.Amnesty.org](http://www.Amnesty.org)

## 4 Strategy conceptualisation and the role of UNHCR

This chapter presents and analyses the conceptualisation and composition of the TANCROSS and the strategic role of the HC's Special Initiative. Box 4.1 shows the milestones from November/December 2006 up to the launch of the HC's Special Initiative on PRS in March 2008.

### Box 4.1 Milestones in conceptualising TANCROSS and the HC Special Initiative

November - December 2006	The Government of Tanzania flagged to UNHCR that it intended to close all camps and settlements and that Tanzania would be a Refugee Free Zone. The refugee-free pledge was part of the 2005 election manifesto of CCM, the ruling party. The Old Settlements were not specifically mentioned at this stage.
June 2007: 11 <sup>th</sup> Tripartite Meeting UNHCR/ Tanzania/ Burundi in Dar es Salaam	Tripartite meeting was held with open discussion on implementation of the Refugee Free Zone and closing of the settlements. Tripartite meeting recommended establishment of Old Settlements Task Force charged with finding a set of durable solutions for the Old Settlements. First steps were to conduct a census, a registration and intention survey and commission an independent socio-economic study of the Old Settlements.
July 2007	Population census conducted (UNHCR with the two Governments).
August - October 2007	Individual registration (personal turn-up) and intention survey carried out. ProGres level III registration of every individual and recording of intentions (voluntary repatriation versus application for naturalisation).
October - November 2007	Independent socio-economic study, and presentation of findings to stakeholder meeting, followed by a full report with recommendations (core of TANCROSS).
December 2007	12 <sup>th</sup> Tripartite Meeting held in Bujumbura. Study report and recommendations presented, approved by Tripartite Meeting as the strategy. The Old Settlements Task Force was charged with implementing the strategy.
January - February 2008	TANCROSS document was drafted and circulated. Operations began to establish UNHCR presence and repatriation pipeline in the Old Settlements.
February 2008	Cabinet reshuffle and change of Home Affairs Minister
March 2008	“Supplementary Appeal for Comprehensive Solutions for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania’s Old Settlements”. Produced in January/February 2008 and replaced the TANCROSS draft document almost immediately for all external matters, but was formally launched with HC’s visit to the Old Settlements in March. Launch of the HC’s Special Initiative for Protracted Refugees Situations.

### 4.1 TANCOSS – the strategy document

Following the agreement of the elements of the comprehensive solutions strategy, TANCOSS, at the 12th Tripartite meeting in Bujumbura in December 2007, the strategy document was circulated in January/February 2008<sup>21</sup>. Implementation of the strategy was originally designed to take two years (January 2008-December 2009). TANCOSS consists of three pillars:

- Voluntary repatriation and reintegration in Burundi (Pillar 1);
- Naturalisation (Pillar 2);
- Full integration of the newly naturalised citizens (Pillar 3)<sup>22</sup>.

Tanzanian policies, aiming to become a refugee free zone, as well as the peace process in Burundi, which enabled the option of voluntary repatriation and reintegration in Burundi (Pillar 1) constituted the broader setting of TANCOSS. In June 2006, UNHCR announced a shift “from a policy of facilitation to promotion of return”<sup>23</sup>, signalling that the situation in Burundi had improved significantly.

### 4.2 Motivations and considerations behind the strategy

This section looks at the motivations and considerations behind the different Pillars of TANCOSS. It is recognised in TANCOSS that there are challenges with regard to the voluntary repatriation and reintegration (Pillar 1), and the document recognises the challenges of repatriating families with very few ties to Burundi and also mentions that, “the absorption capacity in Makamba and Rururi Provinces (*insert: of Burundi*) will be particularly heavily tested by the number of returnees. Lack of timely funding and support for activities in Burundi could undermine efforts for successful reintegration”<sup>24</sup>. The strategy does not take up the key issue of returnees having lost their rights to land but talks about the limited absorption capacity. TANCOSS IV (2009 revision) mentions the establishment of The Integrated Commission for Return and Integration and the creation of “rural integrated villages” aimed at assisting returnees, who have no possibility of accessing their land<sup>25</sup>.

The motivation for the exceptional element of the strategy i.e. to offer naturalisation to a large group (Pillar 2) is, *inter alia*, linked to the government policies at the time of arrival as well as to the experience gained with regards to co-existence, economic contribution and ethnic affiliation to the host population (as discussed in Chapter 3). The choices given by the refugees in the survey carried out in the settlements in 2007 was mentioned as a motivating factor.

Moreover, the personal commitment and motivation of the Minister of Home Affairs, Joseph Mungai, was by several interviewees said to play a major role in promoting natu-

21) The Evaluation had four versions of TANCOSS in hand at the end of the fieldwork, three versions from 2008 and one from 2009.

22) NASCIP, the particular strategy developed for this pillar and launched on 22<sup>nd</sup> June, 2010 is discussed further in Chapter 5.

23) “Money Matters”, July 2009, p 4.

24) TANCOSS I, p 9.

25) TANCOSS IV, p 12.

ralisation, because of his personal knowledge of the settlements. He had been Minister of Agriculture (at the age of 28) when the Burundians came in 1972 and had been part of the decision to settle and allocate land to them. According to a senior UNHCR official, he therefore continued to have an understanding of the vision “you are not refugees, you are guests” and he also had the perspective that Africa should never lose its generosity towards refugees<sup>26</sup>.

After the major government reshuffles in February 2008, the new MoHA minister, Lawrence Masha, continued the naturalisation process (although with a different approach). It was said in interviews with the Evaluation that by sticking to the decision he was putting his political carrier at risk, given that there was resistance both within the cabinet and in Parliament. He did however have the backing of the President and the Prime Minister. According to a senior UNHCR official, both MoHA ministers (Mungai and Masha), the Prime Minister and the President, assessed the option of naturalisation in the larger political context of past insecurity situations in several countries in the Great Lake region. Embarking on a comprehensive solutions strategy with an option of naturalisation was not a gesture to human nature, but a move seen in a broader political context of options. As explained by a UNHCR official: “If you push too many people back to Burundi, you may get a million coming back here the next day”<sup>27</sup>. The same argument was offered in interviews in the MOHA (Refugee Department). The officials interviewed found that repatriation of all 220,000 refugees of the 1972 group could have led to serious security problems in Burundi, which could then threaten the fragile peace situation, resulting in another wave of refugees coming back into Tanzania.

It is also worth noting that naturalisation of refugees is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania. The 1972 group is the fifth group of refugees to be naturalised. However, it was the first time the offer was extended to Burundians<sup>28</sup> and to such a large number of refugees as well as through individual processing rather than by decree.

With regard to Pillar 3 different views were offered as to why the settlements had to be closed and the residents moved. Local government representatives interviewed were of the opinion that the refugees should move out of the settlement and mingle with Tanzanians, so a Burundi enclave could be avoided mainly for security reasons. At a national level the view was that the group of refugees should not retain the feeling of being refugees, they should be part of Tanzanian communities. This is also the official view of the Government, as said by the Prime Minister: “The only obstacle is ensuring that we resettle these people in a way that they don’t feel as though they are being dumped. The thing that we ask of the international community is that it understands that we don’t want these people to remain in the same camps – the Old Settlements... Let them live in other communities, mix as much as possible with other Tanzanians. It may cause a bit of problem in terms of trying to assist them but we know our situation back home – it can be done if the idea is accepted”<sup>29</sup>. The President at the launch of the Old Settlements Programme gave a similar view and so too has the Minister of Home Affairs in speeches<sup>30</sup>.

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26) Interview with one senior UNHCR official, and UNHCR advisers, who had been part of the process from 2006 and interview with MoHA officials.

27) Interview with senior UNHCR official.

28) Interview with senior UNHCR official.

29) Prime Minister of Tanzania, Mizengo Peter Pinda; Opening address of the High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protracted Refugee Situations, Geneva, 19<sup>th</sup> December 2008.

30) Thomson, Jessie: Durable Solutions for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania, Protracted Displacement, FMR 33 (year not stated).

Some interviews suggested that the Government was planning to use state land for commercial agricultural purposes and that the settlements had come in focus because state land is limited and would be attractive to have available for commercial purposes<sup>31</sup>. Senior officials of UNHCR were of the view that land availability only became a hot issue as a result of the international food security crisis in 2008. It was at that time that the opportunity of utilizing the land for commercial farming came up for discussion. The Evaluation did not have an opportunity to triangulate this point with other sources.

Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 were linked together from the beginning, so when the Intention Survey asked about preferences i.e. repatriation or naturalisation, those who opted for naturalisation knew that they would be relocated and integrated in communities outside the present settlements<sup>32</sup>. However, the TANCROSS document does not mention that the linking of Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 would imply the Government holding back the citizenship certificates until relocation had taken place. This decision appears to have been taken later<sup>33</sup>.

An interesting point was raised by a senior official from UNHCR, who was involved both in conceptualisation and implementation of TANCROSS. It was explained that UNHCR staff had anticipated that Pillar 3 would be difficult to implement. In addition there were sentiments in UNHCR that this part of the strategy was unnecessary because leaving the Burundians in the settlements would be the most appropriate option. So rather than waiting for Pillar 3 to be drafted and agreed on, it would be important to promote swift implementation of Pillar 1 and two and in parallel work on the planning of the more difficult Pillar 3.

The view was that it was important to seize the window of opportunity of naturalisation and implement this without delay, fearing that discussions around Pillar 3 could, in a worst-case scenario, result in cancellation of the naturalisation and this should by all means be avoided. The Evaluation did not have an opportunity to triangulate this view with other sources, but it deserves mentioning as it illustrates the catalytic role played by UNHCR and puts the delay of Pillar 3 into an interesting perspective. It was also argued by different UNHCR staff that, in retrospect, there have been positive implications with the delayed implementation of Pillar 3. The delay has meant that when the strategy was published it was a negotiated document and the needs of the NNTs were better accommodated than in the initial discussions<sup>34</sup>.

The Evaluation has not been able to ascertain if other strategic options, than the three Pillars, were discussed during the conceptualisation of TANCROSS, but interviews with senior UNHCR officials indicate that the three strategic options found in TANCROSS were those set by the Governments and aimed for throughout the process. Several thousand Burundians have been resettled to third countries since 2002, but those resettled do not include the 1972 group.

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- 31) Interview with UNHCR staff and independent observers. The Evaluation did not cover this (complicated) issue in detail. Apparently, large parts of some settlements (Ulyankulu) are a forest reserve, which the Government's forestry division would like to return to this state. Other parts are designated for agriculture and occupancy under wider eco-system multiple-use management plans. Only some parts (which are admittedly still very large areas) were earmarked for investors to take over for large-scale agriculture.
  - 32) In mid-2008 all the heads of households, who applied for naturalisation were told during the Intention Survey that "if you are successful in your application for naturalisation, you will be required by Government to leave the Settlements. Where will you go? Name two places."
  - 33) The Evaluation has not been able to clarify when this decision was taken.
  - 34) Interviews with UNHCR staff and PMO-RALG.

### 4.3 UNHCR's protection mandate in the strategy

TANCOSS includes key elements of the “Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern” (UNHCR, May 2003), which reiterates that each situation is a product of a specific context which needs to be taken into account in the design of solutions.

The TANCOSS was developed after a period of more than 20 years without any attention being paid to the 1972 group of refugees. UNHCR had left the settlements in 1985. Potential protection needs had therefore not been adhered to for a long time. The protection needs were, from UNHCR's viewpoint after re-engaging, minor compared to other refugee groups and the UNHCR Country/Regional report (2008) only mentions the 1972 group's need for protection in as far as “there will be some people who do not want to repatriate and do not individually qualify for citizenship either”<sup>35</sup>. The report assesses the situation against UNHCR's global and regional strategic objectives and finds no issues of concern for the 1972 group. The Age Gender Diversity Mainstreaming (AGDM) assessments carried out by UNHCR in settlements, as well as the registration exercise and the socio-economic study would have pointed to rights being violated. The Country/Regional report (2009) finds that the NNTs are concerned about the conditions under which they will relocate (time, modality, assets etc), as well as having concerns with regards to the vulnerable persons in the settlement and their ability to function elsewhere when the existing communities were “broken up”<sup>36</sup>. The reports do not discuss issues of protection in Burundi.

### 4.4 The strategy in an international context

TANCOSS was, seen in an international perspective, developed at a time when asylum space in developed countries was shrinking. During the 1980s and 1990s industrialized states increasingly tried to reduce the number of people from poor countries of the world seeking to enter into their territories as asylum seekers. In response to these developments the countries of Western Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific region introduced a vast array of measures to prevent the arrival of would-be refugees. This is when notions such as ‘protection in regions of origin’ became of interest.<sup>37</sup> Set to this background international development partners were more willing to fund naturalisation and relocation/local integration of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania. This would reduce the pressure for resettlement.

### 4.5 The role of the High Commissioner's Special Initiative

The strategic considerations of the Tanzania and Burundi Governments to find durable solutions were assisted by the HC's Initiative on Protracted Refugee Situations<sup>38</sup>. The process to seek durable solutions in Tanzania was well underway when the initiative was launched in 2008. The initiative included a special appeal, a visit by the HC to Tanzania and a High Level Dialogue Meeting in Geneva in December 2008.

35) Country /Regional Report 2008, p 5.

36) Country /Regional Report 2009, p 13.

37) Crisp J. (2009): ‘A surrogate state? The role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations’.

38) The Evaluation does not discuss UNHCR's role and motivation in relation to durable solutions in general.

These events were an initial boost to the strategy and to the catalytic role played by UNHCR. In addition the special initiative was a way to spur the international community to provide more resources to strategy implementation. The initiative also added a timeline for the goal of finding “durable and dignified solutions for the 1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania”<sup>39</sup>, which became the initial target dates for implementation and completion:

- *Burundian refugees who opted for voluntary repatriation, to be repatriated by September 2009.*
- *Those who opt to remain, to be naturalised under the citizenship laws of Tanzania by the end of 2008 or early 2009.*
- *Naturalised refugees to be integrated in their new host community by the end of 2010.*

The catalytic role played by the UNHCR office in Tanzania both in conceptualising and implementing TANCROSS is well documented. It is more difficult for the Evaluation to establish the contribution of the HC’s initiative. Those who were not close to the strategic players during the initial formulation and the implementation seem to know very little about the initiative<sup>40</sup>. Those who are close to the implementation concur that the initiative added value to the process. Based on interviews and the study of documents, the Evaluation is of the view that at a strategic level, the HC initiative played a role in creating attention to the protracted refugee situation in Tanzania. The high-level missions by the High Commissioner and Assistant High Commissioner helped to build a bridge of trust, commitment and support to the Government of Tanzania. The High Commissioner met with the President and ministers and built confidence with them and the Prime Minister participated in the Dialogue meeting in Geneva in December 2008.

