

Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

Country Report 4: Haiti



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(Translation from original version in French)



Canadian International
Development Agency

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Foreword

After the 12 January 2010 earthquake which devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti needs effective international support more than ever. But whilst we need an immediate response, we must not lose sight of the challenges we were facing before the earthquake. These persistent challenges include the lack of jobs and economic opportunities, physical and food insecurity, political instability, and a lack of dialogue between the elite and ordinary citizens, particularly those in the countryside.

This disaster has struck a blow to the progress we had made since 2006 – the reform of the national police, the gradual securing of the Cité Soleil slum, the holding of general elections, better macroeconomic management, public reform and an infrastructure programme. However, we have no choice but to persist and make further progress.

Haiti is committed to monitoring the *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* launched at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in September 2008. This commitment was made during a national consultation on 20-21 May 2009 which brought together all echelons of Haitian society as well as international partners. We are convinced that monitoring these principles will, over time, improve development effectiveness in Haiti.

The lessons learned from this national consultation, which are synthesised in this report (written before the latest crisis), must act as points of reference as we co-ordinate and implement the support we receive. The *Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship* adopted in 2003 also remind us that humanitarian aid must contribute to long-term development and must not affect pre-existing efforts.

We must put the essential challenges identified during the national consultation at the centre of the recovery effort. We have more to rebuild than our homes – we must rebuild our society and our networks. This is an opportunity for us to “build back better”: by reinforcing capacities, by promoting mutual accountability, and by resuming the democratic and economic transition that was taking gradually place before disaster struck. Seizing this opportunity will demand strong political will on our part, as well as the stable and sustained support of international partners.



H.E. Mr. Jean-Max BELLERIVE
Prime Minister
Minister of Planning and External Co-operation

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This report was drafted by Mr Pierre-Antoine BRAUD (Bridging International), under the direction of Ms Juana de CATHEU (OECD). It is based on a multi-actor consultation which took place on 20 and 21 May 2009 in Port-au-Prince. Its checking and confirmation by the various stakeholders was carried out by the National Co-ordinator, Mr Yves Robert JEAN, and international focal point, Mr Roberts WADDLE (Canada). This report thus represents the analysis of the main stakeholders in Haiti, rather than of the author or the OECD.

Haiti acknowledges with thanks all the participants at the multi-actor consultation, as well as Mr Jean-Philippe BERNARDINI (United Nations Development Programme); Mr Francesco GOSETTI DI STURMECK (European Union); Ms Mélanie BOULET, Mr Jean COUTURIER, Mr Alexandre GUIMOND and Mr Dominique ROSSETTI (Canadian International Development Agency); and Mr Jean-Robert SIMONISE, Ms Caroline LEGROS, Mr OGE and Mr Richard MATHELIER (consultation facilitators) for their contributions. The report was translated into English by Ms Juliette LINDSAY. Ms Maria ZANDT contributed statistical data. The first round of the Fragile States Monitoring Survey has generated six country reports and one global report, available on the survey website: www.oecd.org/fsprinciples.

A second round will take place in 2011 – if conditions permit – and will allow progress to be measured. All the results will be presented at the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Seoul in 2011.

This report was originally written in French. Please refer to the original French version for the official text, which has been agreed by the various stakeholders.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CPA	Country programmable aid
DSNCRP	National growth and poverty reduction strategy paper
EVD	Dutch Agency for International Business and Cooperation
FAES	Economic and Social Assistance Fund
G11	Group comprising the EU, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, Canada, Spain, France, the United States, Japan and a representative (rotating every six months) of the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile)
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IHSI	Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MARNDR	Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAS	Organization of American States
OIF	International Organisation of La Francophonie
ONPES	National Observatory of Poverty and Social Exclusion
PAPDA	Haitian Platform to Advocate for an Alternative Development
PEMFAR	Public expenditure management and financial accountability review
PIUs	Project implementation units
PNH	Haitian National Police
SCTICS	Interministerial technical co-ordination and sector monitoring
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
TFPs	Technical and financial partners
UCAONG	Co-ordination Unit for NGOs
ULCC	Unit for the fight against corruption
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
PIU	Project implementation unit
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

The Haiti Country Report reviews the implementation of the *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, two years after they were endorsed by ministers of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's 23 member countries. It also identifies priority areas for improving the collective impact of international engagement.

The report summarises a discussion among 90 stakeholders representing both national and international institutions, complemented by interviews and data collection (see Introduction).

The implementation of the principles will be reviewed again in 2011 (conditions permitting).

1. Main issues

Principle 1: Take context as the starting point.

- Haiti presents a complex set of deep-seated problems stemming from its context and history. These must be taken into account in the design of international interventions and development programmes. While stakeholders agreed on the importance of contextual understanding, **different stakeholders have interpreted the Haitian context in different ways**. There are important diverging opinions both within Haitian society – reflecting a legacy of divisions and exclusion – and between Haitian and international actors, which have so far prevented the emergence of a common vision for Haiti's development priorities and for the country's direction and pace of change.
- These multiple readings of context, combined with a general failure to translate contextual analysis into programme design and implementation (*e.g.* on youth employment and regional disparities), has led to **a lack of coherence in intervention strategies**. This is reflected in the Haitian Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSNCRP), which provides a common vision for Haiti's long-term development, but does not highlight the immediate priorities.
- Stakeholders agreed on two main points: (1) the need to invest **in a more joined-up understanding of the Haitian context**, including its changing character, across national and international actors; and (2) the need to take greater account of the local context in defining programmes and projects, in particular in relation to the security agenda and democratic transition.

Principle 2: Do no harm.

The consultation recognised the role of international assistance in stabilising the country, but also pointed to several unintended effects of international intervention:

- **Aid delivery and modalities.** There was a concern that the heavy international presence may undermine the capacity and legitimacy of the state, for example where international agencies seek to intervene too heavily in domestic policy debates or establish parallel project implementation units (PIUs) outside of regular government control. In addition, the major disparity in salary levels between government and international actors has drawn skilled labour out of government.
- **Widening disparities.** There is some evidence that development aid has been overly concentrated in certain geographical areas (such as the slum of Cité Soleil, while most rural areas were thought to be under-aided) and in certain sectors (the social sectors tend to be favoured over the productive sectors).
- **Food aid.** There was debate on whether the provision of food aid has diverted attention from tackling the longer term causes of food insecurity, which would require investing in agricultural development.

Principle 3: Focus on statebuilding as the central objective.

- There was firm consensus on the importance of statebuilding, but also some disagreement on how to put this principle into practice. It was noted that **international support for institution building has focused only on selected parts of the executive, without taking a government-wide view or including state-society relations**. There has been a tendency to ignore broader questions of public service reform. For example, the legacy of patron-client relations from the Duvalier era was emphasised as being an obstacle to establishing a modern civil service. And fiscal reform will be required to ensure that government capacity can be enhanced and sustained.
- The **reform of the Haitian National Police (PNH)** was cited as an example of successful statebuilding that has resulted in significant improvements in security. According to a recent opinion poll, 70% of Haitians view the police as the most reputable government institution. However, there were concerns that such improvements have not benefited all parts of the country, and have not been matched by a strengthening of the judicial system. International agencies have been working with the police for 14 years, while support for the justice system began only in the past year.
- The consultation revealed other examples of **a lack of a joined-up approach to statebuilding**. Some of the main gaps appear to be lack of donor interest in supporting political parties, contrasting with large-scale international support for parliament as a whole (*“a parliament without parliamentarians”*¹); a tendency to focus on central government at the expense of local government; and the lack of initiatives to bridge the disconnect between Haitian civil society and government and to promote domestic accountability and partnerships in service delivery: there is *“a weak social contract”*.
- The **proliferation of parallel project implementation units** operating outside of regular government structures was viewed as being a major hindrance to building government capacity, ownership and legitimacy. However, reducing the number of PIUs will depend on international actors seeing progress in tackling corruption.

