Country Level Evaluation
Angola

Final Report

VOLUME 1: MAIN REPORT

September 2009

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission
Consortium composed by
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The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the countries concerned.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa Caribbean Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>Acute Respiratory Infections</td>
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<td>ARVs</td>
<td>Anti-Retroviral Drugs</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>Budget line</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEEAC</td>
<td>Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central (Central African States Economic Community)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Direção Provincial de Agua (Provincial Water Directorate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Direção Provincial de Saúde (Provincial Health Directorate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Directorate</td>
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<td>ECP</td>
<td>Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza (Strategy to Combat Poverty)</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Environmental Management Plan</td>
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<td>ENDIAMA</td>
<td>Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola (Angola National Diamonds Enterprise)</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EPAL</td>
<td>Empresa Pública de Águas do Angola (Angola Water Enterprise)</td>
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<td>EPI</td>
<td>Expanded Programme on Immunisation</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURONAID</td>
<td>European network of NGOs active in the field of Food Aid, Food Security and Emergency Relief</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU-EOM</td>
<td>European Union – Election Observation Mission</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Member State</td>
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<td>Eximbank</td>
<td>China Export Import Bank</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Angola (Armed Forces of Angola)</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
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<td>Fundo de Apoio Social (Social Support Fund)</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FS</td>
<td>Food Security</td>
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<td>FSBL</td>
<td>Food Security Budget Line</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>GoA</td>
<td>Government of Angola</td>
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<td>GRN</td>
<td>Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (National Reconstruction Office)</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human development Report</td>
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<td>HIS</td>
<td>Health Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus - Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HTP</td>
<td>Harmful Traditional Practice</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IDR</td>
<td>Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares sobre Despesas e Receitas (Enquiry on Family Units on Expenses and Incomes)</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Statistic Institute)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRSEM</td>
<td>Instituto para a Reintegração Social dos Ex Militares (Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Judgement criteria</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<td>MCH</td>
<td>Maternal and Child Health</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Ministério da Educação e Cultura (Ministry of Education and Culture)</td>
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<td>MINARS</td>
<td>Ministério de Assistência e Reinserção Social (Ministry for Assistance and Social Reinsertion)</td>
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<td>MINSA</td>
<td>Ministério da Saúde (Ministry of Health)</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular para Libertação da Angola (Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola)</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-State Actors</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PAANE</td>
<td>Programa de Apoio aos Atores Não Estatais (Programme to support NSA)</td>
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<td>PAEP</td>
<td>Programa de Apoio à Educação Pública (Programme in Support to Public education)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (African Countries having Portuguese as official language)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPEFSA</td>
<td>Projecto de Apoio ao Sector Pecuário Familiar no Sul de Angola (Project to support family rearing in Southern Angola)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Programa de Apoio à Reconstrução (Reconstruction Support Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASS</td>
<td>Programa de Apoio ao Setor Saúde (Health Sector Support Program)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCM</td>
<td>Project Cycle Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDISA</td>
<td>Programa de Desenvolvimento do Setor da Agua (Water Sector Development Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEAPP</td>
<td>Programme de Emergência em Apoio ao Processo de Paz (Emergency Programme to support the Peace Process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM</td>
<td>Public Finance Management</td>
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<td>PGDR</td>
<td>Programa Geral de Desmobilização e Reintegração- General Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>PHC</td>
<td>Primary Health Care</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PTAPD</td>
<td>Programa de transição de apoio às populações desloca (Transition Programme to support IDPs)</td>
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<td>PWSU</td>
<td>Provincial Water and Sanitation Utility</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SIGFE</td>
<td>Sistema Integrado de Gestão Financeira do Estado (Integrated State Financial Management System)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIP</td>
<td>Sistema Integrado de Gestão do Investimento Público (Integrated System for Management of Public Investment)</td>
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<td>SONANGOL</td>
<td>Sociedade Nacional Angolana (National Angolan Society)</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>STABEX</td>
<td>Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>Sexually Transmittable Disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYSMIN</td>
<td>System for Stabilising Export Earnings from Mineral Products</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
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<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and training</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for Total Independence of Angola)</td>
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<td>UNTA</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>URMA</td>
<td>Unidade de Registo, Monitoria e Avaliação – (Register, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit)</td>
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<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>USW</td>
<td>Untreated solid waste</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank Group</td>
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<td>VET</td>
<td>Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WSDIP</td>
<td>Water Supply Development Program</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Scope of the evaluation

This report covers the evaluation of the European Commission (EC) cooperation strategy with Angola and its implementation over the period 2002–2007. The main objectives of this evaluation are:

a) to provide the external cooperation Services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission’s past and current cooperation relations with Angola;

b) to identify key lessons learned from the past cooperation with Angola in order to improve the current and future strategies and programmes of the Commission.

The scope of the evaluation covers the cooperation strategy and its implementation in relation to the National Indicative Programme of EDF9 (including uncommitted balances from previous EDFs), and to contributions from thematic Budget Lines and other cooperation instruments. Humanitarian intervention by ECHO has not been within the scope of this evaluation but has been considered as the starting point for the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) strategy of the EDF.

II. Methodology

The Evaluation is based on ten Evaluation Questions covering the EC strategy and its implementation. The evaluation was carried out in four phases from February 2008 to July 2009, mobilising five experts. An inception phase served to reconstruct the intervention logic and formulate the Evaluation Questions. In the desk phase, the evaluation team collected all available documents, consulted databases and interviewed reference persons in Brussels to take stock of the interventions and to formulate preliminary answers to the Evaluation Questions and associated hypotheses, and the methodology for testing them in the field. The field mission aimed at collecting further information needed to answer the Evaluation Questions through confirmation or modification of preliminary hypotheses and conclusions formulated during the desk phase. 18 case studies were carried out, covering 57.5% of the total amount committed during the period evaluated. During the synthesis phase, the evaluators analysed the data and information collected, checked its reliability, made cross analyses and judgements and formulated their conclusions and recommendations that were discussed in a seminar in Luanda in June 2009.

III. Country context

Angola’s 27-years-long war ended with the signing, on April 4th 2002, of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The country is now experiencing a period of political stabilisation. National legislative elections held on 5 September 2008 were a further step in the direction of democratisation.

The war had many far-reaching effects on the economic situation of Angola but only one year after the end of the war, the Angolan economy started to recover. Income from mining and quarrying, and especially the high international oil prices and rapidly growing output from new oil fields, have sustained real GDP growth while inflation has been reduced considerably. Recent macroeconomic reforms and steps taken by the Ministry of Finance are starting to increase the transparency of public finance management, one of the major constraints on public accountability.

The 2007/08 UNDP Human Development Reports still considers Angola a country of Low Human Development ranking it 162nd out of 177 countries. In spite of a higher average annual income than many Sub-Saharan countries, life expectancy at birth and education indices in Angola are lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average. The country’s wealth is highly
concentrated and the few data available indicate still severe poverty levels, particularly in rural areas: 94% compared to 57% in cities.

In the post-war period Angola’s national development policies have focused on rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructures.

IV. EC - Angola cooperation

During the period 2002–2007, the EC was the third most important donor after Portugal and the USA, accounting for 13.4% of total net ODA, with a total amount of €337m disbursed from EDF7-9 and budget line funds (see Figure 1 for details on annual commitments and disbursements). Since ODA represents less than 5% of the State Budget over the period, its leverage potential on policy issues is limited.

Figure 1: ODA commitments and disbursements 2002-2007 by year in million €

In parallel to DG ECHO humanitarian action (€53m in 2002-2005) that laid the foundations for a LRRD process in the country, the National Indicative Programme started urgent short-term interventions which accounted for about 50% of the funding (i.e. for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants [DDRR] including resettlement of populations, and health). Medium- and long-term interventions were mainly financed from EDF9. The main sectors of effective support have been DDRR and de-mining (30%) and social sectors (i.e. education and health, specific or mixed in integrated programs, 42%). Smaller shares were allocated to food security, water and sanitation and other infrastructure, good governance, civil society and human rights. The EDF resources for the country strategy were complemented by commitments from thematic Budget Lines (i.e. the Food Security Budget Line, Co-financing with NGOs, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and Anti-Personal Mines). Additional support was channelled through the Water Facility and the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS Malaria and Tuberculosis.

V. Answers to Evaluation Questions

Summarised answers to the Evaluation Questions are as follows:

**High relevance to country needs but low quality of programme design**

The EC intervention in Angola has been relevant to the needs of the populations, to GoA’s policy framework in the different phases of post-war recovery and development, and to poverty reduction. The phased LRRD approach has contributed greatly to increased relevance.

**Good policy coherence but insufficient donor coordination**

The EC intervention in Angola has shown itself to be coherent with global and regional EC/EU development and other policies as well as the strategies of partner donors. Donor coordination is still considered a problem and EC efforts to improve it have been significant. Cooperation with the World Bank can be considered moderately satisfactory, but a continuing problem is low flexibility in decision-making. The LRRD strategy is by far the most important element of EC Value added and an important contribution to Angola’s post-war recovery and development as
shown by the following graph, which summarises the contribution of the LRRD strategy to the gradual recovery of self-government capacity and national responsibility in Angola.

Figure 2: The institutional phases of EC’s LRRD approach in Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POST CRISIS INTERVENTION</th>
<th>REHABILITATION INTERVENTION</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EC</strong></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Worldbank</td>
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<td>Funds</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>LOCAL COMMUNITIES</td>
<td>Aid Delivery</td>
<td>LOCAL COMMUNITIES</td>
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<td><strong>EC</strong></td>
<td>Government</td>
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<td>Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Capacity Building &amp; Advocacy</td>
<td>LOCAL COMMUNITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL COMMUNITIES</td>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from CSP10 (p.58)

**DDRR support consolidated the peace process**

EC support has contributed to the DDRR process for former combatants by targeting several components of DDRR and focusing on the most vulnerable groups. The DDRR contribution as a whole has led to good results in terms of facilitating the smooth and effective reintegration of demobilised soldiers and has thus contributed to consolidating the peace process.

**Some progress in the health sector**

The planned health reform process in Angola has been slower than expected, primarily due to a lack of human resources, weak institutional capacity in the ministry and inefficient sector coordination. Improvements were registered in primary health care services in remote areas, in improved availability of essential drugs, in aspects of immunisation coverage, in support for rehabilitation of the handicapped, in training at different levels and in construction, rehabilitation and equipment of health facilities. Conversely, there are several areas where EC intervention did not succeed (e.g. drugs procurement, national health strategy and health information system).

**Recovery in food security**

The EC contributed considerably to preparation and implementation of the recovery strategies to reduce food insecurity in Angola. It also played its part in supporting activities ancillary to food security such as feeder roads, de-mining and construction of storage facilities. The LRRD strategy was relevant to attainment of sustainability in food security and contributed greatly to the move from food distribution to food production and then to commodity marketing. The food security situation has improved, although the Food Security Unit of the ministry in charge remains weak despite of years of EC support.

**Improved but not yet sustainable access to good quality water**

EC sector support for water and sanitation has improved access to good-quality water supply for a large beneficiary population in urban, peri-urban and rural areas. On the other hand, the importance of institutional shortcomings appears to have been underestimated. Sustainability of services may be in doubt since weaknesses were detected in relation to technical, institutional and financial aspects of sustainability.

**Contribution to improved access to primary education**

Access to primary education improved in the period 2002-2007 and EC support contributed significantly to this improvement. However, the quality of education services at this level is still low with high repetition rates. The majority of pupils who do not complete primary education are girls. The quality of teaching has improved, but yet huge challenges remain unaddressed and there
is a large need for continuing training as most teachers have completed only basic education. Government of Angola commitment to sector development remains an element of uncertainty.

**Governance and decentralisation as key challenges for development support**

The development partners Government of Angola and EC do not completely share a common interest in the political dialogue on governance. In several sectors sector policies are ready, prepared with the support of the EC, but are not enacted. At central level, the political process is still top-down and issues of transparency and accountability are not considered a priority, whereas several experiences at local level have promoted accountability of municipal administrations and provincial governments and led to good results in terms of functionality of the administrations. The EC’s decision to focus governance interventions at provincial and municipal levels provided an opportunity to support the decentralisation process. As non-State actors (NSAs) are considered important partners for project implementation, policy dialogue and decentralisation, the strengthening of their capacities has been an important contribution and has mobilised several NGOs to act on governance issues.

**Limited attention to cross-cutting issues**

Despite an emphasis on the importance of cross-cutting issues in EC international policies and strategies, CSP and subsequent review documents do not clearly set out coverage of cross-cutting issues in either a strategic or an issue-by-issue manner. This lack of clarity is carried forward into project documents. However, coverage of cross-cutting issues during project implementation (sectoral and stand-alone projects aimed at specific cross-cutting issues) was more comprehensive than might have been expected following perusal of project documentation or reporting, and clearly more attention has been given to cross-cutting issues in recent years.

**Impact on vulnerable groups and its sustainability have still to be demonstrated**

In most cases, programmes had a positive impact on the needs of the most vulnerable populations. However, it appears very difficult to quantify impact and sometimes even to identify it, since indicators of impact were not always identified at the outset, nor were baseline studies carried out. Several initiatives could have had a higher level of impact and generated higher visibility for EC cooperation, but insufficient communication and dissemination of positive impacts and best practice reduced this potential. Sustainability appears to be very much in doubt: it has been influenced by different levels of ownership and motivation, but also unrealistic planning of expected results and timelines.

**VI. Conclusions**

The five major conclusions are the following:

1. **Overall, the country strategy appears relevant for supporting the post-war recovery and development effort of the country.** The principles of the LRRD strategy have improved relevance and stimulated the continuity of interventions. However, post-war conditions appear to have limited the quality of project design, problems with which have adversely influenced effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

2. **The EC intervention in Angola has shown a high level of coherence** with EU global and regional policy documents and EC sector policies. Geographical and sectoral coverage of EC interventions has been coherent with the lines of action identified by the 2002 Common EU position. Coordination of EC and other donor interventions has been problematic, but in 2006, the EU Road Map was launched and thematic working groups have been created, improving coordination.

3. **The transition of sector support (LRRD) from humanitarian response to development has been logical, consistent and strategic.** The LRRD applied in all sectors as a guiding strategy has enhanced the timeliness and effectiveness of EC interventions and is clearly the most important feature of EC intervention in Angola.
4. In general, **effectiveness is moderately satisfactory but its level varies greatly between sectors**. At local level, effectiveness has been quite high in DDRR, food security, and in access to primary health care and primary education. Lower levels of effectiveness were found in the areas of governance, water and sanitation and, in general, in institutional aspects across the sectors.

5. In most projects, there have been positive impacts, but it has been difficult to measure them, as in any case indicators were not always identified at the start through baseline studies. In consequence, it is very **difficult to quantify impact and sometimes even to identify it, and sustainability is likely to be at risk**.

**VII. Recommendations**

Recommendations are clustered as follows:

**Strategic recommendations**
- Concentrate on capacity building in management, institutional development and governance.
- Focus on service delivery at municipal and provincial level as a 'fulcrum' (with support to selected or prioritised municipalities and gradual extension of coverage), but with continued dialogue at national level and with gradual extension of municipal coverage.
- Continue enhancing donor coordination in general and coordination of Member States in particular.
- Focus project activities on realistic expected results and targets, as well as on interventions with high EC value added.
- Pay adequate attention to institution building in the public sector and organisation building in the private sector.
- Significantly improve mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues.
- Identify a specific modality of intervention for Angola.

**Operational recommendations**
- Increase transfer of knowledge to national counterparts.
- Improve proactivity in communication with Government counterparts, implementation partners and other stakeholders.
- Consider greater flexibility in the use of EDF procedures.
- Strengthen monitoring systems.

**Learning recommendations**
- Deepen knowledge of LRRD to facilitate mainstreaming of lessons learned into other situations since LRRD has strengthened impact and sustainability through timely aid, effective targeting and continuity of interventions.
- Collect, systematise and disseminate examples of best practice and lessons learned available in many sectors but not identified and not generalised.

---

1 These recommendations refer to the specific opportunities related to strengths and weaknesses and are aimed at producing a body of knowledge which can be used in Angola and elsewhere to mainstream effective methodologies and courses of action.
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope and objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation of the European Commission (EC) cooperation strategy with Angola and its implementation over the period 2002 – 2007 is a component of the 2007 evaluation programme approved by the External Relations Commissioners. In a context of increasing coordination and concentration of external cooperation and a focus on results-oriented approaches, the main objectives of this evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant Commission external cooperation Services and the wider public with an overall independent and accountable assessment of the Commission’s past and current cooperation relations with Angola;
- to identify key lessons learned and thus provide the Commission’s policy-makers and managers with a valuable aid for implementation of the current strategy and indicative programmes and for future strategies and programming.

The evaluation covers the overall EC intervention in Angola over the period 2002-2007. Analysis is focused on:

- relevance, effectiveness and coherence of the Commission’s cooperation strategies over the period 2002 – 2007;
- consistency between programming and implementation over the same period;
- implementation of the EC cooperation focusing on effectiveness, efficiency, EC value added, impact and sustainability over the period 2002 – 2007 and on the intended effects of the current 2008 – 2013 programming cycle;
- the overall cooperation framework with the country, including the main agreements and other EU-Angola commitments.

1.2 Evaluation methodology implemented

The evaluation has been carried out in four phases, each one with specific tasks as summarised in Figure 3, with a more detailed description in Annex 5.1.

Figure 3: Phases of the evaluation process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception Phase</td>
<td>Desk Phase</td>
<td>Field Phase</td>
<td>Synthesis Phase</td>
<td>Dissemination Seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>RG</td>
<td>RG</td>
<td>RG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception Report</td>
<td>Desk Report</td>
<td>Debriefing Presentation</td>
<td>Draft Synthesis Report and Presentation for the Seminar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The core part of the methodology consists of 10 Evaluation Questions, which cover the DAC and EC evaluation criteria, and all intervention sectors. These questions were validated by the Reference Group, which has been guiding the evaluation process and has provided comments at the different stages. The EQ are presented in the following table:

Table 1: Evaluation Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ 1</td>
<td>Relevance: To what extent are EC strategies relevant and responsive to GoA short and medium term recovery and development policies and to what extent are these EC strategies adapting to the evolving situation in Angola?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 2</td>
<td>Coherence and complementarity: To what extent is EC support coherent with and complementary to relevant Community policies, other EC and other donors’ interventions (i.e. of EU Member States)? To what extent is the EC support coordinated and brings an value added?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 3</td>
<td>DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration): To what extent has EC support, including in particular its support to demobilisation, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, contributed to peace consolidation in Angola?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 4</td>
<td>Health: To what extent has EC support to the health sector contributed to better health service delivery through operational strategies, better management and coordination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 5</td>
<td>Food Security: To what extent has EC support to Food Security contributed to reduce food insecurity and strengthen productive capacity for sustainable rural development and the alleviation of rural poverty?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 6</td>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation: To what extent has EC support to Water &amp; Sanitation improved the quality of life for target populations in peri-urban areas of Luanda and Lubango/Namibe in the context of national sector policies and strategies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 7</td>
<td>Education and training: To what extent has EC support to education and training improved school infrastructure and professional/technical training, thus leading to more accessible, better quality education and greater access to employment opportunities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 8</td>
<td>Good Governance: To what extent has EC support in the area of Governance contributed to the consolidation of peace, the resolution of conflict and the creation of institutional prerequisites for sustainable development interventions in key social sectors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 9</td>
<td>Cross-cutting issues: To what extent have cross-cutting issues been mainstreamed in all sectors of EC support?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 10</td>
<td>Impact, sustainability – LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development): To what extent has EC support contributed to combining satisfaction of immediate needs of vulnerable populations with establishing conditions for long-term sustainability of development activities?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the relation between Evaluation Questions and evaluation criteria:

Table 2: Coverage of evaluation criteria by Evaluation Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>EQ 1</th>
<th>EQ 2</th>
<th>EQ 3</th>
<th>EQ 4</th>
<th>EQ 5</th>
<th>EQ 6</th>
<th>EQ 7</th>
<th>EQ 8</th>
<th>EQ 9</th>
<th>EQ 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC Crit.</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each Evaluation Question several Judgement Criteria (JCs) were formulated to provide a basis for answering the question. Each JC is measured by a set of Indicators, the aim of which is measurement of the achievement of the desired targets of each intervention. The methodology is aimed at collecting reliable information and data useful for analysis and for formulation of well-grounded judgements as the basis for answering the Evaluation Questions (see Annex 5 for a detailed description of the methodology).
The following figure summarises the process of information collection, data analysis, judgment, and formulation of answers, conclusions and recommendations.

**Figure 4: Summary of the evaluation approach**

1.2.1 Information collection

A large number of relevant documents (around 300) were collected during the inception and desk phases. Document collection was completed in the field phase (see bibliography in Annex 10).

In considering the large number of projects and programmes implemented during the period under evaluation, the evaluation team decided to identify a sample group of 18 projects, covering in a representative manner all focal and non-focal sectors, representing 57.5% of commitments during the period. The list of projects examined is given in Annex 3 and the selected case studies are listed in Annex 7.

The evaluators interviewed the following stakeholders:

- members of the Reference Group and of relevant Commission Services in Brussels;
- staff of the EC Delegation to Angola;
- national authorities at central level;
- local authorities (provincial, municipal);
- non-State actors (NSAs, including CSOs, CBOs, Private Sector etc.);
- project staff; and

The total number of interviews and focus group discussions was around 120 (see list of people contacted in Annex 11). Field activities included interviews and meetings, focus group discussions, and field visits to projects (see calendar of activities in Annex 12).

1.2.2 Analysis of available information

The analytical work undertaken was based on the Evaluation Questions with their Judgement Criteria and Indicators; the chain of reasoning, as presented in the Inception Report, is as follows:

- for each Evaluation Question and Judgement Criterion, data collected was used to measure the degree of achievement of targets specified by the Indicators;
- during the desk phase hypotheses to be tested during the field phase were developed, and subsequently cross-checked against the opinions of local stakeholders and experts;
• a synthesis was made and information was grouped according to the specific indicator to which it refers;
• the synthesised information was cross-checked and used to validate (or not) the indicators and the judgement criteria; SWOT analysis was used to combine several aspects in order to analyse the strategy and to come to general conclusions.

The information gathered was analysed systematically by using an evaluation grid consisting of the evaluation matrix (see Annex 6) elaborated in the inception phase and slightly adapted in the desk and field phases. Checklists available on the website on evaluation methodology prepared by the Joint Evaluation Unit were used to check whether relevant aspects had been addressed and adequately covered.

1.2.3 Formulation of the judgements
According to the evidence found for each Indicator, the evaluation team prepared a preliminary answer and hypothesis for each related Judgement Criterion (JC) and Evaluation Question.

The judgements were shaped on the basis of the following considerations and inputs:
• data and information gathered for each indicator;
• coherence between the indicators for each given EQ;
• straightforward and clear formulation;
• quantified visualisation (see introduction to answers to EQs in chapter 3);
• comments from the Reference Group;
• need for thorough answers to the EQs.

1.3 Changes between the Desk Report and the Synthesis Report
The hypotheses and outlook formulated in the Desk Report were, on the whole, confirmed and deepened during the field phase.

The analysis of both the strengths and weaknesses of the EC development support to Angola was further deepened and documental analysis was completed through access to documentation not previously available. Through the field analysis, some processes were clarified and the judgements were formulated on a more in-depth basis of evidence and enhanced through triangulation. This process produced a fine-tuning of the judgements and deepened the understanding of some critical elements such as the role of China’s financial assistance.

The relevance of the EC support to Angola was confirmed, as also was the importance of the LRRD strategy.

At sectoral level, the field phase allowed exploration of some elements, which were not entirely clear at desk level: a) documentation of the importance of institutional shortcomings, including the implications of a lack of action on institutional change, which had not been fully evident from the available documentation; b) identification and analysis of the difficulties encountered by the EC intervention; and fine-tuning of the analysis of some issues (e.g. gender and local governance).

