CANADA-JAPAN JOINT PEACEBUILDING LEARNING PROJECT
Field Mission to CAMBODIA

Japan International Cooperation Agency
Planning and Evaluation Division

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### Chapter 1 Introduction.

1.1 Background.
- Team Members.

1.2 Objectives of the Cambodia Mission.

1.3 List of Projects Visited by the Mission.

### Chapter 2 The Modern History of Cambodia.

2.1 Cambodia’s Independence and Sihanouk’s Dominance Over Politics (1953-1970).

2.2 Emergence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and Lon Nol’s Coup (1970-1975).

2.3 Pol Pot’s Regime and Massacre in Cambodia (1975-1979).


2.5 After the Comprehensive Settlement Plan.
- 2.5.1 Comprehensive Settlement and UNTAC.
- 2.5.2 Reconstruction and Development after the 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Plan.

### Chapter 3 Cambodia’s Priority Reconstruction Requirements.

3.1 The Country Development Plan and Priority Areas by the Government of Cambodia.

3.2 Japan’s ODA Policy Towards Cambodia and Priority Areas.

3.3 Summary.

3.4 Peacebuilding Relevance Assessment.

3.5 Conclusion.

### Chapter 4 Project Assessments.

4.1 Tripartite Cooperation (Program for Rural Development).

4.2 Project on the Formulation of Key Government Policies on the Legal and Judicial System.

4.3 Project on Improvement of Public Security.

4.4 Project on Functional Strengthening of the Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC).

4.5 Project on Rehabilitation of Electricity Supply Facilities.

4.6 Project on Restoration of Chroy Changvar Bridge.

4.7 Project on National Tuberculosis Control.

4.8 Project on Social Services to Support the Handicapped.

4.9 Interband Project - To Be Added.

4.10 ADHOV Project - To Be Added.

4.11 IMPACS - Cambodia Journalists’ Training Project.

### Chapter 5 Peacebuilding Assessment.

5.1 Reconstruction Assistance at the Project Level.

### Chapter 6 Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Future Joint Missions.

### Appendix 1.

Effectiveness of the JPCIA (Japan Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment) Framework.

The Relationship of JPCIA to PCIA.

Recommendations for Improving JPCIA.

Preparing an Appropriate PCIA Methodology for the Next Phase of the Joint Learning Project.
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background

At the “Canada-Japan Symposium on Peacebuilding for Development”, held in Tokyo in 1999, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) agreed to work together to strengthen their capacities in peacebuilding. Subsequently, at a workshop in Winnipeg in September 2000, it was agreed by both parties to advance their knowledge of peacebuilding through direct field observation. Guatemala and Cambodia were selected as case studies for the “Canada-Japan Joint Peacebuilding Learning Project”. The Joint Learning Project was designed as a multi-stage process by which both agencies would not only enhance their individual understanding of peacebuilding as a development tool, but would also be able to explore options for future joint peacebuilding project development. The collaborative effort by both parties to strengthen their mutual capacities to contribute to peacebuilding activities represents a unique and dynamic approach to inter-Agency relations. This report details the lessons learned from the mission to Cambodia and places these in the overall context of the joint effort by CIDA and JICA to expand their knowledge of peacebuilding in practice.

The first mission of the “Canada-Japan Joint Peacebuilding Learning Project”, led by CIDA, visited Guatemala in February 2001. The mission included officials from both development agencies as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from Canada and Japan and reviewed peacebuilding development projects implemented by CIDA, JICA and NGOs throughout the country.1 In November 2001, JICA led the second learning mission, also consisting of officials from both agencies and NGOs from Canada and Japan, to examine peacebuilding projects in Cambodia.

One of the aims of the Guatemala mission was to systematically examine the relationship of development intervention to the dynamics of peace and conflict through the application of a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology. The PCIA tool was designed with the assistance of the International Development Research Centre prior to the mission. This model proved to be difficult to apply in Guatemala because the projects under review were already operational and lacked baseline data.

In preparation for the Cambodia mission, JICA prepared background briefing materials as well as a new Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment model, the Japan Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (JPCIA) framework. CIDA also prepared a Field Guide for Impact Assessment of Programs and Projects on Peace and Conflict designed to simplify the collection of data on peace and conflict issues at the local, national or regional level. The mission to Cambodia built on the experiences of the Guatemala exercise and presented the opportunity to test the revised PCIA/JPCIA methodologies. However, trying to apply such tools to existing projects in a field setting still proved to be problematical and the challenge to find an appropriate analytical methodology remains to

1 The report of the Guatemala Mission is available on the web site of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee: http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/guata_report.htm
be overcome. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the evolution of the PCIA/JPCIA methodologies and details the experiences gained from field-testing JPCIA in Cambodia. Both agencies are committed to working towards the goal of developing a practical field tool for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. This effort will continue as CIDA and JICA prepare for the next phase of their joint peacebuilding learning exercise, a lessons learned workshop scheduled to take place in 2003.

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1.2. Objectives of the Cambodia Mission

The objectives of the Canada-Japan Joint Peacebuilding Learning Project in Cambodia were to:

- Accumulate lessons learned by bilateral agencies, as well as NGOs, by reviewing peacebuilding initiatives.
- Examine the development of the JICA Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (JPCIA) and field-test it.
- Prepare for the forthcoming Canada-Japan joint workshop (to share experiences and lessons learned from peacebuilding projects in Cambodia and Guatemala) aimed at improving the methodology and the implementation of peacebuilding projects.
- Study possible areas for CIDA and JICA to develop a joint peacebuilding project.

1.3 List of Projects Visited by the Mission

The projects assessed by the Mission in Cambodia were:

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Cooperation Program</th>
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<td>Reconciliation</td>
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<td>Kompong Spue</td>
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<td>Security Control</td>
<td>Program for Public Security Improvement</td>
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<td>Program for strengthening of CMAC functions</td>
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<td>Program for Supporting People with Disabilities (including mine victims)</td>
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<td>Security Control</td>
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<td>Governance</td>
<td>IMPACS (Canadian NGO supported by CIDA)</td>
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Most project sites visited were limited to Phnom Penh and the surrounding area because of safety considerations. Nevertheless, Japanese stakeholders engaged in development assistance in Cambodia operate throughout the country, including in regions regarded as unstable in terms of security.
Chapter 2. The Modern History of Cambodia

2.1 Cambodia’s Independence and Sihanouk’s Dominance Over Politics (1953-1970)

France became the dominant power in Cambodia from the 1860s as it expanded its colonial presence throughout Indochina. The French retained their suzerainty until 1941-1945 when Japan occupied Cambodia during the Second World War. After the war, the rising costs of ruling the country and the growth of Cambodian nationalism, as well as the increasing struggle against colonialism throughout the region, prompted the French to grant Cambodia its independence in 1953. In preparation for nationwide elections, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, intending to weaken the preponderant Democratic Party, went into self-imposed exile and formed the political machine, “Sangkum”\(^2\). Sangkum won 83% of the vote and monopolized all the seats in the national assembly. As the result of the election, Sihanouk gained total control over Cambodian politics for the next 15 years, and the multi-party system in Cambodia came to an end. During this period, there were many reported cases of election fraud and harassment against the non-Sihanouk factions.

Neutrality was the central element of Cambodian foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. The main pillar of Sihanouk’s diplomacy had been to maintain neutrality without supporting either side in the Vietnam conflict. By the mid-1960s, however, parts of Cambodia’s eastern provinces were serving as bases for North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces operating against South Vietnam. The port of Sihanoukville was being used to supply them. In 1963, Sihanouk cut Cambodia’s diplomatic ties with the U.S. and secretly signed an agreement with North Vietnam in 1964. The closer relationship with North Vietnam, and Cambodia’s abandonment of neutrality, alienated Cambodia’s elites and students and they became increasingly concerned about the future, particularly at the prospects of Cambodia’s possible involvement in the Vietnam War.

2.2 Emergence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and Lon Nol’s Coup (1970-1975)

Throughout the 1960s, domestic politics became polarized. The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), also known as the Khmer Rouge, started to expand its popular support, particularly among the peasants in the countryside. Opposition to the government grew within the middle class and among leftists, including Paris-educated leaders such as Son Sen, Ieng Sary, and Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot). Pol Pot led an insurgency under the name of the clandestine CPK. Despite the rising left-wing movement, the 1966 national assembly elections showed a significant swing to the right and General Lon Nol formed a new government which lasted until 1967. During 1968 and 1969, the insurgency worsened. Fearing further infusion of communist influence into Cambodia from North Vietnam, Sihanouk reestablished Cambodia’s diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1969. This did not proceed smoothly and caused enormous disappointment among Cambodian nationalists in light of the repeated changes of

\(^2\) David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (Japanese Language Version) (Mekong: Tokyo, October 1994), 84
Cambodia’s foreign policy. In August 1969, Gen. Lon Nol formed a new government. Prince Sihanouk went abroad for medical treatment in January 1970 and, during his absence, the national assembly voted for his removal. The Cambodian monarchy was abolished in October 1970 and the country was renamed the Khmer Republic.

