



## Agenda

Chair: Frédéric Jenny, Chairman of the OECD Competition Committee

### Monday 7 December

<p><b>Opening session</b></p> <p>13:00 – 13:40 CET</p>	<p><b>Opening Remarks</b> Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General</p> <p><b>Introductory Comments</b> Frédéric Jenny, Chair, OECD Competition Committee</p> <p><b>Keynote Address</b> Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice President for A Europe Fit for Digital Age and Commissioner for Competition, European Commission</p>
<p><b>Panel discussion</b></p> <p>13:40 - 16:00 CET</p>	<p><b>Competition policy: Time for a reset?</b></p> <p>There is a lively debate about whether fundamental changes are needed to existing competition policy frameworks. Proposals include legislative changes to capture a wider range of potentially anticompetitive mergers and conduct, to accelerate competition enforcement actions, or to enable different evidentiary standards and remedies. Others are proposing that the fundamental objectives and focus of competition policy be broadened, to include the consideration of industrial policy, competitive neutrality in trade, inequality, resilience and sustainability. These proposals are taking on new urgency as governments seek to promote growth in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Critics of these proposals for fundamental change fear they will undermine the traditional focus of competition policy on consumers, and thus its effectiveness, suggesting that other regulators or policymakers may be better positioned to address these challenges. This session will seek to move this debate forward, and explore whether fundamental changes are needed to existing competition policy frameworks. The session will be led by a panel of experts from different policy areas to debate the question and discuss with delegates in an interactive Q&amp;A format.</p>
<p><b>Speakers</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Jagdish Bhagwati</b>, Professor of Economics, Law, and International Relations at Columbia University and Director of the Raj Center on Indian Economic Policies</li> <li>• <b>William Kovacic</b>, Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy; Professor of Law; Director, Competition Law Center, George Washington University</li> <li>• <b>Diana Moss</b>, President, American Antitrust Institute</li> <li>• <b>Damien Neven</b>, Senior Consultant, Compass Lexecon and Professor, Graduate Institute of Geneva</li> <li>• <b>Hiroshi Ohashi</b>, Dean, the Graduate School of Public Policy, Professor of Economics, University of Tokyo</li> <li>• <b>Thando Vilakazi</b>, Executive Director of the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development (CCRED), University of Johannesburg</li> <li>• <b>Christine Wilson</b>, Commissioner, US Federal Trade Commission</li> </ul>
<p><b>Further details</b></p>	<p>Further details will be made available at <a href="https://oe.cd/cptr">oe.cd/cptr</a>.</p>



Tuesday 8 December

<p><b>Session II</b></p> <p>13:00 – 15:00 CET</p>	<p><b>Abuse of dominance in digital markets</b></p> <p>Many digital markets exhibit certain characteristics, such as low variable costs, high fixed costs and strong network effects, that result in high market shares for a small number of firms. In some cases, these lead to “competition for the market” dynamics, in which a single firm captures the vast majority of sales. Firms in these concentrated markets may possess market power, the ability to unilaterally and profitably raise prices or reduce quality beyond the level that would prevail under competition. There is an ongoing debate about whether competition policy is adequately making use of this tool in digital markets today.</p> <p>However, authorities face numerous challenges when bringing abuse of dominance cases in digital markets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First, determining whether a firm is dominant is a substantial challenge.</li> <li>• Second, authorities must decide whether to use new theories of harm, such as self preferencing, rather than existing theories such as tying and bundling, or refusal to deal.</li> <li>• Third, abuse of dominance cases can be lengthy and resource-intensive.</li> </ul> <p>This session will discuss the main types of abuse of dominance concerns that can emerge in digital markets, what makes these markets unique, and how have competition authorities around the world tackled the challenges described above.</p>
<p><b>Speakers</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cristina Caffarra</b>, Vice President, Head of European Competition Practice, Charles River Associates</li> <li>• <b>Amelia Fletcher OBE</b>, Professor of Competition Policy, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) and Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia and Non-Executive Director of the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)</li> <li>• <b>Pablo Ibáñez Colomo</b>, Professor of Law, London School of Economics</li> <li>• <b>Lina Khan</b>, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School</li> </ul>
<p><b>Contributions</b></p>	<p>Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Germany, India, Kenya, Korea, Mexico (IFT), Romania, Serbia, Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, BEUC, BIAC</p>
<p><b>Documentation</b></p>	<p>Call for contributions: <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Note by the Secretariat – <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Summary of the contributions – <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Documentation is also available at <a href="http://oe.cd/dmkt">oe.cd/dmkt</a>.</p>