Some Judgement criteria and Indicators have been slightly adapted (as documented in Annex 6: Evaluation Matrix) to make the analysis both more comprehensive and more effective.
1.4 Limitations of analytical process and judgment

The evaluators encountered the following limitations:

a) **Availability of Data.** One of the major problems in Angola (clearly highlighted in the JAR 2006) is the lack of statistics and baseline data as well as the weakness of the data collection system for project monitoring. The last census was carried out in 1970. During the war, mainly for security reasons, neither censuses nor specific surveys were carried out. For this reason, decision- and policy-making can rely only on a limited amount of often incomplete and unreliable data. This problem constrained analysis of impact, which has been analysed mainly through information gathered during interviews and visits to projects in the field, which provide qualitative insights but no quantitative data.

b) **Low interest and motivation at Ministerial Level** that made it difficult to fix appointments, to obtain documents, etc.

c) **Logistical difficulties** (non-availability of reliable and regular public transport, high costs of services, low reliability of service providers, very low number of telephone landlines etc.) that increased the time needed to complete the process.

d) **Limits of institutional memory** given that many key informants were not available, that many NGOs involved in implementation had phased out and closed their offices in Angola, and that most programme officers had recently (less than 1 year) changed.

1.5 Structure of the report

The main report (volume I) exist in English and Portuguese and consists of five chapters focused as follows:

1. the **objectives and methodology** of the evaluation (i.e. this section);

2. the overall **evaluation context**;

3. the **answers** to the 10 Evaluation Questions;

4. **conclusions** from the analysis and judgement processes;

5. **recommendations** to the EC.

Annexes (only in English) are presented in a separate volume II.
2 COUNTRY CONTEXT OF EC COOPERATION WITH ANGOLA

2.1 Political context

The 27-year-long civil war ended on April 4th 2002 with the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding complementary to the 1994 Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA. Since then Angola has experienced a period of political stabilisation. National legislative elections were held on 5 September 2008. The large majority obtained by the ruling party MPLA (87% of ballots) on a high turnout has given the government a democratic mandate and legitimacy in spite of important shortcomings highlighted by the European Union's election observer mission. That mission found that Angola's elections fell short of international standards and recorded certain imbalances, mainly with regard to access to State resources or active involvement of provincial administrations and traditional authorities in campaign activities, and irregularities in some polling stations.²

2.2 Economic context

The war had many far-reaching effects on the economic situation of Angola. The consequences were particularly serious in the agricultural sector, owing to a large reduction of the rural labour force, its dislocation, and a breakdown of trade between the urban and rural areas. In consequence, the most isolated rural populations were forced into a precarious state of economic autarchy, even far below basic subsistence levels.

Basic infrastructure was destroyed or severely damaged throughout the country, while roads were mined, thus disrupting communications and raising production costs. Furthermore, the war fragmented the national market into a patchwork of isolated market enclaves. Only one year after the end of the war, the Angolan economy started to recover. The trends in key economic country data during the evaluation period 2002-2007 are summarised in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Selected economic variables³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)*</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP (£ million)</td>
<td>11,431</td>
<td>13,956</td>
<td>19,775</td>
<td>30,632</td>
<td>45,163</td>
<td>46,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (£)</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>2,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of GDP (annual %)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross capital formation (% of GDP)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI (% of GDP)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>-130</td>
<td>-377</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt (US$ million)</td>
<td>8,745</td>
<td>8,702</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>11,781</td>
<td>9,563</td>
<td>8,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt (% GDP)</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt service (US$ million)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (% GDP)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (%)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net ODA received (US$ million)</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government revenue (only GoA) (% GDP)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government expenditure (% GDP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*estimates
Source: World Development Indicators, IMF Country Report, 2008 and UN estimates

³ All economic and social figures are tentative. The latest census is from the 70s and the statistical system is weak in Angola.
Figure 5: Real GDP growth rates 2002-2007

Angola is highly dependent on revenues from oil (see Figure 6). In fact mining and quarrying - particularly petroleum extraction and diamonds - accounted on average for almost 51% of GDP throughout the 1990s (57% according to 2008 OECD data). High international oil prices and rapidly growing output from new oilfields sustained real GDP growth as shown in Figure 5 above.

Figure 6: Sectoral share of GDP in 2007

The ratio of external debt to GDP decreased to one-fifth over the period 2002-2007 as shown in Figure 7. Angola has improved its access to external credit by reaching an agreement with its Paris Club creditors on a repayment schedule for its remaining debt.

Figure 7: Trend in Angola’s external debt in % of GDP

In the 1990s, the Angolan economy experienced hyperinflation with an average price increase of 977% over the decade. From then inflation fell to 268% in 2000, 106% in 2002 and 12% in 2007, indicating the success of the GoA’s efforts in recent years to reduce inflation and improve public finances.

Recent macroeconomic reforms have included creation of a unified budget, a single Treasury account, an on-line system tracking the flow of Government funds (SIGFE), a register for recording State assets, and a system for management of public investments (SIGIP). In 2007, the
quasi-fiscal operations of Sonangol and Endiama (State-owned companies completely outside parliamentary control) have started to decrease. Angola remains a mere observer to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), because

- the issue of transparency in extractive industries is not a political priority for the GoA; and
- full membership requires a set of implementation measures that exceed the country’s current capacity.

However, transparency of public finance management is gradually increasing, as the Ministry of Finance is publishing data in unprecedented detail on the State budget, on revenue from oil and diamonds, and on financial assistance from China Eximbank. A further signal of the political will to increase transparency is that the Ministry of Finance plans to replace the biannual public investment programmes with a Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

The Fiscal Year 2007 was the fourth year in a row of low capital expenditure due to the low absorptive capacity of the country’s institutions.

Relations with the IMF have improved despite the GoA’s decision in February 2008 not to pursue negotiation on an IMF-supported agreement.

As for Angola’s trade relations with the EU25, the volume of imports increased by 84% from €2,264m to €4,158m over the period 2002-2007, while in the same period the volume of exports grew by 186% from €1,408m to €4,023m.4

### 2.3 Social context

In the absence of any recent census data, the UN estimated the population in 2007 at around 17.4 million, compared to 14.7 million in 2002. Population growth of around 3% is fuelled by a high fertility rate (7 children per woman on average) which is the highest in the world. Moreover, 500,000 refugees returned from neighbouring countries. With only 38.4% of the population living in urban areas, Angola still has one of the lowest urbanisation rates in Africa and indeed in the world, despite Luanda’s population soaring to over 5 million according to recent estimates.

The UNDP Human Development Reports still rate Angola as a country of Low Human Development. The 2007/2008 Human Development Report ranks Angola 162nd out of 177 countries with a Human Development Index value of 0.446. Although Angola has a higher average annual income than many Sub-Saharan countries (GNI per capita is US$2,5605) life expectancy at birth is 41.7 years for Angola compared to 49.7 for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The Education Index is 0.598 in SSA but 0.537 in Angola.6 Social inequality is high in Angola (Gini Index is 0.62). According to the 2006 EC end-of term evaluation (ETR), the few data available, while not allowing identification of a clear trend, indicate still very high poverty levels in rural areas (94% compared to 57% in urban areas), while income is highly concentrated.7

The social sector has been targeted during the socio-economic and institutional resumption processes but the problems relating to the social reintegration of about 4.1 million formerly internally displaced people and about 500,000 returning refugees were (and still are) an important challenge to the socio-economic recovery of the country and to the generally high level of vulnerability.

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4 EC EN 120908 EC-Angola trade Statistics
5 The World Bank/IFC Doing Business 2008- Country Profile Angola
6 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
7 EC-Angola Cooperation End of Term Review Conclusions 2006
2.4 Government policy

Angola’s strategic policy framework is rather weak and the PRSP remains at its interim state from 2004. Apart from the Poverty Reduction Strategy - Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza (ECP) - the main policy document that guides the Government’s action is the Biennial Programme (PGG) for 2005-2006, the implementation period for which has been extended to 2008. The Government is promoting implementation of its medium term plan (2008-2010) and establishment of a long-term development vision (to 2025) that will support attainment of sustainable development.

The key objectives of PGG are:

1. consolidating the peace and national reconciliation;
2. laying the foundations for an integrated, self-sufficient national economy;
3. re-establishing the State administration across the entire national territory;
4. human resources development;
5. harmonious development of the national territory; and
6. consolidating the democratisation process, including holding free and fair elections.

The Public Investment Programme, annexed to the PGG, reflects the relative importance attached to the construction of critical infrastructure to stimulate economic growth. The National Budget is being formulated according to the priorities established in the programme.

In the post-war period, national development policies have focused on rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructures. In this framework, de-concentration and decentralisation processes could in principle support attainment of the MDGs. Nevertheless institutional weakness, difficult access, geographical imbalances in coverage, and lack of resources (above all human resources) combine to undermine the availability of social services, mainly in rural areas.

Peace, social stability and cohesion could promote growth of non-oil-related economic activities and help promote decent work and improve the quality of life.

2.5 Donors’ response

OECD data (see Annex 9) shows that ODA committed to Angola between 2002 and 2007 amounted to US$3,047m whilst net disbursements have been US$2,900m.

Figure 8: Total net ODA to Angola, all donors and EC 1987-2006

Source: OECD Statistics online 2008, see Annex 9

Figure 8 and Table 4 (overleaf) depict the overall assistance (net ODA flows to Angola) of all donors compared to the total ODA disbursements from the EC.

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8 It has represented one of the main challenges of several programming and review exercises in Angola
Table 4: ODA total commitments and disbursements 2002-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Current Year</th>
<th>ODA Total Commitments</th>
<th>ODA Total Gross Disbursements</th>
<th>ODA Total Net Disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>105,61</td>
<td>152,91</td>
<td>121,29</td>
<td>67,24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries, Total</td>
<td>149,94</td>
<td>204,31</td>
<td>157,29</td>
<td>94,54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC EU Members, Total</td>
<td>350,87</td>
<td>403,15</td>
<td>302,29</td>
<td>170,97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>25,97</td>
<td>39,62</td>
<td>30,15</td>
<td>16,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11,42</td>
<td>18,77</td>
<td>14,44</td>
<td>8,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>14,85</td>
<td>21,01</td>
<td>15,71</td>
<td>9,75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,73</td>
<td>8,96</td>
<td>6,64</td>
<td>4,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>17,92</td>
<td>28,12</td>
<td>17,36</td>
<td>10,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23,79</td>
<td>34,93</td>
<td>25,08</td>
<td>15,25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>288,63</td>
<td>393,95</td>
<td>281,64</td>
<td>159,54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>1,45</td>
<td>0,91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>115,72</td>
<td>65,87</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>21,08</td>
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<td>43,02</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>1,97</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>9,03</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADF (African Dev. Fund)</td>
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<td>14,44</td>
<td>9,03</td>
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<td>9,03</td>
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<td>Global Fund</td>
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<td>9,03</td>
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<td>17,97</td>
<td>14,44</td>
<td>9,03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD, Statistics online, 2009

Table 4 mirrors the immense increase in net ODA flows from 2002 onwards resulting from the return of peace during this period, reaching its peak in 2004. Since then the ODA flows have plummeted, reflecting both a cut in commitments to the level before 2002 and(callable repayments.9

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9 According to OECD Statistics online, 2009
Portugal was the main donor during the period but the largest share of its contribution was attributable to debt relief.\textsuperscript{10} The EC was the third largest donor.

The issue of donor coordination is still flagged as a cause of concern.\textsuperscript{11} The EC started boosting harmonisation and coordination by promoting dialogue and exchange of information (Thematic Working Groups were created during 2007) and promoted the preparation (in 2006) and approval (in 2007) of the EU Road Map to enhance coordination between EUMS. The next planned steps include use of Basket Funds and organisation of joint Missions.

In this framework, all donors have accepted fiduciary arrangements (Multi Donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank) and reporting procedures agreed by GoA, the Social Fund management, and the International Development Association (IDA). The EC has also accepted fiduciary arrangements for other projects in DDRR. The EC is launching a Basket Fund approach to support NSA during EDF10.

China is assisting Angola with important credit lines aimed at the recovery of infrastructure, railways, education and health facilities, water distribution etc.

In South-South cooperation Brazil’s cooperation support is highly appreciated and targets different sectors with no conditionality.

It has to be highlighted that Donors’ Support to Angola represents a small and decreasing share of GoA’s State Budget (less than 5%) so that EC support represents approximately 0.2\% of the State Budget\textsuperscript{12}. These conditions influence the impact of EC (and other donors) interventions and limit ODAs leverage on the political and policy choices made by the GoA.

### 2.6 EC support to Angola

#### 2.6.1 Principles

EC development assistance to Angola accords with the principles set out in:

a) **Article 177 of the Amsterdam Treaty** which defines development objectives as:
   - sustainable economic and social development;
   - progressive and harmonious integration in the world economy;
   - fighting poverty.

b) **EU/ACP Partnership Agreement** (Cotonou Agreement) signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, with particular regard to development of national strategies for combating poverty through the Millennium challenges of globalisation, liberalisation, and regional integration.

c) **The European Consensus on Development**, of which the principles guiding EC and Member States’ Development Cooperation practices are: a) *ownership*; b) *partnership*; c) *in-depth political dialogue*; d) *participation of civil society*; e) *gender equality*; and f) *addressing State fragility*.

In June 2002, the EU Council adopted the **EU Common Position on Angola**\textsuperscript{13} that identifies lines of action aimed at promoting a process of peace, national reconciliation and democracy in Angola through good governance and a culture of tolerance. These values were confirmed by General Affairs and External Relations Council’s adoption of Conclusion 13098/03\textsuperscript{14}, which welcomed…

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\textsuperscript{10} In 2004, Angola and Portugal agreed on major debt relief and rescheduling, which explains its high contribution in that year. In the years 2002-2006, Portugal provided ODA to Angola of between US$14m and US$20m (and in 2004 Portugal ODA to Angola excluding debt relief was US$17.6m, while in that year Portugal-Angola debt relief was US$698m.

\textsuperscript{11} In the first period after the war, OCHA played a crucial role ensuring donor coordination.

\textsuperscript{12} According to data collected by the EC Delegation in Angola for the EU Road Map

\textsuperscript{13} Council Common Position of 25 June 2002 on Angola and repealing Common Position 2000/391/CFSP

\textsuperscript{14} 2532\textsuperscript{nd} Council Meeting General Affairs Luxembourg 13\textsuperscript{th} October 2003 13098/03
the political changes in Angola and confirmed a willingness to support Angola in its efforts to consolidate democracy and socio-economic development.

The General Affairs and External Relations Council\textsuperscript{15} of 11 October 2004 agreed to maintain the Common Position 2002/495/CFSP on Angola for another year and to uphold conclusions it adopted on 13 October 2003 (13817/03).

2.6.2 The intervention strategy 2002-2007

The situation in Angola at the time of preparation of CSP/NIP of EDF\textsuperscript{9} was characterised by institutional and policy vacuums during which donors were implementing support programmes. The EC support strategy pursues the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (i.e. LRRD) and aims at creating synergies between the different financial instruments. The LRRD strategy proposed phased interventions in the short, medium and long terms to contribute to:

a. furtherance of the 2002 peace process national reconciliation and consolidation of democracy, including the creation of conditions for free and fair elections;
b. good governance and development of civil society;
c. poverty alleviation, through a gradual concentration of EC aid on two focal areas: food security and social sectors\textsuperscript{16}.

Planned \textbf{short-term interventions} (EDF 7/8 – uncommitted balances) included:

a. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants plus initial resettlement of populations;
b. good governance;
c. water and sanitation.

The strategy foresaw \textbf{medium- and longer-term interventions} (EDF 9, Envelope A) in support of the following sectors and cross-cutting issues:

a. food security (focal area);
b. health (focal area);
c. education system (focal area);
d. good governance, democracy and human rights;
e. support for civil society; disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation and reintegration (social sectors).

The \textbf{overall objective} of the intervention strategy was to \textbf{reduce the poverty levels} of vulnerable groups (rural populations and people living in suburban areas of major towns) and \textbf{consolidate the 2002 peace process} by helping the country overcome the post-war difficulties by promoting:

i) \textbf{social development};
ii) \textbf{economic development};
iii) \textbf{creation of basic governance capacities}.

The \textbf{driving forces} of the EC intervention Logic (see Figure 1 in Annex 2) can be identified as follows:

a) \textbf{consolidation of peace}: support to peace and conflict resolution activities;
b) \textbf{support for the post-emergency transition}: support displaced people and their resettlement, begin rehabilitation of accessible social infrastructure, reconstruct social capital and social networks in the areas of re-settlement, reinforce the capacity of local administrations, and promote more stable partnerships with Angolan civil society organisations;

\textsuperscript{15} GAERC (2608th) of 11 October 2004 Conclusions: Angola - Renewal of Common Position
\textsuperscript{16} Consultation with representatives of Angolan civil society confirmed support for these objectives
\textsuperscript{17} In the CSP 2008-2013 Governance will be a main focal issue and this can be interpreted as a signal of GoA’s political will to improve Governance.
c) **Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD):** aim to take advantage of synergies between the different financial instruments, to have GoA more and more engaged in the process, and to draw on the lessons learned from the long-lasting humanitarian support by conceiving short, medium and long term interventions based on continuity between different phases supported by different instruments\(^\text{18}\);

d) **Good Governance as a focal cross-cutting issue:** in the short, medium and long terms to promote democracy and human rights, reform of public finance management, development of civil society, political and economic integration at regional level, and sustainable use of natural resources.

### 2.6.3 The allocations to the implementation of the strategy

The following graphs show the trends in EC and total EU development aid disbursements *per capita* over a long period. The EC average for 2002-2005 including humanitarian aid was US$5 *per capita*.

**Figure 9** Comparison of *per capita* aid disbursement of EU and EC 2002-2005 in US$ (2005)

Total EC commitments to Angola during 2002-2007 from EDF NIP and thematic Budget Lines were €476.7m of which about €337m were disbursed by end of 2007\(^\text{19}\).

**Figure 10:** Share of funding sources in EC commitments and disbursements to Angola during 2002-07

Short-term interventions received 50.4% of the commitments and medium- and long-term interventions 49.6%. In terms of disbursements the share of the short-term interventions is about

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\(^{18}\) LRRD as well as efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid are explicitly mentioned as expected results and effects of the EC strategy.

\(^{19}\) See Project Portfolio in Annex 3.
60% due to the fact, that about 84% of the funds for short-term interventions are disbursed so far, compared to 57% of the medium/long-term interventions. The Figure 11 below provides an overview of the share of the short-term and medium/long-term interventions.

Assistance was quite fragmented as shown by Figure 12, largely owing to the prevailing reactive approach to the emergency situation in 2002. The main sectors were DDRR and de-mining and social sectors in general. Smaller shares were allocated to food security, health, education, water and sanitation, and governance. So far, however, disbursements on education and governance have been comparatively low (see Figure 13).

**Figure 11: Allocation of EC Aid by short- and medium-term perspective 2002-2007**

![Diagram showing allocation of EC Aid](image)

**Figure 12: EC Aid committed and disbursed by sector 2002-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€240.1m</td>
<td>€236.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculation based on CRIS project portfolio in Annex 3
The initial NIP left much room for flexibility during implementation, with the aim of rapid reaction to emerging needs, through allocating relatively large percentage ranges to different focal
sectors (e.g. 1%-12.5% for governance or 6.5%-34% for DDRR/social sectors in NIP EDF 9). There was no reallocation of funds following the 2004 mid-term review, while the end-of-term review advised a reallocation of €8.8m from Envelope A to the long-term development reserve.

EDF9 Envelope B funds were allocated to the Emergency Programme in support of resettlement of displaced people and refugees through funding of de-mining activities (€26m) and the Peace Facility (PEAPP) (€2.2m). Also many of the allocations under EDF9 to DDRR, social sectors (FAS) and food security still followed the initial short term logic (see Table 15 in Annex 6, p. 83).

The above Figure 13 shows the effective level of EC financial support by intervention sector during the evaluation period. The analysis of the EDF portfolio shows an average rate of about 72.5% of disbursed funds (97.9% of EDF7, 77.3% of EDF8 and 55.5% of EDF9).

In this framework, it is important to highlight the role played by the Action Plan to Support the Peace Process and its component, the Emergency Programme to Support the Peace Process or “Peace Facility” (PEAPP). This Action Plan and the related programme represent a major element in the EC’s support in the immediate post-conflict situation and show that the EC reacted swiftly (in close cooperation of all services: AIDCO, DEV, ECHO) to the rapidly evolving situation responding to short-term needs including emergency relief, food aid and food security, re-integration and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, and de-mining operations.

The changing situation on the ground, and the spiralling of new needs as more areas became accessible, led the EC to make available €30m of uncommitted funds from previous EDFs to support the peace process in the short term, in line with and as a part of its Plan of Action for Angola. These funds, targeting emergency medical assistance, distribution of seeds and tools, food aid (including aid to former UNITA soldiers and their families) and humanitarian de-mining were mobilised by the summer of 2002 through a single global financing proposal submitted in line with emergency procedures following an Inter-Service Mission dispatched to Angola by Commissioner Nielson in June of that year. A decision was taken to implement the Programme through UN agencies, the NGO Consortium Euronaid and FAO for the food security component and de-mining through NGOs.

2.6.4 Regional Cooperation

Regional Cooperation is based on SADC and PALOP interventions.

SADC RIP 2002-2007: The first regional strategic document affecting Angola was the Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) with its Regional Indicative Programme for the period 2002-2007 for SADC (Southern African Development Community). The EC intervention strategy contained two focal areas: “Regional Integration and Trade” and “Transport and Communications”.

In the context of the Cotonou Agreement, Regional Integration and Trade emerged as natural focal sectors in regional programming, all the more so in view of the still ongoing SADC EPA negotiations. There was an elaborate regional policy agenda and the majority of the countries in the region were involved in EPA negotiations and in negotiations with WTO. EC support was meant to contribute to the economic development of the countries of the region and to their integration in the world economy.

Negotiations for a full Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) covered the fields of “Services” and “Investment”. For the issues “competition” and “government procurement”, it was agreed that negotiations would only be envisaged once adequate regional capacity has been built up. Angola stated that it would joint the full EPA once it had finalised its tariff offer and its concerns were being satisfactorily dealt with.  

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20 The de-mining activities have contributed to resettlement and resumption of productive activities by increasing access and security and facilitating circulation. See Case Study in Annex 7.

21 Fact sheet on the interim Economic Partnership Agreements, SADC GROUP, January 2009
RIP PALOP: The 2nd PALOP (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa) programme for the group of African Lusophone Countries was signed in March 1997 but its implementation started only in 2000. The total indicative allocation for the RIP was €30.5m. In addition, projects undertaken for the purposes of strengthening and modernising centralised and decentralised administrative facilities could benefit from resources allocated by the European Community to Institutional Support Intervention sectors, namely: a) Institution and administration; b) Employment and Training; c) Culture; d) Statistics; e) Education; f) Tourism and environment. In the framework of the 2nd PALOP programme it is important to highlight the Programme “Supporting the Development of the Judiciary Systems” hosted by Angola, the objective of which was to contribute to a permanent structural change in the justice sector and wider society, reinforcing the social and economic development of all PALOP countries.

2.6.5 Humanitarian intervention

Within the LRRD framework, DG ECHO-funded assistance in Angola aimed at facilitating, along with other aid instruments, the return of displaced populations and subsequent achievement of self-sufficiency wherever and whenever possible, so as to permit the phasing out of DG ECHO funding under favourable conditions. The DG ECHO Office in Angola closed in 2005. During the period 2002-2005 ECHO reoriented its programme in Angola to short-term emergency activities, and a number of projects, notably in the primary health and water sectors, were transferred to EDF funding. However, given the complex emergency situation, the challenge was to establish clear strategies for ensuring continuity after the first phase of the emergency. An ECHO evaluation considered rehabilitation projects as complementary to other EC instruments, and consistent with the LRRD concept (the LRRD intervention portfolio is presented in Annex 4).

2.6.6 Thematic Budget Lines

The Food Security Budget Line (FSBL) channelled about €53.5m to Angola over the period 2002-2007 of which about 53% have been disbursed until end of 2007. These funds complemented those of EDF9. The operations in support of the food security instrument were organised with the aim of linking food aid with other EC development aid instruments (LRRD approach), and of reinforcing the integration of food aid and food security under a general development policy.

In addition to the FSBL, Angola benefited from other thematic Budget Lines (see project portfolio in Annex 3 for details):

- **European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR):** under this Budget Line the €5.2m have been allocated to different projects, partially micro-project grouped in blocks;
- **Anti-Personal Mines:** contribution of €4.4m to a landmine impact survey and mine clearing;
- **Co-financing with NGOs:** €20.8m for diverse projects; in some zones emergency strategies still dominate with a high level of substitution for State activities by European NGOs;
- **Rehabilitation & Reconstruction and Health:** contribution of €0.9m to primary health care rehabilitation, and €4.1m to minimising HIV/AIDS impact in rural areas;
- **Decentralised Cooperation:** €0.9m to improving local governance through capacity building of municipal councils and dialogue between civil society and local authorities.