Principle 4: Prioritise prevention.

- There was broad agreement on the importance of this principle, and recognition of the positive role of international support in stabilising the country over the past five years. However, the situation remains precarious as a result of dire poverty, the weakness of the social contract and the risk of further political instability. Hence, it will be important to **maintain focus on conflict prevention even as security conditions improve**.
- Particular emphasis was placed on the need for a more **holistic approach to conflict prevention** encompassing social, economic and environmental dimensions: (i) This should be based on an integrated approach recognising the links between good governance and security, tackling the problem of youth unemployment, and limiting the social and humanitarian impacts of natural disasters; (ii) A key element in the conflict prevention strategy will be to strengthen national stakeholder dialogue to improve communication and mediate between interest groups.

Principle 5: Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.

Everyone agreed on the importance of the principle. There was particular agreement on the **need for greater focus on inter-sector approaches** linking different ministries to achieve greater impact.

¹ Phrases in italics and quotations marks are quoted verbatim from the national consultation.

Principle 6: Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.

The consultation concluded that international actors have actively promoted gender equity by encouraging the development of women's organisations and greater representation of women in positions of power. However, **international action has generally failed to address other forms of social exclusion that are deeply rooted in Haitian society.** These issues are leading to a rural/urban divide, large-scale unemployment and disillusionment among excluded young people.

Principle 7: Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.

There has been some progress in strengthening alignment at the national level. Ninety-five percent of development aid provided to the public sector is now accounted for in the national budget, a figure that **exceeds the Paris Declaration target** (of 85%). **The DSNCRP also provides a common point of reference** for international support, in spite of its lack of prioritisation.

At the same time, the consultation suggested that there has been a **lack of engagement between international and sub-national actors** at the departmental and communal level. There has not been enough attention paid to specific needs at the local level, and international actors have become part of an essentially top-down planning system. Moving towards more bottom-up processes will be a major challenge in Haiti because of the weakness of representative and judicial structures at the local level.

Principle 8: Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms.

There are several mechanisms in place in Haiti for co-ordinating international actors. **Their design generally satisfies the principles of the Paris Declaration. However, in practice there have been weaknesses in co-ordination** resulting from the diversity of actors and their different ways of working, duplication of effort by donors and international NGOs, the fact that Southern donors do not participate in formal co-ordination structures, and the multiplication of co-ordination mechanisms, including the 22 sector working groups that some judge to be excessive in number.

Several examples were cited of how inadequate co-ordination has led to contradictory policies and aid delivery mechanisms: such as two NGOs simultaneously operating cost recovery and free distribution programmes for seed in the same place, and small-scale building works where different agencies had sought local labour on a paid and unpaid basis.

Principle 9: Act fast... but stay engaged.

Recent events in Haiti and its continued fragility emphasise **the need for rapid international response.** The international community has generally met this need, but in responding quickly to crises there has been a tendency to lose sight of long-term development goals.

Principle 10: Avoid pockets of exclusion.

The **geographical concentration of aid** was a recurring point of debate throughout the consultation. International agencies have tended to operate in the south of the country where infrastructure is better. Many consider that this has widened disparities between different parts of Haiti. However, others countered that this strategy is consistent with the immediate need to promote stabilisation and economic development, and also reflects the pattern of population density in Haiti.

Summary table

PRINCIPLES	FINDINGS	PRIORITIES
Take context as the starting point	There is no consensus between local and international actors on the state of development or the priorities for the country. This risks undermining coherence between the local context and the choice of intervention. A more flexible vision of the changing context is needed.	Agree on a high-level mechanism to improve co-ordination among the international actors and dialogue with Haitian stakeholders, taking the poverty reduction strategy – the DSNCRP – as a model.
Do no harm	Parallel implementation structures and the concentration of aid in certain geographical areas and sectors risk weakening the state. There are major disparities in conditions between local employees and international employees.	Establish a mechanism for evaluating the immediate results of the DSNCRP and its impact on social, economic and governance dynamics.
Focus on statebuilding as the central objective	There has been an improvement in the operation and image of the national police, the PNH. However, its absorption capacity and ability to provide services remain limited. Stakeholders recognise that the DSNCRP is the necessary framework for implementing and improving the services for the population. Support is concentrated in certain branches of the executive and a sector approach is lacking.	Develop a strategic statebuilding plan. Reduce the number of project implementation units. Make a start on public sector reforms, particularly the prevention of corruption and the mobilisation of national resources.
Prioritise prevention	The situation has improved, but little account is being taken of the socio-economic aspects of crisis prevention. There is consensus on the need for a holistic approach to this principle (youth unemployment, education, etc.).	Invest and facilitate investment in the social sector. Strengthen contingency planning and rapid response capacity of both government and international actors (<i>e.g.</i> for food security). Maintain the focus on security even if the situation improves.
Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives	The situation has improved, but an interministerial and inter-sector approach is lacking.	Facilitate exchanges between the executive, legislators and civil society and strengthen interministerial coherence using existing interministerial co-ordination structures.
Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	Positive progress on gender issues, but insufficient attention to the rural population, the unemployed and young people.	Identify elements of the DSNCRP that support disadvantaged groups. Develop communication strategies oriented to the various segments of Haitian society.
Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts	The target set by the Paris Declaration has been reached: 95% of aid provided to the public sector is accounted for in the national budget. But there is too little attention to the priorities of local-level bodies.	Deepen alignment with sectors and local authorities.
Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms	The principles of the Paris Declaration are being met, but the disparity between aid actors and sector groups makes co-ordination difficult.	Promote co-ordination between international actors through joint missions, joint offices, common reporting formats and the use of multi-donor trust funds.
Act fast... but stay engaged	There are absorption capacity problems. The focus on rapid response has reduced long-term engagement in certain sectors and misalignment with the local context.	Introduce a bottom-up, participatory process at commune level to complement the current approach, which is mainly top down.
Avoid pockets of exclusion	There is a concentration of aid in the south of the country, where infrastructure is better.	Standardise data collection. Aim to build up an understanding of the constraints to this and promote the use of common standards by international and local actors.

Introduction

This report on the implementation of the *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* in Haiti summarises a multistakeholder national consultation held in Port-au-Prince on 20 and 21 May 2009.² This report is mainly based on the discussions that took place over those two days, and as such it reflects the views of the stakeholders in Haiti, rather than those of the author or the OECD.

The report is also based on:

1. A review of documents from the Haitian government and funding agencies, as well as from universities and research institutes (see Annex D: Bibliography).
2. Interviews conducted in Port-au-Prince from 22-26 May 2009 with: (i) Haitian government officials; (ii) a sample of donor representatives (selected to reflect the scale of funding agencies' activity) and representatives of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); (iii) residents of the Bel-Air, Martissant, Paco and Pétionville districts of Port-au-Prince.

Table 1. Participants in the national consultation and interviewees

Government
- Prime Minister
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MAST)
- Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of the Interior and Local Communities
- Ministry of Justice and Public Safety (MJSP)
- Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
- Ministry of Public Health
- Haitian National Police
- Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC)
Civil Society
- A sample of Haitians from Port-au-Prince, including residents of the Bel-Air, Martissant, Paco and Pétionville districts.
- Channel 11
- The Protestant Federation of Haiti
- FONDEVIH
- International Solidarity Commission (ISC)
- National Observatory of Poverty and Social Exclusion (ONPES)
- National Radio
- Telestar
- National Television of Haiti
- Union des Jeunes Progressistes pour le Développement d'Haïti (UJDPH, or Union of Young Progressives for Haitian Development)

² See final agenda at: www.oecd.org/fsprinciples.