Wednesday 9 December

<p><b>Session III</b></p> <p>Expert Panel: 13:00 – 14:00 CET</p>	<p><b>Economic analysis in merger investigations</b></p> <p>Economic analysis is a fundamental part of merger control. It underpins the theories of harm that guide merger reviews, and it provides the tools to interpret evidence when assessing these theories. Economic expertise can be of value at each stage of a merger investigation, from evidence gathering to the assessment of remedies.</p> <p>The quantitative economic techniques used by competition authorities to analyse mergers range from diversion ratios, to pricing pressure indices, to merger simulations, among others. Several practical considerations and questions arise when using economic analysis in merger control, including: how to integrate economists into case handler teams, whether to use external expertise, and how to ensure economic analysis is easily comprehensible by decision-makers and courts.</p>
<p><b>Speakers</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Herbert Fung</b>, Senior Director (Business and Economics), Competition and Consumer Commission (CCCS), Singapore</li> <li>• <b>Guilherme Mendes Resende</b>, Chief Economist, CADE, Brazil</li> <li>• <b>Pierre Régibeau</b>, Chief Competition Economist, European Commission</li> <li>• <b>Oren Rigbi</b>, Chief Economist, Israel Competition Authority (ICA)</li> <li>• <b>Jill Walker</b>, Member of the Australian Competition Tribunal and former Commissioner at the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Breakout sessions</b></p> <p>Breakouts group A: 09:00 – 11:00 CET</p> <p>Breakouts group B: 16:00 – 18:00 CET</p>	<p>In addition to the expert panel discussion, This session will be divided into breakout sessions, organised in two time periods to enable as many delegates to participate as possible. For each time period, there will be three breakout groups focusing on either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Surveys and other data gathering techniques</li> <li>• Quantitative analysis</li> <li>• The role of economists in merger teams and qualitative evidence review</li> </ul>
<p><b>Contributions</b></p>	<p>Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico (COFECE &amp; IFT), Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, BIAC</p>
<p><b>Documentation</b></p>	<p>Call for contributions: <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Background note by the Secretariat – <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Summary of the contributions – <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Documentation is also available at <a href="http://oe.cd/eami">oe.cd/eami</a></p>



Thursday 10 December

<p><b>Session IV</b> 13:00 – 15:00 CET</p>	<p><b>Using market studies to tackle emerging competition issues</b></p> <p>The debate on how best to use and adjust the current competition policy framework and tools to deliver benefits to society in a changing world continues to evolve as competition authorities gain experience in both antitrust and merger cases in various industries. This experience has shown that challenges to effective competition do not come solely from anti-competitive behaviour and merger strategies.</p> <p>For example, when markets are characterised by high or discriminatory prices or poor quality, the cause may not be anticompetitive conduct by incumbents, or agreements between firms, but instead market features such as concentration, high barriers to entry, behavioural bias leading to consumer lock-in, network effects, anticompetitive regulation, or distortions of competitive neutrality.</p> <p>This session will discuss the key questions facing competition authorities when considering market studies and emerging competition issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What type of emerging competition issues are competition authorities currently facing?</li> <li>• What role can the market study tool play to address them?</li> <li>• What are the strategic considerations competition authorities take into account when deciding whether to use the market study tool?</li> </ul>
<p><b>Speakers</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Andrea Coscelli</b>, Chief Executive, Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), United Kingdom</li> <li>• <b>Luis A. Gomez</b>, Partner, London office's EU, Competition &amp; Trade Department and Chair, EMEA Competition Group, Baker McKenzie LLP</li> <li>• <b>Alejandra Palacios Prieto</b>, Chairwoman, Board of Commissioners, COFECE, Mexico</li> <li>• <b>Hardin Ratshisusu</b>, Deputy Commissioner, Competition Commission (CCSA), South Africa</li> <li>• <b>Sangeeta Verma</b>, Member, Competition Commission (CCI), India</li> </ul>
<p><b>Contributions</b></p>	<p>Albania, Austria, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Mexico (COFECE &amp; IFT), Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, CARICOM, BIAC</p>
<p><b>Documentation</b></p>	<p>Call for contributions: <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Background note by the Secretariat – <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Summary of the contributions – <a href="#">English</a></p> <p>Documentation is also available at <a href="http://oe.cd/mstei">oe.cd/mstei</a>.</p>