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22 Based on the ECU/Euro parity since in 1997 the NIP was expressed in ECU.
2.6.7 Other sources

Water Facility

This instrument has contributed €3.5m to a project aimed at restoring access to improved water sources in rural areas, expanding the number of existing sources, and improving information systems and planning capacity at provincial level.

Global Fund

The Global Fund against HIV-AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (largely funded by the EC) approved funding of US$63m managed by UNDP, with activities starting in 2005.
3 ANSWER TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS

This chapter presents the answer to the Evaluation Questions based on a range of judgments built on findings from the information collected for different indicators linked to the respective judgment criteria. In order to facilitate orientation indicators are mentioned in brackets for easier reference to the annex.

⇒The collected data, findings and detailed answers can be found in the evaluation matrix in Annex 6; detailed information on projects and programmes selected for case study are given in Annex 7.

After outlining the approach to each Evaluation Question, the evaluators’ judgments as well as the major findings that led to the judgment are presented. The answer to the question is presented in a visualised form along with details as to how far the judgment criteria were fulfilled and any additional explanation needed, concluding with a summary box.

3.1 Relevance

| EQ 1 | To what extent do the objectives of EC support to Angola correspond to beneficiary needs and GoA’s short and medium term recovery and development priorities? To what extent is the EC adequately adapting its cooperation objectives to the evolving situation in Angola? |

3.1.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

Cooperation Strategies must be based on thorough identification of country needs, of Government and EC policies, and of other donors’ interventions. This question examines programming quality and how far the strategy was adapted to population’s needs identified during implementation and GoA’s strategic objectives.

The Evaluation Question is addressed by referring to the EC intervention as a whole as identified in chapter 2.6.3. As outlined there, EC strategy and practice focused on:

(i) short-term and immediate post-conflict situations, and consolidation of the peace process through measures and initiatives targeting demobilised soldiers and IDPs as one of the country’s main challenges since they embody a high risk of revival of the conflict;

(ii) rehabilitation of social services and institutions;

(iii) development needs related to improvements in access to and quality of social services; food security and agricultural development; recovery of productive capacity; strengthening of institutions and promotion of good governance; and democracy, rule of law and human rights;

The relevance of the strategy has been evaluated in relation to its capacity to satisfy the needs of the population and stimulate implementation of the policy framework set up by the GoA to overcome the post-war situation, consolidate peace and foster the development process.

Our judgment is based on the following Judgement Criteria:

- EC focal and non-focal areas of support coincide with GoA recovery and development priorities;
- EC global, regional and national cooperation objectives contribute to alleviation (and eventual eradication) of poverty and responds to the needs of the population.
3.1.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 1.1:** Although some limitations were identified both in the identification of strategic lines and in their implementation, **EC interventions were relevant to GoA’s objectives and helped address important social problems and poverty determinants** that the GoA highlighted in the Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza (Strategy to Combat Poverty) and of Programa Geral de Governo 2005-2006 (extended to 2008).

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

EC focal and non-focal areas of support coincided with the priorities set out in the strategic documents of GoA and contributed to tackling the main problems identified in them.

**Sectors covered by the EC interventions were of outstanding relevance** since recovery of productive capacity in agriculture, and availability and access to basic social services, were basic preconditions for consolidation of the peace process.

**Interventions in DDRR and related activities were highly important as a basis for resettlement of former combatants** and the strategic choice made by the EC, to serve as well the needs of former combatants as of those belonging to the receiving communities who are both vulnerable groups has contributed to completion of DDRR interventions and **reduction of potential conflicts.**

The adoption of the LRRD approach increased the relevance of EC support by **ensuring coverage of areas specifically related to different intervention phases** while taking account of future development needs as well as logistical, operational and organisational coordination of support during successive phases.

More critically, it has to be highlighted that the GoA, although welcoming EC interventions, has not always agreed completely on the EC’s political priorities and has failed to see the utility of political dialogue, as certain areas are regarded as strictly internal matters.

A negative element, which has affected the EC intervention, is that **several projects or programme reviews highlighted relatively low quality and weak logical frameworks.** During the early phases, this could most probably be ascribed to the emergency conditions and multi-sector characteristics, which entail involvement of a high number of partners in the process using different PCM modalities.

**JC 1.2:** EC interventions in all sectors have **contributed to human development by addressing the various sectoral determinants of poverty.** This applied along the whole intervention cycle since the ECHO humanitarian support phase, through:

1. rehabilitation of basic social services and contribution to resettlement of large segments of the population, mostly of the most vulnerable population groups addressed by the DDRR process;
2. serving both the income generation and social service needs of these populations; and **finally**
3. promoting institutional recovery during the development phase, which at local level produced considerable results.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

The Humanitarian Aid provided by ECHO contributed to **reestablishment of basic living conditions and addressed initial basic rehabilitation needs.** The subsequent EDF intervention in many cases ensured continuity by starting from the initial conditions created by the ECHO interventions and thus linking the relief and development phases by:

- **a)** contributing to a gradual reversal of the negative trends;
b) realising the potential for advances in the social sectors and food security to help alleviate poverty;
c) using support for democratic and effective governance at local level as a way of consolidating the peace process.

The recovery of productive capacity as well as the availability of and access to basic social services are basic preconditions for consolidation of the peace process. However, given the high level of depletion of productive capacity, the process is still effectively work in progress, although good results have been attained.

The productive capacity of beneficiaries has been revived and social capital has been recovered by creating social and productive organisational forms such as cooperatives and other productive groups. This process paved the way for further interventions to facilitate income generation.

Another facet of the EC intervention entailed addressing a range of sectoral determinants of poverty by facilitating resettlement of the most vulnerable layers of the populations affected by the war and involved in the DDRR process, and by stimulating human development by increasing access to and quality of basic social services.

Another important issue relating to the long-lasting war is conflict prevention. EC strategy and practice concentrated on conflict prevention as a measure for consolidating peace, on immediate humanitarian support to save lives, and on re-establishment of the minimum conditions for initiating rehabilitation and development. Governance issues relating to rehabilitation of institutions and promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights have also been addressed.

Finally, the EC intervention has targeted local governance by promoting institutional recovery, reinforcement of responsiveness and accountability in local institutions, and citizen participation.

3.1.3 Overall judgment and answer to the Evaluation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQ1: To what extent do the objectives of EC support to Angola correspond to GoA’s short and medium term recovery and development priorities and beneficiary needs? To what extent is the EC adequately adapting its cooperation objectives to the evolving situation in Angola?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC 1.1: Coincidence with GoA recovery and development priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 1.2: Contribution to poverty alleviation and the needs of the population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Answer to Evaluation Question 1

EC support in Angola has been relevant to the needs of the populations in the different phases of post-war recovery and development and to GoA’s policy framework (especially ECP and PGG).

EC assistance has also furthered alleviation of poverty in Angola, and recreation of basic living conditions among the most vulnerable layers of the population following the end of the armed conflict. The LRRD phased approach played an important role in this regard.

The rapidly changing physical, social and political environment in Angola posed a challenge for the EC’s planning and implementation procedures. Expected outcomes and milestones were not always appropriate to the conditions under which activities were ultimately implemented, and the quality of project design was often relatively low.
3.2 Coherence and EC value added

| EQ 2 | To what extent is EC support coherent with and complementary to relevant Community policies, other EC and other donors’ interventions (i.e. of EU member states)? To what extent is the EC support coordinated and brings a value added? |

3.2.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

The EC was the major donor throughout the 1990s, contributing an average of 17% of the total aid (19% in 2000). The EC Country Strategy was established to support measures to promote peace and conflict resolution and to help alleviate poverty. Thus, EC development assistance had to comply not only with the five DAC criteria, but also with the following two specific EC criteria:

i. **Coherence**, that is the EC development programme should be internally coherent, with no contradictions in objectives and activities; there should be convergence between the EC policy in the sphere of development cooperation and the objectives of other EC or EU policies likely to affect developing countries, and policy and interventions should be coherent and coordinated with interventions pursued by the Member States and other development partners; and

ii. **Community Value-Added**, that is to say EC interventions should produce extra benefits relating to its mandate and intervention. This EQ also takes into account the effectiveness of donor harmonisation and territorial or sectoral synergy in the framework of LRRD, the guiding principle for EC intervention in Angola. Along with EDF programmable aid, other EDF and EC-financed interventions are also considered.

The EQ is answered by referring to the EC intervention as a whole as identified in chapter 2.6.3. The judgment is based on the following **Judgement Criteria**:

- NIP interventions are coordinated with those of other donors (especially EU Member States);
- CSP is coherent with EU global and regional policies and AU/NEPAD strategic frameworks;
- Evidence of EC value-added to support EU Member States coordination in dialogue with the government;
- China’s financial assistance and interventions of other non-EU development partners, mainly the World Bank and Brazil, are not negatively affecting the implementation of the EC Country Strategy.

3.2.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 2.1: Donor Coordination has proved to be a major problem in Angola**, even though donor interventions in similar areas did not result in duplication; on the other hand, **the EC initiative produced some progress from 2007 onwards.**

Coordination in general is another problem as it has proved weak between not only the EC and Member States, but among the whole range of donors, as well as between different Ministries and institutional bodies involved in project implementation.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Donor coordination has been low in Angola since the withdrawal of UN-OCHA from its role as principal facilitator. Although no duplication was found both in project activities and in technical assistance to the Ministries, the fact remains that **several donors intervened in the same sectors or sub-sectors, addressing similar geographical areas and problems without clear coordination.**

GoA is not fulfilling its coordination role and consequently, in medium- and long-term sector development support there is **no specific evidence of systemic coordination either with other**
donors in general or more specifically with the EU Member States. In all the documents analysed, other donor initiatives, activities and policy contributions are considered but there is neither specific evidence nor analysis of coordination mechanisms.

Coordination turned out to be a weakness in general since, in many cases, several Ministries are involved in the same activities, and the capacity to exchange information and to plan and implement jointly is relatively low. In consequence, decision-making has been lengthy and overall capacity to fulfil obligations has been low.

From the end of 2007, the situation started to improve considerably as thematic working groups were established and the EC started promoting implementation of the EU Road Map on Coordination. The EC Delegation has involved the Member States in the preparation of the CSP for EDF10, and initiatives for the creation of Basket Funds and promotion of joint missions are in hand.

Non-EU donors are involved in an exchange of information. The EC has worked closely with the World Bank, not only in execution of programmes (DDRR and FAS III) but also in the economic and budgetary sector. However, cooperation with the IMF has proved unsatisfactory.

**JC 2.2:** At strategic level, the EC interventions proved to be coherent with the most important global, regional and country-specific EU and EC policy documents and with the general principles of the AU/NEPAD strategic frameworks. At sectoral level, apart from some specific limitations, the choices and interventions have been coherent with EU sectoral strategic intervention modalities, especially in areas where the EC demonstrates its value added.

Major Findings supporting the judgment

**Coherence of objectives of the strategy and interventions with those of global, regional and national strategic documents** is ensured primarily by the central strategic need to support the process of peace, national reconciliation and democracy by focusing on social sectors, good governance and conflict resolution.

In fact several features of the EC intervention show that promotion of sustainable economic and social development as set out in Article 177 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community pervades the EC intervention across the sectors, and indicate that focal and non-focal sectors are coherent with the EU Development Policy COM (2000) 212.

The EC intervention strategy reflects the basic tenets of the LRRD concept established by the EC Communication “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development” (LRRD) COM (96) 153.

The EC intervention strategy has also been coherent with regional policies and strategic frameworks such as those of the AU and NEPAD whose vision of good governance, respect for human rights and democracy has been underpinned by the EC intervention in Angola.

**Geographical coherence** with the needs of the population and the priorities of the EU Common Position on Angola has been ensured by the fact that development interventions targeted the Planalto Central (Central Highlands), the most densely populated area of the country and the territory most affected by the war, without neglecting the northern provinces of Uíge and Zaire and the Southern Provinces (e.g. Namibe).

This strategic choice did not limit the outreach of EC humanitarian action since as soon as it became possible ECHO shifted its assistance to the Eastern part of the country that had not been reached by other humanitarian operators because of limited access and security risks.
JC 2.3: Across the sectors (Education, Health, Food Security, DDRR), there is evidence of EC value added, which at strategic level resides in LRRD. In fact, the LRRD approach is evident both at strategic level and across sectors, and the EC has involved all its implementing partners in mainstreaming the approach into the whole intervention, not only at the level of international and national NGOs, but also of UN Agencies. At sector level, it is possible to identify EC value added emanating from the mainstreaming of lessons learned and best practice, from the high level of sectoral experience.

Major Findings supporting the judgment

The LRRD strategy (as specific EC post-crisis intervention approach) is the most important component of EC value added, since not only has it contributed to promoting continuity of intervention, but also it has supported partners in such a way as to promote early recovery of the internal capacity of the country. Conceiving its assistance to Angola as a strategically phased approach, the EC created a productive framework for cooperation with the Government. The EC provided the implementing partners with guidance and support, and gave them the opportunity to apply their specific strengths in the different phases of the transition from relief to development.

This experience has been an invaluable support for national personnel who are now progressively taking over responsibilities as post-LRRD operations are ‘Angolised’.

Other components of EC value added have been (i) the deployment of a wide array of instruments and partnerships for security, stability, income generation, development, democratic governance and promotion of human rights, (ii) its vast experience in dealing with humanitarian emergencies, and (iii) its worldwide experience in several sectors (i.e. food security, de-mining and health).

On the other hand, over the longer term the overall weakness of political dialogue and of governance or institutional support activities at central level are likely to reduce the contribution that European Governance Principles make to the country. In consequence, the EDF10 choice to focus on local governance appears more likely to produce a gradual incremental impact in the long term.

JC 2.4: Financial assistance and cooperation support from other donors have so far not had a negative influence on EC support to Angola. Nevertheless, given the fact that, regardless of the nature of support, the GoA has particularly welcomed the absence of conditionalities from donors such as Brazil or China, a problem might still arise in this regard as EDF procedures and EC conditionalities are perceived as obstacles to further EC assistance.

Major Findings supporting the judgment

China is supporting Angola exclusively through oil-backed loans (no grants are foreseen) and is showing the greatest interest in Angola’s extractive industries. Angola has become China's largest supplier of crude oil on the African continent. Many Government bodies and Ministries are considering the lack of conditionalities as a strongly attractive characteristic and GoA is starting to use the fact that Chinese financial support is offered without political or strategic conditions (no account being taken of the difference between oil-backed loans and grant support) as a means of leverage against conditionalities imposed by other donors and during policy dialogue. Moreover GoA praises the fact that China’s financial aid has been disbursed (and activities have been implemented) on a fast track.

Brazil provides support in the fields of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), Rural Development and Innovation in Agriculture, HIV-AIDS, sports and youth, culture, macroeconomic and financial management, construction of Business Centre. The GoA considers the quality of Brazilian support to be very high, especially in TVET and Agriculture.

25 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE- A White Paper COM(2001) 428 final In this Government the EC identifies the five guiding principles of Good Governance: Openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coherence.
Brazil’s interventions are partially coincident with EC intervention priorities in several sectors such as TVET and Rural development) (with the difference of an absence of conditionalities), and Brazil can be considered one of the new partners involved in donor coordination.

The World Bank strategic documents issued over the period 2002-2007 indicate an approach in line with the general direction of EC support. This coherence was highlighted in the DDRR process and in FAS III although inefficiencies did emerge (delays in implementation and partial financial implementation of programmes of which the impact could have been significantly higher). In both programmes entrusted to the WB, substantial proportions of the financial resources invested by the EC were not disbursed owing to various delays in implementation (by the implementing partners FAS III and IRSEM). In both cases, the problems related to rigid application of regulations.

3.2.3 Overall judgment and answer to the Evaluation Question

Answer to Evaluation Question 2

EC interventions are coherent both internally (with EC global, regional and national policy directions) and externally (with global partnership principles and the strategies of partner donors). The effort made by the EC to promote implementation of the EU Road Map to increase coordination is highly valuable, and the creation of Thematic Working Groups is a good starting point for promoting ongoing dialogue and the needed level of coordination. The LRRD strategy is by far the most important element of EC value added as a contribution to Angola’s post-war recovery and development effort. This value added arises from the long experience and the strength of the implementation capacities of partners.

China’s financial support (loans) has so far not affected EC cooperation adversely, but the absence of conditionalities is being used by GoA as leverage to deter political influence by donors. Cooperation with the World Bank has shown some elements of inefficiency which need to be considered during future cooperation in the drafting of Partnership Documents with the World Bank, so as to ensure a greater voice for the EC in the decision-making process.

3.3 DDRR

EQ 3 To what extent has EC support, including in particular its support to demobilisation, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, contributed to peace consolidation in Angola?

3.3.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

Reintegration is a long and complex process with no predictable end. Even comprehensive programmes in a favourable macroeconomic environment cannot ensure by themselves that the living standards of ex-combatants will approach those of the poorer segments of the civilian
population. The EQ analyses the levels of differentiation and integration of the EC intervention in DDRR, the degree of responsiveness to actual needs, the capacity to bridge immediate relief support to a developmental perspective by strengthening social links and institution-building processes, and how far former combatants and their families were provided with sustainable opportunities for earning a livelihood. CSP/NIP compliance with COM(2001)211 is also analysed.

EC intervention in DDRR has been evaluated on the basis of its capacity to promote resettlement of former fighters and their reintegration into the social and economic fabric of the recipient territories, thereby contributing to the consolidation of peace.

The judgment is based on the following Judgement Criteria in respect to EC contribution to:

- adequate consideration of specific issues such as the balance of political and economic power; control of the security forces; ethnic composition of the government; representation of women in decision-making bodies; and potential degradation of environmental resources;
- progress in resettlement of former combatants and amelioration of the overall condition of the populations affected by the DDRR process;
- viability of livelihoods of ex-combatants and their families;
- level of social integration of former fighters and their families into new communities;
- robustness of the overall social and institutional environment in former conflict zones.

3.3.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 3.1:** The EC support to DDRR addressed a wide range of problems, and impacted on layers of the population who risked exclusion from the intervention of the regional ADRP Multi Donor Trust Fund, that is vulnerable groups (women, children, and handicapped people) unrelated to demobilised soldiers.

The principles of balanced power and participation were expressed in a general form in all DDRR documents but no specific project objectives were linked to them. However, political power became more balanced through increased participation in the areas targeted by FAS III.

Women targeted by the interventions were economically empowered and both their access to social services and their participation in civic life improved, but women remain under-represented in the decision-making process.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

The EC support to the DDRR process in Angola was comprehensive as a result of taking into consideration the different aspects of the DDRR process, contributing to the different phases of the resettlement process and targeting different beneficiaries (also taking on board gender and children-related issues). This strategic choice allowed improved impact of the DDRR intervention and prevention of potential conflicts between demobilised soldiers and the poor members of receiving communities.

The main criterion adopted for EC intervention has been that of vulnerability (according to types of household assets - natural, physical, financial, human and social) and exposure to risk: nature, frequency and severity of shocks such as health risks, economic shocks, social shocks, natural disasters, and lifecycle-related shocks. Consequently, the EC interventions targeted the vulnerable groups taking balanced consideration of the problems of the poorest segments of the population among demobilised combatants and resident communities, helping to improve the balance between the two categories of stakeholders and preventing conflicts between them.

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26 Women, children, physically impaired related and not related to the demobilised combatants
Indeed, in the absence of this intervention “stay-at-home” populations might potentially have seen no benefit in reintegration of ex-combatants and might have felt discriminated against.

Along the intervention cycle different outcomes have been produced for all stakeholders involved in the DDRR process as a result of proceeding from immediate social needs (reduction in mortality, food security) and initial re-establishment of institutions, to a gradual improvement of the capacity of private beneficiaries (support for production and income generation) and in the medium term of institutions.

In the longer term, the bases of the development process have been created and direct beneficiaries have achieved marketable agricultural surpluses and recovery of productive capacity. At this stage, institutional constraints have started to emerge since institutions have not always fulfilled their obligations, for example payment of salaries and operational expenses.

The most critical risk is related to the level of social imbalance that could jeopardise social services and undermine national cohesion if most of the population continues to live below the poverty line.

**JC 3.2: Progress in resettlement has been more than satisfactory** although the issue of FAA demobilisation remains outstanding owing to specific difficulties relating to the characteristics of the soldiers to be demobilised and some political limitations.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

As of September 2008, almost 97,500 UNITA members (71% of the target) have been demobilised and almost 80,000 have been reintegrated (48% of the target); reintegration activities have continued to expand although it has to be said that GoA agreed to discharge up to 33,000 members of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) once the demobilisation of UNITA military personnel was complete. Although significant policy, planning and operational preparatory work has been carried out, the actual demobilisation of the FAA only began on a pilot basis. According to IRSEM the massive demobilisation process involving 33,000 soldiers (mostly disabled) was postponed owing to difficulties in finding viable alternatives for rehabilitating and reintegrating them.

This last-mentioned problem was facilitated by the creation of “receiving areas” for the demobilised combatants. The concentration of efforts and projects in these areas has allowed minimisation of the risk of conflict in receiving communities.

The success of the resettlement process is reinforced by the fact that the bulk of the former military live in the same area where they were initially relocated and that 81% of them are not contemplating further relocation.

The creation of conditions for the improvement of agricultural production and profitability and the gradual availability of marketing channels have stabilised the use of land since farmers are linked to local value chains for their products. Moreover, a growing number of resettled former combatants own plots of land.

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27 This emerges from the Implementation Mission Reports for the Support to Vulnerable Groups, the Mid-Term Evaluation for this IRSEM implemented programme and from interviews with the beneficiaries of DDRR activities in Huambo as well as the Final Evaluation of the PTAPD project and interviews with beneficiaries, civil society organisations and EC Officers in charge for the implementation of the programme.

28 Last survey carried out by the IRSEM Unidade de Registo, Monitoria e Avaliação- Register, Monitoring and evaluation unit (URMA) and reported in the: IRSEM “Three-monthly Report” September 2008.

29 The latest IRSEM inquiry found that 98.8 % have their own land (lávra in local language).
**JC 3.3:** Economic reintegration and sustainability of the livelihood of former combatants and their families (and of the most vulnerable layers of receiving resident communities) were promoted by a range of mostly successful initiatives, the beneficiaries of which have achieved better social and economic conditions than the rest of their community.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Interventions co-funded by the EC have contributed to *generation of employment opportunities*. In fact 62.4% are employed - 58% self-employed, and 4.4% with a waged job. Their employment demonstrated a good level of sustainability \(^{30}\) since the historical trend has shown very low variation around the share of 63%-64% of employed over the period (long-term sustainability has yet to be verified). \(^{31}\)

One of the indicators of improved living conditions and growing sustainability of employment and income generation conditions is the **slow but steady growth of productive groups with trading activities** for highly profitable cash crops and a growing infrastructure for their transformation and distribution.

**JC 3.4:** The modality of intervention and the methodological approach adopted by the EC have contributed not only to *resettlement of former combatants* but also to the reconstruction of social relationships and social bonds, and thus to the *revitalisation of social life and civic participation* in the territories targeted by the intervention.

At community level, EC intervention specifically targeted social relationships and contributed to removing former socio-political obstacles (such as formerly belonging to different parties in the conflict) which hindered the reconciliation and reintegration process.

Consequently, **reintegration has been successful in both quantitative and qualitative terms**. \(^{32}\) The vast majority of the demobilised soldiers feel well accepted by the receiving communities. This perception extends to community level producing a virtuous circle of coexistence and peace consolidation. \(^{33}\)

Several project interventions tackled *conflict reduction*. A FAO-implemented project is working on land problems, while projects under the EIDHR have targeted issues such as land tenure and local conflict. These projects suggested various practices and processes for legalisation of land tenure, resolution of conflicts and for the creation of the conditions for sustainable settlement of the populations.

Indeed citizen awareness needs to be further raised and the human rights situation improved, mainly in relation to Harmful Traditional Practices (e.g. sorcery) in the name of which various forms of human rights violations are perpetrated (social marginalisation, violence, lack of treatment in case of sickness etc).

