

The Long Shadow of War: Prospects for Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo

**A Joint Independent Evaluation for the European Commission, UNDP
and the MDRP Secretariat**

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Disclaimer: The observations, findings and recommendations of this report are those of the author and in no way represent the views of the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme or the MDRP Secretariat.

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Executive Summary¹

i. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a temporary intervention designed to reduce insecurity. In laying the basis for security, DDR is supposed to establish the *preconditions* for development to take hold. DDR is not a substitute for development. Nor should it be carried out indefinitely. It is unreasonable to expect DDR to adequately address the many development-related needs of the Republic of Congo – including, *inter alia*, youth employment, investment in infrastructure and the elaboration of social safety nets. Rather, DDR includes a cluster of specific activities to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of ex-combatants, to ensure short-term reintegration assistance, to reform the security sector and to ensure the repatriation of foreign ex-combatants to their place of origin. DDR is neither a development programme nor a system of rewards for ex-combatants. It is, however, an extremely complex process essential to the promotion of security.

ii. This report argues that DDR can be realized – but should be conceived as temporary strategy – in the Republic of Congo. First and foremost, the GoC must develop a national DDR plan that is endorsed at the executive level. The national DDR plan should outline clear, realistic and attainable objectives and timelines for the following activities: **(i) disarmament, (ii) continued reintegration militia ex-combatants, (iii) DDR of armed forces and restructuring of the police and (iv) provisions for the repatriation and resettlement of foreign ex-combatants (DDRRR)**. The national DDR plan should also include provisions for the restructuring of the HC – with a view toward strengthening its implementation capacity. Second, the *GoR* should immediately produce a draft letter of demobilization and security sector reform policy. This should be prepared as soon as possible. The letter of policy forms the legal basis for any funding from the MDRP Secretariat. The national DDR plan should be submitted, together with a letter of *demobilization and security sector reform policy* to the MDRP secretariat *no later than December 2003*.

iii. Central to the success of DDR in the Republic of Congo is effective and transparent disarmament. Disarmament is a high risk intervention. But it also promises proportionately high returns. Disarmament will only succeed if it backed up with political commitment, attention to sequencing with ‘reintegration’ assistance and adequate financing. The MDRP does not finance disarmament, but rather recommends that it be pursued with multilateral or bilateral support. The reality, however, is that financing for disarmament in the Republic of Congo (and the Great Lakes region more generally) is likely to become increasingly difficult in light of the current international political climate.

iv. There is a window of opportunity for disarmament in the Republic of Congo. This window, however, is closing fast. The evaluation team recommends that the MDRP Secretariat and the UNDP issue an ‘urgent appeal’ for emergency bridging funds for disarmament over a one year period starting as soon as possible until MDRP funding

¹ *Note from the evaluation team: the wording of this report has been closely reviewed in order to ensure consistency of concepts and terminology. For the purposes of consistency – the concepts reintegration and reinsertion are synonymous unless described otherwise. While the MDRP Secretariat has devoted considerable time and energy to the definitions of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and (Economic and Social) Reintegration) – these interpretations are not necessarily applicable in all contexts – including the RoC.*

would be approved. The appeal would request **USD 2-2.5 million** (*subject to UNDP-IOM*) for the UNDP-IOM to administer disarmament in strategic locations in the country. A high target of **15,000-20,000 weapons** (*subject to UNDP-IOM*) should be set. Disarmament would be a stand-alone exercise administered under the aegis of the UNDP-IOM – and supported by the HC. A range of different approaches would be adopted by the UNDP-IOM to collect and destroy weapons over a designated timeframe. It is important that all actors recognize the risks involved with disarmament and the need for consistent and speedily disbursed financing for related activities.

v. Militia ex-combatant reintegration assistance should be continued by the HC with the IDA credit – but it should not carry-on indefinitely. There have been a number of relatively successful efforts undertaken in the RoC to ‘reintegrate’ militia ex-combatants: by December 2002, at least 10,981 had received reintegration assistance from either the UNDP-IOM or the GoC. Moreover, by January 2003 the HC had registered an additional 5,570 militia ex-combatants for reintegration assistance. Many more have been ‘validated’ as potential beneficiaries. It should also be recalled, however, that more than three years have passed since the end of the last conflict in 1998-1999 and that the majority of remaining militia ex-combatants have either been recruited by the army and the police, or reintegrated themselves. A minority have either subsequently died or turned to banditry.

vi. The evaluation team recommends that the HC continue its management and implementation of militia ex-combatant reintegration with the remaining funds available from the IDA credit – but without taking another census of militia ex-combatants. The IDA credit should not be extended – much less increased – and funding should be secured through the MDRP Secretariat. It recommends that the HC slow the registration of ‘new’ ex-combatants for reintegration assistance up to the maximum number that can be covered under the current IDA credit.

vii. Central to the success of a national DDR plan in the Republic of Congo is the effective restructuring of the security sector. Household surveys carried out by the evaluation team show that among the civilian respondents, 77 per cent of their insecurity is attributed to the military, and 70 per cent to the police. Only 42 per cent indicated that the presence of ex-combatants made them feel unsafe. The evaluation team commends the current efforts of the GoC to count, demobilize and reintegrate members of the armed forces, navy, air-force and gendarmerie. Nevertheless, the team recommends that the GoC approve an accelerated three-year strategy for the DDR of the armed forces and gendarmerie (est. 15-20,000) and police (est. 4-5,000).

viii. The strategy for restructuring would include provisions for a feasibility study (“security and defense review”) for large-scale demobilization and reintegration, a realistic budget for the demobilization of a least *25 per cent of the armed forces* and adequate financing for their reintegration. The strategy would also include provisions for streamlining and reinforcing of training for police. Appropriate synergies of demobilised regular soldiers with the reintegration militia ex-combatants should be acknowledged in the national DDR plan. **The evaluation team estimates that the cost of DDR of the security sector over a three-year period would be between USD 3.5-5 million.** This strategy should be developed immediately, in consultation with bilateral partners, and included in the draft national DDR plan to be submitted in December 2003.

ix. The national DDR plan must also include a coherent strategy for the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of both foreign ex-combatants living in the Republic of Congo (e.g. Ex-FAZ, Ex-FAC, MLC, Ex-FAR and also ex-combatants from Gabon and CAR, etc.) as well as Congolese ex-combatants living in neighbouring countries (e.g. DRC, Gabon, CAR, etc.). The evaluation team recommends that the HC appoint a Commissioner for DDRRR to oversee the preparation of realistic targets and benchmarks as well as begin a dialogue with neighboring countries regarding repatriation and resettlement. The evaluation team notes with concern the unrealistic targets set by the GoC (primarily estimated ex-combatant numbers in Gabon, DRC and the foreign ex-combatants in northern RoC) – and requests that feasibility studies be supported. DDRRR should be reinforced with technical support from the international community – particularly MDRP partners and the UNDP. **The evaluation team recommends that DDRRR pilot projects are supported** – and that funding for a modest DDRRR strategy be solicited from the MDRP (i.e. under ‘special projects’) within the framework of a national DDR plan.

x. There were a relatively modest number of **vulnerable groups** detected by the evaluation team. Within this category were a small number of child ex-combatants and a nominal number of female ex-combatants. Other vulnerable groups included physically disabled and chronically ill (with HIV/AIDS or otherwise) militia ex-combatants and the like. It is recommended that these particular groups are given due consideration in the national DDR plan. Interventions to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate “vulnerable groups” should be carried out in consultation with government agencies responsible for the health and welfare of women and children, as well as relevant international agencies devoted to child protection. Specialised interventions should be included in the national DDR plan and can be supported by the MDRP (i.e. under ‘special projects’).

xi. DDR is a complex exercise and the risks should not be under-estimated. The ingredients of success include unambiguous political commitment, sustained financial support, realistic benchmarks, clear lines of communication between stakeholders and effective co-ordination. The Republic of Congo has much to gain and everything to lose with respect to DDR. The activities of the HC and the UNDP have highlighted the considerable gains that can be had by disarmament and reintegration. But recent experience has also shown how even the best intentions can be undermined when one of the aforementioned ingredients is not present.

xii. It should be recalled that DDR is about ensuring security and generating the pre-conditions for development. It is not a development programme. The evaluation team does not recommend that it be used as a vehicle for the promotion of widespread employment and infrastructure development. Without a clear strategy and appropriate financing for these more developmental aspirations – implementation will be partial and half-hazard. To be sure, a national development strategy is required to maximize scarce resources and generate cross-linkages between sectors – particularly youth employment. Nevertheless, the importance of DDR to ex-combatants and – more important – the security of the people of the Republic of Congo must not be forgotten. Indeed, this is best explained with a closing anecdote. During a visit to the home of three young ex-combatants in northern Brazzaville the evaluation team was shown a sizeable arms cache. In it were twenty PMAK assault rifles, two rocket-launchers and at least 200 rounds of ammunition. On the way down the path from the cache, the youngest ex-

combatant whispered to the evaluator: 'please, come take these weapons from our hands and liberate us from this awful story'.

Section 1.1. Introduction

1. This evaluation is a joint effort of the European Commission, the UNDP, the World Bank, in co-operation with the Government of the Republic of Congo (GoC) and was carried out between 13 January and 6 March 2003.² The core objectives of the evaluation were twofold: (1) to provide a comprehensive account of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities undertaken by the GoC and non-governmental actors in the Republic of Congo between 1999 and 2003 and (2) to elaborate a preliminary road-map for future interventions in this domain. The evaluation report (report, hereafter) is divided into four sections.

2. The *first section* provides a broad account of the political and humanitarian context of the Republic of Congo since the signing of the Ceasefire Accords in November and December 1999. Moreover, the section describes – in detail – the various interventions undertaken by the GoC and international community in relation to disarmament and reintegration over the past three years.

3. The *second section* revisits a number of normative concepts associated with DDR so as to ensure standardized lexicon for the remainder of the report. It finds that the concepts ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’ are used synonymously – and the evaluation team assumes that the concept ‘reinsertion’ (in French) is analogous to ‘reintegration’ (in English). This section highlights the considerable confusion among stakeholders over the normative definitions and objectives of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. For the purposes of this report, DDR will refer only to those activities associated with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, unless otherwise stated. DDRRR will apply only to those interventions associated with the disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of foreign ex-combatants intended for relocation to their country of origin.


4. *Third*, the report considers the short-term, intermediate and long-term impacts of DDR-related activities in the Republic of Congo. This section documents a number of the key findings emerging from key informant interviews, extensive field visits to five regions of the country and four separate survey instruments (i.e. in relation to public health, education, ex-combatants and household victimization) designed and administered by the evaluation team.

5. *Finally*, the report outlines a number of core findings and recommendations in relation to DDR in the Republic of Congo. In this way, it lays out a strategic vision for DDR – that takes into consideration the interests of all primary stakeholders. It highlights a range of urgent interventions required by the GoC and the international community – with particular reference to the Haut Commissariat pour la Demobilisation et Reinsertion des ex-Combatant (HC), the UNDP, the IOM, the MDRP Secretariat and the European Commission.

Section 1.2. The Long Shadow of War: 1999 -2003

6. The *human costs* of three successive waves of armed conflict – in 1993-94, 1997 and 1998-1999 – in the Republic of Congo (RoC hereafter) have been far-reaching. Conservative indications are that approximately *10-15,000 direct deaths* were attributable to the last war in 1998-1999 – though others estimate that the toll was much higher.³ *Tens of thousands more have perished* as a result of increased morbidity resulting from acute malnutrition and communicable illness.⁴ Though vital registration statistics for the period are unavailable, it can be readily assumed that thousands more suffered debilitating and permanent non-fatal injuries both during and immediately following the war.⁵

Figure 1. Displaced People in the RoC: 1998-2002



7. The secondary costs of the conflict – such as refugee and internal displacement flows and its impacts on the wider economy continue to be felt some three years after the end of the last war. By the end of 1999, more than 60,000 refugees had fled from RoC to DRC and at least 11,900 to Gabon. At least 580,000 others were internally displaced (IDP) in 1999 – though estimates fluctuate (see **Figure 1 and Annex 1 for sources**). Moreover, due to armed conflicts in neighboring countries, approximately 19,500 refugees were being cared for in RoC itself by UNHCR at the time – though at least 39,870 were known to be in the country.⁶ The security of both repatriated refugees and returning IDPs remains precarious.⁷ Though the primary source of foreign exchange – petrol – was not severely affected by the war – largely due to the location of off-shore reserves on the coast – the macroeconomic costs of conflict in relation to GDP, debt servicing, and public expenditures were devastating.⁸

8. On 16 November 1999, an Amnesty (Pointe Noire Cessation of Hostilities Agreement) for the three warring militias was announced by the Sassou-administration, followed by an Amnesty law⁹ and a Ceasefire Accord in December 1999.¹⁰ A *Comité de Suivi* was immediately established in January 2000 to demobilize the estimated 22,640 ex-combatants (e.g. Ninja, Cocoye and Cobra)¹¹ – and collect some of the estimated 71,500 weapons in circulation.¹² Central to the Accords were provisions for the *demobilization* and *reintegration* of ex-combatants and the restructuring and reform of the Congolese military.¹³ Though some *disarmament* and *reintegration* activities were carried out in the interim – as of February 2003, comprehensive disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration, much less the formal restructuring of the military and police, has not taken place.¹⁴

9. Nevertheless, a degree of stability took hold between January 2000 and early 2002 – with a new Constitution approved by referendum in January 2002.¹⁵ Three overlapping ‘national’ interventions contributed to the moderate improvements in security and safety. First, under the supervision of General Mokoki, the *Comité de Suivi* sought to identify, disarm and demobilize ex-combatants.¹⁶ Second, at the request of the RoC, the UNDP launched a project, with the IOM as the implementing partner – to ‘disarm’ and ‘reintegrate’ ex-combatants through weapons collection, training and micro-projects between July 2000 and December 2002.¹⁷ Third, following the negotiation of a debt-relief programme with the World Bank, a USD 5 million IDA credit was provided to the newly formed *Haut Commissariat pour le Demobilisation et Reinsertion des ex-Combatant* (HC, hereafter) on 19 July, 2001.¹⁸ Though only established on the 10th of August 2001, the HC intends to (economically and socially) ‘reintegrate’ approximately 9,000 ex-combatants from the three militias.¹⁹ Furthermore, in October 2001 negotiations were opened between representatives of the HC and the Ninja to extend the disarmament and reintegration efforts in the Pool district.²⁰


10. The political situation in RoC deteriorated precipitously in March 2002, following the abrupt termination of negotiations between the High Commissioner of the HC (Min. Ngakala) and the leader of the remaining Ninja militia in the Pool district (Rev Ntoumi) during a press conference on 21 March 2002.²¹ The reason negotiations were terminated are murky – though speculation abounds. In what was perceived as tantamount to a declaration of war, the HC broke-off official negotiations and the RoC army and air-force proceeded to increase military pressure on the region in 27-31 March 2002. The UNDP-IOM who had earlier received a direct request from the government to support the reintegration of ex-combatants in the area²² could not pursue intended activities following the military ‘bombardments’ in April 2002.²³

11. Following the attack on a train by alleged Ninja combatants on 2 April, 2002, the RoC government reduced access of humanitarian agencies to the Pool region and increased armed incursions in the area leading to an *unknown number of deaths and the internal displacement of an additional 75,000*²⁴ – particularly between June and December 2002.²⁵ Armed violence quickly spread to the capital, Brazzaville with the ‘Ninja’-inspired attack on the airport on June 14th and the death of between 80 and 100 – of which some 75 per cent were purported to be ‘militia forces’. Human rights abuses were alleged by a number of international observers and the situation continued to deteriorate.²⁶ In December 2002, the RoC introduced the concept of ‘humanitarian corridors’ to allow for so-called Ninja militia to leave the Pool district (see RoC December 6, 2003).²⁷ Ex-combatant key informants indicate that the security situation in the Pool region remains extremely volatile.

12. The cost of military incursions has been high. Between June and December 2002, the principal military hospital in Brazzaville reported 262 ‘wounded’ in-patients – of which approximately 121 were civilian and some 141 military victims (see **Figure 2**). Of all reported firearm injuries – some 57 per cent were war-related. To be sure, reported urban firearm-related injuries were particularly high – and more than 40 per cent of all injuries were reported to have resulted from armed ‘banditry’ in Brazzaville itself.²⁸ The central emergency hospital in Brazzaville also recorded an increase in

firearm injuries in Brazzaville during this period – though these findings are explored in detail in *section 3.2*.

