EVALUATION REPORT EV652

EVALUATION OF DFID COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

SYNTHESIS REPORT

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John Gray
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July 2004

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development.
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PREFACE

This programme of study represents DFID’s first evaluation of DFID planning and delivery at country programme level. The study was developed both to address a gap in DFID’s evaluation coverage and to respond to the growing demand across DFID for systematic lesson learning at country level. The case for country level studies was additionally supported by conclusions reached in a National Audit Office study ‘Department for International Development: Performance Management – Helping to Reduce World Poverty, March 2002’.

The evaluation programme was designed by Evaluation Department as a pilot activity with two specific aims:

1) to develop approaches and methodologies appropriate for the evaluation of DFID programmes at the country level

2) to assess the relevance, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of DFID country programmes in achieving intermediate development impacts.

The programme was designed to cover the period 1997, the creation of DFID as an independent government department, to 2003.

To fully address the study aims it was decided that the pilot exercise would encompass multiple country programmes, thereby enabling the study team to compare and contrast a range of evaluation approaches. Equally important, by evaluating more than one country, it was possible to identify consistencies, or the lack of, between country programmes and to determine the relative merits of the approaches adopted. Discussions with DFID’s regional policy and country programme teams resulted in the selection of three programmes: Brazil, Cambodia and Romania. A key factor in the selection process was the opportunity for the evaluations to contribute to the preparation of new country plans, with each of the chosen countries selected having committed to prepare a new plan during 2003–2004.

The output from the programme of study is four reports, this synthesis plus a report for each country programme evaluated: Brazil (Report EV 653); Cambodia (Report EV 654) and Romania (Report EV 655). Each of the reports is supplemented by an Evaluation Summary (EvSum).

The study was managed by Arthur Fagan and Lynn Quinn of Evaluation Department in conjunction with the appointed study consultants Oxford Policy Management (OPM) supported, in the Cambodia study, by Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (The Royal Tropical Institute – KIT).

Inception work started in late 2003 with the main fieldwork being undertaken between October 2003 and January 2004. Analysis of evidence gathered and preparation of the four draft reports was concluded in July 2004. In accordance with EvD policy, considerable effort was expended in communicating lessons learned throughout the evaluation process. In support of this, the study team formed Core Learning Partnerships intended to bring together DFID personnel, partner government officials, representative of both multilateral...
and bilateral country partners, national project partners as well as relevant national and international development consultants. Following preparation of the draft reports, all stakeholders were encouraged to provide comment on the documents. The consultation process concluded with a seminar in London during July 2004, following which a number of factual corrections were made to the report texts.

The programme of study identified the need for:

• a more informed, realistic and strategic approach to partnership arrangements with multilateral agencies;

• a better reciprocal understanding of the culture, policies and procedures of each partner;

• a realisation of the need for adequate monitoring and management of relationships with other organisations (government, multilateral and civil society) and acceptance that such relationships should imply a greater level of corporate responsibility for how they are conducted and managed;

• realisation that the critical resource in small country programmes is human rather than financial and that strategic objectives and ambitions need to be adequately matched to skilled human resources;

• an adequate framework of objectives, targets and indicators for the country programme as a whole and recognition that the absence of precise, monitorable indicators of achievement at the initiative, outcome and objective level, means that it is not possible to make a meaningful assessment of progress or performance at the country programme level.

M. A. Hammond
Head, Evaluation Department

September 2004
## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Annual Assessment Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Abercrombie House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Africa Policy Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>APDP</td>
<td>Annual Performance Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APIFF</td>
<td>Africa Private Infrastructure Financing Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>Associate Professional Officer</td>
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<td>APPR</td>
<td>Annual Plan and Performance Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Aid and Trade Provision</td>
</tr>
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<td>BLCF</td>
<td>Business Linkages Challenge Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Country Assistance Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASCM</td>
<td>Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASPIS</td>
<td>Commission on Social Exclusion and Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Development Corporation</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
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<td>CPE</td>
<td>Country Programme Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Country Strategy Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Curriculum Vitae</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Development Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Development Policy Committee</td>
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<td>DPD</td>
<td>Development Policy Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>EoCR</td>
<td>End of Cycle Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESM</td>
<td>Effective Staff Management</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EvD</td>
<td>Evaluation Department, DFID</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDT</td>
<td>International Development Target</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IiP</td>
<td>Investors in People</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Institutional Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHF</td>
<td>Know How Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEStaff</td>
<td>Locally Engaged Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Middle Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Economic Partnership for African Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>IFAD Office of Evaluation and Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OED</td>
<td>World Bank Operations Evaluation Department</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Oxford Policy Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Policy and Resource Plan</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>Participatory Poverty Assessment</td>
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<td>PPIAF</td>
<td>Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Portfolio Review Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRFA</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Framework Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Performance Reporting Information System for Management</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Service Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>Staff Appointed in Country</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>Service Delivery Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRL</td>
<td>Sustainable Rural Livelihoods</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector-Wide Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPED</td>
<td>Tools and Procedures for Effective Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>Target Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>VS</td>
<td>Victoria Street</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S1. The main objective of this country programme evaluation (CPE) study was to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of three Department for International Development (DFID) country programmes—Brazil, Cambodia and Romania—over the period 1997–2003. The secondary objective was to develop the approach and methodologies for CPEs within DFID.

Main Findings

S2. The overall assessment of the three country programmes was broadly positive. DFID’s strategies and programmes in the three countries are judged to have been generally relevant, both to the priorities of the countries and to DFID’s policies, and have been responsive to changes in both. DFID was highly regarded as a development partner for its commitment to collaboration and consultation; for its responsiveness and flexibility; and for the high quality of its staff and consultants. The strength and reputation of the DFID offices in Phnom Penh and Brasilia, and the benefits that these in-country offices have brought to the programmes, was clear.

S3. The evaluations are critical of some aspects of the programmes, notably in Brazil. All three evaluations indicated the need for a better understanding of the multilateral agencies with which it wanted to collaborate and influence; for better monitoring of partnerships more generally; and for a clearer programme-level monitoring and evaluation framework. Some doubts were expressed about the appropriateness of the strategies for Brazil and Cambodia. The Brazil experience highlights the importance of having a consistent approach, an agreed country strategy, and good change management, all of which were lacking for much of the period.

S4. The study raises the following six issues for DFID more generally.

Working with multilateral agencies

S5. All three programmes gave increasing emphasis to working with multilateral agencies. Experience suggests the need for a more informed, realistic and strategic approach to partnership arrangements with these agencies. A better reciprocal understanding of the culture, policies and procedures of each partner would also be beneficial.

Managing relationships

S6. The evaluations were generally very positive about the quality of the relationships developed by DFID as an organisation, and by its staff and consultants. However, the few problematic instances were damaging. There is a need for DFID to explicitly plan, manage and monitor relationships between DFID (and its staff) and its partners. DFID should also develop a corporate policy and best practice guidelines for relationships with development partners, including the management of exits.
Managing Change

S7. All the programmes changed over the period. However, the changes in the Brazil programme were more far-reaching and problematic, and were exacerbated by DFID’s ambivalence towards the programme. The change process here was neither well managed nor well communicated to DFID’s partners. There needs to be a more careful assessment of the costs and benefits of change and continuity, and for a more carefully-managed change process.

Organising Small Country Programmes

S8. A key lesson regarding country offices is that in small programmes the critical resource is human rather than financial. The Brazil and Cambodia programmes demonstrate the benefits of professionally staffed local offices, particularly when (as in Cambodia) staff are also allowed sufficient time and space to contribute to policy and aid coordination dialogues. Greater delegated authority would also appear to be beneficial.

Monitoring and Evaluating Country Programmes

S9. The assessment of programme-level performance and DFID’s development contribution was hampered by the absence of an adequate framework of objectives and indicators, and by the limited information base. DFID needs to continue to improve the quality of its project and programme level monitoring and evaluation. It also needs to examine the adequacy of the Country Assistance Plan (CAP) framework as an evaluation tool, and the merits of alternative or additional results frameworks in use by other agencies.

Country programme evaluation in DFID

S10. The main lesson of the Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) in Brazil, Cambodia and Romania is that CPEs have to be integral part of the country planning cycle if they are to be useful and relevant, and if engagement with them is to be seen as worthwhile. A secondary lesson is the need for more time on document collection and desk review in advance of the first visit, in part because of the limitations of Performance Reporting Information System for Management (PRISM) for historical and programme-level research.

S11. Any future programme of CPEs commissioned by Evaluation Department (EvD) needs to consider a number of issues: the balance between accountability and lesson learning objectives; the scope and scale of CPEs; the timing of CPEs in the country planning cycle; the evaluation period; programme-level evaluation frameworks; participation by external stakeholders; and how EvD CPEs will fit with the major CAP reviews which are expected to be undertaken by the country/regional departments every 3–4 years. The report makes two main recommendations:

S11.1 Annual and major CAP reviews carried out by the country/regional departments should continue to be the major instruments for accountability and lesson-learning. EvD should help drive improvement in these reviews by instituting a quality control and verification system, supplemented by an annual synthesis of country results and lessons.

S11.2 Independent CPEs, under EvD management but in close coordination with country/regional departments, should replace some of the major CAP/Country Strategy Paper (CSP) reviews.
1.0 Introduction

1.1 This is the draft synthesis report for three independent evaluation studies of DFID’s country programmes in Cambodia, Romania and Brazil. These were pilot country programme evaluations undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) for the Evaluation Department (EvD) of the Department for International Development (DFID). EvD has a long history of commissioning independent evaluations at project, sector and thematic level, but has not previously carried out country programme evaluations (CPE). With the country programme increasingly seen as the focus of development strategy and dialogue, a recent report by the National Audit Office1 recommended that DFID consider replacing the strategic performance reviews commissioned by country management teams with periodic country programme evaluations overseen by EvD.

1.2 The terms of reference for the assignment are contained at Annex 1. The study had two broad aims. First, to prepare evaluation studies of the three DFID country programmes over the period 1997–2003. The specific objective of each CPE was to assess the relevance, appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of the DFID country programme in achieving intermediate development impacts. Individual CPE reports have been prepared for each country, summaries of which can be found in Annexes 2–4. The second aim of the study was to develop appropriate approaches and methodologies for the evaluation of DFID programmes at the country level.

1.3 This synthesis report is structured in two parts. The first part (part A) summarises the findings of the three pilot CPEs. The methodologies used, and the experience with undertaking these evaluations, are first described. The main findings of the three studies are then analysed, followed by a discussion of the issues and lessons raised. The second part of the report (part B) looks at the practice and experience of CPE in DFID and more widely. It ends with recommendations for how CPE should be managed and implemented within DFID.

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PART A: FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION
2.0 Methodology and Experience

2.1 This section describes the methodology used in the three CPEs. It also describes the experience of carrying out the CPEs, which is important for understanding the different approaches followed. These are also relevant to the discussion of the future of CPE in DFID.

Planning and timetable

2.2 The three country programmes—Brazil, Cambodia and Romania—were selected by EvD from the small number that volunteered for this pilot study. Two of these programmes—Cambodia and Romania—were planning to produce new strategic plans in late 2003. The Brazil programme already had a new Country Assistance Plan (CAP) in draft, but was keen to be included because of its interest in improved monitoring and evaluation.

2.3 The three countries are all relatively small recipients of bilateral aid, and none had been recipients of general budget support or sector wide assistance programmes. EvD recognise that it would have been better if two of the programmes had not been in Middle-Income Countries (MICs), and if one of the countries had been in Africa, but a more representative sample was not possible. The three country programmes are nevertheless a reasonable sample of small DFID programmes in Latin America, Europe and Asia.

2.4 The CPE timetable was determined by four main factors:

2.4.1. That the evaluations should involve wide consultation outside DFID, and additional studies over and above existing DFID review documentation. This implied three planned visits to each country. First, a short inception visit to agree the details of the evaluation with the DFID country team; to commission any additional case studies; to agree the composition of the external reference group; and to plan the main visit. Second, a two to three week main evaluation visit. And third, a short follow-up visit to discuss the draft report with the country team and with the external reference group.

2.4.2. That the evaluations should fit in, as far as possible, with the timetable for the new strategic plans for Cambodia and Romania.

2.4.3. That sufficient time should be allowed for preparatory work on DFID documents dating back to 1997 and for consultation on the draft reports.

2.4.4. That the three CPEs should not take place simultaneously, to allow for some learning across the studies and some use of the same consultants.

2.5 These four factors, and the additional time required for producing and consulting upon this synthesis report, resulted in a planned timetable which extended over twelve months, from July 2003 to June 2004.

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2 None of these three countries are in the top 20 recipients of bilateral aid.
3 The idea for this group came from the Core Learning Partnership set by IFAD for each of its evaluation studies.
Methodology

2.6 The original intention had been for a similar methodology to be used in all three CPEs, albeit with some revision on the basis of experience and some adaptation to particular programmes. In the event, rather different, and increasingly truncated, methods were used as the study progressed, largely for reasons outside the evaluators’ control. These are described later. The various methods used in the CPEs are tabulated below (Table 1).

Table 1: Summary of methods used in CPEs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inception visit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Main visit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Follow-up visit</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation matrix(^4)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of programme strategies, plans &amp; reports</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of project documents (75% sample)(^5)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-evaluation survey (75% sample)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of PRISM data</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Project case studies</td>
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<td>Background context paper</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External reference group</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with DFID staff (past and present; UK and overseas)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with DFID partners (government, donor, project, NGO, consultants)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder workshop to discuss findings</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2.7 As can be seen from Table 1, only two evaluation visits were made to each of the countries,\(^6\) and no stakeholder workshops were held to discuss the findings. In line with the pilot nature of this study, the possibility of using a form of balanced scorecard was explored. However, it was concluded that, in the absence of an existing scorecard, this methodology was difficult to use in an ex post evaluation.

\(^4\) This matrix contained a standard set of questions under six headings (context, strategy, programme, process and organization, outcomes, and conclusions and lessons) together with details of the resources and methods to be used in answering these.

\(^5\) The 75% sample consisted of the largest projects which together accounted for 75% of DFID bilateral expenditure in two periods: 1997/8–1999/2000 and 2000/1–2002/3.

\(^6\) Two video conferences were substituted for the third visit to Brazil.
Experience

2.8 The Romania CPE employed most of the methods envisaged at the outset, and the local consultants produced high quality work. However, the external reference group did not work as well as had been hoped, possibly because the evaluation was not directly related to any DFID decision or country strategic plan. Since agreeing to the CPE, DFID decided that a regional assistance plan was more appropriate. In November 2003 it was decided to end the DFID country programme in 2005 rather than 2007 as part of the reduction in DFID bilateral assistance to MICs. This further reduced the immediate utility of the CPE.