Hanoi rejected the new republic’s request for the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodian territory and began to reinfiltrate some of the 2,000-4,000 Cambodians who had gone to North Vietnam in 1954. They became a cadre in the rising insurgency. The Lon Nol regime, which had close ties with the U.S., sent the army to fight the North Vietnamese forces operating in Cambodia. In response, many Cambodians holding strong anti-U.S. sentiments started supporting the Khmer Rouge. North Vietnam, fearing the establishment of a pro-U.S. government in Cambodia, provided military training and arms to the CPK, strengthening their military power.

The signing of the peace agreement between the U.S. and North and South Vietnam in January 1973 had important implications for Cambodia. Under the agreement, North Vietnam agreed to withdraw from Cambodia. However, the Khmer Rouge, which controlled some 60% of Cambodian territory by then, refused the cease-fire proposal. The U.S. initially maintained support for the Lon Nol regime by airlifting rice to the beleaguered population and providing military supplies to government forces. Despite a massive American air campaign against the Khmer Rouge, when Congress refused to sanction any more aid to Cambodia, the outcome was inevitable. Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 17, 1975.

2.3 Pol Pot’s Regime and Massacre in Cambodia (1975-1979)

Immediately after capturing Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge ordered the evacuation of all cities and towns. In what the Khmer Rouge called “Year Zero”, the entire urban population was sent out into the countryside to cultivate land. As people were forced to walk, thousands starved or died of disease along the way. Many were resettled in new villages which lacked food, agricultural implements and medical care. Countless numbers starved before the first harvest and hunger and malnutrition were a constant threat. Hundreds of thousands of middle-class educated people, as well as military and civilian leaders who could not conceal their pasts, were tortured and executed in special centers. Anybody who resisted, or who questioned orders, was executed without hesitation. There is no accurate count of the numbers killed in the Cambodian genocide but estimates run up to 2 million people out of a population of about 7 million.

In 1976, the Khmer Rouge renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea and Pol Pot became the Prime Minister. Prince Sihanouk was placed under virtual house arrest. Pol Pot implemented a number of radical reform measures aimed at transforming Cambodian traditional society into a utopian communist regime. Agriculture was collectivized, the currency, the market system and the concept of private property were abolished.

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3 Ibid., 143
Democratic Kampuchea’s relations with Vietnam and Thailand worsened rapidly as a result of border clashes and ideological differences. While communist, the CPK was fiercely anti-Vietnamese, and most of its members who had lived in Vietnam were purged. The Khmer Rouge sought economic and military assistance from China as a countermeasure against Vietnam’s aggression.

2.4 Vietnam’s Intervention (1979-1991)

Frustrated by the Khmer Rouge’s military provocation, Vietnam started a large-scale attack against Cambodia in 1978, and took over Phnom Penh in 1979. Backed by the U.S.S.R., Vietnam successfully took control of most of Cambodia, forcing the Khmer Rouge to flee to the Thai border areas. Then, out of concern that Vietnam would occupy a hegemonic position in Indochina, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand provided military assistance to the Khmer Rouge.

In an effort to reduce the influence of the Khmer Rouge and to form a non-communist political military power, Western countries, including the U.S., encouraged the establishment of an anti-Vietnam coalition government. The coalition government, comprising the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk’s National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), came into power in 1982. However, the Khmer Rouge maintained a dominant position among the three groups.

Even after 1983, the military balance between Vietnam and the coalition forces had remained unchanged. Meanwhile, significant developments taking place in the international arena were to have a major impact on Cambodia. Gorbachev’s Perestroika in the Soviet Union led to the reduction of the military assistance to Vietnam. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping became more concerned with concentrating the PRC’s resources on its economic reform programs and less interested in maintaining the level of assistance China had been giving to the anti-Vietnam coalition government. This change in the power relationships between the major external actors - the U.S., China and the Soviet Union - led Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia in 1988, opening a path for peace.

2.5 After the Comprehensive Settlement Plan

2.5.1 Comprehensive Settlement and UNTAC

After two years of negotiations, a comprehensive peace settlement was signed at the Paris Conference of October 1991. The settlement plan, which allowed for commencement of post-conflict reconstruction in Cambodia, gave the UN full authority to (1) supervise a ceasefire, (2) repatriate the displaced Khmer along the Thai border, (3) disarm and demobilize the factional armies, and (4) prepare for free and fair elections. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, arrived in Cambodia to begin implementation of
the UN Settlement Plan in March 1992. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) also started full-scale repatriation and resettlement of the refugees.

Although the Khmer Rouge attempted to block the election of May 1993, over four
million Cambodians (about 90% of eligible voters) participated thanks to UNTAC’s
efforts. In the election, Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC Party won the largest number of
votes, followed by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party and the Buddhist Liberal
Democratic Party. FUNCINPEC then entered into a coalition with the other parties that
had participated in the election. The parties represented in the National Assembly drafted
and approved a new Constitution, which was promulgated on September 24. Prince
Ranariddh and Hun Sen became the First and Second Prime Ministers and the Royal
Cambodian Government (RCG) was established.

2.5.2 Reconstruction and Development after the 1991 Comprehensive Settlement
Plan

Following the election, the international community, including Japan, started to actively
support peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. In 1997, however, political conflict
between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People’s Party led to armed conflict. This
raised concern in the international community about Cambodia’s future. In the midst of
the uncertainty, the government of Cambodia successfully carried out general elections -
the first election after the withdrawal of UNTAC - with financial and technical support
from the international community. The economic crisis that affected East Asia during
1997-98 had a major impact in reducing Cambodia’s economic growth and its ability to
rebuild after decades of conflict.

Chapter 3. Cambodia’s Priority Reconstruction Requirements

Based on the situational analysis described above, JICA has developed a priority list of
post-conflict reconstruction needs for Cambodia taking into consideration the following
elements:

1) The country’s development plan,
2) Other donors’ strategies/activities,
3) The organization’s own policy/strategies.

The process of prioritization is based on the assumption that the appropriateness of the
assistance plan in Cambodia will be assessed by JICA.

3.1 The Country Development Plan and Priority Areas by the Government of
Cambodia

The Country Development Plan, and priority areas identified by the Government of
Cambodia, ranges from political, economical to social dimensions. Although it is not
easy to summarize the shifting pattern of the priority areas, the chronological transition of
Cambodia’s reconstruction and development needs are explored according to the
following three time phases: Phase I, from the 1991 Paris comprehensive settlement agreement to the withdrawal of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993; Phase II, from 1993 until the 1998 elections, which were held by the Cambodians themselves without any involvement of outsiders such as the UN; and, Phase III, from the 1998 elections until the present.


The 1991 Paris Agreement identified mainly political and governance areas as priorities. These included issues such as the military, politics, international guarantees, security, elections, repatriation of refugees, and constitutional principles. Among these, the repatriation of refugees, implementation of general elections, disarmament and demobilization were set as high priority issues. With regard to repatriation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assisted the return of more than 360,000 refugees before the general elections were held. UNTAC was not able to disarm and demobilize all the forces of the Cambodian factions concerned but successfully carried out the general election in 1993. The adoption of the constitution and the establishment of the coalition government created a framework for a political system for the country thereby, to a certain degree, fulfilling the political needs called for in the Paris Agreement.


Once the framework of the nation-state system was established, a variety of economic and social needs began to emerge. The National Program to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (NPRD), the first comprehensive national development plan formulated after the new government was established, listed all the reconstruction and development needs and covered almost all of the issues with six development target goals identified as follows: 1) development of the legal system of Cambodia as a constitutional state, 2) doubling Cambodia's GDP by 2004 through economic stability and structural adjustment, 3) development of human resources and enhancement of education and health care services for the improvement of Cambodia’s living standards, 4) reconstruction and development of infrastructure and public facilities, 5) integration of Cambodia's national economy into the wider regional and international economies, and 6) rural development and sustainable natural resource management.

At the Second International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), held in 1994, the Cambodian government and the major donors prioritized the development and reconstruction needs as follows: 1) agriculture, 2) infrastructure development, 3) basic human needs, and 4) capacity building for effective ODA management. This served as a guideline for both Cambodia and the donors until the 1999 Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia (CG) took place.

The First Social and Economic Development Program (SEDP) gave priority to social development, particularly in remote areas. More specifically, health, water supply, public
sanitation, primary education, and assistance to socially vulnerable persons were emphasized in order to reduce poverty. The SEDP also proposed that the proportion of public investment should be 65 percent in the rural areas as opposed to 35 percent in the urban regions. Critics argued that this proposal was mainly led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), not by Cambodians.

Phase III: From the General Election to date (1999-2001)

The 1998 election, which was held immediately after the 1997 armed conflict among political parties, was organized by the Cambodians themselves and not by the UN. It was the cornerstone for the reconstruction of Cambodia. Following the successful election, the third CG was held in Tokyo and identified the following priority areas: (1) good governance, (2) economic recovery, (3) infrastructure, (4) education and human resource development, (5) agriculture and food production, (6) primary health care services, (7) forest management. There were basically no changes with these seven priority areas in the next year’s CG, except that public reform, anti-corruption measures and governance were identified as high priority needs.