International Partners

- German Embassy
- Agro Action Allemande
- Brazilian Embassy
- Japanese Embassy
- Venezuelan Embassy
- Canadian Embassy; ACDI
- United States Embassy
- Norwegian Embassy
- European Union
- ABC (Argentina, Brazil, Chile)
- Inter-American Development Bank
- World Bank
- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
- UNDP
- Secretariat of the G11
- UNICEF
- USAID
- EVD
- Groupe Croissance

This report follows the Principles Monitoring Plan (PMP), a methodology common to the six countries that took part in the 2009 survey of the principles (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste).³

Part One assesses the degree of application of each of the 10 *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* in Haiti (Annex A). Illustrative indicators have been used to complement the analysis and priority actions have been identified. The ultimate purpose is to improve the effectiveness of international engagement in Haiti – all the more critical in the current situation. Part Two summarises the priority actions identified by participants at the national consultation, principle by principle.

³ See www.oecd.org/fsprinciples.

Part 1: Common diagnosis, principle by principle

Principle 1: Take context as the starting point

The discussions during the multistakeholder national consultation in Port-au-Prince revealed significant differences in opinion between the international and Haitian actors, as well as among Haitian stakeholders. There are differences in the investments made in analysis on the Haitian context, in analytical approaches, in resulting typologies, and in operational implications.

- **Analysis of the Haitian context tends to be both partial and static.** Participants agreed that the Haitian context – and especially its dynamic, ever-evolving character – have not been taken into account sufficiently in analyses, in particular the tangible progress that was being made in security and democratic reform before the earthquake. However, all participants were willing to invest in joint analysis of the local context and translate it into programming,
- **The need to agree a common vision and priorities.** Given the many pressing priorities and implementation challenges facing Haiti, a vision shared by all stakeholders will be crucial for effective international engagement. However, the discussions reveal that this vision is still lacking because of the diversity of actors, their different interests and their different analyses of the current context and what underlies it. The Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSNCRP), which embodies national ownership, does reflect a shared, holistic and long-term view. However, the views on the current *priorities* differ, which might explain why international programmes and projects are fragmented and not properly sequenced (*e.g.* security and justice, see Principle 5).

Illustrative Indicator

Indicator 1. Is most international actors' engagement based on sound political and social analysis, taking into account the situation in terms of national capacity, state-society relations and societal divisions?

NOT SYSTEMATICALLY.

Principle 2: Do no harm

The Hippocratic oath “Do no harm” raises the sensitive issue that international interventions may not always be helpful, and could “inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards” (*Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, Annex A). On this subject, the debates have been structured around two questions: “Which aspects of international engagement are locally harmful?” and “What can we do to stop causing harm?”⁴ They have identified three sources of “harm” as follows:

1. The consequences of an international presence and the different forms of aid

Most participants highlighted that international engagement can undermine the legitimacy and the capacity of the state:

- **Parallel project implementation units (PIUs).** The multiplicity of PIUs that operate independently of Haiti’s government system constrains long-term development. Despite being essential to get the job done in the short run, according to some participants PIUs “weaken the state even more” and create distortions in the job market.
- **National ownership and leadership.** The “funds which should be at the state’s disposal are diverted [towards PIUs]”, according to most Haitian participants. This raises the issue of national ownership and leadership. Many consider that the political and technical conditions are now in place to allow the Haitian leadership to assert its leadership and to manage aid (although the emergency situation still requires a pragmatic approach to the subject, see Principles 8 and 9). Some Haitian partners would like to limit the role of international partners to technical assistance and implementation, so that they are no longer involved in the design of strategies or policies.⁵
- **Salary differences.** The discrepancy between national pay scales and the levels of **remuneration** offered by international NGOs and donors to their employees is described as “harmful”. Participants observed that state officials are deserting the Haitian public sector to join better-paying foreign-based organisations. Another problem compounds this phenomenon: it was felt that “with comparable skills, a foreign official will always be preferred to a local official”. Notwithstanding other elements of motivation, this perception reflects, on the part of national stakeholders, the centrality of salary issues in recruiting and retaining civil servants – although it would be wrong to assume that state officials are only motivated by salary levels. Personal commitment and ideological motivation can also be important.
- **The “lack of predictability and continuity of international engagement”.** The sometimes short-term approach of some international actors, their frequent changes in focus and the interruption of programmes without consultation could hinder medium-term planning and implementation and reduce the beneficial impact of aid.
- **The lack of a joined-up approach to capacity development.** This is most visible in the use of international technical assistants who often have disparate job descriptions and come from different administrative cultures. This problem is compounded by the lack of co-ordination among their Haitian counterparts.

2. The consequences of ignoring widening social and geographic disparities

Participants pointed out that international action risks worsening, indirectly and unintentionally, existing regional and sector disparities:

4 Phrases in quotation marks are direct quotes from the consultation.

5 This desire to consider aid from a technical perspective and to regard the state as solely responsible for defining policies is reminiscent of critiques of international aid and the conditions to which it is subject (see, for example, James Ferguson, 2006, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*, Duke University Press.)

- **Geographical disparities:** aid tends to be overly concentrated on specific areas – such as the south, the so-called “*Republic of Port-au-Prince*”. The “*Cité Soleil Special Tour*” is a case in point.⁶
- **Sector disparities:** participants note that programmes dedicated to revitalising social services have been at the expense of the productive sector, even though it is “the pillar and carrier of development”. In this way international aid is acting as “*an ambulance: treating the injured instead of preventing injuries*”.⁷

3. The consequences of an incoherent approach to food security

Participants emphasised the pointlessness of providing food aid whilst trying to simultaneously boost local agricultural production. They also underlined the vulnerability of the country both to natural disasters⁸ and to price variations for commodities and basic needs on international markets.

Although some participants describe food aid as harmful over the long run, there are some counter arguments to this view in the literature: (i) the low level of food cover rate (56%) and the populations’ urgent need for food; (ii) the methods for buying and distributing food aid have been designed to limit their impact on the prices of local products (Muggah, Collinson and Elhwary, 2009; Muggah, 2009).

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 2. Does international engagement benefit one population group over another or contribute to social divisions?

SOMETIMES.

⁶ This expression refers to the organisation of visits for foreign officials which systematically takes them to the slum called Cité Soleil. This place embodies extremes and is even more striking as it is situated close to the harbour, to the president’s palace and key ministries and to richer areas like Pétienville.

⁷ Various international programmes wish to qualify this point of view on prevention. To continue the ambulance metaphor, the International Committee of the Red Cross had thus implemented a system to allow the wounded to use local taxis and tap-taps operating in Cité Soleil. This insertion in the local economic fabric is not unique: several donors are developing support programmes for small and medium-sized companies.

⁸ Hurricanes regularly destroy crops; during 2008 alone there were four hurricanes in a row (costing almost USD 230 million in damage to the agricultural sector). Furthermore, the resulting vast soil erosion reduces the productivity of agriculture, further worsening poverty and aid dependence. The effects of the 12 January 2010 earthquake on the infrastructure for agricultural production, on population movements into rural areas and on the prices of foodstuffs must also be underlined.

Principle 3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective

This principle stresses (i) the capacity of the state to perform its core functions (such as the provision of basic social services and the restoration of a just, secure and effective environment); and (ii) the legitimacy of the state, of which accountability is a central element. Following the OECD's broad definition (see principle 3 in Annex A), the state was taken to mean the three branches of government, including local authorities.

Despite agreement that statebuilding should be a central objective, the implementation of this principle remains insufficient. For example, stakeholders do not agree on how much and how fast aid can be channelled through country systems.

1. Successful institutional transformations, but fragmented statebuilding

This discussion focused on three themes in particular: the National Haitian Police (PNH), justice and corruption.

There has been notable improvement in PNH's performance and its image among the population. According to one opinion poll, 70% of those polled found the PNH to be the most reputable government institution and 58% found it had improved its performance over the last year (pers. comm. from an international representative). This reflects strong and effective international support. Other elements that have contributed to the improved security environment include police "vetting" (process for verifying the police officers' or applicant police officers' skills), which has resulted in significant behavioural change among police officers.