All interviews suggested that UNHCR played more than a catalytic role in the conceptualisation of TANCROSS. UNHCR was said to be instrumental, cases in point are the speedy responses by UNHCR in terms of fielding a census, the intention survey and the independent socio-economic study, and thereby providing the analytical underpinnings to the strategy in a very short time (6-9 months).

### 4.6 Conclusions on strategy conceptualisation and the role of UNHCR

TANCROSS was motivated by several factors, first of all Tanzanian policies to become a refugee free zone, the peace process in Burundi, and the experience with the well integrated group of 1972 refugees. The Tanzanian leadership’s view of “realpolitik” in the region, contemplating that sending back all the refugees of the 1972 group could result in new insecurity in Burundi and thereby another wave of refugees, was also important. Personal commitment by the Minister(s) of Home Affairs has also been instrumental, especially in the offering of naturalisation. Finally, the central Government table the view that the group would need to be relocated and integrated in Tanzanian communities in order to become Tanzanian. It was also proposed that the land of the settlements was to be used for other purposes.

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39) Protracted Refugee Situations, High Commissioner’s Initiative, p.26, UNHCR 2008.

40) This counts both for development partners and field staff of UNHCR. Staff changes also appear to play a role in this.

At a strategic level TANCOSSE follows the principles laid out internationally for durable solution strategies. The strategy includes an exceptional move i.e. the very fast naturalisation of an unprecedented number of refugees. In the international framework for naturalisation such processes are described as lengthy and gradual. The move by the Tanzanian government is different and takes the naturalisation as a fast process to be completed in a very short time.

UNHCR has played an instrumental role in the development of the strategy, although it appears, as the next chapter shows, that the reintegration in Burundi was possibly not assessed thoroughly beforehand. The HC's Special Initiative did not play a role in the conceptualisation of the strategy but it played a role in boosting TANCOSSE, especially at the time of the launch in early 2008 and at the Dialogue meeting in Geneva in December 2008. There are questions to be asked with regard to the choices offered in TANCOSSE, especially tying together naturalisation and relocation/local integration. One may question why the refugees had to agree to move away from the settlements. As citizens this would be a violation of their rights and the uncertainty ahead for the NNTs emphasises this point.

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## 5 Strategy implementation and the role of UNHCR

This chapter assesses implementation progress against the objectives spelled out in the High Commissioner's Special Initiative document in 2008<sup>41</sup>. The chapter also analyses the role of UNHCR in implementation<sup>42</sup> including the internal coordination in UNHCR.

### 5.1 Implementation against objectives

The following sections assess progress against the three main objectives of TANCOSS as well as the fourth objective (on fund raising)<sup>43</sup>. Progress is, to the extent possible, assessed as of June 2010 (please refer to Annex 5 for an overview).

#### Voluntary repatriation and reintegration

- *Objective 1: Burundian refugees who opt for voluntary repatriation will be repatriated by September 2009 and be successfully reintegrated in their areas of return.*

The Intention Survey (August-October 2007) found that 20% of the refugees in the Old Settlements indicated a wish to return to Burundi (eventually, 25% opted for return)<sup>44</sup>. During 2008, UNHCR put in place the infrastructure, logistical and human support needed to return those who had opted for repatriation, and to date some 53,600 refugees have been repatriated to Burundi. The destinations were almost exclusively the Southern provinces of Makamba, Bururi and – for a smaller number of returnees – Rutana (close to Tanzania). A small number remain in Tanzania, i.e. some 2000 people, who expect to be repatriated by October 2010 (a map of Burundi is found on the inside of the back cover of the report).

The evidence available suggests that UNHCR was the main actor in repatriation. The role of the two Governments seems to be at the level of pushing for repatriation (Tanzania) and acceptance (Burundi). Initially, the 1972 group of refugees was assessed by UNHCR as needing less support to assist their repatriation than the support given to the group of 1993 refugees. The 1972 group was considered to be thriving agrarian communities with considerable financial and material resources. The study report presented in December 2007, i.e. the basis for TANCOSS and the plan of operation, seems to have underestimated both the repatriation and the reintegration challenges of the 1972 group. The initial support package was insufficient but adjusted to include unlimited allowance and a larger cash grant<sup>45</sup>. Cargo wagons for the train convoys were hired to deal with a large quantity of luggage including livestock<sup>46</sup>. The needs of vulnerable refugees, such as separated children and orphans, were assessed and taken care of specifically. The repatria-

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41) Protracted Refugee Situations, High Commissioner's Initiative, pp.26-27, UNHCR 2008.

42) Reference is made to the limitations of the Evaluation with regard to the assessment of the repatriation in Burundi. This was discussed in Chapter 2: Methodology.

43) TANCOSS IV, p 12.

44) UN High Commissioner for Refugees Visit to Tanzania: UNHCR Tanzania Background Information, 2010.

45) "Money Matters" (July 2009), p 5.

46) UNHCR's memo on Tanzania 2009 Annual & Supplementary Programme Interim Review, TAN/DSM/PRG/0251, dated 30 July 2009.

tion was, according to observers, eased when the initial material difficulties were solved, which apparently also happened rather swiftly.

The real challenge was the reintegration of the returnees. According to a recent study: “Some 82% of those registered in the Old Settlements had been born in exile, and, located far from the border, they had largely lost touch with their home communities, were out of reach of Burundian radio, had been educated in the Tanzanian school system and sometimes spoke Kiswahili rather than Kirundi. Most significantly, unlike the 1993 group, they had experienced institutionalised deprivation of their land which was frequently confiscated by the Government or sold fraudulently by family members”<sup>47</sup>.

It is not possible to establish the full extent to which reintegration in Burundi has occurred but it is suggested that there were considerable difficulties of absorption capacity. The returnees from the 1993 group were said to have had fewer problems in reclaiming and accessing land than the 1972 group but most returnees seem to have faced problems. The land shortage in Burundi is highly politicised and conflict prone and although this has been recognised at a certain level, the consequences in terms of pointing towards durable solutions seem to have been underestimated by UNHCR.

The UNHCR Annual Report for Burundi (2009) acknowledges the particular difficulties of the 1972 group and confirms that the lack of access to land constitutes the biggest single challenge for the reintegration of returnees and also emphasises the particular challenges for the 1972 group. The report states – without being specific on numbers and locations – that a substantial number of returnees, who had returned during the previous year, still did not have access to land in 2009. One major reason is that former family land had been redistributed by the authorities or occupied in the 1970’s. Some returnees do not even know their family’s place of origin or do not have social support structures to accommodate them while waiting for the restitution of their land and are therefore requesting, from UNHCR or the authorities, temporary shelter. Finally the report finds that a positive trend has been observed since the second half of 2008, with fewer returnees requesting temporary shelters thanks to improved support in Burundi and Tanzania.

Another UNHCR study, here quoted at some length confirms the above: “The major focus of the UNHCR operation in Burundi in 2008 was the repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries, mainly from Tanzania. The operation represented an increase of about 58% in the returnee population assisted by the Office, compared to the previous year. Solutions were found for the local integration of a significant part of this group of refugees who were living in camps in Tanzania. However, a large group of those, who had fled in 1972, chose to return in 2008. Such returns posed significant challenges in particular in the area of land and property rights, a problem, which Burundi has been facing for a long time”<sup>48</sup>.

Some assessments and the ongoing monitoring by UNHCR of both groups of returnees (1972 and 1993) find that most returnees have good relations with their neighbours and the authorities, even if the number of land conflicts have been rising in Southern Burundi related to the return of long-term refugees. The problems affecting the majority of returnees are mostly of a socio-economic nature and concern issues such as food security, health care or education<sup>49</sup>.

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47) Ibid, p 11.

48) UNHCR: Internal Review, UNHCR’s Engagement in the Peace Building Fund. (March 2010), p 38.

49) UNHCR Annual Report Burundi (August 2009).

According to the “Money Matters” study, the refugees came unprepared for the situation. “The refugees were largely unaware of the land challenges they would face upon return and the various routes to claiming their land, receiving alternative land or reaching a mediated agreement”<sup>50</sup>.

In relation to the return package the study found that, “Whilst the assessment that these refugees had largely achieved self-reliance and had acquired assets in Tanzania was correct, the most critical asset in Burundi is one which is not moveable – land. Without this, the 1972 returnees were destined to encounter serious problems in re-establishing livelihoods, given that non-agricultural options for making a living are very limited in Burundi. The smaller cash-only return package was to prove insufficient to provide the extensive bridging support needed for this group”<sup>51</sup>.

The number of planned returns to Burundi (of the 1993 group) had to be revised downwards throughout 2007 because of the difficult socio-economic situation. This stands in contrast to UNHCR’s move in 2006 to “promote return” based on the increased political stability in the country. The “Money Matters” study finds Burundi’s socio-economic situation extremely challenging and highlights that “with 90% of the population dependent on agriculture, the population density on arable land in Burundi is extremely high, resulting in reduced land fertility due to over-exploitation and a high incidence of land conflicts”<sup>52</sup>. The same study finds that UNHCR initially took the approach of facilitation rather than promotion for the 1972 group, because there was a fear that the reintegration, which would include land claims and acquiring of land could fuel land disputes and the process could become highly politicised in the lead up to the elections of 2010. It is in this difficult situation that the repatriation of the 1972 group took place starting in April 2008.

To mitigate the difficult situation encountered, UNHCR has put up temporary housing centres. Furthermore, the Government of Burundi, assisted by UNHCR, has set up a land commission to assist with the mediation of conflicts and negotiation of solutions. Returnees have had to stay in the reception centres for a long time while waiting for their land issues to be resolved. UNHCR is working with UNDP to develop alternative livelihoods and find alternative solutions. The concept of establishment of peace villages is promoted to ensure reintegration. In a recent presentation to UNHCR staff, Milner notes that there is a key shift in approach to returnees, who are no longer seen as simply a humanitarian challenge but also as a key element in successful peace building<sup>53</sup>.

Given the apparent difficulties of reintegration, the question is whether the situation could have been anticipated and whether UNHCR given its presence in both countries could have made a realistic assessment and shared this with the Governments and the 1972 group of refugees. The socio-economic study into the settlements in Tanzania (2007) showed that the decision making by the refugees whether to repatriate or become naturalised centred on their future access to livelihoods of both options and the insecurity faced with regard to both options. Those interviewed in the study were certain that they could reclaim their old land in Burundi and a major conclusion of the study is that

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50) Chambeyron, Nathalie: Land Issues in the Context of Refugee Return to Burundi. SOAS, September 2009.

51) “Money Matters” (July 2009), p 13.

52) Ibid p 5.

53) UNHCR has shared the presentation with the Evaluation, but no date for the presentation is available.

the refugees had to make tough choices with limited information and that these uncertainties made many families opt for repatriation, especially in cases of older family members remembered Burundi<sup>54</sup>.

It was also reported that the church had considerable influence in Katumba settlement and that the number of refugees opting for repatriation increased through the influence of the church. This explains the relatively higher number of returnees from this settlement compared to the other two settlements (Mishamo and Ulyankulu)<sup>55</sup>.

### Box 5.2 Where is Home?

The Evaluation held a focus group discussion with youth groups of newly naturalised Tanzanians in the Katumba settlement. The interviewees were between 14 and 23 of age, and born in Tanzania. They all said that they never wanted to return to Burundi, as it would be like “returning” to a new unknown country.

“When I think about Burundi, I think about nothing. It is not my country and I have no memories from there” (18 year old boy).

“I feel Tanzanian. I am Tanzanian. All my friends are Tanzanians. I never think about Burundi. I don’t know anything about that country” (14 year old boy).

“What should I do in Burundi? My life is here. I was born here. It would be like a new country for me” (21 year old woman).

Some of the interviewees pointed out that their grandparents and parents were often dreaming about Burundi and often talked about the possibility of returning. “My grandfather always talks about how people and the food is better in Burundi. He wanted to return but he is too old and sick”.

Other interviews held in Katumba settlement confirmed that it was the older generation, who were dreaming about return. They still have memories of life in Burundi and still have a sense of belonging, whereas the younger generation does not have any ties or memories associated with Burundi. Several of the interviewed young people mentioned that there had been disagreement within the household regarding the decision to opt for repatriation or naturalisation. The younger members of the families wanted to stay in Tanzania, whereas the older generation often had been less certain about which option to choose. In some of the families these disagreements had resulted in families deciding to split up. Some of the interviewees explained that they had decided to stay in Tanzania and opt for naturalisation, while their parents had returned to Burundi.

“My parents and grandparents returned to Burundi. I decided to stay in Tanzania alone. I am here alone now. I have better options in Tanzania. It will be easier for me to get an education here” (23 year old woman).

54) Centre for Study of Forced Migration/International Refugee Rights Initiative/Social Science Research Council: *Going Home or Staying Home? Ending Displacement for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania* (November 2008).

55) Interview with UNHCR staff.

The Evaluation concludes that the repatriation process was completed with issues of allowances and individual needs being solved in the course of the process. UNHCR was the key implementer and instrumental in solving such “practical” issues.

UNHCR reports about Burundi paint a less bleak picture of the reintegration problems encountered than other sources. A similar positive view of the reintegration is found in a major study of the refugees reintegrated in Burundi between 2002 and 2008, (“Impact Evaluation of PRM Humanitarian Assistance to the Repatriation and Reintegration of Burundi Refugees (2003-08)” by Terra P. Group Inc, September 2008). However this study was carried out before the repatriation of the 1972 group and therefore does not include their particular problems of integration. Based on other written sources, the Evaluation is of the view that UNHCR underestimated real difficulties of reintegration both at the strategic level and in implementation i.e. the land scarcity and the political issues of related to land ownership and distribution.