**Figure 2. Reported Injuries to Brazzaville Military Hospital:
June-December 2002**



13. In terms of secondary costs, some 150,000 or some *five per cent of the population* are today believed to be *internally displaced* and more than 20,800 refugees of RoC origin remain in neighbouring countries.²⁹ An estimated 109,000 refugees – primarily from DRC – are also in RoC – many of whom are living in deplorable conditions in the Northern region. What is more, key infrastructure development projects such as roads – particularly in the Pool region – have been jeopardized by the ‘insecurity’ presented by armed actors in the region.³⁰

14. DDR is now regarded by the GoC as a possible vehicle toward ensuring peace and security – though interpretations of DDR (within RoC and the international community more generally) *vary tremendously* as the following sections of this report will make clear. There has also been a growing recognition among multilateral donors and UN agencies that DDR interventions cannot be carried out in isolation of the instability plaguing other countries in the Great Lakes.³¹ For example, though the Lusaka ceasefire³² and recently agreed Pretoria Agreement³³ ensure provisions for ceasefire monitoring, disarmament, demobilization and the withdrawal of foreign troops – the Democratic Republic of Congo is perilously close to unraveling.³⁴ Other countries in the region – including Chad, CAR, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola and Zimbabwe are also chronically unstable.

15. The insecurity in the Great Lakes region is aggravated by the presence of both *national and foreign ex-combatants*. The precise number of ex-combatants in the RoC are, however, vehemently debated. There is substantial disagreement between the GoC and the international community over precisely how many ex-combatants are left in the country. On the one hand, the GoC estimates that there are between 18-25,000 militia ex-combatants, between 15-20,000 regular forces in the army, navy, air-force and gendarmerie and some 4-5,000 police.³⁵ It also claims to be resident to more than 87,000 ex-combatants from DRC, Rwanda, Angola, Gabon, CAR and Burundi.³⁶ Furthermore, the GoC estimates that up to 7,000 RoC ex-combatants are believed to be based in Gabon and others in DRC (see **Table 1**).³⁷ The MDRP Secretariat and the UNDP, however estimate that the total number of ex-combatants in the country (both national and foreign) are between 8-11,500 – though they do not have reliable figures on

either the armed forces or the police. There have been a number of multilateral efforts between various governments in the region and UNHCR and the IOM to deal with the issue of ex-combatant repatriation – though these have thus far borne little fruit (UNHCR, 2002 and IOM, 2001).³⁸

Table 1. What's in a number: Estimated number of Ex -combatants in the Republic of Congo

	Ninja, Cocoye and Cobra	Nsilo ulou	Mamba	Ex-FAZ	Ex-FAC	Ex-MLC	Ex-FAR	In Gabon	Chad
MDRP*	8,000								
UN**	7,000	NA	NA	4,000				200-500	NA
HC***	17,000-25,000	NA	NA	87,000			NA	7,000-8,000	NA

* These figures drawn from World Bank (2002)

** These figures drawn from a combination of UNDP -IOM documents. See the UN Plan (2003-2004). See IOM (2003) for a detailed estimate of Ex-FAZ, Ex-FAC and Ex-MLC combatants in Likouala.

*** These figures drawn from HC Pro -Docs (2002) and interviews with HC members.³⁹

16. In response to the regional interconnectedness of the conflicts in the region – the World Bank recently launched a *Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme* (MDRP) – which, funded by a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MRTF) – intends to support the demobilization of an estimated 350,000 ex-combatants in nine countries (see World Bank 2002).⁴⁰ As of November 2002, approximately USD 172 million has been pledged by donor governments in addition to the World Bank’s contribution of USD 150 million.⁴¹ The center-piece of the MDRP is the design and consolidation of national *Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes* (DRP) for each of the nine participating countries (**Box 1**).

17. Though DRP funding has only been approved for Rwanda and Angola, it is clear to the evaluators that all governments in the region are rapidly drawing together action plans in this regard.⁴² The RoC, is not particularly advanced in this respect – and has not yet produced a letter of demobilization and reintegration policy. Nevertheless, unlike the other countries in the Great Lakes, the RoC has a very recent history of ‘disarmament’ and ‘reintegration’ interventions. Though it has not yet produced a *national DDR plan*, it does have a number of local stakeholders with expertise in this domain – including the erstwhile Comité de Suivi, the UNDP-IOM, the HC and the World Bank.

Box 1. What is the MDRP?

There is considerable confusion in the RoC about the purpose and origins of the Multi -Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). Though a number of evaluation teams have been sent by the World Bank to evaluate the ‘needs’ of RoC for MDRP – few international agencies, donors or NGOs in Brazzaville understand how it works or what it is intended to do. For the purposes of this evaluation, but also for the future participation of RoC in the programme, it is important that all stakeholders have a clear understanding of what the MDRP is intended to accomplish.

The MDRP for the Great Lakes Region is a four year (2002 -2006) World Bank coordinated initiative that brings together over 30 donor and UN partners to address formal and informal groups from Angola, Burundi, CAR, the RoC, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It was endorsed by the Board of the World Bank in 2002 and a Multi -Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was established in May 2002. Calling for a budget of USD 500 million – approximately USD 170 million has been pledged by donor governments and an additional USD 150 million provided by the World Bank (see World Bank 2002). The MDRP is designed to promote DDR in nine countries for an estimated 350,000 ex -combatants – including both military and irregular forces. Though designed to ensure maximum flexibility in the provision of assistance – the MDRP does not include direct financing for disarmament .

According to the World Bank (2003: 21) the MDRP consists of four primary components : the Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DRPs), special projects, regional activities and programme

management. DRPs will amount to an estimated USD 446.5 million and contain six components: disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, (economic and social) reintegration, support to special groups and programme implementation. HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures would be included during both the demobilization and the reintegration phase. Special projects will amount to USD 37.5 million and include support to 'special target groups' (e.g. ex-combatants who do not wish to return to their country of origin), and demobilization and reintegration projects of a participating country outside the control of governments. Regional activities will amount to USD 5.5 million and involve information sharing, capacity building and the consolidation of a regional data-base. Finally, programme management would be USD 10.5 million and cover the costs of the MDRP Secretariat at the World Bank in Washington DC and the administration of the MDTF.

Source: World Bank (2003, 2002)

Section 1.3 Reviewing Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration: 1999-2003

18. At the outset it is important to emphasize that since December 1999 and March 2003, there *has been no formal coherent DDR undertaken* in RoC – though disarmament and reintegration have taken place. While there have been disparate initiatives undertaken by the GoC and UN agencies to reduce the threat presented by ex-combatants affiliated with the Cocoye, Cobra and Ninja militia – in addition to foreign ex-combatants from DRC, Angola and Rwanda – a coherent and carefully sequenced national DDR plan has not materialised. Rather, approaches have been largely *ad hoc*, involving some limited co-ordination between implementing agencies, and under-financed.

19. Moreover, critical opportunities to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate particular factions have been regularly missed – most notably the Ninja in the Pool region in 2002. The absence of a national DDR plan can be attributed to the political instability that continues to plague the RoC, the limited understanding of the meaning of DDR, but also because of the limited inter-institutional communication and co-operation between the UNDP-IOM, the World Bank, the EU and the HC.⁴³ For example, the provision of an IDA credit of USD 5 million to the HC for 'demobilisation' and 'reintegration' had the unintended effect of undermining support for the UNDP-IOM 'disarmament' and 'reintegration' project.

20. This is not to suggest, however, that no effective action has been taken relating to DDR. Indeed, *disarmament* and *reintegration* efforts have taken place – though whether demobilization has occurred in any tangible way remains unclear. The activities of the GoC (i.e. Comité de Suivi and the HC) and the UNDP-IOM in relation to *disarmament* and *reintegration* are discussed in turn.

Disarmament

21. First, there have been various attempts to '*disarm*' the population through weapons-collection projects.⁴⁴ The first was launched by the *Comité de Suivi* between January and December 2000. The Comité de Suivi sought to ensure 'un ramassage des armes et des munitions de guerre' as stipulated in the December 1999 Ceasefire Accord (Article 10). Though no operational guidelines were established to carry out the disarmament process, the Comité de Suivi claimed to have collected approximately 6,550 weapons by December 2000. Specifically, the Comité de Suivi carried out a loosely administered 'weapons buy-back' initiative that took place primarily in Brazzaville and Northern

Congo (3,537 weapons), Kouilou (211 weapons), Niari (755 weapons), Lekoumou (246 weapons) and Pool (1597 weapons), between January and December 2000.⁴⁵ Though some 6,550 weapons were allegedly collected⁴⁶, a lack of clarity persists as to how these weapons were stored and managed and whether they were destroyed or re-circulated. No documented evidence was presented to the evaluation mission of the whereabouts of these weapons or the number ultimately re-absorbed into the RoC army, navy, air-force, gendarmerie or police.

22. Since the end of the Comité de Suivi, there have also been a host of initiatives launched by the GoC to disarm the population. The HC, for example, intends to undertake a ‘disarmament’ as part of its demobilization activities, but these have not initiated due to lack of adequate financing and constraints on the use of the IDA credit. Moreover, the HC has not yet established a clear process for disarmament should funds become available. This lack of clarity is aggravated by a weak normative framework in the RoC in relation to civilian possession of arms or management of war-related materials – as evidence by the Arms Act which was formed in 1915 and last reviewed in 1943 and an ordinance in 1962.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, an estimated 900 small arms have allegedly been collected in each of its five regional antennas – though there is no way of disposing of them (Rapport D’Activité 2002: 9)⁴⁸ At the same time – other activities have been undertaken by the police and Ministry of Defence. For example, police operations allegedly collected 800 weapons in 2002. The Ministry of Defence is also purported to have carried out extensive buy-back operations in Brazzaville between 2001-2002 as well as specialized operations to disarm Ex-FAZ and Ex-FAR yielding up to 3,000 weapons.⁴⁹

23. The UNDP-IOM, by contrast, administered a ‘weapons collection’ initiative as part of its reintegration project. Between July 2000 and December 2002, weapons were gathered primarily from Brazzaville, Cuvette, Plateaux and Pool (10,604 weapons), Niari (192 weapons), Bouenza and Lekoumou (244 weapons) and Kouilou (100 weapons).⁵⁰ In all, following the belated establishment of formal storage and destruction procedures, approximately 11,140 weapons of varying types were ultimately collected and destroyed (**table 2**).⁵¹ Unlike in the case of the Comité de Suivi, these weapons were not purchased outright, but were rather ‘voluntarily’ provided to UNDP-IOM on the condition that they allow potential ex-combatants participants to be prioritized for reintegration assistance. In other words, those combatants who provided UNDP-IOM with the most weapons – regardless of caliber (or type and condition) would be ‘fast-tracked’ for the reintegration ‘credit’ of up to USD 350 (provided to individuals and groups).

Table 2. Disarmament – Comparing Different Approaches and Outcomes

	Comité de Suivi*	UNDP-IOM**
Brazzaville, Cuvette, Plateaux and Pool	5,134	10,604
Niari	755	192
Bouenza and Lekoumou	246	244
Kouilou	211	100
Total	6,550	11,140

*The project took place between January and December 2000. This figure includes a number of additional heavy weapons and ammunition collected.

** The project took place between July 2000 and December 2002. All UNDP -IOM weapons were destroyed at the Mpila Armoury in Brazzaville. This figure includes explosives and grenades but does not include ammunition.

24. Some confusion persists between the RoC government, on the one side and the UNDP-IOM, on the other, regarding the approach adopted by the respective parties. Both actors claim that the other's disarmament intervention indirectly ratcheted-up the demand for weapons, and therefore undermined the success of disarmament by generating a 'market' for weapons in RoC. Specifically, representatives of the HC complain that the UNDP-IOM reintegration credit (up to USD 350) offered by the UNDP-IOM project has effectively increased the 'street price' of weapons, and therefore rendered any new disarmament initiative more costly. This argument holds little water. At the present time, any market that might exist is saturated. There is no evidence of a thriving weapons market in Brazzaville or throughout RoC and, if anything, weapons are being informally trafficked to DRC where they are more highly valued. There are reports, however, of some weapons being re-circulated for poaching (Demetriou *et al*, 2002). While there are some indications that a number of Ex-MLC dissidents have transported small shipments of weapons to Kinchasa – these are deliberate acts of political de-stabilisation and contribute little to the broader issues of small arms demand in RoC.⁵²

Reintegration

25. Second, both the GoC and the UNDP-IOM have undertaken a combination of reintegration activities in the RoC – though their approaches and outcomes differ. The HC, launched in July 2001 and with the support of a USD 5 million IDA credit of the World Bank⁵³, has established an office in Brazzaville and five regional 'antenna' offices around RoC in order to begin a formal 'demobilization' and 'reintegration' process.⁵⁴ The HC reports that it has financed approximately 1,505 micro-projects for 3,732 ex-combatants (roughly USD 270 per ex-combatant), though approximately 2,133 micro-projects have already been identified and registered for 6,238 ex-combatants (**table 3**). Between September and December 2002, approximately USD 1,205,725 had been spent on these micro-projects.

26. The uneven impacts of the project notwithstanding (see section 3.1 and 3.2), the HC lacks a *clear strategic vision* and faces a *lack of funding for disarmament* – due to constraints associated with the World Bank IDA credit, as well as constraints relating to disbursement. The HC has disseminated 'public awareness' information to inform ex-combatants about the 'demobilisation' and 'reintegration' process as well as HIV and psycho-social rehabilitation schemes. Apart from initiating a public tendering process, there is little supporting evidence that these have taken place.⁵⁵

Table 3. 'Reintegration' Assistance – Number of Beneficiaries involved in Micro -Projects

	HC*	UNDP-IOM**
Brazzaville-Pool	292	5,288 in Brazzaville 1,015 in Pool
Plateaux	874	52
Bouenza	330	373
Niari	458	321
Lekoumou	462	41
Cuvettes	NA	55
Likoula	NA	21
Sangha	NA	10

Kouilou	NA	73
Total	3,732 (received finances) by the end of December 2002	7,249 by December 2002

*The HC has been operating between October 2001 and December 2002.

** The project took place between 2000 and 2002.

Source: Rapport D'Activités du HC, (31 Dec, 2002) and UNDP (Dec 2002).

27. The *UNDP-IOM* also carried out a 'reintegration' project for ex-combatants – primarily through the provision of training and micro-projects to groups and individuals between July 2000 and December 2002. The project budget was USD 4.37 million for July 2000 to December 2002 – of which USD 1.3 million was provided by the UNDP, USD 955,000 provided by Sweden, USD 750,000 provided by the EU, USD 600,000 provided by Norway and USD 400,000 provided by the RoC.

28. The reintegration project had four principal objective: (i) to create micro-projects to generate revenue, (ii) to provide ex-combatants with marketable skills through training, (iii) to provide ex-combatants with paid employment, (iv) and to consolidate micro-projects with the support of micro-credits (of up to USD 350). At the close of the project in December 2002, 8,019 ex-combatants had benefited from reintegration assistance – and over 2,610 micro-projects were financed. Furthermore, 1,849 ex-combatants were provided with formal training (**table 3**). At the time of this writing, more than 1,500 ex-combatants in Brazzaville, with at least 3,000 weapons, have registered for their inclusion should the project be re-launched and additional lists exist in the provinces.⁵⁶

29. It must be re-emphasized that there have been no official 'demobilisation' process undertaken in the RoC. The Comité de Suivi claims that the demobilisation took place implicitly as a result of the signing of the Accords in 1999 – though no formal or concrete programme was introduced to demobilize ex-combatants (e.g. involving official cantonment, registration, issuance of identification cards, orientation and discharge). On the other hand, the HC, as part of its DDR activities, has set an ambitious demobilization and reintegration target of at least 9,000 ex-combatants. It should be recalled that more than three years have passed since the termination of large-scale hostilities.⁵⁷

30. The question remains: who exactly does the GoC intend to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate? It is reasonable to assume that some three years after the end of the war, and at least five since the formal 'dissolution' of militia groups, those who have not already demobilized and reintegrated are either still fighting, have died or, have already reintegrated themselves.⁵⁸ There is, however, the question of the remaining ex-combatants in Pool. More specifically, the HC has introduced the concept of 'humanitarian corridors' (in 2002) to allow for alleged 'Ninja' ex-combatants to leave Pool and enter Brazzaville. The HC estimates that *at least 10,000 Ninja combatants remain*⁵⁹ – though reliable sources place the number of hard-core fighters at closer to 150-300 – and certainly no more than 1,000. Irrespective of the numbers of ex-combatants – it is unclear precisely how the HC intends to provide for the returning ex-combatants from Pool. There has been little consideration of whether official cantonment sites will be created, whether adequate resources and demobilization packages will be prepared, or whether 'reintegration' projects will be ready. By their own admission, the HC has no strategic framework or plan in this regard. A targeted intervention by UNDP-IOM is likely to yield better results in terms of confidence building in the short-term for the problems of the Pool.

Section 2.1 DDR: A Glossary of Terms

31. Definitions matter. How an issue – or an intervention – is defined influences every aspect of the project cycle – from planning to evaluation. In other words, unambiguous definitions allow for a clear and transparent definition of a problem, the elaboration of measurable standards and benchmarks, the determination of access (or not) to resources, and the measurement of success. In the RoC, definitions of particular issues – whether DDR, small arms and light weapons, ex-combatants, and the like – have been careless and confusing. The following section, then, attempts to bring some clarity to the case definitions used in the remainder of this evaluation.