However, a few reservations nuance this picture:

- Although the PNH has shown marked improvement over the last few years, **there are notable differences in staff deployment across the different departments and communes** in the country.⁹ Even though it receives priority in terms of funds allocation, the PNH example shows the need for, and complexity of, balancing administration across the entire country. This not only raises the question of available resources, but also of budget arbitration and whether funding for state administration will be able to be maintained in the long term.
- **The imbalances in investment – and results – between security and justice.** This is a key concern because justice and policing should go hand in hand: while "The PNH has received a lot of support in the last 14 years, it has only been a year since some reforms for justice have been launched". Although the institutional framework is in place (*e.g.* the establishment of the *Unité de Lutte contre la Corruption*, ULCC), everything else remains to be done. Significantly, there has been no major prosecution for corruption yet.
- **Issues of visibility and, thus, legitimacy:** Some participants thought that the results obtained by the PNH benefited it less than it benefited MINUSTAH in terms of credit. In some cases, credit has been attributed to individuals rather than institutions.¹⁰

2. Capacity is a central challenge. The national and international records are both mixed: there is no national capacity development strategy and international actors lack a joined-up approach to capacity development.

- Public reform programmes have begun and they prioritise professionalisation programmes for developing capacity. However, the pace of reforms should take into account the legacy of the past, including out-of-date legislation and patron-client relations inherited from the Duvalier regime. Because of these constraints, finding a balance between the qualitative improvement of public administrations and their quantitative expansion is essential to avoid the development of "*a bureaucracy without bureaucrats*": *i.e.* administrations which formally exist but lack staff able to deliver services.

⁹ At the end of 2008, the central area had only 143 police agents for a population of 670 000. In the northern area, La Victoire municipality had no police officer at all, despite having a population of 9 431 (IHSI, 2008).

¹⁰ For example, during discussions with communities in Martissant, Port-au-Prince (on 22 and 24 May 2009), people noted the key role of Lainé Aceleste, responsible for the Martissant sous-commissariat until his assassination in May 2009.

- The international representatives present described their approach, which is to “*build the capacities of targeted units*” in Haitian administration.¹¹ This raises the question of how to expand capacity beyond islands of excellence; how to sustain recurrent costs, such as the difficulties faced by the Haitian State in paying civil servants’ salaries; and the need for fiscal reform. “*How to retain qualified officials?*” and “*Can the government afford to pay them?*” were recurrent questions during the discussion of Principle 2. Participants recognise that the long-term remuneration of Haitian officials is central to the issue of governance.

3. Improved state accountability is integral to statebuilding

Recognising that state performance in service delivery over time is a fundamental element of the social contract between the state and citizens, the Haitian executive must exert leadership to “develop an aid policy based on clear priorities” and “look at the political and administrative apparatus as a whole” to be able to formulate a Haitian expression of what the priorities are in terms of statebuilding. In this respect, participants have highlighted three relevant issues:

- **A parliament without political parties?** International support to parliament is unfortunately not backed up by support to political parties, despite a “*chronically weak multiparty system*” and the “*need to have good members of parliament to have a good parliament*”.
- **Local accountability and governance:** “*Decentralisation has started but is slow*”. Participants wondered whether the delegation of authority to local communities should be stepped up, given the state’s resource constraints, its limited reach beyond Port-au-Prince, as well as the need to build state legitimacy.
- **Parallel PIUs, an operational issue or a symbol?** PIUs are a recurring subject of controversy. They currently provide essential support for the delivery of services, and civil society organisations (CSOs) also have a history of delivering services when the state does not function. However, most participants agreed that in the long term parallel PIUs should not have a prominent role in service provision. The feeling is that they undermine accountability and deprive the public sector of opportunities for capacity development (such as “learning by doing”). Frustration with this model was so acute that international NGOs were referred to by one participant as “*AGOs – anti government agencies*”. Public-private partnerships are generally welcome, but with the caveat that there are “*red line[s] which should not be crossed*”. There is a Co-ordination Unit for NGOs (UCAONG) in the Ministry of Planning, but in practice it is noticeable that “*follow-up is not done*”, according to one of the representatives of this ministry. The overall assessment is that it is unclear who is doing what and therefore actions are uncoordinated and poorly targeted, and there are glaring geographical and sector disparities. Haitian and international stakeholders are united in their desire for better NGO co-ordination and impact evaluation. From the point of view of international actors, their resort to PIUs has been more of a necessity than a deliberate policy. If the international community is to reduce the number of PIUs, concrete and effective anti-corruption measures will need to be put in place first. However, such measures have been timid so far. Moreover, the EU Head of Mission reminded participants that not all donors resort to PIUs, stating for example that less than 10% of the European Commission’s official development aid is channelled through NGOs.¹²

In short, a balance between short-term and longer-term considerations is needed. Essential services must urgently reach those who need them, while the state’s legitimacy and its financial and human capacities must also be built.

Illustrative Indicators⁴⁷

Indicator 3a. Is the PNH professional, balanced across social groups and does it have civilian oversight?

YES, but this image, backed up by opinion polls, should not be separated from the need to address issues of justice and impunity.

Indicator 3b. Ratio of tax revenue to gross domestic product: 6.3% (2005).¹³

Indicator 3c. Percent of aid disbursed that is focused on governance and security (average 2002-2004): 13.3%.¹⁴

11 Various programmes are already in place. For example, the Canadian government has just launched a course to train Haitian civil servants through its public administration university (ENAP), which plans to support the creation of a senior civil servants’ college in Haiti.

12 See Annex B: Statistical data on international engagement.

13 World Bank: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHAITI/Resources/Haiti.AAG.pdf>. For reference, a tax-to-GDP ratio of 15% is considered a reasonable target for most low-income countries (OECD, Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, OECD, Paris).

14 According to OECD figures and the CRS, on the basis of aid actually disbursed.

Principle 4. Prioritise prevention

Crisis prevention is recognised as “*fundamental*”. Participants agreed on the need to address prevention in a holistic manner rather than just focusing on security (however, without “*forgetting about security too soon*” – see below). Establishing dialogue platforms to bring the different stakeholders together was deemed essential for effective prevention.

1. A holistic approach to prevention

The many challenges facing Haiti – from political turmoil to criminal violence, without forgetting the 2008 food riots and the country’s environmental vulnerability – have spurred Haiti’s partners to reaffirm their commitment to prevention by taking into account the different social, economic and environmental parameters.¹⁵ In this holistic approach to prevention, aid is part of a larger equation which also includes security, education/training and disaster risk reduction:

- **Crisis prevention implies long-term efforts for security.** Security ranks high among the priorities of Haitian and international stakeholders. This is demonstrated by the “*massive investment*” of the international community in security system reform and the consensus on the need to improve the governance of the security system. While security and stabilisation have seen tangible and concrete improvements these last few years, participants still warn: “*do not forget about security too soon*”. Widespread and acute poverty, “*a dislocation of society*”, “*a fragile social contract*” and political instability make stabilisation a largely unfinished agenda.
- **Education and training are central to crisis prevention in Haiti.** Addressing the shortage of jobs, boosting youth education¹⁶ and training public service staff are all top strategic priorities.
- **Mitigating and managing the impact of natural disasters.** Haiti is regularly stricken by deadly natural disasters. Floods, hurricanes and earthquakes claim thousands of victims every time and cause considerable damage. With each disaster, the lives and livelihoods of many Haitians are lost and infrastructure destroyed (e.g. the 2004 and 2008 hurricanes and the January 2010 earthquake). Natural disaster risk reduction should be central to crisis prevention in Haiti. The participants also agreed on the importance of rebuilding infrastructure. In addition to natural disasters, dramatic deforestation has led to massive erosion, further limiting farming potential.
- The debates emphasised a “*dialogue deficit*” and the need to build the processes and space for debates, both for Haitian stakeholders and international partners on the one hand, and the Haitian leadership and CSOs on the other. The Haitian government’s commitment at the April 2009 Washington Conference “Towards a New Cooperation Paradigm for Growth and Development” to a political dialogue on governance was considered to be a significant step forward.¹⁷ This would be the first step in a process of gradual convergence towards shared priorities.