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\(^{30}\) Regularly surveyed by IRSEM’s *Unidade de Registo, Monitoria e Avaliação*

\(^{31}\) Data from the IRSEM post-project monitoring process

\(^{32}\) The last IRSEM inquiry shows that 99% think to have been well received. - IRSEM *Relatório Trimestral de Atividades* Junio/Setembro 2008.

\(^{33}\) The Mid-Term Evaluation of the IRSEM project \(^{33}\) (2007) shows that: a) 71% of interviewees participate in community activities; b) 93% of interviewees think that there are no sensitive internal conflicts in their communities; c) 71 % of interviewees think that now the other members of the community also live better; d) 58% think that they have more means, 32% think that they have more education; and 18% think that they have more jobs. These numbers are confirmed by the findings of the focus groups with the beneficiaries of the IRSEM project in Huambo (see Annex 13).
**JC 3.5: Local institutions are growing in term of robustness, capacity, accountability and motivation for promoting citizen participation** in all locations where the Municipal Development Component of FAS has been implemented, and this is a specific EC contribution to the revival of local institutions in former conflict zones.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

At institutional level in the areas targeted by DDRR intervention, progress has been registered in terms of both institutional accountability and participation. In the municipalities where the Municipal Development Component of FAS III has been implemented, participation in consultative actions and municipal fora has increased the sense of ownership of the reconstruction process through increasing accountability of local administrators and stimulation of citizens’ availability for active participation.

There has been a cross-effect between EIDHR interventions and FAS III in the field of Human Rights since the effectiveness of municipal institutions and their relationship with communities has gradually allowed addressing of Harmful Traditional Practices and existing human rights violations (such as violence against imprisoned people or people arrested by police). Citizen awareness of the importance of consolidating the peace process and of encouraging widespread participation in civic affairs has been raised. However, violations of human rights, lack of respect for human rights and violations of the rule of law are still reported by INGOs.

The EC intervention stimulated wide interest since several governors were interested in expanding the Municipal Development Component of FAS III to all municipalities in the provinces, and seven provincial governments are willing to finance local development plans. The importance of this component will grow with the transformation of all the “Municípios” into “Unidades Orçamentais” (Budget Units) in the upcoming decentralisation process. Municipal fora have been incorporated in the revision of Decree 17/99.

The extensive decentralisation process planned for 2009 and the growing willingness to extend recent best practice to new situations are important opportunities that justify the choice of focusing CSP support under EDF10 at municipal and provincial level.

The capacity for assuming responsibility at national level (State institutions) has been limited and the capacity-building problem remains.

As for family reunification the final reports of IRSEM Implementing Partners state that the majority of the demobilised militaries were reunified with their families following the early cantonment phases and that the process was gradually increasing.

The critical aspects of the EC intervention are related to general problems relating to:

a) low quality of impact monitoring systems (due to lack of updated baseline data, insufficient application of indicators and irregular data collection);

b) quality of project design;

c) capacity and continuity of technical assistance;

d) examples of new-found best practice (e.g. new legal process for land occupation in peri-urban areas, methodologies for conflict resolution and dispute settlement at local level by involving parties to the case, local authorities, traditional authorities, independent technicians etc.) resulting from these processes not being disseminated for replication and mainstreaming in other situations.

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40 FAS Final Report and IRSEM Annual Evaluation 2007
41 The representative of CIC in Huambo has reported several cases of HR violation and violation of the rule of law because of Harmful Traditional Practices.
42 Last Census dates back to 1970.
43 There have been delays in the deployment of the TA for logistical reasons and often TA has been unable to transfer capacity to its national counterparts.
3.3.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

**Answer to Evaluation Question 3**

EC support has contributed to the consolidation of peace in Angola by targeting the DDRR process with a wide array of interventions aimed at tackling different facets of such a complex and large process of reintegration, not only of demobilised fighters and their families but also of internally and externally displaced people. The LRRD strategy has helped the process and fast decision-making has contributed to timeliness. The fact that, in an initial phase, the EC acted through fast resumption of uncommitted EDF7/8 funding and through Budget Line interventions has positively influenced the speed of implementation. EC support, within the framework of the overall multi-donor support for DDRR, has contributed to enhancing community reception and social reintegration. The support for the creation of local value chains (which started with organisation of farmers into productive groups from the early phases of ECHO intervention) has contributed to the reconstruction of social capital.

3.4 Health

**EQ 4** To what extent has EC support to the health sector contributed to better health service delivery through operational strategies, better management and coordination?

3.4.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

This EQ primarily addressed at the health objectives and goals set by the Country Strategy Paper for EDF9 and the commitments the GoA itself made for the sector. It also addressed selected health LRRD operations to arrive at a more complete overview of EC health operations in Angola. Assessment of these issues was achieved by studying pertinent available health statistics and verifying the same in interviews, both in the capital and in the field, with selected implementers as needed.

The EC intervention in health has been evaluated on the basis of its capacity to widen access to health services and improve their quality in all fields of intervention.

The judgment is based on the following *Judgement Criteria* in respect to EC contribution to:
- wider availability and access to health services;
- improved delivery and quality of health and preventive services, essential medicines and contraceptives;
- strengthened management capacity and clinical skills of health sector cadres, and improved health information systems (HIS);
- improved health indicators;
EC rehabilitation activities that re-established operational and institutional mechanisms, which in turn facilitated the start of developmental approaches in health (LRRD approach).

3.4.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 4.1:** Availability, access to and quality of health services have been improved. EC support to the rehabilitation of the health system contributed to new specialised services (e.g. physical rehabilitation), to better distribution of medicines and to reducing the most important poverty-related diseases. Moreover, advice on the policy level focused policy development on nationwide recovery and development of the health sector. However, institutional shortcomings have hindered achievement of a better degree of system recovery.

### Major Findings supporting the judgment

**DG ECHO support** through its partners was indeed a vital starting point for rebuilding the health system at peripheral level and was a basis for more durable solutions to improving the health situation of the most vulnerable populations in Angola. With its emphasis on keeping up DG ECHO’s provision of health services to vulnerable groups, including distribution of essential medicines, **LRRD was clearly a key aspect of EC cooperation.**

In the CSP it was envisaged that GoA’s contribution to the response strategy in this sector was to be as follows: (i) drawing-up, by the end of 2002, of strategic guidelines on the national health policy; (ii) adoption, by the end of 2003, of a position on the financing of the health system, including cost recovery and a medium-term financing framework; (iii) an increase in the annual budgetary allocations to the health sector to around 10% of the State budget by 2003, and all measures necessary to increase budget execution to 100% in 2004; (iv) definition of roles and responsibilities at central and local level, as well as the roles of the different partners in the health sector; and (v) approval and implementation of national pharmaceutical and blood policies.

The health sector budget provision increased over the period under evaluation even though, in percentage terms, allocations remained low. However, the key factor confirmed by this evaluation is the low absorptive capacity of the sector, most probably (at least in part) due to the prolonged absence of a strategic national health plan. The following figure summarises the data:

**Figure 14:** Evolution of public health expenses 2002-2007

The data confirm a substantial decrease in relative terms in public expenditure on health.

Since the ECHO interventions - and significant LRRD operations that followed them - PHC services were offered in places where none previously existed and those have remained operational to date, in good part through the work of the EC’s partner NGOs. Physical rehabilitation services in 11 centres nationwide received EC support and led to their greater utilisation. A sorely needed centre for the care of the deaf, dumb and blind was opened with EC funding in Benguela.
Between 2002 and 2007, 295 health centres were rehabilitated or rebuilt, as were 1,600 health posts, nine central hospitals and 50 general hospitals. With the increase of health facilities, the average distance to facilities (as an important dimension of access) is likely to have decreased, but no information was found on this aspect even during the field visit. As of 2005, access to health services (availability within acceptable distance) had become possible for about 30-40% of the population, but access to essential medicines had only increased from 25% to 30% of the population; to date, regular supplies of medicines remain a concern\textsuperscript{34}. The PASS project’s attempt at streamlining transparent procurement of drugs at central level ended up in rejection of the \textit{ad hoc} proposal to the MINSA.

**Primary Health Care and essential medicines** have been provided to \textbf{one million beneficiaries}; \textbf{health posts} have been constructed or rehabilitated and \textbf{personnel trained} in 30 municipalities; two important \textbf{epidemic outbreaks} have been \textbf{tackled}. Financial policy-making and reviewing of the human resources development plan at the MINSA have also been supported.

Otherwise, in 2004 the Global Fund (largely financed by the EC and Member States) funded HIV, malaria and TB projects to a total of US$63m for the 2004-2005 biennium. Funds were administered by UNDP and activities started in 2005.

**JC 4.2:** The \textbf{availability and quality of preventive health care services}, including MCH, has been \textbf{strengthened in areas served by EC intervention}

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Interventions are ongoing for mother-to-child transmission of HIV-AIDS and provincial supervisors for preventive activities are now in place. Moreover, the National Institute for the Fight against AIDS has been strengthened, HIV screening has been streamlined and anti-retrovirals distributed.

ECHO implemented a large number of health projects and provided support for the combating of two epidemics: Marburg hemorrhagic fever and cholera.

Recent data for the five provinces in the PASS project show that the \textbf{drug supply situation from government sources has improved}. A regulation covering the use of medicines and of blood products that had EC support was approved.\textsuperscript{35}

PASS also engaged with the MINSA in work on a human resources development plan and in providing TA for strengthening financial policies and streamlining transparent procurement of drugs at central level\textsuperscript{36} but \textbf{the interest and commitment of the MINSA in respect of family planning is unclear}; supply of contraceptives is least reliable of all, with frequent interruptions.

**JC 4.3:** The EC has contributed to \textbf{strengthening management capacity and clinical skills} in the system through a significant amount of training of health staff, provision of vital support to DPS and training for management skills. \textbf{Strengthening the HIS has proven difficult} and the system is still too deficient to provide reliable data for any judgement based on official MINSA statistical evidence.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

\textbf{Training of medical and nursing staff has represented an outstanding effort} in the PASS project, as well as in the EC-funded NGO projects. No records have been compiled that might have provided a more objective idea of the magnitude of this effort (i.e. number of cadres trained and follow up to ascertain whether they are applying new quality of clinical care and preventive

\textsuperscript{34} CSP 2007-2013

\textsuperscript{35} PASS, Relatorio trimestral do Orcamento Programa No.3, Julho Setembro 2008.

\textsuperscript{36} The document has not been approved by MINSA. (“the MINSA is simply not interested”).
medicine skills). Altogether, in five provinces lower-level personnel were trained in 30 municipalities; while at central level PASS, in its support to the MINSA in Luanda, also trained cadres in HIS, in human resources, in specialised overall management, in essential medicines management and in safe blood issues.

The Physical Rehabilitation project trained 24 technical cadres in Central America (El Salvador) and 20 more in-country at middle level, as well as an additional 30 through distance learning courses.

The **training of planning and budgeting skills reached the municipal level** in the provinces covered and entailed a detailed situation analysis of the health sector in each municipality; the effort culminated in detailed GIS maps rich in information. In its second phase (after 2006), the PASS project provided support to Direções Provinciais da Saúde (Provincial Health Directorates) which in this case culminated in a widely-praised health mapping exercise that served as a base for the preparation of detailed budgeted provincial and municipal plans (POAs). These plans include budgeted reproductive health and family planning activities and supplies.

The above support was praised not only by the health authorities, but also by the Ministry of Finance, which expressed the wish that other sectors would also embark on preparation of similarly budgeted plans. This progress is important given that the national process of budgetary decentralisation to the municipalities was due to go from pilot to universal status in January 2009.

At central level, PASS introduced some new software and training in its use, but it de-emphasised work on this following the December 2007 amendment of the Financial Agreement to devote more energy to work at provincial level. **EC support for the HIS has thus ceased for the time being.** The overall management capacity of health cadres, especially at municipal level, has been strengthened was certainly not missed, but much still needs to be done in this area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC 4.4:</th>
<th>Very limited and non-systematic data are available overall, the quality of country statistics, data flow and health indicators remained unreliable, monitoring was weak, and improvements in the quality of health indicators were quite limited over the period and highly variable between different aspects of health. Health indicators showed only partial improvements, and while for malaria and cholera the situation has improved, for other diseases (such as diarrhoea and ARIs) the situation showed no appreciable change. The prospect for the three health-related MDGs remains uncertain if not bleak.</th>
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</table>

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Only sporadic surveys have given reliable insight into the health situation; two of these surveys were carried out by national vertical programmes (malaria and AIDS). **Health indicators have shown only partial improvements.** While for malaria and cholera the situation has improved, the situation did not change appreciably for other diseases.

**No improvements have occurred (or can be reliably reported) in respect of child mortality** as a nationwide indicator (with regard to MDG4 on child mortality no improvement has occurred; malaria is the main cause of mortality while measles is the main cause of mortality from vaccine-preventable diseases).

**Malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections (ARI) still account for 90% of morbidity.** Trypanosomiasis is still a problem with very low vector control actions against tsetse flies. Wild polio virus cases have been reported in the north and centre of the country but **cholera seems to be under control.**

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37 In Huambo, the PASS office is adjacent to the provincial director’s office and the latter highly praised the support received.
38 See above
39 Information collected by the interview with PASS Director
With regard to MDG6 on HIV, new reliable data that can be generalised only became available at the end of 2007 and will serve more as a baseline than as an indicator of progress. On maternal mortality (MDG5) data are insufficient but institutional births stand at only around 30% of the total.

From information from border town hospitals, it can be presumed that HIV is spreading fast especially in the south of the country.\(^40\) The reestablishment of transport corridors will almost certainly aggravate the dissemination of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, blood safety controls at some peripheral areas are still poor, although screening in blood transfusion services has increased. Some work is being done to avoid mother-to-child transmission.

**Positive evidence from the EC intervention is limited to the five provinces covered by the PASS project** where the situation is somewhat better; for example in Caala a partner-led community-based data collection system by community health workers has been working well since June.

\[JC 4.5:\text{ The institutional framework is rather insufficient in term of organisation, planning capacities, and commitment; and this is the main limitation on an overall improvement in the Health System at national level. LRRD has worked positively in the health sector with good capacity for early intervention and good continuity between ECHO and EDF interventions.}\]

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Institutional shortcomings giving rise to supply interruptions for some essential medicines (e.g. for TB medication after the MINSA had procured batches of substandard drugs that had to be discarded) are still reported. Medication ordered by PASS had been delayed and had not yet been delivered at the time of the evaluation. In some sectors, the problem is particularly critical; e.g. the supply of contraceptives is the most unreliable of all, with frequent interruptions.

The planned essential medicines procurement system reform attempted by PASS suffered from delays and the project management has written off its chances of approval.

The primary health care needs of displaced and returned populations have, to an extent impossible to quantify but judged to be good, been serviced on a regular basis, except in more remote resettlement areas.

**In Angola DG ECHO succeeded at contributing to interventions that survived beyond its presence in the country.** This was possible through “investing” in partners that had a holistic approach and were experienced in integrated programmes. Also important was the EC’s longer-term perspective. Most of the rehabilitation support given by DG ECHO to its partners was an important starting point for more durable solutions to improving the health situation of the most vulnerable populations in Angola.

The actual operationalisation of LRRD was achieved through the launching by the EC of the Programa de Transição de Apoio às Populações Deslocadas (PTAPD) (Transition Programme to Support Displaced Populations). Projects typically embarked on rehabilitation of facilities and provision of equipment and medicines, along with extensive training of staff and community mobilisers. This transition project was an LRRD success since in many provinces government services steadily improved.

\(^{40}\) These elements emerged in the interview with the Global Fund.
3.4.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

**Answer to Evaluation Question 4**

The overall achievements of the EC support to the health sector (including DG ECHO) can be summarised as: a) provision of PHC services and essential medicines; b) construction or rehabilitation of health posts and training of personnel; c) support for policy formulation at the Ministry of Health; d) review of the Ministry’s human resources development plan and e) elaboration of important national policy and strategy documents which, when approved, should result in greater sustainability of health interventions. The National Health Policy is still not approved and vertical programmes are still not integrated. The concrete impact of EC health sector assistance is nevertheless not yet quantifiable since baseline data are not available, health conditions only improve very slowly, and health monitoring and statistics remain very weak.

Despite both EC support and national budget increases in absolute terms, the health reform process in Angola has been slower than expected. A promising development in this respect is the budget decentralisation process, moving from pilot to full implementation in January 2009.

3.5 Food security

**EQ 5**

To what extent has EC support to Food Security contributed to preparation and implementation of strategies and medium term action plans to reduce food insecurity and alleviate rural poverty?

3.5.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

By improving food security (FS), the GoA seeks to support nutrition, health, and greater productivity. The agricultural sector was heavily affected by the armed conflict and this led the government to set out a priority programme with a five-year horizon. This question addresses how far GoA, with EC help, has finally implemented policies aimed at sustainable development through restructuring the production potential of selected rural areas in an effort to alleviate poverty among the most vulnerable members of the population. The assessment was carried out with the aid of sources of verification both in the capital and, where needed, in the field with the help of selected implementers.

EC intervention in FS has been evaluated on the basis of its capacity to promote self-sufficiency and gradually restore productive capacity, the food market and agricultural value chains.

The judgment is based on the following *Judgement Criteria* in respect to EC contribution to:

- improved food self-sufficiency and production of marketable surpluses for local and national markets;
- better food storage, processing and marketing in EC intervention areas;
coordinated use of EDF funds, EC budget lines and other instruments to re-establish operational and institutional mechanisms, which facilitated the launch of developmental approaches to FS (LRRD approach).

3.5.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 5.1:** EC intervention in food security resulted in improvements in rural livelihoods in project areas through enhanced food self-sufficiency and production of some marketable surpluses. The EC has thereby contributed to helping Angolan agricultural producers start producing sizeable marketable surpluses, and markets are growing both at local and national levels.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

The EC has emphasised in their resettlement support the linking of efforts in food production and self-sufficiency with efforts to promote production of surpluses and of new crops for marketing, thereby increasing family incomes.

Information gathered in the interview with FAO in Luanda suggested that more acreage has been added to the exploitable surface for agricultural production every year, in part due to successful de-mining operations (partly funded by the EC); this has very likely increased the availability of staple foods for household and local markets – and at a later stage, should increase regional and national food security. DG ECHO/WFP food distribution schemes were discontinued in 2005, which is an additional indicator of the improved situation.

In some successful cases, EC interventions in food security have gone so far as to promote real local agricultural development (e.g. the OIKOS project). This linked farmers to markets not only for the marketing of surpluses of their traditional crops, but also by introducing highly productive semi-perishable cash crops (such as onions and potatoes) which, moreover, are import substitutes. Moreover ‘new’ vegetables (tomatoes, cabbage, green peppers and others) have been introduced (in some cases re-introduced) with the aim of complementing the population’s nutrition intake.

EC-funded NGO food security projects addressed a quite comprehensive mix of needs, including seed multiplication and seed banks; crop diversification; demonstration plots; irrigation systems recovery using food-for-work; a revolving fund for distribution of livestock and traction animals (oxen); extensive training and agricultural extension work; commodity marketing support; community organisation; capacity-building among municipal agricultural staff and local partner NGO members; and HIV/AIDS sensitisation.

Many EC food security projects have included de-mining, rehabilitation of roads and bridges, and some small irrigation and storage operations. Moreover, some projects rightly addressed animal husbandry needs and forest interventions. All these activities are clearly part of a development-oriented rather than humanitarian framework.

From many documentary sources and from interviews with international NGOs, local NGOs and beneficiaries, it has emerged that rural livelihoods did improve in project areas through enhanced food self-sufficiency and production of some marketable surpluses, and that agricultural production for local and national markets, rightly including animal products, fruits and non-timber forest products, has begun to increase.\(^{41}\)

Farmers are producing - and some are selling - surpluses, at present more on local than national markets. However, this is changing as the transport infrastructure is getting upgraded – in some cases with EC support as part of food security projects.

\(^{41}\) FAO, Assistance to the FS Department, MOA Project Terminal Report, Aug. 2006
**JC 5.2:** The intervention on the value chain of food production in EC-funded food security projects concentrated on inputs (seeds), finance (mainly revolving funds for animals) and partially on storage and transport of products, but did **not address food processing.** Information on the sustainability of these actions is lacking.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Several of the NGO FS projects successfully set up and undertook the training on seed banks and stores for non-perishable or semi-perishable food products, which are run by strengthened or newly formed farmers’ associations in the project localities. Revolving funds for animals were also an important element in the mobilisation of the farmer community. However, no food processing operation came to light, either in the documents reviewed or during the field visit.

International NGOs, together with local or national NGOs as partners of EC-funded food security projects, provided an effort to make this mobilisation sustainable. The effort has been concentrated primarily on providing support for farmers’ associations and productive groups, for creation of cooperatives and consortia, and for consolidation of agricultural value chains with which EC projects collaborated, providing support for their collective marketing efforts.

FAO confirmed that this experience was shared by many beneficiary farmers in the provinces covered. Partner NGO documentation reviewed in the Delegation in Luanda showed that facilitation of market access also often potentially meant improving storage and transport to more distant markets for the various commodities.

Unfortunately, there is no reliable information on how far these seed banks, revolving funds for animals and joint marketing arrangements continued to function following the departure of the EC-funded NGO partner.

**JC 5.3:** The **convergence of Food Security Budget Line and EDF funds for food security operations** in the framework of DDRR interventions clearly **resulted in synergy** and no overlap, for the EC clearly delineated which funds should pay for what. This proved successful in the LRRD transition.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

LRRD operations in the area of food security in Angola allowed partner NGOs to contribute to weaning resettled communities off the food aid with which DG ECHO/WFP funds provided them until they had two successful crops and could at least attain food self-sufficiency. Now a number of governmental and non-governmental bodies are continuing support to agricultural and rural development. To what extent this has alleviated rural poverty to date is difficult to judge, as there are no respective baselines or reliable data; but it certainly gave thousands of families a new start in that direction.

The EC intervention in food security has been funded mainly from the FSBL and other thematic Budget Lines (i.e. NGO co-financing). LRRD strategy and coordination between different Budget Lines have produced synergies since many emergency intervention included rehabilitation and training components and have been picked up in the development phases. Moreover, the early organisation of beneficiary farmers has been the first step for the creation of cooperatives and other forms of value chain organisation.

Budget Lines have been effective and timely in targeting specific interventions, the relevance of which has become more consistent by dint of a high level of strategic awareness in the EC Delegation.  

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Indeed to ensure coordination of the different kinds of support, funds from FSBL, NGO co-funding and EDF were earmarked for the various food security projects: in accordance with the CSP. EDF funds were primarily used for physical rehabilitation and institutional support and are now being used for pilot projects.

Although a gradual effort has been made to put national institutions in the driving seat, this has still proved a weak link. Indeed the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to monitor agricultural outputs reliably (to which the EC also contributed through a food security project implemented by FAO) has been, at best, weak.  

The foundations laid by successful interventions funded by FSBL and other budget lines, and by important physical rehabilitation of infrastructure, provide a sound basis for the forthcoming support to Rural Development as one of the focal sectors of the EDF10 CSP/NIP. As a result, local value chains can be strengthened and services aimed at supporting agricultural production and marketing can be improved.

Moreover, as regards re-establishing operational and institutional mechanisms at local level, several of the NGO documents reviewed mentioned that municipal MINADER officers were trained. However, it was also observed that it was not easy to motivate the MINADER officers to apply the skills learned. The same is reported in respect of their performance in reliably collecting and forwarding vital crop and agro-meteorological information required by the Ministry’s FS Unit (which was and is also supported by two EC-funded projects, through FAO and under the PRSA).

### 3.5.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

**EQ 5: To what extent has EC support to Food Security contributed to preparation and implementation of strategies and medium term action plans to reduce food insecurity and alleviate rural poverty?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC 5.1: Improved food self-sufficiency and production for markets</th>
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<tr>
<td>JC 5.2: Better food storage, processing and marketing in EC intervention areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC 5.3: Coordinated use of EDF funds, EC BL and others through LRRD approach</td>
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</table>

**Answer to Evaluation Question 5**

The food security situation has clearly improved. In the last three years agricultural production has been increasing and the need for direct food distribution has decreased to almost zero. Moreover, productive capacity has recovered along with a capacity to react to negative events (droughts etc.) As the main donor in the field of food security, and with its vast experience in support of food security interventions, the EC has contributed considerably to the preparation and implementation of the recovery strategies in Angola. It has also played its part in supporting activities ancillary to food security such as feeder roads, de-mining and construction of storage facilities. The use of EC Budget Lines has proved appropriate in a post-war situation as it has allowed a focus on specific projects and is underpinned by strategic coordination provided by the EC Delegation. Working with the different actors in a more direct way is one of the advantages of BLs. At the same time, projects implemented by NGOs have more positive results to show. EDF project interventions at institutional level faced more problems. The LRRD strategy was particularly relevant for attaining sustainability in food security and for moving from food distribution to food production and thence to commodity marketing.