32. DDR includes a cluster of activities and has been conventionally associated with peacekeeping operations and formal peace agreements.⁶⁰ Traditionally the preserve of governments and the military, a number of traditional development agencies and bilateral aid departments⁶¹ have waded into the DDR sector in the last decade – including the World Bank and the UNDP-IOM.⁶² This is partly as a result of the growing expertise of such agencies in post-conflict environments (and relief and development more generally), but can also be attributed to external pressure for development agencies to engage more proactively with similarly affected societies.⁶³ It should be recalled that DDR is not a substitute for political solutions – but rather a concrete instrument to promote stability and security – for peace to take hold.

33. DDR is increasingly being conceived within a ‘one-size-fits-all’ framework. This is problematic. Indeed, DDR, as a philosophy, cluster of activities and objective, must be tailored to meet the particular ‘context’ in which it is intended to be carried out. To be sure – several ‘contexts’ can be considered in which DDR might be a useful strategy. These include, but are not limited to, (i) pre-conflict scenarios (for formal demobilisation and reintegration of armies), (ii) immediately following a ceasefire, (iii) in the transition period between ‘power-sharing’ negotiations, and (iv) following a peace accord in which the negotiation of power-sharing arrangements.⁶⁴ The nature of any DDR activity in any of these scenarios will also depend significantly on the extent to which ‘external parties’ were active in contributing to war and/or peace. Nevertheless, different institutions have evolved different conceptual approaches to DDR (**box 2**).

Box 2. For Security or Development: Competing Interpretations of DDR

Very generally, approaches to DDR can be viewed on a continuum – from a minimalist (improving security) to a maximalist (as an opportunity for development and reconstruction) perspective. In RoC, two distinct approaches to DDR have been elaborated by the UNDP-IOM, on the one side, and the HC (and the World Bank) on the other. It is important to recognize these different philosophical approaches to DDR – as they carry very different assumptions and biases. These two perspectives are discussed in turn.

The UNDP-IOM reintegration of ex-combatants project was launched in the context of a Ceasefire and in the immediate aftermath of a brutal episode of armed violence. It therefore envisioned disarmament and reintegration as a means of reducing insecurity – and, ipso facto, the ex-combatant as an impediment to security and stability. Disarmament and reintegration activities were thus structured around reducing the capacity of ex-combatants to contribute to further destabilisation. In this way – only young able ex-combatants were included in activities and all others excluded. Therefore, disabled, chronically ill, and other ex-combatants were not targeted – much less beneficiaries. Disarmament and reintegration were therefore targeted exclusively at the high-risk groups – with the intention of ensuring stability so that the pre-conditions for development could be achieved. Reintegration assistance was not regarded as a ‘reward’ for ex-combatants but rather an incentive for them to lay down their arms.

The approach adopted by the HC and the World Bank, however, is being conceived within a context of post-conflict reconstruction. Disarmament⁶⁵, demobilisation, reinsertion and economic and social reintegration are therefore being introduced as an opportunity for development – and ex-combatant as *prima facie* vessels of human capital. Consequently, DDR activities are structured in a such a way that they include incentives for participation, with transitional safety nets for participants and their families, psychosocial and HIV projects for ex-combatants and a range of social infrastructure development (e.g. schools, clinics, etc) and reintegration projects to harness and enrich the productive capacities of 'beneficiaries'.⁶⁶ The Bank focuses on one-off cash payments as this entails very little administrative overhead, promotes flexibility and fewer administrative delays. Nevertheless, it introduces a system of benefits and safety nets for ex-combatants and their kin. Referring to the MDRP, the Bank argues that DDR in the Great Lakes would have 'a significant impact on reducing poverty by helping to consolidate peace, build confidence among governments in the region, help to free up national resources for investment in economic and social sectors, attract foreign capital, invest in the human capital of ex-combatants and enhance capacities for development at the community level'.

Sources: UNDP 2002. World Bank 2002.

34. Due to the rapid proliferation of DDR activities around the world and the high importance attached to DDR, a *bewildering array of expressions and concepts* have emerged that are now regularly used in the policy and practice of DDR.⁶⁷ These are often vague, abstract and lack robust conceptual or normative foundations. A short-list of expressions used regularly by, *inter alia*, UN agencies, the World Bank, donors and research institutes might include: 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration', 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion' (DDR), 'Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration' (DDR), 'Reinsertion et Ramassage d'Armes' (RRA), 'Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation' (DRR), 'Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation' (DDRR), 'Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration' (DDRR) and 'Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR).⁶⁸ Concepts are often used synonymously – such as 'reinsertion' and 'reintegration', 'demobilisation' and 'disarmament', or 'reconstruction' and 'rehabilitation' – even if these have different meanings (and outcomes) in practice (**Box 3**). For the purposes of this evaluation, DDR will refer only to those activities associated with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, unless otherwise stated. DDRRR will apply only to those interventions associated with the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Repatriation and Resettlement of foreign ex-combatants intended for relocation to their country of origin.

35. Though some efforts have been made to clarify these careless ambiguities⁶⁹, and some implementing agencies note the benefits of 'flexible' definitions, conceptual confusion frequently arises when it comes to *sequencing* of DDR activities.⁷⁰ The recent initiatives undertaken in RoC are no exception. For example, many representatives of the HC are persuaded that, in theory, 'demobilisation' should precede 'disarmament' and this should be followed by 'reinsertion' and social and economic 'reintegration'. By contrast – others argue that, in principle, 'disarmament' should be followed by 'demobilisation' and 'reintegration'. The following section seeks to redress some of these ambiguities by briefly revisiting each element of DDR: *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*. Clarity of case definitions and approaches could serve to usefully inform the range of different actors working on DDR in RoC and the Great Lakes region.

Section 2.2 Disarmament

36. *Disarmament* is defined here as the collection, control and – preferably - the disposal and destruction of small arms and light weapons, explosives and ammunition held by civilians and the organs of regular and irregular combatants and civilians. There are a host of sub-categories of disarmament – often employed as synonyms – that confuse its scale and scope.⁷¹ ‘Disarmament’ can be carried out in at least three ways. First, it can be administered *coercively* through by the army, police or a peacekeeping force.⁷² Second, it can be carried out *voluntarily* – through amnesty initiatives and public collection campaigns administered by the army, police, peacekeeping or designated actor. Third, weapons can be *exchanged* for another good – either cash or another incentive (e.g. development projects) – and can be administered by a combination of the above mentioned actors.⁷³

37. Disarmament focused exclusively on small arms and light weapons is often referred to as ‘practical’ or ‘micro-disarmament’. It is important that such programmes are carried out in a fair, efficient and controlled fashion with transparent monitoring and verification procedures. Clear procedures should be established to ensure public awareness of the purposes of disarmament, the safe handling, storage, security associated with weapons management and their disposal. Importantly, disarmament should aim to *physically remove weapons* from the target populations possession and eliminate or reduce the psychological or attitudinal predisposition for weapons (mis)use.

Section 2.4 Demobilisation

38. *Demobilisation* is defined here as the formal and usually controlled identification, registration and discharge of active combatants from regular or irregular forces.⁷⁴ In this way, demobilization is a temporary initiative targeted at regular soldiers serving in the military (or para-military) and/or combatants in irregular forces such as guerrilla or militia. The central *objectives* of demobilisation includes the efficient massing of ex-combatants together in encampment sites⁷⁵ that are specifically designed for this purpose and their registration.⁷⁶ Demobilisation may also include disarmament – though this has to be carefully considered.⁷⁷ Demobilisation, then, is primarily concerned with the registration of formal soldiers as part of a security sector reform initiative or ex-combatants in post-conflict situations – and involves the distribution of non-transferable ID cards, the collection of relevant demographic and socio-economic information into a data-base, and, where appropriate, the health screening, orientation and the facilitation of transport to a new site.⁷⁸

Section 2.5 Reintegration

39. *Reintegration* is defined here as a process by which ex-combatants regain access to civilian forms of employment and income (e.g. sustainable livelihoods). In this way it is a process with measurable outcomes – and includes those spectrum of activities designed to ‘reinsert’ the target population. Reintegration is often referred to simultaneously as ‘reinsertion’ – though there is wide disagreement about whether these two terms are synonymous or not (**box 3**).⁷⁹ Importantly, reintegration assistance would build on existing capacities of ex-combatants and would take into consideration the absorptive capacity of the receiving or host community in order to avoid market distortions and for the purposes of equitable allocation of assistance.

Box 3. What’s in a name: Reintegration or Reinsertion?

There is considerable confusion in the literature on DDR over the usage of ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’. The evaluators administered a quick experiment using English and French search engines to explore the ‘conventional wisdom’ in the literature on DDR.⁸⁰ Very generally, it appears that the use of the term ‘reintegration’ is preferred in the English literature – particularly among US-based donors, agencies and research institutes. However, ‘reinsertion’ is preferred among French actors – and is more commonly used in the francophone literature. The use of ‘reintegration’ and ‘reinsertion’ is consistent even when controlled for searchers on English and French search engines. It should be emphasised, however, that the English literature on DDR appears to be more consistent in its use of the concept of ‘reintegration’ (e.g. 3,340-6,420 compared to 202-268 in the English google search). Moreover, the French literature is less consistent in its usage of ‘reinsertion’ or ‘reintegration’ – as is demonstrated by the split in the table below (i.e. 1,320 versus 1,060 in the French google search).

Searching words ...

Search engine	Hits for Disarmament, Demobilis(z)ation and Reinsertion	Hits for Disarmament, Demobilis(z)ation and Reintegration
English Google	*202 (268)	*3,340 (6,420)
	Hits for Desarmament, Demobilisation et Reinsertion	Hits for Desarmament, Demobilisation et Reintegration
French Google	1,320	1,060

40. The *key objective* of reintegration is to support ex-combatants in their efforts to integrate into social and economic networks (referred to as *social and economic reintegration* by the World Bank). Reintegration is ostensibly to take place after demobilization – though this is not always the case. It can include, but is not limited to, the identification of capacities and needs among ex-combatants, the introduction of vocational training and apprenticeship programmes in particular sectors (e.g. agricultural production, the service sector, etc), the introduction of micro-projects (e.g. micro-enterprise development), the provision of targeted health and education services, the provision of cash or credit opportunities⁸¹ and or basic implements for re-starting civilian livelihoods. Where appropriate, reintegration assistance would also include counseling and outreach services, sensitization campaigns and the strengthening of ‘community services’.

Section 2.6 Ex-Combatant

41. *Ex-combatants* are a broad category defined here as either formal soldiers no longer serving in formal military or paramilitary structures or informal combatants no longer

actively serving in militia or guerrilla activities. It is important to recognise that ex-combatants can include a very wide range of actors who nevertheless do not share common characteristics, needs, or vulnerabilities.⁸² In RoC, for example, ex-combatants range from hard-core militia members trained by Israeli special forces to rural peasant farmers who took-up ‘rear-guard’ defense positions in remote villages. Indeed, normatively – there is still an unresolved dichotomy between ‘civilians’ who misuse weapons and ‘combatants’ – even if it is widely recognized that the borders between these actors can be porous and overlapping.⁸³

42. In the case of RoC there are at least *five types of ex-combatant in the country* – though these categories are not necessarily exclusive. These include: (1) *regular forces that served in the formal military* prior to the conflicts in 1993-94, 1997 and 1998-99, (2) *irregular forces* at one time aligned with either the Ninja, Cocoye or Cobra militia, (3) *self-defense and auxiliary units* established prior to the outbreak of the conflicts in 1993-94, 1997 and 1998-99 – and/or more intimately connected with politicians between 2000 and 2003, (4) *foreign regular forces* originally serving governments in Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Gabon, (5) *and foreign irregular forces* originally active in Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and Gabon. Any programme directed at ‘ex-combatants’ must acknowledge their heterogeneity.

Section 2.7 Small Arms and Light Weapons

43. *Small arms and light weapons* are variously defined. There is little consensus internationally, much less in RoC, over what constitutes a small arm or light weapon.⁸⁴ According to the UN (1997) small arms include: ‘revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns’. Light weapons refer to: ‘heavy machine guns, hand-held under barrel mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems and mortars of less than 100mm caliber’ (UN 1997).

44. In RoC, there is a widely recognized distinction between ‘armes a feu’ and ‘armes blanches’. ‘Armes a feu’ include small arms and light weapons, while ‘armes blanche’ include knives, machetes and clubs. Specific small arms include pistols (e.g. makarov) and long-barreled 12 gauge shot-guns. More common, however, are semi and automatic assault rifles (e.g. PMAK, AK-47s, Galils, SKS and the like). Light weapons include rocket-propelled grenade launchers and small and medium sized mortars. According to the Demetriou *et al* (2002: 18), ‘the vast majority of weapons currently in possession of ex-combatants are ... machine guns, grenade-launchers and small mortars. This is a reflection of both the nature of warfare (close combat in urban settings) and the level of training ... what heavy weapons did exist, including artillery pieces, large mortars and heavy cannons were often destroyed or abandoned by retreating forces. The main types of weapons observed by the research team included ... AK-type and SKS assault rifles, but also RPK GPMGs (12.7 and 14.5mm HMGs, RPG 7 and 8), and a variety of foreign assault rifles including Israeli Galil and South African Vector R4/R5’.

45. It is important to recall that ammunition and grenades, while essential to the functioning of small arms and light weapons, *remain ammunition all the same*. Nevertheless, disarmament projects in RoC (including Comité de Suivi and the UNDP-IOM) have often confounded the two – and reported numbers of small arms and light

weapons collected have often been higher than is actually the case. For example, the UNDP-IOM claim to have collected and destroyed 11,140 small arms and light weapons between July 2000 and December 2002. On a close inspection of their figures, however, it appears that only 3,106 of these of these included small arms or heavy weapons. The bulk of the 'arms' collected (more than 8,000) were actually grenades, mines, mortars and ammunition.

Section 3.1 Evaluation Methodology

46. The evaluation team employed a variety of research instruments to assess the short to intermediate and long-term ‘impacts’ of the UNDP-IOM and HC projects. *Short-term and intermediate impacts* here refer to the extent to which project objectives were realized. *Long-term impacts* are defined here as the broader impacts of the various projects in relation to the promotion of security. For the purposes of this report, security is measured as a function of fatal and non-fatal injuries, youth exposure to violence and levels of community victimization.⁸⁵

47. Short-term and intermediate impacts were measured using conventional approaches – such as *on-site inspections, key informant interviews and primary literature reviews* – and at least 150 interviews or meetings were carried out by the evaluators over a three week period (**Annex 2**). Moreover, the evaluation team designed, pre-tested and administered two surveys to evaluate the impressions of ex-combatant and ‘community’ impressions of the UNDP-IOM and HC projects. *The ex-combatant survey* involved a fifteen minute structured interview of ex-combatants (n 63) in Pointe Noire, Niari, Bouenza, Lekoumou, Brazzaville and the Plateaux region to consider their perceptions of the UNDP-IOM and HC initiatives (**Annex 3**). The household survey, described in more detail below, involved structured interviews of heads of households in Brazzaville only.

48. *Long-term impacts* were assessed through a combination of survey instruments – including a review of public health statistics, a questionnaire administered to schools and a household survey. Specifically, the *public health study* included a descriptive retrospective review of injury statistics reported in the three principle hospitals of Brazzaville between 1999 and 2002 (the duration of the UNDP-IOM and HC projects). Data was collected on in-patient profiles, injury types sustained and approximate costs for care and rehabilitation of individual patients. The *school survey* (n 18) explored the scale and magnitude of youth violence in universities, technical colleges and secondary schools – particularly among girls – and the role of ex-combatants in contributing to violence. Finally, the *household victimization survey* was carried out in five neighborhoods of Brazzaville (n 142) and administered by three trained researchers. A combination of sampling methods were used (e.g. interval and simple random). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in the context of on-going hostilities in the Pool – interview refusal rates were high. The interview refusal rate was especially high in the Northern neighborhoods of Talangai and Ouenze (75 per cent) and somewhat lower in the southern neighborhoods of Bacongo, Makelekele and Malingou (25 per cent).

49. The following two sections describe, in detail, the short and intermediate as well as the long-term impacts of the UNDP-IOM and HC projects to date. Because the implementation phase of the HC project is still in development (beginning in September 2002), it is difficult, and perhaps inappropriate, to provide a thorough assessment of its impacts. Nevertheless, a number of observations are included for consideration.

3.2 Short-term and Intermediate Impacts

50. As reviewed in section 1.3, there have been three separate DDR efforts since the end of the last war in RoC. The three principle implementing agencies were: (1) the Comité de Suivi ; (2) the UNDP-OIM project; and (3) the HCREX. This section traces out some of the short term and intermediate impacts of these three initiatives – focusing primarily on their objectives and outputs. Because some three years have passed since the end of the Comité de Suivi process – it is given less attention. Section 3.3 will explore, in more detail, the extent to which the combined efforts have contributed to more long-term aspects of security and safety.

