Single firm conduct is a key concern of many competition laws. Abuse of dominance and similar legal concepts vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in a variety of dimensions. This variation may reflect variations in competition policy objectives or they may reflect differences in how firms attain their market positions.  Competition experts are likely to agree that competition laws should constrain firms with substantial market power from exercising that power in a manner that controls prices, limits production and keeps out competitors.

When one looks beyond the core concepts, however, there is considerable disagreement among experts on a number of complex policy and enforcement questions: how to define dominance? What range of conduct may be seen as abusive? Under what circumstances can abuse of dominance raise problems of an international or trans-border nature? How might trade policy and competition policy perspectives differ with respect to these circumstances? 

The OECD Competition Committee has done significant work in this area. Much of the Committee's work is available in roundtable reports that summarize the roundtables and include written contributions from members and non-members alike, as well as analytical background notes by the OECD Competition Division. Issues addressed in recent roundtables include Resale Below Cost, Competition on the Merits, Barriers to Entry, Predatory Foreclosure, Loyalty and Fidelity Discounts and Rebates, Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation, Essential Facilities Doctrine and Oligopoly.

For further information on the OECD work on competition law enforcement, please contact Antonio Capobianco.