2.9 The Brazil CPE also suffered because of the cuts to DFID programmes in MICs. The announcement of these cuts coincided with the first evaluation visit to Brazil. They amounted to a reduction of 70% in the country specific allocation to Brazil in 2005/06, which could only be met by sharply scaling back on existing and planned commitments. In view of the negative effect of these cuts, and of the uncertainty about what they meant for particular projects and partners, it was decided that it was not appropriate to commission detailed partnership studies and project case studies, or to plan for a stakeholder workshop. A more focused and ‘lighter’ evaluation than originally envisaged was agreed with the country team. It was also agreed that the evaluation should cover the period up to the end of 2003, rather than to March 2003, in order to take account of the cuts and of the draft CAP that had been agreed in principle in September 2003. Despite the unfortunate timing, the level of engagement and cooperation from the DFID country team, and from the external reference group, was extremely positive.

2.10 The Cambodia evaluation proved difficult for other reasons. In order to try to produce an early report that could feed into ongoing discussions about the new CAP, it was agreed with DFID Cambodia to forego the inception visit. This created problems during the first and main visit. Bidding rules also meant that evaluation consultants employed by OPM could not cover the health sector until a new consultancy contract, for which OPM was shortlisted, had been awarded. A separate and later consultancy had to be arranged by EvD to cover this sector. An additional complication was the fact that DFID was in the middle of discussing a joint strategic plan with the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and had already had a number of external consultations in connection with this. DFID Cambodia therefore wanted the evaluation to keep its demands on DFID’s partners to a minimum. It did not want an external reference group, stakeholder workshop, partnership studies or any of the case studies suggested by the evaluators. As a result of this and other factors, the relationship between the evaluators and the country team was initially more difficult than in Romania or Brazil. The implications of this and the other two evaluations for future CPEs is discussed in Part B.

7 In November 2003 the British Government announced that, in order to increase DFID post-conflict assistance to Iraq while still meeting its commitment to raising the percentage of bilateral spending on low-income countries to 90% by 2005/06, bilateral assistance to other MICs was to be reduced.
3.0 Findings of the Country Programme Evaluations

3.1 This section summarises the main findings of the three pilot CPEs. Although covering the same period (1997–2003), and involving the same institution (DFID), the contrasting nature of the countries and programmes, and the different evaluation experiences described above, have meant that there are relatively few common findings.

Context

What was the context within which the country programmes were planned and implemented?

3.2 The three countries could hardly be more different, as is evident from Table 2 below. Cambodia is the only low-income country of the three. It has only recently emerged from more than 30 years of civil war and turmoil, including a devastating period under the Khmer Rouge. Despite peace and reasonable economic growth since 1996, progress towards the millennium development goals (MDGs) has been limited. Under-five and infant mortality rates appear to have increased since 1990, and mortality rates are among the highest in Asia. Romania has experienced a difficult political and economic transition from communism since the revolution in 1989. The poverty rate is declining but remains the fourth highest in Central and Eastern Europe. It receives substantial external assistance, most notably from the EU, to which it is due to accede in 2007. Brazil is by far the largest country, as well as a major regional and international player. Although comparatively wealthy, nearly 20 million of its’ population live on less than US$1 per day. The Amazonian and Atlantic coastal rainforests make it a country of global environmental importance.

Table 2: Summary country data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population 2001 (million)</th>
<th>Income Group 1998</th>
<th>% of pop below $1/day</th>
<th>Income share of poorest 20%</th>
<th>Net oda/oa $ per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>SE Asia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36a</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Lower Middle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>Upper Middle</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 However, there are some similarities. Both Romania and Brazil are middle-income countries, a classification of some significance to DFID with its increased emphasis on poverty reduction and on the poorest countries. Governance and corruption are significant issues in Romania and Cambodia. Both these countries, but especially Cambodia, provided difficult but gradually improving contexts for DFID programmes. Brazil provided the most

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*This is the percentage below the national poverty line in Cambodia, which is lower than the international $1/day measure for absolute poverty.*
positive country context of the three in terms of policies, institutional capacities and quality of governance. In this case, most of the problems with the programme originated with DFID.

3.4 The obvious common factor in all three evaluations was the changing policies, priorities and practices of DFID over the period since 1997. These were in turn influenced by, and influenced, changes in the international environment for development assistance. The most significant UK policy change took place in 1997 with the first of two White Papers on International Development. This committed DFID (and other part of the UK government) to refocus its development efforts on ‘the elimination of poverty and encouragement of economic growth which benefits the poor’. While poverty reduction had been a major objective of the previous Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the clear and explicit focus on poverty elimination had significant implications for ongoing DFID country programmes, all of which had to examine and reorient their strategies and activities to ensure maximum consistency with new UK government policy.

3.5 While the first White Paper marked the most significant policy change, it was by no means the only change. Indeed, the period since 1997 has been marked by a near-continuous process of policy, strategy, organisational and system change. An indication of the number and frequency of these is given in Annex 5. They include decentralisation to country offices, the introduction of the Public Service Agreement and Service Delivery Agreement, and the reorganisation of Policy Division. Country-level strategic planning and review procedures have also changed significantly. Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and Policy and Resource Plans (PARPs) have been replaced by Country Assistance Plans (CAPs). Annual Plan and Performance Reviews (APPRs) have been replaced by annual CAP reviews. These and many other changes have meant that DFID country teams have had to continuously adapt to the changing priorities and procedures of DFID, while at the same time trying to adapt to the changing country context.

Strategy

How did DFID’s country strategies evolve, and were they relevant and appropriate?

3.6 For all three country programmes, the first part of the evaluation period represented a de facto continuation of previous ODA strategy as new DFID CSPs were developed after May 1997. Programmes continued to implement projects initiated prior to May 1997, albeit sometimes with greater attention to their likely impact on poverty, but the major emphasis was on preparing new CSPs. This period lasted until December 1998, October 1999 and March 2000 for Brazil, Romania and Cambodia respectively. The new CSPs were prepared with a much greater level of consultation with local stakeholders than had been the case with previous strategies and, again unlike previous strategies, were publicly available and widely disseminated. The CSPs were a considerable advance on previous strategies in terms of providing a clear, public statement of the rationale, approach and objectives of DFID’s programme.

3.7 The Romania and Cambodia programmes had two strategy sub-periods: the pre-CSP period described above, and a post-CSP period. While the long-term nature of project programming meant that it was not possible to radically and immediately change the
programmes, this was also unnecessary in both of these countries. Both CSPs did, however, signal some strategic change. Whereas support in Romania in the period up to 1999 had concentrated on support for economic transition to a market economy through a broad range of independent initiatives—mostly with the private sector—the 1999 CSP focused on increasing the capacity of government, civil society and the private sector to achieve and sustain transition while ensuring that the social dimensions were addressed. An important new element was the stated objective of influencing the programmes of the major multilateral agencies. A new focus on strengthening government policies and institutions—with less emphasis on non governmental organisations (NGOs)—and a renewed focus on working with multilateral agencies was also a feature of the 2000 CSP for Cambodia. However, the Cambodia CSP went further in emphasising a multilateral rather than bilateral outlook, and in making its overall purpose the promotion of ‘news ways of working’ for donors. The CSP also included a specific objective that, by 2010, DFID would be in a position to support Cambodia entirely through multilateral agencies without the need for a bilateral programme. This ambition was not based on an objective assessment of the relative costs and effectiveness of providing assistance through bilateral, multilateral or NGO channels.

3.8 The evolution of DFID strategy in Brazil has been more problematic. The 1998 CSP stated that the environment (Amazonian and urban) would remain the primary focus, and public sector reform a secondary focus, but with a significantly greater emphasis on the development needs of poor people. However, this was followed within months by a strategic rethink, which challenged the primary emphasis on environmental activities on the grounds that this was insufficiently poverty-focused. This undermined the value of the strategy, led to a hiatus in decision-making, and was temporarily damaging to relations with Brazilian partners.

3.9 Work on the next CSP (2001–05) began in 2000, but a final version of the new CAP was only agreed in September 2003 (and in the event was never published due to the cuts in the Brazil and other MIC programmes announced in November 2003). The main reasons for the delay appear to have doubts about the future of the Brazil programme and disagreements over the drafting of the CAP within DFID. The draft CAP completed the shift away from the environment and the Amazon and towards a focus on poverty and inequality in four northern and north-eastern states. The evaluators conclude that the lack of an agreed strategy from 2001 onwards had a negative impact on the programme. It hindered internal and external communication, and confirmed the uncertainty about the future of the DFID programme in Brazil.

3.10 Overall, DFID’s strategies in the three countries have been relevant, both to the priorities of the countries and to DFID’s policies, and have been responsive to changes in both. In recent years the Brazil strategy has, with its increased emphasis on poverty and inequality, become more central to Brazil’s priorities and more consistent with DFID’s general priorities.

3.11 The DFID strategy in Romania was judged to have been appropriate, but there were some doubts over those for Cambodia and Brazil. In the case of Brazil, the evaluators were not convinced that the strategy of trying to re-engineer existing and planned environment/natural resources projects was appropriate. A transitional, two-part strategy which allowed ‘old-priority’ projects to run their course while ‘new priority’ activities were
developed might have been a better option. In Cambodia, the stress on multilateral programming seems to have been based on an over-optimistic view of the effectiveness of multilateral agencies, or of DFID’s capacity to exert influence over them.

Programme

Did DFID do the right things, given the country context and strategies?

3.12 All three country programmes were relatively small in financial terms, with bilateral aid expenditures of around £6 million per year per country. Total bilateral expenditure over the period ranged from £29 million in Romania to £46 million in Brazil. Expenditure was relatively flat for the first five years, but increased sharply in 2002/3 when expenditure was around 50% higher than in 1997/8. This compares with an increase in total DFID bilateral expenditure to all countries of 75% over the same period, reflecting the lower priority accorded to Romania and Brazil as MICs.

Table 3: Bilateral aid by country, 1997/8–2002/3 (£ million)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>115.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.13 The evolution of the programmes was generally consistent with the changes in the DFID strategies that occurred in the middle of the evaluation period. In Romania, implementation of the CSP in terms of the selective continuation of existing projects and the development of new projects in line with the new priorities was undertaken in a disciplined and systematic way, with little fall-out. The picture was similar in Cambodia, where support for secondary education, urban poverty and malaria has gradually been phased out, and support for rural livelihoods, pro-poor policy capacity, and (more recently) health service delivery has increased.

3.14 Similar changes are evident in Brazil, where project commitments show a shift from environment to sustainable livelihoods projects, and large increases in spending on education, health and opportunities for the poor. New areas of work—notably in social inclusion, race and gender—have been added. While these changes have been consistent with DFID’s strategic priorities, as well as convergent with Brazil’s development priorities, the change process has been more difficult, and less well managed, than in Cambodia and Romania. It has been accompanied by an over-negative attitude towards the environmental/sustainable development portfolio, and by attempts to re-engineer existing and proposed projects. With the benefit of hindsight, the evaluators consider that this was

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9 In 2003/4 around half of DFID’s 46 country programmes will spend less than £10 million per year.
10 This percentage increase is inflated by the £2.4 million accounting adjustment to the Brazil figure in 2002/3. Without this the increase was nearer 40% over the period.
a mistake. It damaged relationships, undervalued what was being achieved, and diverted staff time from developing new areas of work.

3.15 The increased emphasis on working with multilateral agencies was reflected in all the programmes. The CSP for Cambodia renewed DFID’s commitment to working with multilaterals—which had long been a characteristic of the programme—and added the objective of developing ‘new ways of working’ for donors. In developing more collaborative multi-donor funding arrangements, and in moving towards a joint strategy with other donors, the programme has made good progress. In Romania, DFID has been open and responsive to opportunities for collaborating at the project level with the World Bank and the European Union, but has been less proactive and strategic. In Brazil, a number of new initiatives with multilateral agencies were developed in the last two years, but progress has not matched the policy priority attached to this activity by DFID since 1998. However, it can be argued that working with multilateral agencies, as opposed to directly with a Brazilian partner, is not necessarily the most effective way of achieving influence and pro-poor change in Brazil.

3.16 All the programmes have given significantly greater attention to poverty over the evaluation period. The Romania evaluation found a number of important examples where DFID’s choice of project, project location, or strategic entry point, was driven by a desire to impart a stronger and shorter-term poverty reduction objective into a broader set of EU accession related activities. As already discussed, DFID Brazil has also made a real effort to change the portfolio in line with the progressively more detailed analysis of poverty and inequality in the strategy papers, and with DFID’s central objective of poverty reduction. While poverty reduction was a principal rationale for some of the pre-1997 projects in Cambodia, this became a much more dominant consideration for projects approved after 1997. There has been a general shift away from ‘focused’ and towards ‘enabling’ projects. This, and the mixed approach to poverty reduction more generally, was judged to be appropriate.

3.17 Attention to ‘cross-cutting issues’ (gender, HIV/AIDS, and environment) in the three programmes has varied, but has broadly been adequate. The Brazil programme has, since 2001, given the most attention to gender issues. This reflects the stronger treatment of gender in the draft CAP than in previous strategies, and has been evident in the work with multilateral agencies, including a new programme in partnership with UNIFEM on gender and race equity. Gender issues were not directly mentioned in the Cambodia CSP, but have been considered in some of the projects, particularly in the health sector. Little attention has been given to gender in the strategy or programme in Romania. The DFID country team argued that the absence of extreme situations of gender inequality in the post-communist context justified the limited attention given to this issue.

3.18 HIV/AIDS has been a major focus of DFID attention in Cambodia, accounting for 8% of country programme expenditure since 1997. Attention to this issue has been more recent in Brazil. While only mentioned in the draft 2002, DFID has already supported a high profile regional HIV/AIDS prevention project with the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Government of Brazil. HIV/AIDS has not figured as a significant issue in the Romania programme.
Findings of the Country Programme Evaluations

3.19 Expenditure on the natural and physical environment has been a major (and increasingly controversial) element of the Brazil programme. It accounted for the bulk of the expenditure for much of the period under review, but has become much less important latterly in line with DFID’s changed strategic priorities. Environment was also a significant part of the Romania strategy and programme in 1999, but has declined in importance since then in line with the reduced priority accorded to the environment by DFID centrally. In 2002, it was decided that no further environment-orientated projects would be developed in Romania. While not a significant feature of the strategy or programme in Cambodia, DFID has been strongly engaged in broader policy dialogues regarding environmental issues and natural resources management.

3.20 Overall, DFID’s programmes in the three countries have been relevant and consistent with its policies and strategies. In the main, they have evolved appropriately in line with the changing context and priorities, both within DFID and in the countries themselves. However, the evaluators conclude that in Brazil the change process was neither well managed nor well communicated.

Process and organisation

Did DFID operate, and was it organised, in the right way?