The CDS - Disarmament activity based on weapons buy-back schemes

51. The Comité de Suivi presented its ‘Final Activities Report’ on 1 December, 2000. Its primary mandate was to apply the 31 clauses of the "Accord de Cessation des Hostilités" agreed at the end of the 1999 war. Of the 31 clauses laid out in the Accord, the Comité de Suivi noted that 16 had been totally applied, 9 had been partially applied and 6 had not been applied. A detailed explanation of precisely why these Accords were not realised was not possible – though key actors in the process explained to the evaluation team that financial and time constraints prevented the full realisation of the process.

52. There were two processes that the Comité de Suivi undertook that are directly relevant to this evaluation: disarmament and the identification of ex-combatants. In terms of disarmament, some 6,550 light weapons were allegedly collected (not including ammunitions or grenades) and some 22,640 ex-combatants registered. There is no information, however, regarding the whereabouts of these weapons. Moreover, because ex-combatants were not provided with any form of identification card – it is extremely difficult to verify the number of, much less identify, ex-combatants registered.

The UNDP/IOM project - a Disarmament and Reintegration Project

53. The UNDP/IOM project was launched in July 2000 with the initial goal of "assisting 4,700 ex-militia and collect 5,000 light weapons" over an 18-month period (December 2001). The project’s strategic objectives were twofold. First, it aimed to generate ‘confidence building and the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants in order to consolidate peace. This objective is referred to as SO1. Second, it aimed to encourage ex-combatants and others to turn in their weapons in order to improve security and stability in the country. This latter objective is referred to here as SO2. The expected outputs of the projects as stated in the project document are matched with the actual results in **table 4** below:

Table 4. Comparing Short -term and Actual Results

Objectives	Expected Direct and Intermediate Results	Actual Results
SO1	4,700 ex-combatants supported and operational	7,250 ex-combatants received reintegration assistance through 2,270 micro -projects
	Reduction of violence, in particular armed robbery	No evidence is provided on the reduction of violence or its causal linkage with the project

	Very few ex-militia have been reincorporated in the National Army	No evidence is provided by the project. However GoC sources 2.500 ex -militia have been integrated in the armed forces in 2001
	Social cohesion restored	No evidence is provided on cases of violence
SO2	5.000 light weapons collected and destroyed	More than 11,000 weapons collected and destroyed, of which: 3.081 light weapons and 8.000 explosives and grenades
	Reduction in the number of light weapons in circulation	Considerable evidence is provided regarding the number of weapons in circulation by the Small Arms Survey – which carried out a study for the IOM. It estimated an overall of 41,000 weapons in circulation by the end of the project (September 2001)
	Lower crime rate related to firearms violence	No evidence could be obtained from Army or Police sources

54. The evaluation team notes that the short-term objectives of the project were generally successful: both objectives – relating to disarmament and the reintegration of ex-combatants – were met. Nevertheless, the team notes that adequate evidence regarding the wider impacts of the project – particularly with respect to the monitoring of armed violence and criminality – were more limited.

55. The UNDP-IOM project sought to build on early success by expanding the remit of the intervention. By the middle of 2001 – particularly in response to the high number of ex-combatants willing to surrender their weapons – the UNDP/IOM extended the project until the end of the year 2002 with prospective targets set for the reintegration of up to 15.000 ex-combatants and 20.000 weapons. While both strategic objectives remained the same as in the earlier project, the intermediate results are summarised in **table 5** below:

Table 5. Comparing Intermediate and Actual Results

Intermediate Results (IR)	Actual Results Achieved
IR1 15.000 ex-combatants plan and initiate an income generating activity and benefit from economic support, advice and monitoring	8.019 ex-combatant disarmed and benefiting from social and economic reintegration assistance (e.g. training, micro -projects)
IR2 Decrease robbery and crime among ex - combatants	No supporting evidence provided
IR3 Remaining militia disarm and groups dissolve. Reduction in the number of ex - combatants seeking in tegration in the armed forces	No supporting evidence provided Military sources indicate that at least 400 ex - militia were incorporated in the A.F. in 2002.
IR4 Ex-combatants are perceived as useful members of their communities	Based on social and economic reinsertion indicators from two IOM commissioned evaluations, reintegration of ex -militia covers 96% of project beneficiaries. Different

	evaluation methods of the current evaluation give largely different results, with much lower averages for social (3.13 out of a maximum of 4) and economic (2.13 of 4) reintegration among ex-combatants, and lower population appraisal (1.02 of 4) for social and economic (0.53 of 4) reintegration. See table hereunder
IR5 Communities with a high return rate of ex-combatants receive reintegration assistance	Criteria used have been essentially based on presence of ex-combatants, not whether they constituted a high return rate.
IR6. Awareness campaign on human rights, HIV/AIDS prevention and STD	Not carried out
IR7 20,000 small arms are collected and destroyed	No additional funding received, thus the total for weapon collection was 11,140 at the end of 2002
IR8 Lower crime rate due to firearm use	No supporting evidence provided.

Intangible Impacts

56. In addition to the more quantitative analysis presented in **tables 4 and 5** as well two earlier project evaluations commissioned by the UNDP-IOM, there a number of more intangible project outcomes that the evaluation mission was able to identify. These impacts, while not anticipated in the original UNDO-IOM proposal, were nevertheless important insofar as they conditioned the outcomes of the disarmament and reintegration efforts. These include the continued willingness of ex-combatants to surrender their weapon and the positive multipliers of a credible and transparent disarmament process.

57. The UNDP-IOM project managed to generate a relatively high degree of confidence with its intended target group. Indeed, the UNDP/IOM project was gaining critical momentum in its weapons collection and reintegration activities some twelve months after it began. But this momentum ended quickly because of the absence of critical funding in July 2001 and the reluctance of UNDP-IOM staff to continue with project without bridging funds.

58. It should be emphasised that the UNDP-IOM funding crunch emerged at the same time as the finalisation of the IDA credit to the GoC and the creation of the HC. The introduction of the IDA credit for demobilisation and reintegration activities caused considerable confusion within the donor community. Indeed, funding was not allocated to the continuation of the UNDP-IOM project because the donor community believed, only partially correctly, that the HC was about to receive the USD 5 million credit to carry out a similar range of activities.

59. Nevertheless, a critical omission in the HC strategy related to disarmament. Operational Protocol 2.30 of the World Bank restricts funding – by any means – to disarmament activities. Funding via the IDA credit, then, could not be allocated to weapons collection, much less destruction. This led perverse outcomes. Both the HC, and the UNDP-IOM were forced into a position turning away ex-combatants who

wished to turn in their weapons. Both the HC antennas and the UNDP-IOM faced a tremendous dilemma. In some ways, the provision of the IDA credit reduce the capacity of the projects to collect or destroy weapons and subsequently led to the suspending of all disarmament activities despite the strong desire of ex-combatants to turn in their arms. At the time of this writing, the UNDP-IOM has a list of ex-combatants (in both the capital and the provinces) wishing to turn in an estimated 3-5,000 additional weapons. The HC has also collected an additional 900 weapons – though lacks funds or a strategy to carry out a systematic collection.

60. It appears that one of the positive outcomes of the UNDP-IOM project is the willingness it engendered among ex-combatants to hand in their weapons. Given the increasing reticence among ex-combatants to hold on to their weapons – which are now perceived to be a security risk – surveys reveal a strong desire to hand them in for destruction. It stands to reason, then, that a disarmament intervention could, if undertaken in the very near future, build on the remaining momentum. It should be emphasised that the source of this momentum is strongly related to the impartiality of the UNDP-IOM. As a result of its independence and credibility, as well as its public and highly transparent approach to weapons destruction (e.g. flamme de la paix ceremonies), the UNDP-IOM sent a clear and unequivocal message that these weapons would be collected in confidence. In destroying the weapons, the project ensured that they would not be redistributed or recycled – and therefore would not contribute to another outbreak of armed violence.

Concluding remarks on the UNDP-IOM project

61. If measured in purely quantifiable terms, the UNDP-IOM efforts to collect and destroy weapons and reintegrate ex-combatants surpassed its original objectives. Though these successes should be appreciated, a number of unforeseen political and institutional changes undermined the second phase of the project (between July 2001 to December 2002) leading to a situation where no additional funding was made available to fulfil the reviewed projections.

62. Specifically, only one of four expected outputs as foreseen in the project document were realised (number of weapons collected and destroyed and ex-militia reinserted). The other intermediate impacts, such as IR 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 were not matched with the provision of any substantive indicator. Nevertheless, IR 4 has been analysed by the evaluation mission and the different surveys' results are presented in the Table below. Though a number of innovative studies were undertaken under the project – including a comprehensive analysis of weapons collection and destruction methods, a survey of small arms circulation and trade and micro-project evaluations – no mid-term evaluation of the entire project was ever undertaken. This is arguably a result of the financial limitations.

63. In terms of human resources, IOM should be commended for the quality and dedication of the staff working both in Brazzaville and in the provinces, in often very difficult situations and with limited means. While there were – albeit fortuitously – no serious security incidents during the course of the project, this has often been due to a large amount of personal skill ... and a fair share of luck.

64. Finally, the UNDP/IOM is currently undergoing an external financial audit by Ernst & Young for the purposes of transparency, the results of which will be available during the current month of March 2003. As mentioned in previous sections, some USD 4.5 million had reportedly been spent between July 2000 until December 2002 under the project – though details are not available at this time.

Table 6. Comparing approaches to 'reintegration': HC and UNDP -IOM

	HC	UNDP-IOM
Max spending threshold for ex-combatants	USD 300 (-10 per cent)	USD 350
Size of groups for micro - projects	1-10	1-5
Training per head for ex - combatants	USD 20	USD x
Number of days training per ex-combatant	X	5 days
Percentage of ex -combatants that participated	X	5 per cent (316 of 7,249)
Weapons collection component	No	Yes
Health and treatment component	Yes	No
Infrastructure development component	Yes	No
'Reintegration' success rate among ex -combatants	50-60 per cent	60 per cent – still going trade and agriculture

The HC - a Reintegration Project

65. The HC was created by decree on 10 August 2001 following the issuance of an IDA credit of USD 5 million on July 19 2001. In July 2001 the WB granted a USD. 5 million IDA credit to the GoC through the creation of the HC. The activities that were permitted under IDA terms were described in the procedures manual and, as mentioned – disarmament was not explicitly funded. The PDR did not request a formal project document to be presented for approval, but the procedures manual sets out the overall implementation guidelines. Though the project was described as *Projet de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion (PDR)* it should be emphasised that demobilisation was not undertaken.

66. The HC in Brazzaville is composed of five Adjoint Commissioners each in charge of some aspect of DDR and a committee of technical experts. It must communicate effectively with the CONADER (which, to date, has not yet met) and carries out its reintegration activities through five antennas located throughout the country. At present, the HC's activities are essentially evolving around reintegration projects, which are implemented through the "Agences d'Encadrements" (AE). These AEs are primarily (local) NGOs that have responded to a call for an 'expression of interest' from the HC in June 2002, and again in September 2002. The role of AEs is to provide assessment capacity for the antennas, technical assistance in relation to training, and monitoring for micro-projects **beneficiaries (see Table 6 for a comparison of approaches)**. The Antennas are intended to work in cooperation with the Comité de Région (CR) – which includes Préfect and other local authorities – in order to ensure the smooth running of operations and co-ordination. The antennas are also supposed to work through a CRPSP (which includes the AE in order to identify and prepare micro-project proposals for the HC in Brazzaville for approval). As the Préfets have recently been changed, neither the

CR nor the CRPSP formally exist. The evaluation therefore recommends that these structures be formally and legally established immediately.

67. It is somewhat difficult to measure whether the short-term and intermediate objectives of the HC were met because it did not have a project document as such. Nevertheless, the HC did set an initial target objectives were to reintegrate some 5.000 ex-combatants during 2002. Moreover, during the third and fourth quarters of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 the HC focused primarily on building its internal capacity. For example, the HC undertook a large-scale hiring initiative, opened up five antennas in different parts of the country, recruited the necessary staff and purchased equipment, began sensitisation campaigns, began identifying and registering ex-combatants and initiated other activities in order to establish adequate operational capacity.

Box 4. Reintegration where there are no roads, electricity or water?

A number of obstacles to the effective reintegration of ex-combatants in remote areas of the Plateaux district were detected that apply to varying degrees in other parts of the RoC and the Great Lakes. During a week-long visit to over 250 micro-projects, the evaluation team recorded a variety of challenges relating to the familial and social context of 'reintegration', the 'type and variety' of micro-projects and the dynamics of local markets.

With respect to family and social context, the evaluation team noted the role of re-distribution within kinship networks. According to key informants, at least 25 per cent of micro-project assistance is frequently re-distributed to extended family. Moreover, given the prevalence of witchcraft in the region – many ex-combatants who received funding were initially stigmatized and abused in the early period of their activity. The evaluation team recommends that appropriately tailored sensitisation and public awareness campaigns are initiated to counteract the unintended impacts of the reintegration effort. It also recommends the provision of 'equipment and non-cash assets' where possible to avoid redistribution of cash.

The evaluation team observed that the types and varieties of micro-projects were not adequately diversified or not aligned with local absorption capacities. In a number of villages in Plateaux (Gamboma, Ollombo and Allamba), the majority of micro-projects were devoted to livestock rearing. Indeed, the homogeneity among projects had the effect of increasing beneficiary exposure to risk (e.g. disease) and unintentionally inflated purchasing prices and depressed selling prices. For example, villagers sold ex-combatants young pigs and goats, ordinarily valued at 15,000, for 35,000 when news circulated that they were receiving reintegration assistance. Moreover, the focus on livestock demands resource intensive investment and support – including extension services such as veterinarians and medical supplies – that are not available. Finally, many projects that were initiated in the early stages – including taxi driving courses or butcheries – were ill-suited for the local context (e.g. no gas for taxis, no electricity for freezing facilities, etc). The evaluation team recommends that micro-projects are adequately diversified, but also that participatory approaches to micro-project identification are employed where possible.

Another challenge relating to the reintegration of ex-combatant re-integration relates to the dynamics of local markets. For example, project expectations should be relatively modest given the dilapidated state of infrastructure in the RoC. Indeed, most regions are marked by extremely poor quality roads, inaccessible villages, limited information (appropriate selling prices), high transaction costs (police, etc) and uneven accessibility for the transportation of products to market. To be sure, parallel investments in infrastructure – from roads and bridges to electricity and communications infrastructure) are urgently required. The evaluation team recommends that expectations remain modest in the early phases of the reintegration exercise.

67. The evaluation team was able to undertake visits to four of the five HC antennas: Dolisie, Nkayi, Sibiti and Gamboma. In Dolisie and Nkayi, meetings were held respectively with six and five AEs in each district. In Gamboma, meetings were held with three AEs. A significant sample of micro-projects was also visited in each site. As of March 2003, the HC antennas appear to be adequately staffed and in working order, having received the projected equipment and supplies. However, two antennas (i.e.

Sibiti and Gamboma) have few communication linkages and little capacity to undertake computerised registration – because the electricity supply is either non-existent (Gamboma) or erratic (Dolisie). **Box 4** outlines in more detail a number of the challenges associated with reintegration.

68. Most of the HC staff appear to be dedicated and competent, as holds true generally for the AE as well. However it is clear that AE possess very limited means, if any, to carry out their activities, except for goodwill and expertise in specific topics that are of service to the HC. In logistical terms however, most have no transport capacity and must rely alternative strategies to keep monitoring costs down. Examples of these alternative strategies include the hiring of local ‘ex-combatant’ monitors in various sites. It should be stated that the amount received by the AE for its interventions – equivalent to USD 32 per beneficiary (USD 0.60 a week) – is of little interest to larger and potentially able NGOs in relation to the one-year responsibility clause the AE agrees when signing the contract with the HC.

69. A major difficulty for the HC is the sheer geographical scope of its mandate. Given the tremendous dispersion of ex-combatants, the poor quality of the infrastructure and the limited funds allocated for transportation (most antennas had already used up their annual petrol quota within two months) – follow-up and monitoring is extremely difficult. This is especially so for those project-beneficiaries who live in remote villages or localities which are, in cases, not even accessible by land.

Conclusion of the HC PDR

70. As the HC has only relatively recently been launched it is difficult to provide a comprehensive evaluation of its successes and failures. The evaluation team therefore recommends that an external formative mid-term evaluation of the HC be undertaken in the next 12 months. It should be stressed, however, the HC has demonstrated some positive outcomes. Indeed, it has developed an institutional capacity both in Brazzaville and in the regions – no easy task by any means. As of 31 December 2001, it has also identified and reintegrated some 3,732 ex-combatants and has identified a total of 12,000 potential ex-combatants, of which 9,302 have been validated. Significant implementation-related obstacles notwithstanding, it has demonstrated satisfactory capacity among the antennas and AEs. The evaluation team expresses some concerns, however, that the current financial allocation provided under the IDA credit is sufficient to ensure the full range of activities that have been articulated and launched by the HC.

71. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the HC was created through the IDA credit agreement before the GoC established either a national policy for DDR or a formal national DDR programme. The original programme document for the HC did not take into consideration previous disarmament and reintegration efforts. Nor did IDA procedures consider the complexities and difficulties of the situation much less linkages to a comprehensive disarmament intervention. Though the identification procedures undertaken by the HC request information from potential ex-combatant beneficiaries on the number of guns they own – there appears to be little awareness within the HC about how precisely disarmament might be undertaken.⁸⁶

Box 5 Perceptions of the UNDP -IOM and HC projects in Brazzaville

The household survey generated a number of specific findings regarding the perceptions of Brazzaville residents. A number of broad descriptive observations are worth mentioning at the outset. First, as among donors and international agencies, there is general confusion among respondents in Brazzaville over the meaning of the word 'ex-combatant'. Disconcertingly, residents expressed a difficulty in distinguishing the difference between police, army, gendarmerie, militia-affiliated ex-combatants and bandits.

Second it appears that there was a limited awareness of the HC and UNDP-IOM projects in both the northern (e.g. Ouenze, Talangei and Mpila) and southern (Bacongo and Makelekele) neighborhoods of either the UNDP-IOM or HC initiatives. Among those who were aware of the projects – there was widespread speculation among those in North that 'southern' residents were benefiting more than 'northerners' and vice versa. Nevertheless, most respondents indicate their support for the initiatives and the importance of disarmament and targeted support for genuine ex-combatants.

Third, there was an overwhelming perception among those who were aware of the two initiatives that 'genuine' ex-combatants did not or were not receiving 'reintegration assistance' and that the projects privileged certain 'civilians' who received multiple benefits. Many respondents noted that the UNDP-IOM project, in particular, favoured relatives and friends of elite – and were not effectively 'disarming' or 'reintegrating' those who genuinely merited assistance. Such subjective appraisals were deemed to concern less than 10 per cent of the beneficiary caseload.

Fourth, many respondents noted that genuine ex-combatants, particularly Ninja and Cocoye, did not hand in their weapons for fear of being targeted. A significant number of respondents mentioned that the HC process could not successfully 'disarm' or 'reintegrate' genuine ex-combatants because it did not carry an impartial mandate.

Fifth, among residents in the north of Brazzaville, there were concerns that genuine 'Cobra' ex-combatants were not effectively 'reintegrated' and that in the absence of adequate employment opportunities or 'sustainable livelihoods' they will continue to present a clear and present threat.

72. The absence of formal linkages with other projects that had previously been undertaken and the lack of formal consultation (in technical working committees) with the other actors such as the UNDP-IOM has led the HC to work in isolation and in an ad hoc fashion. This in turn is generating considerable confusion among donors as to the objectives of HC activities, since their PDR is in essence limited to a reintegration project.

3.3 Long term impacts on security and stability

73. DDR is fundamentally concerned with the promotion of security and stability. Security and stability are, naturally, variously defined and measured. The UNDP-IOM and HC projects sought to target the ‘causes’ of insecurity through initiatives designed to disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants. They estimated that by disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants – indicators of security would improve. As section 3.2 demonstrates – they have achieved partial and regionally differentiated success in this domain.

74. Conventional approaches to measuring insecurity focus on crime, public health, forced displacement rates, investment and trade conditions and public perceptions of violence.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in the Republic of Congo, related data does not exist in coherent – much less tabulated – form. Moreover, neither the UNDP-IOM nor the HC have elaborated adequate instruments to measure these impacts over time.

75. The evaluation team prepared a number of instruments to generate evidence on the long-term impacts on a narrow bandwidth of ‘security’. Due to time and capacity constraints – only three sectors were reviewed. The evaluation sought to measure security as a function of the impacts of small arms on public health, armed violence in schools and public perceptions of safety. As section 3.1 explains, the evaluation team designed and administered a number of surveys to appraise these three sectors – focusing primarily on Brazzaville. The overall findings from the public health, school and household surveys indicate the following:

- § that *firearm injuries*, while decreasing overall, are concentrated in particular neighbourhoods (including areas where high numbers of ex-combatants were disarmed and reintegrated), demographic groups (including the approximate age groups targeted by the UNDP-IOM and HC) and have long-term financial implications
- § that *youth violence* is considerably widespread (including in areas where high numbers of ex-combatants were disarmed and reintegrated) and that the presence of armed groups – including ex-combatants – can affect the quality of education
- § that *public perceptions* of insecurity are prevalent and widespread in most neighborhoods of the capital – including in those areas where the UNDP-IOM and the HC have initiated projects.

76. Though this evaluation provides a snapshot – albeit blurred – of the security situation, it is clear that further research in each of the above-mentioned sectors is required. For one, it is exceedingly difficult to determine the immediate causal impacts of disarmament and reintegration without carefully controlled and longitudinal monitoring and evaluation. It is obvious, then, that monitoring and evaluation mechanisms should be put in place. Furthermore, there are other sectors – including crime, trade, investment and human rights – where data was either unavailable in aggregate form or simply unreliable and impossible to triangulate. The findings outlined in this section should therefore be treated cautiously, and indicative of broad trends. What is more, given time and space constraints, only a sample of findings are included in this report (see **Annex 2 for summaries**).


Firearm Injuries in Brazzaville⁸⁸

77. As the stated objective of disarmament and reintegration is to improve conditions of security – it is conceivable that effective interventions would reduce the incidence of weapons-related violence on public health. Though disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants in one region does not necessarily preclude the possibility of violence in another – the logic of said intervention is that it will reduce the risk factors associated with violent outcomes.

78. With this in mind, the evaluation team commissioned a retrospective and longitudinal study on firearm injuries in the principal neighborhoods of Brazzaville. The evaluation team focused on the capital because more than 70 per cent (5,734 of 8,019) of all ‘reintegrated’ ex-combatants live in Brazzaville – but also because longitudinal vital registration data is simply not available for the rest of the country. Fatal and non-fatal firearm injury statistics were collated from the three sources for the period 1998-2002: the center hospitalier et Universitaire de Brazzaville (CHU), L’hôpital de base de Makelekele, and L’hôpital de base de Talangai.⁸⁹ Additional data was collected from the hôpital Central des Armées for the period June-December 2002, although this is not included in this section.

79. The public health study indicates that while the number of victims of armed violence has decreased between 1998 and 2002 – there has been a *gradual increase in reported firearm injuries as a proportion of all reported injuries*. From a public health perspective, three discrete trends warrant particular attention. These include, the geographic concentration of firearm injuries in northern Brazzaville, the consistent demographic profile of victims of firearm-related violence and the types and approximate financial costs of registered non-fatal injuries.

Figure 3. Regional Distribution of Injuries in Brazzaville: 1998-2002



80. Between 1998 and 2002, *weapons-related injuries were geographically concentrated in the northern neighborhoods of Brazzaville* – particularly Talangai (34 per cent of all reported firearm injuries), as well as Mikalou, Mpla, Nkombo and

Mbouale (**Figure 4**). It should be noted that according to key informants with the UNDP-IOM and the HC – these are precisely the areas where a high concentration of allegedly disarmed and reintegrated ex-combatants (i.e. Cobras) reside. Though extensive disaggregated data is provided in the commissioned study, further research is required to determine the extent to which registered firearm-related injuries are attributable to ‘reintegrated’ ex-combatants. The stated ‘causes’ of firearm-related injuries are varied – and range from armed aggression (32 per cent) and armed robbery (30 per cent) to simple theft (10 per cent).

81. A second trend relates to the demographic profile of victims. Preliminary findings of the study reveal that *firearm injuries are especially prevalent among young men*. This is not an unusual finding – as there is substantive evidence in other post-conflict societies of the acute exposure of young men to firearm-related violence.⁹⁰ In Brazzaville, for example, between 1998 and 2002 – more than 70 per cent of all reported cases (1,530) involved males aged 11-30. Particularly worrying, at least 15 per cent of all reported firearm injuries involved young children under 11 years of age. Among females, the sub-sector of women aged 21-30 were particularly susceptible to non-fatal firearm injuries. Given the concentration of injuries among the most productive members of society – young adult men and women – the long term costs in relation to human capital and welfare (measured as a function of DALY, QALYs or YPLL) are measurable.

82. Finally, the study revealed the proportion of injuries attributable to small arms and the financial cost. Between 1998-2002, the *overwhelming majority of reported violence-related injuries – over 90 per cent – were attributable to firearms* and less than eight per cent to ‘armes blanche’. The costs of these injuries in both human and financial terms are tremendous. Common types of firearm injuries resulted in severe disability – and included cranial, superior and inferior and pelvic fractures, as well as amputations.⁹¹ A growing number of civilians disabled by firearm injuries can be detected both in Brazzaville, but also in surrounding provinces. Moreover, the financial costs of treatment and care for firearm-related injuries is high. Though 100 per cent of operating and care costs are born by the state, the estimated price-tag for treating injured patients – including operating costs, anesthetic, and the hospital stay – is close to USD 915 per patient. Therefore, if one considers reported firearm-related injuries in Brazzaville from 1998 to 2002 – the costs of treatment and rehabilitation have *totaled USD 1.4million* (USD 350,000 per year).⁹²

Armed Violence among Schools in Brazzaville⁹³

83. Disarmament and reintegration activities are intended not only to reduce the risk factors associated with armed violence committed by ex-combatants, but also contribute to the safety and security of society at large. Given the age categories of ex-combatants, and the vulnerability of children and young adults to violence more generally, the ‘education sector’ warrants particular attention when considering the long-term impacts of DDR. With this in mind, the evaluation team designed, pre-tested, trained and supported the administration of a school survey in Brazzaville. A sample of 18 schools were chosen from five neighborhoods where disarmament and reintegration took place. Structured interviews were carried out with school administrators and teachers.


84. The school survey revealed a number of relevant trends relating to the scale and magnitude of armed violence in the education sector. Specific findings relate to the

*dynamics of armed violence in universities and secondary schools, the impacts of armed violence on the quantity and quality of teaching, and the growing influence of gangs in the education sector.*⁹⁴ Special attention was paid to the *presence of ex-combatants* in or immediately outside the surveyed schools.

85. The survey sought to determine the scale and magnitude of violence – especially violence involving firearms – in universities, technical colleges and secondary schools throughout Brazzaville. School profiles were intentionally varied: enrolment numbers varied from 800 to 3,100 students – though the average was approximately 2,100. Nine surveys were carried out in schools and universities in the southern neighbourhoods (i.e. Baongo and Makelekele) and another nine in the northern neighbourhoods (i.e. Ouenze, Talangai, Mpila) of Brazzaville. Though the sample group was mixed, violence was identified as a major problem in *more than 75 per cent of all schools surveyed.*⁹⁵ On closer inspection, it appears that armed violence involving firearms and ‘armes blanches’ was noted in more than 50 per cent of reported cases.

86. Another focus of the survey related to the impact of armed violence on the quality of teaching. Findings indicate that *student failure and expulsion rates were high and exclusively attributable to ‘violence’ in at least half of the schools.* What is more, when asked about their own ‘security’, most teachers expressed anxiety in relation to their own personal safety. More than 50 per cent of all respondents expressed some concern about their personal exposure to armed violence both inside and outside the classroom (**Figure 5**). Though some efforts have been made to educate students of the risks associated with violence and arms use, they are notable by their absence. Specialized courses devoted to the promotion of conflict resolution and violence-reduction were registered in only 20 per cent of the canvassed schools – and more than 70 per cent of respondents recorded that no such classes were included or foreseen in the curricula.

Figure 4. Teacher exposure to armed violence



87. A worrying trend detected in the school survey related to the *escalation of group violence – particularly armed violence associated with gangs.* Over 60 per cent of the surveyed schools reported a problem of gang or organized youth violence and just under 30 per cent of sampled schools reported no such problem. The membership of gangs varied tremendously – from 2 to 150 members – though most organized groups averaged some 50 participants. Nor is gang violence an exclusively male-activity – as some 20 per cent of these gangs reportedly include girl members. When asked about the effects of gang violence on the wider student population – it was broadly perceived to be *significant* – exposing between 5 and 30 per cent of students to armed violence on a regular basis.

88. Given the extensive involvement of young males in the 1998-1999 conflict, and more recently in related armed violence in Pool and southern Brazzaville, the survey explored the *presence of ex-combatants in the education sector*. Though the response rate was relatively low, *ex-combatants are believed to be enrolled in at least 54 per cent of the schools surveyed*.⁹⁶ The numbers of ex-combatants presently enrolled range from 1 to 55 – though the average was approximately 5 per school. It is important to stress that the source of armed violence in most of the schools surveyed could not be traced to ex-combatants – but rather ‘external elements’ outside of the school. A significant proportion of respondents claimed that the establishment of fences around schools, as well as sensitization efforts could contribute to a reduction of firearm-related violence.

Public Perceptions of Security in Brazzaville⁹⁷

89. Another useful way to measure the effects of DDR is to assess the degree to which it is perceived to promote security in the community in which it is taking place. The evaluation team developed a geographically representative victimization survey in Brazzaville to do precisely this (**Annex 3**). The average age of household respondents was 42 and more than 70 per cent indicated some awareness of ex-combatants in their neighbourhood. Intriguingly, most households perceived a relatively low number of violent acts associated with former ex-combatants.

90. General findings from the representative household survey in Brazzaville indicate that *people still feel insecure* – and that armed violence, rape and theft remain chief concerns. Importantly, the primary concern among Brazzaville respondents relates not to ex-combatants, but rather to the army, the police and ‘bandits’. More than 77 per cent of household respondents attributed their insecurity to the armed forces. At least 70 per cent also noted the role of police in relation to their insecurity (**Table 7**). Importantly, only 42 per cent of households attributed their lingering insecurity to the presence of ex-combatants.

Table 7. Competing Perceptions: Community households and ex-combatants

Data Source	Social Reint.	Econ Reint	Security	Source of Insecurity						
				Armed forces	Police	Militia	Bandits	Neighbor	Ex-comb	Other
	4-High 0-Low	4 – High 0 – Low	4 – High 0 – Low							
Household survey (n142)	1.02 (n121)	0.53 (n123)	1.15 (n141)	0.77 (n141)	0.70 (n141)	0.31 (n141)	0.40 (n141)	0.02 (n141)	0.42 (n141)	0.11 (n141)
Ex-combatant survey (n63)	3.13 (n63)	2.13 (n63)	2.90 (n63)	0.13 (n30)	0.36 (n30)	0.60 (n30)	0.80 (n30)	0 (n30)	NA (n30)	0.03 (n30)

91. The table also highlights a number of contradictions with respect to the perceived sources of insecurity among household and ex-combatant respondents. For example, the majority of Brazzaville household respondents claimed that armed forces and police are the source of their insecurity (77 and 70 per cent). This was followed by ex-combatants, bandits and militia (42, 40 and 31 per cent respectively). By contrast, ex-combatants surveyed in Brazzaville claimed that bandits were their primary source of insecurity (80 per cent). The armed forces and police were highlighted by only 13 and 36 per cent of

ex-combatant respondents as a source of insecurity. Intriguingly, ‘militia’ were identified – perhaps testament to the lingering fears of renewed violence spreading from the Pool.

92. The **table above** outline’s a number of the community’s perceptions in relation to the success of DDR (in relation to socially and economically reintegrating ex-combatants) and their perceived sources of insecurity. It compares these indicators with the perception of ex-combatants themselves (**Table 7**). The table highlights a number of intriguing findings and contradictions. For example, the average household respondent feels that a relatively low proportion of ex-combatants have been socially and economically reintegrated (25 and 13 per cent respectively). The average ex-combatant respondent, however, feels rather more optimistic. More than 78 per cent claim to feel highly socially integrated in relation to other members of the community and more or less 53 per cent economically integrated.

Summary of Key Findings

Basic concepts such as disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration are regularly confused and inappropriately used by stakeholders in the Republic of Congo. The confusion over terminology extends from multilateral and bilateral donors operating in the Great Lakes region, to national policy makers, implementing agencies and the civilian population. Disagreement persists among stakeholders concerning the linguistic distinctions between ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’ and the meaning of related concepts such as ‘ex-combatants’ and ‘small arms and light weapons’. There are also fundamental disagreements relating to the objectives and sequencing of DDR and DDRRR activities. This not an academic issue. This lack of clarity has negatively affected relationships among stakeholders and undermined monitoring and evaluation efforts.