3.2 Japan’s ODA Policy Towards Cambodia and Priority Areas

ODA policy and priority areas set by the government of Japan for Cambodia are also divided into the three phases outlined above: Phase I, from the 1991 Paris comprehensive settlement agreement to the withdrawal of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993; Phase II, from 1993 until the 1998 elections; and, Phase III, from the 1998 elections until present.

Phase I: From the Peace Agreement to the withdrawal of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1991-1993

Between 1967 and 1973, the government of Japan provided 1,570 million Yen as ODA Loan, 2,638 million as Grant Aid, and 1,663 million Yen as Technical Cooperation. Due to the political instability in Cambodia, bilateral assistance ceased in 1974 but this was resumed in 1989 through provision of humanitarian assistance for refugees. After the resumption of bilateral assistance, the Japanese government categorized the projects into two types, namely projects to meet urgent needs and projects to meet mid or long-term objectives. The assistance focused on projects in the urgent category as well as follow-up support for projects implemented in the past, mainly through Grant Aid and Technical Cooperation. Japanese assistance continued up to Cambodia’s general election in 1993. Due to the acute shortage of human resources in public administration, much of the assistance was focused on capacity and institution building. Specifically, the priority areas of assistance included: (1) economic structure reform and capacity building, (2) improvement in agricultural productivity, (3) infrastructure building for sustainable economic growth, (4) infrastructure building for public services.

In this period, the Japanese government focused on Cambodian self-help efforts toward democratization and reconstruction. In addition, Japan organized the Ministerial-level Forum on Comprehensive Development in Indochina in February 1995, deeming that political stability in Indochina is pivotal to keeping peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

Similar to the development priorities before 1993, Japan provided humanitarian assistance to meet urgent needs while supporting strengthening the aid absorption capacity of Cambodia. Also, on a mid-term basis, grant aid and technical cooperation assistance was provided to the areas that the government of Cambodia had given priority to, including agriculture, the health and energy sectors as well as development of human resources and economic infrastructure. In implementation, special attention was given to security maintenance and systematic support across different sectors and schemes.

Phase III: From the General Election to date (1999-2001)

In this period, the government of Japan started taking into consideration the need for:

1. Implementation of DAC’s Strategic Orientations for Development Partnerships,
2. Cooperation in both hard and soft aspects,
3. Cooperation between government and non-government sectors,
4. Comprehensive development strategy in Indochina,
5. Ensuring security.

JICA’s Country Assistance Plan for Cambodia, effective from 2000 to 2003, emphasizes the importance of capacity building, particularly the human resource development for organizational and institutional development, and the rehabilitation and development of infrastructure destroyed during the conflict. The following 8 areas have been identified as priority needs:

1. Good Governance
2. Environment for Economic Development
3. Economic and Social Infrastructure
4. Health Care
5. Education
6. Agricultural and Rural Development
7. Demining
8. Conservation of the Environment

In addition, Japanese ODA loans, which had been stopped since 1968 due to political instability and LLDC rating, resumed from 1999.
3.3 Summary

During the first phase (before 1993), projects with urgent needs, follow-up projects, economic structural reform, improvement of agricultural production, and economic and social infrastructure were the ODA priority areas identified by the government of Japan. During the second phase, between 1994 and 1998, priority areas included agriculture, primary health, energy, economic infrastructure, human resource development, and security. In the third phase, from 1999 until the present date, the government of Japan has given priority to governance, economic infrastructure, primary health care, education, agriculture and agricultural development.

Capacity building is one of the primary objectives of every project. Most intellectuals and technocrats were massacred under the Khmer Rouge regime and the middle classes, who would normally be expected to initiate reconstruction, generally did not survive. Those who managed to stay alive through the Khmer Rouge era got used to acting inconspicuously and they remain passive in post-conflict Cambodia. Furthermore, as people were often killed because they were betrayed by neighbors, Cambodians tend to distrust others. Although this promotes self-reliance, people generally lack the ability to work as a group, not only at government level but also at the village level. These kinds of issues impede project implementation and their resolution is indispensable for sustainable peacebuilding. In this sense, capacity building, aimed at restoring human resources lost because of the war, is the ultimate objective of every project.

3.4 Peacebuilding Relevance Assessment

As peacebuilding is a relatively new concept, the ongoing projects supported by Japan were not formulated within a peace and conflict framework. Assessing their impact in terms of their relevance to peacebuilding is therefore not particularly useful. For this reason, the assessment focused on how differently the projects might have been designed and implemented had consideration been given to their impacts on peace and conflict. The assessment was also aimed at making suggestions on how post-conflict assistance might be carried out within a conflict prevention lens and from a peacebuilding perspective in the future.

3.5 Conclusion

In general, we can conclude that JICA’s assistance has been in accordance with the post-conflict reconstruction needs discussed above. Among the 32 post-conflict assistance needs identified, 18 were met through direct assistance, and 10 through indirect support. “Direct assistance” refers to those programs with objectives that tally with the post-conflict reconstruction needs. “Indirect assistance” refers to those programs with objectives that do not tally with the post-conflict reconstruction needs but are expected, through implementation, to contribute to meeting the post-conflict reconstruction objectives. Analysis by priority area has shown that some of the needs identified in the areas of governance, reconciliation, security maintenance and assistance for socially
vulnerable persons have not been met. Meanwhile, JICA’s assistance has been meeting all the needs identified in the areas of economic recovery and social infrastructure development.

Analysis of each specific post-conflict reconstruction category has illustrated that those needs which JICA projects have not met are: (1) impunity for war crimes and human rights violations, (2) small arms prevalence in society, (3) Khmer Rouge tribunal, (4) underdeveloped awareness of human rights, (5) incomplete land property registration system, and (6) ex-Pol Pot factions’ isolation from economic development. Among these, (1) and (3) are considered as the needs which are least amenable to ODA intervention due to the nature of the problem. These would be better tackled through political measures. With regard to (4) and (5), these are already supported by other donors. As for (6), JICA has not been able to meet this need due to the security situation in the northwestern areas where the ex-Pol Pot factions reside.

Chapter 4. Project Assessments

4.1 Tripartite Cooperation (Program for Rural Development)

The reconstruction need represented by the Tripartite Cooperation Project is the repatriation of refugees. However, repatriations occur voluntarily and refugees choose their own final destination within Cambodia. Accordingly, the project’s focus is on rural development as a means to strengthen the capacity of villages to absorb a wide range of refugees. This impact assessment therefore focuses on the outcomes of the rural development effort rather than that of the repatriation of refugees.

Tripartite Cooperation has been implemented in 227 villages in Kompong Spue and Takeo provinces. Currently the project activities are focused on 6 villages, namely Kol Korm, Trapeang Kess, Prey Changvar, Srey Krong Reach, Trapeang Kralong, Kan Damra, in order to consolidate the functions of the Mini-RDP that will take over these activities after the completion of the project. The transition of repatriations in the 6 villages is summarized in Tables 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As a whole, it is estimated that almost 1,300 refugees were returned to the project areas, accounting for 1.2% of the total population in 227 villages. Whereas most refugees presumably returned to western Cambodia, a small portion of returnees is included in the beneficiary of the project. In this regard, the Tripartite Cooperation is ineffective in repatriation of refugees.

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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Returnee Households</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.1.2 Percentage of Returnees

| Total Number of Households | 692 |
| Total Population            | 3739|
| Total Returnee Household    | 17  |
| Total Returnee Population   | 90  |
| Ratio of Returnee Household | 2.46%|
| Ratio of Returnee Population| 2.41%|

On the other hand, the impact of rural development is divided into two aspects: hard and soft components. Originally the Tripartite Cooperation has been provided through 4 different phases. In Phase I, rural infrastructures were built while Phase II and III converged on technical transfer provided by Japanese and ASEAN experts introducing the Integrated Program⁴ (IP). Finally the last phase aims to hand over the project activities to local staff. As outputs of the hard component, 161 meeting huts, 84 schools and 31 health centers were constructed. The meeting huts are primarily used for regular meetings, awareness creation activities and vocational training. The meeting huts have now become the pivot of community management where villagers can always get together to have a wide range of discussions. They are particularly significant for rural villagers who have not been accustomed to collective activities as a community.

As for the outputs of the soft component, the formation of farmers’ groups and technical transfer in agriculture, education, public health and income generation had a certain impact. In terms of the formation of farmers’ groups, the Partner Revolving Materials (PRM) system involves the group lending fertilizer to farmers and collecting debts with an interest of 10%. The assets accumulated by the PRM are utilized for procuring public properties in the community. Because of the PRM system, farmers are able to minimize labor costs and expenses by directly purchasing fertilizer from the group and the community also enhances an opportunity for public investment. Although quantitative data are not yet aggregated, agricultural productivity has substantially improved and a farmers’ group has reportedly purchased a small irrigation pump. Since Cambodians are very dubious about relations with other people, as an after effect of the Khmer Rouge regime, farmers have seldom understood the effectiveness of the PRM system. However, people have gradually come to realize the efficiency of community management and more people have recently participated in PRMs. In terms of the outputs of technical cooperation, 60% of trainees in a dress-making course in Srey Krong Reach village, which the study team visited, have found a new employment opportunity. Specifically, villagers who work for a state-owned garment factory in Phnom Penh earn at least US$45 as a minimum monthly salary. As a whole, 21% of participants in building construction training, 50% in mechanical repairs training, and 46% in dress-making training reportedly find employment, thereby enhancing income potential other than in agriculture. In this respect, it is concluded that the project has positive impacts on rural development.

**Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection**

In collaboration with the National Coordinator at the Ministry for Rural Development (MRD), Kompong Spue and Takeo provinces were selected as target areas. These provinces are regarded as poor areas where most landmines have been removed and which are accessible from the capital. In addition, during the UNTAC regime, Japanese Self-Defense Forces had been dispatched to the provinces. As a rural development project implemented in the aftermath of the peace accord, the target areas were

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⁴ IP includes formation of farmers’ groups, construction of meeting huts, and introduction of Partner Revolving Materials (PRM).
appropriately selected. However, if the Tripartite Cooperation aimed to promote the repatriation of refugees, its target area would have been set in western Cambodia.

**Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity**
In selecting beneficiaries, the following points were taken into account: i) accessibility from Trum Khna Center, ii) the total motivation of a village, and iii) the result of baseline survey such as agricultural productivity or the number of wells. Moreover, ASEAN experts selected villages where maximum use of their knowledge could be made. As for the construction of schools, a site was selected in collaboration with villagers, taking the number of children and the degree of dilapidation into consideration. In addition, the beneficiaries included 1,849 men and 1,890 women in order to maintain gender equality. Thus, the beneficiaries were properly selected, in light of budgetary limitations, by conducting baseline surveys and considering villagers’ opinions.

In Phase IV, rural development in 150 villages has already been handed over to the MRD or local governments whereas 77 villages are still being supervised by the project. 6 villages out of 177, that generated remarkable outcomes in the last three phases and have high development potential, have been selected as pilot project sites. Phase IV needs to concentrate in particular on the handover of project activities at the management level.

**Securing Transparency in Implementation**
The project organized an explanatory meeting with related parties since some NGOs and international organizations had already implemented projects in the region. Throughout the implementation process, a monthly report is first submitted to the local government and is later sent to the upper-level of administration. At the village level, project officers take into account local opinions and also organize a community event in which anybody can participate, such as a marathon race or karaoke tournament. By organizing such events, mutual understanding with villagers excluded from the project is facilitated. A rural development project needs to maintain decent relationships with peripheral villages and this is also properly taken into consideration.

**Impartiality of Stakeholders**
At the beginning of project implementation, some counterparts were politically appointed but, as the project proceeded, the number of political appointments decreased and even local villagers were selected as counterparts. It is said that the Minister of Rural Development is less influential in the cabinet as he belongs to FUNCINPEC, but project implementation has not suffered from political intervention. At the general election, some villagers put election posters on the meeting hut, but election campaigning was prohibited inside the meeting hut. Even though counterparts or village leaders belong to political parties, the project has not been influenced by political distribution.

**Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace**
The trainees in a dress-making course are mainly composed of women and form a women’s group after completion of their training. In this respect, the project has a certain impact on mainstreaming women’s participation in a community. Moreover, monks often engage in conflict resolution within a village. However, the mediation process, by
persuading villagers to comply with the monk’s point of view, is a rather top-down approach that does not necessarily resolve an underlying conflict among villagers. Therefore, although his mediation ability can be appreciated, whether a monk is an actor promoting peace or not is unclear.

4.2 Project on the Formulation of Key Government Policies on the Legal and Judicial System

The identified reconstruction need of this project is the establishment of a legal system. The project supports the drafting of legislation with respect to the Civil Code and the Civil Procedure Code. The Development Partnership Program provides training for lawyers in Cambodia. During the Khmer Rouge regime, the legal and judicial system, based on the French colonial era, was abolished. A law, along with 75 chapters, was provisionally enforced by UNTAC but, currently, the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code do not exist. In light of such circumstances, drafting the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code directly promotes the establishment of a legal system and the progress of project activities itself has a positive impact on the reconstruction effort. In fact, the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code are regarded as fundamental to a legal system that guarantees people’s rights and properties, which, in turn, is an indispensable factor supportive of economic development. Drafting of the Civil Code has been completed, and the draft is now under deliberation at the Council of Ministers. In terms of drafting the Civil Procedure Code, there is a need to conduct research on customary law and to draw up more than 1,000 provisions. It is expected that the Japanese draft will be finalized by the completion of the project. One of the difficulties is making appropriate translations of legal terms into Khmer.

In addition, in order to strengthen legal enforcement in the future, it is necessary to develop human resources in the legal profession. In this regard, 9 workshops on the Civil Code and 4 workshops on the Civil Procedure Code were conducted in which judicial officers and prosecutors at the Ministry of Justice participated. Furthermore, 11 participants in the Civil Code training, 6 participants in the Civil Procedure Code training, and 2 undersecretaries were accepted to study in Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Justice also invited 6 participants for training and the University of Nagoya accepted 2 long-term trainees. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations has also conducted 2 seminars to train Cambodian lawyers and will conduct two more seminars in this fiscal year. It is expected that 80% of registered lawyers will have benefited from the seminars. According to a questionnaire survey conducted after a seminar, all of the participants answered that the seminars were very important and useful in helping them understand the new legal system drafted by Japanese experts. In this respect, the project has a positive impact on human resource development in the legal field. In particular, when Cambodian counterparts were invited to Japan for training, a relationship of mutual trust was established between the Japanese and Cambodian sides which clearly facilitated drafting activities.
Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection
In Cambodia, the field of legal assistance is divided as follows: the development of the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code is being supported by Japan; the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code by France; Commercial Law by the World Bank, and Land Law by the Asian Development Bank. As the Civil Code and Commercial Law are mutually connected, in this sense, donor coordination is properly conducted. Overall, each field of legal assistance is selected in order to minimize duplication between donors.

Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity
The project involves motivated stakeholders in the legal profession and provides assistance to almost all the persons concerned. As a case in point, the Development Partnership Program involves about 80% of 235 lawyers registered in Cambodia. Most registered lawyers reside in Phnom Penh, and 20% of participants in the seminar that the study team observed were women. In addition, in order to reflect the actual socio-economic situation, field research on customary law has been conducted. In this sense, the draft prepared by Japanese experts is appropriate to local needs.

Securing Transparency in Implementation
The project provides a textbook in Khmer which stakeholders who could not participate in a particular seminar can refer to. By going through various deliberations that include collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, approval by the Council of Ministers, approval by the National Assembly and a public hearing on the adequacy of legislation, the legislation processes are also transparent.

Impartiality of Stakeholders
The Minister of Justice belongs to FUNCINPEC and undersecretaries are appointed from both government parties. Even though the project has not experienced political intervention, some expect a conflict between different party affiliations to occur in the approval process. This is because the submission and approval of the draft of the Civil Code are considered as a credit to the Minister of Justice. Given the Minister’s political affiliation, the Cambodian People’s Party will not be able to give him credit for passing the legislation. Consequently the submission of the draft law to the National Assembly might be delayed because of the rivalry between political factions. As the scope of the project is limited to drafting activities, political intervention after the completion of the project would have a negative effect on the achievement of the project’s overall goal.

Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
The involvement of actors promoting peace is not a particular issue in the implementation of the project.

4.3 Project on Improvement of Public Security
The reconstruction need of this project is the improvement of domestic security. The project specifically strengthens the capacity for criminal investigation, including police education, the theory of criminal identification, drug control and a police neighborhood box system. The recent outcomes of crime investigation are presented in Figure 4.3.1.
The police have maintained constant performance without remarkable improvements. In terms of drug control, 52 crimes were identified in 2000 and 124 criminals were arrested. Compared with outcomes in 1999, the number of arrests increased by 44.44%. This is partly because of the increase in drug trafficking as well as an increase in drug users within Cambodia. However, it is unclear if drug crime itself has increased or if criminal investigation has improved.

Figure 4.3.1 Number of Penal Code Offences

According to reports and interviews with experts, long-term commitment is required in order to make a distinctive impact on the improvement of criminal investigation as well as public security. First of all, the police face serious budgetary limitations so that equipment needed for criminal investigations is never renovated but just becomes superannuated. There is a dependence on equipment brought by Japanese experts. Secondly, a Japanese expert made exactly the same observation, in terms of organizational capacity, as an expert who had been dispatched a year ago - there are inexperienced criminal investigation skills at the field level and a lack of human resources as a whole. This indicates that the intermittent dispatch of short-term experts has had almost no impact on comprehensive human resource development even though it helped build theoretical knowledge at individual levels. As a matter of fact, the police conducted only two seminars by themselves to educate young police officers. Generally, senior management, who are most likely to have participated in seminars, have no intention of sharing the knowledge they have gained with their subordinates.

A long-term expert is paying special attention to such problems and has developed awareness creation in order to help police management better understand the necessity of

training and self-help and to tackle internal corruption issues within the force. Such considerations are extremely important given the fundamental requirement to rebuild Cambodia’s human resources. However, a long-term expert also points out that it took almost a year to establish mutual understanding and an actual technical transfer could only be started after that. In this sense, a short-term expert would not have enough time to take such issues into consideration. This demonstrates that the dispatch of long-term experts, along with a long-term commitment, will be more effective in its impact on public security given the extreme lack of human resources and support in the police.

**Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection**

In the project, the Ministry of Interior, the National Police Agency, provincial police and municipal police were selected as direct beneficiaries. However, the information necessary to assess the appropriateness of this selection could not be fully collected.

**Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity**

Participants for seminars are selected from middle-grade executives who are responsible for criminal investigations. The selection is made in light of their degree of knowledge, the level of technology and allocation of equipment. However, since participants tend not to share the knowledge gained from the seminar with others, there is little ripple effect within the organization.

**Securing Transparency in Implementation**

Given that the project mainly consists of the dispatch of experts to Cambodia, and trainees to Japan, transparency is, at the minimum, secured by making a detailed report on project activities.

**Impartiality of Stakeholders**

Project implementation has not suffered from political intervention but corruption within the police is problematic. As a case in point, an executive at the National Authority for Combating Drugs and the judge of the Phnom Penh court were arrested for possession of illegal drugs. In addition, small weapons disarmament has been delayed because of distrust of the police. In this respect, corruption in the police should be addressed as soon as possible.

**Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace**

The involvement of actors promoting peace is not a particular feature in the implementation of the project.\(^5\)

### 4.4 Project on Functional Strengthening of the Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC)

The reconstruction need of this project relates to the problem of remaining landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXOs) in the country. The project assists the CMAC by

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\(^5\) This study focuses only on “Project on Improvement of Public Security” implemented by JICA. If public security activities in Cambodia are taken into account as a whole, there must be some involvement of actors promoting peace such as NGOs engaging in disarmament.
providing machinery and equipment as grant aid. Currently 95% of CMAC’s budget is allocated from donor assistance, of which Japanese aid accounted for 21% in 1999, 25% in 2000, and 21% in 2001. Japan has been providing assistance to CMAC since 1994 as one of the largest donors. When the machinery is provided to CMAC, a trainer conducts a course on its use and maintenance over a two-week period. As the provided machinery is highly efficient, the two-week training course is long enough for participants to obtain operational skills.

CMAC’s demining performance since 1994 is illustrated in Table 4.4.1. Landmines are most prevalent in northwestern Cambodia, especially where the Khmer Rouge used to be in control, while UXOs are widespread in the Cambodia-Vietnam border area because of the Vietnam War. At the beginning of CMAC’s operations, accidents derived from landmines occurred frequently. CMAC’s mandate was originally more focused on emergency measures to save lives through demining and awareness creation campaigns. However, the positive impact of CMAC’s activities can now be seen in the decrease in mine/UXO victims (cf. Figure 4.4.1). Moreover, the dispatch of a Japanese expert on Information Systems has also contributed to data management at CMAC. CMAC can now provide periodical statistical data and performance figures with presentation software.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Period</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Areas (㎡)</td>
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<td>Jan/01-Sep/01</td>
<td>7,058,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>82,682,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CMAC Progress Report

Having succeeded in emergency demining in particular areas, CMAC strategically relates its activities with social development in Cambodia. As a case in point, CMAC has sent a demining platoon to a region where an international NGO, namely CARE, implements a social development project. The year 1998 was a major turning point for CMAC when its policy shifted to the development aspect of demining rather than emergency measures. Synergetic effects of CMAC activities and social development projects are expected in the near future. Generally CMAC designates a demining area in light of the following priorities: i) arterial roads that reach to isolated villages, ii) schools and hospitals, iii) resettlement areas of repatriates, and iv) farmlands. In particular, the restoration of an arterial road contributes to the economic and social development of local villages by facilitating distribution of commodities. Moreover northwestern Cambodia, which the
Khmer Rouge used to control, has been added as a priority area since 2000 and CMAC activities are expected to have a positive impact on the reconciliation of the former Khmer Rouge population.

**Figure 4.4.1 Transition of Mine/UXO Victims**

![Transition of Mine/UXO Victims](image)

Source: Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System

*The data in 2001 include January to September.*

One of the reasons why CMAC shows such impressive performance is that high salaries, to the amount of US$160 per month, attract competent human resources. Nevertheless 95% of CMAC’s budget is still financed by foreign donors, and its financial sustainability is in question. Demining activities do not last forever and CMAC needs to find a way to be financially independent so as to sustain its positive impact on social development in Cambodia.

**Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection**

As the project concentrates on the provision of facilities, its scope was limited to procurement and delivery of the machinery requested by CMAC. In this sense, the appropriateness of beneficiary selection cannot be assessed. In particular, since the Japanese side has seldom procured special equipment, such as mine detectors, the procurement of the machinery was initiated by CMAC.

**Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity**

The distribution of the machinery is also beyond the scope of this project. However, it is reported that the machinery provided by the Japanese government was equally distributed to each demining unit and that the machinery necessary for demining is sufficient within CMAC.

**Securing Transparency in Implementation**

CMAC has paid special attention to transparency in implementation since an internal scandal, involving misappropriation of land by military and local officials, questionable financial practices and almost no CMAC accountability occurred in 1999. In fact, an accounting firm now audits the financial management at CMAC so as to ensure its accountability.
Impartiality of Stakeholders
Because of the scandal in 1999, the Director General (DG) of CMAC was forced out of office and, while the operation of CMAC was suspended, many managerial officers left the organization. Since then CMAC has operated without a hitch. However as the exiled DG has a political connection with the Prime Minister (he was later appointed as advisor on landmine issues and is now the DG at the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) that is newly established to supervise donor coordination in demining), it seems that this project is more likely influenced by political factions.

Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
The involvement of actors promoting peace is not particularly observed in the implementation of the project.

4.5 Project on Rehabilitation of Electricity Supply Facilities
The reconstruction need of this project is the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. The project rehabilitated the electricity supply facilities including the provision of a diesel engine power generator. According to the Ex-post Evaluation of Grant Aid conducted in 1997, the cost of power generation at the Fifth Power Plant was reduced from 177 Riel per kWh to 163 Riel, and the time of power supply per day in 12,000 households was increased from 35% to 75%. The electricity supply of Electricité du Cambodge (EDC) from 1995 to 1998 is indicated in Figure 4.5.1. Its growth rate in 1996, when the project was completed, is 76%, which surpassed the growth rates of 29% and 25% in the next two years.

Figure 4.5.1 Electricity Supply in Phnom Penh  Figure 4.5.2 Power Generation Capacity by Donor

In 2000, the electricity supply facilities in Phnom Penh had a total capacity of 154,300 KW, which is eight times larger than in 1992 (cf. Figure 4.5.2). The diesel engine power generator provided by Japanese grant aid accounts for about 10% of the actual electricity supply in Phnom Penh. Because of its importance, the power generator is fully
maintained and controlled under a round-the-clock system. In consequence, there is no need for planned power cuts and power failures, caused by trouble in a service wire, occur less than twice per month. The continuing assistance to power distribution has reached almost all over the city of Phnom Penh including the suburbs and airports. Needless to say, the stable power supply to hospitals and factories boosted social and economic development in Phnom Penh. Furthermore the Japanese grant aid was provided prior to any other donor assistance and its positive impact, especially in the early years of reconstruction in Phnom Penh, is worthy of special mention. In addition, the installation of telegraph polls increased the number of streetlamps and improved public security at night. One remaining problem is that the power generation cost of a diesel engine is considerably influenced by the import price of crude oil and electricity charges are set at a relatively high rate. In this regard, a pro-poor power policy, such as setting lower electricity charges in rural areas, is now being taken into consideration.

**Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection**
The Basic Design Study, conducted in 1993, drew up the plan for the restoration of electricity supply facilities in Phnom Penh and Siem Riep. In light of security issues, however, the implementation of a project in Phnom Penh was chosen. Cambodia’s greatest electricity demand is in Phnom Penh so the project site was appropriately selected.

**Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity**
In order to minimize the overlap of development assistance in Phnom Penh, a project area was divided by organizations. The project site for the rehabilitation of the power supply was selected in light of the following priorities: i) roads of importance, ii) industrial areas, iii) residential quarters. The aid was equally distributed according to the national policy.

**Securing Transparency in Implementation**
As electricity installation, repairs and maintenance requires power to be cut temporarily, the works schedule is advertised through the media. In terms of placing new telegraph polls, the agreement of residents is obtained prior to installation. As the economic benefit is enormous, most residents are cooperative with regard to installation requirements. Moreover, people in Phnom Penh have gradually come to understand the utility value of land and positively participate in consultations regarding land use. The Cambodian government also plans to hold a public hearing session for the rehabilitation of the electricity supply, gathering central and local government officials, NGO staff and local residents. In this sense, transparency is mostly secured in the project.

**Impartiality of Stakeholders**
Project implementation has not been compromised by political intervention. Occasionally some counterparts asked to select a particular brand name or constructor, but such requests were never accepted because of the regulations attached to the ODA scheme.
Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
The involvement of actors promoting peace is not particularly observed in the implementation of the project.

