Competition
Gun jumping and suspensory effects of merger notifications
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When merging parties fail to notify a merger to the competition authority, implement all or parts of the merger during mandatory waiting periods or co-ordinate their competitive behaviour before closing, this is commonly called “gun jumping”. The topic has received a lot of attention recently, as a perception has arisen that competition authorities are devoting more enforcement resources to these violations, and that the amounts of monetary fines for such infringements are increasing. In November 2018, the OECD held a roundtable to discuss recent developments in the enforcement practice, and contrast them with business needs in various stages before closing a merger. All related materials for the discussion are available on this page. » Read the OECD background note » Executive Summary with key findings » Detailed Summary of the discussion » View the full list of OECD best practice roundtables on competition policy
INVITED SPEAKERS Charlesa CERES Jay MODRALL Bio Richard WHISH Bio
KEY PAPERS » OECD background note • Note de référence de l'OCDE » Executive Summary with key findings • Synthèse des points clés de la discussion » Detailed Summary of the discussion • Compte rendu detaillé de la discussion
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Executive Summary with key findings |
27 November 2018 
Paris 
PRESENTATIONS
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RELATED DOCUMENTS AND LINKS Jurisdictional nexus in merger control regimes, 2016 Investigations of consummated and non-notifiable mergers, 2014 Definition of transaction for the purpose of merger control review, 2013 |
RELATED TOPICS Cartels and anti-competitive agreements |
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