DDR – as a coherent and sequenced activity – has not taken place in the Republic of Congo. Rather, between 1999-2003, three independent and overlapping processes have been carried out in relation to ‘disarmament’ and, in some cases ‘reintegration’. The Comité de Suivi, established by the GoC after the Ceasefire Accords (1999), carried out a large-scale ‘disarmament’ initiative (buy-back) and some registration of ex-combatants.⁹⁸ The UNDP-IOM ex-combatant project – administered between July 2000 and December 2002 carried out ‘disarmament’ (weapons collection and destruction) and ‘reintegration’.⁹⁹ Finally, the HC, launched a ‘reintegration’ project¹⁰⁰ in October 2001 with financing from an IDA World Bank credit.¹⁰¹

No national DDR plan has been elaborated for the Republic of Congo. Though a number of activities – notably disarmament and reintegration – have taken place – a comprehensive national strategy for DDR with clear timelines, benchmarks and attainable targets has not been developed. Rather, there have been an assemblage of disparate projects with varying objectives, target group estimates and conflicting strategies. Moreover, the current HC approach for DDR has not fully taken into consideration lessons learned from previous efforts.

Disarmament is an urgent priority in the Republic of Congo. With an estimated 41,000 small arms still circulating in the Republic of Congo, their availability remains a very real threat to sustained security and stability. The wide availability of military-style assault rifles and grenades – particularly in the hands of ex-combatants, undisciplined security sector forces and civilians – presents a menace. The evaluation team notes that especially high concentrations of weapons caches are in the homes and common properties of the northern neighbourhoods of Brazzaville, and districts in Niari, Lekoumou, Bouenza and Pool. Individual cache sizes range from 1 to 75 weapons in Brazzaville – though as high as 400 weapons in Pool. Though some suspicion of the GoC persists, there appears to be considerable willingness among ex-combatants and civilians alike to dispose of their weapons.

The short term and intermediate impacts of the UNDP-IOM disarmament and reintegration project have been generally positive – though show signs of decline. The UNDP-IOM project succeeded in disarming and reinserting a significant number of ex-combatants – particularly in the Brazzaville and Pool. Nevertheless, a survey undertaken by the evaluation team in the five regions indicates that the ‘success’ of micro-projects has declined from 80 per cent (in 2002) to 60 per cent (in 2003). Of those micro-projects

that have generated profits and are continuing to operate – at least 20 per cent are experiencing significant ‘problems’. It appears that the intermediate ‘success rate’ of the micro-projects will likely decline due to the inadequacy of social infrastructure, low absorption rates and other external factors.

The short-term impacts of the HC DDR have been moderately satisfactory – though significant challenges remain. Though it is difficult to evaluate the HC project in light of its recent implementation – it has demonstrated some progress – particularly in terms of its support to ‘ex-combatants’ in the five antennas and satisfactory follow-up services given its scarce resources among its NGO partners. Nevertheless, severe weaknesses remain. For example, it still lacks a disarmament component – despite the willingness of many ex-combatants to return their weapons, a formal process of registration for ex-combatants, and demonstrates considerable weakness in relation to its NGO-implementation capacities with regard to reintegration.

The provision of an International Development Association (IDA) credit to the HC undermined previous disarmament efforts in the Republic of Congo. The World Bank provided an IDA credit to the GoC in July 2001 to begin reintegration activities. The HC was created one month later. But the IDA credit had counter-intuitive side effects. First it essentially undermined previously existing efforts. Specifically, the UNDP-IOM project failed to secure additional funding after the creation of the HC despite its considerable successes. Donor governments had little incentive to invest in the UNDP-IOM project because the HC project had a substantial budget and similar mandate. Second, the IDA credit had the effect of terminating all activities associated with disarmament. Due to World Bank procedures (i.e. Operational Policy 2.30) – disarmament was not permitted under the terms of the IDA credit. Moreover, a strategic plan for disarmament, much less funding for disarmament, for the HC (for disarmament) was not prepared in advance.

The long-term impacts of disarmament and reintegration efforts in RoC are mixed. Any evaluation of the long-term impacts of DDR in the Republic of Congo must be situated within the context of a relative decline in armed violence since the end of the war in 1999 and a recent surge in armed violence in the Pool district in 2002. Moreover, it should acknowledge the fact that the UNDP-IOM project ended prematurely – without fully extending its reach into areas most affected. That said, there is some evidence that the UNDP-IOM and HC disarmament and reintegration projects have partially contributed to the promotion of security and stability. But insecurity throughout the Republic of Congo remains pervasive. Specifically, firearm injuries are widespread – if geographically and demographically specific, schools are regularly exposed to armed violence and a representative sample of household in Brazzaville note that they still feel insecure. Moreover, there appears to be a gradual increase in banditry (e.g. cable-theft) and armed intimidation in Brazzaville.

The restructuring of the national army, the gendarmerie and the police has not yet taken place in the Republic of Congo. There are approximately 19,000-25,000 employed in the security sector – including the army (est. 12,000 – 15,000), gendarmerie (est. 3-5,000) and the police (e.g. 4-5,000). A census of the army, gendarmerie and the police is currently underway. The Cease-Fire Agreement signed December 1999 (notably, article 6) stipulated the ‘reorganization’ of the armed forces – with provisions only for the rebuilding or re-establishment of the army. It did not include provisions for the DDR of

these actors. At the present time, with the exception of a low-profile census exercise – there has not been a formal DDR of the national army, the gendarmerie or police.

The security forces appear to be a significant contributing factor to insecurity in the Republic of Congo. Household surveys carried out by the evaluation team show that among the civilian respondents, 77 per cent of respondents attribute their persistent insecurity to the armed forces, and 70 per cent to the police. Only 40 per cent indicated that the presence of ex-combatants made them feel unsafe. This contrasts with ex-combatants who were also surveyed. More than 80 per cent of respondents attributed their insecurity to “bandits” followed by other “militia” members.

Unreliable estimates and the use of arbitrary figures by all stakeholders in the Republic of Congo. There are a range of unsubstantiated figures associated with DDR and DDRRR that have generated confusion in the Republic of Congo. All stakeholders are guilty of over-estimation. For example the estimates of militia and foreign ex-combatants in the country range broadly: from 8,000 (the MDRP secretariat) to 112,000 (the GoC). Indeed, the number of ex-combatants in the Pool district emerge almost daily (e.g. 150 to 10,000) – as do those of Ex-FAZ (e.g. 800-87,000). Figures are also regularly supplied by the GoC for disarmament (buy-back) initiatives without substantiating evidence. Given the political and resource-related implications of these numbers – it is vital that more attention is devoted to the issue.

Summary of Recommendations

Standardised case definitions are essential for improving planning, preparation, implementation and evaluation of DDR. All stakeholders in the Republic of Congo must develop a basic consensus on the meaning and objectives of DDR and DDRRR. DDR should be described as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (in English). DDRRR should be described as disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (in English). It is also suggested that stakeholders agree that ‘reinsertion’ and ‘reintegration’ are synonymous (in both English and French). Furthermore, appropriate definitions and criteria for ‘small arms and light weapons’ as well as ‘ex-combatant’ should be agreed by all stakeholders in RoC.

The GoC must develop a national DDR plan no later than December 2003. The national plan should lay out attainable benchmarks and an appropriate division of labor for the following four activities: (1) disarmament – including the issuance of registration cards and transparent weapons destruction; (2) the DDR of *at least 25 per cent* of the security forces and include provisions for the restructuring of the police; (3) the continued reintegration of a realistic and appropriate number of militia ex-combatants; and (4) the DDR of foreign ex-combatants in and outside the Republic of Congo. MDRP partners can help with the drafting of a national DDR plan and the letter of demobilization and security sector reform policy. This national DDR plan, which would be supported at the executive level, should be submitted with a *letter of demobilization and security sector reform policy* to the MDRP Secretariat and the European Commission no later than December 2003.

Political commitment to a national DDR plan must be demonstrated by the executive of the RoC and international donors. Even the most comprehensive and carefully constructed DDR will fail if parallel political commitment to the process is opaque,

absent or sporadic. The experience from other regions in the world demonstrates that genuine political commitment to national DDR from international donors and UN agencies and, most importantly, the executive, is essential if disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is to be successfully implemented. A national DDR plan should be endorsed and strongly supported by the President, the *Commission Nationale de Demobilisation et de Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants* (CONADER) and the principal implementing arm – the HC. Moreover, regular communication should be established between the HC and CONADER in the form of quarterly updates and formal reporting procedures.¹⁰²

DDR of security forces must be included in a national DDR plan. A feasibility study outlining strategic targets and realistic outputs of the DDR of formal military forces should be prepared immediately – in co-operation with bilateral support where necessary – to be included in the national DDR plan. Current efforts to register and restructure the national army, gendarmerie and police should be continued with the objective of establishing a restructuring framework by December 2003. A strategy for realistic DDR (of at least 25 per cent of the armed forces) and effective stockpile and management procedures should be launched no later than the first quarter of 2004. Support for the DDR of the security forces should be solicited from the MDRP.

The national DDR plan should be designed to reduce the threat of armed insecurity and not as a comprehensive development programme. The Republic of Congo has many urgent needs that require immediate attention – including the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and the promotion of employment opportunities, land distribution and agricultural productivity. These needs should be addressed by a combination of efforts on the part of the GoC, multilateral and bilateral donors. The national DDR plan, however, while conceived within a broad framework, should include a relatively narrow cluster of activities to redress the insecurity generated by (formal, foreign and militia-based) ex-combatants in the country. It can nor should be carried out indefinitely, and should adopt limited time-horizons, clear objectives and a specific beneficiary target group.

An ‘urgent appeal’ for disarmament should be launched by the MDRP Secretariat and the UNDP. The MDRP Secretariat, together with the UNDP, should issue an *urgent appeal for an estimated USD 2-2.5 million – subject to UNDP-IOM needs*. This urgent appeal would outline the very real insecurities associated with small arms, the history of missed opportunities with respect to disarmament in the Republic of Congo and the need for emergency ‘bridging support’ for DDR. The urgent appeal would set out clear targets for weapons collection and destruction and the issuance of ‘identity cards’ in order to ensure smooth co-ordination with the prospective national DDR plan. The implementation of the disarmament component would be carried out by the UNDP and IOM. The UNDP and IOM – who can begin disarmament within one month’s advance notice – would develop a range of locally appropriate approaches. The disarmament operation would begin as soon as funds are received from the ‘urgent appeal’ and would focus primarily on Brazzaville, Pool, Bouenza, Niari and Lekoumou. The urgent appeal should be prepared immediately, and released no later than May 2003. The disarmament activities should begin at the earliest possible moment – depending on how quickly funding can be secured. The evaluation team also recommends that HC second some of its staff for training (e.g. capacity-building) in the disarmament activities undertaken by the UNDP-IOM.

The HC, together with the UNDP, should immediately begin a constructive dialogue with a view of operationalising disarmament within the national DDR plan over the long-term. The UNDP has considerable expertise in disarmament and reintegration and, as lead international agency in the Republic of Congo, should support the HC with backing from the MDRP Secretariat. Among the central issues to be agreed by the HC and the UNDP are: (1) realistic targets for the number of weapons to be collected and destroyed; (2) the division of labor with respect to ‘technical assistance’ for disarmament; (3) appropriate time-frames and geographic targets for disarmament; (4) the mainstreaming of disarmament within the ‘national DDR plan’; and (5) the confidential exchange of information relating to UNDP and HC ex-combatant beneficiaries to reduce the incidence of moral hazard. A strategy for disarmament should be prepared for inclusion in the national DDR plan and include a role for the United Nations under a contingency fund for exceptional circumstances in regions where armed conflict or high levels of violence are pervasive. Funding for the disarmament component of the national DDR plan should be provided by the European Commission.

Special attention to the potential DDR of ex-combatants in the Pool region: The HC, together with the international community, must develop a special contingency plan for the equivalent of 1,000 ex-combatants still remaining in the Pool. This plan must be prepared at the earliest notice – given the unpredictability of the situation and the urgent needs that will be required should they require emergency disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration assistance. The evaluation team recommends that this plan be drawn up by the HC, in consultation with MDRP partners and led by the UNDP, and be overseen by impartial monitors. Funding for ex-combatants from Pool should be allocated from resources available under the IDA credit.

Attention to police restructuring and security sector reform should be included in the national DDR plan. A feasibility study should be prepared independently in order to elaborate a coherent and concrete strategy toward the reform and strengthening of the policing sector (current est. size 4-5,000¹⁰³) in parallel with the restructuring of the military. This strategy should include provisions for multilateral or bilateral co-operation with foreign police forces, the reinforcing of training programmes in policing and human rights, and associated security sector reform initiatives.

The HC should be immediately restructured to reflect planning and implementation priorities for the national DDR plan. The current executive of the HC should be elevated to work with a ‘policy and planning committee’ at the cabinet level. The policy and planning committee would consist of senior figures within the current executive and responsible for the elaboration of a national DDR plan and demobilization and security sector reform policy. The HC would therefore be comprised of a purely technical body of experts – contracted by tender – concerned exclusively with the implementation of the national DDR plan. The CONADER would remain as a co-ordination body for all stakeholders and meet as required.

In line with HC restructuring, a Commissioner for DDRRR should be created for the HC. Because of the enormous complexities in relation to repatriating/resettling foreign ex-combatants, a Commissioner should be appointed to ensure the smooth implementation of DDRRR in the HC.¹⁰⁴ The Commissioner for DDRRR would be

charged with ensuring continuous dialogue with representatives in Gabon, DRC, Rwanda and elsewhere and elaborating a strategy for DDRRR in co-operation with donors and UN agencies. The UNDP-IOM has recently signed a tri-partite agreement with DRC and RoC in this regard, and its efforts should be supported. A preliminary strategy for DDRRR should be included in the national plan for DDR. DDRRR would be funded as a 'special project' of the MDRP.

A mechanism should be developed by the HC and implementing partners to measure (and respond to) the short, intermediate and long-term impacts of DDR on security. These mechanisms would include instruments to record the impacts of disarmament and reintegration on criminality, public health, education, public perceptions of security and trade and investment. They are a number of longitudinal tools that can be developed and they should be extremely low-cost, representative and carried out on a regular basis. The HC must also develop a capacity to respond to findings in an efficient and coherent fashion.

Acronyms

AE	Agence d'Encadrement
CDS	Comité de Suivi
CHU	Center hospitalier et Universitaire de Brazzaville
CONADER	Commission Nationale de Demobilisation et de Reinsertion des Ex-Combatant
CR	Comité de Région
DALY	Disability Adjusted Life Years
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRP	Demoblization and Reintegration Program
Ex-FAC	Force Arme de Congo
Ex-FAR	Force Armee de Rwanda
Ex-FAZ	Forces Armee de Zaire
FDLR	Force pour la Liberation de Rwanda
GoC	Government of the Republic of Congo
HC	Haut Commisariat a la Reinsertion des Ex-Combattants
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced person
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
MDRP	Multi-Country Demoblisation and Reintegration Programme
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
PDR	Projet de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion
QALY	Quality Adjusted Life Years
RoC	Republic of Congo
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launcher
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSECCORD	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USCR	US Committee for Refugees
YPLL	Years of Productive Life Lost

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Annex 1. Assorted Tables

Displaced Persons in RoC: 1999 -2002

Year	Refugees in RoC*	IDPs in RoC
1998	21,000	800-810,000
1999	39,870	580,000-700,000
2000	123,240	100,000-150,000
2001	119,147	125,000-150,000
2002	109,159	60,000-75,000

*As of 2003, refugees are from Angola (17,745), Burundi (130), CAR (1,585). Chad (220). DRC (92,778) and Rwanda (6,888) – of which UNHCR currently assists 81,801.

Source: Refugee figures are from UNHCR -Brazzaville (2003) and USCR (1998). IDP figures are drawn from UN-OCHA (July 2002), UN (1999) and USCR (2001)

Reported Injuries to Brazzaville Military Hospital* (June -December 2002)

Cause	Number of Victims
Firearm injuries	167
War-related firearm injuries	96
Other war-related injuries	70
Shelling injuries	20
Burns	5
Total number of victims	262

*Hospital catchment area is Pool and Brazzaville and it has a 300 -bed capacity

Source: ICRC, 2003

Annex 2. Sample of Survey Findings

Ex-Combatant Survey

Average age of respondent : 31.2

Average age of non-Brazzaville respondent: 28.7

Weapons given: 77 per cent (yes)

Weapons given by non-Brazzaville respondent: 62 per cent (yes)

Explosives given: 41 per cent (yes)

Explosives given by non-Brazzaville respondent: 37 (yes)

Any remaining weapons: 78 (yes)

Non-Brazzaville: NA

Do you feel reinserted socially: 3.13 of 4

Do you feel reinserted socially among non-Brazzaville respondents: 3.26 of 4

Do you feel reinserted economically: 2.13 of 4

Do you feel reinserted economically among non-Brazzaville respondents: 1.57 of 4

Do you feel secure: 2.9 of 4 (0 not at all, 4 totally)

Do you feel secure among non-Brazzaville respondents: 3.33 of 4 (0 not at all, 4 totally)

Household Survey

Average age of household respondent: 42

Number of Male respondents: 113

Number of Female respondents: 29

Total number of respondents: 142

Awareness of ex-combatants in your neighbourhood: 70 per cent (yes)

Average number of ex-combatants you perceive to be in your neighbourhood: 1.27 (between 0 and 50).