4.6 Project on Restoration of Chroy Changwar Bridge

The reconstruction need of this project is developing economic infrastructure. Although Japanese assistance to transportation is nationwide in Cambodia, this assessment focuses on the restoration of Chroy Changwar Bridge, along with the projects at national routes 6A and 7. The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation also prioritizes the restoration of transportation in eastern Cambodia as a poverty alleviation program. A bridge over the Mekong River is to be constructed by the end of Year 2001, enhancing the development of economic infrastructure in the region.

The restoration of Chroy Changwar Bridge was started in December 1992 and completed in February 1994, extraordinarily fast for the construction of a bridge. Cambodian citizens regarded the restoration of the bridge as a symbol of peace as the project was first provided after the Paris Accord. This demonstrates the enormous psychological impact the project had for the Cambodian people. The Chroy Changwar Bridge is also known as the Cambodia-Japan Friendship Bridge and is famous as a place to take a souvenir picture.

According to the traffic volume survey conducted in the Ex-post Evaluation of Grant Aid, the total volume of traffic in a 14-hour period in March 1999 reached 44,584 and that in a 12-hour period in December 2000, 44,749. This indicates that the bridge is highly efficient as a national link supporting arterial roads. In terms of the social and economic impact, the restoration of the bridge has facilitated the distribution of commodities between Phnom Penh and eastern Cambodia. The eastern shore of the bridge has also experienced economic growth with a burgeoning supply of restaurants and stores. In addition, the opening up of the eastern region contributed to an improvement in public security as remnants of the Khmer Rouge were forced out.

The maintenance of the bridge is one of the remaining issues to be addressed. Currently only 3% of the national budget is allocated to the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, most of which is spent on labor costs. The project costs are highly dependent on the external assistance of foreign donors and there is only a small amount of the budget remaining for maintenance as building new roads and bridges is prioritized. Consequently Chroy Changwar Bridge is becoming dilapidated despite occasional repair work. The Ministry now accepts foreign experts specializing in maintenance, but more determined measures are urgently needed to sustain the positive impact of the project.

Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection
Chroy Changwar Bridge, located on the important road leading to eastern Cambodia, was constructed by the Japanese government in 1963. The project site was appropriately selected as the very first project implemented in Cambodia after the Paris Accord.
Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity
The bridge is public property that anyone can utilize. In this regard, its benefit is equally distributed in society.

Securing Transparency in Implementation
The restoration of Chroy Changwar Bridge plays a pivotal role, not only as part of the economic infrastructure, but also as a symbol of peace. Both Cambodian and Japanese politicians have visited the project site several times in order to propagandize its importance in the development of Cambodia. However, this reflects transparency in peace-building processes; information necessary to make a judgment regarding transparency in project implementation could not be fully collected.

Impartiality of Stakeholders
At that time of the project, the chief of the road bureau belonged to FUNCINPEC while the deputy manager was from the CPP. Nevertheless, project implementation was not compromised as stakeholders shared a common development objective. On the other hand, it is reported that bureaucrats belonging to CPP are more influential in acquiring project budgets for implementation.

Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
The involvement of actors promoting peace is not particularly observed in the implementation of the project.

4.7 Project on National Tuberculosis Control
The reconstruction need of this project is the improvement of health care. The recent health indicators related to tuberculosis control are indicated in Figure 4.7.1. The diffusion of the DOTS strategy, which is the primary method of tuberculosis control, reached 100% in 1998. The cure rate for a new smear-positive patient also reached 95%. The detection rate, however, reached less than 60% - that is lower than the target level advocated by WHO.

WHO first supervised tuberculosis control in Cambodia by implementing a program promoting DOTS, and the Japanese government has now taken over the initiative. WHO’s program, however, posed a problem in the quality of DOTS implementation although it succeeded in diffusing the methodology. In this connection, the project focuses on improvement in the quality of the DOTS strategy. The project is being implemented and it is premature to assess its impact. This section therefore summarizes the progress of the project.

DOTS Strategy has five key components: 1. Government commitment to sustained TB Control activities, 2. Case detection by sputum smear microscopy among symptomatic patients self-reporting to health services, 3. Standardized treatment regimen of six to eight months for at least all sputum smear positive cases with DOT for at least the initial two months, 4. A regular and uninterrupted supply of all essential anti-TB drugs, 5. A standardized recording and reporting system that allows assessment of treatment results for each patient and of the TB control program performance overall.
The activity consists of four components: i) strengthening the supervision of DOTS by transferring technology in the constant administration of medicine, ii) conducting an awareness creation campaign in order that people may properly cope with tuberculosis, iii) building systematic institutions for tuberculosis control based on the National TB Center (CENAT) located in Phnom Penh, and iv) conducting training for the medical staff concerned so as to provide decent services. Most of the activities are properly executed, including various training courses conducted by short-term experts. One of the remarkable outcomes so far is the enhancement of health centers conducting DOTS and partnerships with NGOs, both of which have been advocated by the project. Since the project converges on human resource development in the sector, it will be some time before its effect can be assessed. In particular, the improvement in the detection rate will be the key indicator for assessment.

Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection
According to WHO’s report, the prevalence of TB infection is the highest in the region (560 cases among 100,000 people). In addition, HIV infection, which is closely related with TB, is also highest in the region. In this regard, this project was properly selected in meeting one of the pressing issues in the health sector.

Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity
Because of public security issues, the project focuses on the improvement of CENAT, located in Phnom Penh. Nevertheless, the project design pays special attention to the nationwide ripple effect in Cambodia. In addition, in order to assure the equal distribution of aid, the project activity prioritizes a policy for the poor who cannot bear medical expenses, as well as remote areas.
Securing Transparency in Implementation
The DOTS strategy requires DOTS supervisors to constantly update patients’ registers and execute comprehensive data management at district, provincial and national levels. In this sense, the transparency in implementation is secured.

Impartiality of Stakeholders
Project implementation has not experienced political intervention. By April 2000, an ex-Khmer Rouge person was appointed as the chief of CENAT. Regardless of his background, his talent for management was highly appreciated. Moreover, the Prime Minister of Cambodia chairs the National Tuberculosis Committee, facilitating the political commitment to tuberculosis control in Cambodia.

Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
The involvement of actors promoting peace is not particularly observed in the implementation of the project.

4.8 Project on Social Services to Support the Handicapped
The reconstruction need of this project reflects measures to treat mental diseases including trauma. Figure 4.8.1 shows the number of the disabled by categories. The SSC, an implementing agency, consists of 2 managers and 43 social workers, supporting 500 cases of mental disorder in Kompong Spue. 30% of beneficiaries are medically diagnosed as having a mental disability while the other 70% are poor people who need counseling service in everyday life. As the case may be, a stabilizer is provided to a patient free of charge.

SSC has also formulated a community group aimed at self-support by beneficiaries. The group maintains an emergency fund in order to reconstruct a community when a natural disaster, such as a flood, occurs. Since the formulation of community groups has been uncommon in Cambodia, few people understood their effectiveness at the beginning. However, as people gradually recognized how they worked, participation increased. In this respect, assistance that meets the reconstruction need is provided even though the total population of the beneficiary is comparatively small.

One of remaining issues is that the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, Vocational Training and Youth, which supervises public services for vulnerable people, cannot provide such assistance owing to lack of finances and human resources. In fact, social services are only provided by NGOs, and no mental hospitals exist in Cambodia. In order to solve the problem, SSC provides government officials and NGO workers with training in social capital management and the social integration of the vulnerable. An immediate requirement is enabling the ministry to take over the social services currently provided by NGOs.
Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection
When Kompong Spue was selected as a project site, SSC did not have a clear rationale for its strategy. However, most assistance to vulnerable people has been implemented in northwestern Cambodia, and Kompong Spue was marginalized although the level of poverty was high. As things turned out, the selection of a project site proved to be appropriate.

Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity
The beneficiary includes not only mentally and physically-handicapped persons but also poor households suffering from social problems. In this sense, the aid has been equally provided within the target group.

Securing Transparency in Implementation
SSC secures transparency in implementation by conducting periodical monitoring and evaluation.

Impartiality of Stakeholders
There has not been political intervention in project implementation.

Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
Schools and teachers are involved in the awareness creation campaign implemented by SSC. However, information necessary to conclude whether that means involvement of actors promoting peace or not could not be fully collected.

Source: Study on Persons with Disabilities (2001)
4.9 Interband Project - To Be Added

4.10 ADHOC Project - To Be Added

4.11 IMPACS - Cambodia Journalists’ Training Project

The reconstruction need of this project is to improve the flow of quality media information, and thereby strengthen Cambodia’s fledgling democracy. The premise is that training Cambodian radio journalists would facilitate the improved flow of information and the establishment of an independent, open and accountable radio media. This will encourage political dialogue rather than violence as the method to resolve conflict. Radio, in particular, was targeted for the project because it is the primary source of information for most Cambodians. The Cambodia Radio Journalists’ Training Project provided a range of training activities to Cambodian journalists between 1999 and 2002.

Media has a crucial role to play both during times of conflict, when it is often manipulated by the combatants, and following the end of hostilities. Indeed, it is not uncommon for press freedom to be restricted following the end of hostilities, but such restrictions can reduce information available to the public that might help people understand the options available to them in the conflict reconciliation stage. Activities such as media training and capacity building can help support independent or alternative media, enhance the protection of journalists and raise public awareness of the value of a free and independent media.