3.21 All three programmes, and particularly the Brazil and Cambodia programmes, have placed a strong emphasis on partnerships, which was a concept given particular emphasis within DFID at the time of formulation of the CSPs. A partnership may be defined as an inter-organisational relationship based on a shared understanding and aimed at achieving shared objectives. The Cambodia programme has always been strongly dependent on partnerships with multilateral agencies and NGOs, initially for aid management reasons but now more for aid coordination reasons. The 2000 CSP led to a further widening in the list of partners, and a number of successful partnerships have been developed. The experience of working with the UN agencies has been mixed, perhaps reflecting a degree of over-optimism about the capacity of these agencies to generate good projects and to manage them efficiently. This has contributed to the trend away from these agencies and towards the two development banks (WB and ADB) and government as DFID’s major partners. It was noted that there was no provision for the systematic monitoring of partnerships in Cambodia, despite the central importance of these to DFID.

3.22 Monitoring and analysing partnership has been one of the strengths of the Brazil programme. Partnerships have been part and parcel of the monitoring and evaluation system developed by the programme. A number of case studies and workshops have also been supported. This work has been innovative and has great potential within DFID more widely. However, the Brazil team would be the first to recognise that there has sometimes been a gap between the partnership principles developed and espoused by the programme and much of DFID practice, where DFID is sometimes seen as unilateral and high-handed.

11 Subsequent experience in DFID has highlighted the need for a more critical understanding of the concept of partnership than is exhibited in some CSPs—in particular the presumption that objectives can always be regarded as shared in an unproblematic way. For example, the GBS Evaluation Framework (DFID, 2004) questions the value of the concept of partnership and suggests instead an approach that recognises that there are typically some common and some differing objectives in an aid relationship.
3.23 DFID’s partnerships with other donors and government were narrower and less well
developed in the Romania programme. In terms of donor partners, DFID has only had
important relationships with the World Bank and the EU. DFID’s relationships with
government have essentially been at the project level, and have been relatively weak with
central government as a whole. This has stemmed partly from the persistent weakness of
the central organs of government, but also because influencing government was not a
major element of DFID strategy, nor was DFID staffed in country to do this. DFID relied
heavily on its consultants, and it was the relationships between these and their respective
beneficiary organisations that were the more important. Fortunately, most of these
consultant/beneficiary partnerships were generally strong and enduring, and were cited
as a major factor in the success of projects.

3.24 Perceptions of DFID as a development partner were generally very positive in all
three countries. In Cambodia, DFID was seen as flexible, with a strong and genuine desire
to work in a consultative and collaborative way, and to promote local ownership. However,
while perceptions of DFID, its advisers and consultants were generally very positive, some
of the partners involved with the design of the new health sector strategic plan were critical
of DFID’s approach and some of the consultants provided.

3.25 In Brazil, DFID was generally seen as providing good quality technical assistance
and support, and as having professional in-country staff. The commitment to partnership,
participation and open dialogue was perceived as key strengths. Partners noted
weaknesses in the way change is managed, the long delays associated with project
decision-making, and the impression that DFID was constantly changing its mind about
what it wanted to do. DFID was nevertheless perceived as being one of the most highly
regarded development agencies in Brazil because of its other strengths.

3.26 One of these strengths was the effort and resources DFID Brazil has put into improving
the monitoring and evaluation of its projects and the programme as a whole. Project
monitoring as a process has significantly improved. Similar efforts have been made at the
programme level, and have led to annual reports that represent a considerable advance
on what was produced before. However, programme level monitoring in Brazil, as in
Cambodia and Romania, has been hampered by the lack of an adequate framework of
objectives and indicators. Project level monitoring in Romania and Cambodia appears to
have improved, but not to the same extent as in Brazil.

3.27 The management of all three country programmes underwent major changes during
the period under review. In Romania, the major changes occurred early on with the transfer
of responsibility for the Know How Fund from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
to DFID in 1997. Since then the DFID office in Bucharest has remained small and low-key.
The programme was strategically managed from London and was crucially dependent on
visiting advisers. The increasing shortage and rapid turnover of London-based advisers
had made it difficult to achieve consistency and continuity of supervision, and to respond
adequately the expectations of major project partners.

3.28 The Brazil and Cambodia programmes, by contrast, benefited from significant expansions
in their in-country offices from 2000 onwards. This allowed them to interact more directly and
strategically with local donor, government and civil society partners. The establishment of the
small DFID office in Phnom Penh, staffed by advisers, was widely seen as a very positive development. The fact that these advisers—unlike in Brazil—have not had extensive project management responsibilities, and have been well insulated from central DFID by the regional office in Bangkok, has allowed them the time and the space to contribute on policy, strategic and aid coordination issues. The relationship between the Bangkok and Phnom Penh offices has also been closer, and has worked better, than that between the London and Brasilia offices, where the distance was greater, the local office larger, and the changes more difficult. The long and unproductive process of agreeing the new CAP undermined the relationship, as did differences over the approval/refusal of proposed projects. Granting greater delegated authority to the Brazil office at an earlier stage, and a greater degree of certainty and consistency in DFID London, would have helped.

Outcomes

How effective were the programmes in achieving the desired outcomes?

3.29 The three country studies attempted to assess programme performance at three levels: project; programme; and contribution to development progress. The problems of assessment and attribution are much greater with the latter two than with the first.

3.30 Comparing the effectiveness of DFID-supported projects between periods and countries is difficult because of variations in the approach to project scoring. Overall, comment on achievement is made more difficult by doubts over the adequacy of the risk assessment. Many of the projects also fall below the threshold for PRISM scoring. These reservations aside, it is possible to draw some conclusions about project-level performance on the basis of PRISM scores.

3.31 The overall performance of DFID-supported projects in Romania in the period since 2000, and for earlier Know How Fund (KHF) projects with the private sector, was high. Projects working with central government institutions in the earlier period (1997–99) were in the main unsuccessful, largely because of the limited commitment within government for the reform processes supported. Public sector reform activities are now yielding important benefits due partly to the more targeted and strategic approach as well as the increased willingness of the present government to address core problems of the political and administrative system.

3.32 PRISM scores for Cambodia appear to show a deterioration in portfolio performance over the period. In the period 1998–2000 around 77% of the output scores were in the ‘largely achieved’ category (rating = 2), as were 44% of the purpose scores. In the 2001–03 period these figures fell to 27% and 20% respectively. The two possible explanations for this apparent deterioration are, first, that scoring has become more cautious and rigorous, and second, that recent projects are more complex and ambitious. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that 75% of the projects scored since 2001 are likely to only partially achieve their objectives (rating = 3). A tendency to over-estimate the capacity of partners, and the difficult country context, are important explanatory factors in most cases.

3.33 Comparisons between country programmes are difficult. It does nevertheless appear that, despite the internal DFID problems, project performance was best in Brazil. Around
75% of completed projects were likely to completely or largely achieve their objectives. The positive country context, the high quality of project partners and consultants, and the good standard of DFID project management have all contributed to this good performance.

3.34 Assessment of programme-level performance was hampered in all the countries by the absence of a clear framework of objectives and indicators in the country strategies and plans. The general objectives or outputs specified in the CSPs were an advance on previous strategies, but still lacked measurable targets or indicators of achievement. Thus, while it is possible to identify project contributions in each thematic area, or even outcomes to which DFID-supported projects have made a significant contribution, it is not possible to assign a performance score on the basis of the information available.

3.35 The evaluation report for Romania concluded that the programme had made a significant or satisfactory contribution in two of the five CSP output areas: a more accountable public administration, and the promotion of development at the regional level. The evaluation also found that, while collaboration with the World Bank and EU had been viewed as worthwhile by all parties, the degree of influence achieved by DFID was limited and did not extend beyond the specific projects or activities concerned.

3.36 Progress against the Cambodia CSP objectives has been limited. Attainment of planned outcomes has been difficult in almost all the major projects, and spending against two of the three strategic objectives has been relatively recent. It was nevertheless possible to identify a number of important outcomes under each CSP objective, including ‘new ways of working for donors’, to which DFID has made a considerable contribution. The presence of DFID advisers in Phnom Penh has been a key factor in many of these contributions.

3.37 The 2001 review of the Brazil CSP noted that its assessment of programme performance was handicapped by the lack of an appropriate framework of programme-level objectives, targets and indicators. It concluded that DFID had been strongest in research and policy generation, in developing technical skills, and in fostering collaboration between different organisations, and weakest in strategic dissemination, lesson learning and influencing broader debate. The assessment of programme performance since 2001 is similarly handicapped by the lack of an appropriate results framework, although annual plans have reported against annual outcome indicators. On the basis of the information available the evaluators were not able to present a meaningful assessment of programme-level performance.12

3.38 Assessing DFID’s contribution to development progress is extremely difficult. It requires an assessment of development progress and an estimate of what that progress would have been without the DFID programme (the counterfactual). Even in a small country such as Cambodia, where DFID is a small but significant donor, this is very difficult. The evaluation was able to identify significant DFID contributions to the reduction in the prevalence of adult HIV infection, and in the incidence and case fatality rate of malaria. DFID’s activities have also contributed to less visible changes, for example in public finance and elections, that have helped to build the foundation for future development.

12 The final version of the Brazil report will revisit this issue.
3.39 Neither the Romania nor Brazil evaluations attempted an assessment of DFID’s development contribution. In the case of Brazil, the extremely small size of the DFID programme relative to the scale of Brazil’s economy and government made any connection with country development outcomes impossible.

Overall assessment

3.40 The overall assessment of the three DFID programmes was broadly positive. All three were judged to have been relevant to the country priorities, and consistent with DFID priorities. The Romania programme has been a low-key, consultant-led but mostly effective technical assistance operation. The Cambodia programme has made a positive contribution in a difficult development context. And despite its internal problems, the Brazil programme has generally been successful at the project level.

3.41 It is evident from all three programmes that DFID is highly regarded as a development agency for its commitment to partnership, consultation and collaboration; for its openness, responsiveness and flexibility; and for the high quality and professionalism of its advisers, in-country staff and consultants. The strength and reputation of the DFID offices in Phnom Penh and Brasilia, and the benefits that these in-country offices have brought to the programmes, was clear.

3.42 All three evaluations indicated the need for a better understanding of the multilateral agencies with which it wanted to collaborate and influence; for better monitoring of partnerships more generally; and for a clearer programme-level monitoring and evaluation framework. Some doubts were expressed about the appropriateness of the strategies for Brazil and Cambodia. The Brazil experience highlights the importance of having a consistent approach, an agreed country strategy, and good change management, all of which were lacking for much of the period.
4.0 Lessons and Issues

4.1 The three evaluation reports raise a number of issues and lessons for DFID more widely. The main issues relate to how DFID:

- works with multilateral agencies.
- manages relationships
- manages change
- organises its small country programmes
- monitors and evaluates country programmes

Working with multilateral agencies

4.2 All three country programmes gave increasing emphasis to working with multilateral agencies over the period of the evaluation. The Cambodia programme had an explicitly multilateral, rather than bilateral, outlook: the 2000 CSP said that DFID should only develop interventions that complement a wider programme of multi-donor support, and included the aim that, by 2010, DFID support should be entirely provided through multilateral agencies. The Romania CSP included the stated objective of influencing the programmes of the major multilateral agencies (World Bank, EU, IMF and EBRD). The World Bank, IADB and UN agencies were also seen as DFID’s main international partners in the draft CAP for Brazil: the role of bilateral agencies such as DFID was to enhance the effectiveness of the larger resources of government and multilateral agencies to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality.

4.3 The experience in the three programmes shows the need for:

- A more informed, realistic and strategic approach to partnership arrangements with multilateral agencies. It should not be assumed that multilateral agencies are automatically and always the best route to pro-poor impact, nor that influencing them or their programmes is always an appropriate or realistic goal. Collaboration should not be confused with influence, and may be good enough.
- A better reciprocal understanding of the culture, policies and procedures of each partner. There has to be sufficient shared vision between organisations, a good understanding and knowledge within DFID of the multilateral with whom a partnership is to be developed, and a clear and long-term strategy for how that partnership will be realised.

Managing relationships

4.4 The evaluations were generally very positive about the quality of the relationships established and maintained by DFID as an organisation, and by its staff and consultants. However, the sometimes-difficult relationships with other organisations (government, multilateral and civil society) in Cambodia and Brazil shows how important it is that these relationships are adequately monitored and managed. Part of the problem stems from a failure to recognise that DFID needs to manage relationships, not just project or programme partnerships, and that these relationships should imply a greater level of corporate responsibility for how they are conducted and managed.
4.5 Experience in Brazil and Cambodia suggests that there is a need to:

- Explicitly plan, manage and monitor relationships between DFID, its individual staff members, and its partners. This should be an important measure of ‘process quality’ for DFID programmes and DFID staff.
- Develop corporate policy and guidelines for relationships with development partners. These should include, inter alia, guidelines for how to minimise risks for partners (e.g. in developing proposals which may not be funded) and best practice for exiting from projects and country programmes.

**Managing change**

4.6 All the country programmes underwent significant change over the period of the evaluation in response to changing contexts and policies. In the case of Romania and Cambodia these changes have been modest, and appear to have been managed without significant problems. The changes in the Brazil programme have been more fundamental and more problematic, and have been exacerbated by DFID’s ambivalence towards the programme.

4.7 The message of the Brazil report was not that programmes should not change. It was that continuity should be more valued, and change better managed. A balance needs to be struck between changing strategic priorities and projects in order to best fit new corporate priorities and policies, and supporting programme and project relationships long enough and consistently enough for significant and sustainable results to be achieved.

4.8 It is important to distinguish between the case for change and the management of that change. While some would disagree with the decision to re-orient the Brazil programme from its environmental and Amazonian focus, and the decision to reduce the bilateral programme in November 2003, it is the way in which both of these decisions have been (or are to be) implemented that has exacerbated the problem. With hindsight, the evaluators conclude that the attempt to re-engineer the environmental programme was a mistake, and that a transitional strategy would have been more appropriate. Similarly, a more gradual exit from the bilateral programme over a 5–10 year period, including standing by existing and proposed commitments, would have been less damaging. In both instances, a consultative process of developing, communicating and implementing a carefully considered change strategy would have been beneficial.

**Organisation of small programmes**

4.9 The CPEs present three contrasts. The first is between the relatively high-cost, professionally staffed country offices in Brazil and Cambodia, and the relatively low-cost low-key country office in Romania. The second is between the different project management loads of the offices in Brazil and Cambodia, and the implications this had for strategic work with partners. And the third is between the relatively smooth relationship that existed between the Phnom Penh and Bangkok offices, and the more troubled relationship between Brasilia and London.