### **Naturalisation**

- *Objective 2: Burundian refugees who opt to remain, will be naturalised under the citizenship laws of Tanzania by the end of 2008 or early 2009.*

As of April 2010, the Minister of Home Affairs had granted citizenship to 162,256 refugees, or 98.7% of the applicants. The delay of more than one year was due to a decision made by the Minister of Home Affairs (Lawrence Masha). Although he continued the overall strategy as first decided by his predecessor, he changed the naturalisation procedure from “fast track”, i.e. to issue citizenship through a Presidential Decree to all refugees as a group, to an “expedited”, i.e. an individual procedure. The “expedited” procedure followed an individual screening but simplified some of the existing procedures. The “fast track” procedure is associated with some unresolved legal issues, such as questions about the citizenship of children, while the expedite process has meant that there will be no legal issues in the future. Newborn children will, for example, automatically qualify for Tanzanian citizenship, because of the introduction of the “expedited” procedure.

The change was also explained to the Evaluation, as a way of instituting the feeling among the refugees that citizenship is something you qualify for and also intended to mitigate negative sentiments in public opinion that citizenship can just be given with the stroke of a pen<sup>56</sup>. The decision had consequences in terms of resources and timing because all operations of individual naturalisations had to be set up in and outside the settlements. Government officers (immigration and police) had to be trained to manage the process and the local Security Committees had to get involved. The change of process opened up for involvement of a broader group of stakeholders and the challenges were considerable, also due to resistance especially among local officials. It was reported to the Evaluation that almost half of the applicants were simply rejected by the local officials at a certain point in the process<sup>57</sup>. The rejections were not legally valid and typically based on hearsay, speculation or on alleged administrative misdemeanours (such as going outside the settlement without permission).

UNHCR has assisted MoHA with an electronic database to allow the ministry to separate out the different categories of rejections and address them accordingly, for example rejection on grounds of being accused of poaching, without evidence, trial, conviction, was not considered a valid reason for rejection.

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56) Interview with senior UNHCR officials and the Refugee and Immigration Departments, MoHA.

57) Immigration department, UNHCR senior staff, UNHCR field staff Mpanda.

About 2,000 applicants still remain in the rejected category and appeals processes are ongoing. UNHCR is currently engaged in assisting the rejected refugees and expects that there will be positive results in most of the cases. More recently, another group of the 1972 refugees has been given attention. This concerns about 24,000 persons, who live in villages primarily around Kigoma. Issues concerning this group were brought up at the Tripartite Commission meeting in Dar es Salaam in 2008. It was decided that this group would not be addressed until the bulk of the work in the settlements was concluded. The decision was that the refugees in Kigoma villages would be offered the same options as the people in the settlements (although they would not be likely to have to relocate after their naturalisation). They are presently being registered and more than 99% have expressed that they would like to apply for naturalisation.

The majority of interviewees stated that it was the competent leaderships of MoHA and UNHCR that made the unprecedented step of naturalisation possible. At the time when the HC's Initiative was launched, extensive advocacy efforts were being carried out by the then Home Affairs Minister and the former UNHCR Representative to gain support from other ministers, the prime minister's office and from local governments. The Government of Tanzania also showed the sincerity of its intentions by reducing the naturalisation fees from USD 800/person to USD 50/person.

UNHCR contributed to the capacity building of the immigration department by introducing an electronic processing system, rehabilitation of offices and provision of training. UNHCR also financed vehicles and motorcycles to Government and security offices. Apart from paying USD 3.6 million for naturalisation fees, UNHCR also spent some USD 4.9 million on the processing of naturalisation applications (clerks, lawyers, clearance by local defence and security committees) and for capacity building (including the computerisation of the Citizenship Processing Unit in the Immigration Department)<sup>58</sup>.

The Evaluation finds that the implementation of Pillar 2 of the strategy is an extraordinary decision and action taken by the Tanzanian Government. Both the decision to naturalise such a large number of refugees, the reduction in the applicant fee and finally the change from "fast track" to "expedite" underline the extraordinary decisiveness of the Government in offering a durable solution to this group of refugees. The role of UNHCR is assessed to be constructive and adaptable to changing conditions and options. Furthermore, UNHCR played an instrumental role in safeguarding the rights of the applicants in the process<sup>59</sup>.

However, when the naturalisation status of the NNTs was announced on large boards in the settlements in April 2010, it was also communicated that the certificates would not be given until relocation has taken place (as mentioned elsewhere). This is of concern, because the NNTs are presently in a state of "limbo".

The rights advocacy role calling for the situation to be resolved has been taken on by civil society and national and international observers. The International Research and Rights Initiative (et. al.) has the following view: "To refer to them as citizens seems somewhat premature given that these 'Tanzanians' are neither allowed freedom of movement, nor

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58) Country Report 2009; Interview with senior UNHCR official.

59) In accordance with UNHCR's protection mandate.

the security of having the necessary and vital documentation to prove their status”<sup>60</sup>. Similar concerns are also expressed in research carried out by the Centre for Forced Migration and the International Refugee Rights Initiative<sup>61</sup>. Meanwhile, UNHCR and the international development partners have been rather quiet.

### Full integration of newly naturalised Tanzanians

- *Objective 3: Naturalised refugees will be integrated in their new host communities by the end of 2010.*

In June 2010 the strategy on local integration (NASCIP) was presented<sup>62</sup>. The plans leading to the strategy have been discussed and worked on over a period of two years. The strategy is a well thought out document. It has been negotiated prior to the launch and a stakeholders’ meeting with high-level presentation (ministerial level) showed that the Government (both local and national) is fully behind the strategy. The strategy deals with sensitive and difficult issues, and the agreement within Government on locations for relocation and local integration, which has been a sore point, appears to be settled. This contrasts to the early days of TANCOS, when a local consultation was carried out by the Prime Minister’s Office and found that only nine regional commissioners replied that they were willing to accept NNTs. It was said in one interview during the Evaluation that at that time, one district had come up with a large infrastructure plan to be financed and in return the district would accept 30 refugees<sup>63</sup>.

The endorsed strategy includes the final government decision on relocation and local integration and it lists the 50 districts in 16 regions<sup>64</sup>, which have been selected to host NNTs. The document notes that the list includes eight of the top ten regions identified in the household survey conducted in 2008/09<sup>65</sup>, which means that there is some correlation between the wishes of the households and areas designated for relocation. The strategy implementation will run from July 2010-14 and the cost is USD 144 million.

The strategy divides the 35,000 families into three batches or segments:

A) Those who are already living outside the settlements and would prefer to continue living in their current locations together with their families (10%);

60) Hovel, Lucy: *Naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania: A New Home?* [www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/64063](http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/64063). Similar views are raised for example in *Naturalisation of refugees in Tanzania: Nyerere’s Vision*. Daily News: Online edition: Feature: June 1 2010.

61) Centre for the Study of Forced Migration/IRRI: *“I don’t know where to go”: Burundian Refugees in Tanzania under Pressure to Leave*, September 2009, and Centre for the Study of Forced Migration/IRRI/Social Science research Council: *“Going Home or Staying Home: Ending Displacement for Burundian refugees in Tanzania*, November 2008.

62) National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NASCIP) 2010-14, Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government. The strategy was shared at a “stakeholder meeting” on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2010, and the Evaluation received a copy of the strategy on 28<sup>th</sup> June. During the field visit the Evaluation did not have access to the strategy and interviews were conducted on basis of oral summaries of the draft strategy.

63) Interview with senior UNHCR official.

64) Tanzania has 26 regions, and 127 districts. The figures show that the relocation will affect about 2/5 of the districts.

65) NASCIP, p 4.

B) Those currently living in the settlements, but who are ready to move on their own initiative to one of the 16 selected regions, with support for moving and for establishing themselves in the local communities there (30%);

C) Those who will need greater assistance in selecting a suitable destination, in relocating and in establishing themselves (60%).

UNHCR foresees that the first batch will receive their certificates in July-August 2010<sup>66</sup> and that most of these families will move after the elections to be held in October 2010. The first batch is not a physical move. This batch concerns people who already live outside the settlements with their dependents in the settlements, who will be allowed to join them. The process to move batch B will start after the elections. Batch C will start at the same time but it is anticipated that individual needs will entail longer processes and that the implementation of this batch will take place throughout the strategy implementation<sup>67</sup>.

The strategy includes brief sections on operational support, land acquisition and ownership and community based support. It lays out principles, which aim to secure that rights and protection principles are adhered to. The strategy also acknowledges the losses of existing livelihoods and a large cash grant of USD 500 per person will be given to cover transport, lodging, land transaction fees; shelter and building materials and food assistance. While it is not completely clear in the strategy, it seems that this is a package mainly designed for batch B. Acquisition of land is proposed to be in the open market from individual land owners. It is the intention to avoid, to the extent possible, block allocations of land. This would, according to NASCIP, lead to the formation of small enclaves. Associated with the relocation and local integration community based support will include support to a) basic services; b) co-existence programmes (for example environmental protection and health sensitisation campaigns to enhance the integration of host community and NNTs) and lastly support to agricultural production. The community programmes will follow the priorities in the national development plan and be in line with the MDGs. The strategy mentions community-based organizations as service providers. The strategy sees the broader partnerships between the Government and the broader group of UN agencies and other international development partners as partners to the implementation of NASCIP. But the exact modalities are not outlined in the strategy. According to the strategy, larger projects should be done through “implementing partners, using qualified contractors through public tendering processes, which has shown the ability to deliver quality work within a very short time<sup>68</sup>. This statement runs counter to the strategy of UN Delivering As One, which has the local governments as implementers. It also runs counter to the efforts to enhance government ownership and building the capacity of local authorities to implement community projects.

The Evaluation is of the view that the problems of NASCIP are not so much the issues covered in the strategy; it is rather the issues, which are not covered. As it often happens the “devil is in the details”. The strategy lists some principles, one of these principles is to ensure “that NNTs receive their naturalisation certificates in a timely fashion, preferably at the Regional Immigration Office of the concerned region; ensuring proper records of management of naturalisation certificates so that those claiming not to have received their certificates, or to have lost these, or new families... can be issued with replacement

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66) Interview with senior UNHCR official.

67) NASCIP p 5.

68) Ibid p 10.

certificates, or new certificates<sup>69</sup>. While the strategy is very specific and it is underlined that it is the Government's policy to close the settlements and the NNTs will be issued with a clearance note when they leave the settlement, the strategy is silent on when in the process the NNTs will receive their certificates. It is stated as a principle, as quoted above but in a way that almost leaves the statement as a wish of the authors of the strategy. The Evaluation could not establish how and when the certificates will be issued, but was told that this will be elaborated in the plan of operation of the strategy being worked at present. The issuance of certificates has now become a main element of Pillar 3, while it originally was the main objective of Pillar 2.

In order to ease the sentiments of local officials, a number of activities in Rukwa and Tabora and in Mwanza Regions have been carried out. These were strategically targeted activities to establish better infrastructure in the current hosting regions because both regions insisted that none of the NNTs "would ever be allowed to remain in those regions"<sup>70</sup>. The community activities included the rehabilitation of government and community infrastructure such as schools, clinics and water boreholes, as well as activities on forestation. The support to host communities even included a non-traditional activity such as the upgrading of an airstrip in Mpanda. The total UNHCR expenditure for the host community support already amounts to some USD 5 million for 2008 and 2009. In 2010, over USD 2 million is allocated to similar activities, financed as part of Pillar 2<sup>71</sup>.

UNHCR staff also informed the Evaluation that the delays had shaped policy decisions in respect of a more "mature" and balanced approach to the relocation/local integration in Government and the delays had diffused the initial strong resistance of the regional governments<sup>72</sup>. UNHCR has played a key catalytic role in the lengthy and challenging planning process, but it is also noted that it took a long time both for the Government and for UNHCR to create positions in their organizations to deal specifically with Pillar 3 indicating that the challenges were underestimated. When UNHCR recruited a staff member with expertise in local integration in the second quarter of 2010, the process of working out a strategy was speeded up, and after only two months, a document could be presented. The delay should also be looked at in the light of the overall role of UNHCR as a humanitarian agency and the "development challenges" of this pillar. The development of the strategy and the implementation involves other actors than UNHCR's core clients and this may also be a factor explaining the lengthy process.

The delay in relocation and local integration as well as the apparent lack of information on the conditions is also a sticking issue. At the visit to Katumba settlement it was conveyed that the present uncertainty was unbearable for many. Some families were very concerned about their future move; others appeared to have relatives waiting for them in other locations and one headman interviewed by the Evaluation optimistically said: "a move out of the settlements in turn for citizenship is a small price to pay when you look

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69) Ibid p 3,

70) The success of this strategy may be reflected in the acceptance by the Government that significant numbers of the newly naturalised now will be allowed to fulfil their wish to stay in Rukwa and Tabora Regions (see NASCIP), June 2010.

71) Two notably large-scale activities are the upgrading of Mpanda Airstrip and the rehabilitation of Tabora Secondary School for girls. Each project costs over USD 1 million. Source: Country Reports 2008-09; Local integration interventions, solution strategy for Burundian refugees in Tanzania's Old Settlements provided by UNHCR Tanzania during the Evaluation.

72) This view was not triangulated with other sources.

at the long-term gains”<sup>73</sup>. Nevertheless, this delay and the insecurity created in conjunction with the holding back of the citizenship certificates could potentially jeopardise what is generally considered a success and a remarkable step by the Tanzania Government.

Critical voices are also raised and human rights organizations and public sentiments have pointed to the (unrealised) complexity and the negative aspects of the implementation, i.e. undermining of present economic self-sufficiency and the cultural identity<sup>74</sup>.

### **Mobilisation of support for TANCOS**

- *Objective 4: International support will be mobilised, with UNHCR playing the catalytic role, to ensure burden and responsibility sharing in the implementation of TANCOS.*

The progress on this objective comprises UNHCR’s efforts in resource mobilisation and partnership with development actors (Partnerships are discussed in Chapter 6).

In February 2008, just before the start of the High Commissioner’s Special Initiative, UNHCR launched a supplementary appeal for “Comprehensive Solutions for Burundian Refugees in Tanzania’s Old Settlement”. The appeal, with two-year budgets for both Tanzania and Burundi, was originally at USD 34.2 million, and USD 22.5 million was spent in 2008. The budget for 2009, originally at USD 11.5 million was then revised upwards to USD 28 million, most of which was funded. Funds were mainly raised locally and the visit of the High Commissioner served to boost the visibility of the initiative<sup>75</sup>. Keeping in mind that the supplementary funding appeal for the “expedite” naturalisation process was responded to favourably by the international development partners, indicates a sense of trust that the undertaking would be successful.

