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Taking place in Paris on 18-19 February 2010, the 9th OECD Global Forum on Competition will focus on state aids and subsidies and collusion and corruption in public procurement. Participants will also discuss a peer review of Brazil's competition law and policy.
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The financial sector is vulnerable to systemic loss of trust. The current crisis resulted from failures in financial market regulation, not failure of competition. Competition and stability can co-exist in the financial sector: more competitive market structures promote stability by reducing the number of banks that are “too big to fail”. Competition helps make the financial sector efficient and ensure that rescue and stimulus
Webcast - Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Angel Gurría and Frédéric Jenny open the 2009 Global Forum on Competition and answer journalists' questions.
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While there is no presumption of per se illegality of structural links between competitors, minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates can have negative effects on competition depending on the circumstances, either by reducing the individual incentives to compete or by facilitating collusion.
In OECD countries, merger review rules are most frequently used to examine the competitive effects of minority shareholdings. However,
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Between 2004 and 2006, the Competition Committee held a series of four roundtables on private enforcement in competition cases. This document summarises those discussions and focuses on general principles and policies as well as a number of specific issues related to private actions for damages.
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This roundtable addressed the economics, practice, and policy of vertical merger enforcement. It explored the state of research on vertical mergers and the practical strategies, difficulties, and successes of vertical merger enforcement by competition agencies.
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Cartels are agreements among competitors fixing prices, allocating markets or rigging tenders (bids). They are the most harmful of all types of competition law violations and should be sanctioned severely. Cartel cases are unique. The most important part of a cartel case is simply proving that such an agreement existed. But getting direct evidence of a cartel agreement can be difficult. Cartel operators work in secret and often do not
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Before a firm can compete in a market, it has to be able to enter it. Many markets have at least some impediments that make it more difficult for a firm to enter a market. A debate over how to define the term “barriers to entry” began decades ago, however, and it has yet to be won. Some scholars have argued, for example, that an obstacle is not an entry barrier if incumbent firms faced it when they entered the market. Others contend
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This roundtable addressed how to define entry barriers, whether a precise definition is really required, how various types of barriers affect the likelihood, timing, and extent of entry, and how competition agencies assess entry conditions.