4.10 As regards country offices, a key lesson is that in small country programmes the critical resource is human rather than financial. Strategic objectives and ambitions need to be adequately matched to skilled human resources. For much of the period under review,
Lessons and Issues

the combination of contracted technical assistance (TA) services, visiting advisers from London, and limited capacity in the local office was sufficient for a TA and project-based programme in Romania. More recently, with the shift in strategic focus to the Western Balkans and the reorganisation of the advisory departments, the Romania programme has lacked the local capacity and advisory support to play a higher-profile strategic support role to government. The Brazil and Cambodia programmes demonstrate the benefits of having professionally staffed local offices. Both offices have enabled DFID to participate more actively than previously in formal and informal development discussions, and to develop wider and deeper relationships in country.

4.11 There is, however, one important difference between the DFID offices in Cambodia and Brazil. Whereas the advisers in the Cambodia office (with the possible exception of the health adviser) have had some freedom from direct project management tasks, and have been insulated from the demands of DFID London by the regional office in Bangkok, and have therefore had the time and space to contribute to policy and aid coordination dialogues, the staff in Brazil had a heavy project management/re-engineering workload as well the additional demands of long drawn out strategy and other debates with DFID London. This, and the very different context of Brazil and Cambodia, may go some way to explain the greater non-project contribution of the Cambodia programme.

4.12 The smoother working relationship that appears to have existed between Phnom Penh and Bangkok than between Brasilia and London may partly be the result of management and personalities. On the other hand, it seems likely that the greater physical distance between Brasilia and London, the more problematic change process, the challenges of seeking effective engagement in a country context very unlike most of those in which DFID staff are used to working, and the larger and more assertive offices involved, made management from London increasingly difficult. The evaluators conclude that while granting greater delegated authority to the Phnom Penh office would now be beneficial, the decision to do so for Brazil in 2003 was long overdue.

Monitoring and evaluating Country Programme performance

4.13 The three evaluation studies have made less methodological progress than had been hoped in evaluating programme-level performance. While this is partly because it is inherently more difficult than evaluating project-level performance, there are three other reasons. First, implementation problems with the Cambodia and Brazil evaluations (paras. 2.8-2.10 above) made it difficult to develop and evolve the methodology over the three evaluations. Second, all the programmes lack an adequate framework of objectives, targets and indicators for the country programme as a whole. The CSPs were an improvement, but in the absence of precise, monitorable indicators of achievement at the initiative, outcome and objective level, it is not possible to make a meaningful assessment of progress or performance. DFID needs to explore alternative frameworks, such as the results frameworks now being use to monitor World Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CASs).

4.14 Third, these CPEs were heavily dependent on existing monitoring and evaluation material generated by the country programmes themselves. This is adequate, if not necessarily consistent or satisfactory, for projects, but is far less so at programme level. This is one of the issues for country programme evaluation within DFID that is addressed in the second part of this report.
Part B: COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION IN DFID
5.0 Donor Practice and Experience with CPE

5.1 The future of CPE within DFID needs to be informed by three types of practice and experience: other donor CPEs; DFID country strategy reviews; and this EvD pilot study. The first is the subject of this section. It is based on a review of general documentation—including the report of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) sponsored workshop in Vienna in 1999 and the Country Performance Synthesis Study (EV641)—and documentation relating to current CPE practice in ten development assistance organisations (six multilateral and four bilateral). DFID practice and experience is covered in section 6.

5.2 The most comprehensive review of CPEs is contained in the report of the DAC sponsored workshop in Vienna in 1999. This revealed a wide range of rationales and methodologies, as well as a wide variation in the extent to which CPEs were carried out by other donors/IFIs. Definitional issues aside, it is clear that the World Bank is the most experienced practitioner, having now carried out some 58 CPEs of one type or another. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has completed 17 CPEs since 1992. Most bilateral donors have completed far fewer than this. Table 4 below provides summary information for seven development agencies.

Table 4: CPE practices in selected agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>No. of CPEs per year(^{16})</th>
<th>Timing in relation to the strategy cycle</th>
<th>Carried out by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mid-point in CAS, looking back 4–5 years</td>
<td>Independent evaluation department (OED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Prior to new or revised country strategy</td>
<td>External consultants employed by independent evaluation office (OE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Input to programme strategy or mid-term review</td>
<td>External consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ex post, generally two years after the end of the strategy period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attempted to start CPEs two years before end of strategy period</td>
<td>External consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Not currently. Recent CPEs were prepared to inform new policy and reorganisation</td>
<td>External consultants reporting to Evaluation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Towards the end of the programme cycle</td>
<td>External consultants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{15}\) Much depends on how a CPE is defined. Most of the EoCRs would probably qualify if the Vienna workshop was repeated today.

\(^{16}\) Number of CPEs in 2004 or recent average.
5.3 The rationale for CPEs varies between donors, between CPEs conducted by the same donor, and may change over time. Some generalisation is nevertheless possible. Most involve the familiar evaluation mix of accountability and learning. In the case of bilateral donors, the most common rationale is the need for accountability against the national and corporate development objectives of the donor, and an assessment of the programme performance, prior to the design of a new country strategy or plan. Some evaluations also try to extract more general lessons on aid effectiveness and corporate strategies for the benefit of the organisation as a whole.

5.4 CPE approaches used by bilateral donors show a high degree of variation in approach and/or not well articulated as yet. Those for multilaterals tend to be more similar, and typically involve a top-down strategy review combined with a bottom-up aggregation of performance data from projects. The World Bank adds a third dimension to this—an attribution dimension—in order to achieve what is called ‘triangulation’. The attribution dimension involves measuring the contribution to the development impact made by four major actors/influences: the Bank, the Client, aid partners and exogenous factors.

5.5 For a number of bilateral donors CPEs are relatively high profile exercises using externally contracted consultants, with a high degree of disclosure because of the need to account to Parliament and taxpayers, and active interest in the results. Most of the multilaterals on the other hand tend to treat country evaluation as a separate exercise carried out by an independent evaluation department, albeit with the clear expectation that it will be a major input into the next programming cycle.

5.6 While expectation and experience with CPEs has varied, a number of common issues have emerged. Foremost among these is the issue of evaluation scale and depth. CPEs have varied from the ‘heavy’ evaluations looking at impact and addressing a long period of donor-partner relations (costing up to US$0.5 million and involving up to 15 person months of input) to ‘light’ evaluations addressing relatively straightforward performance criteria (e.g. relevance and efficiency), concentrating upon recent and near-future activities, and aiming for indicative rather than conclusive findings. These may cost only US$ 0.1 million and involve 3–4 person-months input. This appears to represent a minimum for any serious evaluative work at the country level.17

5.7 Much depends on the ambition of the evaluation objectives and the size of the programme. The DAC conference nevertheless reported a consensus to the effect that ‘heavy’ evaluations made more sense where the donor dominates aid to the country in question, aid plays a major role, and/or the programme represents a significant part of the donor’s global activities; where there is a good monitoring and evaluation information base on the country programme; and where there are good prospects for cooperation with state and civil partner institutions, and interest from these partners in the findings and recommendations of the evaluation. A ‘lighter’ CPE is more appropriate when these conditions are not present, and when findings are needed quickly. More generally, it is important that the approach is flexible and proportionate, and that CPEs are selective in the range of issues and activities covered.

5.8 Other issues encountered include\(^{18}\):

5.8.1 **Balancing accountability and lesson learning.** This has both timing and content implications. For example, a CPE carried out very late in the strategy cycle (or even ex post) might be best for accountability, but would then be too late to contribute to the formulation of the next country strategy. Similarly, a backward-looking focus for accountability purposes might not be as useful for a new country strategy as an evaluation aimed at generating relevant lessons for the future.

5.8.2. **External or internal evaluators?** Achieving an adequate degree of ownership by country management teams of CPEs conducted by external consultants has been a recurrent problem. Good evaluation practice (e.g. fairness, transparency, consultation and feedback) should help, as may the option of enrolling representatives from the country team and government as evaluation team members.

5.8.3. **Impact data and/or opinion?** Most CPEs have relatively modest expectations regarding reporting on impact, and have to rely on existing impact information. CPEs cannot collect primary impact data. On the other hand, evaluations that rely solely on information already documented by the country management team and Government tend to lack objectivity and credibility. Some direct consultation with a range of programme beneficiaries, partners and other development agencies is required to ensure that the CPE is based on a balanced mix of existing impact data and original stakeholder opinion.

5.9 These and other issues were extensively discussed at the DAC workshop. The recommendations for good CPE practice that resulted are reproduced below. These remain relevant and should guide DFID practice.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
1. The terms of reference (ToR) for a CPE should clearly state the purposes (e.g. input to country planning) or provide a more general agency review of “lessons learned”; the timing; the criteria to be used; and the ways in which the findings are to feed into policy or practice (approval, dissemination and follow-up procedures).

2. The ToR should clearly specify the goals against which country programme success or failure must be judged (e.g. poverty reduction, growth in certain sectors). These goals may be those of the individual projects; of the country programme (if a country strategy is in existence); or of the agency as a whole. If the CPE is to examine more than one level of goals, or if goals have changed over time, it should address specifically the complementary or contradictory relationships between goals at different levels.

3. The terms of reference for CPEs should generally require the evaluators to consider the influence of systemic issues i.e. policy and administrative constraints affecting the programme, on both the donor and recipient sides. Appropriate expertise, time and access should be allotted to these tasks.

4. The identification of valid comparators, essential to all evaluation, is harder at the country programme level. If a number of donors were to carry out CPEs jointly, then this would provide each with benchmarks against which to judge their own performance. Even if it is hard to obtain a valid comparator for the full country programme, evaluators should seek to obtain programme, sector or project evaluation reports from other donors. This will allow at least some elements of country programme performance to be benchmarked.

5. Detailed analysis of impact is always desirable but may be beyond the scope of some CPEs. Donors should design CPEs on the basis of what is feasible and justifiable in a given situation: when impact evaluation is impossible or can only be obtained at a prohibitive cost, this should be acknowledged and the goals of the CPE limited, realistically, to a rigorous examination of the relevance, efficiency and sustainability of the country programme.

6. Mechanisms to strengthen donor-recipient partnership include: consultation prior to design of ToR; partner-country or joint partner-donor advisory groups; presentation of draft findings to stakeholder groups for review; and invitations for a formal partner reaction to draft and final documents. Whoever manages the CPE, the team carrying out the study should consist of nationals of both the donor and recipient countries.

7. The widest possible stakeholder consultation and involvement is required in CPEs. In addition to informal interviews, consideration should be given to using customer surveys, focus group discussions and/or field-based participatory methods.

8. Reporting and follow-up procedures should be specified in advance. Normally, CPEs will be discussed either by senior management, by the governing body of an institution, or by the donor Parliament. There is a strong case for circulating them to other country programmes run by the donor. Unless there are specific and compelling reasons to do otherwise, they should also be made available to the taxpaying public, other donors working in the same country and implementing partners such as NGOs.
6.0 DFID Practice and Experience with CPE

Country and regional strategy reviews

6.1 This pilot series of country programme evaluations is not the first time that DFID has reviewed its country programmes using independent, external consultants. A series of Country Strategy Reviews (CSRs)\(^{19}\) have been carried out since 2001. The main difference between these reviews and the pilot series of independent CPEs is that the CSRs were commissioned by country or regional departments rather than by EvD. The CSRs were conceived mainly as an input to the preparation of new CSPs or more recently CAPs, and used terms of reference and approaches developed by the commissioning country teams and consultants, and without following any particular central DFID guidance.

6.2 To date, significant strategy reviews have been completed in at least eight countries or regions: Bangladesh; Brazil; Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova (CASC); Central America; Ghana; India; Russia; and Ukraine. The timescale, resources and methods used show considerable variation (see Annex 6). For example, the review period has ranged from nine months (in the case of Bangladesh) to just two weeks in-country (in the case of Central America). The methodological approaches also range from extremely detailed project and sector level analysis and compiled over many months of work and attempting to assess impact (e.g. the Russia CSPR in 2001) to much lighter exercises focused on identifying a limited set of critical lessons and issues for future strategy preparation and undertaken over a couple of months (e.g. the India Country Strategy Perspective Study undertaken in 2003). There has been little relationship between the level of resources applied and the size of the DFID country programme.

6.3 This variation aside, the CSRs nevertheless constitute a substantial body of country programme review/evaluation experience. Two important findings emerge. First, the majority of the key recommendations made in the strategy reviews have been incorporated into subsequent programme strategies. This suggests that the reviews have provided a useful input into the preparation of these strategies. But second, while the terms of reference for the reviews did involve an attempt to make assessments of impact and outcomes, this in practice proved difficult if not impossible. In most cases reviews were hampered by the lack of a framework of indicators and targets to enable evaluation at programme level—this has been an endemic problem with DFID’s Country Strategy Papers as noted in the Country Performance Synthesis study. Where they have existed, there have been problems of attribution, particularly where outcome indicators have focused on MDG goals. As a result, none of the reviews attempted to assess DFID programmes against MDG-related outcome indicators, but instead focused on intermediate outcomes. At the project level too, performance data was often incomplete and of variable quality—it was noted in several cases that the performance data within DFID’s PRISM system was not being used for management at the level of the country programme, only in relation to individual projects.

\(^{19}\) In some cases these were called Country Strategy Performance Reviews or End of Cycle Reviews or indeed Evaluations.
CPE pilot programme

6.4 The experience with the three pilot evaluations has been summarised above (Section 2). Reference has also been made to the fact that less methodological progress was made than had been hoped, largely because of implementation problems with the evaluations in Cambodia and Brazil. DFID’s decision in November 2003 to reduce its programmes in Middle Income Countries such as Brazil and Romania was a major complicating factor. Valuable lessons have nevertheless been learned.

6.5 The most important lesson relates to the need for CPEs to be relevant, both in content and timing, to the country programmes and to DFID’s partners. For one reason or another, the pilot CPEs became de-linked from future programmes and strategies in all three countries. The Romania programme decided not to have a country strategy, and was then foreshortened by the November 2003 cuts. The Brazil country assistance plan had already been finalised by the time of the evaluation, and the bilateral programme was then sharply cut. And in Cambodia, the evaluation took place later than intended, by which time the country team were heavily engaged in a joint country planning process with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. The net result in all three cases was that the evaluations became much less relevant to the country teams and to DFID’s partners. CPEs have to be an integral part of the country planning cycle if they are to be useful, and if engagement with them is to be seen as worthwhile.

6.6 The second important lesson relates to evaluation preparation. Better use could have made of country visits, and of the time of DFID staff in country, had more time been spent on document collection and review in advance of the first visit. Many key project and programme documents are not on PRISM and can only be located in files. The production of a comprehensive desk review of the country programme well in advance of the first planning visit should be the norm. This implies starting preparation at least six months before the first visit.
7.0 Methodological and Management Issues

There are two separate of issues to be addressed with respect to the future of CPEs within DFID. The first concerns methodology: what should CPEs do and how? The second concerns management: how should CPEs be organised and managed?