The full extent of the budgetary resources to move the NNTs out of the Old Settlements and integrate them in the regions in Tanzania was, according to UNHCR staff, not fully appreciated. The requirements in the Comprehensive Needs Assessment for local integration in 2010 were valued at USD 23.4 million out of which to date UNHCR at present has a spending authority (IBT) of approximately USD 10 million.

UNHCR Tanzania remains engaged in local fund-raising and it is anticipated that it will be possible to bridge the funding gap following the recent approval of Pillar 3<sup>76</sup>. During interviews it was said that if funding would not be forthcoming from the international community, it would be a major disappointment to Tanzania<sup>77</sup>. The Government has taken major steps and also waived most of the fee for naturalisation (mentioned above) and the initial understanding was that the partnership with international development partners would remain intact throughout the implementation. The increased costs of implementation of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, have meant that funds for Pillar 3 have been “borrowed” to pay for activities in these pillars (as discussed earlier). In meetings with international development partners the Evaluation found that there was preparedness for continued support but there was obviously also a keen interest to learn more about the strategy for Pillar 3 prior to committing funds. One of the international develop-

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73) Interview with headmen in Katumba settlement.

74) Tanzania Times 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010 quoting the International Refugee Rights Initiative.

75) Interviews with development partners and UNHCR staff.

76) The strategy was presented at a stakeholder meeting on June 22<sup>nd</sup> 2010.

77) Interviews with development partner representatives and UNHCR senior official.

ment partners expressed concerns of the human rights aspect of the closure of the settlements and the forced relocation step of Pillar 3. However, at the launch of the strategy for Pillar 3 in June 2010, the same donor did not voice concern and expressed interest in further discussions with UNHCR and the Government on potential support.

### **Age gender diversity mainstreaming in implementation**

UNHCR Tanzania has conducted a participatory assessment with Burundian refugee men, boys, women and girls from the 1972 group to ensure that their different needs were incorporated into the design, planning and implementation of TANCOS. In October and November 2009 teams from UNHCR and its implementing partners conducted a second round of participatory AGDM assessments with the refugees, who had opted for naturalisation. The assessments aimed to ascertain the issues faced by the refugees and how they prepared themselves both psychologically and materially, as well as their intended coping strategies in relation to the challenges of the movement and local integration.

The refugees shared their views, concerns, and strategies with the teams. Five hundred individuals in Katumba, 400 in Mishamo and 400 in Ulyankulu were involved. They were sampled in such a manner as to ensure that the survey was representative of the population. An overwhelming majority indicated their concerns to move to unknown areas and would prefer to stay in the same regions/districts. Another major concern was the availability of productive land in the final destinations. Many expressed that they do not wish to be perceived as former “refugees” but as Tanzanians. As the majority of the population are productive farmers, most people expressed their desire to be informed by the Government about their destinations and how they would be allocated land. Many in the population expressed that they would prefer to organize their own transportation if they were provided with individual cash assistance. The vulnerable individuals preferred support for the travel through organized transport. Many of the refugees were worried that the movement would disrupt their children’s education and several of the refugees mentioned that the relocation would be a challenge for the older generation in the households as they often have a fragile state of health. Several mentioned that the younger element of the family might leave before older family members in order to prepare the plot of land.

The findings from the age, gender and diversity assessments will be mainstreamed into implementation of NASCIP, which includes the findings of the assessments and strongly advocates for the protection and rights principles to be adhered to. It was reported by UNHCR field staff that budget constraints often limit the chances of AGDM initiatives being implemented. However, the conduct of the AGDM assessments does strengthen UNHCR’s attention to protection needs of different groups.

## **5.2 UNHCR internal coordination and staffing**

### **Internal coordination**

The internal coordination in the implementation of Pillar 1, was considered by UNHCR staff, by implementing partners and by the Tanzanian Government to be smooth and well coordinated at all levels. This view could not be triangulated with the views of families being repatriated. The Evaluation is of the view that, the unsolved situation for a large number of returnees in Burundi and the fact that families continue up to the present to be placed in reception centres could possibly have been lessened, as discussed elsewhere in the report. If UNHCR coordination between Burundi and Tanzania offices had taken a regional perspective, the result could have been more nu-

anced with regard to the situation in Burundi and the particular land issues facing the 1972 group. Analyses in Burundi, similar to those undertaken in Tanzania, could have been generated and given a more realistic picture of the situation to be faced by those choosing repatriation.

The internal coordination in the implementation of Pillar 2 was considered by UNHCR staff to be excellent. Field offices, the Dar es Salaam office and the engagement from Geneva, including the role played by the HC himself, were considered to have been valuable in assisting the Tanzanian Government carry out the vast naturalisation exercise and overcome resistance on the way. This view was shared by the refugee department in the Government and by implementing partners.

The internal coordination in UNHCR on the implementation of Pillar 3 is too premature to assess. The internal coordination in UNHCR is not the main issue in local integration; it is the broader coordination issue among the UN agencies under the auspices of DaO as well as the coordination with Government and within Government<sup>78</sup> and other partners.

### **UNHCR staffing**

UNHCR had at the start of the operation seven offices, 11 international staff, 28 staff national staff and one volunteer<sup>79</sup>. In 2008, to complement the operational capacity to implement TANCOSS, UNHCR created 53 additional posts within a short time, mainly in Tanzania, but also some in Burundi. Moreover offices were established for implementation purposes in Mpanda, Mishamo and Ulyankulu<sup>80</sup>.

Both the MoHA and the implementing partners interviewed were of the view that UNHCR staff were capable. However, the implementing partners interviewed also found the UNHCR staffing pattern, with many international short-term staff with very limited working experience to be frustrating. The implementing partners said that they had to spend time building the capacity of young and inexperienced UNHCR staff. This view was challenged by UNHCR staff, who found that the implementing partners also had staffing problems with frequent vacancies and difficulties in retaining qualified staff in Western Tanzania.

It was apparent in the interviews of the Evaluation that the staff profiles and personalities of UNHCR at the time of strategy formulation were instrumental in “seizing the opportunity” for a durable solution offered by the Tanzanian Government<sup>81</sup>. This has for the Evaluation raised the issue of the role played by UNHCR staff as catalysts. The ability of UNHCR staff in such a situation to network with a broader range of stakeholders, to engage with Government and to take swift action on opportunities seems to have played a major role initially in Tanzania. According to “UNHCR News Stories” (October 2008) this was not incidental but also a strategic change in the operations of the Tanzania office. In the publication, the former Representative phrases it as: “UNHCR Tanzania has made an important transition from a relatively stable care-and-maintenance operation to a dy-

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78) Limited coordination between ministries and local and central government was an obstacle. The Evaluation did not have a possibility to triangulate these statements.

79) TANCOSS I p 10.

80) TANCOSS III p 6.

81) This view came through strongly in interviews with Government officials, but also with UNHCR staff.

dynamic operation which aims to find a dignified solution for each refugee”<sup>82</sup>. This was also the view of a senior UNHCR official, who said that the country operations are those that have to use their initiative and skills to be catalytic and instrumental in finding durable solutions. The role of the headquarters is then to support and assist bringing in the more global picture, solutions and resources.

It was also pointed out to the Evaluation that strategic deployment in the Tanzania office should have focused on getting a local integration expert with networking and facilitation skills on board earlier in the strategy process. This staff member was only deployed in the second quarter of 2010, and from the time of his deployment, it only took a couple of months to formulate the strategy for Pillar 3 with the Government. A senior UNHCR official did not agree, and pointed out that internal processes in Government had to be negotiated and cleared before Pillar 3 could be developed. The Evaluation has not been able to assess this issue in more detail.

### 5.3 Conclusions on strategy implementation and the role of UNHCR

Based on the materials available to the Evaluation the reintegration in Burundi has not been as smooth as anticipated. There seems to have been insufficient acknowledgement and understanding of the particular difficulties faced by the 1972 group (in particular their loss of rights to land). This has led to a prolonged situation where returnees have remained in temporary situations. The naturalisation has been completed with the crucial exception that citizen certificates will only be issued upon relocation (Pillar 3). The strategy for relocation and local integration was completed recently and is an agreed document within the Government of Tanzania following some initial disagreements between the national and local governments, as the local governments did not want to receive the refugees. The strategy still has open ends on implementation modalities, also with regard to when and how the citizen certificates will be given. A positive aspect of the strategy is that the understanding of the needs of different segments of the NNT population is to be taken into account. Human rights organizations and public sentiments have pointed to the (unrealised) complexity and negative aspects of the implementation of relocation and local integration. This delay and the lack of information, as well as the insecurity created in conjunction with the holding back of the citizenship certificate, could potentially jeopardise what is generally considered a success and a remarkable step by the Tanzanian Government.

The Evaluation is of the view that the reintegration element of Pillar 1 and the local integration (Pillar 3) are the most difficult elements in TANCOS. UNHCR did not foresee the difficulties ahead of reintegration although the agency has substantial operations in both countries and a long-time engagement in the Great Lakes Region. The achievement of the objective for local integration depends both on a dignified relocation through a cash grant (including a “travel/movement of assets” component and a “resettlement/livelihood/land component), and suitable settlement conditions for the families (access to land) but also on the attitude and social acceptance by local governments and host communities, which needs to be carefully designed and monitored. The uncertainty with regard to when in the process the NNTs are likely to become “real” citizens could in, a worst-case scenario, result in the creation of a group of internally displaced persons. Even with certificates in hand the local reintegration is risky and complex and could result in

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82) Q&A: UNHCR in pursuit of durable solutions for refugees in Tanzania, News Stories, 10 October 2008.

destitution for some families, who are relocated but will not be able to establish a livelihood and be integrated.

UNHCR intends to monitor the situation for some years to come<sup>83</sup> and to mitigate the risks of such situations<sup>84</sup>, even if the implementation will be in a larger group of development partners (including UN DaO) and the Government. It is the view of the Evaluation that UNHCR is playing an important catalytic role in establishing the platform and conditions for the implementation of Pillar 3<sup>85</sup>. However, seen in a broader context the protection mandate of UNHCR would not apply to Tanzanian citizens and this questions the role and authority of UNHCR to act in these circumstances.

UNHCR has been a main catalyst and has been instrumental in the implementation of TANCOS, which has been driven forward by a clear vision of the Tanzanian Government. All stakeholders point out that UNHCR has played a tireless role as catalyst, given the political intentions of the Government form and modalities and ensured that international standards in line with the mandate of UNHCR have been followed – possibly with the exception of the reintegration in Burundi<sup>86</sup>. The HC Special Initiative has raised awareness at early stages of implementation but has not been visible throughout the process. This is the impression of the Evaluation, although it is recognised that the Evaluation did not have an opportunity to speak to high level decision makers in the Tanzania Government with whom the HC has engaged.

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83) Discussion at debriefing meeting of the mission (UNHCR management and staff).

84) Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government: National Strategy for Community Integration Programme: NASCIP 2010-2014.

85) Interview with PMO-RALG programme coordinator and UNHCR staff.

86) This finding is cursory due to the methodology of the Evaluation.

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## 6 Partnerships

This chapter analyses the role and nature of partnerships in the search for durable solutions. The chapter then analyses the role of UNHCR in forging partnerships and exploiting the opportunities that partnerships have provided in the conceptualisation and implementation of TANCROSS. The chapter finally assesses the prospective roles of UN DaO and UNHCR in the implementation of Pillar 3. This is based on a brief analysis of the partnership in the UN DaO Joint Project 6.1 “Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Sustainable Development”, in a former refugee camp area in North-western Tanzania.

Both Government (at national and sub-national level) and implementing partners informed the Evaluation that UNHCR was playing a major catalytic role in engaging the different stakeholders and moving TANCROSS forward. Manager and ‘energiser’ of the different partnerships was the label put on the role of UNHCR. Annex 6 presents an overview of different stakeholders’ support to TANCROSS as seen by the Evaluation.

### 6.1 The role of partnerships in solutions to protracted refugee situations

The central role of partnerships, especially cooperation with non-humanitarian partners is highlighted in the HC’s Special Initiative on PRS, “development related activities are central to viable management of protracted refugee situations”<sup>87</sup>, and there is a need to engage with “less traditional actors in the search for solutions, especially those in the development sector”. The partners mentioned are the different UN agencies, as well as the World Bank.

TANCROSS (I, II, III, IV) is explicit about the broader partnership engagement, which is seen to extend beyond the humanitarian actors and the usual government counterparts for humanitarian action. At the international level the HC’s dialogue meeting on protracted refugee situations (December 2008), boosted the broader partnership engagement of TANCROSS. Through the participation of the Prime Minister of Tanzania, the meeting seems to have created visibility and consensus at the international level of the need to address the protracted refugee situations and to engage a broader range of partners in solutions<sup>88</sup>.

TANCROSS I lists the following government partners: Government of Tanzania: Ministry of Home Affairs, the Refugee Department and the Immigration Department, Regional authorities in Rukwa and Tabora, as well as district authorities in Mpanda and Urambo districts. In Burundi the main partner is the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Solidarity<sup>89</sup>.

Implementing partners are the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service for implementation of Pillars one, two, and three. GTZ are engaged in repatriation (Pillar 1) and in the logistics of naturalisation (Pillar 2). The International Rescue Committee and Relief to

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87) ExCOM, 2 June 2008, p 6.

88) Interviews with senior UNHCR officials (present and former staff in Tanzania) and Refugee Department, MoHA.

89) Listed in TANCROSS II.

Development Society also play a supporting role in the implementation of TANCROSS. In Burundi a number of NGOs are also engaged as implementing partners<sup>90</sup>.

The following partners are expected to support the Government in the implementation of Pillar 3: The UN DaO, (although NASCIP is not clear on the DaO role) along with CBOs and international development partners (not specified further in the strategy).

## 6.2 UNHCR and partnerships

### UNHCR and international development partners

International development partners<sup>91</sup> are considered as partners at different levels, i.e. at the level of funding (responses to appeals) but also as broader supporters to the overall strategy (international burden sharing). The considerable costs of implementing TANCROSS called for a close partnership with the international community.