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43 FAO, Assistance to the FS Department, MOA, project terminal report, Aug.2006
3.6 Water and sanitation

| EQ 6 | To what extent has EC support to Water and Sanitation improved the quality of life for the beneficiary populations in peri-urban areas of Luanda, Lubango and Tombwa and in the context of national sector policies and strategies? |

3.6.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

Much water and sanitation infrastructure dates back to pre-independence days and was damaged or simply deteriorated during the war years. Therefore, water and sanitation became a priority for humanitarian assistance. In recent years, there has been investment, especially in urban areas, but water costs remain high, in particular from the perspective of the poor. In rural areas, surface water is the main source of potable and irrigation water and this supply can vary seasonally and suffers from poor quality and pollution. There is now a national sector strategy and development plan. The EQ analyses the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EC support to water and sanitation infrastructure.

The EC intervention in water and sanitation has been evaluated against the objective of supplying good-quality water and improving the treatment of solid and liquid waste.

The judgment is based on the following Judgement Criteria in respect to EC contribution to:

- sector policy and strategy measures in place and operational;
- improved access to good quality, reliable potable water supply;
- wider waste water treatment and disposal;
- fewer infections due to water borne disease;
- EC interventions addressed financial and economic sustainability.

3.6.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 6.1: Sector policy and strategy measures are in place** and operational in respect of EC support but enactment of policy and legislative measures is hindered by lack of implementation and management arrangements as well as by institutional constraints and weaknesses at all levels.

*Major Findings supporting the judgment*

The Water Law\(^{44}\) has been passed and a **two-stage strategy for development of WATSAN** until 2016 was adopted in 2003. Complete enactment of the law is limited by the fact that most complementary regulations relating to potable water supply are still in preparation.

GoA made funds available from the national budget (> US$1.8bn over the 3-year period 2004-2007, including US$650m under the ‘Agua para Todos’ programme) but disbursement was limited by many sectoral constraints including lack of credible national plans, strategies, tools, guidelines, manuals and regulatory frameworks, and capacity deficits at all levels. Although EC funding was slow-moving due to EDF procedures, complicated institutional relationships, lack of clear responsibilities, and equivocal government support, all EC funds were eventually absorbed. However, due to increases in costs of construction materials, actual physical infrastructure targets had to be cut back.

Urban and rural master plans have been prepared\(^{45}\) but have not yet been implemented to any great extent.

The institutional situation is the weakest point of the sector and its importance is crucial for the management of schemes, planning of investments, maintenance and cost recovery. With regard to these issues, it has transpired that **shortcomings in sector institutional capacity** are serious.

\(^{44}\) Lei 6/02 (2002)

\(^{45}\) Programma para o Desenvolvimento do Sector de Aguas (PDSA) 2004; Resolution 10/04; Water Sector Development Plan 2003
constraints. The current lack of technical and managerial capacity and resources in this essential sector represents a real threat to the credibility of its institutions.\textsuperscript{46}

Responsibility for service delivery is increasingly being assigned to provinces, municipalities and communities. At these levels capacities fall far short of needs and yet most donor support has been focused at national level. Decentralisation as a practical concept risks losing credibility if services are not sustained or improved as a result.

\textbf{JC 6.2:} There has been \textit{improved access to good quality and reliable potable water supply} in recent years to which the EC intervention contributed but \textit{availability and access still appear to be largely insufficient} given that water provision absorbs a considerable share of the income of the poor. Moreover, weak management information systems and institutional shortcomings do not allow forecasting, monitoring, evaluation of progress or gauging of the impact of development interventions.

\textit{Major Findings supporting the judgment}

\textbf{The 2006 HDR estimates that only some 36\% of Angolans have access to safe potable water} (34\% urban, 39\% rural). In Luanda only about 30\% of the population has access to Empresa Pública de Aguas de Angola (EPAL) supplies, the remainder being dependent on mainly untreated river water brought in by tanker with prices up to 50 times those of EPAL.

Access to water is difficult for the vast majority of Angolans and almost 90\% of the urban and peri-urban populations, and 70\% of the rural population, have to carry water up to 500m. This water is not necessarily from a safe source, as observed in some studies.\textsuperscript{47} Outside Luanda the situation is worse. Most urban areas are served by water utilities from colonial days, which were designed for a much smaller population than exists today.

Owing to the above conditions the cost of water in Angola is still very high for citizens not served by public water supply. \textit{Water costs continue to be a significant proportion of poor household expenditure} for those who receive supplies from commercial vendors at prices, which can be up to 50 times those of public supplies.

The stakeholders have been involved in project implementation but \textit{community management of point-of-delivery water supply appears weak}, whilst continuing involvement in operations remains to be demonstrated and experience to date of the longevity of such community-managed services is not wholly encouraging.

\textit{Generally speaking, the quality of management information and M&E systems is inadequate} with little or no baseline data or measurement of change resulting from sector support.

\textbf{JC 6.3: Sanitation is still an outstanding problem in Angola due to lack of systems and insufficiency of physical schemes.} The EC contributed to tackling the problem but its intervention is far from having a significant impact, given the magnitude and complexity of the problem.

\textit{Major Findings supporting the judgment}

Only five major cities are partially covered by sanitation services, which date from colonial times and often discharge untreated effluent directly into water courses or the sea. Although data on

\textsuperscript{46} Corollary lower levels of government institutions (such as municipios) require certain levels of capacity even to access resources on offer from government (e.g. an annual programme of works needs to be presented to qualify for funding).

\textsuperscript{47} E.g.: HDR 2006; ADF Memorandum: Proposal for Loan to Fund Sumbwe Water Supply, Sanitation and Institutional Support Project Mapa Sanitaria (Caracterização do Sistema da Protecção de Serviços de Saúde), Provincia de Luanda, Feb 2007 – PASS has various statistics on location and description of facilities, including water supply and waste disposal arrangements for those facilities but nothing on the population served or the incidence of water-borne disease. That said, there were undoubtedly significant increases in availability of water supplies over the period 2002-2007 (to which EC support contributed) although no reliable estimates of such coverage appear to be available.
populations served by such services is inadequate, sanitation costs for most families are nil since no such services exist.

Indicators on access to basic sanitation in Angola are worse than those for Africa as a whole, and for all developing and developed countries.48

The EC has supported sanitation in limited areas. EC support included components of wide-ranging projects (since ECHO and through PAR and FAS programmes) e.g. *Programa de Transição de Apoio as Populações Deslocadas* ANG/8/7255/13 (Transition Programme to support displaced people) with construction of integrated systems including latrines as well as 270 water sources and five village gravity systems. Technical Personnel from the provincial water directorates DPAs (Direções Provinciais de Agua) was trained.

Where such services are received, usually no fee is payable by households, although a debate is in progress and there are proposals for introducing schemes for Untreated Solid Waste (USW) collection and treatment by communal structures and NGOs. Although no estimated costs have been stated, a major risk for the sustainability of sanitation systems has been identified in potential non-payment of such services by the population49.

**JC 6.4:** Water-borne diseases have been reduced but are still a major problem. In particular institutional deficits, such as lack of capacity to fulfil obligations relating to completion of project interventions or provision of maintenance for water schemes are likely to reduce dramatically the impact of EC interventions; moreover recent epidemics (cholera in 2006 and 2007 and Marburg fever in 2007) are clearly water-related.50

Major Findings supporting the judgment

No data are available linking incidence of water borne disease to indices of safe drinking water or sanitation services although conversely the major cholera outbreaks of 2006 and 2007 could be directly linked to poor water and sanitation conditions, especially in the Luanda area, which had 50% of the recorded cases.51

However, improved health indicators are widely accepted as an outcome of water and sanitation projects although this linkage cannot yet be quantified52. Nevertheless, despite the lack of good data it can be stated there is general consensus among beneficiaries, Government officials, national NGOs, CBOs, international NGOs and other international partners that there are fewer infections due to water borne diseases.

Secondary or inferred impact has been reported in relation to school attendance, which in some cases increased from 70% to 90% as a result of fewer cases of diarrhoea and gastric illnesses during implementation of this component.53

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48 While in Angola only 31% of the population has access to sanitation, in Africa the share of the official population with access to sanitation services is 44%, in developing countries 54% and in developed countries 100%.

49 FA 9ACPANG004 Water Supply and Sanitation for Suburban Areas of Luanda

50 Cholera transmission to humans occurs through eating food or drinking water contaminated with Vibrio cholerae from other cholera patients. The major reservoir for cholera was long assumed to be humans themselves, but considerable evidence exists that aquatic environments can serve as reservoirs of the bacteria. Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever, which is caused by the genus of viruses Marburg filovirus and belongs to the same taxonomic family as Ebola, originated in Central and East Africa and infects both human and nonhuman primates. In 2007 body fluids infected water without adequate sanitation and disinfection, and infections were identified by WHO as having been spread by drinking water, water for washing and processing food, and water for bathing.

51 Review of Cholera Outbreaks Worldwide 1995-2005, Griffith, Kelly & Miller records 4,000 cases of cholera in Angola in 2006 alone compared with 424,000 for the whole of Africa during the period 1995-2005. ECHO provided support.

52 That is not to say that there are no benefits, quite the contrary, but even obvious indicators such as incidence of water-borne diseases or US mortality rates appear not to be generally available.

53 This was reported during the field visit (e.g. ADPP, an NGO implementing part of the sanitation component of 9ACPANG004/9ACPANG022 Water Supply and Sanitation to the Suburban Areas of Luanda, which is working directly with Escola Polivalente Formigas do Futuro, Cazenga.

46
A cause for concern is the rapidly developing ‘swamp’ extending for a radius of some 15m around some recently-commissioned chafarizes (fountains) in the peri-urban areas of Luanda. Remedial action is required to address what could become a very real health hazard even before the expected flooding of undrained settlement areas, which constitute the major part of the peri-urban areas.

**JC 6.5:** EC interventions have not yet addressed financial and economic sustainability to any great extent. Poorly designed projects, lack of information, and the issue of cost-recovery are especially likely to jeopardise sustainability of EC (and other donors’) interventions in the field of water and sanitation since institutional problems relating to water distribution facilities and bodies have been only partially tackled and what transpired is a widespread lack or insufficiency of institutional and management responsibilities for maintenance and cost recovery.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

**Institutional problems** have plagued EC interventions in Tombwa54 and Luanda (with partial recovery in the final phases of implementation) 55 and overall shortcomings in institutional capacity have been flagged as serious constraints, which will only be addressed in 2009 by WSIDP, although no Training Needs Assessment or structured Human Resources Development Plan has yet been prepared.

Only two public enterprises managing water and sanitation services currently have legal identity (EPAL and ELISAL in Luanda) although ‘water companies’ without legal standing exist in four main cities. As a consequence, financial viability and economic sustainability of existing and proposed water and sanitation services are thus considered doubtful (or at best unproven).

Lack of baseline data and inadequate effort to monitor the impact and effectiveness of ongoing interventions have resulted in poorly designed projects, the targets of which were generally unrealistically high; time-scales and institutional capacity constraints were underestimated leading to cost and time over-runs, problematic implementation modalities, disappointed target beneficiaries, and reduced impact. Cost recovery issues were inadequately addressed, or were not addressed in timely fashion, putting at risk the sustainability of the interventions. The available data show that available water is by far below the level of need. 56

Project management decisions taken on the basis of incomplete and suspect information are likely to be flawed thus leading to poor efficiency and reduced effectiveness. Moreover, the EC does not appear to be proactive in communicating with other sector donors or with GoA 57, at a time when major integrated sector initiatives are being prepared (e.g. Agua para Todos, PDISA/WSIDP)

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54 Especially Tombwa Water Supply 8ACPANG005, 8ACPANG012, which is a case study of design and implementation pitfalls.


56 Although actual production is estimated at only 25 litres per person per day (rural areas average ~5 litres per person per day) overall, ECP specifies water supply of at least 15 litres per person per day (for urban and peri-urban areas) PDISA targets (by 2016) are 100 litres per person per day for urban areas (i.e. after losses consumption would be ~70 litres per person per day but that level would require good system management) and 30 litres per person per day for 70% of rural and peri-urban areas. However, 150 litres per person per day would normally be required to meet industrial and commercial demand.

57 Although the relatively small value of EC sector support compared with GoA national budgets limits any possible leverage or incentive for dialogue on the part of government.
3.6.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQ 6: To what extent has EC support to Water and Sanitation improved the quality of life for the beneficiary populations in peri-urban areas of Luanda, Lubango and Tombwa and in the context of national sector policies and strategies?</th>
<th>poor</th>
<th>good</th>
<th>excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC 6.1: Sector policy and strategy measures are in place and operational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JC 6.2: Improved access to good quality, reliable potable water supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC 6.3: Wider wastewater treatment and disposal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JC 6.4: Fewer infections due to water borne disease</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JC 6.5: EC interventions have addressed financial and economic sustainability</td>
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</table>

Answer to Evaluation Question 6

EC non-focal sector support is highly relevant, potentially affecting a large proportion of the population. EC sector support has improved access to good quality water supply for a large beneficiary population in urban, peri-urban and rural areas although severe problems have affected the intervention and in some cases limited its effectiveness (e.g. in Tombwa Water Supply Project). The importance of institutional shortcomings appears to have been underestimated, and institutional change has not been fully appreciated. The complicated and crowded institutional landscape, with its unclear responsibilities, jurisdictions and communication problems is another critical factor, which has negatively influenced effectiveness and sustainability. Only recently have EC interventions started to address these issues. Restoration of infrastructure will increasingly be matched by the institutional and operational structures necessary to improve prospects of sustainability and maximise the impacts of the improved infrastructure. Wastewater treatment, as well as waste disposal and sanitation in general, have been a source of weakness compared to the efforts made to improve potable water supply.

3.7 Education

| EQ 7 | To what extent has EC support to education and training improved school infrastructure and professional/technical training, thus leading to more accessible, better quality education and greater access to employment opportunities? |

3.7.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

The Angolan Constitution, in its section on fundamental rights and duties, states that it is incumbent on the family, with the support of the State, to promote and ensure the education of children and young people. Angola’s long-term national development will depend in large measure on raising the levels of educational access and attainment, so that the country has a literate and well-educated population, with functional work-places and life skills. Education has suffered from years of neglect and degradation with insufficient teachers, infrastructure and facilities, which in turn led to low levels of attendance (especially by girls) and literacy. GoA has adopted an integrated strategy for improvement of the education system which prioritised teacher training, sector management and rehabilitation of schools infrastructure, and the EC (and EU Member States) and other donor funding agencies are supporting this strategy. The EQ analyses the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EC sector support along with coordination of sector donors and complementarity of programmes in the development of, and support for, national policies and programmes.

The EC intervention in education has been evaluated on the basis of its capacity to improve access and quality of education and to provide employment opportunities.
The overall judgment is based on the following *Judgement Criteria* in respect to the EC’s contribution to:

- improved equal access to primary education;
- improved quality of teaching;
- improved school infrastructure;
- availability and quality of professional/technical education;
- improved access to employment opportunities.

### 3.7.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 7.1:** Education needs are very great, and although the EC has contributed to increasing access to primary education significantly by increasing availability of equipped education facilities, quality of education is still low, access to education is unequally distributed, and rural areas, along with the most vulnerable layers in the population, are disadvantaged.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

There has been a considerable increase in access to primary education (UNICEF Progress Report Angola 2007) and EC support has contributed significantly to these increases including (re)construction of schools, especially primary schools. Initial post-conflict support rightly targeted infrastructure, numbers of teachers, and provision of teaching aids so as to accommodate a doubling (and trebling) of primary school pupils over a few years whilst subsequent support has improved quality of teaching and institutional issues.58

In the CSP, an increase in annual budgetary allocations to the education and training sector was planned in order to attain a level of around 10% of the State budget by 2003, as well as to allow whatever measures needed to be taken to achieve a 100% level of budget execution in 2004. These measures include not only the definition of roles and responsibilities at central and local level, as well as of roles of the different partners in the education sector, but also the implementation of policies and of the plan for development of the sector as approved by the Government in September 2001.

Prioritised allocations by government to primary education during the period 2000-2005 were transferred to technical education after 2005. Overall education allocations were reduced in 2006 in comparison with preceding years although 2006 showed a modest increase (5.6%) compared with the previous year. However, GoA stated that the reduction was in response to non-disbursement of allocated funds due to limited sector absorption capacity (e.g. only 42% in 2003). No evidence was found to suggest that there was any increase in the rate of disbursement following the shift to technical education.

**Rates of entry into primary education, which collapsed during the war years, have increased** (including large numbers of previously excluded children and vulnerable groups). Gross enrolment rates are reported as having grown uninterruptedly from 2003 to 200659 so that primary school attendance has risen considerably.60

Even though access has grown considerably, **quality of education services is low and repetition rates are high** with only 33% of registered pupils successfully completing primary education. Only 8% of pupils complete education without repetition.61 The picture is worsened by **serious provincial disparities in access to education. Rural areas and the rural poor are especially**

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58 GoA sources: 1.906M in 2001; 4.87M in 2005
59 The data were: 2003 + 104.4%, 2005 + 122.8%, 2006 + 164.5%. The data over 100% indicate the enrolment of formerly excluded children recovered from previous cohorts or age brackets.
60 According to UNICEF estimates (see above) during the period primary school attendance rose from 1.5m in 2002 to an estimated 3.8m in 2007.
61 Annual repetition rates are 26.8%; annual drop out rate is 16.1% - Source: End of Term Report.
Gender- and age-differentiated data is incomplete but there are repeated contemporary reports that female pupils make up the majority of those who do not complete primary education.

Given the vast increase in the numbers of enrolled pupils passing through primary and secondary education there is increasing evidence of a ‘bottleneck’ in transiting from primary to secondary and higher education levels.

In this situation, there has been little consideration of pre-school education although this can make a significant contribution to better primary education, literacy and numeracy.

**JC 7.2: The quality of teaching has improved but challenges remain as yet unaddressed.**

Literacy and numeracy rates are improving as well as relevant statistics including the preparation of an EMIS. Despite some potential overlap, donor cooperation is evident and there is good coherence of sector support with EC international policies and government sector plans. Allocations to the sector from national budgets have not increased as expected, and weaknesses in sector absorption capacity has resulted in allocated funds not all being disbursed.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

The EC has significantly supported teacher training but some problems have arisen such as late budget approvals, poor capacity for handling EDF procedures, late payments, and poor communications. However, many of the project outputs were achieved and there is a general consensus that there has been an increase in teacher quality resulting from this training.

Large numbers of teachers have undergone in-service training in pedagogical techniques but the quality and extent of uptake of this training is not clear. There is also a large outstanding need for continuing training as most teachers have completed only basic education. Teachers are unevenly distributed across provinces.

As already mentioned the quality of education in Angola is patchy as evidenced by data on teacher-pupil ratios and from several ROM Reports - most wealthy families in urban areas send their children to private schools. With the huge increases in pupil numbers between 2002 and 2007, class sizes increased despite recruitment of large numbers of teachers.

**Teacher-pupil ratios worsened during the period** since the data examined show that the average class size of 30-35 in 2003 increased to 32-37 in 2006. From such trends it may be inferred that teacher shortages are a continuing (and possibly increasing) threat to quality of education. Poor conditions of employment and lack of career structure for many teachers, most...
engaged on short-term contracts, are very real impediments to motivation and institutional response.

Some EC project interventions have targeted special needs, which are not generally addressed in the national education systems (such as the needs of the street children or the physically and mentally impaired children). Progress has been made in curriculum reform and in tailoring of curricula to local conditions. Some EC project interventions targeted Curriculum Reform jointly with other activities and ROM reports note good prospects for their sustainability and expansion.

There is some evidence of donor cooperation in division of work, such that the World Bank took the lead in overall support to education (supported by some EU Member States) while the EC focused on sectors where it could bring a value added (e.g. Support to Primary Education, Training of Teachers, School Reconstruction). However, communication appears to be a problem, and a fundamental issue reported by several sources is a lack of ‘open doors’ in MINED.

Late budget allocations have been identified as a constraint. GoA engagement appears to be equivocal despite protestations of prioritisation of this sector in the ECP. Educational reform is planned to continue up until 2011 but in 2006 education allocations were reduced in comparison with the period 2004-2006 while allocations for 2007 showed only a modest increase (+5.6%).

Last but not least, the issue of capacity-building has to be addressed; in fact, given the accelerating pace of decentralisation of responsibilities to provincial and municipal levels, the reported low capacity, especially at municipal levels, is a cause for concern.

**JC 7.3:** School infrastructure was improved by the EC and other donors, although many schools, especially those in rural areas, do not have access to utility services and there are widespread shortages of teaching materials, furniture and equipment.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

There has been considerable support for improved school infrastructure at all levels – primary, secondary, further education and technical or professional institutes – by EC and other donors especially in the immediate aftermath of the peace agreement in 2002. These interventions were supported by GoA that increased allocations for primary school education between 2000 and 2005, although this policy was changed after 2005.

But construction and rehabilitation of school facilities are not sufficient to produce good quality of education and shortages of teaching materials and school equipment persist, including textbooks, materials, furniture, equipment, and electrical and water supplies.

**JC 7.4:** Technical training is recognised as essential for meeting the increase in national demands in all fields of industry, services and agriculture. EC-funded TVET initiatives are of good quality but the needs are still far from being covered since the available TVET is in general unresponsive to labour market needs.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) are outstanding components of an education system aimed at promoting growing and sustainable access to employment. This problem is particularly important in Angola, owing to the high level of professional shortages. Available VET training falls far short of demand although the available training is responsive to labour market needs.

Availability and quality of professional and technical education has improved as a result of EC and other donor support, but institutional problems have constrained the effectiveness and

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69 Source: Aid Harmonisation and Alignment website www.aidharmonization.org
impact of such support. The number of institutions offering higher and technical education has increased and the number of students at such establishments more than doubled between 2003 and 2006. The GoA prioritised allocation of budgets to technical education after 2005, and this strategy, combined with donor support (including from the EC), led to increased quality of technical education which in turn increased access to employment opportunities.

From information gathered in the Ministry of Education and from other informants (i.e. UNICEF and local NGOs involved in project implementation), it results that the quality of technical education has also improved and access to employment opportunities has increased but institutional problems continue to constrain not only the effectiveness of training but also the number of opportunities available to graduating trainees.

In the field of Technical Education, the rehabilitation of the Agrarian Institute of Tchivinguiro had an important impact on technical training and employment opportunities, as many agricultural technicians (including some from other provinces) have been educated in this institute. The support covered three elements – rehabilitation, supply of functional and teaching materials, and technical assistance. Institutional shortcomings have influenced the effectiveness and efficiency of the projects. Continuing institutional problems have limited impact such that the number of graduates continues to be less than expected.

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The EC has also supported the Vocational Training system in Angola VIS-Dom Bosco in Muena, Dondo, N’dalatando, Calulo and Luanda: these initiatives have promoted good synergy with the surrounding entrepreneurial communities. Unfortunately, “Best Practices” have not been systematically collected for mainstreaming and dissemination.

**JC 7.5:** Access to employment opportunities has increased but institutional deficits (e.g. lack of active labour market measures aimed at linking training to the labour market) have limited the increase of employment opportunities. Moreover, the scale of need nationally is far greater than the reach of such support since TVET initiatives are limited in quantity as compared to the magnitude of the problem of youth unemployment.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Several surveys and limited monitoring information report that employment opportunities increased during the period 2002-2007 although their long-term sustainability is unproven.

As seen above, in many areas institutional capacity deficits have been identified as a major constraint and the EC support project relating to primary education at national and provincial levels continues to suffer from implementation problems.

**GoA engagement appears to be equivocal** despite protestations of prioritisation of this sector in ECP. Educational reform is planned to continue until 2011 but in 2006, education allocations were reduced in comparison with the period 2004-2006, while allocations for 2007 show only a modest increase (+5.6%) and late budget allocations were identified as a constraint.