Accountability and learning

While the tension between accountability and lesson learning in evaluation is a well-known problem, there may also be a tension within the lesson-learning objective between focusing on lessons within a country or regional programme and across the organisation as a whole. DFID CSRs have not been designed to identify and facilitate the learning of lessons beyond the country or regional team commissioning them. Some of the DFID CSRs, for example, were explicitly designed to be restricted to the country team, with a feeling that this would enable a more open discussion of issues.

Country teams will tend to be more interested in evaluations that are designed and timed to inform the future, while external stakeholders interested in accountability will want to know what has been achieved to date. This will have implications for evaluation coverage and timing. For example, significant parts of the old strategy that are being phased out would not be a priority for a forward-looking evaluation, but would need to be covered in the interests of accountability. However, there is also complementarity between the objectives need not always conflict: it is hard to see how sound lessons for the future can be drawn without an adequate assessment of the past.

The reality for DFID is that CPEs will need to balance all of these objectives. With at least part of the stimulus for CPEs coming from outside DFID, accountability has to be one of the objectives. Equally, if DFID is to avoid a costly duplication of internal review and external evaluation, CPEs will have to meet the lesson learning needs of country teams and of DFID more widely. This should include challenging previous strategy and practice.

Evaluation scale and scope

Other development agency CPEs, as well as DFID’s previous country programme reviews, have varied considerably in scale and scope. In DFID’s case the scale of the review has not been related to the size of the country programme. Reference has also been made to two extreme types of CPEs: ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ (para. 5.6). Where should DFID CPEs fit on this continuum?

There are good arguments for pursuing a ‘lighter’ approach, apart from the lower cost. In most countries DFID will not be the dominant donor, and/or aid will not play a major role. Despite improvements in project-level monitoring and evaluation, information on impact and contribution is likely to be scarce. The extent to which CAP frameworks will permit a better assessment of programme-level performance than CSPs also remains to be determined. For all these reasons, plus the advantage of speed, a ‘lighter’ approach may be preferable.
Methodological and Management Issues

7.7 The arguments for a ‘heavier’ approach are to some extent the reverse. In some countries (or at least sectors) DFID is a major donor and/or aid does play a major role. There are therefore reasonable prospects of being able to identify DFID’s contribution. The accountability objective also requires that a serious effort be made to assess the performance of the country programme, including consultations with a wide range of external stakeholders. This is particularly the case for the larger country programmes, where upwards of £200 million may have been spent over a three year period.

7.8 The conclusion drawn is that CPEs should be broadly proportionate to the scale and significance of the country programme. Very light CPEs are unlikely to provide credible assessments of DFID’s programme performance for accountability purposes, particularly for the larger programmes. But equally, experience also suggests that CPEs are subject to diminishing returns: larger CPEs do not necessarily provide better insights nor more reliable impact assessments, particularly where M&E systems are weak and attribution is difficult. Selectivity and focus should be important elements of all CPEs. CPEs should not aim to collect impact data where it does not already exist, but should interact directly with range of external stakeholders.

Timing and evaluation period

7.9 The timing of CPEs is an issue (see para. 5.8). There is need to balance CPE’s contribution to planning (lesson learning) and to accountability (achievements). In general, the accountability objective implies that evaluation should occur after the end of the period covered by the evaluation, while lesson-learning for the programme requires that the exercise take place at a sufficiently early point in the planning cycle. As the experience with the pilot CPEs demonstrated very clearly, CPEs need to be timed to inform the new CAP. One way to square these conflicting objectives and allow firmer conclusions about accountability to be drawn is to take the evaluation period back beyond the current strategy cycle, although experience suggests this can cause problems both in relation to the availability of information and the interest of stakeholders in engagement.

Evaluation frameworks

7.10 A strategic review process for CSPs, based on APPRs and End of Cycle Reviews (EoCRs), was introduced in January 2000. The experience of APPRs was reviewed in the EvD Country Performance Synthesis Study (2002). One of the main findings of the study was that the value of APPRs as instruments of corporate performance management had been limited due to inadequate monitoring frameworks in CSPs. It was concluded that:

DFID Country Strategies have not provided an adequate framework of performance indicators to link DFID activities to higher-level objectives. In most cases, explicit log frames at the country strategy level have not been developed, or if developed, indicators have not had been tied to DFID’s performance (as opposed to the performance of the country as measured for instance by the MDGs) to allow assessments of the impact of DFID’s activities.

7.11 The experience of the pilot CPEs (para. 3.34) and country strategy reviews (para. 6.3) bears out these conclusions. All the programmes lacked an adequate framework of
objectives, targets and indicators for the country programme as a whole. The move towards CAPs should help to some extent. These are different from CSPs in two key respects. CAPs start from the basis of the country’s own poverty strategy, and assess to what extent it is appropriate for DFID to support this, rather than starting from DFID’s analysis of what the country should do to reduce poverty. Second, CAPs are intended to include a framework for assessing on an annual basis DFID’s performance in implementing the plan. The framework should set out measurable indicators for expected annual changes for the major areas of DFID support. Initial indications are that monitoring and evaluation of CAPs has improved, and that country CAP reviews have become an annual event. While this is an improvement over CSPs, it remains to be seen how well CAP frameworks will work as longer-term evaluation frameworks.

7.12 One of the key challenges for CPEs will be the extent to which they can assess DFID’s development contribution, which the pilot CPEs were not particularly successful at doing. The 2002 Development Effectiveness Report made the distinction between organisational effectiveness (DFID outputs and processes) and development effectiveness (collective development outcomes). The Public Service Agreement (PSA) / Service Delivery Agreement (SDA), Director’s Delivery Plans (DDPs) and CAPs have a strong focus on the latter. But by themselves these are a poor measure of DFID’s own development performance in country. What is required are clear links between DFID’s organisational effectiveness and country progress. This is DFID’s development contribution. Providing a thorough and independent assessment of this contribution will be one of the key tests of the added value provided by CPEs over and above regular country review processes. Developing a methodology for delivering this assessment remains a priority.

Participation and ownership

7.13 One of the recommendations of the DAC workshop was that there should be the widest possible stakeholder consultation and involvement in CPEs. The report of the workshop also observed that ‘CPEs are likely to have the greatest impact upon practice if they feed back rapidly into policy dialogue and programming, and if partners can and do participate substantively in both country programming and country programme evaluation’. The importance of gathering opinion from external stakeholders—not just from DFID and government—should also be an important principle for CPEs (see para. 5.8).

7.14 The pilot CPEs experimented with an external reference group in two of the three countries, based on IFAD experience with their ‘core learning partnerships’. The IFAD groups produce a short document, appended to the evaluation report, setting out the consensus conclusions and implications for the future. The latter is the key to the utility of this approach. Most IFAD project evaluations are timed to feed into the design of subsequent phases of support or, in the case of CPEs, to new country strategies. The evaluations are therefore part of the planning process, which gives members of the core learning partnerships a clear incentive to participate and contribute. As already mentioned, the problem with the pilot CPEs was that they were or became de-linked from the country

20 CAPs are required for all countries receiving over £20 million UK bilateral development assistance per annum. They are voluntary for smaller country programmes.

21 The Cambodia office did not want a reference group established because on their ongoing country planning process.
planning process. This considerably reduced the utility of the external reference groups, even in Brazil where participation and engagement with the evaluation was good.

7.15 This experience reinforces the importance of integrating the CPE process within the country planning cycle. It also suggests that, where possible, any DFID CPE should be guided by the same DFID/government/other donor working group that DFID is engaging with in designing its new country strategy/plan. The Cambodia CPE could, for example, have been incorporated into the joint DFID/WB/ADB country planning process rather than excluded from it. Linking the CPE to whatever country planning group or process exists also opens up the possibility of joint CPEs with other donors, or of joint sector evaluations that could contribute to DFID’s CPE. It will be important that CPEs are open and flexible in this way, rather than follow a uniform approach in all countries.

Conclusions: Proposals for CPE in DFID

7.16 This study endorses the view that CPE should be a central focus of DFID’s evaluation effort but notes a number of challenges in ensuring it is an effective instrument.

7.17 A major conclusion of this report is that CPEs need to be integrated within the country programming and review cycle if they are to influence strategic decisions, and if they are to receive the support required from country and regional departments. CAPs are currently reviewed and updated annually. However, parts I and II of the CAP will only be updated when significant changes in the external environment necessitate a major review of the entire plan. The presumption is that such major reviews will be undertaken every three to four years. Where such major exercises are being carried out according to a regular schedule, the development of a parallel programme of CPE is very undesirable.

7.18 Proposals for taking forward CPE within DFID need to take account of a number of other considerations. First, CSRs have proved to be a highly effective instrument for reshaping country programmes, as is evidenced by the high rate of take up of their recommendations. However, they have not served an accountability purpose (within country or to the UK Government), nor have they been used as an instrument for wider learning within DFID (except possibly within the region in cases where the initiative has been a regional one). In some cases, the CSR has largely been kept internal to the country programme. There may indeed be a tension between the effectiveness of this instrument for country programme management and for wider corporate learning and accountability.

7.19 Second, a major weakness of Country Strategy Papers, which has been apparent in the Country Evaluations undertaken here, as well as in earlier CSPR exercises, has been the inadequate articulation at the country level of a framework of indicators and objectives that are sufficient to judge DFID’s organisational effectiveness as opposed to measuring the country’s development progress (e.g. performance against the MDGs). Accountability for DFID’s performance requires the former as well as the latter. The CAP process is designed to improve reporting against results and the assessment of impact at the country level. This should mean that CAPs are easier to evaluate than CSPs but involvement of EvD in the development of the framework of objectives within each CAP or Regional Assistance Plan (RAP) is likely to be required in order to ensure that this is the case, and to establish the ‘evaluability’ of CAPs.
7.20 Third, CPEs need to meet both lesson learning and accountability objectives. Using CPEs as an effective accountability instrument requires that sufficient and representative coverage of the programme is obtained through the ongoing evaluation programme. This poses difficulties in relation to resources and criteria for country selection. The conclusion of the report is therefore that a rolling programme of CPEs will not be sufficient to achieve the objectives of accountability and lesson-learning, and that such a programme must be supplemented by action to strengthen and synthesise the country-level monitoring information that is provided from country programmes. The reliance on self-selection or volunteering for country selection significantly limited the value of the CPE pilot and suggests that criteria-based country selection is required, particularly for accountability and for DFID-wide learning purposes.

7.21 Fourth, as general budget support becomes an increasingly important aid modality for DFID and other donors, country level joint general budget support evaluations are likely to become the norm for important parts of the DFID programme. This does not obviate the need for DFID to make assessments of its own organisational effectiveness but it does alter the context within which CPEs will need to be carried out and how they will need to be done. This will have important implications for the design of a programme of CPEs particularly to ensure that they are in accord with partnership principles at national level that seek, for example, to limit the burden on the aid-receiving government of individual donor monitoring and evaluation activities and to ensure common reporting so far as possible.22

7.22 These considerations, and other CPE experience reviewed in this report, underlie the following proposals for the role of CPEs within DFID:

7.22.1 CPE needs to be integrated into the CAP review process to avoid duplication and ensure that CPEs produce results that can feed into country level planning as well as achieving their other purposes.

7.22.2 Effective CPE requires that CAPs should be designed in a way that makes monitoring and evaluation easier than was the case for CSPs. This requires EvD to have a mandate to review CAPs in relation to their monitoring and evaluation strategies and to have the power to ensure that CAPs are appropriately designed in this respect. The design of the CAP monitoring and evaluation plan will take account of issues such as the role of GBS, proposed joint evaluations between donors, and the monitoring that aid receiving governments carry out.

7.22.3 A rolling programme of CPEs alone is unlikely to provide sufficiently representative coverage to serve the accountability objective within an acceptable budget cost. Detailed country evaluations should therefore be supplemented by a regular and comprehensive review of CAP annual monitoring information. To the extent that through exercising oversight of the establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems for CAPs, EvD is able to ensure consistent approaches to reporting, this will enable monitoring

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22 This may mean in practice an approach that is based on evaluation of development effectiveness within a joint and common framework, supplemented by a much more limited exercise that focuses more on DFID’s own organizational effectiveness and modes of operation, that would require only very light involvement of government and wider stakeholders.
information to be synthesised and conclusions drawn on a regular basis across the whole programme, as well as making more manageable the process of implementing full CPEs (which will serve in effect as an audit check on the accuracy of the annual monitoring information).

7.22.4 A rolling programme of CPEs should be drawn up with regional departments, approved by the Management Board and closely monitored by EvD to ensure best fit with evolving regional/country-planning timetables. The programme should include clear criteria explaining the selection of country/regional programmes to be evaluated and these arrangements should be built into the country programme’s monitoring and evaluation plan.

7.22.5 In countries selected for CPEs, these will replace the CAP major review and be integrated into the CAP cycle. The strengthening of programme monitoring and evaluation will enable this exercise to be ‘lighter’ than it would otherwise need to be. CPEs will differ from CAP major reviews in being commissioned and managed independently of the country programme, through being prepared for the public domain and designed explicitly to inform DFID’s wider corporate learning. EvD will need to establish contracting arrangements for external consultants that will minimise the risk of timing problems in relation to fitting within the CAP or RAP cycle.

7.22.6 CPEs should cover the current CSP/CAP period but also involve a more limited review of the previous strategy period to provide contextual information and to allow stronger conclusions about impact to be drawn.

7.22.7 EvD should have a nominated counterpart in all country/regional programmes with whom to liaise on monitoring and evaluation issues (both for countries for which a full CPE is envisaged and others).

7.22.8 The design and methodology of CPEs should be responsive and flexible. Each CPE should be tailored to the specific country/regional circumstances. The resources committed should be sufficient to ensure that all three objectives can be met, but broadly proportionate to the size and complexity of the programme.

7.22.9 CPEs should be comprehensive in their coverage of the programmes (using existing information only) but selective and focused in the issues/sectors selected for in-depth evaluation. Where possible these in-depth studies should be commissioned with government and other donors.

7.22.10 CPEs should in general rely on existing reviews and impact assessments but should consult with a wide range of external stakeholders (programme beneficiaries, partners and other development agencies) in order to obtain independent opinions on the programme.

7.22.11 EvD should review annual country monitoring information and CAP major reviews and produce an annual synthesis report drawing on this and the CPEs.
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Basic Information

1.1 The consultants are to supply the service below to DFID.

2. Introduction

2.1 DFID’s performance management system is supported by periodic independent evaluations at project, programme, sector and thematic level. However, a recent National Audit Office (NAO) report suggested that performance management could be strengthened by periodic country evaluations.\(^{23}\)

2.2 DFID’s Evaluation Department (EvD) proposes to undertake a series of independent country programme evaluations by undertaking pilot studies in three countries, Cambodia, Romania and Brazil. The evaluation will be centred on the Country Programme Strategy (CSP), covering the period 1997–2002.