The role of the international development partners<sup>92</sup> is emphasised in the High Commissioners Dialogue on Protection Challenges<sup>93</sup> as it talks about the shared commitments that must be made by the international community to develop a more effective response to the protracted refugee situations. In accordance with UNHCR's mandate, as an entirely non-political organization, the role of UNHCR is to support the international community's efforts to address the political causes and consequences of protracted refugee situations<sup>94</sup>. As said in the same dialogue document, it is the political will and actions of the states, regional organizations and relevant components of the UN system, i.e. mainly the Security Council and the General Assembly, which play key roles. Another key element in the partnership concept is the principle of international solidarity and responsibility sharing. It is in this light that the implementation of TANCROSS calls upon development partners to share the costs of its implementation.

The considerable costs of implementing TANCROSS have also called for a close partnership with the international community, which UNHCR has managed well. For example, when it was decided to change the naturalisation process from fast track to expedite, extra resources were needed. UNHCR advocated successfully with the international development partners present in Tanzania to provide extra resources if needed and be flexible around purposes of existing grants. If UNHCR had not managed this process, the whole strategy could have been jeopardised<sup>95</sup>.

### UNHCR and implementing partners

NGOs/CSOs have been involved in implementation in particular of Pillar 1. In the UNHCR terminology NGOs are called implementing partners signalling the contractual engagement between them and UNHCR. This working relationship between UNHCR and NGOs/CSO is common, not only in Tanzania. In the case of repatriation and naturalisation these partnerships were reported by the parties involved to have worked well. How-

90) Ibid

91) Terminology used in Tanzania for foreign donors.

92) Terminology used in Tanzania for foreign donors. Most international development partner representatives interviewed were relatively new in post and only few had some knowledge on the contents of Pillar 3.

93) UNHCR/DPC/2008/Doc.02: A Discussion Paper prepared for the High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, Geneva December 2008.

94) Ibid p 6.

95) Interview with UNHCR senior official, interview with Refugee department in MoHA.

ever, there was also some frustration in the group of partners. They felt that their knowledge and insights could be better utilised by UNHCR. It was indicated that UNHCR has a top down approach rather than a partnership approach, which would also value the skills and knowledge of the implementing partners<sup>96</sup>. It was reported that knowledge of local conditions and a dialogue concerning local knowledge could have produced higher quality implementation. This could not be verified by the Evaluation but UNHCR management recognised the issue and admitted that UNHCR should be better at tapping the knowledge and insights of NGOs and the engagement between the two parties should be in the spirit of partnerships rather than a “contractor” relationship.

### **UNHCR and national government**

At national level UNHCR was supportive of the MoHA and the Office of the Prime Minister in their role to engage the public and at times diffuse refugee xenophobia, engage and inform parliamentarians and provide technical implementation skills to the Old Settlements Task Force. At national level the partnerships with the donors were, according to interviews, essential as the costs of the operation were huge by all standards and momentum should not be lost<sup>97</sup>.

### **UNHCR and regional and district governments**

A less smooth partnership emerged with some regional and district governments, law enforcement agencies and immigration authorities at local level. The prevailing view at this level was that repatriation was the (only) suitable solution to pursue. Concerns were voiced particularly in relation to high crime rates and environmental degradation.

With regard to naturalisation, there was outright resistance among the officers deployed locally (police and immigration officials) to assess the applicants according to neutral criteria. UNHCR financed training of these officials, and also purchased different kinds of equipment and infrastructure projects to smooth relations. UNHCR also played an advocacy role in diffusing the local resistance. With regard to local authorities UNHCR has managed to strike a balance between mitigating xenophobia towards refugees and identifying positive spin-offs. This has been achieved at considerable costs, such as the financing of an airstrip in Mpanda and other infrastructure support near the existing settlements.

Although mainly related to the camped refugees in Mtabila camps and other camps, which have now been closed (not to the 1972 group in the settlements), the District Commissioner in Kasulu reflected on the role of her administration and their frustrations. She said that, the district is “at the receiving end” trying to deal with the consequences of the refugee problem (such as higher crime rates and environmental degradation), and she called for more active engagement by the leaders the Great Lakes region to seek political solutions. In this regard she mentioned the potential role to be played by the East African Community. She also made the point that both regional and district governments and UNHCR could do little unless the political processes moved in the right direction.

## **6.3 UNHCR and the UN Delivering as One**

In November 2007, the Secretary-General of the UN decided to establish a series of pilot country initiatives to test the DaO approach. The governments of eight countries – including Tanzania – volunteered to pilot the approach.

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96) Interviews with NGO partners and acknowledged by UNHCR country team.

97) Interviews with senior UNHCR officials and international development partners.

The DaO approach was initially conceptualised as the “Four Ones” – One Programme, One Leader, One Budgetary Framework, and One Office where appropriate. Tanzania then added One Voice, making it “Five Ones”.

In the implementation of Pillar 3, the plan is for UNHCR to work under the auspices of the UN DaO<sup>98</sup>. UNHCR is at present involved in the DaO pilot through the “Joint Project (JP) 6.1”. This project concerns the “Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Sustainable Development” and is implemented in the context of downscaling the humanitarian presence following the closure of refugee camps in Kagera and Kigoma Regions. The project supports the Government in the transition from a humanitarian aid environment towards a sustainable development environment. The project also aims to hand over the area to the host communities in good order. A large part of the programme consists of the rehabilitation of infrastructure and facilities in the former refugee camps in order to serve the needs of host communities<sup>99</sup>. The implementation is through the government system and the support from the UN system comes under the leadership of UNDP.

On the one hand UNHCR acknowledges UNDP’s approach i.e. to build capacity and work through existing institutional mechanisms in Government, but there are also considerable frustrations within UNHCR with regards to the slowness of the mechanisms of implementing through Government. Establishing the role and coordinated actions of the different UN organizations (present in Western Tanzania) have also created considerable friction among the organizations and their internal relations have not been smooth. This was indicated to have had substantial transaction costs for the project. Delays seem to have occurred both in the “interface” between the UN agencies but also due to procedural issues in Government (government exchequer and tendering processes are lengthy and low institutional capacity was mentioned by the UN system as a cause of delay). Meanwhile government officials mentioned that UNDP procedures are cumbersome and caused delays<sup>100</sup>.

The findings sketched above point in the same direction to that of firmer conclusions reached in a recent evaluation of the DaO in Tanzania: “The very core of DaO (the joint programmes) is a multiple of existing initiatives and projects put together without an overall vision and strategy. In as much as being a practical gradual approach, this however has implications for programme efficiency and coherence. Despite some joint work, it is not fully clear that the UN in terms of programme design, implementation and management is ‘doing business’ in a new way. Stakeholders expect, specifically the Development Partners, that an implication of the UN reform and the new ‘business approach’ will result in reduced transaction costs, increased programme effectiveness and the creation of synergy effects. However, clear quantitative information is not available on what has been reduced and saved or where the value added is to be found. In fact, to some degree it appears that joint programming has meant an increase in internal UN transaction costs with an increase in time and resources spent in coordination”<sup>101</sup>.

98) UN agencies, UNHCR staff, it should also be mentioned that there were divergent views on this and the recently published NASCIP does not specify the exact modality and division of labour between the UNHCR and the other UN agencies.

99) The Evaluation visited infrastructure rehabilitation sites, had a meeting with the staff of the participating UN Agencies in Kigoma and had a focus group discussion with local government. An unsuccessful attempt was made to meet with representatives of the host communities. The host community interviews were with random villagers.

100) The interviews, site visit and materials available do not allow for an in-depth analysis.

101) Nordic Consulting Group (July 2010): Country Led Evaluation of the Delivering as One UN Pilot Initiative in Tanzania, p xiv.

At a different level the reported inefficiencies and friction within the UN agencies is about different mandates and different cultures. In relation to the implementation of Pillar 3 of TANCOS, the issue at stake is the change from a short-term humanitarian paradigm on the one hand to a longer-term development paradigm on the other. UNHCR staff interviewed both at regional and national level, recognised the role to be played by DaO in the implementation of Pillar 3 but also stressed a wish for UNHCR to stay engaged and have a visible role until the end of implementation of Pillar 3 in order to safeguard “the investment”. It was also said by UNHCR staff that there would be a need to engage other development partners at the same time, when working through the DaO mechanism, in order to ensure that implementation would be adequately resourced and that there would be a pressure on the UN system to deliver; a statement which basically reinforces the findings of the evaluation quoted above.

In the interview with the Evaluation, MoHA officials expressed concern about the delays of the Joint Project 6.1 and of development projects “of long-term capacity building character”, as being unsuitable for the purpose of refugee matters. The real need was said to be “for visible projects to be implemented fast and efficiently”<sup>102</sup>.

The joint UN work programme from 2011 (UNDAP) has included implementation of Pillar 3. With regard to expectations and capacity of the DaO to carry out the implementation and avoid delays such as those experienced in the JP 6.1, the Evaluation has not been able to form a solid view. The implementation has been marked by difficulties and delays, but it could be argued that the lessons learned and the country evaluation of the pilot initiative should lead to future improvements<sup>103</sup>.

### 6.4 Conclusions on partnerships

UNHCR has worked with a broad number of partners throughout the implementation. This is in line with the policy of UNHCR in search for durable solutions. UNHCR has been catalytic in policy processes at national level, in moving implementation forward and overcoming difficulties with some partners. This has included “payoffs” to local authorities and other officials such as the local police, who have received equipment and infrastructure to help smoothen relationships.

Implementing partners (mainly NGOs) find that the working relations with UNHCR have been smooth but also find that their knowledge has not been recognised and tapped by UNHCR. In their view this could have improved the quality of implementation. UNHCR agreed that this is a common shortcoming of the agency’s relationships with implementing partners.

Interviews found that both Government and international development partners find it valuable to cooperate with UNHCR, as the office in Tanzania was considered dynamic and action oriented. In MoHA it was said that the leadership in the UNHCR office during implementation had made a big difference, because it was so dynamic and engaging.

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102) Interview Refugee Department, MoHA.

103) The question was raised at a meeting with representatives from UN agencies in Dar es Salaam, the participants were, with a few exceptions, not senior staff and had no perspectives to offer in this respect.

UNHCR should be complimented for its ability to engage partners at different levels and in different capacities, both in connection with strategy development and in implementation of durable solutions for the protracted refugee situation.

UNHCR is committed to work through the DaO, but the JP 6.1 shows that the common approach and cooperation of the UN agencies has been difficult. The long-term capacity building approach and the implementation through the local government, with UNDP as the main government counterpart has been a different approach to the “fast contractor style” implementation practised by UNHCR. The implementation of JP 6.1 has been seriously delayed, also because of bureaucratic hurdles in the UN system and in the government system.

Pillar 3 will be part of the UNDAP and will be brought into the planning system of Government. Additionally, UNHCR wants to remain visible and closely monitor implementation, although UNHCR’s protection mandate does not extend to the reintegration of the NNTs, who are citizens of Tanzania. The authority of UNHCR is therefore a point to be considered if a monitoring role is established. It is the view of the Evaluation that UNHCR intends to see TANCOS being successfully concluded and raise concerns if and as necessary.

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## 7 Conclusions and assessment against the OECD-DAC criteria

This chapter presents conclusions by applying the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness, coordination and connectedness; effectiveness; and impact (to the extent possible) of TANCOS, the role of UNHCR and the HC initiative.

*Relevance* asks for an assessment of the validity of the objectives and the consistency of the internal logic of a programme (in this case the strategy) including the logic of the intended impacts and benefits. *Appropriateness* (criterion especially added in evaluation of humanitarian assistance) refers to the tailoring of humanitarian activities for example to local needs and increased ownership. Assessment of *coordination* includes answering whether the strategy, the HC's special initiative and the role of UNHCR have been coordinated with Government and key stakeholders. *Connectedness* deals with the question of whether there is a link between short- and medium-term activities on the one hand and longer term development goals on the other hand.

*Effectiveness* is understood as an assessment of whether the objectives are likely to be attained based on the planned outputs, as well as major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement. A key element in the assessment of effectiveness is timeliness.

Finally elements of expectations and potential *impact* of the strategy are assessed. TANCOS<sup>104</sup> mentions some anticipated impacts, which have not been possible to fully substantiate, partly because it is too early but also and more importantly, because the verification would require considerable resources. Impact is envisaged as:

1. The end of one of the most protracted refugee situations in Africa through voluntary and peaceful means (voluntary repatriation and naturalisation).
2. The dispersal and resettlement of the naturalised Tanzanians, helping to allay potential concerns over the existence of a substantial Burundian enclave in Central-western Tanzania.
3. Economic benefit to both Burundi and Tanzania from the influx and the liberation of a "highly productive, skilled and self sufficient agricultural and trading labour force"<sup>105</sup>
4. Return of 2,500 square kilometres of productive and reserve lands to the state. The forest systems, encroached on and damaged will have the opportunity of being rehabilitated. The infrastructure will be handed over in good state for use by the districts.

As the ambitions of impact are high and require considerable analysis based on data availability, the chapter only sketches the trends to the extent that these could be detected by the Evaluation.

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104) TANCOS IV, p 9. The terminology in TANCOS IV is slightly different from that used in other documents. In this section the wording of TANCOS IV is used, this document is quite explicit on the expected impact.

105) Ibid.

First, this chapter presents the overall conclusions and subsequently the chapter has sub-sections specific to the selected OECD-DAC criteria and Pillars one, two and three of TANCROSS.

### 7.1 Overall conclusions

TANCROSS was set in a unique historical context, which has been instrumental in formulating the options of the strategy and the strategy was driven by political will internally in the Tanzanian Government. UNHCR has played a catalytic role and been instrumental in the conceptualisation and implementation of the strategy. The solutions of TANCROSS have at a general level largely been in accordance with UNHCR's mandate under its Statute to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees. Moreover UNHCR has provided modalities and implementation capacity to the three pillars of the strategy in line with the mandate of UNHCR.

There are, however, reservations to the conclusion. These concern the reintegration process in Burundi, with the clause that if the Evaluation had been in Burundi the conclusion drawn in this respect could have been more nuanced. A second reservation relates to the linking of naturalisation (Pillar 2) and full integration of the newly naturalised citizens (Pillar 3). Pillar 3 includes two distinct steps, relocation from the settlements and local integration in new communities. The Government has decided only to issue the citizen certificates (of Pillar 2), once the relocation step of Pillar 3 has taken place. At present, this move leaves the newly naturalised Tanzanians in a situation, where their legal status and their rights are unclear. This should be of concern to UNHCR and other observers. The Evaluation finally flags concern that the strategy for Pillar 3 is vague on the locations that more than half of the affected families will be sent to and how and when in the process the NNTs can expect to receive their citizen certificates. This could have severe consequences for the future life situation of the NNTs and jeopardise the already acclaimed success of TANCROSS. The Evaluation is, on a cautionary note, of the view that full integration of the newly naturalised Tanzanians (Pillar 3), which is still at the planning stage, could become the most difficult part of the comprehensive solutions strategy to implement.