Estimated significance of violence acts in your community: 1.37 (0 none and 4 high).

Proportion of violent acts committed with small arms: 1.16 (0 none and 3 high)

Proportion of violent acts committed with 'armes blanche': 1.13 (0 none and 3 high)

Violent acts committed by ex-combatants: 0.5 (0 none and 4 high)

Social Reintegration: 1.02 (0 is none and 4 is high)

Economic Reintegration: 0.53 (0 is low and 4 is high)

Do you feel secure: 1.15 (0 is not at all and 4 is totally)

Annex 3. Survey Questionnaires

GUIDE D'ENTRETIEN POUR LES ECOLES – évaluation conjointe UE/PNUD

I. Informations générales

1. Date de l'interview : _____
4. Département: _____ 5. Région: _____
6. Arrondissement et quartier (soulignez ce qui convient): _____
7. Nom de l'école: _____
8. Type d'enseignement dispensé (primaire, secondaire, université, collège technique, etc.): _____
9. Nombre de classes: _____ Nombre de classes pédagogique : _____
10. Effectifs de l'ensemble de l'école (toutes classes confondues, nombre d'élèves inscrits): _____
11. Personne(s) rencontrée(s) (Directeur, administrateur, professeurs)

Nom	Prénom	fonction	âge	sexe
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____
6	_____	_____	_____	_____

10. Tranche d'âge des élèves (des plus petits au plus âgé): _____

11. La violence est-elle un problème à l'école? (Encerclez la réponse) **Oui / Non**

Si oui, de quelle type de violence s'agit-il?

12. Les élèves détiennent-ils des armes à feu ou sont-ils armés? (Encerclez la réponse) : **Oui / Non / ne sait pas**

Si oui,

(___) % approximatif ou estimé détenant des armes à feu (grenades, pistolets, fusils, etc.)

(___) % approximatif ou estimé (par rapport au total des effectifs) détenant des armes blanches (couteaux, machette, etc.) ?

13. Nombre d'enfants qui n'ont pas fini l'année scolaire passée (% approximatif du total des effectifs) :

14. De ce pourcentage, quel en est environ le % attribuable à la violence? : _____

15. Le curriculum scolaire comporte-t-il des cours spécifiques en rapport avec le problème de la violence? (Encerclez la bonne réponse) **Oui / non**

Si oui, de quel type de cours s'agit-il?: _____

Pour les élèves de quel niveau?: _____

16. Parmi vos élèves certains se sont-ils transformés en groupes recourant à la violence comme moyen de subsistance (gangs, vols, petite délinquance, etc.) (encerclez la bonne réponse) **Oui / Non / Ne sait pas**

Si oui, combien d'élèves approximativement sont-ils concernés?: _____

Des filles en font-elles partie?: _____

Si oui, à peu près combien?: _____

17. A quel type d'armes ces groupes ont-ils recours?: _____

() % approximatif des armes à feu

() % approximatif des armes blanches

100% total

Ne sait pas/Ne peut pas répondre

18. Par rapport au total des effectifs, quel est le nombre approximatif de garçons/jeunes hommes affectés par le problème de la violence?: _____

19. Par rapport au total des effectifs, quel est le nombre approximatif de filles/femmes affectées par le problème de la violence?: _____

20. Existe-t-il des ex-combattants dans votre école? (encerclez la réponse)

Oui / Non / Ne sait pas

Si Non ou ne sait pas, allez à la question 23

Si oui, combien environ?: _____

21. Ces ex-combattants commettent-ils de actes de violence à l'école? (encerclez la réponse)

Oui / Non / Ne sait pas

22. Ces actes sont-ils commis avec une arme? (Encerclez la réponse) **Oui / non / ne sait pas**

Si oui, laquelle: _____

23. L'école est-elle un lieu où les étudiants et professeurs se sentent en sécurité? (encerclez la réponse):

pas du tout - un peu - suffisamment - entièrement - ne sait pas

24. Quels sont les principaux risques qui contribuent à l'insécurité de l'école?: _____

Merci de votre collaboration

**GUIDE D'ENTRETIEN POUR LES MENAGES –
évaluation conjointe UE/PNUD**

I. Information générale

1. Date de l'interview : _____

2. Département: _____

3. Région: _____

4a Arrondissement et quartier (soulignez ce qui convient): _____

4b. Population de l'arrondissement approximative: _____

II. Personnelle	II. Groupe
5. Age de la personne :	5. Nr. de personnes :
6. Sexe :	
7. Nr. de personnes composant la maison/ménage :	
6. Age et sexe de chaque personne	6. Age et sexe de chaque personne :
1.	1.
2.	2.
3.	3.
4.	4.
5.	5.
6.	6.
7.	7.
8. Niveau d'études et fonction (p. ex. chef de quartier, etc.) :	7. Type de groupe : formel/coutumier/autre
	8. Nom du groupe: (p. ex. comité des sages)

9. Exercez-vous actuellement d'autres activités génératrices de revenu : oui/non
Si oui, laquelle?: _____

10. Avez-vous connaissance s'il existe des ex-combattants qui vivent ou travaillent dans le quartier?: **oui / non**

Si oui, question 11, si non allez à la question 13

11. Combien d'ex-combattants connaissez-vous qui vivent ou travaillent dans le quartier:
0 - 25 () 26-50 () 51-75 () 76-100 () 100 et plus ()

12. Leur présence vous inspire-t-elle un sentiment d'insécurité :
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - entièrement

13. Existe-t-il des actes de violence dans votre quartier ?
aucun - très peu - assez - énormément - ne sait pas

14. Ces actes sont-ils perpétrés avec une arme à feu ?
aucun - très peu - assez - énormément - ne sait pas

15. Ces actes sont-ils perpétrés avec une arme blanche ?
aucun - très peu - assez - énormément - ne sait pas

16. Avez-vous connaissance d'actes de violence commis par les ex -combattants?
Oui / Non

Si oui, quel en était l'origine et le motif : _____

17. Estimez-vous que les ex-combattants se sont réintégrés socialement dans votre communauté ?
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - tout à fait - ne sait pas

18. Estimez-vous que les ex-combattants se sont réintégrés économiquement dans votre communauté ?
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - tout à fait - ne sait pas

19. Vous sentez-vous en sécurité ?
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - tout à fait

20. Quelle est la source de votre insécurité (par ordre de priorité):

<i>forces armées</i>	_____
<i>police</i>	_____
<i>milices</i>	_____
<i>assauts (bandits)</i>	_____
<i>voisins</i>	_____
<i>ex-combattants</i>	_____
<i>autres</i>	_____

Merci de votre collaboration

Verification: Address (et no. de cel) de **5.** : _____

19. Quel est votre bénéfice mensuel ?
20. Avez-vous déposé de l'argent à la MUCODEC ? Si oui, montant :
21. Avez-vous obtenu un crédit de la MUCODED ? Si oui, montant :
22. Pour quelle activité : 23. Sur quelle période :
24. A quel taux d'intérêt :
25. Bénéficiaire du projet Appui Communautaire : Oui /non
- Si oui, type d'appui perçu :
26. Bénéficiaire du projet PDR du HCREC : Oui / Non
- Si oui, type d'appui perçu :
27. Montant dépenses alimentaires mensuel :
28. Montant dépenses en bière par semaine
29. Bénéficiaire d'autre type de projet :
- Si oui, lequel et sous quelle forme
30. Vous sentez-vous réintégré socialement dans votre communauté ?
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - tout à fait
31. Vous sentez-vous réintégré économiquement dans votre communauté ?
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - tout à fait
32. De quel groupe ou milice avez-vous fait partie :
33. Vous sentez-vous en sécurité ?
pas du tout - un peu - moyennement - beaucoup - tout à fait
34. Quelle est la source de votre insécurité :
forces armées - police - milices - assauts (bandits) - habitants du quartier - autres
35. Exercez-vous actuellement d'autres activités génératrices de revenu : oui/non
- Si oui, laquelle :
- Merci de votre collaboration

Annex 4. Preliminary Interview Schedule

Michel Ngakala, Haut Commissaire
François Bouesse, Haut Commissaire Adjoint
Pierre Boungou Boungou, Commissaire (démobilisation, désarmement)
Joseph Mbizi, Commissaire à la Réinsertion Sociale
Joseph Mbossa, Directeur du cabinet du Haut-Commissaire
Madeleine Yica, Conseillère Socio-culturelle
Emile Niombo, Conseiller Technique
Fidèle Migambanou, attaché administratif et juridique
Cyrille Malonga, attaché coordinateur CRS
Emile Fernand Ekouomo, attaché coordinateur CRE
Jean Hervé Mandounou, attaché coordinateur CDD
Mwaziby Olingoba, Conseiller économique du Haut Commissaire
Antoinette Kebi, Conseillère administrative et juridique

Willy Marcus, chargé d'affaires, ambassade de Belgique
Ibrahima Traore, chargé du bureau de liaison, UNHCR
Mohamed Dayri, protection officer, UNHCR
Jean-Marie Kinteko, statisticien, UNHCR
Colonel Mopita, DECAM
Général Mokoki, chef de la Gendarmerie
Hilly-Anne Fumey, UNDP
Claude Thureau, UNOPS
Colonel Jean-Bruno Vautrey, ambassade de France
Etienne de Souza, premier conseiller, ambassade de France
Maarten Merkelbach, chef de délégation, CICR
Julie Godin, administrateur, UE
Domenico Rosa, administrateur, UE
Jean-Eric Holzapfel, chef de délégation, UE
Eniko Toth, Economiste, UE
Colonel Paul Victor Moigny, Directeur Général des Affaires Stratégiques et de la
Coopération Militaire
Piercarlo Pisa, Chargé d'affaires, ambassade d'Italie

Endnotes

² The evaluation was undertaken primarily by Robert Muggah (consultant to the E U) and Christian Bugnion (consultant to the UNDP). Philippe Maughan also participated between February 27 -March 3 2003.

³ Direct deaths attributed to conflict tended to be concentrated in specific regions – particularly in Pool and Brazzaville itself. A report by Amnesty (1999), for example, claims that according to ‘numerous sources in Brazzaville ... as many as 2,000 civilians, many of them elderly people who had failed to flee, were killed in southern Brazzaville’s Makélékélé and Bacongo districts during December 1998 and in early January 1999.’ See also MSF (1999).

⁴ According to MSF and other NGOs operating in Congo -Brazzaville in 1998, malnutrition was the principal cause of death among the displaced. Indeed, a third of children seen by doctors at the Centre Sportif in Brazzaville registered acute malnutrition. In total, more than 10 000 cases of acute malnutrition were treated in MSF’s feeding centres. The figure of 10,000 does not include the medical activities of other aid organisations present in Congo in 1999.

⁵ See, for example, Demetriou *et al* (2002) for epidemiological records on fatal and non -fatal injuries associated with small arms between 2000 -2002.

⁶ See UNHCR (1999: 86) for a detailed breakdown of RoC and DRC refugees in 1999. The figure of 19,500 refugees above includes 12,400 refugees from DRC and 7,100 Rwandese refugees. It does not include the tens of thousands of Angolan refugees in Pointe Noire – in the west of RoC.

⁷ In May 1999, in an incident now popularly referred to as ‘the Beaches’, several hundred RoC refugees returned unassisted by UNHCR to Brazzaville from DRC. According to a variety of sources, of this large returning group some 352 people – primarily from the Pool district – were ‘disappeared’ – many later found dead. An inquiry was launched in 2002, followed swiftly by military incursions into the Pool district, and is still pending as of March 2003. Interviews with alleged witnesses of the Beaches incident, February 2003. See also, L’Observateur (February 20 -26, 2003).

⁸ The economic and social costs of the conflict are illuminatingly detailed in HDR -Congo (2002), World Bank (2002 – see annexes) and UNHCR reports. A thoughtful consideration of the political dynamics of the three successive conflicts can be found in Amnesty International (1999). See also RoC (2000).

⁹ See Law no 21 -99. December 20, 1999.

¹⁰ See, for example, the *Accord de Cessation des Hostilites en Republique de Congo*, 16 Novembre and 29 December 1999.

¹¹ The estimate of 22,640 ex-combatants was generated by the Comité de Suivi in 2000. The IOM -UNDP and the Haut Commissariat, not to mention the EU and World Bank have also used this estimate despite recognizing its arbitrary nature. There is no record of a methodology or registration system for the recording of this number of ex-combatants. Demetriou *et al* (2002) placed the number at 16,000 militia – see also *UNDP Rapport des Activites October 2002*.

¹² At the time of the Comité de Suivi, there was no official estimation of the number of weapons to be collected. The estimate of 71,500 was established by a Small Arms Survey research team in July 2001. The number of weapons in circulation had been reduced to approximately 41,000 by 2002 – as a result of both Comité de Suivi and IOM -UNDP disarmament efforts and attrition. This number does not, however, include new acquisitions since December 2001 or prospective trade into or out of RoC.

¹³ See Présidence de la République, Article 10 of Decree 2000 -4 (February 14, 2000).

¹⁴ There is, however, an on-going dialogue between the French Mission and the L’Etat Majeur, to identify and register all members of the land army, navy, air -force and gendarmerie, (ii) determine those who should be eliminated due to lack of experience, disability, or dubious qualifications, (iii) exclude additional payrolls not accounted for and (iv) begin a formal process of demobilization. The official registration process began in July 2002 and will be completed in July 2003. The logistics and preparation phase will be finished by late 2004. If continued at the current pace, a formal demobilization programme could conceivably be ready for implementation by January 2005. Interview with Etienne De Souza and Jean-Bruno Vautrey, French Mission -Brazzaville, February 22, 2003.

¹⁵ Furthermore, the GDP of RoC increased by 4.5 per cent in 2000. See, for example, World Bank (2002).

¹⁶ It should be noted that the Comité de Suivi only partially fulfilled its mandate. The final report of the Comité de Suivi notes that 16 of the 31 Articles were totally executed, 9 Articles partly executed and 6 clauses not executed. See République du Congo (2000).

¹⁷ Discussions for the UNDP and IOM to begin a disarmament and reintegration project began before the signing of the Peace Accords in November and December 1999. The Resident Representative of the UNDP signed a ‘SPPD/STS’ project document with the IOM to bring in specialists to begin designing the project in mid-1999. Pilot activities were begun in early 2000 – particularly following the arrival of IOM-representative Maximo Halty.

¹⁸ The principal actors in the negotiation of the IDA credit were Salomon Samen (IDA), Alassane Diawara (World Bank representative in RoC), Solange Alliali (Judicial Counsellor), Hoang Dam Vam (Demobilisation consultant), Prosper Biabo (Financial Management) and Nadege Nouviale (Programme Assistant).

¹⁹ The original HC target was for the reintegration of 10,000 ex-combatants. In February 2003, this target was readjusted to 9,000 in order to devote additional funds to monitoring and evaluation.

²⁰ It should be noted that as the *Secretary General of the Executive Committee* of the Comité du Suivi, General Mokoki also visited the head of the Ninja militia, Ntoumi, on several occasions in 2000. Interview with Mokoki, Feb 18, 2003.

²¹ Governmental sources in the HC indicate that some 20 visits were made between the HC and the Reverend Ntoumi.

²² An official letter of support from the High Commissioner for Reinsertion, Mr. Ngkala, was sent to the UNDP on November 21, 2001 – and promised USD 500,000 to continue the project. These funds were never received.

²³ The Resident Representative, Bill Paton, left the RoC soon after in August 2002.

²⁴ ICR estimates that some 10 to 11,000 have been internally displaced in Pool since October 2002. Interview with IRC director, 25 February 2003.

²⁵ The 75,000 newly displaced was in addition to the existing 60-75,000 IDPs. Though the number of deaths is still unknown, consult the table below for a list of reported injuries by cause in the principal military hospital between June and December 2002.

²⁶ Humanitarian workers have become increasingly vulnerable to armed violence. For example, a French missionary, initially taken hostage, was killed in April 2002. Also, two staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were held hostage (and later released) in the Bouenza region between 4–29 December 2002.

²⁷ It is unclear what the humanitarian corridors are intended to accomplish. On the one hand, a number of so-called Ninja combatants who attempted to ‘leave’ the Pool district were attacked by government forces in December 2002. On the other, among those who have left, it is not clear whether they are or are not ex-combatants. At present, a few hundred young men (and their families) from Pool are currently residing in abandoned government offices in the center of Brazzaville.

²⁸ Moreover – 31 per cent of all reported firearm-injuries (53 of 167) required hospitalization while just under 70 per cent required only out-patient care. It should be noted that these figures must be considered in relation to the exceptional circumstances accompanying the June 14 2002 train attack and the offensive launched by the RoC army in Pool between October and November 2002.

²⁹ Interview with UNHCR-Brazzaville, 21 February, 2003.