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 4. To what extent does international engagement “prioritise prevention” or fail to do so? With what impact?

SUFFICIENTLY, on the critical issues of these last five years. However, it is increasingly necessary to widen the field of prevention to economic and social aspects, including youth unemployment and education.

¹⁵ The economic impact of the hurricanes at the end of 2008 was to reduce GDP by 15%. The Haitian Interior Ministry assessed the number of dead at 793, plus 310 missing people (National Emergency Operations Centre, Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities, Civil Protection Directorate, *Final assessment of the impact of Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike, 1 October 2008*, 2008). The number of casualties of the January 2010 earthquake is estimated at more than 110 000 according to the Haitian Minister of Information and Telecommunication.

¹⁶ Only 49.6% of children attend primary school (47.9% of boys and 51.4% of girls); one child in eight (301 000) aged between 7 and 18 has never attended school (UNDAF 2009-2011).

¹⁷ The *Pact of Mutual Responsibility for Governance* of 1 April 2009 points out that the financial commitment of donors should be linked to the improvement of governance and to the drafting of a “road map”.

Principle 5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives

There was strong and immediate consensus on the need to recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. The debates highlighted two elements:

- There have been improvements during the last year in co-operation between sectors.¹⁸ However, there is still a need for better working relationships between administrations.
- The Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSNCRP) is recognised as the main strategic framework, and it appropriately integrates political, economic, security and development dimensions. However, it has some limitations, in particular the lack of hierarchy among the priorities identified by the Haitian executive (see also Principle 2).

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 5. Percentage of assistance that aligns to an integrated multi-sector framework.

There is no trust fund to support the DSNCRP: assistance to government goes directly through the national budget.

¹⁸ Sectors in Haiti refer to activity categories, which are grouped into three themes: growth, human development and democratic governance. These are complemented by specific cross-disciplinary politics and strategies. A “sector group” therefore in general involves several ministries. See Chart 4 in Annex C for the structure of sector groups.

Principle 6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies

The discussion of this principle highlighted that in the Haitian context, the term “exclusion” (the result, intended or not, of certain policies and programmes) is more relevant than the term “discrimination” (which entails an element of intent). Exclusion is a major issue in Haiti, even though Haiti has a strong sense of nationhood and identity politics are limited.

1. The inclusion of women in society


There was strong agreement that the international community gives the highest priority to gender equality and has actively promoted non-discriminatory measures. Participants highlighted that gender equality is the only area where Haiti has experienced positive progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. They noted the growth of organisations working in this area and the increasing number of female staff in senior positions.

On the other hand, the attention given to rural populations, unemployment and youth is considered to be insufficient. This is the result of current aid priorities, as well as the legacy of Haitian history and culture.

2. “It is the [rural] majority that is excluded”

The disconnect between the Port-au-Prince-based political and economic élite and the rest of the (largely rural) population, is rooted in Haitian history. Although the situation differs across departments, symptoms of this divide include conflicts over land rights; more limited access to healthcare and drinking water in rural areas than in urban areas;¹⁹ and “parallel structures” in the police and consequent abuse (MINUSTAH (2009; Haiti and MINUSTAH, 2009). Budget allocations and investment in agriculture and rural development are limited despite the contribution of these sectors to the Haitian economy (Chart 1).²⁰

Chart 1. Distribution of gross domestic product by sector



Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, IHSI.

¹⁹ Although the proportion is now less than in the 1980s, the majority of the Haitian population continues to live in rural areas: 55% in 2007 compared to 80% in the 80s. The contribution of agriculture to GDP fell from 40% in the early 1990s to 25% in 2006. Over the same period the tax rate on imports of basic produce like rice fell from 50% to 3% (World Bank, 2008; Lamaute-Brisson *et al.*, 2008; Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development, 2008; cited in Fukuda-Parr, 2009). The poverty rate (58%) is higher in rural areas than the national average (50%), compared to 20% in the capital (survey on the conditions of life in Haiti, 2001, cited in Verner, 2008).

²⁰ The current budget allocations in these two areas are below 10% (Fukuda-Parr, 2009).

3. Unemployment and youth

Participants described unemployment as “*a form of exclusion*”. The highly uneven distribution of wealth in Haiti and the uneven access to economic opportunities raise broader societal issues and sparked a debate about how the current economic development model does not give priority to agriculture and rural development.²¹ The shortage of jobs is not only a social and security risk in the short-term, it is also a liability for the future, with Haiti the top emigration country in the Caribbean (International Crisis Group, 2007).

However, programmes and projects to address unemployment are currently being implemented with the hope that they will stimulate the job market and restore investors’ confidence.

Participants agreed that engaging with young people and focusing on economic opportunities for them were critical to prevent crisis and further brain drain. They also highlighted the lack of inclusion of “*youth, [who] are absent from the dialogue*”.²²

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 6. All things being equal, how does international engagement impact on social divides?

POSITIVELY, but participants have requested that data be collected to support this positive perception.

21 The wealthiest 10% of Haitians receive 47.7% of the national revenues; the poorest 10% receive only 0.7% (Fukuda-Parr, 2009).

22 The Haitian demographic structure is as follows: the 0 to 14 age-group makes up 42% of the population; 15 to 64-year-olds make up 54%, and the over-65s are 3%.

Principle 7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts

The notion of “local” in this principle was interpreted as meaning either national or subnational, depending on the context. Participants noted that partners’ increasing alignment with national priorities contrasts with the very limited recognition of subnational needs. Three issues were agreed upon:

1. Alignment to national priorities and systems needs to be deepened

The participants agreed that the conditions were now conducive to increase partners’ alignment with national priorities and systems. According to most Haitian participants, this increase is “*too slow*” (see debate on PIUs, Principle 3). However, Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey data show that donor use of public finance management system in Haiti is not only better than the average for fragile countries, it is also better than all the countries taking part in the 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey (OECD, 2008; and see Table 2).

This contrast between perception and data can be attributed to two factors:

- (i) **A lack of clear priorities:** In spite of public awareness campaigns on the DSNCRP and multiple planning documents, neither international participants nor Haitian civil society were able to list the government’s priorities. There is a risk of “*losing the thread in the face of an excess of documents*”.²³ To allow partners to improve their alignment with national priorities, these priorities need to be clarified, and a push is needed for implementing them.
- (ii) **Donors’ constraints:** there is a timing mismatch between Haitian decision-making and budget cycles and those of donors. Donors are under pressure to “*spend within given deadlines, whereas some ministries have difficulty spending [the available budgets] quickly enough*”.

Table 2. Use of national systems (2007)

	Public finance management systems	Procurement systems
Haiti	46%	31%
Fragile states average	26%	25%
Other countries average	39%	41%

Source: OECD-DAC (2008), *Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-affected States*, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.

2. Subnational issues are being overlooked

The decision-making, resource allocation and capacity development focus of central government and the international community has been on Port-au-Prince over the last decade. This tends to prevent the local perspective from being taken into account, even though some departments and communes have great opportunities (e.g. mango production), while others face great risks (vulnerability to natural disasters). “*The micro level eludes us*” confessed one international representative. Participants agreed that disparities between departments and local differences are not, as yet, being taken into account.²⁴

Furthermore, even though national planning includes communal or departmental plans, “*an eagerness to take part*” at these levels is confronted with problems of human and financial resources. There are real “*problems of access to information in order to define needs*”. Planning thus tends to be mainly “top-down”, from the capital, and very seldom “bottom-up” (see Box 1).

However, there are two areas in which the subnational level has received attention:

²³ The DSNCRP is quite comprehensive. In other countries affected by crisis, a holistic poverty reduction strategy paper like this is usually accompanied by a shorter-term, more focused action plan.

²⁴ E.g. a scattered rural settlement, the most isolated regions, or mountainous terrain.