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70 Curriculum development, water supply, laboratories not fully functional; budget deficits of more than 70%, managerial and HR issues; no integration of institute in NEP; teachers not included in state salary system; student fees; and no viable financial management strategies.

71 See: Department of Economics, Oxford University Angola: Options for Prosperity 2006

72 This reduction was stated to be in response to the fact that not all allocated funds actually were disbursed because of inadequate sector absorption capacity (e.g. 42% in 2003). No evidence is available showing that absorption capacity improved following this transfer to technical education.
3.7.3 **Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question**

**Answer to Evaluation Question 7**

EC support to Education and training has contributed to the significant increase in access to primary education through rehabilitation, construction and equipping of school facilities along with training of large numbers of teachers. Support for construction and rehabilitation has been distributed to all levels – primary, secondary, further education and technical and vocational education. Sector budget provision has not been increased as expected but, even so, not all allocated funds have been disbursed as a consequence of weak sector management, which remains an outstanding priority for future interventions in the area of education. The EC has contributed to the development of Technical and Vocational Education and Training provided by different INGOs and NGOs, the quality of which in term of employment generation is recognised as positive by different sector stakeholders. This is also a consequence of some linkage with the entrepreneurial and productive fabric, but the scale of need is so much more than the technical education systems can meet that many technical and professional posts are filled by foreigners. The fact that a sector approach has been developed (with an EC contribution) but not applied, shows that institutional capacity deficits have to be considered as a major constraint. The EC approach has been coherent with the LRRD concept.

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**3.8 Governance and institutional support**

**EQ 8**

To what extent has EC support in the area of Governance contributed to the consolidation of peace and the resolution of conflict as well as to the creation of institutional prerequisites for sustainable development interventions in key social sectors?

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**3.8.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention**

Angola is facing several governance challenges:

a) the lack of capacity in the public sector compromises the management of public finances and has a negative effect on services to the population;

b) participation in public affairs has also been held back by insecurity, poverty and illiteracy, which tend to marginalise much of the population. Although large numbers of associations and NGOs have come into being, and trade unions have become independent of the State, active civic participation is still limited to relatively small numbers of people, mainly from the more educated, higher income groups;

c) while the war has unquestionably been the single most important constraint on development, other factors of an institutional and policy-related nature have exacerbated the situation and produced the existing institutional problems relating to governance;
d) the transparency of government finances, by bringing all revenue and expenditure within
the framework of the approved national budget and requiring that expenditures follow
strictly the procedures set down by law.

The planned interventions referred to in the 2002-2007 CSP were supposed to help reinforce
specific areas of good governance, namely the judicial sector, reform of the administration and
public finances, good governance and development of civil society. This EQ analyses the extent to
which EC Governance and Institutional Support has helped to produce better conditions for
development, poverty reduction and reduction of social and territorial imbalances. The EQ
analyses how short-term support aimed at consolidation of peace has been phased over into long-
term interventions in support of good governance in the wider sense.

EC intervention in Governance and Institutional Support has been evaluated on the basis of its
capacity to stimulate consolidation of peace, development of good governance, accountability,
transparency and responsiveness at all levels, and respect for human rights.

The judgment is based on the following **Judgement Criteria** in respect to EC contribution to:

- progress in consolidation of the peace process and conflict resolution;
- sustained political dialogue between EC and GoA regarding priorities for governance
  support (across sectors);
- change in implementation capacity of supported legislative bodies, governmental and non-
governmental organisations;
- enhancement of society’s capacity to participate in development processes.

### 3.8.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 8.1:** The EC has contributed to the **consolidation of peace** by promoting growing citizen
participation and the gradual reconstruction of social capital at the level of intermediate
organisations (CSOs). At local level, experiences of citizen participation have been successful to
the extent that participation has started to be institutionalised.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

**Governance** has been considered a **focal cross-cutting issue** since both the short-term
interventions and all important interventions in social fields, as well as transition support,
included governance or institutional components. The objective of this intervention in
governance, including in the early post-war period when social needs were urgent, was grounded
in the need to **re-establish a capacity to mediate social relations and enact the rule of law,**
both of which had been constrained by the conflict for more than 27 years.

The approach to resolution of historic conflicts (like the conflict over land tenure in more than one
sense\(^{73}\)) was one of the main drivers for the early intervention on governance.

In this area, the EC intervention was successful since the EC had been actively implementing
components of wide-ranging programmes that helped reinforce participation and the spirit of
citizenship. The Municipal Fora promoted by the Municipal Development Component of FAS III
(and eventually institutionalised by the revision of the Decree 17/99 regulating municipal
activities) **increased citizen’s participation in local decision-making.**

The reduction of potential conflicts, which locally might revive the spirit of the war, has been
addressed by:

a) a “pull” approach represented by the implementation of micro-projects, funded by mainly
by EIDHR but also through NGO co-financing to address local conflicts (mainly on land
tenure). Best practice developed in some of these projects is worth disseminating to a
wider audience;

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\(^{73}\) Agricultural land, urban and peri-urban land etc.
b) a “push” approach represented by support to legislative initiatives such as the decision-making process for a new Land law.

**JC 8.2: Political and Policy Dialogue**

Political and Policy Dialogue have been and still are problematic in Angola since any politically sensitive issue is considered by GoA as off-limits for donors’ political influence. The EC attempt to revitalise political dialogue and to transform informal sectoral interchange into a systematic and official policy dialogue on the implementation of Sector Approaches, has not succeeded so far. Conversely, many administrations at local level became gradually more open to policy dialogue.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Weak governance and concentration of power are still outstanding characteristics of Angola. All EC projects have been delayed by bureaucratic problems, equivocal engagement or differences in priority on the part of Government counterparts. The political process is still top-down and the issues of transparency and accountability are not considered as a priority although the effort made to increase transparency of Public Finance Management (supported by the EC and other donors) and macroeconomic stabilisation are appreciable.

**Policy Dialogue** faced many difficulties and has rarely produced important results. In some sectors (such as education and health), the sector policy approach has been applied but often only partially implemented (or even not implemented at all) owing to weak governance and lack of institutional capacity as well as to the fact that management, baseline and monitoring systems for decision-making and control are completely lacking.

The problems related to transparency of the extractive sectors persist, including those related to the quasi-fiscal operations of SONANGOL and ENDIAMA, the two state-owned companies in the extractive sector, but these operations started to be run down in 2007. In EC cooperation annual reviews the issue of transparency of public finances, and notably the country’s adhesion to the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), was repeatedly raised with the government and was also included in the review documents (such as MTR conclusions). Angola is an observer in EITI as the political will for attaining the prescribed standards is not yet mature and technical capacity is lacking, although there has been some progress (see chapter 2.2).

The effort to foster regional integration has yet to lead to significant results. Angola has postponed full adhesion to the SADC Common Market although it is considered an important opportunity for the growth of national exports. Angola has not ratified and is not implementing the SADC EPA interim agreement; on the grounds that it can only subscribe to the full agreement once adequate capacity is attained at country level. GoA favours, however, its CEEAC membership in view of the necessity of maintaining peace and stability in the region.

For long periods, political dialogue has been irregular. As a part of the political dialogue, governance issues (such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, participation, decentralisation and transparency of Public Finance Management) were discussed, but there have been no tangible consequences. The political dialogue has lost impetus in recent years but efforts are being made to revitalise it.

As already indicated in the discussion of other EQs, at local level, several experiences have promoted accountability of municipal administrations and also of provincial governments.

Dialogue with the NAO is ongoing, but difficulties relating to EDF procedures are hindering...
cooperation and, as a result, most projects are delayed or take quite a long time (from six months to a year) to reach the full implementation stage.

**JC 8.3: Support to legislative bodies** and to government bodies cannot be considered a success since it has attained only partial results (e.g. improvements in the Judiciary) and several programmes have been cancelled or their implementation has been delayed.

Several elements (see above discussion of other JCs) have shown that the most productive level for promoting good governance is local level (provincial, municipal) but at this level – even though in the provinces targeted by the Municipal Development Component some improvements have been made - the issue of capacity and motivation is critical to increasing absorptive capacity. Local governance, if supported systematically is likely to produce a critical mass of good governance best practice that could be scaled-up to national (ministerial) level. The decision taken in the CSP for EDF10 to focus governance support at local level can be regarded as a consequence of this observation.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Capacity-building needs are indeed high, since the most important characteristic of Angolan Public Institutions’ performance is weak implementation and low absorptive capacity. Official data on 2007 show that the revised budget passed by the National Assembly proposed an increased spending of 28%, following a doubling of expenditure in 2006. The Ministries only managed to execute 40% of the 2005 programme and around 50% of the 2006 programme. In 2007, for the third year in a row, a low execution rate was recorded (less than 60% of budget of capital expenditure)\(^76\) but still the Government fails to see the utility and importance of institutional strengthening.

In spite of these needs, the least successful intervention on governance has been institutional support which has been affected by the fact that the Angolan authorities have repeatedly stated that institutional support and advice are not a priority, implying that Angolans know their needs and are able to devise solutions, and that therefore decisions on these sensitive issues should be left to them.

As an example of the difficulties which have affected EC intervention in this field, it has to be said that the outcomes of projects aimed at strengthening the implementation capacity of governmental bodies such as the National Assembly and the judiciary system have remained far below expectations\(^77\), i.e.:

a) support for the National Assembly was phased out before any deliverables could be produced;

b) support for Public Administration was not implemented;

c) support for the planning and budgeting process was cancelled by the NAO after approval (with observations) by the EC.

Another case is the Institutional Support to the National Statistics Institute - Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas (INE) which was considered to be of strategic importance for decision-making on the development process in the country. The project was aimed at enhancing statistical capabilities with a view to contributing to the strategy for combating poverty, but the potential benefit of the EC support did not become operational owing to a lack of human and financial resources.

A relative successful initiative (although initially affected by substantial delays) was the Regional Project “Supporting the development of Judiciary Systems”\(^78\) which improved the judiciary’s settlement of conflicts by promoting professional qualifications for judiciary staff, especially the

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\(^76\) While 27% of GDP had been budgeted for investment, only 16% of GDP were executed.

\(^77\) According to the result of interviews with Officials in Brussels and in Luanda and to final evaluation reports

\(^78\) 8ACP MTR 4 supporting the development of the judiciary system
local judges who had no prior formal qualifications and are in most cases asked to judge on local conflicts.

More recently, a capacity-building initiative has started that seems to have been well supported at ministerial level. The TRAINFORTRADE project (entrusted to UNCTAD) fostered appropriate changes and policy orientation in the international trade, investment and services of Angola through capacity development in the field of international trade and investment, ultimately so as to promote mastery of international trade exchange flows, increase participation in the globalised economy and thereby contribute to economic growth and sustainable development. Initial activities started with a high level of satisfaction on the part of the beneficiaries and institutions involved. A long delay affected implementation of this project, owing to which cost estimates are no longer in line with the current cost of services.

Conversely, as repeatedly stated in the discussion of previous EQs, at decentralised level the effectiveness of EC interventions on good governance has proven to be much higher than at central level, and also - especially given the modest resources available - impact has been better. Also at this level, the issue of capacity is critical. Most authorities (both at provincial and municipal level) have exhibited clear gaps in vision and capacity although they have also shown themselves to be more aware and accountable.

This situation on local governance becomes highly important in the light of two elements:

1. In 2008, the budget legislation launched the pilot decentralisation of budget execution. 68 of Angola’s 167 municipalities have been designated “Budget Units” (unidades orçamentais), and each has been allocated US$300,000. This reform, which reduces the dependence of local administrations on provincial governments, aims at raising the execution rate of capital projects and at accelerating and improving delivery of basic services. In 2009, the full decentralisation process will be implemented, and all municipalities will be considered as Budget Units with an endowment of US$5m.

2. The EC has taken a decision to focus interventions in governance at provincial and municipal level as an important focal area for the 2008-2013 period.

**JC 8.4:** The EC is contributing directly (through its direct support) and indirectly both to strengthening the functional capacities of NSAs and to improve their willingness and capacity to participate in a national policy dialogue, starting with cooperation with Local Institutions in important processes where their contribution is of crucial importance.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Civil Society and NSA in Angola are still living their “nascent status” (growth of the sector dating back to the 1990s stimulated by a certain degree of liberalisation) and need to grow in terms of technical capacity (specialisation), organisational resources and modalities, values and strategies, and capacity for increasing their institutional status. At present individual and isolated strategies are often followed at the expense of an organisational culture based on dialogue and cooperation.

The landscape of NSAs in Angola has also changed significantly during the last five-year period. Major transformations include:

a) creation and transformation of network and platforms aimed at strengthening Civil Society
b) increasing advocacy of socio-economic transformation and development of the country
c) raising awareness on citizens’ organisation
d) participation (to a certain extent) in social, policy and political dialogue

A considerable share of the resources invested by the EC in Angola has been channelled directly and indirectly through NSAs such as NGOs, religious institutions, CBOs and community

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79 E.g. EQ 3 and EQ 4
associations. The capacity for implementation has been growing as a result of these interventions, making CSOs more reliable partners in the development process. The impact and sustainability of CSOs activities in Angola are still dubious since a highly centralised and top-down political dynamic, paired with weak governance capacity, go hand in hand with a low cooperation between public authorities and civil society and limited participation of CSOs in the policy dialogue, although some positive efforts have being made by the Government.

The EC is acting through the PAANE project that is strengthening the capacity of NSAs to interact positively with municipalities. In this field, PAANE has trained and mobilised NSA in de-concentration and decentralisation issues, produced guideline for the start-up of CACS (Consultation and Concertation Councils established by the Decree 02/2007).

3.8.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

Answer to Evaluation Question 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Performance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ 8: To what extent has EC support in the area of Governance contributed to the consolidation of peace and the resolution of conflict as well as to the creation of institutional prerequisites for sustainable development interventions in key social sectors?</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.1: Progress in consolidation of the peace process and conflict resolution</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.2: Sustained political dialogue between EC and GoA regarding governance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.3: Change in implementation capacity of supported governmental bodies</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC 8.4: Enhanced Civil Society capacity to participate in development processes</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EC intervention in the area of Governance and Institutional Support can be considered the most controversial in terms of results. The EC has contributed to the consolidation of peace through its efforts (also utilising the LRRD approach) to gradually transfer decision-making responsibilities and management to national institutions, and EC programmes have contributed to building institutional capacity and disseminating professional skills in local authorities’ human resources. Steps have been taken in the direction of a higher level of transparency in Public Finance Management. The Government fails to see the utility of political dialogue, applies a high level of formality in the political dialogue held under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, and avoids day-to-day formal dialogue in policy formulation. The most important opportunity in Governance is provided by the decentralisation process. The capacity of local administrations has been developed. Support to non-State actors is in line with the needs of Civil Society Organisations and with the most important processes in which NSAs are involved (e.g. decentralisation).

3.9 Cross-cutting issues

EQ 9 To what extent have cross-cutting issues been mainstreamed in all sectors of EC support?

3.9.1 Approach to the question and EC intervention

The Cotonou Agreement (Article 20) and the European Consensus on Development stress the importance of mainstreaming cross-cutting issues in development activities to improve the impact and sustainability of cooperation. Thematic or cross-cutting themes identified for mainstreaming in CSP include gender, environment, institutional development and capacity-building (CSP, p.6). Good governance and involvement of civil society, human rights, democratisation and consolidation of rule of law are identified in CSP as ‘focal cross-cutting issues’ (CSP/NIP 2002-
2007). During the evaluation process, it was decided to consider the issue of civil society within the framework of Governance intervention (see EQ 8) and also to consider children-related problems and child protection as cross-cutting issues.

Most issues identified by CSP/NIP as cross-cutting do appear in the ECP in the context of a sectoral approach, but without any apparent prioritisation of emphasis of these issues within the individual sectors other than generic identification of target groups (i.e. displaced persons, refugees, children, the disabled, the elderly, and women). (GoA Programming documents)

The judgment is based on the following *Judgement Criteria*:

- EC adequately identified cross-cutting issues in the CSP and in identification, design and implementation of interventions.
- EC intervention has contributed to the reduction of gender disparities.
- EC intervention has contributed to the reduction of environmental risks and problems such as impact of population growth, seawater and freshwater pollution and scarcity, oil-related environmental pollution, de-forestation.
- HIV-AIDS specific results have been produced and sectoral implications of HIV-AIDS have been addressed with some solutions such as population awareness raising and mainstreaming of HIV-AIDS issues in sector programmes in order to increase the population targeted by HIV-AIDS prevention.
- EC interventions have contributed to the reduction of children’s risks such as different forms of violence, lack of birth registration, child marriage, early pregnancy, child labour, child trafficking, sexual exploitation, and harmful traditional practices (HTP).
- Monitoring frameworks, programme and project reports and evaluations include data collection and analysis of impacts on cross-cutting issues.

The EQ is answered by referring to the EC intervention as a whole as identified in section 2.6.2.

3.9.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 9.1:** The modality adopted for identification of cross-cutting issues in the CSP is quite confused. In consequence, cross-cutting issues were not strategically considered in project design nor mainstreamed in project implementation, at least in early interventions. This is only partially justified by the urgency of supporting a massive number of highly disadvantaged and war-affected citizens.

*Major Findings supporting the judgment*

ECP does not identify cross-cutting issues as such (although most issues do appear in sectoral contexts) but more attention is being paid to such issues during implementation than the project documentation suggests. Thus, there is some improvement in management and coverage of cross-cutting issues.

Thematic or cross-cutting issues identified (albeit in a somewhat confused two-stage process) in the CSP include gender, environment, institutional development and capacity-building whilst good governance, involvement of civil society, human rights, democratisation and consolidation of the rule of law are identified by CSP as ‘focal cross-cutting issues’.

The main review documents of the CSP highlight that the integration of cross-cutting issues cannot be considered systematic. Already in the Mid-Term Review is noted that ‘cross-cutting issues were integrated where possible’ and surmises that the new peace environment will allow stronger consideration of these issues and that particular attention should be given to gender

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80 The identification of cross-cutting issues in the CSP has been already considered rather confused. Moreover some issues, which were considered to have a transversal influence across the intervention sectors, have been identified as “focal cross-cutting issues” (Governance is the most important).
mainstreaming in all EC operations. The End-of-Term Review refers only to gender equality and environmental concerns.

**Cross-cutting issues were explicitly addressed in fewer than half of the projects** examined, however, coverage of cross-cutting issues during project implementation (sectoral and stand-alone projects aimed at specific cross-cutting issues) was more comprehensive than was expected following perusal of project documentation, and clearly more attention has been given to cross-cutting issues in recent years.

Delegation staff, whilst concentrating on sector or thematic issues, is aware of the importance of cross-cutting issues and the need to ensure as wide a coverage as possible in sector project interventions. No evidence of NAO’s capacity for taking account of cross-cutting issues was observed during the evaluation.

**JC 9.2:** When gender issues have been specifically addressed (e.g. in DDRR), the EC has significantly contributed to the economic empowerment of women but the condition of women has not been addressed in all its aspects.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Although Angola is a signatory to various international agreements promoting gender equality, there is a lack of capacity for the instalment of effective non-discriminatory instruments. As a result, discrimination against girls is accentuated, especially in secondary and university education. There are no women governors and women occupy only 16% of parliamentary seats.

Although the EC response as set out in the CSP is limited to analysis of gender issues in the context of support to civil society, **EC support has targeted gender issues more substantially than other cross-cutting issues** as most EC project interventions throughout the evaluation period have targeted vulnerable populations (of which women constitute the majority). An important example is given by the DDRR project ‘Socio-economic reintegration assistance to vulnerable groups’81, in which the choice to target women and children was made on the grounds that assessments of the needs of combatant populations had downplayed the needs of women and children whereas in the receiving communities the poorest among the poor were in fact women (particularly widows). Results were attained in terms of reduction of economic disparities and, to a lesser extent, in terms of improved women’s participation in civic activities such as the Municipal Fora, but no data were available on cultural issues.82

Besides this, no other reliable evidence was found that EC interventions actually contributed to reduction of gender disparities despite significant targeting of the issue in project interventions.

**JC 9.3:** EC interventions have only marginally contributed to a reduction in environmental risks and problems such as population growth, seawater and fresh water pollution and scarcity, oil-related environmental pollution and deforestation. Pressure to remedy environmental shortcomings is mainly donor-driven.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

In Angola environmental threats are severe (e.g. oil – marine pollution; diamonds – use of monitors leading to extreme erosion and soil degradation; minerals – toxic chemicals) and

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81 In DDRR intervention the Program “Socio-economic reintegration assistance to vulnerable groups” ACP 9 ANG/001/001 and ACP 9 ANG/001/003 has had as one of the main target women, related or not related to the demobilised fighters and in many cases, this has produced sustainable income generation activities and a better access to social service for the women. Best practices are not generalised.

82 In the visit to project fields in Huambo it was reported that women’s economic empowerment had generated good practices, and that women in some cases were participating more in civic life, and some data (mainly on employment and self-employment opportunities) were available in the World Bank Implementation Mission Reports and Quarterly Report.
dubious practices lead to pollution of water tables and soils and health hazards. No information obtained and examined during the evaluation suggests that the risks have diminished. Moreover, there is degradation of arable land near cities due to population pressures.

Despite a plethora of environmental legislation, enforcement and regulation has been virtually non-existent. The national environmental agenda was updated recently and a national environmental action plan is now being prepared (Estratégia Nacional sobre Biodiversidade) although this seems to be mainly donor-driven. However, legislation enforcement and institutional capacity is rudimentary, as this issue remains low on GoA agendas and GoA still does not view environmental issues as of high priority.

The 2006 update of the Country Environment Profile highlights that in Angola there is neither a national environmental policy nor an environmental information system, and that installed institutional capacity is weak. Besides, the Government Budget is often inadequate for achievement of the objectives set out in the Government Programme for the environment, and similarly for strengthening of environmental institutions.

EC support to the various sectors during the period 2002-2007 has identified environmental issues as secondary to sector impacts as regards mitigation measures (e.g. temporary negative impacts during construction) although a number of focal and non-focal sector programmes have outcomes which directly impact upon the environment (e.g. water and sanitation, agriculture, health).

The limited strategic consideration of environmental issues can be ascribed to the fact that in the immediate post-conflict period, environmental considerations were subservient to other more pressing humanitarian and operational considerations and until recently, GoA did not view environmental issues as being of high priority. Even now pressure to remedy environmental shortcomings appears to be mainly donor-driven rather than a country initiative at government or civil society level.

**JC 9.4:** Overall HIV/AIDS-specific results have not been (quantifiably) produced, but the sectoral implications of HIV/AIDS have been addressed and several ECHO projects had awareness-raising components. This choice has been continued in sector interventions by EDF projects but there is little evidence of population awareness increasing despite an increase in the populations targeted by HIV/AIDS prevention.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Angola is not characterised by the high level of HIV-AIDS prevalence found in other Sub-Saharan African countries. This is mainly due to the fact that during the war communications with surrounding countries were reduced. In fact, the infection was mostly diffused in the major towns and in the south. However, the increase in mobility following the development of roads and transport links and the increase in urbanisation are serious threats to containment of the disease.

The national response is based on the National Strategic Plan for Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS elaborated for the period 2003-2008. HIV/AIDS is one of the priority areas of the ECP, but with no direct EC contribution.

The low level of awareness is a further element of risk (e.g. 70% of youths in the country do not use condoms) and there is no evidence of any improvement so far.

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83 Mid-term Review, 2004
84 See: Capacity Building for Environmental Planning and Biodiversity Conservation in Angola – Final Evaluation Report, Sept 2004; Update of Country Environmental Profile of Angola – Additional Comments, 2006.). A report on: “State of the Environment” is being finalised and a National Strategy and Plan of Action for biodiversity is under preparation but some parts have been made available.
At strategic level the EC response strategy as set out in the CSP includes reference to additional funds which may be made available from the HIV/AIDS thematic intervention in the framework of the thematic Budget Line ‘Investing in People’. During examination of a sample of EC sector support interventions for evidence of inclusion of HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue, it was found that several ECHO interventions had HIV-AIDS awareness raising components, which contributed to avoiding the spread of the infection during the early relief and recovery phases. However, **there was little or no reference to HIV/AIDS in EC project documentation** as a cross-cutting issue except for rather specific health sector interventions, which had HIV/AIDS as a component (although some food security and infrastructure sector interventions do mention HIV/AIDS in project documents).