The media environment in Cambodia is a mixed one. Under the Khmer Rouge regime many intellectuals including local journalists were persecuted and up to one third of them perished. Even after 1993, several journalists were murdered, apparently because of stories they wrote. Since 1997, the situation has improved and there has been progress towards the establishment of a free press, albeit slow and uneven. Prime Minister Hun Sen has declared his support for press freedom, publicly praising the benefits to society of an unfettered media. Access to information from the outside world is relatively open; there are, for example, no restrictions on satellite dish ownership and foreign radio broadcasts can be received easily from neighboring countries. However, Hun Sen’s declarations notwithstanding, press freedom is still restricted. Two publications were forced to suspend publication in 2001 and, when the government has perceived a threat, it has moved to muzzle dissident media.

The national government, political parties, and local governmental entities control, either directly or by asserting a strong influence, a significant share of print and broadcast media. Such media suffer, therefore, from a lack of editorial independence. But privately owned newspapers do publish, and private radio and television broadcasters are also operating. Nonetheless, outside of the capital city of Phnom Penh, neither newspapers nor television play any significant role in providing information to the population. Radio, on the other hand, penetrates even to remote areas, sometimes via loudspeakers in the marketplace.
Appropriateness of Beneficiary Selection
In implementing the Cambodia Journalists’ Training Project, IMPACS worked with several key local partners, including the Women’s Media Centre, the Cambodian Communications Institute and the Royal University of Phnom Penh. Most of the participants were aspiring journalists who had come to appreciate the importance of the media in society.

Equal Distribution of Aid in Quality and Quantity
The first radio training course was conducted in November 1999. In February 2000, IMPACS conducted a course on media ethics with the staff of the Women’s Media Centre. In June 2000, radio training was conducted in Battambang for 26 regional media practitioners, marking the first session outside Phnom Penh. In November 2000, IMPACS organized a workshop entitled “Media Development Funders Consultation” and in August 2001, it hosted a roundtable discussion to address proposals for laws to place controls on who could work as a journalist. The event was attended by members of the media, civil society and the government.

Securing Transparency in Implementation
IMPACS has provided training to students of journalism through a university program, hosted a roundtable with international donor agencies, conducted a training session in Battambang for 26 regional journalists, provided combined on-site radio and television training, trained dozens of women journalists through the Women’s Media Centre, and delivered a media and messaging workshop for Cambodian NGOs.

Impartiality of Stakeholders
The station is not suffering political interference and has received praise from politicians and non-governmental leaders alike.

Involvement of Actors Promoting Peace
The involvement of actors promoting peace is not particularly evident in this project.

Chapter 5. Peacebuilding Assessment
The projects visited in Cambodia, for the most part, were designed to address traditional development problems and did not have a peacebuilding focus. In this respect, assessing the impact of these projects in a peace and conflict context presented some challenges to the review team. Nevertheless, through observation and interviews with Cambodian counterparts, the impact on peace and conflict of projects dealing with issues such as infrastructure, health or public security could be usefully assessed. The mission members feel that they gained a strong sense of the value of non-peacebuilding projects as development tools to promote peacebuilding. Incorporating a checklist of items for conflict prevention during the project planning and implementation stage for traditional development projects could promote peacebuilding objectives.

JICA has seven priority sectors in reconstruction assistance: emergency assistance, reconciliation, security, infrastructure, governance, economic recovery and assistance to
vulnerable populations. After taking in to consideration the on-going activities of other donors, specific sectors are prioritized in order to draw up a reconstruction assistance plan. The preparatory process includes the completion of Conflict Analysis and an Assessment of Reconstruction Needs. The prioritization of reconstruction needs must also take into account issues of chronological transition as well as policy factors. Figure 5.1 demonstrates changes in inputs for 8 specific projects as the emergency assistance phase gives way to longer-term reconstruction priorities.

The Emergency Assistance Phase includes projects that aim to restore infrastructure such as the rehabilitation of electricity supply facilities and the restoration of transportation. The Reconstruction Phase contains soft-component projects such as health care, judicial assistance and social services to the vulnerable as well as infrastructure projects that are aimed at local areas other than Phnom Penh. The Tripartite Cooperation project, the one dealing with the improvement of public security and the CMAC Functional Strengthening Program are identified as overlapping both phases. In terms of Tripartite Cooperation in particular, its objectives have changed from the repatriation of refugees to rural development. Each sector is connected directly with livelihoods of Cambodians and necessitates a long-term commitment regardless of the transition of phases. Basic infrastructure and public security issues had markedly improved by the beginning of the Reconstruction Phase.

Figure 5.1 Changes in Inputs of 8 Projects

5.1. Reconstruction Assistance at the Project Level

The outcome of interviews with stakeholders of the 8 projects suggests that special attention was paid to common issues at the project level. The issues are almost identical to the problems identified in chapter six of the Report on the Implementation Structure of Development in Cambodia by MOFA Evaluation Office in March 2000: i) lack of human resources, ii) lack of financial resources and iii) lack of coordination ability. In order to effectively execute projects, and best contribute to the reconstruction of Cambodia in the mid and long-term, project managers have to tackle the basic issues of: Capacity Building, Sustainability and Donor Coordination. As noted above, each project has more or less achieved the objective of enhancing human resource development. As for sustainability and donor coordination, however, not all projects have successfully resolved these issues.

In terms of sustainability, the deficiency in tax revenues clearly indicates that the governance capacity of the Cambodian government is ineffective. In particular, official development assistance projects, in which governmental organizations are involved, are unlikely to be sustainable because of the lack of revenues. Donor coordination, on the other hand, is well organized at the macro level such as allocation of sectors and regions. Nevertheless, coordination at the technical level has not been achieved. For example, the technical specifications of infrastructure projects are not standardized and cross cutting coordination in judicial assistance has also not been achieved. The Cambodian government should initiate this kind of coordination at the micro level but this is made more complicated by the inefficiency of governance. Every development assistance project should take these issues into consideration but it is even more important to do so in the case of reconstruction projects implemented in a post-conflict country without effective governance, such as Cambodia. In this regard, measures to solve such issues should be considered from the beginning of a project.

One of the serious obstacles to reconstruction in Cambodia is the lack of human resources. The 8 projects properly cope with this issue but the output of the infrastructure projects is most noteworthy. Nonetheless, infrastructure projects are only appraised in terms of their outcomes, i.e., construction and the human resource development aspects are marginalized. In light of the social and economic conditions of post-conflict Cambodia, a grant aid infrastructure project aimed at capacity building should be provided. The Cambodian government needs to collaborate with Japanese experts in areas such as procurement and contract management processes. In addition, the transfer of technical skills from a contractor to local laborers through actual construction is more effective than theoretical training. In this sense, even though the duration of a project may be short, a grant aid infrastructure project including a soft component to provide practical training would be most useful.

The partnership with NGOs in post-conflict assistance has been underscored in this review. In terms of judicial assistance, the project on legal and judicial reform drafts laws and deals with training of prosecutors and judges at the Ministry of Justice. The Development Partnership Program trains local lawyers and supports legal access for the
poor. This demonstrates the positive impact on the legal profession of the synergy of two distinct but complimentary programs.

This joint review has also identified that official development assistance is more focused on Phnom Penh while NGOs execute more projects in rural areas such as northwestern Cambodia. Peacebuilding should benefit society as a whole and development at the central level, but also at the village level, is required. In this respect, official development assistance is mainly implemented in a top-down manner whereas NGOs’ activities tend to promote a bottom-up approach. This implies that the assistance of both parties can complement each other. As the demand for interdependence between official development assistance and NGOs is significant in reconstruction assistance, the execution of the Emergency Grants for Reconstruction should take into account the advantages of linking NGO activities and official development assistance in order not to isolate NGO activities in any particular sector.

Chapter 6. Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Future Joint Missions

The mission to Cambodia built on the experiences gained in Guatemala and provided additional valuable lessons on the challenges of conducting field research in post-conflict countries. The following summarizes the main conclusions drawn by the team:

- Both Japanese and Canadian participants felt that more emphasis should be given to conducting country level conflict assessments at the local as well as national level. Local level assessments, focusing on specific areas within a country where conflict impact has been particularly intense, would better reflect peacebuilding responses.

- Further study is needed on how to categorize reconstruction needs and how they should be described. For example, some Cambodian government officials reacted negatively to the way in which a conflict factor was described as “small arms prevailing among society”, preferring the more positive sounding “collection of small arms among society”, which seemed to offer promise that a solution to the problem was being sought.

- It was evident that there should have been more participation by local residents and beneficiaries in order for the mission to get a better grasp of the needs as perceived at the grass-roots level of society. In particular, considering the fact that local NGOs have played an important role in reconstructing Cambodia, it was regretted that they had little involvement in this review mission.

- In terms of prioritizing and screening for assistance, it was noted that the Team were unable to track the location and types of assistance provided by other donors. In planning future missions, background information on peacebuilding projects supported by other aid organizations and NGOs should be sought out in advance.

- An important question raised was how to prioritize conflict factors and reconstruction needs while conducting the Conflict Assessment stage. In particular, distinguishing conflict factors and reconstruction needs directly linked
to the outbreak of conflict from those factors indirectly related to the conflict would be useful.