- (i) Response to emergency situations, particularly hurricanes and storms, which call for a precise and localised response.
 - a. Engagement in areas critical to the stabilisation process, notably Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince. As mentioned earlier, which has a media dimension on top of being a strategic issue because of its proximity to the airport and the warehouses of the main companies.

Box 1: Co-ordination at the subnational level

A civil society representative working in a rural area pointed out that in the field there is an image of overlapping projects if not “*a cacophony between actors*”, when the problem is not the absence of any information on the roles and responsibilities of the different international actors.²⁵

Information flows currently travel in a “top-down” direction from the capital; this could be complemented by “a bottom-up and participative” approach from elsewhere in the country. As well as improving the impact of international engagement, a mix of “top-down” and “bottom-up” processes could increase state legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.

3. Which counterparts for local co-operation?

Whilst all agreed that the local dimension needs to be better integrated into co-operation, there was debate on the feasibility of such an approach:

- **How do we define a legal framework** when local governments have not yet been set up?
- **What is the right level of engagement?** One civil society representative proposed making the communal sections²⁶ the entry point, because of the concrete nature of discussions at this level. However, there are 577 communal sections in Haiti, so implementing this strategy would be expensive.
- **How do we identify local representatives?** This is essential to the success of a participatory approach. However, the “scattered” nature of Haitian society makes the issue of appropriate representation a recurring problem (see also the weakness of political parties mentioned under Principle 3). Attempts are being made to understand local dynamics and link them to national planning. For example, the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES), a government entity which carries out community projects (building water supply systems, modernising schools, repairing rural roads, etc.), is developing a project to support communal development plans in Nippes on the Plateau Central.

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 7. Percent of aid flows to the government sector that is reported on partners’ national budget.

Haiti has already exceeded the target objective of the Paris Declaration of 85%: in 2007, 95% of the aid given to the Haitian public sector was reported in the government’s budget (USD 298 million of the USD 313 million disbursed by donors).²⁷

²⁵ For example in the Bel-Air area only the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti is known about (author’s interviews, Bel-Air, May 2009).

²⁶ The Haitian administrative system divides the country into departments, communes, and communal sections.

²⁷ Indicator 3 of the Haiti Country report of the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey (OECD, 2008): www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/9/42543794.pdf.

Principle 8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms

As with Principle 7, the views expressed had to do more with implementation (operational aspects, daily joint working procedures) than with the actual principle. Participants were concerned with three aspects in particular:

1. The great variety of international actors and complex co-ordination arrangements

Co-ordination of international actors in Haiti has necessarily brought together a wide variety of actors tackling a host of issues. Participants emphasised:

- the heterogeneity of international actors in their working methods and operational models (diplomats, security agencies, aid agencies, international organisations, NGOs, humanitarian bodies, etc.);
- the variable participation by international actors in co-ordination mechanisms; and
- the competitive “canvassing” of funding agencies by international NGOs, etc.

Participants in particular compared traditional Northern donors²⁸ with South-South co-operation. Although regarded as faster and more responsive, South-South co-operation remains uncoordinated. Participants concluded that while co-ordination is resource-intensive, given Haiti’s multiple priorities and challenges, it is almost always a worthwhile investment.

In contrast to the customarily three-pronged nature of international effort – development, defence and diplomacy – the Haitian situation has involved setting up 22 sector coordination groups (see Annex C), not all of which are functioning or have a clear sector policy. The multiplicity of sector groups leads to a profusion of documents, tables, evaluations and sector appraisals, not to mention the constantly acute problem of monitoring them. This may result in “*considerable wastage*” at both government and international level. Participants felt that “*some groups function very well and others poorly*”, with about three-quarters of the sector groups regarded as operating effectively, especially those concerned with agriculture.

2. The limits to co-ordination mechanisms

Although access to information on the activity of international NGOs is still regarded as inadequate, some co-ordination mechanisms have improved operational approaches. For example, the gradual establishment of databases and of mapping and zoning has enabled the actors and their interventions to be located more accurately.²⁹ Thus at Camp Perrin, in the South, two NGOs had been distributing crop seeds following different procedures (one was distributing them free while the other was charging for them). They have now harmonised their practices, thereby avoiding misperceptions and confusion. Similarly, at Gonaïves two construction activities – one involving wage-remunerated work and the other a voluntary community contribution by the community respectively – have now been brought into line with each other.

Nevertheless, there is still a significant “*lack of information management*”, inadequate common reporting standards, and lack of any systematic “*do no harm*” review.

3. Dialogue and capacity for negotiation

Dialogue, negotiation and accountability through a “twin pact” – among (i) Haitian actors and (ii) Haitian and international partners – are vital for more effective development. Participants felt that the dialogue among Haitian actors was still too weak, noting a narrow political class, extreme concentration of economic power, and a Port-au-Prince/rural divide. On the other hand, it was recognised that Haitian civil society had a central, positive to play in promoting this “twin pact”.

²⁸ Beyond bilateral aid, the majority of funding for multilateral bodies comes from countries in “the North”: American taxpayers thus fund 24% of the United Nations budget, and those in Japan 12%; if all contributions from the 27 EU Member States are aggregated, European taxpayers fund 39% of the United Nations budget, and 30% of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank budget.

²⁹ This work has been carried out in particular by the Office for Co-ordination, which is responsible to the Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), in co-ordination with the international partners.

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 8a. Is there an agreed division of labour?

VARIABLE, depending on the areas of intervention.

Indicator 8b. Percentage of assistance channelled through multi-donor trust funds:

No consolidated data. However, multi-donor trust funds exist, notably in the field of support to elections and education.

Principle 9. Act fast... but stay engaged

1. Act fast

Because of Haiti's legacy of decades of social, political, economic and environmental fragility, it is crucial that international engagement be particularly reactive and flexible: to respond to emergencies but also to make the best of windows of opportunities and consolidate gains over time. Several factors further accentuate the need to act fast: the steady fall in the per capita income over at least the past four decades; the global crisis of 2009, coupled with the turmoil experienced by the country in 2008; and the tragedy of the earthquake in 2010. To resume the pre-earthquake gains that were being made in security, democratic transition and attracting investors, it is crucial that the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and trade legislation (such as HOPE II) be maintained over time. In view of the need to act fast and deliver tangible results in the short-term, criticism about the growing share of services provided either on an *ad hoc* basis or by non-state entities should be put into perspective.

However, short-term pressures should not obscure the importance of longer-term strategies.

2. ... but stay engaged long enough

A representative of civil society commented that funding agencies act like "firemen who fail to prevent the fire from starting again". This person was referring to the counter-productive effects of suspending aid as soon as the "symptoms" disappear. Other participants did not accept this view, emphasising on the contrary the important long-term international commitment, and especially MINUSTAH, which has been active since 2004. Neither is this assertion borne out by an examination of aid flows: aid to Haiti has exhibited modest but regular growth since 2005 (Table 3). Table 4 also indicates that aid predictability in Haiti is well above average, not just for fragile states but for all countries taking part in the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2008).

Table 3. Aid for Haiti (2005-2010)

CPA baseline ³⁰	CPA planned			Change		CPA/gross national income	
2005	2008	2009	2010	2005 to 2010		2005	2010
Constant 2005 USD million				%	USD million	%	
383	436	438	451	18%	68.0	8.7	8.7

Source : DAC-OECD (2008), *Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-affected States*, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.

Table 4. Predictability of aid (2007)

	Disbursements on schedule and recorded by government
Haiti	74%
Average, for fragile states	45%
Average, other countries	58%

Source: DAC-OECD (2008), *Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-affected States*, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.

³⁰ Country Programmable Aid (CPA) reflects the amount of aid that can be programmed by the donor at partner country level.

CPA is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from gross ODA aid that is unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt forgiveness and reorganisation), entails no cross-border flows (development research in donor country, promotion of development awareness, imputed student costs, refugees in donor country and administrative costs), does not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid extended by local governments in donor countries), is not country programmable by the donor (core funding to national NGOs and International NGOs), or is not susceptible for programming at country level (*e.g.* contributions to Public Private Partnerships, for some donors aid extended by other agencies than the main aid agency).