**JC 9.5: EC interventions have contributed to the reduction of some children’s’ risk** in compliance with extensive international legislation and with the needs of a large DDRR process. Despite these results, children are still at high risk in Angola since only DDRR areas have been covered by the intervention, and meanwhile the problems of urban children, street children and recently urbanised children and young people are still in evidence.

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

Children-related issues are of paramount importance in Angola (as in all SSA and non-African countries affected by long-lasting internal conflicts). Children have been recruited as soldiers, used as sex slaves, separated from their families and during the conflict were one of the groups most affected by violence. Moreover, the specific incidence of Harmful Tradition Practices (mainly in Northern provinces but also in the Highlands, although to a lesser extent in towns) such as sorcery (*feitiçaria*), which affects mainly the children, needs to be highlighted.

The EC intervention targeted children’s risks through a specific project implemented by UNICEF which provided assistance, protection, education and family reintegration support to war-affected children\(^86\) and supported reinforcement of national networks (such as NGOs, church, police, community groups) with the objective of helping children in conflict by means of the law preventing criminality and child trafficking, and through promoting children’s rights and creation of a network of services for vulnerable girls and young women.

Other sector projects (such as the ONJILA\(^87\)) had components specifically aimed at targeting the most vulnerable among children such as street children.\(^88\)

Other by-products of sectoral intervention are found in water and sanitation; for example, improvements in availability of water have in some cases increased school attendance rates.\(^89\)

**JC 9.6: Monitoring frameworks, programmes, project reports and evaluations generally do not include adequate data collection or analysis of impacts on cross-cutting issues.**

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

**Efforts are only now being made to establish sector databases and monitoring systems** but across all sectors baseline data and monitoring systems are inadequate, not only as regards cross-cutting issues but also as regards most sectors of EC support.

Therefore, in respect to cross-cutting issues, specific impact and effectiveness are difficult to quantify (or even to identify in some cases) and informed decision-making is not possible. There

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\(^{86}\) In the project Long-Term Reintegration of war-affected children 9 ACP ANG 014/2 close to 2000 children have been assisted in various provinces. The project has provided training which has been very much appreciated by the beneficiary institutions (Ministry of Assistance of Social Reinsertion, NGOs, etc.).

\(^{87}\) Project financed by the BL NGO-co-financing and implemented by the important national NGO platform ADRA

\(^{88}\) PVD/2001/011-821 ONJILA: Contextual Basic Education in Angola

\(^{89}\) E.g. the case reported by the NGO ADPP about its cooperation with Escola Polivalente Formigas do Futuro, Cazenga
is little or no information on trends or results arising from implementation of ECP except for some limited, not very reliable information on MDG progress.  

Some WATSAN and DDRR programmes relating to social issues have shown some evidence of consultation of beneficiaries in implementation, for example involvement of women in decisions about location of public water points and public taps in Luanda. This participatory approach should potentially have contributed to promoting ownership, impact and sustainability on a gender-sensitive basis.

### 3.9.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

**Answer to Evaluation Question 9**

Despite an emphasis on the importance of crosscutting issues in EC international policies and strategies, CSP and subsequent review documents do not clearly set out coverage of crosscutting issues, neither in a strategic nor an issue-by-issue manner. This lack of clarity is carried forward into project documents that treat crosscutting issues as ‘bolt-on extras’ or afterthoughts. In fact, the extent of coverage is greater than could be expected from the documentation, which can be credited to the management of some projects. However, monitoring of these efforts on crosscutting issues is not better than for sectoral interventions such that impacts are not quantified (or in some cases even identified).

### 3.10 Impact, sustainability, LRRD

**EQ 10**  
To what extent has EC support contributed to combining satisfaction of immediate needs of vulnerable populations with establishing conditions for long-term sustainability of development activities?

#### 3.10.1 Approach to the question and the EC intervention

Rehabilitation programmes are seen as progressively taking over from relief assistance for stabilising the economic and social situation and facilitating the transition to a medium and long-term development strategy. Chronic crises (such as the 27-year-long war in Angola) represent a difficult context for an LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development) approach. Conflict prevention, and early intervention at political and developmental levels, was meant to produce structural stabilisation, that is a situation where viable institutions, acceptable social conditions, economic development, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights could be the starting point for managing planned change and preventing renewal of violence. The EC decided to launch the short-term development initiative in the programming period 2002-2007 to

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90 See Annex
support consolidation of peace in the perspective of long-term development. In this sense, rehabilitation was considered not only as restoring previous conditions but also as pursuing resumption of sustainable development, taking account of the lessons learned from the crisis period. The EQ analyses the intervention philosophy and implementation methodologies, based on the LRRD strategy and on the achievement of early post-war interventions which focused on avoidance of deterioration of physical infrastructure and on key aspects such as level of organisation, local expertise, and the motivation and resilience drawn upon during the crisis and kept up by the population. It then assesses the overall impact of the EC intervention across the sectors, and the basis for technical, financial and institutional sustainability.

The judgment is based on the following *Judgement Criteria*:

- completeness and timeliness of the policy framework adopted to target the post-crisis intervention;
- quality of specific measures to protect development resources in post-crisis interventions in relief and rehabilitation phases and to support national take-over of responsibility (LRRD approach);
- quality of coordination and continuity between ECHO, EDF, and budget-line-funded activities;
- satisfaction with EC responsiveness to emerging GoA priorities;
- overall impact and sustainability of EC interventions.

The EQ is answered by referring to the EC intervention as a whole as identified in section 2.6.2.

### 3.10.2 Judgements related to the Evaluation Question

**JC 10.1:** The policy framework, plans of action and implementation of EC post-crisis intervention resulted in a well-timed intervention that targeted the most important critical situations, and covered a wide range of sectors while addressing the whole range of problems affecting the population in the immediate post-crisis situation, and during the post-crisis period tackled several other emergencies up until 2007.

*Major Findings supporting the judgment*

The EC’s *early response to the crisis*, given the characteristics of ECHO interventions (most ECHO projects contained capacity and institution building or social capital components) and the Action Plan to Support the Peace Process, was not only *timely* but a *cornerstone* of the EC post-war recovery and development strategy for Angola, and proved capable of addressing the diverse and complex needs in terms of post-war relief, stabilisation and reintegration, as well as preparing the ground for development initiatives.

One of the challenges was the issue of balancing interventions in a country, which had been affected by a long-lasting war with its burden of conflict and division. In this field, the overall EC intervention applied a fair and balanced approach by targeting different participants in the conflict and different categories of people affected by the war. The role of PEAPP is particularly highlighted, as it emerged throughout the evaluation process that it was the starting point for the LRRD strategy in Angola.

The above efforts were confirmed in the recovery phase when the EC intervention in the DDRR process through the Project “Socio-Economic Assistance to vulnerable groups” increased (i) the balance between the beneficiaries selected (by including the most vulnerable layers of receiving communities) and (ii) the number of partnerships (the IRSEM project covered 102 implementing partners).
JC 10.2: The wide sectoral coverage of short-term EC interventions ensured the tackling of highly critical situations so as to save lives, always involving existing institutions and avoiding jeopardising of national capacities. This choice paved the way for subsequent development interventions that continued support for the most important sectors from the point of view of consolidating social services and rehabilitating physical infrastructure and institutional organisation. The LRRD approach was clearly adopted in the overall strategic approach and in project implementation. The EC in Angola applied the LRRD continuum by taking into account vertical aspects (geographical and sector coverage) and horizontal aspects (specific characteristics of the different intervention phases to ensure a smooth phase-to-phase transition and due consideration of early factors in development phases such as the “risk factor” in de-mining activities).

Major Findings supporting the judgment

On many occasions throughout the evaluation process there was evidence of the strategic and operational value of adopting the LRRD strategy given that the most important positive results of the EC interventions were obtained through the continuity of interventions along the LRRD intervention cycle.

In the Angolan context, the LRRD approach has allowed promotion of a gradual appropriation of responsibilities by national governmental and non-governmental organisations and bodies. In all the sectors of intervention, national authorities and institutions have been gradually moved to the drivers’ seat and the communities empowered, both in the management of facilities and infrastructure and in the capacity of planning for current and future needs.\(^{91}\) The following Figure 15 outlines this institutional process.

Figure 15: The institutional phases of EC’s LRRD approach in Angola

The gradual increase in national responsibility was attained along the LRRD cycle by using the following modalities of intervention:

1. In the post-war emergency the European Commission financed WFP, FAO and the Euronaid NGO Consortium to deliver goods and services using all available instruments (EDF, budget lines, ECHO etc.) as securing delivery to the communities, wherever they were located, in the most rapid way was and remains the priority.

2. In the rehabilitation and development phases, the EC (a) stimulated change in the nature of NGO activities, and (b) directed funds both direct to the government and through UN

\(^{91}\) FAS III management and the NGOs involved in the DDRR process and implementation of FAS III and PMR III have witnessed that while during the early phases demand was mainly for rehabilitation or construction of basic infrastructure and service facilities, during the advanced phase more evolutionary needs emerged as a result of the LRRD mechanism.
Agencies or the World Bank with the objective of strengthening government bodies at central and local levels.

In all sectors, the coherent application of **LRRD principles facilitated rehabilitation of national capacity** although the issue of capacity remains a problem in Angola.

Since the early ECHO intervention, almost all projects had forward-looking orientation through taking into consideration the transition to rehabilitation and development and considering capacity needs. The PEAPP gradually supported the increase in territorial coverage for basic services and rebuilt institutional capacity. PTAPD continued emergency activities carried out by ECHO implementing partners and started long-term rehabilitation of facilities and training of technical staff and community immobilisers.

Interventions at local level respected local culture by building a positive relationship with local authorities. In the areas visited, local ‘Soba’ (traditional authorities) had been involved and were participating in the process, thereby facilitating the viability of resettlement, decision-making, land concessions handling of potential conflicts at local level, and combating of Harmful Traditional Practices (mainly sorcery). Where these authorities were not involved, the problems remained.

**JC 10.3:** Coordination between ECHO operations, EDF and thematic Budget Line interventions functioned through convincing application of the LRRD approach. This coordination was applied through joint strategic work, division of tasks and continuity of interventions (several ECHO interventions were picked up and continued in the rehabilitation and even development phases).

**Major Findings supporting the judgment**

An element clearly featuring in programming documents is explicit reference to the LRRD strategy as a cornerstone of EC strategy. In the CSP, the idea of coordination is specifically contextualised since EC interventions during the programming period were strategically divided into two phases: short term assistance to reinforce humanitarian assistance and post-emergency aid (including DDRR) and initiate support for good governance; and in the medium and longer terms a move towards focal areas of concentration (social sectors and food security).

First and foremost, **coordination was effectively established between ECHO and EDF** in terms of continuity and project management. As ECHO started to prepare its phasing-out, interventions became increasingly coordinated with EDF instruments to allow take-over of appropriate projects. This included re-scheduling of uncommitted funds under the principles of urgent intervention, which characterised the first part of the EC intervention.

Moreover, the CSP and NIP, in coherence with the EC response strategy, identify potential use of the thematic Budget Lines to finance specific operations mainly in the food security focal sector, for humanitarian aid, for peace building measures and for human rights and democracy. These interventions were phased in along the LRRD cycle. The use of thematic Budget Lines can be considered coherent with and complementary to EDF interventions and synergetic with the CSP/NIP objective as well as with the themes covered during EC political dialogue with Angola.

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92 In fact, the CSP/NIP 2002-2007 incorporated the principles highlighted in relevant EC policy documents (such as EC Communication on LRRD (COM (96) 153 final, EC Communication on Conflict Prevention COM (2001) 211, The 2002 EU Common Position on Angola) by underlining the need to generate synergies between different EC instruments to support Angola.

93 This is important since these principles and management modalities have allowed great flexibility, speed and comprehensiveness as well as rapid disbursement of funds and the adoption of the LRRD philosophy. At the same time, the fact that in the early phase of intervention so many actions were funded from EU Budget Lines and the Emergency Program gave rise to reduced capacity for Project Cycle Management, which is probably one of the concurrent causes of the low quality of project design found in several sectors (food security, health, education, Water & Sanitation), most of which belong to the early period of intervention while in the 9th EDF the attention to Project Design and PCM appears much higher.
FSBL interventions were crucial to generating impact in this field owing to their disbursement characteristics and the high volume of financial resources transferred.

Such a complex intervention had to be coordinated to ensure a smooth transition between the different phases of the recovery and development process. A good level of continuity was assured across the sectors by assuming the LRRD perspective. LRRD has also been mainstreamed in EC intervention by:

1. awareness of backward linkages, that is to say taking account of the characteristics of the early phases during more advanced phases, and
2. guiding implementing partners to adopt the LRRD strategy principles and course of action (international and national NGOs, UN Agencies and the World Bank).

A weak point of the process is that scaling-up of processes was inadequate, and thus the leverage effect experienced was restricted to geographically limited or in sector-specific interventions, best practice not having been disseminated at national level or mainstreamed in large interventions.

**JC 10.4:** Beneficiaries at all levels have shown a good level of satisfaction across the sectors. Satisfaction at the level of local authorities has also been high. In fact, if the leverage results of EC development aid (or of any cooperation) are low in comparison with the State budget, at local (municipal) level, impact is undoubtedly much higher and the difference stands out strongly. Participatory involvement of the population, CSOs, local administrators and traditional authorities in the planning process for basic social services and facilities (and in more advanced phases for community resources) has increased the capacity and accountability of local administrations.

Major Findings supporting the judgment

The GoA’s overall judgement on EC support was positive and interventions in the areas of basic social services and food security were considered highly satisfactory. Nevertheless, partial differences in identification of priorities conditioned the level of satisfaction expressed by GoA with regard to emerging priorities. The issue of leverage (and existence of alternative opportunities such as oil-backed financial support by China), the weakness of the political dialogue and a certain unease on the part of GoA with regard to political influence, all influenced the overall level of satisfaction.

Another critical issue is the difficulty associated with EDF procedures, the introduction of which, along with the simultaneous introduction of decentralisation, slowed down the pace of implementation.

Finally, the EC has contributed to strengthening the operational capacities of local NGOs both at national level (e.g. ADRA) and local level (several local NGOs or CBOs).

Beneficiary satisfaction is in general high at both grassroots and local government levels. It can be summarised as follows:

a) Beneficiaries expressed a good level of satisfaction with EC interventions. It should be noted that satisfaction is directly related to motivation and ownership. The most appreciated benefits were: (i) employment and income generation opportunities, availability of land and agricultural inputs; (ii) support for the agricultural value chain by facilitating income

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94 The EC Communication on LRRD (COM 96 153 final) suggests to take adequately into consideration disaster prevention and vulnerability in development planning and operations (page iv)
95 Such as local village chiefs called “Soba”.
96 Clearly and openly expressed in interviews with NAO, Ministry of Plan etc..
97 This has emerged from evaluation documents consulted and from interviews and FGD.
generation through marketing of agricultural products; (iii) family tracking and family reunification; and (iv) availability of and easier access to basic social services.
b) Traditional authorities, where involved, expressed a good level of satisfaction.
c) At municipal and provincial level, institutions showed a high level of satisfaction both with institutional support and capacity building and with their results, as stakeholders developed partnerships, participatory decision-making, and mutual accountability of local administrations, civil society and other grassroots organisations. In this case the impact of development aid on the budget of a “Municipio” was very noticeably high;
d) Social and civic partners and community organisations rated positively the support given to networking of organisations on specific issues and more generally the improvements in social mobilisation and relations with local authorities, which were considered a major benefit in the context of the decentralisation process.

**JC 10.5:** In most cases, the EC intervention had a positive impact, which however is very difficult to quantify owing to the weakness of statistical and monitoring systems. Lack of baseline data and of effectiveness of data collection systems adversely affected quantification of short, medium and long-term impact. Sustainability is differentiated between sectors since the outcomes of the DDRR process, de-mining interventions and food security interventions laid the basis for a developmental process in other sectors; but mainly because of institutional weaknesses sustainability is difficult to assess.

*Major Findings supporting the judgment*

The lack of baseline studies from national institutions and from implemented projects made it difficult to identify impact. This is of specific concern in respect of the indicators needed to gauge progress towards achievement of the MDGs. Only ad hoc surveys (the last available dating back to 2005) provide some data indicating the likelihood of non-attainment of most of the MDGs.

Specific institutional weaknesses have undermined effectiveness and impact, and put sustainability at risk; for example:

a) in several sectors the Government’s difficulties in fulfilling its obligations relating to the interventions is likely to have reduced the impact of EC interventions;
b) lack of, or delays in establishment of institutional bodies or utilities aimed at managing the systems, which is a serious threat to sustainability (e.g. drug distribution and water supply cost recovery and maintenance);
c) EDF procedures, which in the specific situation of Angola, where decision-making is complicated and lengthy, have been an implementation constraint.

Conversely, at local level, the impact of some small projects was significant and contributed largely to eradicating the sources of potential conflict. Best practice and lessons learned will be worth dissemination and possibly scaling-up to national level.

Impact was limited by the lack of visibility of EC interventions. The communication policy adopted hindered the possibility of learning from successful initiatives. Communication of positive impacts in the interests of visibility and possible replication was not effective. This weakened potential impact since best practice and lessons were not widely disseminated.

Finally, weaknesses in PCM (design, planning and management) had a negative effect on impact. Unrealistic planning of expected results and time-lines had specific consequences in several activities (most severely in those with engineering content).

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98 E.g. children issues by the project implemented by UNICEF
99 The UN-ECA MDG database shows, for Angola an absolute lack of data.
100 In Water and Sanitation provision of water to distribution points, lack of sanitation, in Education provision of teaching materials to rehabilitated or new schools, in Health procurement of medicines, etc.
Sustainability was variously influenced by (a) ownership by specific ministerial bureaucracies which is now at a high level despite partially differing views on cooperation priorities; (b) motivation, inasmuch as while the GoA does not refuse cooperation, the level of institutional motivation is often low; (c) weaknesses in technical and institutional capacities; (d) strong growth in demand for social services which outstripped efforts to rebuild the various sectors. The decentralisation process presents an opportunity since increasing availability of resources will increase the degree of subsidiarity; and in this case, the issue of capacity of local administrations will become even more critical. Finally in some sectors (health, education, and food security), the EC provided technical assistance for the elaboration of key national policy documents and such institutional support should have an impact on sustainability.

3.10.3 Overall judgement and answer to the Evaluation Question

EQ 10: To what extent has EC support contributed to combining satisfaction of immediate needs of vulnerable populations with establishing conditions for long-term sustainability of development activities?

| JC 10.1: Policy framework adopted to target the post-crisis intervention |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| poor | good | excellent |

| JC 10.2: Development resources and LRRD approach to support national take |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| poor | good | excellent |

| JC 10.3: Quality of coordination and continuity between ECHO, EDF and BL |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| poor | good | excellent |

| JC 10.4: Satisfaction with EC responsiveness to emerging GoA priorities |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| poor | good | excellent |

| JC 10.5: Overall impact and sustainability of EC interventions |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| poor | good | excellent |

Answer to Evaluation Question 10

The adoption of the LRRD strategy as a guiding strategy in all sectors proved a major contribution to the timeliness and effectiveness of EC interventions and was clearly the most important feature of the EC intervention in Angola. The fact that it was initiated by ECHO interventions and then continued through budget line and special interventions (e.g. PEAPP) is highly relevant; it generated positive lessons learned in all sectors of intervention and ensured that immediate post-war needs were satisfied without neglecting the need for recovery of social capital, capacities and organisational and institutional resources. Positive impacts were generated by the EC intervention in all sectors but it has to be said that (a) impact could have been greater if examples of best practice had been better disseminated; (b) the weakness of monitoring systems and baseline data has made it difficult to gauge impact and sometimes even to identify it properly. Sustainability has been influenced by different levels of motivation and by technical and institutional capacities that proved to be very low and likely to influence adversely management and maintenance of facilities, distribution schemes and so forth. For the reasons above and given the specific factors highlighted in the discussion of sector-related EQs, it can be said that, overall, sustainability remains to be demonstrated.
Conclusions are clustered according to the major issues raised in the Evaluation Questions that are of overall relevance for the country strategy and for learning from experience: (i) strategic approach and design, (ii) coordination and EC value added, (iii) implementation modalities and (iv) impact and sustainability. For each of the themes two major conclusions have been formulated. A table assesses the importance of the conclusions (XXX=very high, XX=high, X=moderate), the strength of the supporting evidence (XXX=very high, XX=good, X=limited), the possibility to generalize the conclusion as lessons, the evaluation questions to which it is referring and which recommendations are founded on the conclusion. Five conclusions of eight have been identified being the most important; six are based on very strong evidence; and five have a high generalisation potential.

Specific additional sectoral conclusions can be found in Annex 14.

4.1 Strategic approach and design

**Conclusion 1:** Overall, the country strategy appears relevant to supporting the post-war recovery and development effort of the country. The principles of the LRRD strategy have improved relevance and stimulated continuity of interventions. Post-war conditions appear to have limited the quality of project design, which in turn reduced the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EC interventions.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Generalisation</th>
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**JUSTIFICATION**

The overall analysis and the individual analyses of sectoral intervention have shown that the EC cooperation strategy with Angola for the period 2002-2007 is relevant to country needs, both in a bottom-up perspective (population’s need of immediate post-war assistance, access to public services, recovery of productive capacity and the capacity for earning a livelihood) and in a top-down perspective (GoA’s priorities expressed in main policy documents).

CSP/NIP is a joint EC/Angola document that was jointly discussed and agreed. The differences between the EC strategy and the GoA’s vision do not call into question the principal relevance of interventions in the focal and non-focal sectors, which are considered of crucial importance for the recovery and development of the country, but important institutional issues are not always adequately considered in project design.

In-depth analysis of implementation has shown that several projects were conceived under the pressure of post-crisis needs and in a situation of fragility. Moreover, in these phases stakeholder’s capacity to identify and express their needs had been weakened by the war and has not been adequately considered during project formulation.

In this situation, the LRRD strategy did indeed boost the relevance of the different phases of post-war recovery but, with the gradual shift to rehabilitation and development, weaknesses emerged in relation to quality of project and programme design, use of PCM tools, and consideration of cross-cutting issues.

An important lesson learned is that the EC should make an effort to identify strategic guidelines for interventions in countries that are rich in resources but in which the rating for Human Development is very low, with the majority of the population being poor.
**Conclusion 2**: The transition of sector support (LRRD) from humanitarian response to development has been logical, consistent and strategic. It could be taken as a best practice example for learning.

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</table>

**JUSTIFICATION**

The LRRD approach has clearly been adopted in the overall strategic approach and project implementation by:

- utilising approaches geared to promoting recovery of capacities and organisational structures since the early humanitarian interventions;
- promoting a smooth phase-to-phase transition;
- guiding implementing partners in adoption of the LRRD strategy and the course of action they should follow;
- gradually moving the “driver’s seat” over to national authorities and stakeholders.

LRRD operations have been particularly relevant to sustainability.

### 4.2 Coordination and EC value added

**Conclusion 3**: The EC intervention in Angola has been supported by EC global regional and national policy documents and by EC sector policies. Donor coordination is an outstanding problem in Angola although in some sectors (e.g. education) a certain degree of coordination with EU Member States exists. Geographical coverage of EC intervention has been coherent with the major post-war needs. Implementation by entrustment of funds to other international donors has produced positive outcomes but has also given rise to delays and inefficiencies.

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**JUSTIFICATION**

Coherence is not a problem at the strategy and policy levels. **Shortcomings have been evident in coordination** given that problems exist in the following areas: a) EC-EUMS coordination; b) coordination and harmonisation with other donors; c) coordination between implementing partners; and d) coordination between implementation line ministries in multi-sector interventions. **Donor coordination is a major problem but has been improving since the end of 2007.** The efforts made by the EC to **promote implementation of the EU Road Map** and to enhance donor networking by promoting an ongoing dialogue through periodic overall meetings and the formation of Thematic Working Groups were crucial and had a worthwhile effect at national level. This has placed the EC in a good position and is likely to increase its visibility.

