Best Practices / Guidelines


2-December-2008

English, , 2,112kb

Minority Shareholdings and Interlocking Directorates

While there is no presumption of per se illegality of structural links between competitors, minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates can have negative effects on competition depending on the circumstances, either by reducing the individual incentives to compete or by facilitating collusion. In OECD countries, merger review rules are most frequently used to examine the competitive effects of minority shareholdings. However,

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14-January-2008

English, , 2,566kb

Private Remedies

Between 2004 and 2006, the Competition Committee held a series of four roundtables on private enforcement in competition cases. This document summarises those discussions and focuses on general principles and policies as well as a number of specific issues related to private actions for damages.

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14-January-2008

English, , 3,146kb

Energy Security and Competition Policy

This roundtable examined the links between competition policy and energy security, with a focus on natural gas. The discussion began by addressing the questions of the meaning and importance of energy security; and the determinants of energy security, particularly as they relate to competition policy. It continued in dealing with gas supply, transportation, and distribution, addressing five aspects that relate to different aspects

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11-January-2008

English, , 5,446kb

Vertical Mergers

This roundtable addressed the economics, practice, and policy of vertical merger enforcement. It explored the state of research on vertical mergers and the practical strategies, difficulties, and successes of vertical merger enforcement by competition agencies.

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7-December-2007

English, , 2,648kb

Competition and Regulation in Retail Banking

Competition can improve the functioning of the retail banking sector without harming prudential regulation. Customer mobility and choice are essential to stimulate banking competition; credit ratings and easy, low-cost transaction costs for switching are crucial for promoting customer mobility.

21-November-2007

English, , 3,242kb

Competitive Restrictions in Legal Professions

Regulation of the legal professions, including self-regulation, typically involves many restrictions on entry and professional conduct. Certain restrictions may be a remedy to market failures and may also be based on distributional or paternalistic motives. But other restrictions can be based on rent-seeking and achieve cartel-like effects. The major policy challenge is to identify and remove the restrictions which are unnecessary or

6-March-2006

English, , 2,525kb

Barriers to Entry - Competition Policy Roundtable - OECD

This roundtable addressed how to define entry barriers, whether a precise definition is really required, how various types of barriers affect the likelihood, timing, and extent of entry, and how competition agencies assess entry conditions.

2-November-2005

English, , 54kb

Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Investigations

These Best Practices aim to identify safeguards that member countries should consider applying when they authorise competition authorities to exchange confidential information in cartel investigations.

10-January-2005

English, , 654kb

Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals

Individual sanctions can be an important tool in the fight against cartels, as corporate fines are almost never sufficiently high to be an optimal deterrent. A country’s decision whether to provide for criminal sanctions depends on several factors, such as the cultural and legal environment and the competition authority’s resources. If a country provides for criminal sanctions, relatively short prison sentences appear to be the most

1-January-2004

English, , 1,811kb

Universal Service Obligations - Competition Policy Roundtables

Universal service obligations are common in many of the infrastructure sectors. The obligations are often cited as a justification for limiting entry of new providers because the new providers would cherry-pick the high profit customers who provide the basis for subsidisation of another group of customers. When obligations are beneficial, there are a number of policy traps that can be encountered. Obligations are often not

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