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 9a. Are there rapid response mechanisms?

Yes, and on the whole they are effective.

Indicator 9b. Amount of aid committed at a given time beyond a three-year timeframe

Some funding agencies have 5-year country strategies.

Indicator 9c. Aid fluctuations to GNP (1990-2005 average):

	Annual commitments		Smoothed commitments	
	Commitments less disbursements (% GNP)	Absolute value of commitments less disbursements (% GNP)	Commitments less disbursements (% GNP)	Absolute value of commitments less disbursements (% GNP)
Haiti	1.2	1.9	0.3	3.7


Source: Celasun, O. and J. Walliser (2008), "Predictability of Aid: Do Fickle Donors Undermine Aid Effectiveness?", *Economic Policy*, Vol. 23, July, pp. 545-94.

Principle 10. Avoid pockets of exclusion

The marked differences between regions and sectors create a complex playing field for implementation and monitoring of programmes such as the DSNCRP. Not surprisingly, the geographical concentration of aid was a recurrent criticism. By focusing excessive attention on one particular region, donors or national authorities may amplify disparities or exacerbate conflict over resources. Haitian actors attributed the aid concentration in the south of the country to the better infrastructure and therefore easier access. International representatives pointed out that the focus on Port-au-Prince is to some extent justified because of the need to invest quickly in the central administration so as to stabilise Haiti. Other relevant factors include population density, which is higher in the southern part of the country.

Nevertheless, it would be easier to adapt to disparities across regions (Chart 2) by establishing intermediate agencies on the ground: “donor agencies welcome geographical decentralisation, but have no government counterparts at local level”. As mentioned, the lack of any legal framework for local communities is also a major drawback in this respect.

Chart 2. Mapping poverty: geographical variations



Source: Ministry of Planning and External Co-operation (2004).

Illustrative Indicators

Indicator 10a. Aid, revenue (gross national income) and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score

- Official development assistance: USD (2008) 701 million, of which USD 434 million from DAC-OECD members
- Gross national income: USD (2007) 6.1 billion.³¹
- Country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) score: 2.9 (2008) on a scale of 1 to 6.³²

Indicator 10b. Proportion of population living with less than USD 1 a day:

54%.³³

31 Source: World Bank data: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/hti_aag.pdf.

32 Source: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/73153-1181752621336/IRAI2008table1.pdf>.

33 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, USA: www.cia.gov.

Part II: Priority actions

Priority actions identified by participants at the national consultation included:

<p><i>Principle 1: Take context as the starting point</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agree on a high-level mechanism to improve co-ordination between international actors and Haitian stakeholders (for example on the basis of the political dialogue on governance initiated at the Conference in Washington DC on 14 April 2009). 2. Ensure that the DSNCRP (growth and poverty reduction strategy paper) remains the essential reference document, reflecting a vision and priorities shared by the Haitian government and the international partners; ensure that it is perceived as a real contract between national and international stakeholders. 3. Ensure that local differences are taken into account when identifying short-term priorities. 4. Encourage joint evaluations and field research that is either conducted jointly or that involves co-ordination. 5. Clarify the definition of the sector projects based on the DSNCRP to enable clearer priorities to be established.
<p><i>Principle 2: Do no harm</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. To limit brain drain, promote, as good practice, a moratorium on the recruitment of any public servant in the six months immediately after the person concerned has left his or her administrative post. 7. Establish a mechanism for evaluating the immediate results of the DSNCRP. Identify indicators that can measure its impact on social and economic dynamics as well as on the forces underlying governance. This might involve a mid-term evaluation and then a further evaluation at the end of the period covered by the DSNCRP.
<p><i>Principle 3: Focus on statebuilding as the central objective</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Re-establish a strategic plan to strengthen the state (funds are available to support such a programme). 9. Map out priority needs for all essential state commitments, so that the government can develop a very clear grasp of this issue. 10. Identify resources that can be mobilised, especially from taxation. Revive the public fiscal system so as to re-establish the tax base, strengthen social solidarity, and provide people with more extensive services. Expand the means available for the state to resume a strategic operational dimension while reorganising services in the departments. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Draw up a framework to develop the private sector so that it is conducive to employment and expanding the tax base. Reduce monopolies in certain economic sectors. b. Devise a framework for improving the delivery of basic services. The recently adopted justice and security reform plan should be subject to special monitoring. c. Monitor the listed results of programmes carried out by international actors to strengthen the state, and assess the impact of initiatives related to this goal. d. Revise legislation dating from the Duvalier period which governs the activities of state bodies so that current control and management requirements can be met. Update the handbook of procedures for each ministry. e. Develop a public service human resources policy to enhance the status of public servants and ensure their professional loyalty. f. Implement the anti-corruption strategy prepared by the Anti-Corruption Unit, including setting up anti-corruption offices throughout the country's different departments and strengthening enforcement of the legal framework. 11. Prepare a road map for progressing from Phase II to Phase III alignment,³⁴ lessen dependency on the PIUs and strengthen monitoring and control facilities.

³⁴ Phase I: alignment is impossible because of the lack of national and sector strategies, or because the executive is not representative; Phase II: partial alignment is possible; Phase III: there is no political or major technical barrier to alignment (OECD DAC staff).

<p>Principle 4: <i>Prioritise prevention</i></p>	<p>12. Strengthen the mechanisms for international organisations to monitor the local context more effectively, so as to better align international aid with the local situation and to consider sub-national and regional issues.</p> <p>13. Strengthen contingency planning and the ability of the government and international actors to respond rapidly (for example, in the area of food security).</p> <p>14. Establish a national policy for developing agricultural productivity in regions with strong food-producing potential. Expand the road infrastructure in accordance with food security needs. Create an insurance mechanism for protection against sharp rises in world prices.</p> <p>15. Invest and encourage investment in the social sphere, which is a basic aspect of long-term stabilisation. Ensure that social programmes are funded through long-term mechanisms so that national authorities can steadily re-establish their strategic priorities.</p> <p>16. Encourage employment programmes that target young people, along with rural development programmes.</p> <p>17. Launch a dialogue on family planning.</p> <p>18. Promote reforestation through new legislative incentives. Establish clear land use property rights.</p>
<p>Principle 5: <i>Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives</i></p>	<p>19. Encourage discussions between the executive, legislature and civil society before any strengthening of inter-ministerial capacity.</p> <p>20. Strengthen inter-ministerial capacity on the basis of the government's general policy declaration while making the best possible use of existing inter-ministerial co-ordination arrangements.</p> <p>21. Promote an attractive legal framework for foreign investors, especially in the clothing sector. Establish a dialogue between the actors concerned.</p> <p>22. Strengthen the customs system and regulations.</p>
<p>Principle 6: <i>Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies</i></p>	<p>23. Identify actions in the DSNCRP aimed at reducing poverty. Give priority to executing and promoting these actions while supporting dialogue with the target groups.³⁵</p> <p>24. Continue to ensure that cases of exclusion are dealt with in programming, in particular through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Re-allocating data on aid management (budgetary allocations, assistance, development indicators) according to the subdivisions in Haitian society (e.g. urban vs. rural, young people, men vs. women). b. Developing a policy that stimulates engagement in the most neglected or vulnerable departments. c. Continuing support institutions responsible for fighting discrimination, such as the Ministry for the Condition of Women. d. Strengthening transparency of the geographical distribution of budgetary allocations and official development assistance. <p>25. Develop ways of communicating that are geared to the various subdivisions of Haitian society to strengthen understanding of the procedures of international engagement, as well as commitment and transparency.</p>
<p>Principles 7-8-9-10: <i>The practicalities</i></p>	<p>26. Support broader alignment at sector and local community levels.</p> <p>27. Improve co-ordination between international actors through joint missions, joint offices, common reporting arrangements and the use of multi-donor trust funds.</p> <p>28. Superimpose a bottom-up and participatory approach on the mainly top-down current approach:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Jointly develop a methodology for increasing the flow of information coming from the communes. b. Plan for the establishment at communal level of committees for monitoring and popular consultation (with quorums for women, young people and other vulnerable groups) in order to facilitate local consultation with beneficiaries before, during and after projects. <p>29. Develop information systems based on standardised data collection so as to improve data management and communication with partners.</p> <p>30. Provide joint training courses for national and international partners to strengthen mutual understanding of the constraints faced by each, and promote reliance on common standards.</p>

³⁵ If the social insurance system were strengthened with budgetary support and technical assistance programmes, it could cover 20% of the Haitian population by 2011 (currently 3% are covered by the state and 2% by the private sector).