Following the conceptualisation and the launch of TANCROSS in the beginning of 2008 (January/February), the HC's special initiative on PRS included Tanzania as one of the five situations in the initiative (March 2008). In the initial phase of TANCROSS implementation, the initiative played a role in facilitating attention to the protracted refugee situation of Burundians in Tanzania. The HC's engagement attracted attention and visibility to the situation. Additionally, high-level missions helped to build a bridge of trust and support to the Government of Tanzania. The Prime Minister's participation in the Dialogue Meeting in Geneva in December 2008 is a case in point. TANCROSS is likely to have been implemented without the Special Initiative, but the initiative appears to have made a contribution for example in the trust and confidence building between the Tanzanian and the UNHCR leadership and international partners. The initiative is, however, no longer traceable among staff and other partners.

The efforts of implementing Pillar 1 and two have been impressive but Pillar 3 has been seriously delayed. A short timeline of two years was set for implementation of the strategy. During interviews of the Evaluation, it was acknowledged that the timeline was probably unrealistic but was set as a way to keep the momentum and to ensure that actions would be

taken swiftly in order to capitalise on the unprecedented opportunity of naturalisation<sup>106</sup>. The effectiveness of implementation seen in this perspective would therefore not do justice to the strategic considerations behind setting such a short timeline.

The internal coordination in the implementation of Pillar 1, repatriation and reintegration, was considered by UNHCR staff, by implementing partners and by the Tanzanian Government to be smooth and well coordinated at all levels. Nevertheless, the Evaluation is of the view that the unresolved situation for a large number of returnees in Burundi could possibly have been lessened, if UNHCR coordination between Burundi and Tanzania had been stronger. In Tanzania UNHCR was instrumental in ensuring that several in depth studies were carried out in 2007 to prepare the ground for implementation, but the situation for the particular circumstances for the 1972 group of refugees when returning to Burundi was not given due attention in this process. The Evaluation has not been able to determine the role of headquarters in these activities. It is proposed that a regional approach instead of a “two country office approach” could have led to a more appropriate and realistic assessment of the absorption capacity in Burundi.

The staff profiles and personalities of UNHCR at the time of strategy formulation were instrumental in UNHCR Tanzania “seizing the opportunity” to actively engage and pursue the durable solution offered by the Tanzanian Government and also in seeing the value addition of the HC’s special initiative as a boost to the process<sup>107</sup>. This has for the Evaluation raised the issue of the role played by UNHCR staff as catalysts in the development of strategies for durable solutions. The ability of UNHCR staff in such a situation to network with a broader range of stakeholders, to engage with Government and to take swift action on opportunities, seems to have played a major role.

UNHCR has also coordinated with a broader range of stakeholders, including the UN DaO partners, as it is envisaged in the overall strategic conceptualisation of seeking durable solutions to PRS<sup>108</sup>. Interviews showed that both Government and international development partners considered it valuable to partner with UNHCR, because the office in Tanzania was considered dynamic and action oriented. In MoHA it was said that the leadership in the UNHCR office during implementation had made a big difference, because it was dynamic and engaging. Implementing partners, i.e. NGOs voiced concern that their expertise and resources were not valued and exploited by UNHCR, they mentioned that they could add more value to implementation. The viewpoint was recognised by UNHCR, Tanzania. The implementing partners also found that high staff turnover in UNHCR hampered cooperation, UNHCR on their part found that implementing partners also had difficulties retaining qualified staff in the areas of implementation.

## 7.2 Pillar specific conclusions

### **Pillar 1 – conclusions**

In the broader geopolitical context, the peace process in Burundi had advanced to the extent that repatriation of Burundian refugees in general was relevant, but concern is raised

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106) Interviews with present and former UNHCR Tanzania staff and management; interviews with senior UNHCR staff and MoHA, Refugee Department.

107) This view came through strongly in interviews with Government officials, but also with UNHCR staff.

108) ExCom, Standing Committee 42<sup>nd</sup> Meeting: Protracted Refugee Situations: revisiting the problem (2 June 2008).

both with regard to the specific relevance and the appropriateness of the strategy in relation to the particular needs of the 1972 group.

Overall, those repatriated have faced considerable livelihood difficulties upon return, although the Evaluation cannot draw a conclusion for the group as a whole. It is likely that some have managed well upon return and repatriation has been relevant, but for a large part of the group there have been constraints, which questions the relevance of return. The appropriateness can also be questioned at a general level, because the preparation of the refugees for their return did not anticipate their special situation and needs. UNHCR should have paid more attention and resources to trace and avail accurate information about these difficulties.

Assessing *connectedness*, the repatriation was a short-term humanitarian type activity, but with a profound link to longer-term development, i.e. reintegration. The presumed prospect was to return to sustainable livelihoods, in line with what the returnees had been used to, when they lived in the settlements in Tanzania. This has not yet happened and could compromise the achievement of connectedness. The Government in Burundi, UNDP, UNHCR and other organisations in Burundi have responded to the situation and taken steps to alleviate the problems faced by the returnees. These efforts include promotion of permanent settlement for example in rural integrated villages and legal settlement of land rights issues for the returnees, as well as promotion of alternative livelihoods.

With regard to *effectiveness*, the expected result was that refugees would make a voluntary and informed choice, and that 46,000 Burundian refugees would be transported back in safety and dignity with their personal belongings. The repatriation issues of “practical” nature (such as luggage allowance and size cash grants) were resolved rather swiftly. The reintegration process has not been effective, as discussed above. This reflects a pattern of effectiveness being hampered in those parts of TANCOS, which are highly political. Access to land for the returnees is such a case. Implementation has been smooth and timely, when there is political backing and will, but effectiveness is immediately hampered when issues become political.

It was pointed out that there could be positive economic *impact* to the receiving communities in Burundi. The returnees are an injection of a “highly productive, skilled and self sufficient agricultural and trading labour force”<sup>109</sup>, into a depressed and resource scarce society. There could also be negative impacts of the voluntary repatriation, such as returnees to Burundi continuing to have difficulties in building sustainable livelihoods<sup>110</sup>. It was also said that school dropout is common for the returnees, because of a different education curriculum and language of instruction.

## **Pillar 2 – conclusions**

The naturalisation was a gesture from the Government, which was *relevant*, given the affiliation of the 1972 refugees group with Tanzania and the fact that the majority of the refugee population is born and has grown up in Tanzania. Relevance is also underscored by fact that about 80% of the settlement population, when asked in 2007 made the choice to become Tanzanian citizens. The naturalisation process was until recently handled in an *appropriate* manner with the decision to treat refugee applications for citizenship in an individual expedite process. Earlier naturalisation processes for refugees had

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109) TANCOS III, p 6.

110) This has also been discussed by NGO articles and in Chambeyron, Nathalie: Land Issues in the Context of Refugee Return to Burundi. School of African and Oriental Studies, September 2009.

been issued by Presidential Decree to groups “with the stroke of a pen”<sup>111</sup>, which had given legal complications downstream, first of all in relation to the citizenship of children.

More recently a major concern related to appropriateness has arisen in the interface between Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 of the strategy, when the Government decided to withhold the long awaited citizen certificates. This action also raises concern from a rights perspective. At the time of the Evaluation there appeared to be a state of insecurity and confusion among the NNTs in the settlements due to inadequate information sharing by UNHCR and the Government about the delays and actual contents of Pillar 3. UNHCR did not come forward as rights advocates for the NNTs. When asked by the Evaluation UNHCR staff pointed out that it was strategically more important for UNHCR to conclude the strategy for Pillar 3 in good cooperation with the Government and to ensure the respect of the rights of the NNTs in the strategy rather than engaging resources (more than done already) in the immediate situation. The rights advocacy role has been taken on by civil society and national and international observers.

With regard to *connectedness*, naturalisation is by nature a long-term development measure. This is particularly the case with the “expedite” process adopted in TANCOS, because it follows normal procedures for naturalisation and gives the NNTs equal terms with other persons being naturalised. Nevertheless, the long-term and potentially sustainable nature of naturalisation could be jeopardised in the event that citizen certificates are not issued to the NNTs.

The expected results of Pillar 2 and thus the measure of *effectiveness* are the objectives that refugees would be well informed about the naturalisation process and procedures, and that 172,000 Burundian refugees would have Tanzanian citizenship through an expedited process by early 2009. The results as of June 2010 (with a minor difference in actual numbers in relation to the plan) confirm that the processes have more or less been completed on time. This part of the strategy has therefore been effectively managed and the outputs have been achieved through a tremendous work effort.

Naturalisation could have both positive and negative *impact* on refugees and host communities. The new citizens of Tanzania can potentially establish themselves everywhere and access education and employment opportunities on equal terms with others. There has also been a major institutional capacity building process at the Department of the Immigration in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is assessed to have a sustainable impact.

### **Pillar 3 – conclusions**

The overall *relevance* of Pillar 3 is questioned by the Evaluation, but relocation and local integration have been premises for TANCOS throughout.

The relevance also differs between stakeholder groups. The Tanzanian Government has driven the relocation and local integration forward in order to avoid a Burundian enclave. From the refugees’ point of view one might question the relevance of forcefully removing people from the location where they have settled and integrated both economically, socially and culturally over the past almost 40 years.

The strategy for Pillar 3 takes on a broad partnership approach and envisages the implementation to be in the hands of the Government and UN DaO with UNHCR playing a role in protection and monitoring. This is considered relevant for UNHCR given the

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111) Wording used by a senior UNHCR official in an interview with the Evaluation.

organization's mandate. The strategy divides the population of the settlements into segments according to their characteristics and needs for assistance and protection.

The *appropriateness* of the future implementation hinges on a dignified relocation (including movement of persons, assets), and suitable local integration for the families (access to land), including the attitude and social acceptance by local authorities and host communities. The strategy is vague on the key issue of where, when and how the citizen certificates will be issued, which could jeopardize the appropriateness.

Full integration is by nature a long-term development process and this signals *connectedness* in principle. The strategy recognises the non-humanitarian actors mainly the Government, the UN DaO partners and other partners as key to successful implementation. Some efforts, although with several difficulties, are observed attempting to bridge the short-term humanitarian and the longer-term development modalities of operation, the UN DaO project, JP 6.1 in North-western Tanzania serves an example.

Originally the target was that naturalised refugees would be integrated in their new host communities by the end of 2010. This timeframe has changed to the end of 2014. A plan of operation is presently being elaborated and will present the different actions (activities and outputs), the sequencing and the timeline of implementation. The complication of the strategy and the need to thoroughly prepare the different elements of the strategy is recognised. One major complication in relation to *effectiveness* lies in the different conditions meeting the families. With such a large number being relocated and to different areas of the country, it is likely that "full integration" will only have been effectively implemented many years after the closure of the strategy implementation.

The community representatives in the vicinity of the settlements interviewed by the Evaluation on the expected *impact*, found that closing of the settlements could lead to an unwanted reduction in produce flowing to the local markets, a decline in social services because of out-migration of a part of the population in the district, and to declining revenues of the local governments. A research project carried out at the University of Dar es Salaam has found in North-western Tanzania that the positive impacts of refugee presence outweigh the negative impacts. The presence of refugees in those areas has brought positive impacts such as improved social services especially health services; improved physical infrastructure (roads, airstrips, water facilities) as well as economic development (markets for agricultural produce). On the negative side the study mentions insecurity and large number of weapons found in local communities<sup>112</sup>.

The expectations of the NNTs showed that they did not have much information on what was going to happen. Their views were that relocation and local integration could lead to loss of family ties, traditions and culture, and negative economic effects to the NNTs. For some people relocation was also seen as an opportunity to move on, and UNHCR staff mentioned that young persons expected to leave farming and go to town.

### 7.3 Lessons learned

Several lessons can be drawn from the Tanzanian experience. The lessons do not claim to be universal in scope, but should only be seen as sources of inspiration for other UNHCR offices and governments facing similar challenges:

112) [www.refugees.org/article/The\\_Impact\\_of\\_refugees\\_on\\_Tanzania](http://www.refugees.org/article/The_Impact_of_refugees_on_Tanzania).

*Strong commitment of top-level officials in the Tanzanian Government.* The Government was the driving force and played a crucial role in shaping durable solutions for the protracted refugee situation. Finding durable solutions to refugee situations can only be achieved if governments are driving the process and are supportive – i.e. political will and leadership is key.

*Appropriate timing.* The implementation of a durable solutions strategy in Tanzania illustrates that several factors have to be in place in order to move forward. The ongoing peace process in Burundi and the political will to find durable solutions both from the Burundian Government and the Tanzanian Government created a window of opportunity to draw up the strategy and embark on implementation. Repatriation is only possible if there is peace and stability in the country of origin, and naturalisation is only possible if the political will is present in the host country.

*Presence of a UNHCR country team with strong networking and engagement skills.* This point was reiterated again and again in interviews and was found to be crucial in initiating the discussions with the Tanzanian Government and in reaching an agreement for the Burundian refugees. The staff configuration seems to have been incidental rather than strategic. In the future, UNHCR could consider applying a more systematic deployment of staff members with professional experience in acting as “catalysts” to find solutions in protracted refugee situations.

*Need for a regional approach by UNHCR.* A regional approach instead of a “two country office approach” with the particular perspectives of national policies could have led to a more appropriate and realistic assessment of the absorption capacity in Burundi. UNHCR’s advocacy role could also have been more balanced than was the case.

*The importance of undertaking a thorough contextual analysis.* It is proposed (without having analysed the Burundi operation first hand) that the reintegration difficulties in Burundi could have been better assessed and analysed beforehand, if the coordination had been stronger. The situation in Tanzania was well studied but the reintegration problems appear to have been underestimated. UNHCR’s catalytic role in the process could have been more balanced if the situation and in particular the constraints of reintegration in Burundi, had been thoroughly analysed and advocacy for a durable solution had been based on a fuller picture.