2.3 While DFID is a relatively small donor in each of these countries new approaches are being used, including that of ‘partnership’ and ‘influencing’ to promote change and increase DFID’s effectiveness. Hence the evaluation will assess the use and purpose of these approached and the human resource skills needed for their effective operation. New tools and skills for assessing country level approached and performance will therefore be development as an output of this initial CPE series. Over time these skills will be developed to undertake larger country programme evaluations to fit with DFID’s new Country Assistance Paper (CAP) cycle.

3. Background

3.1 DFID has increasingly targeted development assistance at the country level and become a highly decentralised organisation. Country offices have replaced regional development offices and decision-making and financial authority have been delegated to country programme heads. The purpose of this shift is to improve the relevance and coherence of development assistant programmes while at the same time maximising opportunities for partnership, influencing and donor harmonisation around a nationally owned programme for poverty reduction. The way in which country programmes (as described in the CSP) translate DFID corporate objectives into context-specific operational plans for the achievement of development outcomes has hence become the logical object for evaluation.

4. Overarching Objectives

4.1 The evaluation has the following objectives:

To assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the DFID country programme in achieving intermediate development impacts by assessing:

• the **appropriateness** of country programme objectives and the logic behind then given domestic policy objectives for poverty reduction, as well as DFID’s own corporate level objectives.

• the **relevance** of programme interventions given overall objectives (i.e. the cause and effect link between interventions and objectives), the governance and institutional setting, and DFID’s comparative advantage and human resource availability.

• the **efficiency** with which programme plans are translated into activities, including human resource and office management, collaboration and harmonisation with other stakeholders, policy dialogue and influencing, the use of financial instruments, and the quality of DFID as a development partner.

• the **effectiveness** of the overall programme in achieving intermediate poverty reduction outcomes and the systems for measuring and monitoring success.

• whether anything can be said about impact and sustainability and at what level this occurs.

• how the programme mainstreams poverty, gender and environmental issues.

5. **Scope of Work**

5.1 The purpose of evaluating country programmes is to strengthen the planning, management, influence and delivery of DFID’s development assistance, as well as to promote knowledge sharing and enhance learning across different country programmes.

5.2 In most countries where DFID operated, the goal of poverty reduction is an enormous challenge that cannot be addressed by aid resources alone. The size of DFID’s aid programme, in relation to the government’s budget or as a share of GDP, is likely to be small, too small to have a sustainable impact on poverty reduction. In this setting, the purpose of evaluation is not to assess the impact of DFID’s programmes on poverty reduction outcomes, but to assess what value DFID adds in the development process.

5.3 The conceptual framework in which the evaluation needs to be developed is hence one that starts with an assessment of the policy and institutional environment for the delivery of poverty reduction. The key will be to assess and examine how well DFID operates in this environment; both in relation to government and other stakeholders. Hence the evaluation will need to assess the appropriateness and relevance of DFID’s behaviour and activities given the context in which it operates, consistency of these with the country government’s broader domestic policy objectives, and the link between these and wider international development objectives.

5.4 The evaluation will seek to explore the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the DFID programme in its specific country-context and to draw the cause and effect links between:

• **Programme direction and the poverty outcomes** to which they are linked—
  Does the country programme have a clear direction? How does this relate to DFID’s corporate objectives on the one hand and the country-specific environment on the other? What development theory and evidence underpins programme direction? Why were certain investment decisions made over others?
• **Choice of Instrument and objectives**—Are there clear cause and effect links between the choice of development instrument and the country objective it is attempting to achieve?

As well as explore:

• **DFID as development partner**—What is the nature and quality of DFID's partnerships with the country government and other development stakeholders? How do these different stakeholders perceive DFID as a development partners?

5.5 An inception Report will underpin each country evaluation. This will include desk study research and initial interviews with country staff (past and present), Regional Directors and Regional Policy Departments to:

• Understand the development environment particularly issues surrounding governance, economic management and the climate for investment and human capital development.

• Investigate the direction of the country programme, including its historical evolution. The desk study will need to draw on data in DFID's Performance Reporting Information System for Management (PRISM), including project and programme information, output to purpose reviews, project completion reports, as well as other relevant programme documentation.24

• Develop a Stakeholder analysis, identifying the relevant stakeholders (beneficiaries, partners, other donors) of the country programme.

5.6 The inception report will explore the direction of the evaluation in more detail, including the main evaluative questions (and relevant hypotheses) that the country case studies will explore in the field. It will describe the evaluation methodology and approach for collecting evidence, which may include, for example, detailed questionnaires, focus groups, interviews, workshops, participatory assessment and so on. Detailed plans showing the timing and management of these events will also need to be specified.

5.7 The inception report will be discussed in details with DFID's EvD; country programmes offices, Regional Directors and other stakeholders. Once agreed, the inception report will constitute the basis of the case study.

*In summary, the key tasks are as follows:*

**Task 1:**

Develop a detailed Inception report for each country programme evaluation, describing the key evaluative questions and the evaluation methodology and logic underpinning it. This will draw on country level project documentation, PRISM, country level data, and other DFID material, as well as relevant development effectiveness literature. Preparation of the Inception Report must involve EvD and country office personnel. An early visit to each of the target countries will be required.

24 Relevant data and documentation from PRISM has been compiled by EvD for each country and will be made available to the consultants.
Task 2:
Conduct a series of country visits to collect data and evidence to support the country case study and line of enquiry. This may involve managing and setting up focus groups or workshops to explore donor ranking or the quality of partnership as perceived by government, civil society or project beneficiaries. The country visit will include field visits as appropriate, feedback to country office staff, the production of an aide memoire capturing the lessons learned and general direction of the evaluation report.

Task 3:
Develop discussion draft for circulation through EvD to relevant DFID personnel. Use comments and feedback to update the draft as appropriate.

Task 4:
Develop a dissemination and communication strategy for the duration of the evaluation programme aimed at the country office and its partners, DFID departments and other stakeholders.

Task 5:
Produce a Synthesis Report drawing on all three case studies. The synthesis should recommend methodologies for future evaluations of DFID country programmes.

6. Expected Outcome and Deliverables

6.1 Outputs include:

- a detailed inception report for each country study setting out a fully resourced plan for delivering the study.
- three country case studies including:
  a. Preliminary conclusions on the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of the country programme as a mechanism for poverty reduction.
  b. Interim findings on the skills and organisational structure required for effective country programme management given existing as well as emerging new instruments and approaches.
  c. Identification of emerging new instruments and approaches, management, partnership approached, policy dialogue (influencing), and monitoring and evaluation of country level programmes.

Each country study would include a stand-alone executive summary (no longer than 10 pages) plus a one-page evaluation summary.

- a synthesis report drawing on all three-country studies, including a stand-alone executive summary, and an overall evaluation summary of no longer than three-pages.
- a dissemination strategy for interim findings in country as well as in DFID HQ.
7. **Competence and Expertise Requirements**

7.1 One consultancy organisation will be appointed to deliver the outputs described above. The team will need to be balanced in terms of gender and must include a strong national/regional component.

7.2 A full-time Task Coordinator/Leader with extensive evaluation experience, and a record of managing country/strategic level evaluations will be required to manage the planning and delivery of this study. The individual will also be expected to have strong written and oral communications skills as he/she will play a major role in communicating lessons learned both to country programme personnel and to a wider DFID.

7.3 Each country team will need to be familiar with country programme evaluation, monitoring and performance management issues. The team will be made up of a combined skill set covering economics, social and institutional development, and human resource management.

7.4 The consultancy team will have responsibility for:

- maintaining ethical standards in implementing the evaluation
- the production of evidence based conclusions and recommendations
- managing logistics in country
- dissemination of products specified in this ToR.

8. **Conduct of the Work**

8.1 The evaluation will identify and share emerging lessons on good practice in the appraisal, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of country programmes. The consultants will enhance lesson learning and knowledge sharing by, amongst others, using the latest international and country-specific literature and information on development effectiveness.

8.2 DFID country offices will need to be engaged by the study team throughout both the inception and main phases of this programme to ensure maximum benefit is gained from the feedback of emerging findings and lessons learned. Particular emphasis is to be placed on the production of reader-friendly report for the communication of findings to a wider development audience.

8.3 DFID EvD staff will be involved in each country evaluation particularly through participating in country visits, helping to define methodology and commenting on draft documents. Administrative staff in the concerned country office will provide limited support to study teams to ensure documentary material is readily available and that meetings/appointments are organised efficiently. A review panel will be established by EvD to independently assess the quality of the evaluation outputs, including each inception report and the country programme and synthesis reports.
8.4 The consultants will report to the Evaluation Department within DFID. The Evaluation management for DFID will be Arthur Fagan (Programme Manager) with support from Joanne Asquith (Economic Adviser) in DFID Evaluation Department. Iain Murray (Deputy Programme Manager) will act as first point of contact on contractual and operational issues.

9. Timing

9.1 The consultancy should start in March 2003 and the outputs produced over a twelve-month period. Consultants must specify the level of inputs for each component of the evaluation work as well as provide CV’s of the proposed country evaluation team membership.

Evaluation Department, October 2002
Annex 2: Romania—Report Summary

1. This is the draft of a Country Programme Evaluation report for Romania. The Romania evaluation forms part of the wider Evaluation of Country Programmes, which is currently being undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) on behalf of the Evaluation Department (EvD) of DFID. The wider evaluation project has two aims: to prepare evaluations of DFID programmes in three countries (Brazil, Cambodia and Romania) and (ii) to develop appropriate approaches and methodologies for the evaluation of DFID programmes at the country level.

2. The Evaluation was conducted in the period July-October 2003 using a variety of methodologies, including extensive in-country participation by DFID’s staff, partners and other stakeholders.

3. The evaluation covers the period from 1997–2003, during which DFID expenditure averaged around £5 million per year. Although DFID has been in existence over all this period it is useful to see the period as falling into two sub-periods:
   • the early period (1997–99), referred to here as the KHF period, when although under DFID management, the content of the programme was confined to projects identified and developed during the pre-DFID period.
   • the later period (2000–03), after the publication of the Romania Country Strategy Paper (CSP), when the programme was unambiguously owned and managed by DFID.

Main findings

4. DFID’s programme in Romania has taken place in a difficult and volatile political context. Despite this, the programme has been largely successful. The majority of projects, especially during the latter period under the guidance of the CSP, have been broadly successful in achieving their outputs.

5. The programme was largely successful because:
   • most of the projects were realistic and based on a reasonable knowledge of local circumstances
   • DFID was flexible and willing to take risks. It was able to adapt to the reality on the ground, and to respond more quickly than other agencies.
   • DFID advisers, even though London-based, were able to identify and support key development opportunities.
   • the technical assistance provided by DFID was generally high quality, committed and long-term.
   • the majority of the CSP period projects were designed to complement and add value to much larger EC and World Bank programmes. The most influential were often small, strategic contributions early in the multilateral planning process.
   • most of the successful private sector projects in the KHF period, and projects more generally in the CSP period, worked with cooperative and committed Romanian partners.
6. The programme was less successful when it attempted to support central public sector reforms at a time in the late 1990’s when government’s commitment to reform and its capacity for policy formulation was weak. It was also less successful at influencing multilateral programmes when it simply provided technical assistance or add-on components, but had not been involved as a partner from the outset. While viewed as worthwhile by all the parties concerned, the three examples of DFID-World Bank project-level collaboration were not always easy or unproblematic.

7. For most of the period Romania programme remained a low-key operation, directed from London, depending heavily on the delivery of project-based contracted TA services as the main vehicle for change. The development of a strong advocacy or process-support role was constrained by a combination of limited capacity in the local office, a limited and declining availability of London-based advisers, a significant project management load, and the lack of a strong working relationship with the British Embassy. Only in the final years of the programme was an attempt made to break out from this limited role, notably through the attempt to achieve strategic influence at a high level of government through the public sector reform programme and through support for the Commission on Social Exclusion and Poverty (CASPIS).

Lessons

8. The Romanian experience is of interest in relation to the issues surrounding appropriate approaches and human resource support for country programmes where DFID is an extremely small player in relation to total aid budgets, and aid is a relatively small proportion of national income and the government budget.

9. The main lesson drawn is that in small country programmes the critical resource is actually human rather than financial. A strategic approach to the country programme needs to be matched with accessible and skilled human resources: advisers from London, local staff (local and expatriate) and consultants. In the most successful cases it was the combination of high quality inputs from DFID advisers (even if London-based), relatively small amounts of funds, and high quality technical assistance that achieved a result.

10. The evaluation also contains lessons for how DFID can influence the programmes of multilateral agencies, notably the World Bank and the European Commission. In the case of the World Bank it is important not to confuse collaboration with influence. Achieving influence over the design or implementation of a World Bank project is difficult to achieve through the provision of technical assistance (TA) alone, or even of add-on components financed by DFID, where DFID has not been involved from the outset of project preparation. By way of contrast, DFID can probably achieve much more in terms of influence, and at lower cost, by being ready to provide small amounts of TA at the design stage, or by being able to respond quickly with high quality TA when a strategic opportunity is identified.
Annex 3: Cambodia—Report Summary

1. This is the draft of a Country Programme Evaluation report for Cambodia. The evaluation forms part of the wider Country Programme Evaluation study, which is currently being undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) on behalf of the Evaluation Department (EvD) of DFID. The wider evaluation project has two aims: to prepare evaluations of DFID programmes in three countries (Cambodia, Brazil, and Romania) and (ii) to develop appropriate approaches and methodologies for the evaluation of DFID programmes at the country level.

2. The evaluation was conducted in the period October 2003 to January 2004. Three members of the evaluation team visited Cambodia for two weeks in October. This was followed by separate visit to evaluate support in the health sector. A final one-week visit took place in January to discuss an initial version of this report.

3. The evaluation covers the period from 1997-2003, during which time DFID bilateral country programme expenditure in Cambodia rose from around £3 million in 1997/98 to £8 million in 2002/03, or £27 million in total. A further £12 million was provided to non governmental organisations (NGOs) by central DFID departments over this period. The UK is one of the smaller donors, providing around 3% of the US$487 million in overseas development assistance (ODA) disbursed in 2002.

Main findings

4. Cambodia has lived through a traumatic recent history, but is now enjoying a higher degree of peace than the country has known for a generation. However, the constraints to pro-poor policy making are significant, the political environment remains uncertain, and aid coordination is weak. Progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been limited. The context within which DFID has been working since 1997 has been difficult but improving.