Annex A: Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations

Preamble

A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared Principles can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm. The Principles are intended to help international actors foster constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders in countries with problems of weak governance and conflict, and during episodes of temporary fragility in the stronger performing countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and co-ordination processes, not to generate new ones. In particular, they aim to complement the partnership commitments set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As experience deepens, the Principles will be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary.

The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development. Realisation of this objective requires taking account of, and acting according to, the following Principles:

1. Take context as the starting point. It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. It is particularly important to recognise the different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy, and the differences between: (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country and regional context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blue-print approaches.

2. Do no harm. International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonised and graduated responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and companies, often based in OECD countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority.

3. Focus on state-building as the central objective. States are fragile when state³⁶ structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilising revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment

³⁶ The term "state" here refers to a broad definition of the concept which, includes the executive branch of the central and local governments within a state but also the legislative and the judiciary arms of government.

generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens' confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery

4. Prioritise prevention. Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention will also include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peacebuilding capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.

5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peacebuilding in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer-term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a "whole of government" approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts. Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments – such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds – can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.

8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors. This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and co-ordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among donors, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.


9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.

10. Avoid pockets of exclusion. International actors need to address the problem of “aid orphans” – states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, co-ordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, are therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem of aid orphans.

Annex B: Statistical data on international engagement in Haiti

Based on 2005 figures, the net disbursement of per capita ODA was USD 60. It averaged USD 41.7 in sub-Saharan Africa and USD 18.2 per capita in low-income countries. In overall volume, this represented 12.1% of GDP compared to an average for Africa of 5.1% and an average for low-income countries of 3.2% (*Source: OECD*).

Chart 3. Peace-keeping, official development assistance and emergency aid (Haiti, 2007)



Source: OECD (2010), Annual Report on Resource Flows to Fragile States, OECD, Paris.

Table 5. Commitments and disbursements by sector of activity, 2007 (USD million)

	Commitments	Net disbursements
Security sector and its reform	4.7	2.7
Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution	38.6	17.6
Post-conflict peace-building (United Nations)	1.9	1.9
Reintegration	0.1	0.1
Mine clearance	-	-
Child soldiers	0	0
Total A: "Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security"	45.3	22.3
Economy and development policy	26.8	23.5
Public sector management (public finances)	25.4	0.3
Legal and judicial development	7.7	10.7
Government and administration	11.9	7.3
Strengthening civil society	4.2	5.4
Elections	4.6	0.8
Human rights	1.7	1.4
Facilitating access to information	0.5	0.6
Equality of women	0.5	0.5
Monetary institutions	-	-
Total B "Government, civil society and monetary institutions" ("Governance")	83.3	50.5
Total A + B "PEACE AND GOVERNANCE"	670.9	546.5

Source: OECD (2007), OECD online database, OECD, Paris.

Table 6. Peacekeeping expenditures compared to ODA, 2000-07 (USD million)

	Peacekeeping Expenditures								Peacekeeping	Peace-keeping as % of ODA
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2000-07	2000-07
Burundi	-	-	-	40	304	239	118	.	701	29%
Ivory Coast	-	-	-	83	337	382	450	471	1 723	53%
Dem. Rep. Congo	246	389	480	636	901	1 055	1 085	1 116	5 908	39%
Eritrea	164	185	210	184	180	156	126	113	1 318	59%
Haiti	-	-	-	35	377	480	484	535	1 910	65%
Liberia	-	-	-	548	741	707	676	688	3 360	196%
Lebanon	46	50	-	-	56	-	-	-	152	4%
Sierra Leone	521	618	603	449	265	86	-	-	2 541	79%
Sudan	-	-	-	-	219	801	990	846	2 856	33%
Timor-Leste	528	454	288	196	82	2	0	-	1 549	78%
Total	1 505	1 695	1 581	2 171	3 461	3 908	3 929	3 770	22 019	49%

Source: DAC-OECD (2008), *Resource flows to fragile and conflict-affected states*, OCDE, Paris. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.

Table 7. Foreign investment in Haiti and real annual variation as percentage

Foreign investment					
	1997	2002	2006	2007	2008
Real annual variation, as %	7.65	2.55	2.18	2.77	1.54
% of GNP	24.5	25.1	28.9	27.7	25.7

Source: Inter-American Development Bank: www.iadb.org/res/lmw_countrytables.cfm?country=Haiti.

Annex C: The co-ordination of technical and financial partners

Mechanisms for co-ordinating technical and financial partners (TFPs) are aligned to the mechanisms for co-ordinating national aid by the Ministry of Planning and External Co-operation, and are consistent with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.

1. Strategic co-ordination

In strategic terms, funding agencies in Haiti have two co-ordination platforms:

a. The Restricted Group

The Restricted Group of technical and financial partners is a political co-ordination group. Convened by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), it includes representatives from diplomatic and multilateral missions to Haiti (the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).

There is also a broader group consisting of all cooperation partners present in Haiti. The group includes the G11 (see below), Germany, Switzerland, Mexico, Norway, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the *Organisation internationale de la francophonie* (OIF), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Venezuela, Cuba and China.

b. The Executive Committee of Technical and Financial Partners (G11)

The Executive Committee of Technical and Financial Partners (G11) is co-ordinated by the United Nations Resident Co-ordinator and brings together the following 11 main TFPs in Haiti: the EU, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the IMF, the United Nations, Canada, Spain, France, the United States, Japan and a representative (rotating every six months) of the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile).

The G11 activities are structured into five main action lines as follows: monitoring of the DSNCRP; monitoring of governance indicators; sector co-ordination; implementation of the Paris Declaration; and communication.

Besides ensuring strategic co-ordination among the main partners, the G11 aims to promote the effectiveness of aid, a fully consistent joint strategy and a joint dialogue with the government. In strategic terms, the G11 constitutes the Advisory Committee of the funding agencies. The committee is appointed by the government to support monitoring of the DSNCRP.


Finally, four members of the G11 represent the TFPs in the Inter-ministerial Technical Sub-Committee for Co-ordination and the Sector Monitoring of Implementation (SCTICS) of the DSNCRP. The sub-committee is responsible for the (technical and operational) sector co-ordination of the execution and monitoring of the DSNCRP.

2. Operational and sector co-ordination

A system of 22 sector groups has been established to improve operational co-ordination between the TFPs and offer support to the government's sector and geographical co-ordination (Chart 4).

Chart 4.

Structure of sector groups



Source: Office of the United Nations Resident Co-ordinator, July 2008.

The TFP sector groups promote the consistency and compatibility of action by the TFPs and work overall in accordance with national priorities. Co-ordination of this kind serves to avoid duplication, overcome possible barriers to implementation and promote joint activity so as to optimise the use of resources. Groups exist only in those areas in which there is a perceived need at operational level for TFPs to co-ordinate their activity.

The sector groups are co-ordinated by the TFPs and consist of TFP and NGO representatives. Meanwhile, sector charts are co-ordinated by the sector ministries and include all those who intervene in the sector concerned.

The two types of working group co-operate with each other to promote the effectiveness of development initiatives.

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