*The need to carefully assess when a durable solution has actually been successfully accomplished.* TANCOSS is already being communicated as a success story, although the most difficult steps are still ahead. Politicisation of the strategy and delays associated with this could jeopardise the completion of the strategy with the unfortunate end result that the expected solution is not durable. This would have disastrous consequences and turn an existing durable solution – experienced by the 1972 group of refugees having lived in the settlements in Tanzania for about 40 years, into a situation resembling internal displacement.

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# Annex 1 Terms of Reference

## Protracted refugee situation evaluations

### Evaluation of UNHCR's role in the Burundian refugee situation in Tanzania

#### 1. Background and rationale

In 2008, the High Commissioner (HC) launched a Special Initiative on Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) to promote durable solutions and improvements in the life of refugees in protracted refugee situations.

The HC's Initiative focuses on five situations in different parts of the world where refugees have been living in exile for long periods of time. As a part of the Initiative, a number of country-specific strategies and work plans were established. A commitment was also made to '*review the overall progress of the PRS Initiative and report on its findings and recommendations in 2010*'. This will be done by undertaking country-based evaluations in four of the five targeted protracted refugee situations:

- Croatian refugees in Serbia (*Amended August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2010*);
- Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh;
- Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan and;
- Burundian refugees in Tanzania.

The Afghan situation has been excluded for the time being due to security considerations.

#### 2. Overall purpose and objectives

The overall aims of the evaluations are:

- to assess how effectively UNHCR has exercised its mandate in finding durable solutions for refugees;
- to determine whether the search for solutions has been consistent with UNHCR's protection mandate;
- to examine the catalytic role UNHCR has played in engaging other players in the resolution of the refugee situation;
- to assess the progress UNHCR has made in improving the quality of life for the refugees;

- to identify examples of good practice, innovative approaches and lessons learned.

### 3. Background to PRS evaluation in Tanzania

For over a decade the United Republic of Tanzania has hosted the largest number of refugees in Africa, with Burundian refugees constituting the largest single group. Burundian refugees have come in several waves, firstly in 1972 when internal conflict drove a mass of people out of the country – the majority to Tanzania, where 220,000 people continue to live in three designated settlements in central and western Tanzania, known as the ‘Old Settlements’.

These people are in a different situation to those who arrived later as the 1972 refugees have lost all claims to their land and assets in Burundi, many of them have lived in Tanzania for 35 years or were born there (82%) and have developed cultural, economic and kinship ties to Tanzania. Furthermore, the approach to these refugees was quite different, with settlements laid out as planned villages and each household allocated a few acres of land for cultivation.

Settlements achieved agricultural and economic self sufficiency fairly rapidly and stopped receiving any form of international assistance in 1985. They are now administered by the Government of Tanzania through the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In 2007 Tanzania indicated its intention to close the Old Settlements. As a result a tripartite Commission of the Governments of Burundi and Tanzania, and UNHCR, established an Old Settlements Task Force (OSTF) to find durable solutions to these people’s displacement.

UNHCR organized a census and an individual registration, through which the intention of refugees was recorded. In addition a detailed study was made of their social, demographic and economic situation. On the basis of this the OSTF developed a durable solutions programme based on three components:

1. Voluntary repatriation and re-integration in Burundi for those who wish to return (20%)
2. Naturalisation of refugees who wish to stay in Tanzania (80%), and
3. Full social and economic integration of the newly naturalized citizens including relocation to other areas of Tanzania.

Later influxes of Burundian refugees in the 1990s have been hosted in refugee camps in the north western part of Tanzania, which hosted 340,000 people for over ten years. With peace and stability returning to Burundi, an organized repatriation programme assisting refugees cover the immediate needs during the actual relocation (transport of people and assets) and the initial repatriation period (food, non-food items, cash grant, legal aid, and shelter for vulnerable groups), coupled with the Tanzanian Government decision to close down all camps, the number of Burundian refugees in camps has reduced significantly. Only one camp – the Mtabila camp – remains open providing protection and essential services for the residual population of Burundian 35,000 refugees.

#### 4. Objective of Tanzania evaluation

The overall objective of the evaluation will be to address the key questions outlined in the generic ToR and above, i.e. assess:

- how UNHCR has exercised its mandate in finding durable solutions, i.e. the role and contribution of UNHCR in the design and implementation of the durable solution strategies in Tanzania, particularly the naturalisation and full integration strategies;
- the catalytic role UNHCR has played in engaging other players, in particular the Governments as well as UN and donors through the Deliver as One UN process (to which Tanzania is a pilot);
- the progress it has made in improving the quality of refugee life.

In addition to this the objective of the Tanzania evaluation will be to assess each of the three durable solution strategies in terms of:

- the relevance and appropriateness of the strategies to refugees themselves and to other relevant stakeholders such as host communities, local and national government;
- the effectiveness of the strategies in achieving their stated goals and the role and adequacy of UNHCR support to these processes;
- the link between short and medium term activities and objectives of repatriation and integration strategies on one hand and longer term development goals on the other.

#### 5. Scope of evaluation

*Interventions:* The evaluation will cover all three strategies for durable solutions. While the strategy on naturalisation, and the strategy on full social and economic integration are only relevant to the 1972 group of Burundian refugees living in the ‘Old Settlements’, the strategy on voluntary repatriation pertains to all Burundian refugees, both the 1972 group as well as later Burundian refugees based in camps. The repatriation strategy has, however, been applied slightly differently between the ‘Old settlements’ and the camps. An assessment of the repatriation strategy will therefore need to distinguish between the two approaches.

*Timeframe:* While the Special Initiative of the High Commissioner was initiated in December 2008, the evaluation will cover a longer time period from 2007 when the Tanzania Government announced its intention of closing down the Old Settlements and the OSTF was established. The period from 2007 and onwards also covers the time when significant repatriation of refugees in camps took place.

*Evaluation criteria:* A subset of the five standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria will be applied, in particular relevance and effectiveness and to some extent impact (see section on methodology) as well as a subset of the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria developed for

evaluating humanitarian action in complex emergencies, in particular appropriateness, coordination and connectedness i.e. the extent to which UNHCR has been able to engage Government and other stakeholders with more long term development agendas to 'take over' when UNHCR support ceases.

*Evaluation questions:* Below follows a list of nine main evaluation questions as well as suggested sub-questions pertaining to each of these. While the first three questions are not evaluation questions in themselves but more background and contextual information necessary to understand the subsequent more investigative and analytical evaluation questions, they have however been included in the list below in order to provide a full overview of the issues expected to be covered in the evaluation report.

### *Background (contextual information)*

- i) Outline the overall historical context of the refugee situation as well as the current refugee situation:
  - Reasons behind, scope and timing of refugee migration flows; current location, profile, and situation of refugees; impact on host communities.
- ii) Describe the operational environment in which UNHCR and other partners work:
  - Political / social / economic / and security environment; the national asylum climate; how the formal legal framework, as well as the existing informal structures have affected the PRS and influenced people's lives.
- iii) Describe the durable solutions strategy in general and the three specific durable solution strategies for refugees in Tanzania – voluntary repatriation, naturalisation and full integration:
  - Rationale for the Special Initiative in Tanzania. Is the initiative appropriate and in line with UNHCR's principles and AGDM strategy?
  - Underlying assumptions (programme theory), planned activities, and expected results of each of the three strategies.

### *Evaluation questions*

- iv) What is the relevance and appropriateness of the durable solution strategies to refugees as well as other key stakeholders?
  - What motivated the Governments of Tanzania and Burundi to engage in durable solutions? What role did UNHCR play in bringing about the durable solutions strategy? What determined the mix of strategies?
  - To which extent have the interests and needs of different key stakeholders (national and local government, host communities, refugees themselves including vulnerable groups within those societies) been taken into account and reflected in the durable solution strategies?

- v) How effective has the implementation of the durable solutions strategy been in undertaking the planned activities and achieving the anticipated results? How relevant and appropriate have the activities been?
- What is progress and achievements compared with the expected results?
  - Which constraints or challenges to implementation exist and to which extent are they related to logistical bottle necks, capacity and experience of UNHCR and other partners, coordination, resource allocation etc.?
  - Was the assistance provided by UNHCR to the repatriation process, the naturalisation process and the integration process appropriate and adequate? To which extent did it meet the (short/medium/long term) needs of refugees including vulnerable groups. To which extent did it contribute to capacity building of local authorities?
- vi) How has the internal coordination been in UNHCR?
- Degree of internal coordination and support between UNHCR field offices operating in the countries of origin and in host countries, as well as the relevance and effectiveness of support provided by HQ?
- vii) What has been the role of partnerships in the planning and implementation of the PRS – UNHCR's role in engaging different stakeholders?
- To what extent was UNHCR's strategy developed a part of a broader inter-agency assessment and planning process – what role has the Delivering as One process played?
  - Establishment of effective partnerships with national and local government authorities, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders? Did UNHCR play a catalytic role in bringing about these partnerships?
  - Do other agencies see any added value in partnering with UNHCR? Is there potential for greater collaboration?
  - Did UNHCR make any effort for responsible disengagement including capacity building of key partners? If not, is there potential for measured disengagement and the handing over of responsibilities to other partners?
- viii) To what extent has UNHCR and the Special Initiative on PRS influenced or contributed to the implementation of durable solutions in Tanzania:
- Who are the movers and drivers of the durable solutions strategy (stakeholder analysis)? What has been the role and manoeuvre room for UNHCR and has its role changed over time?
  - To which extent has UNHCR exploited the full potential for the promotion of durable solutions, are there any missed opportunities?

- ix) What difference if any has the High Commissioners Special Initiative on PRS made compared with what was already planned in the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS) launched in March 2008.
- ix) To what extent have the durable solution strategies contributed to improvements in the quality of life of Burundian refugees?
- What are the expectations of different stakeholders to the repatriation process and the naturalisation process, what are these expectations based on, how realistic are they, and what role has UNHCR played in shaping the expectations?
  - What difference has the repatriation process made to the lives of the returned Burundian refugees? To which degree have their expectations been met?
  - What are the possible positive and negative implications of the integration strategy for the newly naturalized former Burundian refugees?
  - How does UNHCR plan to protect the rights of newly naturalized former refugees and promote the full implementation of the planned integration activities, once they start to be relocated? What role does UNHCR play in the debate on whether and where to relocate the former Burundian refugees?

## 6. Methodology

The evaluation will be based on a triangulation of methods including:

- a *desk review* of relevant documents, UNHCR documents will be reviewed as well as documents and reports from external partners such as NGOs, Government and other international organizations;
- *interviews* with UNHCR staff in Geneva;
- *country mission* including interviews with UNHCR staff in Tanzania, staff from relevant organizations such as civil society, government at national and local level, donors etc. and focus group discussions with district staff as well as with refugees in the Mtabila camp and in one or more of the three 'Old Settlements' disaggregated on the basis of *age, gender* and diversity.

### *Distinction between UNHCR support in general and the PRS initiative*

As the durable solutions strategies for Burundian refugees in Tanzania were planned before the launch of the High Commissioners PRS initiative, the evaluation will to a large extent focus on the role UNHCR has played in the development and implementation of these strategies, and the lessons that can be drawn from this irrespective of whether Tanzania was part of the special initiative or not. Only the last concluding question will address the issue, of whether the inclusion of Tanzania as one of the five targeted countries for the special initiative on PRS has actually had any influence on the durable solutions work in Tanzania or not.

### *Limitations*

The impact of the durable solution strategies on refugees, can only be dealt with in an indirect manner. As fieldwork is confined to Tanzania, it will not be possible to conduct

interviews with refugees who have already repatriated to Burundi. Information on how the strategy has influenced their lives will therefore need to be based on i) secondary data such as existing reports, studies, surveys, ii) anecdotal evidence from refugees still in Tanzania but in contact with friends or relatives already repatriated in Burundi, and iii) possibly telephone interviews with the UNHCR Burundi office and possibly relevant district offices (with many returnees).

In relation to the naturalisation and local integration strategy the relocation of newly naturalized citizens has not yet been implemented and it is therefore too early to evaluate the actual impact of the strategy. Instead the evaluation will need to discuss the possible implications of the integration strategy on refugees as well as on local communities in terms of economic, social, cultural and environmental implications.

## 7. Evaluation team

The evaluation will be undertaken by a two person team of external consultants, an international team leader and a national team member. This team will be supported by two resource persons from UNHCR HQ, a staff member from respectively OSTs and PDES.

## 8. Output

The evaluation will lead to the preparation of a report providing specific recommendations for the durable solutions programme, generic lessons learned and good practice examples. The report should not exceed 35 pages (excluding annexes) and must be accompanied by a summary of findings and recommendations.

## 9. Reporting and timing

The evaluation will be undertaken during the period April-August 2010. The following workplan outlines timing of key milestones:

<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Submit <b>Inception report</b>	8 June, 2010
Comments from Management Group to Inception Report	8 June, 2010
Submit <b>Draft Report</b>	2 July, 2010
Comments from Management Group to Draft Report	16 July, 2010
Submit <b>Final Draft Report</b>	30 July, 2010
Comments by Management Group to Final Draft Report	13 August, 2010
Submit <b>Final Report</b>	20 August, 2010

## 10. Management and funding

The evaluation will be managed jointly by the Policy Development and Evaluations Serv-

ices (PDES) in UNHCR and the Evaluation Department (EVAL) in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Participation of UNHCR staff members in the evaluation missions will be funded by their respective units. Consulting fees, travel expenses and DSA for the two consultants will be covered by EVAL. Please refer to 'Agreement between the Evaluation Department in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNHCR regarding the Tanzania Evaluation' for further details.

### **11. Norms and standards**

The evaluation will be undertaken in accordance with UNHCR's evaluation policy, as well as the UN Evaluation Group's Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN system and the UNEG Code of Conduct.

Copenhagen, June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

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## Annex 2 List of Persons Interviewed

Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders (refugees, host communities, local authorities, national authorities and UNHCR). Moreover were NGOs/think tanks and development partners' country missions interviewed. The Evaluation's time in the field was limited with the result that interviews with host communities but also with refugees were given insufficient time.

Interviews have included UNHCR staff (headquarters, country offices – the Burundi office was interviewed by telephone – and field levels), senior advisers to UNHCR in Tanzania and the former Representative to Tanzania (by telephone). A telephone interview was also held with the Head of the Africa Bureau in UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva.