5. The overall judgement of the evaluators is that DFID has made a positive contribution in a difficult environment. The 2000 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) provided a clearer statement of strategy than had been available before. DFID has been influential and is generally highly regarded by its development partners for its professionalism and flexibility, and particularly for its commitment to a consultative and collaborative approach. The quality of project cycle management appears to have improved over time.

6. While the overall judgement of the current programme in terms of strategy, activities, process and organisation is positive, it is much more difficult to demonstrate that the programme has been, or will be, developmentally effective. To a large extent this may be more of a problem of measurement and attribution, than of achievement, a problem not helped by the lack of clear programme level indicators and targets in the DFID strategies to date. But it also reflects the difficult and fragile Cambodian context.

Issues and implications

7. The evaluation raises four issues of relevance to DFID in Cambodia and elsewhere:
8. A key feature of the DFID programme has been the attempt to work through and with multilateral agencies, initially mainly UN agencies and now increasingly IFIs. The experience points towards the need for a more realistic and strategic approach to partnership arrangements with multilateral agencies. Relationships with other agencies need to be monitored and managed, and a better reciprocal understanding of the culture, policies and procedures of each partner needs to be developed. Based on this, DFID needs a clearer understanding of the appropriate form of relationship, and how to maximise DFID’s influence, with different partners and in different circumstances.

9. DFID’s programme in Cambodia now has clearer overall objectives than it did before the 2000 CSP, but still lacks an effective framework for programme-level monitoring and evaluation. Future monitoring of programme objectives should benefit from recent government work, in follow-up to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), to produce a set of national MDG targets, and from the increased attention that DFID has given to the development of monitoring and evaluation systems in the programmes in which it is directly involved. Together, these efforts may permit the adoption of well-founded quantitative targets for DFID-supported programmes and the more effective monitoring of progress towards them. Until this happens, the wide gap that exists between project-level scores on the one hand, and country-level outcome statistics, both of variable quality, will remain. Assessing other aspects of a country programme—such as strategy, process and organisation—can inform, but the basic problem of assessing programme-level effectiveness and impact has not been solved. We can say that the programme is generally ‘doing the right thing in the right way’, but we cannot really say how effective it is or what impact it has had.

10. The establishment of the in-country office has enabled DFID to participate more actively than previously in formal and informal discussions on development issues, and to develop wider relations in the country, including with civil society organisations. Ongoing DFID-supported projects in each adviser’s field have provided grassroots information and contacts, while freedom from direct management tasks has normally ensured adequate time for work on broader issues. However, the fact that the Programme Manager is based in DFID’s regional office in Bangkok may have limited DFID’s influence in country. The Government would favour locating project/programme decision-making in Phnom Penh.

11. Political fragility, weak governmental institutions, high dependency on aid for financing investment, and the great diversity and agendas of donors involved have made for unusually serious difficulties of donor coordination. Though a relatively small donor, DFID has maintained a prominent position in policy dialogues and donor discussions. Good progress has been made in developing more collaborative ways of working in the latter part of the period under review. DFID has recently taken the decision, however, to drop the aim, contained in the 2000 CSP, of eliminating the bilateral aid programme by 2010 and supporting Cambodia entirely through multilateral agencies.
Annex 4: Brazil—Report Summary

1. This is the report of an evaluation of the DFID country programme in Brazil. The evaluation forms part of the wider Country Programme Evaluation study which is currently being undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) on behalf of the Evaluation Department (EvD) of DFID. The wider evaluation project has two aims: (i) to prepare evaluations of DFID programmes in three countries (Brazil, Cambodia, and Romania); and (ii) to develop appropriate approaches and methodologies for the evaluation of DFID programmes at the country level. The evaluation of the Brazil programme was conducted in the period November 2003 to January 2004, and followed a ‘lighter’ approach than was used in Cambodia and Romania.

2. The evaluation covers the period from 1997–2003, during which time DFID’s recorded expenditure in Brazil rose from around £7 million in 1997/8 to £12 million in 2002/3, or £47 million in total over the evaluation period. The UK is the fifth largest donor, excluding the IFIs, but provided only around 3% of the US$322 million of official development assistance (ODA) disbursed in 2000.

Main findings

3. The climate for UK-Brazil development cooperation improved significantly over the evaluation period. The degree of synergy between the two governments, and between their development priorities, increased still further with the advent of the Lula administration in 2003. Addressing inequality and poverty are central themes of the Brazil government’s policies. Brazil is a key regional and global partner for DFID and the UK government more widely.

4. The programme in Brazil has for some time been seen as slightly marginal to DFID, with an uncertain future. This partly explains why the arguments over the country strategy been so long drawn out. Tensions between the environmental focus of the programme and an interpretation of DFID’s central objective of poverty reduction led to a hiatus in decision making shortly after the 1998 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) was published. The new Country Assistance Plan (CAP) was only approved in principle in late 2003, and was then immediately rendered redundant by the cuts to the bilateral country programme in Brazil (and other programmes in Middle-Income Countries (MICs)) in November 2003.

5. This strategic uncertainty has been damaging. While the programme used the draft country strategy produced in 2001 as a guideline, the lack of an approved strategy or plan meant that there was no agreed and approved focus for the programme, and no agreed and approved criteria for the identification of new initiatives. This increased the scope for internal argument within DFID, and decreased the incentive for wider teamwork. It hindered communication with partners, both government and donor, and increased the uncertainty about DFID’s commitment to Brazil.

6. The programme has been relevant, both to Brazil’s priorities and to DFID’s policies, and has been responsive to changes in both. New areas of social and governance work have been developed, and the programme has moved away from stand-alone projects to a more programmatic and strategic way of working. However, the evaluators consider that the attempt to re-engineer existing and planned environment/natural resources projects
was a mistake. It damaged relationships, undervalued what was being achieved, and diverted staff time away from developing the new areas of work. While DFID was right to re-orient the programme over time, a more gradual approach (and a transitional strategy) might have been preferable. The change process was poorly managed and communicated.

7. While there have been a number of promising initiatives involving multilateral agencies in recent years, these have been strongly driven by global and regional DFID policy towards multilaterals. The evaluators are not convinced that working with IFIs/multilateral agencies in the context of a bilateral programme is as effective a way of achieving influence and pro-poor change in Brazil as working directly with the appropriate Brazilian partner.

8. The programme’s work on partnership has been innovative, has improved relationships with partners, and is highly relevant to DFID more widely. The continuity of effort in building and maintaining relationships through a period of great uncertainty within DFID has been particularly creditable. The DFID office nevertheless recognises the gap that exists between the principles and practice of partnership, where DFID is sometimes seen as unilateral, abrupt and high-handed.

9. DFID has worked hard to reflect the principles of participation, inclusion and reciprocity in their monitoring of projects, and the quality of project-level monitoring and evaluation has improved significantly. This has been important for the programme both in terms of the development of trust between partners and for joint learning. This was recognised and appreciated by all of the partners consulted.

10. Project performance has been good, with the majority rated as largely successful or better. DFID has a high reputation for the technical and personal qualities of its staff, Technical Cooperation Officers (TCOs) and consultants. Consultations indicate that DFID was, until November 2003 at least, one of the most highly regarded development cooperation agencies in Brazil. However, it was perceived that, compared to other donors, DFID appeared to be constantly changing its mind about what it wanted to do in Brazil.

11. Programme-level monitoring has also improved, but probably less, in the main because it is intrinsically more difficult. Assessment of programme level performance has been made very difficult by the lack of a framework of objectives, targets and indicators in the all the country strategies and plans produced to date. The draft 2003–2005 CAP contained a matrix of objectives, outcomes and initiatives, but lacked effective indicators.

Issues

12. The evaluation of the Brazil programme since 1997 raises five issues for DFID. It suggests that there is a need for the following:

i. a clearer, integrated framework of objectives and monitorable indicators in country/regional plans in order to be better able to monitor and evaluate country programme performance.

ii. a careful analysis of the potential and modalities of working with different multilateral agencies in a middle-income country context, and a better institutional understanding of these agencies.
iii. a more considered balance between the merits of **continuity and change** in country programmes. While change may be necessary and desirable, constant and over-rapid change is inimical to long-term commitments and relationships.

iv. **change** needs to be explicitly (and better) managed. A change vision and strategy needs to be clearly defined and well communicated; change leadership and commitment built; and change plans implemented and monitored.

v. corporate policy and guidelines are needed governing how DFID’s relationships with **development partners** should be conducted, managed, and eventually ended.
### Annex 5: Timeline for Important Changes in DFID from 1997–2003

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<td>ODA part of the FCO</td>
<td>Elections DFID new Dept. Joined up working of Whitehall Depts.</td>
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<td>UK Govt. White Paper ‘Public Service for Future’.</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Spending Review, Emphasis on PSA</td>
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<td>Case for Aid. Spending Review, £1b for Africa by 06, 0.4% ODA/ GNI by 06. Intl Dev. Act</td>
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<td>New devolved country Office.</td>
<td>PRC approval threshold. More devolved country offices.</td>
<td>Restructuring of: Management Board Sub-Committees; DPC/PRC merged to form DC; APD to TMG; Regional Divisions</td>
<td>Palace St. Smaller Management Board, PSA focus, non-executive directors. Restructuring of Policy Div. PED/DPD. Devolved office</td>
<td>More devolved country offices</td>
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<td>ISP: Support for Transition Countries by KHF</td>
<td>SWAp. PRISM. Intranet in UK. Project scoring. PPIAF. ATP. 3 ISPs Montserrat Emergency Evaluation.</td>
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<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>UK-national managers, advisers, TCOs, APOs, Consultants.</td>
<td>Management and Dev. APDP. Consultants contracts. Diversity, LEStaff/SAIC</td>
<td>ESM introduced. iIP Triangle of skills.</td>
<td>ESM Progress. AAF/PDP. Advisory Groups, SAIC Diversity</td>
<td>New Permanent Secretary</td>
<td>New Secretary of State</td>
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Annex 5: Timeline for Important Changes in DFID from 1997-2003
Annex 6: Review of DFID Country and Regional Strategy Reviews

Introduction

1. This annex provides an overview of eight Country and Regional Strategy Reviews that have been undertaken by DFID programmes since 2001. The main distinction between these reviews and Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) is that the initiative for the strategy reviews has originated from the country programmes themselves, who have managed and financed the process, rather than the Evaluation Department (EvD). On the whole, these reviews have been undertaken by teams of independent consultants, although in one case (Bangladesh), the review was completed by the DFID office itself, with minor external support.

2. The remainder of this annex is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises and compares the reviews in terms of their approach, scope and methodology. Section 3 considers the degree to which these reviews have influenced subsequent country/regional strategies and plans.

Overview of the strategy reviews

3. Table A3 (at the end of the Annex) provides a summary of the eight reviews that have been considered in terms of the timescale reviewed, inputs used, their scope, and their structure. A comparison of these reviews, in terms of purpose and timing, scope, methodology and approach, is provided below.

Purpose and timing

4. With the exception of the Central America Review (whose overall purpose is not made clear in the review document), the purpose of all of the reviews has been to evaluate the implementation of the country or regional strategies in terms of their outcomes and impacts, against original intentions. The timing of all reviews has come towards the end of the strategy periods and the reviews have been used to draw lessons from the recent past as part of the process of preparing new country or regional strategies.

Scope

5. It is not always clear whether the reviews were just evaluating the country or regional strategy as set out, or the totality of DFID’s activities carried out in the country/region over the strategy period. Some of the reviews (such Brazil and Russia) have included case study reviews of major projects under the programme. Although these have tended to focus on the degree to which the projects have contributed to the realisation of country programme objectives to a greater extent that stand-alone project evaluations would, they have inevitably also reviewed the success of the projects in their own regard—i.e. in relation to the projects’ own logframe targets. In the Russia case, this included detailed project-level assessments of impact. Other ‘lighter’ reviews have concentrated more on broader programme strategy issues, focusing on identifying a limited set of critical lessons and issues for future strategy preparation.

25 Bangladesh, Brazil, Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova (CASC), Central America, Ghana, India, Russia, Ukraine.
6. The timescale and inputs that have been put into the strategy reviews have varied widely and there is little relationship between level of resources applied and size of country/regional programme. The review period has varied between nine months (in the case of Bangladesh) to two weeks in-country (in the case of Central America).

**Methodology and approach**

7. A review of the methodological approaches adopted in the strategy reviews points to considerable divergence. Table 2 provides a summary of the degree to which core evaluation questions relating to relevance, efficiency, effectiveness/impact, sustainability, partnership and influencing were considered in each of the strategy reviews. A few striking patterns emerge from this analysis:

- Whilst most of the strategy reviews considered the majority of the core evaluation questions to a significant extent, there were considerable divergences in the depth to which these questions were assessed, which broadly follows the resources committed to the reviews. In other words, the most in-depth (or ‘heavier’) reviews included assessment of the core evaluation questions at a variety of levels—i.e. the project and sector level, as well as at the broader programme level, where as the ‘lighter’ reviews tended to focus the evaluation questions at the programme level.

- There was particular focus on the relevance and effectiveness/impact of the programmes’ interventions, with relative omission of explicit consideration of their sustainability.

- In reviewing impact, none of the reviews attempted to assess DFID programmes against outcome indicators that relate to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and have instead focused on intermediate outcomes, such as impact on reforms, etc. In many cases, the reviews have been hampered by the lack of outcome indicators included in the strategies, or where they have existed, there have been problems of attribution, particularly where outcomes indicators have tended to focus on MDG goals. This situation is likely to improve under the new Country Assistance Plan (CAP) process, which incorporates more measurable indicators into programme plans.

**Table A1: Evaluation methodology employed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Effectiveness/Impact</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Influencing</th>
<th>Depth of review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASCIM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Light</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 The scoring contained in this table provides an indication of degree to which core evaluation questions were considered in the reviews. Ranking is as follows:

0 No consideration
1 Cursory consideration
2 Significant consideration
3 Detailed consideration
8. The structures of the review reports vary considerably, and the terms of reference for the reviews are also variable. For example, the analysis employed in the Bangladesh strategy review tended to be based on a sector-by-sector approach, whilst other country reviews tended to concentrate on themes or objectives.

9. The emphasis of the reviews of regional programmes are noticeably different to the country reviews. The Central America review looked particularly at ways of working with other donors and staffing and funding arrangements, with brief analysis of the achievements of the programme, categorised according to four themes. The CASCM review contained particular consideration of broader management issues, such as the geographical spread of the programme and ways in which country programmes should be managed. This appears to be largely due to the different nature of the key decisions facing DFID for regional programmes.

10. Table A2 considers the methods employed in information gathering during the reviews. Most reviews relied heavily on meetings with key stakeholders, which in all cases included DFID staff, governments and other donors. Most also consulted with project beneficiaries, project managers and civil society, though this was not universally the case. Only one of the reviews (India) used survey questionnaires to help answer questions that the review was attempting to address, whilst half of the reviews used structured workshops to discuss the issues raised during the reviews. The participants at the workshops, and the issues discussed varied considerably.