³⁰ The Minister responsible for the ON reported in February that an EU-funded E20 million road building and infrastructure development project (80km from Brazzaville to Kinkale) has been thrown into doubt due to the insecurities presented to engineers over a 15 km stretch in areas affected by ‘Ninja’ forces. According to the EU, however, the project should be in a position to move forward by the middle of March 2003. Interview February 17, 2003.

³¹ In DRC alone, some 2 million are reported to have died due to the direct (firearm and machete) and indirect (communicable illness and malnutrition) effects of war. In the Great Lakes, there are an estimated 10 million refugees and internally displaced people (UNHCR 2002, World Bank 2002).

³² The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in July 1999 – and is supported by UNSC resolution 1258 (1999). Its center-pieces are to organize the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, disarm and demobilize foreign armed groups and withdraw foreign troops. This is not to be confused with the Lusaka Protocol signed in 1994 in Angola.

³³ The Pretoria Agreement was signed on July 31, 2002. It includes provisions for, among other things the continuation of MONUC, emergency DDRRR of ex-FAR and DDR.

³⁴ Official Development Assistance to the region has also fallen precipitously – from USD 3.7 billion in 1994 to USD 2.2 billion in 1999 (see OECD-DAC, 2002).

³⁵ An estimated 10,000 ex-combatants are believed to have been reintegrated into the armed forces and police forces by 2000. Interview with De Souza, February 20, 2003.

³⁶ Though most Angolas have left, an estimated 250 now working in the private security industry in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.

³⁷ See, for example, République du Congo (2002) and the estimate of 8,000 RoC ex-combatants in Gabon.

³⁸ At the diplomatic level, official governmental envoys shuttled between Kigali and Brazzaville in order to begin discussions on repatriating foreign ex-combatants (ex-FAR) from RoC to Rwanda – particularly in 2002. A number of joint RoC and DRC military operations have sought to remove EX-FAC from RoC. In June 2001, an estimated 600 Ex-FAC were ‘voluntarily’ repatriated to DRC – though details remain

unclear. Other activities have also been undertaken by non-governmental agencies. For example, on 11 September 2002, a tri-partite agreement was established between the Gabon, RoC and the UNHCR to address the issue of refugee repatriation (see UNHCR 2002). None of the 41 Articles in the Accord deal explicitly with the question of ex-combatants in either RoC or Gabon – but rather focus on the refugees. In relation to ex-combatants, the UNDP and the IOM have begun carrying out feasibility studies on the numbers of foreign ex-combatants in RoC and DRC, as well as conditions for possible return. A separate tri-partite agreement was signed between RoC, DRC and the IOM for the repatriation of possible Ex-FAZ, Ex-FAC and Ex-MLC combatants in September 2002.

³⁹ Estimates are that there are 2,000 in Kouilou, 3,000 in Niari, 3,000 in Lekoumou, 3,000 in Bouenza, 3,000 in Pool, 2,500 in Brazzaville, 800 in Plateaux, 1,000 in Cuvette Centrale, 600 in Cuvette Ouest, 400 in Sangha and 700 in Likouala.

⁴⁰ The MDRP secretariat (2003; 42) estimates that some 8,000 ex-combatants would be considered beneficiaries in RoC. This estimate was generated in 2001 and is flexible.

⁴¹ At the Advisory and Trust Fund Committee meeting on the MDRP in November 7-8 2002, approximately E 170 million was pledged. These include, the Netherlands USD 105.5m disbursed over 3 years, EC disbursed USD 19.5 million, UK disbursed USD 25m over 5 years, Canada USD 9.6m over 3 years, Norway USD 3.3m, Sweden USD 3 million, Belgium USD 1.9 million with an additional informal pledge of USD 8 million, France USD 1.9 million, Germany USD 1.9 million over 2 years and Italy USD 1.5 million.

⁴² Robert Muggah visited Kinchasa on 19 Feb 2003 to discuss regional developments for the MDRP with the EU delegation, the UNDP, the Netherlands Mission and the MDRP representative at the World Bank.

⁴³ Moreover, there are also clearly a range of political ‘interests’ within the current administration with respect to the objectives of DDR and financing for post-conflict reconstruction.

⁴⁴ Though important differences – in design, implementation and outcomes – between the RoC government and UNDP-IOM approaches to disarmament are obvious – they are nevertheless compared in the table above.

⁴⁵ Various types of weapons were purchased by the Comité de Suivi for between CFA 10-30,000. Interview with Gilbert Mboundou, responsible for weapons collection in the Comité de Suivi, on February 19, 2003.

⁴⁶ Types of weapons included PMAK, SKS, PA, rocket-launchers, Maytroyer, SGM, AK-47, 12.7, Galil, 14.5mm, Hunting rifles, Schmel, Mortars (82, 60mm), Castor, PAL/MA-SS, CAR-44, B10, CRS 75mm, and FIG. Ammunition types included .762 rounds, RPG-7 and RPG-2 rounds, BM21 rounds, rockets, HF Motorola communications systems, defensive grenades, offensive grenades, fuses and B-10 rounds. See RoC (2000).

⁴⁷ See, for example, RoC 1943 and 1962.

⁴⁸ The HC – funded by the World Bank IDA credit of USD 5 million in July 2001 – did not originally intend to include disarmament – though the most recent Pro-Doc (December 2002) does include a ‘weapons collection programme’ modeled on the UNDP-IOM approach.

⁴⁹ Interview with Colonel Paul Victor Moigny, March 3 2003.

⁵⁰ It should be noted that approximately 85 per cent of all grenades and mines did not include ‘fuses’ at the time of collection. This is because at the time of the looting of armories – the fuses were largely left behind.

⁵¹ Types of small arms included AK, Galil, SKS, MAG, PA and Uzis. Light weapons included SGM, RPG-2, RPG-7, RPG-22 and Schmels. Ammunition included defensive and offensive grenades, castor, flairs, lacrymogenes, manche de bpos, RD 40mm, antipersonnel mines, anti-tank mines, RAC antipersonnel and anti-tank rockets, TNT, B10 75, 82 and 120 mm rockets, 60mm mortars, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. See PNUD (2002).

⁵² Intelligence sources reveal that AK-47s are being sold for between CFA 25-30,000 (USD 35-40) in Brazzaville in early 2003 – a price that has remained fixed since last recorded in 2001 (Small Arms Survey 2003). Prices are higher in Kinchasa – with sources estimating AK-47s at more than USD 50 per item. Trade continues, but is erratic – and generally related to politically-inspired activities. For example, sources within the diplomatic community revealed that approximately 372 grenades were shipped across the Congo river from Brazzaville to Kinchasa by dissidents of ex-FAZ with the intention of destabilizing the city through attacks on Makala prison (and others) on January 16 2003.

⁵³ See, for example, the World Bank (2001) *Proces Vebals des Negotiations* (June 19).

⁵⁴ Antenna offices are located in Dolesie, Nyaki, Sibiti, Gambona and Brazzaville.

⁵⁵ An official audit of both the UNDP and HC will be undertaken by Ernst and Young in March 2003.

- ⁵⁶ The UNDP-IOM has also identified at least an additional 1,500 ex-combatants in Pool, Niari, Lekoumou and Bounza who are committed to returning more than 2,000 additional weapons. Interview with Stephane Rostiaux, February 20, 2003.
- ⁵⁷ Interview with Minister Ngkala on February 18 and 20, 2003.
- ⁵⁸ See, for example, the RoC Decree 98-126 (1998).
- ⁵⁹ See, for example, the RoC government document entitled 'Operation Couloirs Humanitaires' where it is stated that: 'l'operation pourrait deboucher sur le deplacement de 20,000 personnes dont la moitie serait des combattants et le reste des femmes et enfants tous prisonniers du systeme'.
- ⁶⁰ See, for example, DPKO (1999). Also consult GTZ (1996) and ECHA (2000).
- ⁶¹ See, for example, the work of DfID, GTZ and others.
- ⁶² See also the work UNICEF in relation to child soldiers in Rwanda and DRC and the efforts of ILO in relation to the reintegration of vulnerable ex-combatants (e.g. chronically ill, disabled and women) in DRC.
- ⁶³ See, for example, the OECD-DAC Guidelines (1999)
- ⁶⁴ These ideas have been developed in more detail by Maximo Halty, currently a DDR specialist at the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (UNDP) in Geneva.
- ⁶⁵ In accordance with Operational Policy 2.30, the Bank 'will not provide direct support to the disarmament of ex-combatants, neither through lending operations nor through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund' (World Bank, 2003: 1). See also Ragazzi (2001).
- ⁶⁶ It should be noted that in the World Bank (2002) strategy for the MDRP – there is a confusing use of concepts to describe the process of DDR. For example, on page 18 there is a discussion of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programs. But paragraphs 67 to 76 cover much more than is ordinarily implied in DDR – extending to disarmament and demobilization on the one side (67-68) to reinsertion, economic reintegration, social reintegration and institutional issues on the other (69-76).
- ⁶⁷ See, for example, ECHA (2000: 6-9) for a matrix of approaches to DDR.
- ⁶⁸ DDRRR is drawn on in the recently launched IOM project on ex-combatants from Gabon and DRC in the North of RoC. The concept of DDRRR applies exclusively to those combatants who are expected to be repatriated from one country to another – as it is being practiced by MONUC in DRC (World Bank 2002: 10).
- ⁶⁹ See, for example, Berdal (1996), GTZ (2001), Steffen and Stepputat (2001), Kingma (2002)
- ⁷⁰ Moreover, exceedingly flexible definitions limit the possibility, much less the utility, of internal or external evaluations.
- ⁷¹ Synonyms commonly invoked for disarmament include demilitarization (described in French as a situation where there is 'plus d'actions militaires dans les zones'), micro-disarmament, voluntary disarmament, involuntary disarmament, civilian disarmament, coercive disarmament, etc.
- ⁷² The World Bank describes this as *forcible or involuntary disarmament*. This is also described, albeit more benignly, as 'mop-up' operations in Jensen and Stepputat (2001). The World Bank (2002: 56) also observes that 'procedures for disarmament would be adapted to the specific situations of soldiers and members of irregular forces. Soldiers would be disarmed by the national army before entering the demobilization process. Members of irregular forces would be disarmed in special disarmament centers before being transferred to demobilization centers.'
- ⁷³ This is also described as 'swaps' by Jensen and Stepputat (2001).
- ⁷⁴ Demobilisation is also referred to as 'cantonment', 'forced encampment' or – incorrectly – 'disarmament'.
- ⁷⁵ 'Encampment sites' are synonymous with 'cantonment sites', 'discharge sites', 'transition areas' and 'assembly areas'. See, for example, DPKO (1999:6).
- ⁷⁶ The World Bank (2002: 56) contends, albeit arbitrarily, that 'demobilization would be expected to be undertaken over a period of 36 months for all countries' and that, to the extent possible, all 'procedures for regular soldiers and members of irregular forces would be similar'. Among these procedures are, assembly in discharge centers, verification of status and provision of ID cards, collection of relevant data, orientation sessions, health screening, support to vulnerable groups (female troops and child ex-combatants) and transport to new sites.
- ⁷⁷ Both the World Bank (2002) and ECHA (2000: 7) envision disarmament as a component of demobilization – though acknowledge that this is not always the case.
- ⁷⁸ The World Bank (2002: 18) also notes that 'the assembly of ex-combatants during the demobilization phase provides a good opportunity for health counseling and HIV/AIDS education and voluntary testing, as well as the dissemination of information' about reintegration. This approach has been endorsed by the HC.

⁷⁹ The World Bank (2002: 56) notes that reinsertion includes, in certain contexts, a ‘transitional safety net’ to ex-combatants as they ‘return’ to civilian life. Reinsertion assistance would be adequate to cover the costs of relocation and the transitional period between demobilisation and reintegration – and would last between 6-12 months.

⁸⁰ In terms of methodology, both English and French *google* and *yahoo* search engines were used with terms in both languages (www.google.com, www.google.fr, www.yahoo.com and www.yahoo.fr). Four different expressions of DDR were then entered and results compared. The findings are illustrated in the table above.

⁸¹ The World Bank prefers cash assistance to in-kind support, and contends that it maximizes beneficiary choice and reduces administrative costs.

⁸² There are a range of synonyms used to describe ex-combatants in the press, policy documents and evaluations in the RoC. These include, and are not limited to, regular forces, government forces, guerrilla forces, irregular forces, ex-militia, former combatants, former militia, etc.

⁸³ One of the reasons for the persistence of this confusion is political. To be labeled a bandit, a terrorist, a militia member or a guerrilla is central to questions of legitimacy.

See, for example, Jensen and Stepputat (2001) for a detailed discussion of this point.

⁸⁴ At the international level – two expert panels at the UN sought to define small arms and light weapons in 1997 and 1999

⁸⁵ Repeated request by the evaluation team and UNSECCORD to the police for statistics on crime were regularly turned down.

⁸⁶ The information collected by the HC on small arms ownership is of relatively little use. Indeed, only those who fought on the ‘winning’ side (e.g. Cobra) acknowledge possessing weapons. The evaluation team notes that many so-called Ninjas or Cocoyes who indicated that they did not possess weapons, do, in fact, own small arms. This tends to support the recommendation that a neutral, impartial body be in charge of disarmament among the ex-militia during a period of transition until confidence in government structures has developed.

⁸⁷ Crime rates might include homicide, attempted homicide, armed robbery, armed assault and the impacts on public health can be determined by collecting data from hospitals and morgues. See Muggah and Batchelor (2002) for an extended discussion of the impacts of firearm-related violence on security and development.

⁸⁸ The *health study* was commissioned by the evaluation team and was carried out by Andre Mbou, of the research, statistics, planning and budget department, CHU Brazzaville.

⁸⁹ It should be noted that fatal firearm injury rates are noticeably low because most of the fatally wounded were deposited directly at the municipal morgue. Interview with Andre Mbou, March 1, 2003.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Muggah and Griffiths (2002) or the *Small Arms Survey* (2003, 2002 or 2001).

⁹¹ A case study carried out at CHU hospital between 1998 -2001 observed that 39 of 136 firearm injuries resulted in amputations. It also noted that 50 per cent of cranial fractures (10 cases), 90 per cent of inferior and superior fractures (73 cases) and 80 per cent of pelvic fractures (14 cases) resulted from firearm injuries. Moreover, 80 per cent of all victims were male.

⁹² This figure would rise to approximately USD 2.6 million of USD 667,000 per year if one included firearm-injuries reported in the military hospital over the same period.

⁹³ The *education survey* was designed, pre-tested and developed by the evaluation team (see **Annex 3**). It was administered by Matthias Ndinga, Audrey Minzola and Lydie Kouka between Feb 26 -29 2003.

⁹⁴ The survey was carried out with the participation of 14 secondary schools, 2 technical colleges, 1 lycee and 1 university.

⁹⁵ Enrolment varied from 800 to 3,100 students – though the average was approximately 2,100. Approximately 9 surveys were carried out in schools and universities in the southern neighbourhoods (Baongo and Makelekele) and another 9 in the northern neighbourhoods (Ouenze, Talangei, Mpila).

⁹⁶ It should be noted that only 11 of the 18 schools answered this question. Of these, 54 per cent said that there were known ex-combatants in their school and 45 per cent said that there were not ex-combatants in their school. The rest claimed that this was either too difficult to know or refused to answer the question during the interview.

⁹⁷ The *household survey* was designed, pre-tested and developed by the evaluation team (see **Annex**). It was administered by Matthias Ndinga, Audrey Minzola and Lydie Kouka between Feb 26 -29 2003.

⁹⁸ The CDS ran from January -December 2000 and from its budget of USD 2.15 million, Some 6,550 weapons were allegedly collected and 25,000 ex-combatants identified for demobilization and reinsertion assistance.

⁹⁹ The total project budget was USD 4.2 million (e.g. support from the governments of Sweden, Norway and the RoC, together with funding from the UNDP and EU). At the close of the project, some 11,140

weapons were collected, and 7,249 ex-combatants ‘reinserted’ with the support of micro-credits, micro-projects and training.

¹⁰⁰ The use of the concepts of ‘programme’ and ‘project’ are confused in the latest HC strategy for DDR. See for example, HC (April 2002: 6 – Part 1, Chapter 1).

¹⁰¹ The IDA credit was for USD 5 million and the HC claims to have reinserted 3,732 ex-combatants between September and December 2002

¹⁰² The need for strong support from CONADER was identified HC (2002) and HC (2003) respectively. It should be emphasized that CONADER was not created until January 2003.

¹⁰³ though believed to be increased by more than 6,000 more recruits in 2003/04

¹⁰⁴ There are at least 800-1,000 ex-FAZ, 250-500 ex-FAC, at least 100 ex-MLC dissidents – and between 400-800 ex-FAR in RoC who would need to be repatriated to DRC and Rwanda. Moreover, there are a significant number of RoC ex-combatants in Gabon and DRC who would require repatriation to RoC.