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Competition

Gun jumping and suspensory effects of merger notifications

 

 27 November 2018  Paris  

When merging parties fail to notify a merger to the competition authority, implement all or parts of the merger during mandatory waiting periods or co-ordinate their competitive behaviour before closing, this is commonly called “gun jumping”.  The topic has received a lot of attention recently, as a perception has arisen that competition authorities are devoting more enforcement resources to these violations, and that the amounts of monetary fines for such infringements are increasing.

In November 2018, the OECD held a roundtable to discuss recent developments in the enforcement practice, and contrast them with business needs in various stages before closing a merger.

All related materials for the discussion are available on this page.

» Read the OECD background note

» Executive Summary with key findings

» Detailed Summary of the discussion 

» View the full list of OECD best practice roundtables on competition policy

 

INVITED SPEAKERS

Charlesa CERES  
Associate General Counsel, Antitrust & Competition Law at United Technologies Corporation

Jay MODRALL Bio
Partner, Norton Rose Fulbright 

Richard WHISH Bio
Professor of Law, King's College London

 

KEY PAPERS

» OECD background note • Note de référence de l'OCDE 

» Executive Summary with key findings

» Detailed Summary of the discussion 

 

Summaries of contributions

Australia

Austria

Belgium

BIAC

Chile

Chinese Taipei

Costa Rica

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

EU

France EN • FR

Germany

Hungary

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Japan

Korea

Lithuania

Mexico

New Zealand

Portugal

Russian Federation

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Turkey

Ukraine

United Kingdom

United States

 

 

Read the OECD background note

Executive Summary with key findings

Video about the other topics under discussion in Nov 2018

OECD Competition Youtube channel

PRESENTATIONS

 

RELATED DOCUMENTS AND LINKS

Jurisdictional nexus in merger control regimes, 2016

Investigations of consummated and non-notifiable mergers, 2014

Definition of transaction for the purpose of merger control review, 2013

RELATED TOPICS

Cartels and anti-competitive agreements

Mergers

OECD best practice roundtables on competition

More OECD work on competition 

 

Related Documents