In central government the Evaluation interviewed senior management in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Refugee and Immigration departments) and the Coordinator for local integration in Office of the Prime Minister (PMO-RALG). Heads of local governments or their representatives and relevant departments were interviewed in Kigoma (regional level), and Kasulu and Mpanda (district level). This was in the form of large meetings.

Interviews with implementing partners were carried out in Dar es Salaam and in the field (focus groups). Interviews with development partner representations were held in Dar es Salaam and UN organizations were interviewed in Kigoma (specifically for the Joint Programme 6.1). For the implementation of Pillar 3, the Evaluation met representatives from the UN agencies in Dar es Salaam.

Refugees and host communities were interviewed in focus groups both in and around Mtabila camp and in and around Katumba settlement. The refugees interviewed in Katumba settlement were grouped by: youth, women and men (the latter were selected headmen), this was followed by interviews with three families in their homes. The host communities around Katumba settlement were both randomly selected for interviews as well as a group of persons with considerable status in Mpanda, who had been following the naturalisation process closely were interviewed.

1	Judith Vicky Mtawali	Director, Ministry of Home Affairs Refugee Services
2	Harrison Mseke	Assistant Director, Ministry of Home Affairs Refugee Services
3	Yacoub El Hillo	Former UNHCR Representative Tanzania
4	Oluseyi Bajulaiye	Representative UNHCR Tanzania
5	Andrew Mbogori	Snr. Field Coordinator, UNHCR Tanzania
6	Guido Ambroso	Snr. Programme Officer UNHCR Tanzania
7	James Tremayne	Local Integration Advisor UNHCR Tanzania
8	Prof. Bonaventure Rutinwa	Naturalisation Advisor UNHCR Tanzania
9	Ron Mponda	Snr. Protection Officer UNHCR Tanzania
10	Bernadette Castel	Head of Office UNHCR Kigoma
11	Makkonen Tesfaye	Programme Officer UNHCR Kasulu Tanzania
12	Kamanga	Centre for study of forced migration
13	Ilham Abdullayev	Former Old Settlements field coordinator
14	Freddy Nisajile	Liason Officer Ministry of Home Affairs Mtabila Camp

## ANNEX 2 LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

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15	Augustino Kalinga	Project Coordinator Ministry of Regional administration & local government.
16	Anthony Jaco Nyango	Assistant Administrative Secretary Regional Commissioner Office Kigoma
17	Betty Machange	District Commissioner, Kasulu
18	Oswald Kasaizi	Director Relief to Development Society
19	Mark Leverii	Director Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services
20	Harold G. Sungusia	Director of Advocacy & Reform Legal & Human Rights Centre
21	Clemens Hach	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission
22	Hasegwa Toshihisa	Snr. Representative JICA Tanzania
23	Katsuta Yukihinde	Chief Representative JICA Tanzania
24	Emiko Nishimura	Representative JICA Tanzania
25	Pia Weurlander	Political Attache, Delegation of the European Union
26	Niels Vestergaard Knudsen	Acting Program Manager, UN Joint Program 6.1 UNDP Kigoma
27	Clementine Awu, Nkweta Salami	Representative UNHCR Burundi
28	Germaine Bationo	Deputy Representative UNHCR Burundi.
29	Sophie Muller	Snr. Protection Officer UNHCR Burundi
30	Francois Marrillet	Snr. Programme Officer UNHCR Burundi
31	Focus group	Host community Mtabila Kasulu
32	Focus group	Refugees Mtabila camp Kasulu
33	Focus group	Implementing partners Kasulu
34	Focus group	UNHCR Kasulu
35	Focus group	District officials Kasulu
36	Focus group	Newly Naturalized Katumba Old Settlement
37	Focus group	Host Community Mpanda
38	Focus group	UNHCR Mpanda
39	Focus group	Village headmen Katumba Old Settlement
40	Bjarne Sørensen	Ambassador of Denmark
41	Par Liljert	Chief of Mission IOM
42	Carl B. Fox	US Embassy
43	Sajjad Malik	Chief OPS Solutions & Trans Section UNHCR Geneva
44	Vicky Tennant	Snr. Policy Officer
45	Mathhews Crentsil	Snr. Desk Officer C. Africa, G. Lakes & W. Africa
46	Daimu S. Mkwawa	UN Capital Development Fund
47	Ulf Flink	UNDP Governance Officer
48	Courtesy call	Regional Officials Kigoma
49	Penina Sangiwa	UNICEF Officer Kigoma
50	Noriko Kominami	Head of UNICEF Office in Kigoma
51	Abebe Hankore	Head of UN WFP Sub-Office in Kigoma
52	William Mwakyami	Programme Assistant, UNIDO Office in Kigoma
53	George Okoth-Obbo	Head of Africa Bureau, UNHCR, Geneva

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## Annex 3 List of Documents

Written sources to cover the Burundi reintegration have been used to the extent that these have been relevant, however, one caveat should be noted. The documentation dealing with the particular issues facing the 1972 group is limited. A major study of the refugees reintegrated in Burundi between 2002 and 2008 was initially assumed to be a key source on reintegration (i.e. the “Impact Evaluation of PRM Humanitarian Assistance to the Repatriation and Reintegration of Burundi Refugees (2003-08)” by Terra P. Group Inc, September 2008). However, this study was carried out before the repatriation of the 1972 group and therefore does not include their particular problems of integration. An evaluation of the use of cash grants in UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation and reintegration programme in Burundi (“Money Matters”, July 2009) has been very valuable for the Evaluation in trying to cover aspects of reintegration. Thesis work on “Land issues in the context of refugee return to Burundi” by Nathalie Chambeyron, September 2009, as well as selected articles and status reports from UNHCR have also provided relevant insights into the land issue.

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## Annex 4 Itinerary of the Fieldwork

<b>Sunday 6 June: Arrival in Dar es Salaam</b>	
Overnight Movenpick Hotel	
<b>Monday 7 June: Dar es Salaam</b>	
10.00 - 12.00	Briefing and presentations by UNHCR senior staff (UNHCR Conference Room)
12.30 - 13.30	Meeting with the Refugee Department (Ministry of Home Affairs)
13.30	Lunch
Overnight Movenpick Hotel	
<b>Tuesday 8 June: Dar es Salaam</b>	
08.30 - 10.00	Visit to the Citizenship Processing Unit (Immigration Department)
10.30 - 12.00	Meeting with NGOs: Relief to Development Society/REDESO and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services/TCRS (UNHCR Conference Room)
12.00 - 13.30	Lunch
13.30 - 14.30	Meeting with the Centre for Legal and Human Rights
17.00 - 17.15	Phone interview with Dr. Kamanga from the Center for the Study of Forced Migration (University of Dar es Salaam)
Overnight Movenpick Hotel	
<b>Wednesday 9 June: Dar es Salaam – Mwanza – Kigoma</b>	
06.30 - 09.20	Commercial flight to Mwanza
09.30 - 11.15	UNHCR flight Mwanza-Kigoma
11.30 - 11.45	Courtesy call to the Assistant Administrative Secretary from District Commissioner's Office
12.00 - 13.00	Briefing at UNHCR Liaison Office Kigoma
13.00 - 14.00	Lunch
14.00 - 15.30	Meeting with UN team in Kigoma (UNHCR Conference Room)
Overnight in Lake Tanganyika Hotel	
<b>Thursday 10 June: Kigoma – Kasulu</b>	
07.30 - 09.30	Drive from Kigoma to Kasulu
09.30 - 10.00	Courtesy call on the Kasulu District Commissioner
10.00 - 11.00	Meeting with UNHCR Kasulu
11.00 - 11.30	Drive to Mtabila camp for Burundian refugees
11.30 - 13.00	Visit the camp
13.00 - 14.30	Drive through Muyovosi closed refugee camp and visit rehabilitation activities implemented under the UN Delivering as One Joint Programme 'From Humanitarian Assistance to Sustainable Development in North-western Tanzania', interact with host community
14.30 - 15.00	Drive back to Kasulu
Overnight in Kasulu Motel	

<b>Friday 11 June: Kasulu-Mpanda</b>	
Morning	Focus Group discussions (UNHCR Conference Room)
12.00 - 13.00	UNHCR flight Kasulu-Mpanda
13.00 - 13.30	Courtesy call to the Mpanda District Assistant Administrative Secretary
13.30 - 14.30	Lunch
14.30 - 15.30	Meeting with UNHCR Mpanda (UNHCR Conference Room)
15.30	Focus group discussions (UNHCR Conference Room)
	Overnight UNHCR Guesthouse
<b>Saturday 12 June: Mpanda-Mwanza-Dar es Salaam</b>	
08.30 - 09.30	Drive to Katumba settlement for former Burundian refugees from 1972
09.30 - 12.30	Visit Katumba settlement: interact with newly-naturalized, host community and visit UNHCR community support activities
12.30 - 13.30	Drive back to Mpanda and visit UNHCR community support activities along the way
13.30 - 14.30	Lunch
14.30 - 16.30	UNHCR flight Mpanda-Mwanza
20.00 - 22.10	Commercial flight Mwanza-Dar es Salaam
	Overnight Movenpick Hotel
<b>Sunday 13 June: Dar es Salaam</b>	
<b>Monday 14 June: Dar es Salaam</b>	
10.00 - 11.00	Meeting with Representatives of the Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government (UNHCR Office)
14.00 - 15.00	Meeting at European delegation with Ms. Pia Weurlander, Political Officer
15.30 - 16.30	Meeting at US Embassy with Mr. Carl Fox, Head of Political and Economic Affairs
	Overnight Movenpick Hotel
<b>Tuesday 15 June: Dar es Salaam</b>	
10.00 - 11.00	Meeting with Danish Ambassador, H.E. Bjarne H. Sørensen
11.30 - 12.00	Meetings with JICA, Tanzania
	Overnight Movenpick Hotel
<b>Wednesday 16 June: Dar es Salaam</b>	
11.00 - 12.00	Meeting with UN Delivering as One counterparts in Dar es Salaam (UNDP Conference Room 3006)
13.00 - 14.00	Teleconference with UNHCR Senior Management in Burundi
14.00 - 16.00	Debriefing meeting UNHCR senior staff (UNHCR Conference Room)
	Return flight to Geneva

## Annex 5 Implementation Progress

Progress on the implementation of planned actions<sup>113</sup>

### Pillar 1: Voluntary Repatriation and re-integration in Burundi

Expected results:	Results as of June 2010
Refugees make a voluntary and informed choice.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 218,234 refugees in the Old Settlements registered. Intension survey done.</li> <li>- 20% of the refugees from the Old Settlements initially indicated a wish to return to Burundi but later, people opting for return increased to 25%.</li> <li>- Registration started for Burundian refugees from 1972 spontaneously settled in Kigoma Region.</li> </ul>
Over 46,000 Burundian refugees are transported in safety and dignity with their personal belongings, including livestock, by the end of September 2009.	53,600 refugees repatriated to Burundi.
Upon repatriation, returnees receive an individual cash grant, benefit from relief items, food and non-food depending on their specific needs, as well as temporary accommodation for those without land or homes.	On-going
Returnees are fully integrated into their return communities.	

### Pillar 2: Naturalisation

Expected results:	Results as of June 2010
Refugees are well-informed about the naturalisation process and procedures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 164,449 refugees from the Old Settlement applied for naturalisation.</li> <li>- Registration started for Burundian refugees from 1972 spontaneously settled in Kigoma Region.</li> </ul>
Some 172,000 Burundian refugees have obtained Tanzanian citizenship through an expedited process by early 2009.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 164,449 applications were submitted.</li> <li>- Of the above, 162,256 refugees were granted citizenship (98.7%) by April 2010.</li> </ul>

113) The “expected results” columns are excerpt from “Protracted Refugee Situations, High Commissioner’s Initiative”, pp.26-30, UNHCR 2008.

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**Pillar 3: Full integration of newly naturalized citizens**


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<b>Expected results:</b>	<b>Results as of June 2010</b>
Community-based projects enhance existing local infrastructure through the UN Delivering as One initiative and direct support provided from bi-lateral and multi-lateral development players.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Government plan on local integration was endorsed on 22 June 2010. Over 50 districts in 16 regions were selected to receive NNTs.</li> <li>- Therefore, no action in ‘new’ places but host community support was initiated in regions of the Old Settlements, including activities on environment, rehabilitation of community infrastructure and upgrading of an air-field.</li> <li>- Delivering as One programme titled “Managing Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Sustainable Development in NWT” being piloted in a community hosting Burundian refugees from the 1990’s.</li> <li>- A bilateral agency (JICA) and donors approached to support ‘new’ host communities.</li> </ul>
Peaceful and harmonious integration and co-existence is evident in host areas.	See above.
Local Government is capacitated to assume ownership for the inputs provided to the communities.	See above.

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
## Annex 6 Stakeholders' Relation to TANCOS

The overview below shows the interests of different stakeholders in relation to the three pillars of the comprehensive solutions strategy. It is not all stakeholders who are partners with UNHCR, and some stakeholders, i.e. think tanks/NGOs keep a distance to the process but visit the settlements occasionally and are opinion makers.

### Simplified overview of stakeholders' interest in support to TANCOS (as found by the Evaluation)

<b>Pillar 1: Voluntary repatriation</b>	<b>Pillar 2: Naturalisation</b>	<b>Pillar 3: Local Integration</b>
OSTF	OSTF	OSTF
National Government (MoHA)	National Government (MoHA)	National Government (PMO-RALG)
Affected local governments	Affected local governments	Affected local governments
Security committees	Local security committees	Local security committees
UNHCR	UNHCR	UNHCR
Implementing partners	Implementing partners	Implementing partners
Host communities	Host communities	Host communities
Refugees (20%)	Refugees (80%)	Newly-Naturalised Tanzanians
Host communities Burundi	Host communities Burundi	Host communities Burundi
Local governments Burundi	Local governments Burundi	Local governments Burundi
Government of Burundi	Government of Burundi	Government of Burundi
International development partners	International development partners	International development partners
Think tanks/NGOs	Think tanks/NGOs	Think tanks/NGOs

*Note: The colour coding shows light grey for positive engagement; medium grey for those who do not visibly express their interest and the dark grey shows resistance. No colour shading refers to the evaluation team not having interviewed. This overview is based on perceptions gathered during interviews.*



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