Table A2: Evaluation approach—methods of information gathering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Survey Questionnaires</th>
<th>Structured Workshops</th>
<th>DFID</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Other Donors</th>
<th>Project Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Project Managers</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASCM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Impact of the strategy reviews

11. This section considers the impact of the strategy reviews by assessing the degree to which their key recommendations were adopted in subsequent programme strategies. It begins by considering each review in turn, before drawing broad conclusions from this analysis.

27 These questionnaires were given to members of the DFID programme’s ‘theme groups’ and included a broad range issues under consideration during the review.
**Bangladesh**

12. The CAP refers to the findings of the strategy review and related studies (including the Drivers of Change analysis and the ‘Influencing Study’). Many of the key recommendations coming out of the review, particularly with regard to improved criteria for prioritisation in the programme and the introduction of more specific objectives with measurable indicators, were included in the CAP. There is also evidence of plans for greater focus in the programme. However the degree to which the recommendations relating to longer timeframes for interactions and a focus on higher-level engagement have been adopted in the programme is difficult to judge from the CAP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Recommendations of review for the CSP</th>
<th>Degree to which adopted in CAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for CAP to determine how to set programme priorities</td>
<td>• Criteria for prioritisation set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for further analysis of political process (drivers of change)</td>
<td>• Evidence of extensive consideration of ‘drivers of change’ issues, e.g. in risk analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for longer time frames for interaction with partners</td>
<td>• Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for future strategy to have specific objectives built around expected outcomes that are operational and measurable</td>
<td>• Measurable annual indicators built into the CAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for donors to concentrate on comparative advantages</td>
<td>• DFID to focus on gender issues. Direct bilateral inputs in some other sectors being cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for focus on higher level engagement</td>
<td>• Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brazil**

13. Although a finalised CAP was never produced following the Country Strategy Performance Review, a draft CAP was finalised in July 2003. Uncertainty surrounding future of the Brazil programme has made long-term planning around the recommendations of the strategy review difficult. Although the review was referred to in the CAP, many of recommendations have not been fully incorporated.
### Key Recommendations of review for the CAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Degree to which adopted in CAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop longer-term framework based around achieving International Development Targets (IDTs).</td>
<td>• Not incorporated, largely due to uncertainties regarding future of DFID Brazil programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP needs to be supplemented by country strategic plan, including explicit logframe and milestones/process indicators.</td>
<td>• This is included in the CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinction between poverty reduction and environmental goals needs to be made more explicit.</td>
<td>• Clear movement away from environmental focus of the programme, although the distinction between the goals remains unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit risk analysis needs to be developed as part of CSP.</td>
<td>• Risk analysis incorporated into CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater attention needs to be given to building relationships with Brazilian government and other partners.</td>
<td>• Acceptance of this need in the CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID should consider developing an integrated regional support strategy where there are clusters of interventions.</td>
<td>• Support focusing on four states, though no integrated regional support strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID should undertake a broad stakeholder analysis, including assessment of key decision-makers and areas where wider impact can be achieved.</td>
<td>• Stakeholder analysis undertaken as part of CAP preparation process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova (CASCM)

14. The draft Regional Assistance Plan (RAP) refers to the review and its key recommendations are quoted, including a broad acceptance of the validity of these recommendations and a resultant major shift in the approach and focus of the DFID programme. The one recommendation that is not mentioned in the Assistance Plan is for ‘Engagement Strategies’ to be prepared for each country in the region. It is not clear whether these are being prepared.
### Key Recommendations of review

| Case for Engagement Strategy with each country, even if no significant bilateral programme. | Focus of bilateral programme in 5 countries.  
|                                                                                       | No mention of an engagement strategy in other countries. |
| Need for more complete articulation of intervention logic at country level.              | Concentration of country-level support in 3 thematic areas, with additional regional support to 2 thematic areas.  
|                                                                                       | Phasing out of interventions that fall outside strategic framework. |
| No argument for higher levels of aid resources.                                         | Small increase in programme resources envisaged. |
| DFID should not pre-determine sectoral scope of programme—should focus on identifying strategic opportunities. | Broad thematic focus, but no sectoral predetermination. |
| GBS not an appropriate aid modality in short to medium term.                            | No GBS planned. Support largely small-scale project based. |
| Need for more clearly defined role for country offices.                                 | Greater engagement of country staff in strategic decision-making planned. |
| DFID should have strategic bias towards selecting activities that are short term, but work in longer term context and that compliment programmes requiring greater resources. | ‘Strategic Impact Fund’ being set up to implement this recommendation. |

### Degree to which adopted in Draft Regional Assistance Plan

| Case for Engagement Strategy with each country, even if no significant bilateral programme. | Focus of bilateral programme in 5 countries.  
|                                                                                       | No mention of an engagement strategy in other countries. |
| Need for more complete articulation of intervention logic at country level.              | Concentration of country-level support in 3 thematic areas, with additional regional support to 2 thematic areas.  
|                                                                                       | Phasing out of interventions that fall outside strategic framework. |
| No argument for higher levels of aid resources.                                         | Small increase in programme resources envisaged. |
| DFID should not pre-determine sectoral scope of programme—should focus on identifying strategic opportunities. | Broad thematic focus, but no sectoral predetermination. |
| GBS not an appropriate aid modality in short to medium term.                            | No GBS planned. Support largely small-scale project based. |
| Need for more clearly defined role for country offices.                                 | Greater engagement of country staff in strategic decision-making planned. |
| DFID should have strategic bias towards selecting activities that are short term, but work in longer term context and that compliment programmes requiring greater resources. | ‘Strategic Impact Fund’ being set up to implement this recommendation. |

### Central America

15. No CAP available.

### Ghana

16. The CAP explicitly acknowledges the strategy review and many of the lessons drawn from this review appear to have been taken on board. In particular there is clear evidence of the intention to move the balance of the programme away from focusing on social spending, with greater engagement in the PRSP process and support to central reform, in the context of greater programme resources being provided through GBS.

17. Areas where the CAP does not make clear reference to implementing the recommendations of the review relate to cutting failed programmes (where there is clear reference to the intention to continue to fund programmes highlighted in the strategy review as failing), support for small, innovative projects and the need for DFID to bring its procedures more in line with those of the government. It is not possible from this superficial analysis to come to conclusions about why this is the case.
### Key Recommendations of review for the CSP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Degree to which adopted in CAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebalance CSP away from focus purely on supporting social spending. Continued support to central reforms.</td>
<td>• Gradual movement away from sectoral programmes towards GBS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recognition of need for greater emphasis on public financial management and public sector reform, particularly in context of movement towards GBS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bring procedures in line with those of govt.</td>
<td>• Not clear from the CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer engagement with PRSP process.</td>
<td>• Intention to support PRSP process and strengthen its poverty process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide TA to strengthening budget systems.</td>
<td>• Support to improving public financial management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of activities around strategic objectives.</td>
<td>• Decision to structure support around four ‘themes’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut failing programmes.</td>
<td>• No clear evidence of this from the CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to support small innovative projects.</td>
<td>• Movement towards GBS suggests this is unlikely.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### India

18. In general, there is clear evidence that recommendations from the strategy review have been taken on board in the CAP. This is particularly the case with respect to recommendations relating to greater engagement in institutional change and incentive strengthening, particularly at the national level. Unsurprisingly, the CAP does not provide evidence of improvements to internal management procedures, such as the management of the programme's project portfolio, although the CAP hints that this might be the case by stating that there will be a thorough review of the portfolio and a reorientation of the programme to free up resources.

### Key Recommendations of review for the CAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Degree to which adopted in CAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus programme on institutional change and incentive strengthening.</td>
<td>• More strategic and focused approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support to civil society to articulate interests and influence policy decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greater policy dialogue with key line ministries and partnerships with other agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stronger and more strategic national programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Phase out projects in non-focus states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop coherent planning framework related to overall objectives and national planning cycles.</td>
<td>• Stronger links to Indian 10\textsuperscript{th} 5-year plan and MDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More thorough consideration of risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved impact measurement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen portfolio management procedures.</td>
<td>• Thorough review of the programme envisaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Russia

19. The strategy review and its findings are summarised in the CSP. There is explicit acceptance of the review’s conclusions and a statement that they have been incorporated into the CSP. The key recommendations, including linking interventions more clearly with programme objectives; moving away from a sectoral focus in the programme; reducing the geographical coverage of the programme; and including local stakeholders more closely in programme interventions, have all been taken up in the CSP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Recommendations of review for the CSP</th>
<th>Degree to which adopted in CSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Move away from sectoral focus towards interventions categorised according to themes. Link interventions more clearly with programme objectives.</td>
<td>• Support focused on five outputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider more direct financing of Russian organisations.</td>
<td>• Unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen logical linkages between programme interventions and socio-economic challenges in Russia.</td>
<td>• Unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link interventions more closely with Russian government’s policy priorities.</td>
<td>• Programme will seek to support the government’s economic and social modernisation programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involve Russians more closely and systematically in programme and project design.</td>
<td>• Intention stated in the CSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical spread of programme should be concentrated.</td>
<td>• Spread cut from eight to two oblasts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ukraine

20. The strategy review is referred to in the CAP. Although the CAP makes clear that some of the key recommendations of the review (such as the need to strengthen the capacity of the Kijiv office) have been adopted, many of the other recommendations referred to in the table below are not explicitly addressed in the CAP. The CAP is written in a very general nature and some of the recommendations may have been too specific to include in the document. It is therefore not clear whether or not the recommendations not addressed in the CAP have not been adopted.
### Key Recommendations of review for the CAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Degree to which adopted in CAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appoint a Ukrainian Advisory Group to consult on drafting the CAP.</td>
<td>• Unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select 3 systemic issues and set targets for poverty impact.</td>
<td>• Four key outcomes identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore scope for using competition in the selection of local government partners.</td>
<td>• No explicit poverty impact targets set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Donetsk/Donbass as a focal region.</td>
<td>• Local government partners identified in the CAP. No evidence of competitive selection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a small Strategic impact Fund.</td>
<td>• Donetsk the main focal region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit emphasis on capacity building.</td>
<td>• No mention in CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen public communications on programmes/results.</td>
<td>• Not explicit in CAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop projects &amp; contractor ToRs jointly with recipients.</td>
<td>• Mentioned in CAP, but unclear how this will be achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further decentralise responsibilities to DFID's Kjiv office.</td>
<td>• Unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacity of Kjiv office to be strengthened.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusions

21. Overall, it is apparent that the majority of the key recommendations made in the strategy reviews have been adopted in subsequent programme strategies. This suggests that the strategy reviews have provided a useful input into the preparation of these programme strategies. However the extent to which this is the case depends partly on how specific and detailed the review recommendations are compared to the programme strategies. There are cases where the strategies provide a plan that is far more general in its coverage than the review recommendations, meaning that it is not surprising that these recommendations are not explicitly addressed in the strategy documents.
References


DFID, *Central Asia South Caucasus and Moldova (CASC) Regional Assistance Plan (DRAFT)*, February, 2004


EME, *Central America Regional Strategy Performance Review*, February 2003


OPM, *DFID’s Central Asia, South Caucasus and Moldova Programme: Strategic Review*, October 2003
### Table A3: Summary of strategy reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Region</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
<th>Review Report Date</th>
<th>Timescale reviewed</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Scope of Review</th>
<th>Review Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>5 evaluators. 9.2 person months. £109K.</td>
<td>Review of development contribution of the DFID programme with a view to informing the identification of priorities, implementation and evaluation of the 2001-03 programme. Case study review of major projects.</td>
<td>1. Assessment of relevance of CSP objectives. 2. Assessment of effectiveness of the strategy in terms of approach, instruments used, and implementation. 3. Assessment of the impact of the programme against stated objectives. 4. Draw lessons to inform the development, implementation and evaluation of the 2001–03 programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CASCM</strong></td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>Review lasted 4 months. 10 evaluators. 9.7 person months. $161K.</td>
<td>Review of relevance and effectiveness of CSP and identify lessons for the CAP. Case studies for 5 countries.</td>
<td>1. Key characteristics of 9 countries in CASCM region relevant to decisions about development assistance assessed. 2. Role of aid in the region and environment for development effectiveness analysed. 3. DFID’s experience to date reviewed, using case studies. 4. On this basis, recommendations for future of DFID programme developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>28</sup> With verification from a small external team.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Region</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Timescale reviewed</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Scope of Review</th>
<th>Review Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Central America | EME | February 2003 | 1998-2001 | 2 week in-country visit with additional UK meetings. | Broad assessment of ways of working and influencing, and progress in four thematic areas. | 1. Assessment of country situation.  
2. Review of success in working with multilaterals, donor coordination and the programme’s four thematic areas.  
3. Assessment of staffing and funding arrangements.  
4. Recommendations regarding resource envelop, programme focus, and funding instruments. |
| India | OPM | June 2003 | 1998-2001 | 3 evaluators. 1 staff month (value £20K) for lead evaluator. | Review of performance against CSP objectives and DFID’s contribution to this progress.  
Limited specific project level analysis, although primarily analysis of project portfolio as a whole. | 1. Analysis of external environment within which the DFID programme operates.  
2. Assessment of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and partnership of CSP.  
3. Assessment of robustness of DFID’s corporate analysis, planning, programme delivery and risk management systems.  
4. Provision of lessons and recommendations on priorities for the CAP, in terms of (a) strategic issues and; (b) the management of the portfolio. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Region</th>
<th>Reviewer</th>
<th>Review Report Date</th>
<th>Timescale reviewed</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Scope of Review</th>
<th>Review Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Mokoro</td>
<td>January 2001</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>3 evaluators. ‘Heavy’ and extensive review carried out. 160 people consulted.</td>
<td>Project case studies to test hypotheses. Comprehensive review of all components of the programme.</td>
<td>1. Role of DFID programme and its relevance, effectiveness of dialogue underpinning the programme. 2. Effectiveness of strategies to improve poverty focus and engagement with multilaterals. 3. Effectiveness of instruments used and of DFID procedures. 4. Impact of DFID assistance. 5. Geographical focus of programme resources. 6. Conclusions and proposals for the new CSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>April 2001</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>9 evaluators. 3.2 person months. £50K.</td>
<td>Broad review of the project portfolio broken down into 6 sectoral groupings, and the programme as a whole, including management arrangements.</td>
<td>Similar methodology to Brazil review, although considerably less resources. Assessment of DFID's activities in terms of: 1. Impact on Ukraine’s transition to a market economy and pluralist democracy. 2. Impact on poverty and Ukraine's attainment of the IDTs. 3. Issues relating to DFID's programme management.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government’s policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID’s assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

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