- It was recommended that, for future missions, project assessments should be conducted before visiting project sites, instead of after the visits. The argument being that this would sharpen the approach to project analysis and help in the preparation of questionnaires.

- Mission members had fewer chances to communicate with each other in Cambodia than in Guatemala and it was recommended that future missions should provide more opportunities for sharing mutual experiences. In particular, an effort should be made to maintain communication between CIDA and JICA before the next phase of the Project to allow both Canada and Japan to build a broad consensus on present and future goals and to better understand each other’s points of view and perceptions.

- As in Guatemala, it was felt by some members that the number of sites visited in Cambodia was too many to allow for a thorough assessment of each of the projects. Others argued that visiting more sites provided an opportunity to review diverse programs and projects and that this provided the team with a broad perspective of the peacebuilding challenges Cambodia faces. Therefore, before the next mission, it is necessary to deepen discussion on how intensely the qualitative study should be conducted, and how much participation is required for this type of activity.

- Mission participants made recommendations on a regional workshop, formulation of peacebuilding programs and aid implementation schemes for future peacebuilding activities. The primary purpose is to hold a regional workshop with local and international NGOs in order to share experiences and lessons learned from the studies conducted both in Guatemala and Cambodia. The Joint Mission recommended targeting a country in which peacebuilding needs are clearly identified and where Japanese and Canadian NGOs and government agencies are implementing development programs. The team proposed that Japan and Canada should then formulate a joint peacebuilding program, and implement sub-programs, according to preferences and experiences.

- It was suggested that peacebuilding programs should not be limited to established aid schemes, but rather that approaches to aid programs be expanded to provide the flexibility and mobility to implement components of peacebuilding programs. Furthermore, in countries with low governance capacity, such as Cambodia, it was felt that peacebuilding programs could be actively formulated and implemented based on tried peacebuilding initiatives and practices without waiting for formal requests for assistance.

- Finally, as Cambodia has followed a process of reconstruction and development since the peace agreement without experiencing the recurrence of civil war, it would be useful to compare the positive lessons from Cambodia with other less successful post-conflict countries in order to determine what factors contributed most to the peaceful transition from war to peace in Cambodia.
Appendix 1. Effectiveness of the JPCIA (Japan Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment) Framework

The JICA Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (JPCIA) methodology was developed in order to mainstream the concept of peacebuilding in JICA’s development assistance programming. Its role is to provide development practitioners with a comprehensive understanding of the peace and conflict status of the country/territory they are dealing with and to examine ways in which to address the problem of conflict. The focus is on those post-conflict countries/territories where peacebuilding is essential for swift and sustainable recovery. JPCIA also aims to help aid practitioners view all development projects, from their preparation and implementation through to monitoring, with a peacebuilding lens so that they will not contribute to the deterioration of the situation or generate conflict.

The Relationship of JPCIA to PCIA

The Canadian Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology, as explored in Guatemala, was comprised of two parts: Peace and Conflict Analysis and Project Analysis. Although the methodology was found to be effective for conflict assessment, it became clear when testing it that PCIA was more appropriate as an up-front analytical, planning and project identification tool. It was more difficult to apply PCIA to operational projects. One of the objectives of the Cambodia mission was to field test the Japan Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (JPCIA) methodology, developed by JICA and Japanese NGOs as a response to the lessons learned from the application of PCIA in Guatemala.

The JPCIA methodology has similarities with the Canadian PCIA tool but JPCIA has three distinctive features:

- First, all of the steps from the situation analysis to the peace and conflict assessment are linked sequentially. For instance, the factors that are considered in the project-level peace assessment stage are derived from the conflict factors analyzed at the country-level conflict analysis stage.
- Second, the country-level conflict analysis identifies not only conflict prevention needs but also specific post-conflict requirements. These include new needs that emerge from the conflict, reconstruction and development process that may not necessarily be conflict factors but may be specific to the post-conflict situation.
- The third feature unique to JPCIA is that the project-level analysis includes a general checklist to be reviewed for conflict prevention and peace building impact during project planning, implementation and monitoring/evaluation. Through this, JPCIA can be applied to assess the impact of projects on peace and conflict - not only for those projects that directly target peacebuilding, but also for those projects that are not directly aimed at peacebuilding. JPCIA can also be used as a tool in formulating and reviewing Country Programs and for identifying conflict factors and post-conflict needs.
JPCIA proceeds through a series of interrelated steps:

**Conflict Assessment:**

**Step 1 Country Level Conflict Assessment**
Analyzes the root causes of the conflict at the country level under three different categories: structural, triggering and perpetuating factors. Post-conflict reconstruction needs are assessed based on the analysis of these features.

**Step 2 Reconstruction Needs Assessment**
Reconstruction Needs are divided in three sections:

a) unresolved root causes of the conflict; 
b) emerging causes that may cause conflict to recur if not dealt with; 
c) issues not directly related to the cause of the conflict or recurrence, but recognized as reconstruction needs.

**Step 3 Prioritizing and Screening**
Reconstruction Needs are reviewed taking other aspects into consideration e.g. UN Consolidated Appeal, Consultative Group’s assistance policy, etc., then prioritized and screened to identify the most important area of reconstruction and development assistance.

**Step 4 Formulation of Reconstruction and Development Plan and Relevance Assessment**
The reconstruction and development plan is formulated based on the previous two steps.

**Project Assessment:**

**Step 5 Stakeholder Analysis**
The stakeholders of each project formulated in step 4 are analyzed, including the identification of their relations to the conflict and other specific issues that may affect the project and its area.

**Step 6 Drawing a Project Design Matrix (PDM)**
A PDM is designed for the reconstruction and development projects identified in step 4 to better understand and implement the project.

**Step 7 Peace Assessment**
Projects are analyzed to see how they might have positive or negative impacts on the factors determining conflict in the given country/territory.

**Recommendations for Improving JPCIA**

While the mission was able to confirm, in general, the effectiveness of JPCIA, the following suggestions were made with regard to the application of the methodology and with respect to its content:
When applying the JPCIA tool, there needs to be a consensus among those concerned on the definition of the concept of “peacebuilding”. CIDA and JICA both use a broad approach to peacebuilding, incorporating a range of issues from conflict prevention through conflict stabilization, resolution and specific post-conflict needs. However, there was some confusion over definitional issues when applying JPCIA during the Cambodia mission. It is recommended that a common understanding of the concept of peacebuilding be developed to make field assessment more effective in the future.

It is important to understand what stage a country is at in terms of peacebuilding when applying JPCIA methodology. Peacebuilding is not an end in itself, but rather a process. Moreover, the results of the assessment revealed that it is possible to consider projects not only from the perspective of “impact”, but also in terms of their “relevance”, “effectiveness”, “efficiency”, and “sustainability”, and to assess the relationship between peacebuilding and the project.

JPCIA should be applied and revised at different stages of project management. It was suggested during the mission that the JPCIA methodology lacked chronological perspective. Questions were also raised concerning the timing of revisions to the JPCIA framework. As time passes after a conflict, post-conflict requirements vary and peace assessment checklist items, which are linked to conflict prevention needs and stakeholder priorities, also vary. In Cambodia, the same analysis was used to assess the projects implemented at different chronological stages. However, in theory, the needs that emerged at different phases of project implementation should have been analyzed and assessed in terms of the contents of the project.

The JPCIA methodology, designed mainly for post-conflict assistance, should be revised to be used from the perspective of conflict prevention in pre-conflict countries.

As it is not feasible to apply the JPCIA methodology to all developing countries, it is necessary to select specific countries that require a conflict prevention approach and apply the methodology selectively.

Simplification of the JPCIA methodology may be necessary as speed of application can be more crucial than thorough analysis, for example, where field-level scrutiny is not possible because of security reasons.

The analysis based on JPCIA methodology should incorporate more local views through an increased number of interviews with beneficiaries and local residents. In Cambodia, interviews were conducted in a rather formal manner and this may have restricted the interviewees from expressing frank opinions.

JPCIA needs to demonstrate how the contents of the assistance programs were determined, why particular sectors were chosen as a target of assistance, and why particular aid implementation tools were chosen to address targeted reconstruction needs and conflict factors.

In attempting to integrate the Canadian “Field Guide and Data Collection Booklet” with JPCIA during the Cambodia mission, it was realized that the “flow chart” approach of JPCIA could be made more effective by incorporating the analytical and checklist technique of the Field Guide.
- It is important to clarify from the beginning how the results of the assessment should be utilized. In particular, the items listed under General Peace Consideration require more feedback through further application of the JPCIA methodology.

Preventing an Appropriate PCIA Methodology for the Next Phase of the Joint Learning Project

CIDA and JICA agree that more work needs to be done on merging the PCIA/JPCIA methodologies before moving to the next phase of the Joint Learning Project. CIDA is currently supporting London-based Saferworld and FEWER in field-testing a revised PCIA methodology in Africa. At a follow-up meeting between a CIDA consultant and officials from the Global Issues Division at JICA in Tokyo in November 2002, it was agreed to wait for the results of this ongoing effort before trying to develop a new methodology.