A major related issue to be addressed is that **the Government does not appear interested in promoting donor coordination.**

**The characteristics of China’s financial support** have to be adequately considered by the EC since they question **conditionalities attached to EC intervention, political influence and political dialogue promoted by the EC.** GoA is valuing China’s economic cooperation as an important contribution to the development of the country, implemented on a fast track and free from conditionalities, thus tabling the need to reflect on conditionalities and on flexibility in the use of EDF regulations.
Brazil's support has proved very effective in some sectors (such as VET and Agricultural Development) which are priorities for both GoA and the population but not for EC support. The intervention philosophy and choice of sectors by Brazil (competence-based TVET) are coherent with the EC’s philosophy.

Conclusion 4: By adopting the LRRD strategy as well as using its worldwide experience in several sectors, the EC has produced a value added through its intervention in Angola.

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JUSTIFICATION
The adoption of LRRD as a guiding principle is the most important specific characteristic of EC intervention and its most important value added. LRRD has been disseminated to all implementing partners, not only at the level of international and national NGOs, but also at the level of UN Agencies (e.g. UNICEF) and at some Government institutions (IRSEM intervention modalities were clearly inspired by the LRRD philosophy).

Other elements of EC value added have been the high level of sectoral experience in health, education, food security and de-mining, and the capacity to deploy long-standing partnerships for implementation.

The fact that since the end of 2007 general donor coordination meetings (including non-DAC members) have been convened with greater regularity is a good starting point for taking into consideration different views and for improving exchanges of information.

4.3 Implementation modalities

Conclusion 5: Implementation arrangements have produced medium-to-low efficiency, but it has to be considered that it would be unrealistic to expect high efficiency in a post-war transitional situation or during a period when institutions are seeking to overcome long-term dysfunctionality and capacity deficits. EDF procedures slowed down the speed of the early interventions under special arrangements and through Budget lines.

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JUSTIFICATION
Efficiency in Angola has to be assessed in the light of major difficulties confronting development work in the country: processes are very slow and decision-making is not always in the hands of the implementers; to this must be added well-known bureaucratic delays on the part of donors and recipients.

Many projects experienced initial start-up delays from six months to a year because of EDF procedures, delays in national decision-making, and difficulties in appointment and establishment of TA contractors. One notes also a high turnover of staff (often due to logistical problems and the quality of relations with implementation counterparts). All this had a negative effect on transaction costs and also on effectiveness.

The issue of EDF procedures (although whether this is due to intrinsic flaws in the procedures themselves or to the way in which they have been applied is an open question) has had a specific

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101 Within the PALOP RIP II a project aimed at improving the VET system has been formulated but not yet implemented.
influence in Angola since the effect of the lengthy bureaucratic and decision-making processes, as well as low levels of motivation and commitment by government officials, have exacerbated the intrinsic difficulties of the procedures.

Another Angola-specific conclusion is that, since early EC interventions in the period under evaluation were mainly implemented under special arrangements and by interventions through Budget Lines, the introduction of EDF procedures, especially as it coincided with the Commission’s de-concentration process, has certainly slowed down implementation, the more so given the low level of familiarity with the PCM set of tools.

One issue that emerged repeatedly is the difficulty some partner NGOs have had in moving from a humanitarian to a development mode in their LRRD operations. This could have produced inefficiencies that resulted in delays in implementation.

4.4 Impact and sustainability

**Conclusion 6:** In general, the outcomes of EC interventions are moderately satisfactory but the level is highly variable between sectors. This is related to differences in the attitude of public institutions, differences between the central and local levels, low levels of institutional and technical capacity, quality of project design, and specific implementation factors.

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**JUSTIFICATION**

From many findings it can be concluded that the outstanding causes of the deficiencies in effectiveness can be ascribed to:

**Institutional factors**

- the negative synergistic effect of the political and institutional environment (complicated institutional relationships, lack of clarity of responsibilities, and equivocal government support in terms of action taken);

- low absorption capacity, which has been a hindrance almost across the board, calls into question the effectiveness of the TA, and stresses the importance of capacity building.

**Implementation factors**

- many projects being characterised by long learning curves (projects coming on board after quite long time-lags) due to problems in coordination with partners or with national bodies in charge of implementation, and also due to poor project design;

- poor communication and cooperation with stakeholders across sectors, and little effort at facilitating such dialogue, including on the part of the government;

- TA effectiveness being adversely affected by the implementation modalities and by the fact that TA has, in many cases, been affected by high turnover of staff; in several cases TA was unable to transfer capacity and ownership and this reduced effectiveness, while more recently it has been shown that, conversely, in the cases where such transfer did occur (e.g. PAANE project), it has a positive influence on effectiveness;

- the negative influence of the long period of elapsed time between the signing of the FA and the start of implementation. A consequence is that achievement of the planned operational phases has been very slow. In this sense, EDF procedures have represented an implementation constraint (see below in 4.4).

The provincial and municipal levels have proved more productive and actions at that level more likely to lead to impact and stimulate and strengthen efficiency, effectiveness and accountability.
Capacity and institutional building have had better success at provincial and municipal level.

**Conclusion 7: In most of the projects there has been positive impact**, but this has been difficult to measure as it takes time to achieve and indicators of impact were not always identified at the outset through baseline studies. Opinions of well-informed stakeholders on impact were mainly collected during the field phase. Consequently, it appears very difficult to quantify impact and sometimes even to identify it.

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**JUSTIFICATION**

As with effectiveness the main conclusion is that, while there is impact at grassroots level, at national level it is much more problematic. Indeed lack of monitoring systems and baseline data make quantification of impact difficult.

If at national level impact is quite low, at local level the impact of the EC intervention on the financial resources of a municipality was high and in some cases made a significant difference in the sectors targeted by EC interventions. This needs to be taken into account in view of the decentralisation process that will provide municipalities with a budget. On the limited budget of a municipality, the impact of EC interventions can be very high and produce examples of best practice for dissemination.

Equivocal commitment by the Government, and the Government's incapacity to fulfil its obligations, in many cases resulted in reduced impact.

Communication of impact, dissemination and visibility of the EC interventions could have raised he impact by promoting replication and mainstreaming.

**Conclusion 8: Sustainability is still unproven** since (i) motivation in Government bodies has been shown to be quite low and unsteady, (ii) motivation at ministerial level is inadequate, (iii) technical and institutional capacities low, and (iv) cross-cutting issues not sufficiently addressed. These factors made it difficult to create the institutional conditions for sustainability since whereas availability of financial resources is not a major problem in Angola, institutional issues are critical.

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**JUSTIFICATION**

In sectors such as DDRR, Food Security and Agricultural Development where locally deep-rooted institutional resources have been strengthened or created from scratch, sustainability is more likely to arise from these institutional and organisational resources on grassroots level. For instance: a) farmer's cooperatives have linked farmers to markets that have created value chains; and b) local productive groups have accessed local markets for goods and services and local institutional structures have increased the accountability of local institutions; this is paving the way for improved service delivery and capacity to plan local development.

Again, even though these forms of bottom-up intervention have been well-conceived and in most cases well-implemented (e.g. in the case of food security the reconstruction of agricultural value
chains is a sustainable and forward-looking measure for the creation of organised national agricultural markets and a reduction in the import of some staple vegetable foods), the scaling-up of successful practices into policies implemented at national level has not been successful.

Cross-cutting issues are, to a varying extent, prerequisites for real sustainability of sector support. The lack of attention to, or, at best, lack of quantification of impact in respect to cross-cutting issues suggests that, when combined with doubts about operational sustainability in some sectoral initiatives, sustainability in the area of cross-cutting issues has not been enhanced by EC activities.

4.5 Overall assessment of factors influencing EC cooperation with Angola

The graph below shows the importance of specific factors and their influence on the strategic performance of the EC cooperation in Angola. It shows that Relevance and the LRRD approach of the strategy are the two most important strengths of the country strategy and its implementation, while low effectiveness, impact and sustainability of an important number of projects and programmes are important threats to the achievement of the country strategy’s goals. Besides, the low incidence of ODA (and of EC development aid) on state budget is an important limitation to the impact of the EC intervention and to the leverage effect of EC intervention on policy formulation.

Figure 16: Critical factors influencing EC cooperation in Angola

These conclusions are also confirmed by the SWOT analysis of EC intervention in Angola (see Table 5) undertaken by the evaluation team. The major weaknesses are in the areas of institutional short comings including weaknesses in communication and coordination. The LRRD approach and interventions on provincial, municipal and local level have been the highlights, and the strategy of EDF10 with its focus on local governance is building upon these lessons learnt.

Communication and dissemination of LRRD successes in Angola could have considerably improved its outreach and thus impact by promoting mainstreaming of best practice.

The table below summarises the SWOT analysis for the EC intervention in Angola over the period 2002-2007. It has to be noted that there is a certain degree of overlap in the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats identified by the evaluators: thus some strengths could also be a weakness (e.g. if the feature or characteristic identified is not enough to produce positive effects); while in the same way there are opportunities which could also be threats if they cannot be positively managed or seized.
Table 5: **SWOT analysis of EC intervention in Angola in the period 2002-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Comprehensiveness of EC intervention in preventing conflicts and increasing the number of beneficiaries (impact)</td>
<td>1. Quality of project/programme design and underestimation of institutional shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. High level of experience and intervention capacity in focal and non-focal areas</td>
<td>2. Weakness of political dialogue and of action on governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Implementing partners network</td>
<td>3. EDF procedures and some inefficiencies during implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Community Action and support to NSAs and Local Institutions</td>
<td>4. Discontinuities in the provision of TA and problems in transfer of skills and knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. LRRD has strengthened impact and sustainability through timely aid, effective targeting and continuity of interventions</td>
<td>5. Weaknesses in communication with stakeholders and day-by-day formal sector policy dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. By involving communities and strengthening local governance the LRRD approach contributed to reduction of future risks by reducing potential sources of conflict</td>
<td>6. Identification of cross-cutting issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Quality of project/programme design and underestimation of institutional shortcomings</td>
<td>7. Lack of monitoring resources and impact analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Weakness of political dialogue and of action on governance</td>
<td>8. Donor coordination</td>
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<td>9. EDF procedures and some inefficiencies during implementation</td>
<td>9. Unrealistic targets established due to low quality of project design in several cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Discontinuities in the provision of TA and problems in transfer of skills and knowledge</td>
<td>10. Low consideration for EC visibility</td>
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<td>11. Weaknesses in communication with stakeholders and day-by-day formal sector policy dialogue</td>
<td>11. Lack of dissemination of Best Practices</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Good level of motivation of Local (provincial and municipal) Government Authorities</td>
<td>1. High incidence of local conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. High Level of expectations from beneficiary communities</td>
<td>2. Low level of motivation and ownership in some Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Low level of coordination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Low capacity at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. High level of expectations from beneficiary communities</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>6. China’s financial support is interpreted as having a possible deterrent effect on EC political influence and conditionalities</td>
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102 In this case this is an opportunity since if expectations are high the likeliness of positive participation and high ownership is high, but it is also a threat if these expectations, raised by inadequate programming or unrealistic targets, are frustrated by a low quality of project outcomes (at least in beneficiaries’ perception of low quality outcomes).
5 RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter is presented a set of recommendations to the EC. They are clustered according to three clusters:

1) Strategic recommendations addressing issues of relevance, coherence, alignment, strategy and programme design
2) Operational recommendation relating to procedures, monitoring, implementation modalities and communication
3) Learning recommendation relating to learning potential and the dissemination of best practices

Recommendations are assessed in respect to their priority (??? = high, ?? = medium, ? = low) and recipient they are addressed to. Each recommendation is operationalised in respect to short-term and medium-long term aspects of implementation. The conclusions from which the conclusion arose are mentioned.

Specific additional sectoral recommendations can be found in Annex 14.

5.1 Strategic recommendations

Recommendation 1: Concentrate on capacity-building in management, institutional development and governance of all development partners.

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<td>Short term implementation</td>
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- Focus interventions on capacity-building or include substantive capacity-building components in all projects
- TA teams should concentrate more on transfer of capacity to their institutional and non-institutional counterparts

| Medium-long term implementation | | | | | |
- Collect examples of best practice in capacity-building from specific projects and mainstream them into Governance and Institutional Support activities (Focal Sector under EDF10) and also into other sectoral interventions.
- Promote exchange of experience between different partners and projects, and organise study tours for local communities starting a new project.

Comment
The issue of capacity has been one of the most important constraints to maximising the full potential of EC interventions. Angola is a rich country and its first need is capacity at institutional and technical level since low capacity:
- for beneficiaries: has a negative effect on quality of service delivery;
- for EC development aid: decreases absorption of aid, contributes to a slow-down in implementation, and is one of the most important causes of conflict and relational problems between the TA and institutional partners.

Link Conclusions: 1-5-6
**Recommendation 2:** Focus on service delivery at municipal and provincial level as a 'fulcrum' (with support to selected/prioritised municipalities) but with continued dialogue at national level and with gradual extension of municipal coverage.

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<th>No 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>Short term implementation</td>
<td>The draft CSP for EDF10 has set concentration of interventions at decentralised level as a driving principle - the evaluation team endorses this choice. It is highly relevant and highly recommended for all sectors of intervention. Pay attention to visibility and communication of examples of best practice. However, within sectoral interventions, pay adequate attention to the risk of spreading too thin and concentrate activities geographically and by contents.</td>
<td>EC Headquarters, EC Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium-long term implementation</td>
<td>Systematise and classify examples of best practice emerging from the local level according to relevance, importance, critical mass and level of consensus in different situations, and mainstream this into the national policy dialogue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Interventions at provincial and municipal level have been productive. Systematisation and dissemination of best practice along with a gradual extension of coverage on the basis of set selection criteria (such as type of problem, size of population, geographic coverage) is likely to produce satisfactory replication of best practice that can influence and support the extension of EC policy and a productive dialogue at national level.</td>
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**Recommendation 3:** Continue enhancing donor coordination in general and coordination of Member States in particular.

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<tr>
<td>Short term implementation</td>
<td>1. Continue with implementation of the EU Road Map 2. Strengthen the functioning and productivity of Thematic Working Groups 3. Include new donors (e.g., Brazil) 4. Maintain the choice of promoting a Basket Fund approach to support NSA under EDF10</td>
<td>EC Headquarters, EC Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium-long term implementation</td>
<td>Enhance the level of coordination with all donors and take the lead in joint programming between them. While increasing efforts at donor level continue motivating GoA to take a more active role.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Donor coordination and coordination in general, is an area where improvements can show a high level of leverage in all sectors and types of intervention. GoA did not show a high level of interest in promoting donor coordination. Increased coordination can (i) promote coherence and actual implementation of policies that have been slow in taking off, (ii) increase the effectiveness of project outcomes, (iii) stimulate government’s capacity to fulfil its obligations and by this way increasing impact; and (iv) also introduce institutional features likely to increase sustainability.</td>
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**Link** Conclusions: 7-8
**Recommendation 4:** Focus project activities on realistic expected results and targets, as well as on interventions with high EC value added (e.g. Health, TVET and Employment Generation, Good Governance, Rural Development).

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| Short term implementation | 1. Insist on participatory situation analyses with early decision-making and taking of responsibility by the beneficiaries themselves.  
2. Improve analytical capacity for programme/project formulation  
3. Improve the quality of project design (logical framework, OVIs, monitoring systems)  
4. Support sectoral baseline studies and set project objectives on the basis of these baseline studies  
5. Insist on a more critical review of logical frameworks in projects funded by the EC prior to project approval. Also ensure that all specific activities proposed *de facto* cover crosscutting issues.  
6. Review support modalities to establish more effective, timely and user-friendly systems capable of delivering results within the specified project time period. Continue or replicate modalities already shown to be effective in Angola. | | |
| Medium-long term implementation | The choice already made to address institution building/strengthening issues at central and local levels is endorsed. | | |
| Comment | Several activities have had unrealistic targets. This situation can be improved by improving the quality of project design and the establishment of reliable sectoral baselines. | | |
| Link | Conclusion: 8 | | |

**Recommendation 5:** Pay adequate attention to Institution Building in the Public Sector and Organisation Building in the private sector.

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<tr>
<td>Short term implementation</td>
<td>Plan for support to institutional strengthening or institution-building within the forthcoming decentralisation process. Consider support to both sectoral and private sector organisations (cooperatives, producers’ associations, sector confederations) within the framework of the support to non-State actors in forthcoming projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium-long term implementation</td>
<td>Promote vertical integration and networking of cooperatives, farmers’ organisations, etc. by creation of consortia and second/third level cooperatives to strengthen links with the market and provide high-quality services in support of productive activities. Plan to hand over part of the project management functions to the local beneficiaries’ organisations around mid-project to increase ownership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>The choice made to address institution building/strengthening issues at central and local levels is endorsed by the evaluation team. Support to local value chains is the most effective way to consolidate local and national development. Organisation and institution building at community and local levels is a key to sustainability and maximisation of advantages for the beneficiaries. Strengthening existing forms of organisation at grassroots level (e.g. cooperatives) and strengthening building of local institutions are the key to ensuring good management of the systems set up in development interventions and their sustainability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Links</td>
<td>Conclusions: 1-5-7</td>
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**Recommendation 6:** Significantly improve mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues

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<tr>
<td><strong>Short term implementation</strong></td>
<td>Insist on identification and implementation of specific cross-cutting interventions. There is huge potential for wider support for environmental issues in Angola (including regulation and enforcement). Advocacy for greater engagement by government and increased prioritisation are prerequisites for greater focus. Ensure that all projects have an adequate M&amp;E system that includes baseline data collection, which adequately captures data relevant to cross-cutting issues that can be addressed by those projects. Ensure that adequate EIAs are undertaken, where appropriate, for sectoral support interventions which involve physical works or infrastructure provision, and that EMPs are produced and implemented as necessary. If considered appropriate, project budgets should include a contingency allowance for mitigation of negative environmental impacts that become apparent during the course of implementation.</td>
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<td><strong>Medium-long term implementation</strong></td>
<td>Identify expected results, measures and activities to tackle cross-cutting issues. Better mainstream and tackle environmental problems (through specific environmental projects and environmental activities in other projects). The EC should continue to expand its support for cross-cutting issues under EDF10 programmes including dialogue and advocacy with the government on environmental and gender concerns. A strategy for addressing crosscutting issues (overall and sector-specific), including identification and definition of such issues, should be prepared showing prioritisation of support for them both on a ‘stand-alone’ basis and as components of sectoral interventions. This strategy should include practical guidelines for coverage of crosscutting issues relevant to and impacted on by sectoral interventions, covering both project design and implementation.</td>
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<td><strong>Comment</strong></td>
<td>Despite an emphasis on the importance of crosscutting issues in EC international policies and strategies, CSPs and subsequent review documents do not clearly set out coverage of crosscutting issues on either a strategic or an issue-by-issue basis. This lack of clarity is carried forward into project documents, which treat crosscutting issues as ‘bolt-on extras’ or afterthoughts. Systematic mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues will increase effectiveness in targeting of vulnerable groups (a priority under EDF10).</td>
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<td><strong>Links</strong></td>
<td>Conclusion: 8</td>
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**Recommendation 7:** Identify a specific modality of intervention for Angola

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<td><strong>Short term implementation</strong></td>
<td>Prepare an issues paper identifying the position of Angola (in comparison with similar countries) and the strategic stance, which should be adopted in identifying development cooperation interventions.</td>
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<td><strong>Medium-long term implementation</strong></td>
<td>Consolidate a position for intervention in countries that are rich in resources but low in terms of human development ratings.</td>
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Comment

Angola has very specific conditions due to its high level of financial resources, which affect the focus of development cooperation. At the same time, the majority of the population lives in poverty and a considerable part in extreme poverty. Clear policy lines relating to these strategic characteristics could aid decision-making at local level.

5.2 Operational recommendations

Recommendation 8: Increase transfer of knowledge to national counterparts.

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<td>Plan for TA becoming more long-term (taking into consideration logistical difficulties and institutional issues for the establishment of TA in the Angolan context). In the implementation of TA, increase the capacity-building component and promote a capacity-building culture and staff attitudes by making a periodic assessment of the implementation process, and setting up specific sessions to analyse problems in the transfer of knowledge and skills to counterparts.</td>
<td>Plan for longer-term engagements by the EC.</td>
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Comment

The role of technical assistance should stress its capacity-building component in coherence with other strategic considerations. Counselling of national counterparts should also be considered.

Link

Conclusions: 1-5-6-7

Recommendation 9: Improve proactivity in communication with Government counterparts, implementation partners and other stakeholders.

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<td>Increase communication with the Government not only on project implementation but also on specific sectoral issues and on best practice and policy issues. The limited absorptive capacity of the health sector is an issue that should figure prominently in the design of the upcoming EC project.</td>
<td>Make efforts to strengthen formal day-by-day communications and policy dialogue at ministerial level to increase coordination between different actors in a sector and promote implementation of policies. Policy support should be more explicitly identified in project documents (logical framework, DTA) as a specific activity. Establish TA-related plans for regular policy discussion from the inception of programmes and projects on.</td>
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Comment

The EC should be more proactive in communicating with national sector stakeholders, with other donors and with the public in general. This will increase coordination (dialogue is the basis for coordination), will improve project implementation and visibility.

Link

Conclusions: 3-7
**Recommendation 10:** Consider greater flexibility in the use of EDF procedures.

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<td>Analyse delays in procurement and consequences on efficiency in implementation. Draw conclusions for action.</td>
<td>Adapt procurement procedures to local market realities so that procurement decisions take into consideration local efficiency standards.</td>
<td>In the specific situation of Angola, some flexibility in the application of EDF procedures (not blaming the system, but adapting it to the difficult specific local situation) is needed. Improving guidance of national counterparts is likely to enhance efficiency by helping them overcome bottlenecks and to improve access and effective absorption of resources.</td>
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**Link** Conclusion: 3-7

**Recommendation 11:** Strengthen monitoring systems.

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<td>Insist on baseline studies as a preliminary activity before starting implementation of EDF10 projects. Ensure that all project interventions incorporate adequate M&amp;E systems including provision for baseline data collection and continuous monitoring of indicators, in order that implementation may be more effectively managed, leading to improved impact ratings.</td>
<td>Make sure that monitoring procedures proposed in project design are actually followed during implementation from the very beginning on, covering outputs, outcomes but also impact. Continue ROM activities, focusing them on projects with suspected weaknesses and ensure evaluations</td>
<td>Baseline studies and functioning monitoring systems will substantially improve project management and allow gauging of impact. Baseline studies for the focal and non-focal sectors should be a requirement and the establishment of effective data collection and monitoring systems should be basic requirements for better planning and decision making.</td>
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**Origin** Conclusion: 7

5.3 Learning recommendations

**Recommendation 12:** Deepen knowledge of LRRD for mainstreaming lessons learned into other situations

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<td>In case a thematic evaluation of LRRD is to be launched, consider Angola as an outstanding case study.</td>
<td>The decentralisation process will increase the relevance and importance of information on institution building. Collecting and mainstreaming methodological and institutional lessons learned will help better steer institutional support for decentralisation.</td>
<td>Conclusions: 1-2-4</td>
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**Recommendation 13: Collect, systematise and disseminate Best Practices and lessons learned**

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**Short term implementation**

Collect, systematise and arrange for the proactive dissemination of best practice and lessons learned across the sectors. In the design of projects and programmes, include components for best practice collection and dissemination.

Launch a specific Best Practice analysis activity.

**Medium-long term implementation**

Mainstream collection and dissemination of best practice in all EC interventions.

Analyse best practice in each project as judged by the following criteria:

- a) project strategies
- b) quality of project components and measures;
- c) reproducibility (degree to which projects are replicable with a view to addressing similar or related problems);
- d) transferability (potential for using projects as models for addressing different problems).

Devise a dissemination strategy based on:

- a) an inventory of successful experiences drawn from various situations which can be modelled for replication;
- b) a working model which makes it amenable to replication in a different situation or context;
- c) implementation of the working model in a situation identified for the purpose, while also ensuring active participation and involvement of the stakeholders.

Make information available, giving consideration to:

- a) content that is tailored to the needs of other users;
- b) presentation of content in an easy-to-understand format with complexities minimised;
- c) inclusion of lessons learned in respect of what did not work well;
- d) evidence that the effects of the initiative are attributable to the adopter’s inputs;
- e) easy availability of implementation details;
- f) information sharing.

**Comment**

Examples of best practice systematically collated in several sectors are likely to offer guidance for the human development, food security, water and sanitation, and governance activities under EDF10.

**Links**

Conclusions: 2-7